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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil War
+by Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Great Britain and the American Civil War
+
+Author: Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+Release Date: October 18, 2004 [EBook #13789]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Charlie Kirschner and the PG Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: LORD JOHN RUSSELL
+(_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy_")]
+
+_EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS_
+
+GREAT BRITAIN
+AND
+THE AMERICAN
+CIVIL WAR
+
+TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the British Museum
+many newspapers and journals for the years 1860-1865, and then planned a
+survey of English public opinion on the American Civil War. In the
+succeeding years as a teacher at Stanford University, California, the
+published diplomatic correspondence of Great Britain and of the United
+States were studied in connection with instruction given in the field of
+British-American relations. Several of my students prepared excellent
+theses on special topics and these have been acknowledged where used in
+this work. Many distractions and other writing prevented the completion
+of my original plan; and fortunately, for when in 1913 I had at last
+begun this work and had prepared three chapters, a letter was received
+from the late Charles Francis Adams inviting me to collaborate with him
+in preparing a "Life" of his father, the Charles Francis Adams who was
+American Minister to Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams had
+recently returned from England where he had given at Oxford University a
+series of lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as to
+obtain copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. Worthington
+C. Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office files
+in the Public Record Office and from the private papers in the
+possession of various families.
+
+The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at Washington
+and at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life." Two volumes were
+completed, the first by Mr. Adams carrying the story to 1848, the
+second by myself for the period 1848 to 1860. For the third volume I
+analysed and organized the new materials obtained in England and we were
+about to begin actual collaboration on the most vital period of the
+"Life" when Mr. Adams died, and the work was indefinitely suspended,
+probably wisely, since any completion of the "Life" by me would have
+lacked that individual charm in historical writing so markedly
+characteristic of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr.
+Adams was an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory.
+
+The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I returned
+to the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the American Civil
+War" in the hope that the English materials obtained by Mr. Adams might
+be made available to me. When copies were secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 a
+restriction had been imposed by the Foreign Office to the effect that
+while studied for information, citations and quotations were not
+permissible since the general diplomatic archives were not yet open to
+students beyond the year 1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, the
+whole matter was again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exact
+statement that the new request was in no way related to the proposed
+"Life" of Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of the
+materials. Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved the
+request but with the usual condition that my manuscript be submitted
+before publication to the Foreign Office. This has now been done, and no
+single citation censored. Before this work will have appeared the
+limitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic correspondence will have been
+removed, and the date for open research have been advanced beyond 1865,
+the end of the Civil War.
+
+Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made through
+my friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the owners of various private papers,
+and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came to England for further study
+of some of these private papers. The Russell Papers, transmitted to the
+Public Record Office in 1914 and there preserved, were used through the
+courtesy of the Executors of the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with the
+hearty goodwill of Lady Agatha Russell, daughter of the late Earl
+Russell, the only living representative of her father, Mr. Rollo
+Russell, his son, having died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved in
+the Muniment Room at Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesy
+of the Duchess of Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor.
+The Gladstone Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used through
+the courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from the
+Palmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved by
+Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M.P.
+
+The opportunity to study these private papers has been invaluable for my
+work. Shortly after returning from England in 1913 Mr. Worthington Ford
+well said: "The inside history of diplomatic relations between the
+United States and Great Britain may be surmised from the official
+archives; the tinting and shading needed to complete the picture must be
+sought elsewhere." (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 478.) Mr.
+C.F. Adams declared (_ibid._, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers
+"... the character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865) cannot
+be understood.... It would appear that the commonly entertained
+impressions as to certain phases of international relations, and the
+proceedings and utterances of English public men during the progress of
+the War of Secession, must be to some extent revised."
+
+In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate in the
+generosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor Frank A.
+Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St. Petersburg in
+1914, of all Russian diplomatic correspondence on the Civil War. Many
+friends have aided, by suggestion or by permitting the use of notes and
+manuscripts, in the preparation of this work. I have sought to make due
+acknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to those
+already named, I should here particularly note the courtesy of the late
+Mr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State Department at
+Washington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, for the
+transcript of the Correspondence of Mason and Slidell, Confederate
+Commissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles Moore, Chief of Manuscripts
+Division, Library of Congress, for the use of the Schurz Papers
+containing copies of the despatches of Schleiden, Minister of the
+Republic of Bremen at Washington during the Civil War. Especially thanks
+are due to my friend, Mr. Herbert Hoover, for his early interest in this
+work and for his generous aid in the making of transcripts which would
+otherwise have been beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to the
+skill and care of my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press,
+and whose criticisms were invaluable.
+
+It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my hope
+that with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence," now for the
+first time available to the historian, a fairly true estimate may be
+made of what the American Civil War meant to Great Britain; how she
+regarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief, my work is primarily a
+study in British history in the belief that the American drama had a
+world significance, and peculiarly a British one.
+
+EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS.
+
+_November 25, 1924_
+
+
+
+CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE
+
+CHAPTER                                                       PAGE
+
+   I. BACKGROUNDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1
+  II. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61   .  .  .  35
+ III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861  .  .  .  .  .  .  76
+  IV. BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 113
+   V. THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION .  .  .  .  .  .  . 137
+  VI. BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND MERCIER   .  .  .  . 172
+ VII. THE "TRENT"  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 203
+VIII. THE BLOCKADE .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 244
+  IX. ENTER MR. LINDSAY  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 274
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+PART ONE
+
+LORD JOHN RUSSELL   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . _Frontispiece_
+_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of
+Italy_"
+
+LORD LYONS (1860)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   _facing p_. 42
+_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons" (Edward
+Arnold & Co_.)
+
+SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.  .  .  .  .  .       "     90
+_From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory,
+K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography"_ (_John Murray_)
+
+WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    114
+_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons"_ (_Edward
+Arnold & Co._)
+
+C.F. ADAMS   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    138
+_From a photograph in the United States Embassy,
+London_
+
+JAMES M. MASON  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    206
+_From a photograph by L.C. Handy, Washington_
+
+"KING COTTON BOUND"   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    262
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch"_
+
+GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+BACKGROUNDS
+
+In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in London, the
+American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of depression and
+bitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That Great Britain did,
+in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a
+monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and
+at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only
+foreign nation steadily contributing in every indirect way possible to
+verify its judgment, will probably be the verdict made against her by
+posterity, on calm comparison of the evidence[1]." Very different were
+the views of Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "The
+perfect neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to
+me almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has
+been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. It is
+the single case in which the English Government and public--generally so
+meddlesome--have displayed most prudent and commendable forbearance in
+spite of great temptations to the contrary[2]." And Sir William
+Harcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord Russell's many
+titles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner in which he has
+steered the vessel of State through the Scylla and Charybdis of the
+American War will, I think, always stand conspicuous[3]."
+
+Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason somewhat
+to modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of Great Britain was
+long prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was also among the historians
+and writers of Continental Europe--notably those of France and Russia.
+To what extent was this dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite of
+her long years of championship of personal freedom and of leadership in
+the cause of anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in the
+disruption of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms,
+react only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national
+power? In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted by
+historians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in both
+foreign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of her
+statesmen, or the inspirations of her people?
+
+It was to answer this question that the present work was originally
+undertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became progressively more
+clear that the great crisis in America was almost equally a crisis in
+the domestic history of Great Britain itself and that unless this were
+fully appreciated no just estimate was possible of British policy toward
+America. Still more it became evident that the American Civil War, as
+seen through British spectacles, could not be understood if regarded as
+an isolated and unique situation, but that the conditions preceding that
+situation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the two
+nations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when the
+crisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions is
+here possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this first
+chapter is devoted.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it is
+unnecessary to dilate, though it should always be remembered that both
+during the war and afterwards there existed a minority in Great Britain
+strongly sympathetic with the political ideals proclaimed in
+America--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something to be striven for
+in Britain itself and the conflict with America as, in a measure, a
+conflict in home politics. But independence once acknowledged by the
+Treaty of Peace of 1783, the relations between the Mother Country and
+the newly-created United States of America rapidly tended to adjust
+themselves to lines of contact customary between Great Britain and any
+other Sovereign State. Such contacts, fixing national attitude and
+policy, ordinarily occur on three main lines: governmental, determined
+by officials in authority in either State whose duty it is to secure the
+greatest advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial,
+resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the business
+opportunities of either nation in the other's territory, or from their
+rivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of comparative
+development especially in those ideals of political structure which
+determine the nature of the State and the form of its government. The
+more obvious of these contacts is the governmental, since the attitude
+of a people is judged by the formal action of its Government, and,
+indeed, in all three lines of contact the government of a State is
+directly concerned and frequently active. But it may be of service to a
+clearer appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if the
+intermingling of elements required by a strict chronological account of
+relations is here replaced by a separate review of each of the three
+main lines of contact.
+
+Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, the
+interest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs American.
+True, there still remained the valued establishments in the West Indies,
+and the less considered British possessions on the continent to the
+north of the United States. Meanwhile, there were occasional frictions
+with America arising from uncertain claims drawn from the former
+colonial privileges of the new state, or from boundary contentions not
+settled in the treaty of peace. Thus the use of the Newfoundland
+fisheries furnished ground for an acrimonious controversy lasting even
+into the twentieth century, and occasionally rising to the danger point.
+Boundary disputes dragged along through official argument, survey
+commissions, arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of the
+northern limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty of
+Washington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any time in
+the forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an agreement
+creditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both countries, was
+reached establishing small and equal naval armaments on the Great Lakes.
+The British fear of an American attack on Canada proved groundless as
+time went on and was definitely set at rest by the strict curb placed by
+the American Government upon the restless activities of such of its
+citizens as sympathized with the followers of McKenzie and Papineau in
+the Canadian rebellion of 1837[4].
+
+None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British policy
+toward America. But the "War of 1812," as it is termed in the United
+States, "Mr. Madison's War," as it was derisively named by Tory
+contemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious policies in which
+the respective governments were in definite opposition. Briefly, this
+was a clash between belligerent and neutral interests. Britain, fighting
+at first for the preservation of Europe against the spread of French
+revolutionary influence, later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire,
+held the seas in her grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomed
+rights of a naval belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view,
+and as always in the case of the dominant naval belligerent, she
+stretched principles of international law to their utmost interpretation
+to secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral of
+importance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested point by
+point the issue of exceeded belligerent right as established in
+international law. America did more; she advanced new rules and theories
+of belligerent and neutral right respectively, and demanded that the
+belligerents accede to them. Dispute arose over blockades, contraband,
+the British "rule of 1756" which would have forbidden American trade
+with French colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited by
+France herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching the
+personal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the British
+exercise of a right of search and seizure to recover British sailors.
+
+Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely opposed
+theories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a man once born a
+British subject could never cease to be a subject--could never "alienate
+his duty." It was her practice to fill up her navy, in part at least, by
+the "impressment" of her sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, and
+wherever found--in her own coast towns, or from the decks of her own
+mercantile marine. But many British sailors sought security from such
+impressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to desert to
+American merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in the
+rapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became by
+naturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty of
+America to defend them as such in their lives and business. America
+ultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was accomplished
+from Great Britain when American citizenship was conferred. On shore
+they were safe, for Britain did not attempt to reclaim her subjects
+from the soil of another nation. But she denied that the American flag
+on merchant vessels at sea gave like security and she asserted a naval
+right to search such vessels in time of peace, professing her complete
+acquiescence in a like right to the American navy over British merchant
+vessels--a concession refused by America, and of no practical value
+since no American citizen sought service in the British merchant marine.
+
+This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic points of
+opposition between the two governments. First America contested the
+British theory of "once a citizen always a citizen[5]"; second, America
+denied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel in _time of peace_
+to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying the American flag. The
+_right of search in time of war_, that is, a belligerent right of
+search, America never denied, but there was both then and later much
+public confusion in both countries as to the question at issue since,
+once at war, Great Britain frequently exercised a legal belligerent
+right of search and followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged to
+be British subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially careful
+to make sure that no American-born sailors were included in their
+impressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after victim,
+the American irritation steadily increased. True, France was also an
+offender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was lost sight of in
+view of the, literally, thousands of _bona fide_ Americans seized by
+Great Britain. Here, then, was a third cause of irritation connected
+with impressment, though not a point of governmental dispute as to
+right, for Great Britain professed her earnest desire to restore
+promptly any American-born sailors whom her naval officers had seized
+through error. In fact many such sailors were soon liberated, but a
+large number either continued to serve on British ships or to languish
+in British prisons until the end of the Napoleonic Wars[6].
+
+There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812, most of
+them arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief maritime
+neutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific presidential
+administration of Jefferson sought by trade restrictions, using embargo
+and non-intercourse acts, to bring pressure on both England and France,
+hoping to force a better treatment of neutrals. The United States,
+divided in sympathy between the belligerents, came near to disorder and
+disruption at home, over the question of foreign policy. But through all
+American factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to Great
+Britain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by America in
+1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one section, New
+England, that war later came to be regarded as of great national value
+as one of the factors which welded the discordant states into a national
+unity. Naturally also, the war once ended, its commercial causes were
+quickly forgotten, whereas the individual, personal offence involved in
+impressment and right of search, with its insult to national pride,
+became a patriotic theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, in
+fact, a British "right of search" became a national point of honour,
+upon which no American statesman would have dared to yield to British
+overtures.
+
+In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war of
+Independence" and also as of international importance in contesting an
+unjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to be
+remembered that no other war of importance was fought by America until
+the Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus centred on the
+two wars fought against Great Britain. The contemporary British view
+was that of a nation involved in a life and death struggle with a great
+European enemy, irritated by what seemed captious claims, developed to
+war, by a minor power[7]. To be sure there were a few obstinate Tories
+in Britain who saw in the war the opportunity of smashing at one blow
+Napoleon's dream of empire, and the American "democratic system." The
+London _Times_ urged the government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and
+then deal with Mr. Madison and democracy," arguing that it should be
+England's object to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian
+school." But this was not the purpose of the British Government, nor
+would such a purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whig
+minority in Parliament.
+
+The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of the war,
+quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict. Impressment was
+not mentioned, but it was never again resorted to by Great Britain upon
+American ships. But the principle of right of search in time of peace,
+though for another object than impressment, was soon again asserted by
+Great Britain and for forty years was a cause of constant irritation and
+a source of danger in the relations of the two countries. Stirred by
+philanthropic emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for the
+suppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principle
+repudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various maritime
+powers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels of each upon
+the others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade was in fact
+outlawed for the flags of all nations. But America, smarting under the
+memory of impressment injuries, and maintaining in any case the doctrine
+that in time of peace the national flag protected a vessel from
+interference or search by the naval vessels of any other power, refused
+to sign mutual right of search treaties and denied, absolutely, such a
+right for any cause whatever to Great Britain or to any other nation.
+Being refused a treaty, Britain merely renewed her assertion of the
+right and continued to exercise it.
+
+Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not ended with
+the war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national relations, for
+Britain alone used her navy with energy to suppress the slave trade, and
+the slave traders of all nations sought refuge, when approached by a
+British naval vessel, under the protection of the American flag. If
+Britain respected the flag, and sheered off from search, how could she
+stop the trade? If she ignored the flag and on boarding found an
+innocent American vessel engaged in legal trade, there resulted claims
+for damages by detention of voyage, and demands by the American
+Government for apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seized
+under the American flag, never protested to the United States, nor
+claimed American citizenship, for his punishment in American law for
+engaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any other
+nation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his vessel.
+
+Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British contention was
+that here was a great international humanitarian object frustrated by an
+absurd American sensitiveness on a point of honour about the flag. After
+fifteen years of dispute Great Britain offered to abandon any claim to a
+right of _search_, contenting herself with a right of _visit_, merely to
+verify a vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted this
+to be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whose
+legality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine boundary
+controversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape. Joint
+cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of Africa, the British
+to search all suspected vessels except those flying the American flag,
+and these to be searched by the American squadron. At once President
+Tyler notified Congress that Great Britain had renounced the right of
+search. Immediately in Parliament a clamour was raised against the
+Government for the "sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and Lord
+Aberdeen promptly made official disclaimer of such surrender.
+
+Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of peace was a
+steady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty of Great Britain,
+appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, but suspicious of an
+ulterior "will to rule the seas." After 1830 no American political
+leader would have dared to yield the right of search. Great Britain for
+her part, viewing the expansion of domestic slavery in the United
+States, came gradually to attribute the American contention, not to
+patriotic pride, but to the selfish business interests of the
+slave-holding states. In the end, in 1858, with a waning British
+enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade suppression, and with
+recognition that America had become a great world power, Britain yielded
+her claim to right of search or visit, save when established by Treaty.
+Four years later, in 1862, it may well have seemed to British statesmen
+that American slavery had indeed been the basic cause of America's
+attitude, for in that year a treaty was signed by the two nations giving
+mutual right of search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade.
+In fact, however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State
+for the North, to influence British and European opinion against the
+seceding slave states of the South.
+
+The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when American power
+reached a point where the British Government must take it seriously into
+account as a factor in general world policy. That power had been
+steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From almost the first moment
+of established independence American statesmen visualized the
+separation of the interests of the western continent from those of
+Europe, and planned for American leadership in this new world.
+Washington, the first President, emphasized in his farewell address the
+danger of entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations of
+Europe, immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this
+new world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward,
+but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France,
+commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened in
+Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about to
+intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted colonies,
+there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly about to draw
+America and England into closer co-operation. Canning, for Britain,
+proposed to America a joint declaration against French intervention in
+the Americas. His argument was against the principle of intervention;
+his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial expansion; but his
+ultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influence
+and position in the new world.
+
+Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The
+ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, but
+the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, favouring
+rather a separate declaration by the United States, and of this opinion
+was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe Doctrine announcing
+American opposition to the principle of "intervention," and declaring
+that the American continents were no longer to be regarded as open to
+further colonization by European nations. The British emergency
+situation with France, though already quieted, caused Monroe's Message
+to be greeted in England with high approval. But Canning did not so
+approve it for he saw clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge
+not merely to continental Europe, but to England as well and he set
+himself to thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policy
+been followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted a
+serious clash with the United States[8].
+
+In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying policy of
+non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the United States
+the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own expansion in territory
+and in influence. But for a time there was no need of additional
+territory for that already hers stretched from the Atlantic to the Rocky
+Mountains, two-thirds of the way from ocean to ocean. Her population was
+growing fast. But four millions at the time of the Revolution, there
+were thirteen millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were already
+across the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards new
+lands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first definite
+notice given to Europe of America's preconceived "destiny," but the
+earlier realization of that destiny took place on lines of expansion
+within her own boundaries. To this there could be no governmental
+objection, whether by Great Britain or any other nation.
+
+But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the view of
+British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering upon a policy
+of further territorial expansion, forsaking her peaceful progress and
+turning toward war, there was a quick determination on a line of British
+policy as regards the American advance. The first intimation of the new
+American policy came in relation to the State of Texas which had
+revolted from Mexico in 1836, and whose independence had been generally
+recognized by 1842. To this new state Britain sent diplomatic and
+consular agents and these reported two factions among the people--one
+seeking admission to the American Union, one desiring the maintenance
+of independence.
+
+In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with instructions to
+secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in dispute. Here was a
+genuine British effort to escape from national irritations. But before
+the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the earlier stages
+of negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm, quite new
+questions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious relation
+with the United States the desire for which had led to the Ashburton
+mission. This new development was the appearance of an American fever
+for territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced
+as a "manifest destiny" which should carry American power and
+institutions to the Pacific and even into Central America. Among these
+institutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of Great
+Britain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration since the
+great cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of
+raw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself a
+cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon slave-grown
+cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once acquired, what was there
+to prevent further American exploitation, followed by slave expansion,
+into Mexico, where for long British influence had been dominant?
+
+On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole British
+policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, urged a
+British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering Texas, and
+strong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining her
+independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer Anglo-Saxon
+state, prohibiting American advance to the south-west, releasing Britain
+from dependence on American cotton, and ultimately, he hoped, leading
+Texas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be ineradicable. This
+policy was approved by the British Government, Pakenham was sent to
+Washington to watch events, a _chargé_, Elliot, was despatched to Texas,
+and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to
+force the acquiescence of Mexico.
+
+In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it is
+unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, for such
+it became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both sides. The basic
+fact was that America was bent upon territorial expansion, and that
+Great Britain set herself to thwart this ambition. But not to the point
+of war. Aberdeen was so incautious at one moment as to propose to France
+and Mexico a triple guarantee of the independence of Texas, if that
+state would acquiesce, but when Pakenham notified him that in this case,
+Britain must clearly understand that war with America was not merely
+possible, but probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan of
+guarantee, fortunately not yet approved by Mexico[9].
+
+The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. Did she
+wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer independence?
+Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas would choose
+independence and British favour. But the people of the new state were
+largely emigrants from the United States, and a majority of them wished
+to re-enter the Union, a step finally accomplished in 1846, after ten
+years of separate existence as a Republic. The part played by the
+British Government in this whole episode was not a fortunate one. It is
+the duty of Governments to watch over the interests of their subjects,
+and to guard the prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a
+perfect _right_ to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to
+Texas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a
+policy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. The
+Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a policy
+of preventing the development of the power of the United States. Then,
+fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic British public
+feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, of never again being
+drawn into war with America, not because of fear, but because of
+important trade relations and also because of essential liking and
+admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, was not appreciated in
+America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in governmental circles,
+pleaded that the support of Texan independence was in reality perfectly
+in harmony with the best interests of the United States, since it would
+have tended toward the limitation of American slavery. And in the matter
+of national power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that the
+American Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two,
+perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South, free
+nations in North and West.
+
+The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all
+opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted
+northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness. Mexico,
+relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy between the
+United States and Great Britain over the Oregon territory, expected
+British aid in her war of 1846 against America. But she was sharply
+warned that such aid would not be given, and the Oregon dispute was
+settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of vigorous legal argument, followed
+by a fair compromise. The Mexican war resulted in the acquisition of
+California by the United States. British agents in this province of
+Mexico, and British admirals on the Pacific were cautioned to take no
+active steps in opposition.
+
+Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier to
+American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the extension
+of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was not realized.
+The United States was soon plunged, as British statesmen had prophesied,
+into internal conflict over the question whether the newly-acquired
+territories should be slave or free.
+
+The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick transit
+between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned across Central
+America. Here Britain and America acted together, at first in amity,
+though the convention signed in 1850 later developed discord as to the
+British claim of a protectorate over the Atlantic end of the proposed
+canal at San Juan del Nicaragua. But Britain was again at war in Europe
+in the middle 'fifties, and America was deep in quarrel over slavery at
+home. On both sides in spite of much diplomatic intrigue and of
+manifestations of national pride there was governmental desire to avoid
+difficulties. At the end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to
+Nicaragua her protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of
+friction, so reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, were
+happily removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition to
+the growth of American power.
+
+In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were seemingly all
+at an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The differing theories
+of the two Governments on British expatriation still remained, but
+Britain attempted no practical application of her view. The right of
+search in time of peace controversy, first eased by the plan of joint
+cruising, had been definitely settled by the British renunciation of
+1858. Opposition to American territorial advance but briefly manifested
+by Britain, had ended with the annexation of Texas, and the fever of
+expansion had waned in America. Minor disputes in Central America,
+related to the proposed canal, were amicably adjusted.
+
+But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples,
+frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions in
+governmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to react
+to such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the commercial
+relations of the two nations--later to examine their political ideals.
+
+In 1783 America won her independence in government from a colonial
+status. But commercially she remained a British colony--yet with a
+difference. She had formed a part of the British colonial system. All
+her normal trade was with the mother country or with other British
+colonies. Now her privileges in such trade were at an end, and she must
+seek as a favour that which had formerly been hers as a member of the
+British Empire. The direct trade between England and America was easily
+and quickly resumed, for the commercial classes of both nations desired
+it and profited by it. But the British colonial system prohibited trade
+between a foreign state and British colonies and there was one channel
+of trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable to
+both sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by American
+independence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and farm products
+desired by the West Indian planters, and these in turn offered needed
+sugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired to restore the trade, and
+in spite of the legal restrictions of the colonial system, the trade was
+in fact resumed in part and either permitted or winked at by the British
+Government, but never to the advantageous exchange of former times.
+
+The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not reached
+until some thirty years after American Independence, but the uncertainty
+of such trade during a long period in which a portion of it consisted
+in unauthorized and unregulated exchange was a constant irritant to all
+parties concerned. Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with its
+preliminary check upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and its
+final total prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800
+the bulk of American importation of manufactures still came from Great
+Britain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jefferson
+attempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially on
+England, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation Act,
+1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were so
+unpopular in the commercial states of New England that they were
+withdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked the
+United States into believing that France had yielded to American
+contentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse was
+proclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America finally
+declared war and trade stopped save in a few New England ports where
+rebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a blockading British
+naval squadron.
+
+For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had steadily
+decreased, finally almost to extinction during the war. But America
+required certain articles customarily imported and necessity now forced
+her to develop her own manufactures. New England had been the centre of
+American foreign commerce, but now there began a trend toward
+manufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814, however, at the end of the war,
+it was still thought in the United States that under normal conditions
+manufactured goods would again be imported and the general cry of
+"protection for home industries" was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, a
+group of infant industries had in fact been started and clamoured for
+defence now that peace was restored. This situation was not unnoticed in
+Great Britain where merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peace
+on the continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discovered
+that the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking with
+apprehension toward the new industries of America, British merchants,
+following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary speech, dumped
+great quantities of their surplus goods on the American market, selling
+them far below cost, or even on extravagant credit terms. One object was
+to smash the budding American manufactures.
+
+This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry patriotic
+emotions in the circles where American business suffered and a demand
+began to be heard for protection. But the Government of the United
+States was still representative of agriculture, in the main, and while a
+Tariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was regarded as a temporary
+measure required by the necessity of paying the costs of the recent war.
+Just at this juncture, however, British policy, now looking again toward
+a great colonial empire, sought advantages for the hitherto neglected
+maritime provinces of British North America, and thought that it had
+found them by encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies.
+The legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now enforced
+and for a time intercourse was practically suspended.
+
+This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection in
+America. It not only worked against a return by New England from
+manufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks of
+protectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had been
+accustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters seeking
+cheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist element was
+as yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home markets" for
+agriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning to be felt, and
+by 1820 the question of West Indian trade became one of constant
+agitation and demanded political action. That action was taken on lines
+of retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law excluding from American
+ports any British vessel coming from a port access to which was denied
+to an American vessel, and placing under bond in American ports British
+vessels with prohibition of their proceeding to a British port to which
+American vessels could not go. This act affected not merely direct trade
+with the West Indies, but stopped the general custom of British ships of
+taking part cargoes to Jamaica while _en route_ to and from the United
+States. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson's
+administration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment by
+Britain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial system.
+
+The "retaliatory system" which J.Q. Adams regarded as "a new declaration
+of independence," was, in fact, quickly taken up by other non-colonial
+nations, and these, with America, compelled Great Britain to take stock
+of her interests. Huskisson, rightly foreseeing British prosperity as
+dependent upon her manufactures and upon the carrying trade, stated in
+Parliament that American "retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom of
+trade in British ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nations
+that would open their ports within one year on terms of equality to
+British ships. J.Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayed
+acceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and was
+rebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade did
+not take place until 1830, after the close of Adams' administration.
+That trade never recovered its former prosperity.
+
+Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, had
+resulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not a
+sufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice of, the
+theory of protection to attribute this alone to British checks placed
+upon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless the progress of America
+toward an established system, reaching its highest mark for years in the
+Tariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly related to the events just narrated.
+After American independence, the partially illegal status of West Indian
+trade hampered commercial progress and slightly encouraged American
+manufactures by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutral
+troubles of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increased
+the transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection to
+infant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirred
+patriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial system
+restrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave time
+for the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the United
+States. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for the world
+the common advantage and the justice of a great theory of free trade.
+America was apparently now committed to an opposing economic theory, the
+first great nation definitely to establish it, and thus there resulted a
+clear-cut opposition of principle and a clash of interests. From 1846,
+when free trade ideas triumphed in England, the devoted British free
+trader regarded America as the chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptance
+of his theory.
+
+The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free trader,
+was in the Southern States, where cotton interests, desiring no
+advantage from protection, since their market was in Europe, attacked
+American protection and sought to escape from it. Also slave supplies,
+without protection, could have been purchased more cheaply from England
+than from the manufacturing North. In 1833 indeed the South had forced a
+reaction against protection, but it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it was
+Southern opinion that carried through Congress the reciprocity treaty
+with the British American Provinces, partly brought about, no doubt, by
+a Southern fear that Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantages
+in British markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join the
+United States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union.
+Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial tie
+with the United States, and the one great hope, to the British minds, of
+a break in the false American system of protection. Thus both in
+economic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of slavery, the
+export trading interests of Great Britain became more and more directed
+toward the Southern States of America. Adding powerfully to this was the
+dependence of British cotton manufactures upon the American supply. The
+British trade attitude, arising largely outside of direct governmental
+contacts, was bound to have, nevertheless, a constant and important
+influence on governmental action.
+
+Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade and
+industrial interests, are the favourite themes of those historians who
+regard nations as determined in their relations solely by economic
+causes--by what is called "enlightened self-interest." But governments,
+no matter how arbitrary, and still more if in a measure resting on
+representation, react both consciously and unconsciously to a public
+opinion not obviously based upon either national or commercial rivalry.
+Sometimes, indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter to
+popular attitude in international affairs. In such a case, the
+historical estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmental
+action, is a false one and may do great injustice to the essential
+friendliness of a people.
+
+How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America before
+1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British Government?
+Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and its reaction to,
+American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such public opinion can
+be found in quantity sufficient to base an estimate only in travellers'
+books, in reviews, and in newspapers of the period. When all these are
+brought together it is found that while there was an almost universal
+British criticism of American social customs and habits of life, due to
+that insularity of mental attitude characteristic of every nation,
+making it prefer its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours,
+summed up in the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found that
+British opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as a
+place for emigration and, second, American political ideals and
+institutions[10].
+
+British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured colonization
+process before the American revolution, lost that favour after 1783,
+though not at first definitely opposed. But emigration still continued
+and at no time, save during the war of 1812, was it absolutely stopped.
+Its exact amount is unascertainable, for neither Government kept
+adequate statistics before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic wars
+there came great distress in England from which the man of energy sought
+escape. He turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay at
+least, with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, and
+influenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would find
+people of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier emigration
+to America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825, one energetic
+Member of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the Government to appoint a
+committee to investigate the whole subject, the result was a mass of
+testimony, secured from returned emigrants or from their letters home,
+in which there constantly appeared one main argument influencing the
+labourer type of emigrant; he got good wages, and he was supplied, as a
+farm hand, with good food. Repeatedly he testifies that he had "three
+meat meals a day," whereas in England he had ordinarily received but one
+such meal a week.
+
+Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type of
+emigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this type
+remaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity surrounding
+America. But there was a second testimony brought out by Horton's
+Committee, less general, yet to be picked up here and there as evidence
+of another argument for emigration to America. The labourer did not
+dilate upon political equality, nor boast of a share in government,
+indeed generally had no such share, but he did boast to his fellows at
+home of the social equality, though not thus expressing it, which was
+all about him. He was a common farm hand, yet he "sat down to meals"
+with his employer and family, and worked in the fields side by side with
+his "master." This, too, was an astounding difference to the mind of the
+British labourer. Probably for him it created a clearer, if not
+altogether universal and true picture of the meaning of American
+democracy than would have volumes of writing upon political
+institutions. Gradually there was established in the lower orders of
+British society a visualization of America as a haven of physical
+well-being and personal social happiness.
+
+This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium of
+expression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public opinion
+of America, of much latent influence, but for the moment largely
+negligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A more
+important emigrating class in its influence on opinion at home, though
+not a large class, was composed about equally of small farmers and small
+merchants facing ruin in the agricultural and trading crises that
+followed the end of the European war. The British travellers' books
+from 1810 to 1820 are generally written by men of this class, or by
+agents sent out from co-operative groups planning emigration. Generally
+they were discontented with political conditions at home, commonly
+opposed to a petrified social order, and attracted to the United States
+by its lure of prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, a
+superior type of emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant,
+examining and emphasizing industrial opportunity.
+
+Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior political
+institutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican finds here A
+Republic, and the only Republic on the face of the earth that ever
+deserved the name: where all are under the protection of equal laws; of
+laws made by Themselves[11]." Another, who established an English colony
+in the Western States of Illinois, wrote of England that he objected to
+"being ruled and taxed by people who had no more right to rule and tax
+us than consisted in the power to do it." And of his adopted country he
+concludes: "I love the Government; and thus a novel sensation is
+excited; it is like the development of a new faculty. I am become a
+patriot in my old age[12]." Still another detailed the points of his
+content, "I am here, lord and master of myself and of 100 acres of
+land--an improvable farm, little trouble to me, good society and a good
+market, and, I think, a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry in
+summer; the parson gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and
+poor rates amount to §25.00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I
+leave my door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an
+ounce or a little more[13]."
+
+From the first days of the American colonial movement toward
+independence there had been, indeed, a British interest in American
+political principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these principles for
+reasons of home political controversy. Their sympathy continued after
+American independence and by its insistent expression brought out
+equally insistent opposition from Tory circles. The British home
+movement toward a more representative Government had been temporarily
+checked by the extremes into which French Liberalism plunged in 1791,
+causing reaction in England. By 1820 pressure was again being exerted by
+British Liberals of intelligence, and they found arguments in such
+reports as those just quoted. From that date onward, and especially just
+before the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, the
+example of a prosperous American democracy was an element in British
+home politics, lauded or derided as the man in England desired or not an
+expansion of the British franchise. In the earlier period, however, it
+is to be remembered that applause of American institutions did not mean
+acceptance of democracy to the extent of manhood franchise, for no such
+franchise at first existed in America itself. The debate in England was
+simply whether the step forward in American democracy, was an argument
+for a similar step in Great Britain.
+
+Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political quarrel
+there grew in force, depicted America favourably or otherwise according
+to political sympathies at home. Both before and after the Reform Bill
+of 1832 this type of effort to mould opinion, by citation of America,
+was widespread. Hence there is in such writing, not so much the
+expression of public opinion, as of propaganda to affect that opinion.
+Book upon book, review upon review, might be quoted to illustrate this,
+but a few notable examples will suffice.
+
+The most widely read and reviewed book on the United States before
+1840, except the humorous and flippant characterization of America by
+Mrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil Hall's three-volume work, published in
+1829[14]. Claiming an open mind, he expected for his adverse findings a
+readier credence. For adverse to American political institutions these
+findings are in all their larger applications. In every line Hall
+betrays himself as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief,
+and convinced of the perfection and unalterableness of the British
+Constitution. Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank in
+avowal of a purpose[15]. He states in his preface:
+
+     "... When I found the institutions and experiences of the
+     United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament,
+     as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and
+     learned that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense,
+     instead of encountering merited derision, were listened to
+     with patience and approbation by men as ignorant as
+     themselves, I certainly did feel that another work on America
+     was yet wanted, and at once determined to undertake a task
+     which inferior considerations would probably have induced me
+     to decline."
+
+Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home, found in
+the United States proofs for her faith in democracy[16]. Captain Marryat
+belittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes proved himself less a
+critic of America than an enemy of democracy. Answering a review of his
+earlier volumes, published separately, he wrote in his concluding
+volume: "I candidly acknowledge that the reviewer is right in his
+supposition; my great object has been to do serious injury to the cause
+of democracy[17]."
+
+The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes were
+suffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step toward
+democracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was still
+limited to a small minority of the population. Britain was still ruled
+by her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile, however, just at
+the moment when dominant Whig influence in England carried through that
+step forward toward democratic institutions which Whigs had long lauded
+in America, the latter country had progressed to manhood suffrage, or as
+nearly all leading Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, had
+plunged into the rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening in
+Whig ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before long
+to the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in Great
+Britain that the Reform of 1832 was "final," the last step toward
+democracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange that the
+books and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily stress the
+dangers and crudity of American democracy. They were written for what
+was now a nearly unanimous British reading public, fearful lest Radical
+pressure for still further electoral reform should preach the example of
+the United States.
+
+Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section of the
+British governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by a critical,
+if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid development of the
+power and wealth of the United States, governing-class England, of all
+factions save the Radical, came to view America just as it would have
+viewed any other rising nation, that is, as a problem to be studied for
+its influence on British prosperity and power. Again, expressions in
+print reflect the changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than in
+travellers' books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted,
+not to American political institutions, but to studies, many of them
+very careful ones, of American industry and governmental policy.
+
+Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of such
+description. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this day to the
+American historical student[18]. George Combe, philosopher and
+phrenologist, studied especially social institutions[19]. Joseph Sturge,
+philanthropist and abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of the
+poet Whittier, through the Northern and Eastern States[20].
+Featherstonaugh, a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southern
+slave states, in terms completely at variance with those of Sturge[21].
+Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston, and
+Warburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of Canada,
+an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter professedly
+alarmed, at the evidences of power in America[22]. Amazed at the energy,
+growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the anti-British
+feeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote that "they
+[Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the incendiary torch of
+Republicanism to the nations of Europe[23]." Soon after this was written
+there began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish emigration to America
+which heavily reinforced the anti-British attitude of the City of New
+York, and largely changed its character.
+
+Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect British
+public opinion, or did they create it? It is difficult to estimate such
+matters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these books coincided in
+point of time with a British governmental attitude of opposition, though
+on peaceful lines, to the development of American power, and to the
+adoption to the point of faith, by British commercial classes, of free
+trade as opposed to the American protective system. But governing
+classes were not the British public, and to the great unenfranchised
+mass, finding voice through the writings of a few leaders, the
+prosperity of America made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy was
+again beginning to make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was published
+a study of the United States, more careful and exact than any previous
+to Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions. This
+was Mackay's "Western World," and that there was a public eager for such
+estimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went through four
+British editions in 1850[24]. At the end of the decade, then, there
+appeared once more a vigorous champion of the cause of British
+democracy, comparing the results of "government by the wise" with
+alleged mob rule. Mackay wrote:
+
+     "Society in America started from the point to which society
+     in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to
+     this moment, its corner-stone ... that which develops itself
+     as the sympathy of class, becomes in America the general
+     sentiment of society.... We present an imposing front to the
+     world; but let us tear the picture and look at the canvas.
+     One out of every seven of us is a pauper. Every six
+     Englishmen have, in addition to their other enormous burdens,
+     to support a seventh between them, whose life is spent in
+     consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of their
+     common subsistence."
+
+British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition to the
+advance of American power, found themselves involved again, as before
+1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a prosperous American
+democracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion at home. Also, for all
+Englishmen, of whatever class, in spite of rivalry in power, of opposing
+theories of trade, of divergent political institutions, there existed a
+vague, though influential, pride in the advance of a people of similar
+race, sprung from British loins[25]. And there remained for all
+Englishmen also one puzzling and discreditable American institution,
+slavery--held up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficult
+of excuse among her friends.
+
+Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce, had early
+committed British Government and people to a crusade against the African
+slave trade. This British policy was clearly announced to the world in
+the negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15. But Britain herself still
+supported the institution of slavery in her West Indian colonies and it
+was not until British humanitarian sentiment had forced emancipation
+upon the unwilling sugar planters, in 1833, that the nation was morally
+free to criticize American domestic slavery. Meanwhile great
+emancipation societies, with many branches, all virile and active, had
+grown up in England and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack on
+slavery the world over, and especially on American slavery. The great
+American abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than in
+his own country; his weekly paper, _The Liberator_, is full of messages
+of cheer from British friends and societies, and of quotations from a
+sympathetic, though generally provincial, British press.
+
+From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its height. It
+watched with anxiety the evidence of a developing struggle over slavery
+in the United States, hopeful, as each crisis arose, that the free
+Northern States would impose their will upon the Southern Slave States.
+But as each crisis turned to compromise, seemingly enhancing the power
+of the South, and committing America to a retention of slavery, the
+hopes of British abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to British
+opinion, become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery,
+but after the "great compromise of 1850," where the elder American
+statesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of that
+measure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover,
+after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general humanitarian
+sentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to seem hopeless and
+the earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The British Government still
+maintained its naval squadron for the suppression of the African slave
+trade, but the British official mind no longer keenly interested itself
+either in this effort or in the general question of slavery.
+
+Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still, after
+1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally critical, by
+English writers. Each renewal of the conflict in America, even though
+local, not national in character, drew out a flood of comment. In the
+public press this blot upon American civilization was a steady subject
+for attack, and that attack was naturally directed against the South.
+The London _Times_, in particular, lost no opportunity of presenting the
+matter to its readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansas
+during the height of the border struggles there, and reported his
+observations in letters to the _Times_. The writer was wholly on the
+side of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that the
+Kansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantly
+depicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence of
+the North as compared with the South[26].
+
+Mrs. Stowe's _Uncle Tom's Cabin_ excited greater interest in England
+than in America itself. The first London edition appeared in May, 1852,
+and by the end of the year over one million copies had been sold, as
+opposed to one hundred and fifty thousand in the United States. But if
+one distinguished writer is to be believed, this great British interest
+in the book was due more to English antipathy to America than to
+antipathy to slavery[27]. This writer was Nassau W. Senior, who, in
+1857, published a reprint of his article on "American Slavery" in the
+206th number of the _Edinburgh Review_, reintroducing in his book
+extreme language denunciatory of slavery that had been cut out by the
+editor of the _Review_[28]. Senior had been stirred to write by the
+brutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after his
+speech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident of the
+slavery quarrel in America excited British attention.
+
+Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all anti-slavery,
+the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of British
+understanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the citations of
+the British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison in his
+_Liberator_[29]. Yet for intellectual Britain, at least--that Britain
+which was vocal and whose opinion can be ascertained in spite of this
+constant interest in American slavery, there was generally a fixed
+belief that slavery in the United States was so firmly established that
+it could not be overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditure
+of British sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at the
+conclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed the
+pessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not venture to hope
+that we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see American slavery
+extirpated, or even materially mitigated[30]."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: State Department, Eng., Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Walpole, _Russell_, Vol. II, p. 367.]
+
+[Footnote 3: _Life of Lady John Russell_, p. 197.]
+
+[Footnote 4: There was a revival of this fear at the end of the American
+Civil War. This will be commented on later.]
+
+[Footnote 5: This was the position of President and Congress: yet the
+United States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen to
+expatriate himself.]
+
+[Footnote 6: Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from American
+ships, 102 were retained, 1,042 were discharged, and 805 were held for
+further proof. (Updyke, _The Diplomacy of the War of 1812_, p. 21.)]
+
+[Footnote 7: The people of the British North American Provinces regarded
+the war as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the European
+wars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United Empire
+Loyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the same two
+wars which fostered militant patriotism in America against England had
+the same result in Canadian sentiment against America.]
+
+[Footnote 8: Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in
+_Am. Hist. Rev._, XI, 783. Also _Cambridge History of British Foreign
+Policy_, Vol. II, ch. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 9: Much has recently been published on British policy in
+Texas. See my book, _British Interests and Activities in Texas,
+1838-1846_, Johns Hopkins Press, Balt., 1910. Also Adams, Editor,
+_British Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas_,
+The Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, 1918.]
+
+[Footnote 10: In my studies on British-American relations, I have read
+the leading British reviews and newspapers, and some four hundred
+volumes by British travellers. For a summary of the British travellers
+before 1860 see my article "The Point of View of the British Traveller
+in America," in the _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XXIX, No. 2,
+June, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 11: John Melish, _Travels_, Vol. I, p. 148.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Morris Birkbeck, _Letters from Illinois_, London, 1818, p.
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 13: Letter in Edinburgh _Scotsman_, March, 1823. Cited by
+_Niles Register_, Vol. XXV, p. 39.]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Travels in North America_, 1827-28, London, 1829.]
+
+[Footnote 15: Captain Thomas Hamilton, _Men and Manners in America_,
+Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 16: _Society in America_, London, 1837. 3 vols. _Retrospect of
+Western Travel_, London, 1838. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 17: Captain Frederick Marryat, _A Diary in America, with
+Remarks on Its Institutions_, Vol. VI, p. 293.]
+
+[Footnote 18: James Silk Buckingham, _America, Historical, Statistic and
+Descriptive_, London, 1841-43. 9 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 19: _Notes on the United States of North America during a
+phrenological visit_, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh, 1841. 3 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 20: _A Visit to the United States in 1841_, London, 1842.]
+
+[Footnote 21: George William Featherstonaugh, _Excursion through the
+Slave States_, London, 1844. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 22: William Kennedy, _Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects
+of the Republic of Texas_, London, 1841. 2 vols. George Warburton,
+_Hochelaga: or, England in the New World_, London, 1845. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 23: Warburton, _Hochelaga_, 5th Edition, Vol. II, pp. 363-4.]
+
+[Footnote 24: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World: or, Travels through
+the United States in 1846-47_, London, 1849.]
+
+[Footnote 25: This is clearly indicated in Parliament itself, in the
+debate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856 of Crampton, the
+British Minister at Washington, for enlistment activities during the
+Crimean War.--_Hansard_, 3rd. Ser., CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203.]
+
+[Footnote 26: Gladstone's letters were later published in book form,
+under the title _The Englishman in Kansas_, London, 1857.]
+
+[Footnote 27: "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom' gratified in England
+were not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but national jealousy and
+national vanity. We have long been smarting under the conceit of
+America--we are tired of hearing her boast that she is the freest and
+the most enlightened country that the world has ever seen. Our clergy
+hate her voluntary system--our Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hate
+her parvenus--our Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, and
+her ambition. All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from the
+enemy." Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 38.]
+
+[Footnote 28: The reprint is without date, but the context shows the
+year to be 1857.]
+
+[Footnote 29: For example the many British expressions quoted in
+reference to John Brown's raid, in _The Liberator_ for February 10,
+1860, and in succeeding issues.]
+
+[Footnote 30: Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 68.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61.
+
+It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, that
+immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomatic
+controversies between England and America had largely been settled, and
+that England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly" yielded under
+American demands. This generalization, as applied to what were, after
+all, minor controversies, is in great measure true. In larger questions
+of policy, as regards spheres of influence or developing power, or
+principles of trade, there was difference, but no longer any essential
+opposition or declared rivalry[31]. In theories of government there was
+sharp divergence, clearly appreciated, however, only in governing-class
+Britain. This sense of divergence, even of a certain threat from America
+to British political institutions, united with an established opinion
+that slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforce
+governmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America. The
+British public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in the
+institution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest was
+waning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to a degree
+not true of any other two world-powers, were of the same race, had
+similar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in close touch at
+many points by the steady flow of British emigration to the
+United States.
+
+When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in November,
+1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered, the situation
+took both British Government and people by surprise. There was not any
+clear understanding either of American political conditions, or of the
+intensity of feeling now aroused over the question of the extension of
+slave territory. The most recent descriptions of America had agreed in
+assertion that at some future time there would take place, in all
+probability, a dissolution of the Union, on lines of diverging economic
+interests, but also stated that there was nothing in the American
+situation to indicate immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, a
+long-time resident in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote:
+
+     "The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will break
+     the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But
+     no man may foretell the period of dissolution.... The many
+     restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation.
+     The Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are
+     invisible; and it seems wondrous that each limb does not act
+     for itself independently of its fellows. A closer examination
+     shows the nature of the network which keeps the members of
+     this association so tightly bound. Any attempt to untangle
+     the ties, more firmly fastens them. When any one State talks
+     of separation, the others become spontaneously knotted
+     together. When a section blusters about its particular
+     rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to all. If
+     a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes
+     in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which
+     there can be danger, there is also found the element of
+     safety." Yet, he added, "All attempts to strengthen this
+     federal government at the expense of the States' governments
+     must be futile.... The federal government exists on
+     sufferance only. Any State may at any time constitutionally
+     withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually dissolve it[32]."
+
+Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one Charles
+Mackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished British poet,"
+who made the usual rapid tour of the principal cities of America in
+1857-58, and as rapidly penned his impressions:
+
+     "Many persons in the United States talk of a dissolution of
+     the Union, but few believe in it.... All this is mere bravado
+     and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to all
+     Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary.... There is
+     no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions
+     to which over-ardent politicians of the North and South
+     sometimes give vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West,'
+     as it is fondly called, is in the position even now to
+     arbitrate between North and South, should the quarrel stretch
+     beyond words, or should anti-slavery or any other question
+     succeed in throwing any difference between them which it
+     would take revolvers and rifles rather than speeches and
+     votes to put an end to[33]."
+
+The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be regarded in
+England as a constant quarrel between North and South, but of no
+immediate danger to the Union. Each outbreak of violent American
+controversy produced a British comment sympathetic with the North. The
+turmoil preceding and following the election of Lincoln in 1860, on the
+platform of "no extension of slavery," was very generally noted by the
+British press and public, as a sign favourable to the cause of
+anti-slavery, but with no understanding that Southern threat would at
+last be realized in definite action. Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May
+15, 1862, to his American friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had the
+means of judging, the feeling here was at first _very decidedly_ on the
+side of the North[34] ..." The British metropolitan press, in nearly
+every issue of which for at least two years after December, 1860, there
+appeared news items and editorial comment on the American crisis, was at
+first nearly unanimous in condemning the South[35]. The _Times_, with
+accustomed vigour, led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated:
+
+     "When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject of
+     Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments
+     it expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation,
+     for the feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we
+     see how entirely he narrows his opposition to the single
+     point of the admission of Slavery into the Territories, we
+     cannot help being forcibly struck by the absurdity of
+     breaking up a vast and glorious confederacy like that of the
+     United States from the dread and anger inspired by the
+     election of such a man to the office of Chief Magistrate....
+     We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it [the
+     election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad
+     to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone
+     which its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom,
+     has been at length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a
+     vast community of our own race has at length given an
+     authoritative expression to sentiments which are entertained
+     by everyone in this country. We trust to see the American
+     Government employed in tasks more worthy of a State founded
+     on the doctrines of liberty and equality than the invention
+     of shifts and devices to perpetuate servitude; and we hear in
+     this great protest of American freedom the tardy echo of
+     those humane doctrines to which England has so long become a
+     convert."
+
+Other leading journals, though with less of patronizing
+self-complacency, struck the same note as the _Times_. The _Economist_
+attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the sympathies of the "lower
+orders" in the electorate who had now deserted their former leaders, the
+slave-owning aristocracy of the South, and allied themselves with the
+refined and wise leaders of the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not an
+extremist in any sense. His plan of action lay within the limits of
+statesmanlike moderation[36]. The _Saturday Review_ was less sure that
+England should rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had suffered
+some hard blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but at
+least England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no more
+discourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The Republican
+party, however, had no policy, except that of its leader, Seward, and
+from him might be expected extreme insolence[37]. This was a very early
+judgment of Seward, and one upon which the _Saturday Review_ preened
+itself later, as wholly justified. The _Spectator_, the only one of the
+four journals thus far considered which ultimately remained constant in
+advocacy of the Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment,
+regarding the 1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as in
+reality a mere contest between parties for political power[38].
+
+Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press issue
+for several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding varying
+notes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said the _Times_,
+it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred thousand slave-owners,
+trembling nightly with visions of murder and pillage, backed by a
+dissolute population of 'poor whites,' are no match for the hardy and
+resolute populations of the Free States[39]," and if the South hoped for
+foreign aid it should be undeceived promptly: "Can any sane man believe
+that England and France will consent, as is now suggested, to stultify
+the policy of half a century for the sake of an extended cotton trade,
+and to purchase the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville by
+recognizing what has been called 'the isothermal law, which impels
+African labour toward the tropics' on the other side of the
+Atlantic[40]?" Moreover all Americans ought to understand clearly that
+British respect for the United States "was not due to the attitude of
+the South with its ruffian demonstrations in Congress.... All that is
+noble and venerable in the United States is associated with its Federal
+Constitution[41]."
+
+Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no direct
+evidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography or letters
+upon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent on the struggle
+in America for the first few months and presumably public opinion, less
+informed even than the press, received its impressions from the journals
+customarily read. Both at this period and all through the war, also, it
+should be remembered, clearly, that most newspapers, all the reviews, in
+fact nearly all vehicles of British expression, were in the early
+'sixties "in the hands of the educated classes, and these educated
+classes corresponded closely with the privileged classes." The more
+democratic element of British Society lacked any adequate press
+representation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by such
+comparatively crude methods as public meetings and demonstrations, but
+it was hampered in literary and political expression[42]." The opinion
+of the press was then, presumably, the opinion of the majority of the
+educated British public.
+
+Thus British comment on America took the form, at first of
+moralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet very
+generally asserting the essential justice of the Northern position. But
+it was early evident that the newspapers, one and all, were quite
+unprepared for the determined front soon put up by South Carolina and
+other Southern States. Surprised by the violence of Southern
+declarations, the only explanation found by the British press was that
+political control had been seized by the uneducated and lawless element.
+The _Times_ characterized this element of the South as in a state of
+deplorable ignorance comparable with that of the Irish peasantry, a
+"poor, proud, lazy, excitable and violent class, ever ready with knife
+and revolver[43]." The fate of the Union, according to the _Saturday
+Review_, was in the hands of the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, and
+most lawless [class] in the world--the poor or mean whites of the Slave
+States[44]." Like judgments were expressed by the _Economist_ and, more
+mildly, by the _Spectator_[45]. Subsequently some of these journals
+found difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle to
+expressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of the
+South; but all, especially the _Times_, were skilled by long practice
+in the journalistic art of facing about while claiming perfect
+consistency. In denial of a Southern right of secession, also, they were
+nearly a unit[46], though the _Saturday Review_ argued the case for the
+South, making a pointed parallel between the present situation and that
+of the American Colonies in seceding from England[47].
+
+The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an initial
+confusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the theory of an
+"enlightened press." The Reviews, by the conditions of publication, came
+into action more slowly and during 1860 there appeared but one article,
+in the _Edinburgh Review_, giving any adequate idea of what was really
+taking place in America[48]. The lesser British papers generally
+followed the tone of the leading journals, but without either great
+interest or much acumen. In truth the depth of British newspaper
+ignorance, considering their positiveness of utterance, appears utterly
+astonishing if regarded from the view-point of modern historical
+knowledge. But is this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there not
+equal confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself,
+certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They also
+had come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were slow to
+understand that the great conflict of ideals and interests was at
+last begun.
+
+The British press both influenced and reflected educated class opinion,
+and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John Russell at the
+Foreign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, were
+exchanging anxious letters, and the latter was sending home reports
+remarkable for their clear analysis of the American controversy. Yet
+even he was slow to appreciate the inevitability of secession.
+
+[Illustration: LORD LYONS (_From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S.A.,
+in 1860) (From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind permission_)]
+
+Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the United
+States, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to that of the
+press. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a far-fetched view of
+causes, is supplied in a letter of February 2, 1860, from Consul Bunch,
+at Charleston, S.C., to Lord Lyons, the British Minister at
+Washington[49]. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had been given the
+evening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston. Being called upon for
+a speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the Turf at home, and had
+referred especially to the Plates run for the various British colonies.
+Continuing, he said:
+
+     "'... I cannot help calling your attention to the great loss
+     you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial
+     Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had
+     continued to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure
+     in sending you some Plates too.'
+
+     "Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke,
+     calculated to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my
+     amazement, the company chose to take me literally, and
+     applauded for about ten minutes--in fact I could not go on
+     for some time."
+
+Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration. He could
+with difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be re-annexed as a
+colony of Great Britain, and comments upon the episode in a somewhat
+humorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his letter, he solemnly
+assures Lord Lyons that
+
+     "... The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people' of
+     South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents,
+     therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of
+     universal suffrage."
+
+It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in England
+there was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a resumption of
+colonial relations, though W.H. Russell, correspondent of the _Times_,
+reported in the spring, 1861, that he frequently heard the same
+sentiment in the South[50]. For general official England, as for the
+press, the truth is that up to the time of the secession of South
+Carolina no one really believed that a final rupture was about to take
+place between North and South. When, on December 20, 1860, that State in
+solemn convention declared the dissolution "of the Union now existing
+between South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the
+'United States of America,'" and when it was understood that other
+Southern States would soon follow this example, British opinion believed
+and hoped that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until it
+became clear that war would ensue, the South was still damned by the
+press as seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery was
+even more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In the
+number for April, 1861, the _Edinburgh Review_ attributed the whole
+difficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would be with the
+anti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the very dissolution of
+the Union would hasten the ultimate extinction of slavery since economic
+competition with a neighbouring free state, the North, would compel the
+South itself to abandon its beloved "domestic institution[51]."
+
+Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the _Times_, in a long and
+carefully worded editorial, took up one by one the alleged causes of
+secession, dismissed them as inadequate, and concluded, "... we cannot
+disguise from ourselves that, apart from all political complications,
+there is a right and a wrong in this question, and that the right
+belongs, with all its advantages, to the States of the North[52]." Three
+days later it asserted, "The North is for freedom of discussion, the
+South represses freedom of discussion with the tar-brush and the
+pine-fagot." And again, on January 10, "The Southern States expected
+sympathy for their undertaking from the public opinion of this country.
+The tone of the press has already done much to undeceive them...."
+
+In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press expressed
+similar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The _Dublin News_
+published with approval a long communication addressed to Irishmen at
+home and abroad: "... there is no power on earth or in heaven which can
+keep in peace this unholy co-partnership.... I hope ... that the North
+will quietly permit the South to retire from the confederacy and bear
+alone the odium of all mankind[53]...." The _Saturday Review_ thought
+that deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social structure of
+the South which now visioned a re-opening of the African Slave Trade,
+and the occupation by slavery of the whole southern portion of North
+America. "A more ignoble basis for a great Confederacy it is impossible
+to conceive, nor one in the long run more precarious.... Assuredly it
+will be the Northern Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with a
+policy untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, that
+will be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the New
+World[54]." The _London Chronicle_ was vigorous in denunciation. "No
+country on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or a
+treachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the new
+Southern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in itself[55].
+The _London Review_ more moderately stigmatized slavery as the cause,
+but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding the whole
+matter as one of diverging economic systems and in any case as
+inevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some time. The
+inevitable might as well come now as later and would result in benefit
+to both sections as well as to the world fearing the monstrous empire of
+power that had grown up in America[56].
+
+The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in truth,
+definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was particularly true of
+the provincial press. Garrison's _Liberator_, advocating extreme
+abolition action, had long made a practice of presenting excerpts from
+British newspapers, speeches and sermons in support of its cause. In
+1860 there were thirty-nine such citations; in the first months of 1861
+many more, all condemning slavery and the South. For the most part these
+citations represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section,
+both in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnold
+was among the first of men of letters to record his faith that secession
+was final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the North, looking to
+the purity of race and the opportunity for unhampered advance[57]. If
+English writers were in any way influenced by their correspondents in
+the United States they may, indeed, have well been in doubt as to the
+origin and prospects of the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently at
+home again after seven years' consulship in England, was writing that
+abolition was not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittier
+wrote to _his_ English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was the
+basic issue[58]. But literary Britain was slow to express itself save in
+the Reviews. These, representing varying shades of British upper-class
+opinion and presenting articles presumably more profound than the
+newspaper editorials, frequently offered more recondite origins of the
+American crisis. The _Quarterly Review_, organ of extreme Conservatism,
+in its first article, dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions,
+a topic not here treated at length since it will be dealt with in a
+separate chapter as deserving special study. The _Quarterly_ is also the
+first to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated by
+the North, was a real cause for Southern secession[59]; an idea made
+much of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, but not
+hitherto advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, there
+was frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory.
+
+     "At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern planters
+     did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country
+     gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with
+     him on the part of those in England who represented the old
+     traditions of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman'
+     theory, containing as it did an undeniable element of truth,
+     is much harped upon by certain of the reviewers, and one can
+     easily conceive of its popularity in the London Clubs.... The
+     'American,' so familiar to British readers, during the first
+     half of the century, through the eyes of such travellers as
+     Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee,' and is located north
+     of Mason and Dixon's line[60]."
+
+Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of the Tory
+organs alone, and the Radical _Westminster_ took pains to deny the truth
+of the picture, asserting again and again that the vital and sole cause
+of the conflict was slavery. Previous articles are summed up in that of
+October, 1863, as a profession of the _Westminster's_ opinion
+throughout: "... the South are fighting for liberty to found a Slave
+Power. Should it prove successful, truer devil's work, if we may use the
+metaphor, will rarely have been done[61]."
+
+Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British opinion
+generally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had not soon
+found cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from the trend of
+events in America. Lincoln had been elected on a platform opposing the
+further territorial expansion of slavery. On that point the North was
+fairly well united. But the great majority of those who voted for
+Lincoln would have indignantly repudiated any purpose to take active
+steps toward the extinction of slavery where it already existed. Lincoln
+understood this perfectly, and whatever his opinion about the ultimate
+fate of slavery if prohibited expansion, he from the first took the
+ground that the terms of his election constituted a mandate limiting his
+action. As secession developed he rightly centred his thought and effort
+on the preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to the
+Presidency.
+
+Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at still
+another great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing President,
+Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until March 4, 1861,
+there were still some Southern leaders, like Jefferson Davis, seeking
+either a complete surrender to Southern will, or advantages for Southern
+security in case secession was accomplished. Buchanan appealed
+hysterically to the old-time love of the Union and to the spirit of
+compromise. Great congressional committees of both Senate and House of
+Representatives were formed seeking a solution. Crittenden for the
+border states between North and South, where, more than anywhere else,
+there was division of opinion, proposed pledges to be given to the
+South. Seward, long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was active
+in the Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended to
+conciliate by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler,
+in the House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republican
+colleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of slavery as
+then established[62]. A constitutional amendment was drafted to this
+effect and received Lincoln's preliminary approval. Finally Lincoln, in
+his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared:
+
+     "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with
+     the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I
+     believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
+     inclination to do so."
+
+It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these efforts
+were observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began to replace
+the earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of slavery was at stake
+in America. This offered an easy excuse for a switch-about of sympathy
+as British commercial and other interests began to be developed, and
+even dismayed the ardent friends of the anti-slavery North. Meanwhile
+the Government of Great Britain, from the very first appearance of the
+cloud of civil war, had focused its attention on the point of what the
+events in America portended to British interests and policy. This is the
+business of governments, and their agents would be condemned as
+inefficient did they neglect it. But did British governmental policy go
+beyond this entirely justifiable first thought for immediate British
+interests to the point of positive hope that England would find an
+advantage in the breaking up of the great American Republic? American
+opinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of this
+offence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the Civil
+War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an unfriendly one
+because of his official position, made emphatic declaration to like
+effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, Russian Ambassador at
+London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the English Government, at the
+bottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into two
+republics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one
+the other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both,
+would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them,
+restraining them by their rival ambitions[63]."
+
+If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as to the
+springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of official
+and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no proof for such
+accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, nor
+Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, reveal any animus against
+the United States. Considering his many personal ties with leaders of
+both factions Lyons, from the first, reported events with wonderful
+impartiality, and great clarity. On November 12, 1860, he sent to
+Russell a full description of the clamour raised in the South over the
+election of Lincoln, enumerated the resignation of Federal officials
+(calling these "ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that
+Lincoln was no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without
+damage to the Union[64]. Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct
+Lyons and the British consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather
+than the other," and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless
+asked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should be
+against all violent action as tending toward civil war[65].
+
+This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an eager
+readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the dissolution of the
+Union, but such an interpretation is not borne out by a reading of his
+instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and anxious that British agents
+should not gain the ill-will of either American faction, an ill-will
+that would be alike detrimental in the future, whether the Union
+remained unbroken or was destroyed.
+
+Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore repeated
+frequently[66]. Meanwhile the first concrete problem requiring British
+action came from the seizure by South Carolina of the Federal customs
+house at the port of Charleston, and the attempt of the State
+authorities to collect port dues customarily paid to Federal officials.
+British shipowners appealed to Consul Bunch for instructions, he to
+Lyons, and the latter to the American Secretary of State, Judge Black.
+This was on December 31, 1860, while Buchanan was still President, and
+Black's answer was evasive, though asserting that the United States must
+technically regard the events in South Carolina as acts of violent
+rebellion[67]. Black refused to state what action would be taken if
+Bunch advised British shipowners to pay, but a way out of the
+embarrassment was found by advising such payment to State authorities
+"under protest" as done "under compulsion." To one of his letters to
+Bunch on this topic, Lyons appended an expression indicative of his own
+early attitude. "The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pill
+which it will be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the
+Slave Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish British
+stomach will reject it[68]."
+
+Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon followed by
+other Southern States, made a deep impression on Russell, especially
+when compared with the uncertainty and irresolution manifested in the
+attempted compromise measures of Northern statesmen. In a private letter
+to Lyons, January 10, 1861, he wrote "I do not see how the United States
+can be cobbled together again by any compromise.... I cannot see any
+mode of reconciling such parties as these. The best thing _now_ would
+be that the right to secede should be acknowledged.... I hope sensible
+men will take this view.... But above all I hope no force will be
+used[69]." And again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of the
+Union is now inevitable[70]." To Russell, as to most foreign observers,
+it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous extent
+of territory, and its five and one-half millions of population, were
+determined to leave the Union, no force whatever could compel a return.
+History failed to record any revolution on so large a scale which had
+not succeeded. His desire, therefore, was that the North would yield to
+the inevitable, and would not plunge into a useless civil war disastrous
+alike to the prosperity of America and of foreign nations. Russell's
+first hope was that the South would forgo secession; his second, this
+accomplished, that there would be no war, and in this sense he
+instructed Lyons. The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and
+more aware of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his
+entire service at Washington that there was at least a _chance_ that the
+North could subdue the South by might of arms[71], but he also, looking
+to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, in cautious
+suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from January to
+March, 1861, British effort and indirect advice were based on the hope
+that British trade interests might escape the tribulations inevitable
+from a civil conflict in America. Beyond that point there was no grasp
+of the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clear
+formulation of British policy[72].
+
+In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and official
+British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determined
+Northern effort to recover the South. Early British attitude was,
+therefore, based on a misconception. As this became clear, public
+opinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentiment
+and to show, in some quarters, quite another face. Even as early as
+January the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States had
+not availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such an
+incubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]." and a month
+later professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit the
+North to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexing
+Canada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was
+argued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down military
+expenditures[74]. The _London Press_ indulged in similar speculation,
+though from the angle of a Canadian annexation of the Northern States,
+whose more sober citizens must by now be weary of the sham of American
+democracy, and disgusted with the rowdyism of political elections, which
+"combine the morals of a horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the
+passions of a tap-room, and the emotions of a gambling house[75]."
+Probably such suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the
+moment, but it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in
+Canada should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the
+same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles Sumner
+held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the face of the
+growing Northern determination to preserve the Union. It lay at the
+bottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old friend Charles
+Francis Adams, now busy in schemes intended, apparently, to restore the
+Union by compromise, and it led Sumner to hope for appointment as
+Minister to England[76].
+
+The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the _Times_, was one of
+the first to begin the process of "face about," as civil war in America
+seemed imminent[77]. Viewed from the later attitude of the _Times_, the
+earlier expressions of that paper, and in truth of many British
+journals, seem merely the customary platitudinous British holding up of
+horrified hands at American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strong
+editorial still proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting
+"without law, without justice," but displayed a real dismay at the
+possible consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January
+22, the _Times_ reprinted an article from the _Economist_, on a probable
+cessation of cotton supply and editorially professed great alarm, even
+advocating an early recognition of the Southern confederacy if needed to
+maintain that supply. From this time on there is no further note in the
+_Times_ of the righteousness of the Northern cause; but while it is
+still asserted that war would be folly, the strength of the South, its
+superiority as a military nation, are depicted.
+
+A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial comment.
+Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written by Bancroft
+Davis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause, was discontinued.
+W.H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the Crimea, was summoned
+to London and, according to his own story, upon being given papers,
+clippings, and correspondence (largely articles from the _New York
+Herald_) supporting the right of the South to secede, hastily took his
+departure for America to report upon the situation[78]. He sailed from
+Queenstown on March 3, and arrived in New York on March 16. At last on
+March 12, the _Times_ took positive ground in favour of the justice of
+the Southern cause.
+
+     "No treachery has been at work to produce the disruption, and
+     the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies
+     of every free and enlightened people. Such are the widely
+     different auspices under which the two rival Republics start
+     into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these
+     things by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly
+     swayed by their own interest, and the two Republics must be
+     weighed, not by their professions or their previous history,
+     but by the conduct they pursue and the position they maintain
+     among the Powers of the earth. Their internal institutions
+     are their own affair; their financial and political
+     arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil is a slave-holding
+     Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct it has
+     contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy of
+     nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free
+     from this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy
+     of America evinces a determination to act in a narrow,
+     exclusive, and unsocial spirit, while its Southern
+     competitor extends the hand of good fellowship to all
+     mankind, with the exception of its own bondsmen, we must not
+     be surprised to see the North, in spite of the goodness of
+     its cause and the great negative merit of the absence of
+     Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the
+     sympathy and regard of mankind."
+
+This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral tone
+earlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that England
+would not "stultify the policy of half a century for the sake of an
+extended cotton trade[79]."
+
+The _Economist_, with more consistency, still reported the violence and
+recklessness of the South, yet in logical argument proved to its own
+satisfaction the impossibility of Northern reconquest, and urged a
+peaceful separation[80]. The _Spectator_, even though pro-Northern, had
+at first small hope of reunion by force, and offered consolation in the
+thought that there would still remain a United States of America
+"strong, powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the Black
+South[81]." In short from all quarters the public press, whatever its
+sympathy, united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failure
+if undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion,
+however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was indeed
+more slow to make up its mind and more considerate in expressing itself.
+When it became clear that in all probability the North would fight,
+there was still no conception, any more than in the United States
+itself, of the duration and intensity of the conflict. Indeed, Russell
+yet hoped, as late as the end of January, that no protracted war would
+occur. Nevertheless he was compelled to face the situation in its
+relation to British commerce.
+
+On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of possible war
+which would at once call for a determination of British policy. "Above
+all things," he wrote, "endeavour to prevent a blockade of the Southern
+coast. It would produce misery, discord, and enmity incalculable[82]."
+Within a week Forster, a thorough friend of the North throughout the
+whole war, was interrogating the Ministry in the House of Commons in
+regard to the situation at Charleston, and expressing the hope that
+England would not in any way attempt to interfere[83]. This was the
+first reference in Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the
+long vacation, to the American conflict, but British commercial
+interests were being forced to a keener attention, and already men in
+many circles were asking themselves what should be the proper
+governmental attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could
+justly claim European recognition; how far and how fast European
+governments ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be
+the proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a
+declaration of neutrality ought to be issued.
+
+With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became important
+for British statesmen to know something about the leaders in this new
+Southern movement, the attitude of the people in general, and the
+purposes of the new Government. Here, unfortunately, Lord Lyons could
+be no guide. The consuls in the South, however, were in a position to
+give their impressions. On February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell,
+describing the election of Davis and Stephens[84], to the Presidency and
+Vice-Presidency of the Confederacy, and giving a personal
+characterization of many members of the Government. He was rather
+caustic. Davis, he said, was the only _able_ man, and he, unfortunately,
+was a confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunch
+prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had acquiesced
+in a Southern State and the fear of the North had passed. Bunch had no
+faith in any future greatness of the South, asserting that it would be a
+State despised among nations for its maintenance of slavery, and that it
+could not hope for any encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations
+of Europe; in fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to
+the South. Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned
+that the South had already actually established its independence. This
+he seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter,
+there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to the
+Civil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity long
+preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and her
+certainty that a new State was being born.
+
+For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to report,
+but up to the end of January he had not written in any great detail with
+regard to the new administration and its make-up, though on January 7,
+he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State and
+had expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be "a
+dangerous Foreign Minister[85]." Lincoln was still in Illinois and the
+constituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward's voice was
+sure to be a powerful one. Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to
+talk with him. On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell,
+Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter
+had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was but
+superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon
+prevail[86]. In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons
+asserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary
+of State. He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to
+protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in order
+to resist such interference[87]. Again, on February 12, while himself
+expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties in
+America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solve
+these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governments
+refused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formal
+blockade closing the Southern ports[88]. Writing privately, Lyons
+exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested
+that the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for
+if these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade,
+Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89].
+
+Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction in
+which it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld and
+a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by an
+assertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy toward
+England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of
+strength but that "blustering demonstrations" must not be carried too
+far[90]. Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the
+possibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in
+America. Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons
+that this might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct
+Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same
+time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism.
+Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for a
+time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see what
+Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope of
+compromise, and that in his own view this was still possible. In this
+letter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyons
+is concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a
+resumption of normal relations between the North and South. He at least
+had no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91].
+
+Before this communication could reach England Russell had thoroughly
+awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in relation to
+British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to Lyons, he
+stated, "I hope you are getting on well with the new President. If he
+blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a difficulty. But according
+to all American doctrine it must be an actual blockade kept up by an
+efficient force[92]." Thus, before any act had really occurred in
+America, the matter of a blockade was occupying the attention of British
+statesmen. One difficulty at the time was that there was no one in
+England qualified to speak for the new administration at Washington.
+Dallas, the American Minister appointed under the Buchanan
+administration, while, unlike some other diplomatic representatives
+abroad, faithful to the cause of the United States, was nevertheless not
+wholly trusted by Lincoln or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in
+representing to Russell American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had
+very little communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England was
+known to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell,
+"Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister in
+London. I think it a very good appointment[93]." This news was received
+in London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to elapse before Adams
+reached his post. The appointment of Adams, however, seemed to Lyons a
+matter of congratulation in his hope that no vicious anti-British policy
+would be indulged in by Seward. Ten days after his telegram, he wrote at
+length to Russell, making an excellent statement and analysis in regard
+to the character of Adams.
+
+     "Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. of the
+     U.S., and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The
+     grandfather was the first Am. minister in England. The father
+     was one of the Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the
+     Convention of the 3rd July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of
+     the H. of R. for one of the districts of Mass., acted with
+     the less violent section of the 'Republican' Party. During
+     the last session of Congress he made a very remarkable
+     speech on the state of the Union, denying the reasonableness
+     of the complaints of the Southern States, but stating his
+     desire that every concession not inconsistent with honour and
+     principle should be made to them. He is considered to be a
+     man of great independence of character, and has the
+     reputation of being very tenacious of his own opinions. In
+     manner he is quiet and unassuming. He is a man of good
+     fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a considerable family in Mass.,
+     of the name of Brooks. The late wife of Mr. Edward Everett,
+     who, as your L. is aware, has held the offices of Minister in
+     London and Secretary of State, was her sister[94]."
+
+Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the same time
+by Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now being despatched
+to London, but they were not so favourable. Mann, wrote Bunch, was the
+son of a "bankrupt grocer." His personal character was "not good," yet
+he alone of the three Commissioners appointed had had diplomatic
+experience. Yancey, it was stated, was an able lawyer, a stirring
+orator, and a recognized leader of the secession movement, but he was
+also extremely pro-slavery in his views, had expressed himself in favour
+of a renewal of the slave trade, and throughout his career had been a
+"manifest destiny" man. Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusion
+Bunch described the extreme confidence expressed in the South in "King
+Cotton," and in rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern
+Commissioners thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be
+compelled to bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get
+cotton[95].
+
+The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an astonishingly
+pro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald, consul at New York,
+wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, an exceedingly strong
+statement of his faith in the power of the North and its fixed and
+unalterable determination to force the South back into the Union, his
+confidence in Northern success, and his belief in the justice of the
+Northern cause. He ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to
+pursue, viz., to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly
+and clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did not
+feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such a
+consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for the
+North as would help in shortening the war[96]. The British Consul at
+Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far, indeed, did these
+men go in expressing their sympathy with the North, that Lyons, on April
+27, commented to Russell that these consuls had "taken the Northern War
+Fever," and that he had mildly reproved Archibald[97].
+
+With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the installation of
+Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for Lyons to become more
+active in his efforts to prevent a disruption of British Trade. On March
+20 he told Seward in a confidential conversation:
+
+     "... If the United States determined to stop by force so
+     important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the
+     cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what
+     might happen.
+
+     "... It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to
+     England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were
+     to take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were
+     to be at the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an
+     immense pressure would be put upon Her Majesty's Government
+     to use all the means in their power to open those ports. If
+     Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to do so,
+     they would naturally endeavour to effect their object in a
+     manner as consistent as possible, first with their friendly
+     feelings towards both Sections of this Country, and secondly
+     with the recognized principles of International Law. As
+     regards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared
+     that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to
+     recognize the Southern Confederacy[98]."
+
+This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the South did
+not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five days later, on
+March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreign
+Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all
+ships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade,
+made Lyons very anxious. As a host he diverted the conversation lest it
+become too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward
+
+     "... that it was really a matter so very serious that I was
+     unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount
+     in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast
+     comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an
+     enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase
+     the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in
+     the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of
+     submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99]."
+
+Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the Southern
+Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treated
+well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his folly. Still
+Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as his
+language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that "prudent
+counsels" were in the ascendant, that there would be no interference
+with trade "_at present_," and that a quieter tone was everywhere
+perceptible in Washington[100].
+
+From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, the
+danger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain lay
+in this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports. Naturally,
+and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade. At first,
+indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war really
+ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. Certainly he bore hard
+and constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not only
+officials at Washington but the public press. Thus, in a letter to Bunch
+dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W.H. Russell, the
+_Times_ correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed
+Bunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impress
+him with the idea that any interruption of trade might and probably
+would result in a British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, "...
+the _only_ chance, if chance there still be of preventing an
+interruption of the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained
+here, that it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.[101]" In these
+words is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the
+fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade rather
+than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result in a
+British recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen, when the
+blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause for recognition
+and was most tolerant of its early ineffectiveness.
+
+While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the relations
+between England and America at London were exceedingly meagre. All that
+the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's intentions is summed up
+in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and April 9, 1861[102]. On the
+former date, he gave an account of an interview with Russell in which
+the latter simply refused to pledge himself against a recognition of
+the Confederacy; in the latter, presenting a long memorial written by
+Seward to all of the larger European Governments arguing in friendly
+spirit the cause of the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell
+merely a general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the
+United States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful
+solution. Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English
+policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be better
+for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any definite
+action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though the latter
+later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There is no doubt,
+however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say to Dallas, the
+separation in America was an accomplished fact and the hope of Great
+Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful separation.
+
+Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting that no
+definite stand was yet being taken by the American Government. At the
+same time Russell was continuing his instructions to Lyons to recommend
+conciliation "but never to obtrude advice unasked[103]." Yet Russell was
+not wholly undisturbed by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude,
+for in a private letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to
+Lyons, "I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us
+through the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr.
+Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the
+Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a
+proper distance[104]." It is an interesting query, whether this fear
+thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct benefit to the
+United States at the moment when the Southern Commissioners arrived in
+England. The inference would seem to be clear, that in spite of Lyons'
+advice to treat them well, the effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude
+was to treat them coolly. Russell was indeed distinctly worried by
+Seward's unfriendly attitude.
+
+In the meantime the British press and public, while still uncertain and
+divided as to the merits of the conflict were now substantially a unit
+in accepting separation as final. The _Times_, with judicial ponderosity
+declared: "The new nationality has been brought forth after a very short
+period of gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted
+themselves a nation[105] ..." At the other end of the scale in newspaper
+"tone," the _London Press_ jeered at the Northern American eagle as
+having "had his tail pulled out and his wings clipped--yet the meek bird
+now holds out his claws to be pared, with a resignation that would be
+degrading in the most henpecked of domestic fowls[106]." Having now
+veered about to expressions of confidence in the permanency of the
+Southern Confederacy the _Times_ was also compelled to alter its opinion
+of Southern Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate
+Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far superior
+to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to resist making
+the customary reference to manners traditionally American;
+
+     "With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain from
+     quoting the _naďve_ testimony of a visitor in its favour.
+     'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in
+     Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such
+     industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant
+     Congressional action. _Not one member has appeared in his
+     seat under the influence of liquors or wines_, not a harsh
+     word has been uttered in debate, and all exhibit the most
+     unflagging energy and determination[107].'"
+
+The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the _Times_,
+forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the control of
+"ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike directness and
+sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the stupidity of the
+North, displayed in its tariff policy[108]. A few journals thought that
+the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle but that such a
+victory would be disastrous to the principles of federalism[109], and,
+in any case, that this civil war was one without "a noble cause to
+sustain either side[110]." By May nearly all the older journals were
+aligned on the right of the South to secede, and on the fact of a
+successful secession, though still differing as to the basic causes and
+essential justice involved. In this same month, however, there emerged a
+few vigorous champions of the Northern cause and prospects. In April the
+_Spectator_ agreed that the Great Republic was at an end[111]; in May it
+urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of
+ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of all
+European nations[112]. A small newspaper of limited circulation, the
+_Morning Star_, organ of John Bright, had from the first championed the
+Northern cause. Now, as the armed conflict broke in America, it was
+joined by a more important paper, the _Daily News_, which set itself the
+task of controverting the _Times_. Moreover the _Daily News_ was all the
+more influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet
+consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause and
+principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling for a
+low price, twopence-halfpenny, the _Daily News_, like the _Westminster_
+among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and more popular constituency
+than the older publications, especially to a constituency not yet vocal,
+since still unrepresented, in Parliament[113].
+
+The _Daily News_ was fortunate in having, after 1862, the best-informed
+New York correspondent writing to the London press. This was an
+Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in America, was the
+intimate friend of literary men, and himself, later, a great moulder of
+public opinion[114]. Harriet Martineau further aided the _Daily News_ by
+contributing pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical
+circles[115]. But literary England in general, was slow to express
+itself with conviction, though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was
+firmly determined in his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was
+writing in letters of the "good cause[116]." But Browning was a rare
+exception and it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many
+months that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make
+comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was
+negligible[117].
+
+In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike indicative of
+a widespread conviction that Southern independence was assured, there
+still remained both in those circles where anti-slavery sentiment was
+strong, and in others more neutral in sympathy, a distaste for the
+newly-born State as the embodiment of a degrading institution. Lincoln's
+inaugural address denying an intention to interfere with slavery was a
+weapon for the friends of the South, but it could not wholly still that
+issue. Even in the _Times_, through the medium of W.H. Russell's
+descriptive letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his
+"Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and perfect
+the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the more hateful
+and odious does slavery become[118]," and in his letter of May 8, from
+Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale of slaves he stated:
+
+     "I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor negro
+     worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill
+     through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar
+     with the fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as
+     absolutely the owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew,
+     flesh and brains as of the horse which stood by my side.
+     There was no sophistry which could persuade me the man was
+     not a man--he was, indeed, by no means my brother, but
+     assuredly he was a fellow creature[119]."
+
+This was hard printing for the _Times_, in its new advocacy of the
+South, and Russell's description was made much of by the _Westminster
+Review_ and other publications that soon began to sound again the
+"issue" of slavery[120]. Yet the _Westminster_ itself in the same
+article decried the folly of the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also
+thought even John Bright at the moment, when expressing himself
+privately to friends in America[121].
+
+Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British public, but of
+what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world State were in fact
+born? And if a State in power, why not give it prompt recognition? The
+extreme British anti-slavery opponents feared that this was just what
+the Government was inclined to do, and with promptness. Here and there
+meetings were hurriedly called to protest against recognition[122]. This
+fear was unfounded. Neither in London nor at Washington was there any
+official inclination to hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward
+the logic of such action, if British trade were illegally interfered
+with. By April 9 Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the
+Cabinet would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer
+be attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to
+follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in
+Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere to
+protect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassing
+to that trade. He himself was still insisting, but with dwindling
+confidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under any
+circumstances. And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated to
+Russell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners with
+deference. Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase the
+Northern confidence that they may do anything without provoking the
+resistance of England[123].
+
+Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all it
+was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if that
+injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) he
+did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action by
+Great Britain. When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter in
+Charleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyons
+expressed himself with regard to other elements in the struggle
+previously neglected in his correspondence. On April 15 describing to
+Russell the fall of Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun.
+The North he believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the
+South more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of
+slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized
+world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the cotton States
+is of vital importance to manufacturing nations[124]...." but Lyons was
+now facing an actual situation rather than a possible one, and as will
+be seen later, he soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this
+"commercial intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of
+the South.
+
+With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a civil
+war was actually under way in America, a large number of new and vexing
+problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them furnishes the
+subject matter of later chapters. For the period previous to April,
+1861, British official attitude may be summed up in the statement that
+the British Minister at Washington hoped against hope that some solution
+might be found for the preservation of the Union, but that at the same
+time, looking to future British interests and possibly believing also
+that his attitude would tend to preserve the Union, he asserted
+vehemently the impossibility of any Northern interference with British
+trade to Southern ports. Across the water, Russell also hoped faintly
+that there might be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that
+separation inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed
+his hope on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this,
+however, he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else
+in England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a
+long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering the
+arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new,
+independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the future is
+no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of British
+governmental pleasure in American disruption was justified[125].
+Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge himself to Dallas, was using
+exactly such caution as a Foreign Secretary was bound to exercise. He
+would have been a rash man who, in view of the uncertainty and
+irresolution of Northern statesmen, would have committed Great Britain
+in March, 1861, to a definite line of policy.
+
+On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend
+reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an instruction
+from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of "traditional friendship"
+against a British recognition of the Confederacy. Russell again refused
+to pledge his Government, but on April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British
+Ministers were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and
+final[126]." In the early morning of that same day the armed conflict in
+America had begun, and on the day following, April 13, the first
+Southern victory had been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The
+important question which the man at the head of the British Foreign
+Office had now immediately to decide was, what was to be England's
+attitude, under international law, toward the two combatants in
+America. In deciding this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of
+morality, nor humanitarianism need play any part; England's _first_ need
+and duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens
+the correct position, under International law, which must be assumed in
+the presence of certain definite facts.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 31: Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the 'fifties Great
+Britain made a sharp change of policy. (_Cambridge History of British
+Foreign Policy_, Vol. II, p. 283.)]
+
+[Footnote 32: Thomas Colley Grattan, _Civilized America_, 2 vols. 2nd
+ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The first edition was printed in
+1859 and a third in 1861. In some respects the work is historically
+untrustworthy since internal evidence makes clear that the greater part
+of it was written before 1846, in which year Grattan retired from his
+post in Boston. In general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his
+son succeeded to the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it
+wiser to postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which
+treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This fact
+and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work importance as
+influencing British knowledge and opinions.]
+
+[Footnote 33: Charles Mackay, _Life and Liberty in America: or, Sketches
+of a Tour in the United States and Canada in 1857-8_, one vol., New
+York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at least of sufficient repute as a
+poet to be thought worthy of a dinner in Boston at which there were
+present, Longfellow, Holmes, Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks,
+and others. He preached "hands across the seas" in his public lectures,
+occasionally reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance
+copy of Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding
+verse, "John" speaking, was:
+
+     "And I have strength for nobler work
+       Than e'er my hand has done,
+     And realms to rule and truths to plant
+       Beyond the rising sun.
+     Take you the West and I the East;
+       We'll spread ourselves abroad,
+     With trade and spade and wholesome laws,
+       And faith in man and God."
+]
+
+[Footnote 34: Duncan, _Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer_, Vol. I, p.
+140.]
+
+[Footnote 35: R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes on "The
+English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work on this
+subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford University before
+completing his thesis. His notes have been of considerable value, both
+for suggested citations from the English Press, and for points of
+interpretation.]
+
+[Footnote 36: _Economist_, November 24, 1860. Six months later, however,
+the _Economist_ pictured Lincoln as merely an unknown "sectionalist,"
+with no evidence of statesmanship--_Economist_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 37: _Saturday Review_, November 24, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 38: _Spectator_, November 24, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 39: The _Times_, November 26, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 40: _Ibid._, November 29, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 41: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 42: R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the
+American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in fulfilment of the
+requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Stanford University,
+1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a valuable study of the
+Reviews and of the writings of men of letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus
+"English Opinion."]
+
+[Footnote 43: The _Times_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 44: _Saturday Review_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 45: _Economist_, December 8, 1860. _Spectator_, January 19,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 46: _Spectator_, December 1, 1860. _Times_, January 29, 1861.
+_Economist_, May 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 47: _Saturday Review_, January 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 48: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 112, p. 545.]
+
+[Footnote 49: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 50: Russell, _My Diary North and South_, Boston, 1863, p. 134.
+"Then cropped out again the expression of regret for the rebellion of
+1776, and the desire that if it came to the worst, England would receive
+back her erring children, or give them a prince under whom they could
+secure a monarchical form of government. There is no doubt about the
+earnestness with which these things are said." Russell's _Diary_ is
+largely a condensation of his letters to the _Times_. In the letter of
+April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a column
+on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of colonial
+relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported a Charleston
+sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club in February. He
+wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration of a
+     newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the
+     _nefastus ille dies_ in which the bloody Britishers left
+     Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for
+     about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos _de_
+     nothing at all."
+
+In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic demonstration.
+Returning to his home one evening, he met a military company, which from
+curiosity he followed, and which
+
+     "drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of my
+     friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium
+     of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto
+     Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very
+     brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life
+     an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded,
+     to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr.
+     Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the
+     amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (_dia
+     stomatos_) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back
+     into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a
+     blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy
+     that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over
+     the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to
+     the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit
+     on the floor."
+
+Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the
+British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than the
+clamour of the orator, that offended him? (_Lyons Papers_.)]
+
+[Footnote 51: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 113, p. 555.]
+
+[Footnote 52: The _Times_, January 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 53: Letter to _Dublin News_, dated January 26, 1861. Cited in
+_The Liberator_, March 1, 1861. Garrison, editor of _The Liberator_, was
+then earnest in advocating "letting the South go in peace" as a good
+riddance.]
+
+[Footnote 54: _Saturday Review_, March 2, 1861, p. 216.]
+
+[Footnote 55: _London Chronicle_, March 14, 1861. Cited in _The
+Liberator_, April 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 56: _London Review_, April 20, 1861. Cited in Littel's _Living
+Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the _Review_ was a Dr. Mackay,
+but I have been unable to identify him, as might seem natural from his
+opinions, as the Mackay previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York
+correspondent of the _Times_.]
+
+[Footnote 57: Matthew Arnold, _Letters_, Vol. I., p. 150. Letter to Mrs.
+Forster, January 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 58: Julian Hawthorne, _Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife_, Vol.
+II, pp. 271-78. _Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier_, Vol. II,
+pp. 439 seq.]
+
+[Footnote 59: _Quarterly Review_, Vol. 110, p. 282. July, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 60: Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 61: _Westminster_, Vol. LXXX, p. 587.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his former
+intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of Adams was,
+foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so strongly the
+arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create greater unity of
+Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could not be declared and
+both at home and abroad his action, and that of other former
+anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith that the North was
+in earnest on the general issue of slavery.]
+
+[Footnote 63: _Services rendered by Russia to the American People during
+the War of the Rebellion_, Petersburg, 1904, p. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 65: _Ibid._, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, December 26, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 66: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, January 5, 1861, and No.
+17, February 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 67: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Lords_, Vol. XVIII.
+Correspondence with U.S. Government respecting suspension of Federal
+Customs House at the Port of Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.]
+
+[Footnote 68: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 69: _Ibid._, The same day official instructions were sent
+permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, but directing him, if asked to
+recognize South Carolina, to refer the matter to England. F.O., Am.,
+Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, January 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 70: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 71: This view was not shared by Lyons' colleagues at
+Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early declared the Union
+permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, yet hoped the North
+would soon accept the inevitable and seek close co-operation with the
+South in commerce and in foreign relations. This view was repeated by
+him many times and most emphatically as late as the first month of 1863.
+(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No.
+342.) It was not until September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope
+for a Northern reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A.
+Golder, of Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts
+covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the United
+States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this material the
+English translation is mine.]
+
+[Footnote 72: Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with Lyons, at which he,
+Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had asserted that if Civil
+War came all foreign commerce with the South would be interrupted. To
+this Lyons protested that England could not get along without cotton and
+that she would secure it in one way or another. Seward made no reply.
+(_Ibid._, March 25-April 9, 1861, No. 810.)]
+
+[Footnote 73: _Economist_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Ibid._, February 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 75: _London Press_, March 23, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living
+Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.]
+
+[Footnote 76: Before Adams' selection as Minister to England was decided
+upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were urging him for the place.
+Longfellow was active in this interest. _H.W. Longfellow_, by Samuel
+Longfellow, Vol. II, pp. 412-13.]
+
+[Footnote 77: John Bright later declared "his conviction that the
+leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or friendly
+article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to office." Dasent,
+_Life of Delane_, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is approximately correct, but
+the shift in policy began earlier, when it came to be feared that the
+North would not submit to peaceable secession.]
+
+[Footnote 78: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. I, pp. 344-45.]
+
+[Footnote 79: See _ante_, p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 80: _Economist_, March 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 81: _Spectator_, March 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 82: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 83: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February 22, 1861.
+William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early taken part in
+public meetings called to express humanitarian sentiment. From 1850 on
+he was an acceptable public speaker in all matters liberal, as free
+trade, social reform, and anti-slavery. Elected to Parliament in 1859
+and again in 1861 from Bradford, where he was engaged in business as a
+woollen manufacturer, he sought, after the fashion of new Members, a
+cause to represent and found it in championship of the North. Having
+great native ability, as shown by his later distinguished career, it was
+the good fortune of the United States thus to enlist so eager a
+champion. Forster and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the
+North" in Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but
+was more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a
+reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved prestige
+for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and private
+secretary of the American Minister to England, once told the writer that
+he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, the most valuable
+rendered by any Englishman to the North.]
+
+[Footnote 84: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 85: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I, p. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 86: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 87: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 88: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.]
+
+[Footnote 89: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 90: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 17. Russell to
+Lyons, February 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 91: F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March 11. It is
+curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no extended
+characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with the new
+President were insufficient to justify it. The first record of personal
+impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later printed in his
+"Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the _Times_. Russell was
+taken to the White House. "Soon afterwards there entered, with a
+shambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean
+man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long
+pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which,
+however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression
+produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and
+wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness,
+sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes dark, full, and
+deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almost
+amounts to tenderness.... A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street
+would not take him to be what--according to usages of European
+society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at the same time, it would not
+be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street
+without notice."--_My Diary_, I, pp. 37-8.]
+
+[Footnote 92: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 93: F.O., Am., Vol. 761.]
+
+[Footnote 94: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, 1861. Received
+April 16.]
+
+[Footnote 95: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. Received
+April 9.]
+
+[Footnote 96: F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 97: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 98: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, 1861. Printed
+in Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I., p. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 99: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 100: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 101: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 102: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, pp, 80-81.]
+
+[Footnote 103: F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to Lyons, April 6,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 104: Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 105: The _Times_, February 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 106: _London Press_, March 30, 1861, Cited in Littell's
+_Living Age_, Vol. 69, p. 379.]
+
+[Footnote 107: The _Times_, March 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 108: _Saturday Review_, May 11, 1861, pp. 465-6.]
+
+[Footnote 109: _Economist_, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 110: _Examiner_, January 5 and (as quoted) April 27, 1861.
+Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 68, p. 758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.]
+
+[Footnote 111: _Spectator_, April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 112: _Ibid._, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 113: These four publications, the _Spectator_, the
+_Westminster_, the _Daily News_, and the _Morning Star_, were the
+principal British pro-Northern organs. In addition _The Liberator_ names
+among the lesser and provincial press the following: _Nonconformist,
+British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, Newcastle
+Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury_ and _Belfast Whig_. Duffus, "English
+Opinion," p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 114: Godkin had joined the staff of the _Daily News_ in 1853.
+During the Crimea War he was special war correspondent. He had travelled
+extensively in America in the late 'fifties and was thoroughly well
+informed. From 1862 to 1865 his letters to the _Daily News_ were of
+great value in encouraging the British friends of the North. In 1865
+Godkin became editor of the New York _Nation_.]
+
+[Footnote 115: W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet Martineau alone
+who was keeping English opinion about America on the right side through
+the Press." The _Daily News_ Jubilee Edition, p. 46.]
+
+[Footnote 116: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, Vol. II,
+p. 92.]
+
+[Footnote 117: Moncure D. Conway's _Autobiography_ asserts that
+two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union cause, some of
+them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, Sir Charles Lyell,
+Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic
+Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406.
+This is probably true of ultimate, though not of initial, interest and
+attitude. But for many writers their published works give no clue to
+their opinions on the Civil War--as for example the works of Dickens,
+Thackeray, William Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion,"
+p. 103.]
+
+[Footnote 118: Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 398.]
+
+[Footnote 119: The _Times_, May 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 120: _Westminster Review_, Vol. 76, pp. 487-509, October,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 121: Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited in Rhodes,
+_United States_, Vol. III, p. 509.]
+
+[Footnote 122: A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, declared that
+anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the South. Reported in
+_Liberator_, May 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 123: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and 142.]
+
+[Footnote 124: _Ibid._, No. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 125: See _ante_, pp. 50-51.]
+
+[Footnote 126: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861
+
+In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under the
+leadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" Liberal
+Government, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so constituted
+that almost equal influence was attributed to the Foreign Secretary,
+Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held the Premiership, and, as
+they represented different wings of the Whig-Liberal party, it was
+prophesied by political wiseacres that personal friction would soon lead
+to a new disruption. Nor were the possible elements of discord confined
+to these two. Gladstone, formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a time
+uncertain whether to return to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals,
+had yielded to Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters,
+and had joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed to
+him in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadership
+among the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home Secretary
+until July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April, 1863, Secretary
+for War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and conciliator between
+these divergent interests stood Lord Granville, President of Council,
+then a "Conservative-Liberal," especially valuable to the Cabinet for
+the confidence reposed in him by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.
+
+In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this he had
+built his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism," assertive of
+England's honour and jealous for British advantage. Now, however, as
+head of a Government requiring the most delicate handling to maintain
+itself, he devoted his energies to details of political management in
+which he had great skill. His ambition was, primarily, to retain office,
+and in this purpose he was fortunate because, unknown to his ministerial
+colleagues, he had received an indirect pledge from Lord Derby, the
+Opposition leader, that there would be, for a time at least, no
+determined effort to unseat him so long as his Ministry brought forward
+no Bill for a further expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingness
+to make any further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerston
+was wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so,
+was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John," gained by his
+assertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step toward
+democracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchise
+question. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the
+"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political faith, and
+none were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The outspoken Radicals in
+Parliament, like John Bright, and his friend Cobden, who had refused to
+take office under Palmerston, gave a lukewarm support to the Ministry,
+but would not pledge themselves to steadfast adherence. They had hopes
+of Gladstone, believed that he would ultimately come into their group,
+but meanwhile watched with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeed
+Palmerston desired it, in the details of financial management to the
+exclusion of other questions.
+
+The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward democracy
+as affecting British policy during the American Civil War will be
+considered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had not become a
+clear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as historical evidence can
+determine, affect early governmental policy toward America. The
+outstanding feature of the British Government in 1861 is that it was
+made up of various so-called "Liberal" elements, the representatives of
+each of which carried on the business of his own department much as he
+pleased. Palmerston's was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever he
+cared to express it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern was
+to keep his all-star associates running smoothly together and thus to
+give no occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followed
+that Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreign
+affairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed the
+Government was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell Ministry."
+These two were the leaders of the team; next came Gladstone and
+Cornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation, and each eager to
+lead when their elders should retire from harness. Gladstone's great
+ability was already recognized, but his personal political faith was not
+yet clear. Lewis, lacking his rival's magnetic and emotional qualities,
+cold, scholarly, and accurate in performance, was regarded as a
+statesman of high promise[127]. Other Cabinet members, as is the custom
+of coalitions, were more free in opinion and action than in a strict
+party ministry where one dominating personality imposes his will upon
+his colleagues.
+
+Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the main voice
+of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme crisis, governmental
+foreign policy was Russell's policy. This was even more true as regards
+American than European affairs, for the former were little understood,
+and dependence was necessarily placed upon the man whose business it was
+to be familiar with them. Indeed there was little actual parliamentary
+or governmental interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American
+question, attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian
+expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian
+islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in Schleswig-Holstein.
+Neither did the opposition party venture to express a policy as regards
+America. Lord Derby, able but indolent, occasionally indulged in caustic
+criticism, but made no attempt to push his attack home. Malmesbury, his
+former Foreign Secretary, was active and alert in French affairs, but
+gave no thought to relations across the Atlantic[128]. Disraeli, Tory
+leader in the Commons, skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the
+Government's policy, but never on the American question, though
+frequently urged to do so by the friends of the South. In short for the
+first year of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward
+America was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend
+or foe.
+
+This being the case, what did Russell know about the American crisis?
+Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived from the
+reports of British officials in the United States, and from the pages of
+the public press. The salient facts known to Russell were few. Lincoln's
+Cabinet had been named. Lincoln himself was absolutely an unknown
+quantity, but it was unbelievable that a man of his origins and history
+could be more than a mere figurehead--an opinion then held as widely in
+America as in England. But someone must determine American policy, and
+by universal consent, this would be Seward.
+
+The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in England
+than any other American statesman, with the possible exception of
+Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had established a
+circle of British friendships. Both men were accepted as champions of
+anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations and his so-called
+"martyrdom" under the physical violence of the South Carolinan, Brooks;
+and Seward for his clever political anti-Southern leadership in the
+United States Senate. But Seward's reputation in this respect was offset
+by the belief that he was anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at
+least that he was very ready to arouse for political ends the customary
+anti-British sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New
+York. In 1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the
+Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of
+Newcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then
+"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat,
+whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious speculation
+in British governmental circles[129]. Moreover Seward's reputation was
+that of a wily, clever politician, rather unscrupulous in methods which
+British politicians professed to disdain--a reputation serving to dim
+somewhat, as indeed it did in America also, the sincere idealisms and
+patriotism of the statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in Great
+Britain as a rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding power
+in the new Republican administration.
+
+This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but not by
+all. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis Adams, himself
+a most stiffly upright politician, both regarded Seward as the only
+possible leader of Republican party policy and rejoiced that this was
+so, having great confidence in his chief's integrity and wisdom. Adams
+himself was well suited to his new post. He was known as having early in
+1849 fought the battle of anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig," and later
+as a leading Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts.
+Principally, however, he was suited to his post by education, family,
+and character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father's
+ministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England. His
+father and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, both
+Presidents of the United States, had both, also, been American Ministers
+at London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide acquaintance through
+training and study with European affairs, especially those of Britain,
+and equipped with high intellectual gifts, Adams was still further
+fitted to his new post by his power of cool judgment and careful
+expression in critical times. His very coolness, sometimes appearing as
+coldness and stiff dignity, rendered him an especially fit agent to deal
+with Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. The two men quickly
+learned to respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose in
+national policies.
+
+But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in London. The
+Southern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama, but soon
+transferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson Davis as
+President and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President. Neither man was well
+known in England, though both had long been prominent in American
+politics. The little British information on Davis, that he had served in
+the United States Senate and as a Cabinet member, seemed to indicate
+that he was better fitted to executive duties than his rival, Lincoln.
+But Davis' foreign policy was wholly a matter for speculation, and his
+Cabinet consisted of men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. In
+truth it was not a Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune of
+the South that everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southern
+gentlemen sought reputation and glory in the army rather than in
+political position. Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the
+importance to the South of a well-considered and energetic foreign
+policy. At first, indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention
+to the exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southern
+patriotism, Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary
+in denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to
+appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on both
+slavery and secession[130]. "The single exception to this general
+policy[131]" was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and
+Mann, all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Of
+these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic experience.
+Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he at least was
+known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern orator, demanding for
+ten years past, that Southern action in defence of states rights and
+Southern "interests," which now, at last, the South was attempting[132].
+
+Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached London
+on April 29[133]. Meanwhile in this same month of April, conditions in
+America, so long confused and uncertain, were being rapidly clarified.
+The South, earlier than the North, had come to a determined policy, for
+while during January and February, at the Montgomery convention, there
+had been uncertainty as to actively applying the doctrinaire right of
+secession, by March the party of action had triumphed, and though there
+was still talk of conferences with the North, and commissioners actually
+appointed, no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In the
+North, the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincoln
+was not inaugurated until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was
+earlier possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed.
+European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing to let
+the South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was discussing the
+advisability of a separate secession by that financial centre from
+Nation and State alike--and of setting up as a "free town." Seward, just
+appointed Secretary of State, was repudiating in both official and
+private talk any intention to coerce the South by force of arms[134]. It
+is no wonder that British statesmen were largely at sea over the
+American situation.
+
+But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort Sumter
+in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal fortress
+under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That event drove
+away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and removed the last
+vestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of militant patriotism swept
+over both sections[135]. Hurriedly both North and South prepared for
+war, issuing calls for volunteers and organizing in all accustomed
+warlike preparations. The news of Sumter reached London on April 27, and
+that civil war seemed certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis,
+since the South lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue
+letters of marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a
+Northern intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such
+letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to be
+instituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British officials and
+public after the long delay and uncertainty of months, events in America
+had precipitated a state of war, though in fact there were still to
+elapse other months in which both North and South laboured to transform
+a peaceful society into one capable of waging effective battle.
+
+The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to alter,
+almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British policy,
+though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting the turn of
+events, had given careful consideration to the steps required of it in
+just such a situation as had now arisen. Certainly both Lyons and
+Russell had been deeply anxious for some time, and had visualized a
+proper British policy. The movement in Great Britain now became rapid.
+On April 29, Malmesbury, in the Lords, spoke of the news of civil war
+which had arrived "this morning," and asked if the Government had tried
+to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with other powers to
+check it. Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United
+States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions from
+Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be extremely
+careful about offering advice unless "asked for by the contending
+parties themselves." Both speakers commented on the "ties of blood"
+rendering Britain especially anxious in this American quarrel, and
+regretted the conflict[136]. Malmesbury's query as to the approach to
+another government, meaning France, was evaded. That some such approach,
+in accordance with the earlier advice of Lyons[137], had already been
+made, is evident from the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas
+learned from Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though
+what that action would be was not made clear[138]. As Dallas' report was
+soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be considered, the
+paragraph referring to this matter is important:
+
+     "The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of
+     certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the
+     President induced him to request me to call at his private
+     residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three
+     representatives of the Southern confederacy were here[139];
+     that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so,
+     _unofficially_; that there existed an understanding between
+     this government and that of France which would lead both to
+     take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course
+     might be; and he then referred to the rumour of a meditated
+     blockade of Southern ports and their discontinuance as ports
+     of entry--topics on which I had heard nothing. But as I
+     informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention
+     to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara,' which
+     left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive
+     in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his
+     lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere
+     rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my
+     successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be
+     further postponed, at his lordship's suggestion."
+
+May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two Southern
+commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As reported by
+them[140], Russell listened with attention to their representation, but
+made no informing comment. They argued the constitutional right of
+secession, depicted the firm determination of the South, were confident
+of early acquiescence by the North, and especially laid stress on the
+Southern desire for free trade. Russell's own report to Lyons on this
+interview and on one held six days later, May 9, is in substantial
+agreement, but much more is made by him than by the Commissioners of a
+question put by Russell as to a Southern plan of reviving the African
+slave-trade[141]. Yancey and Rost denied this and asserted "that they
+had prohibited the slave-trade, and did not mean to revive it." Their
+report to Richmond does not depict this matter as of special
+significance in the interview; Russell's report to Lyons lays stress
+upon it. The general result of the interview was that Russell listened,
+but refused, as to Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But the
+Southern Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were
+content to wait on British action[142].
+
+On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the Attorney-General a
+memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing the belligerency of the
+South and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and
+reprisal. The memorandum notes that Southern privateering would be
+dangerous to British commerce with the North, but sees no help for it.
+"The best solution," wrote the Attorney-General, "would be for the
+European nations to determine that the war between the two Confederacies
+shall be carried on on the principles of 'Justum Bellum,' and shall be
+conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize the
+Southern States as a Belligerent on this condition only[143]." The next
+day, referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law
+officers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in America
+as regular war[144]," but he does _not_ comment on the legal advice to
+press the South to abandon privateering before recognizing her
+belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning that can be attached to
+the last sentence quoted from the Attorney-General's memorandum. This
+advice, however, in view of the opinion that there was "no help for it,"
+was presumably but a suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre
+with little confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" was
+not the probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily
+yield its only naval weapon.
+
+In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and announced. The
+letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to be a "regular war"
+was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction giving Lyons advance
+notice of the determination reached by the Cabinet to recognize the
+belligerent rights of the South. Russell indulged in many expressions of
+regret and sympathy, but Lyons was not to conceal that this British
+action represented the Government's view of the actualities of the
+American situation. Yet while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he
+was not instructed to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of
+Southern belligerency[145]. Here was a correct understanding of the
+difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a permitted
+avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground[146]. Russell was not then aware
+of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a theory, not yet
+clearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was a
+rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he does
+appear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to the
+constituted government at Washington[147]. Moreover his instructions
+were in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, a
+recognition of Southern sovereignty.
+
+On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent to
+Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France to
+join, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights. Cowley was
+also instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautions
+by European governments, and it was suggested that France and England
+unite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and third
+articles of the Declaration of Paris[148]. These articles refer to the
+exemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a
+neutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag[149]. This day,
+also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognize
+the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as a
+necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified Russell that
+Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with
+England's policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication,
+Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's suggestion that both powers issue a
+declaration that they "intended to abstain from all interference," and
+that M. de Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been given
+instructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151].
+
+The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May
+1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat by
+surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell's
+parliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date. But on May
+9 the _Times_ set the fashion of general approval in an editorial
+stating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflict
+in a new light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals
+involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were now
+more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to be
+regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business to keep strictly
+out of it and to maintain neutrality[152]. This generalization was no
+doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the Government and in
+Parliament men who were thinking seriously of specific difficulties
+realized that the two main problems immediately confronting a British
+neutral policy were privateering and blockade. The South had declared
+its _intention_ to use privateers. The North had declared its
+_intention_, first to hang those who engaged in privateering, and second
+to establish a blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been put
+into effect.
+
+The first action of the British Government was directed toward
+privateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords Commissioners
+of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern plan to issue letters
+of marque and reprisal and directing that reinforcements be sent to the
+British fleet in American waters. This was prompt action on unofficial
+information, for Davis' proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons'
+despatch containing copies of it, sent on April 22, was not received by
+Russell until May 10[153]. Ordinary news from the United States required
+ten days to get into print in London[154], but official messages might
+be sent more rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer
+to Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram to
+Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was
+occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best the
+exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln
+proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been received
+only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce the
+British fleet.
+
+[Illustration: _Photo: F. Hollyer_. SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G. (_From
+Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography," by
+kind permission_)]
+
+The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers sailing
+under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with as Pirates,"
+thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at the Davis and
+Lincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a British fleet had
+been sent to protect British interests and took occasion to indicate
+British policy by adding, "we have not been involved in any way in that
+contest by any act or giving any advice in the matter, and, for God's
+sake, let us if possible keep out of it[155]." May 6, Gregory, a friend
+of the South, who had already given notice of a motion for the
+recognition of the Confederacy as an independent State, asked whether
+the United States had been informed that a blockade of Southern ports
+would not be recognized unless effective, and whether there would be
+acquiescence in the belligerent right of the South to issue letters of
+marque and reprisal[156]. Russell replied that Lincoln had _not_ been
+informed that a blockade must be effective to be respected since the
+Washington Government did not need to be told of an international rule
+which it had itself long proclaimed. As to the second point, he now
+announced what heretofore had not been clearly stated, that Southern
+privateers could not be regarded by Great Britain as pirates, for if so
+regarded Britain would herself have to treat them as pirates and would
+thus be unneutral. This was in fact, in spite of Northern bitter
+accusations that Britain was exhibiting governmental sympathy with the
+South by her tolerance of the plan of Southern privateering, an
+inescapable conclusion. Russell added, however, that the matter of
+privateering involved some new questions under the Declaration of Paris
+upon which the Government had not yet decided what stand to take[157].
+It was on this same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley to
+take up with France the question of the Declaration of Paris[158],
+Privateering and blockade, declared in America months before there was
+any possibility of putting them into effect, and months before there
+were any military operations in the field, forced this rapid European
+action, especially the action of Great Britain, which, more than any
+other European nation, feared belligerent interference with her carrying
+and export trade. How was the British Government to know that Davis
+would not bend every energy in sending out privateers, and Lincoln to
+establish a blockade? The respective declarations of Davis and Lincoln
+were the _first_ evidences offered of belligerent status. It was
+reasonable to assume that here would come the first energetic efforts of
+the belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence sufficiently
+informed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled few ships that
+could be fitted out as privateers, or that two-thirds of the Northern
+navy was at the moment widely scattered in foreign seas, making
+impossible a prompt blockade.
+
+To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial interests lay
+in this announced maritime war, and it felt the necessity of defining
+its neutral position with speed. The underlying fact of the fixity of
+Southern determination to maintain secession had in the last few weeks
+become clearly recognized.
+
+Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in America,
+some of it received just before the issue of the Proclamation of
+Neutrality, some just after, was all confirmative of the rapid approach
+of a great war. A letter from Bunch, at Charleston, was received on May
+10, depicting the united Southern will to resist Northern attack, and
+asserting that the South had no purpose save to conduct a strictly
+defensive war. Bunch was no longer caustic; he now felt that a new
+nation was in process of birth[159]. May 4, Monson, writing from
+Washington, and just returned from a trip through the South, in the
+course of which he had visited Montgomery, stated "_no reconstruction_
+of the Union is possible," and added that there was no danger of a
+servile insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb the
+British Government and public[160]. A few days later on, May 12, Lyons
+expressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons of
+anti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from expressions
+of sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern Cabinet in its
+plan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would be frightful in its
+consequences both to America and to England[161].
+
+Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation of
+Neutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action was
+necessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that action had
+been wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series of questions as
+to the application of the British Foreign Enlistment Act in the American
+crisis. What would be the status of British citizens serving on
+Confederate privateers? How would the Government treat citizens who
+aided in equipping such privateers? Did not the Government intend to
+take measures to prevent the infringement of law in British ports? Here
+was pressure by a friend of the North to hasten an official announcement
+of the policy already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis replied
+stating that the Government was about to issue a general proclamation
+warning British subjects not to take any part in the war[162]. Similar
+questions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received a
+similar answer[163]. The few days' delay following Russell's statement
+of May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law Officers to the exact
+form required. The Proclamation as issued was dated May 13, and was
+officially printed in the _London Gazette_ on May 14.
+
+In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not differ
+from customary usage[164]. It spoke of the Confederacy as "states
+styling themselves the Confederate States of America," prohibited to
+Englishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist others, or
+equipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to such ships. War
+vessels being equipped in British ports would be seized and forfeited to
+the British Government. If a belligerent war-ship came into a British
+port, no change or increase of equipment was to be permitted. If a
+subject violated the Proclamation he was both punishable in British
+courts and forfeited any claim to British protection. The Parliamentary
+discussion on May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimity
+of opinion the policy of the Government in application of the
+Proclamation; the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, but
+recognition of independence was for the future to determine; the right
+of the South to send out privateers was regretfully recognized; such
+privateers could not be regarded as pirates and the North would have no
+right to treat them as such, but if the North in defiance of
+international opinion did so treat them, Great Britain had at least
+warned its subjects that they, if engaged in service on a Southern
+privateer, had no claim to British protection; a blockade of the South
+to be respected must be effective at least to the point where a vessel
+attempting to pass through was likely to be captured; the plan of
+blockading the entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of
+coast line, was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members of
+Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of the
+Southern seaboard[165].
+
+The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for one side
+in the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly on legal
+questions and their probable application. On May 15 Russell sent to
+Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but did not instruct him to
+communicate it officially to Seward, leaving this rather to Lyons'
+discretion. This was discretionary in diplomatic usage since in strict
+fact the Proclamation was addressed to British subjects and need not be
+communicated officially to the belligerents. In the result the
+discretion permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition
+of Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the
+Northern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then, or
+later, make official communication to Seward of the Proclamation[166].
+The fact soon appeared that the United States seriously objected to the
+Proclamation of Neutrality, protesting first, its having been issued at
+all, and, in the second place, resenting what was considered its
+"premature" announcement by a friendly nation. This matter developed so
+serious a criticism by both American Government and public, both during
+and after the Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did the
+British Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a
+"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality?
+
+On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on the
+morning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in London[167],
+but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was
+prevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford[168].
+All that was immediately possible was to make official notification of
+arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen. This was
+promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, Palmerston
+attending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams' first report to
+Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that public opinion was "not
+exactly what we would wish." In this he referred to the utterances of
+the press, particularly those of the _Times_, which from day to day and
+with increasing vigour sounded the note of strict neutrality in a
+"non-idealistic" war. On May 30 the _Times_, asserting that both parties
+in America were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion
+as follows:
+
+     "We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, that it
+     does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern leaders
+     that they are half inclined to become British once more. Both
+     sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans
+     over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily.
+
+     "For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of
+     events has induced us to regard the dispute as a more
+     commonplace kind of quarrel than it at first appeared to be.
+     The real motives of the belligerents, as the truth
+     transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as have caused
+     wars in all times and countries. They are essentially selfish
+     motives--that is to say, they are based upon speculations of
+     national power, territorial aggrandizement, political
+     advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim any
+     superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of
+     patriotism....
+
+     "We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to
+     remove the case from the common category of national or
+     monarchical quarrels. The representations of the North might
+     be made word for word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous
+     of 'rectifying' his frontier, consolidating his empire, or
+     retaining a disaffected province in subjection. The
+     manifestos of the South might be put forth by any State
+     desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion or exchanging
+     union for independence....
+
+     "It is just such a question as has been left times out of
+     mind in this Old World to the decision of the sword. The
+     sword will be the arbitrator in the New World too; but the
+     event teaches us plainly enough that Republics and
+     Democracies enjoy no exemption from the passions and follies
+     of humanity."
+
+Under these impressions Adams presented himself on May 18 for his first
+interview with Russell[169]. He stated that he had come with the idea
+that there was
+
+     ".... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the
+     relations actually existing between the two nations from the
+     risk of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate
+     domestic disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was
+     not without pain that I was compelled to admit that from the
+     day of my arrival I had felt in the proceedings of both
+     houses of Parliament, in the language of Her Majesty's
+     ministers, and in the tone of opinion prevailing in private
+     circles, more of uncertainty about this than I had before
+     thought possible,"
+
+Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to Dallas
+refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South implied a
+British purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the effect to widen,
+if not to make irreparable, a breach [between North and South] which we
+believed yet to be entirely manageable by ourselves."
+
+Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had simply
+meant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not disposed in
+any way to interfere." To this Adams answered that:
+
+     ".... it was deserving of grave consideration whether great
+     caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might,
+     even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage
+     the hopes of the disaffected in America.... It was in this
+     view that I must be permitted to express the great regret I
+     had felt on learning the decision to issue the Queen's
+     proclamation, which at once raised the insurgents to the
+     level of a belligerent State, and still more the language
+     used in regard to it by Her Majesty's ministers in both
+     houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever might be the
+     design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the effect of
+     these events had been to encourage the friends of the
+     disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private
+     opinion indicated it strongly."
+
+Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on recent events
+than they deserved. The Government had taken the advice of the Law
+Officers and as a result had concluded that "as a question merely of
+_fact_, a war existed.... Under such circumstances
+
+     it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this in the
+     technical sense as _justum bellum_, that is, a war of two
+     sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice,
+     as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to
+     bring the management of it within the rules of modern
+     civilized warfare. This was all that was contemplated by the
+     Queen's proclamation. It was designed to show the purport of
+     existing laws, and to explain to British subjects their
+     liabilities in case they should engage in the war."
+
+To this Adams answered "... that under other circumstances
+
+     I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to this
+     view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to
+     remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a
+     little more rapid than was absolutely called for by the
+     occasion.... And furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to
+     be a belligerent State before they had ever shown their
+     capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever, except
+     within one of their own harbours, and under every possible
+     advantage. It considered them a marine power before they had
+     ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean.... The rule
+     was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any
+     organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its
+     power to defend and protect itself against the assaults of
+     enemies, and at the same time to manifest a capacity to
+     maintain binding relations with foreign nations, then a
+     measure of recognition could not be justly objected to on any
+     side. The case was very different when such an interference
+     should take place, prior to the establishment of the proof
+     required, as to bring about a result which would not probably
+     have happened but for that external agency."
+
+This representation by the American Minister, thus early made, contains
+the whole argument advanced against the British Proclamation of
+Neutrality, though there were many similar representations made at
+greater length both by Adams later, and by Seward at Washington. They
+are all well summarized by Bernard as "a rejection ... of the
+proposition that the existence of war is a simple matter of fact, to be
+ascertained as other facts are--and an assertion ... of the dogma that
+there can be no war, so far as foreign nations are concerned, and,
+therefore, no neutrality, so long as there is a sovereignty _de
+jure_[170]." But in this first representation Adams, in the main, laid
+stress upon the _haste_ with which the Proclamation of Neutrality had
+been issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that British
+sympathies were with the South.
+
+One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing exactly
+those opinions advanced by Adams. The _Spectator_ declared that while
+the Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared to be one of strict
+neutrality, it in reality tended "directly to the benefit of the
+South[171]." A fortnight later this paper asserted, "The quarrel, cover
+it with cotton as we may, is between freedom and slavery, right and
+wrong, the dominion of God and the dominion of the Devil, and the duty
+of England, we submit, is clear." She should, even though forced to
+declare her neutrality, refuse for all time to recognize the
+slave-holding Confederacy[172]. But the _Spectator_ stood nearly alone
+in this view. The _Saturday Review_ defended in every respect the issue
+of the Proclamation and added, "In a short time, it will be necessary
+further to recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but the
+United States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall be
+postponed until the failure of the effort which they assert or believe
+that they are about to make has resulted in an experimental proof that
+subjugation is impossible[173]." A few provincial papers supported the
+view of the _Spectator_, but they were of minor importance, and
+generally the press heartily approved the Proclamation.
+
+At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has just
+received an instruction from Seward written under the impression aroused
+by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April 8 to make any pledge as
+to British policy on the recognition of Southern independence. Seward
+was very much disturbed by what Russell had said to Dallas. In this
+instruction, dated April 27[174], he wrote:
+
+     "When you shall have read the instructions at large which
+     have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that
+     these last remarks of his lordship are by no means
+     satisfactory to this government. Her Britannic Majesty's
+     government is at liberty to choose whether it will retain the
+     friendship of this government by refusing all aid and comfort
+     to its enemies, now in flagrant rebellion against it, as we
+     think the treaties existing between the two countries
+     require, or whether the government of Her Majesty will take
+     the precarious benefits of a different course.
+
+     "You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic
+     Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of
+     his lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this
+     government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights
+     and derogating from its dignity."
+
+Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood them,
+Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and especially
+in the Government, stating that this improvement was due, in part, to
+the vigour now being shown by the Northern Government, in part "to a
+sense that the preceding action of Her Majesty's ministers has been
+construed to mean more than they intended by it[175]." But at
+Washington the American irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was
+reporting Seward and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the
+Proclamation of Neutrality[176]. On June 14, Lyons had a long
+conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that the
+South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the conference
+feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and England on this
+point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious because France was so long
+delaying her own Proclamation[177]. To meet the situation, he and
+Mercier, the French Minister, went the next day, June 15, on an official
+visit to Seward with the intention of formally presenting the British
+Proclamation and Thouvenel's instructions to Mercier to support it[178].
+But Seward "said at once that he could not receive from us a
+communication founded on the assumption that
+
+     the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as Belligerents; that
+     this was a determination to which the Cabinet had come
+     deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events had
+     in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers
+     and the Southern States; that he would not discuss the
+     question with us, but that he should give instructions to the
+     United States Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be
+     enabled to state the reasons for the course taken by their
+     Government to Your Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you
+     should be desirous to hear them.... He should not take
+     Official cognizance of the recognition of the Belligerent
+     Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and France, unless
+     he should be forced to do so by an Official communication
+     addressed to the Government of the United States itself."
+
+In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward "for
+his own use only." They did not regard the moment well chosen "to be
+punctilious." Lyons reported that Seward's language and demeanour
+throughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good humoured," but
+the fact remained that the United States had not been officially
+notified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and that the American
+Government, sensitive to popular excitement in the matter and committed
+to the theory of a rebellion of peoples, was thus left free to continue
+argument in London without any necessity of making formal protest and of
+taking active steps to support such protest[179]. The official relation
+was eased by the conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger of
+America, expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and,
+temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs. The
+_Times_ told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that the utmost care
+and circumspection must be used by every man or party in England to
+avoid giving offence to either of the two incensed belligerents[180]."
+In answer to the Northern outcry at the lack of British sympathy, it
+declared "Neutrality--strict neutrality--is all that the United States
+Government can claim[181]."
+
+While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward the
+British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two other
+matters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of the
+British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing given by
+Russell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward, on May 21,
+wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent
+service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We
+treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by
+our own citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great
+Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents and give
+them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the law of nations affords
+an adequate and proper remedy[182]." This was threatening language, but
+was for Adams' own eye, and in the next sentence of his letter Seward
+stated that avoidance of friction on this point was easy, since in 1856
+Great Britain had invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration
+of Paris everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United
+States was now ready to accede.
+
+What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made clear for
+the question of privateering did not constitute the main point of his
+belligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed treatment of
+privateers as pirates might have resulted in very serious complications,
+for though the Proclamation of Neutrality had warned British subjects
+that they would forfeit any claim to protection if they engaged in the
+conflict, it is obvious that the hanging as a pirate of a British seaman
+would have aroused a national outcry almost certain to have forced the
+Government into protest and action against America. Fortunately the
+cooler judgment of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of
+the plan of treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of
+giving "shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from
+Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such
+shelter would be available in British ports[183].
+
+In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that the
+Southern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially,"
+instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that: "You
+will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as
+well as official, with the British Government, so long as it shall
+continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this
+country." Here was a positive instruction as to the American Minister's
+conduct in a given situation, and a very serious instruction, nearly
+equivalent to "taking leave" after a rupture of diplomatic relations,
+but the method to be used in avoiding if possible the necessity of the
+serious step was left to Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment,
+when reporting the outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion of
+my task[184]." Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as to
+British intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, but
+added that he had not been able to convince himself of the existence of
+an unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised that the fact of
+the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in this city, and still
+more the knowledge that they had been admitted to more or less
+interviews with his lordship, was calculated to excite uneasiness.
+Indeed, it had already given great dissatisfaction to my Government. I
+added, as moderately as I could, that in all frankness any further
+protraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as
+hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action
+accordingly." Russell replied that both France and England had long been
+accustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the case of
+"Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc.," to hear what they had to say. "But
+this did not imply recognition in their case any more than in ours. He
+added that he had seen the gentlemen once some time ago, and once more
+some time since; he had no expectation of seeing them any more[185]."
+
+For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions might
+have brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of Adams and
+the acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been given; Russell
+merely stated that he had "no expectation" of further interviews with
+the Southern commissioners; he was still ready to hear from them in
+writing. This caused a division of opinion between the commissioners;
+Yancey argued that Russell's concession to Adams was itself a violation
+of the neutrality the British Government had announced, and that it
+should be met by a formal protest. But the other members insisted on a
+reference to Richmond for instructions[186]. On the same day that Adams
+reported the result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston:
+
+     "My position here thus far has not been difficult or painful.
+     If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in the
+     diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high
+     road to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to
+     me to be expedient so to play into the hands of our
+     opponents. Although there has been and is more or less of
+     sympathy with the slave-holders in certain circles, they are
+     not so powerful as to overbear the general sentiment of the
+     people. The ministry has been placed in rather delicate
+     circumstances, when a small loss of power on either extreme
+     would have thrown them out[187]."
+
+In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly, at
+least, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he therefore
+considered it best not to press too harshly upon the Government.
+
+But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant: "I wait
+with patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to engage a house
+for more than a month at a time...." He might himself be inclined to
+view more leniently the Proclamation of Neutrality and be able to find
+excuses for the alleged haste with which it had been issued, but his
+instructions required strong representations, especially on the latter
+point. Adams' report to Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interview
+with Russell of June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southern
+commissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of delay
+given by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that pledge in a
+hasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on the line already
+taken on May 18[188]. From this time on, throughout and after the war,
+this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing bitterness.
+British friends of the North joined in the American outcry. By mere
+reiteration it became in the popular mind on both sides of the Atlantic
+an accepted and well-founded evidence of British governmental
+unfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion of the Civil War, John
+Bright in Parliament, commenting on the causes of American ill-will,
+declared that the Government of 1861, knowing that Adams was on his way,
+should in mere courtesy, have waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, the
+Proclamation, entirely justifiable in itself, might have been issued
+without offence and without embittering the United States[189].
+
+Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was the
+Proclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had given any
+such pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the interview of May 1
+would seem to support that denial[190]. On that day Russell for the
+second time told Dallas that England would not commit herself, as yet,
+as regards Southern recognition, clearly meaning a recognition of
+_sovereignty_, not of belligerency, and immediately asked Dallas what
+the rumours of a blockade meant. Dallas replied that he had no
+information on this point, and Russell "acquiesced in the expediency of
+disregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought
+by my successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further
+postponed, at his lordship's suggestion."
+
+The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that Russell
+refrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of which Dallas
+knew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by Adams, and
+especially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's motion, which
+was one for _recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the South_,
+would be postponed. If there was a pledge here it was a pledge not to
+recognize Southern sovereignty until after Adams' arrival.
+
+But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no question,"
+writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his father, "that the
+proclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly haste.... The purpose
+was manifest. It was to have the status of the Confederacy as a
+belligerent an accomplished fact before the arrival of the newly
+accredited minister. This precipitate action was chiefly significant as
+indicating an animus; that animus being really based on ... the belief,
+already matured into a conviction, that the full recognition of the
+Confederacy as an independent power was merely a question of time, and
+probably of a very short time[191]." The author does not, however,
+support the contemporary American contention that _any_ Proclamation was
+contrary to international custom and that no recognition of belligerent
+status was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced the
+mother country itself to recognize the division as fully accomplished,
+even while war still continued. Indeed American practice was flatly
+contradictory of the argument, as in the very pertinent example of the
+petty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when President Van Buren had promptly
+issued a proclamation of neutrality. It is curious that in his several
+replies to Seward's complaints Russell did not quote a letter from
+Stevenson, the American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May
+22, 1838. Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the
+"Caroline" affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible
+principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, as to
+belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same ground,
+and are governed by the same principles; that whenever a portion of a
+State seek by force of arms to overthrow the Government, and maintain
+independence, the contest becomes one _de facto_ of war[192]." This was
+as exact, and correct, a statement of the British view as could have
+been desired[193].
+
+The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did not
+then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July 2, 1861,
+his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our side; of that I
+have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of this.] But they
+thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and as we seemed to have
+made up our minds to it, that their Proclamation was just the thing to
+keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned out otherwise
+they did their best to correct their mistake[194]." The modern
+historical judgment of the best American writers likewise exonerates the
+British Government of "unfriendly animus[195]," but is still apt to
+refer to the "premature" issue of the Proclamation.
+
+This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the Government be
+criticized even as exercising an unwise (not unfriendly) haste? Henry
+Adams wrote that the British thought the "dissolution seemed inevitable"
+and "we seemed to have made up our minds to it." Certainly this was a
+justifiable conclusion from the events in America from Lincoln's
+election in November, 1860, to his inauguration in March, 1861--and even
+to a later date, almost in fact to the first week in April. During this
+period the British Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy.
+Then, suddenly, actual conflict begins and at once each side in America
+issues declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and
+piracy, indicative that _maritime_ war, the form of war at once most
+dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in British
+citizens, was the method first to be tried by the contestants. Unless
+these declarations were mere bluff and bluster England could not dare
+wait their application. She must at once warn her citizens and make
+clear her position as a neutral. The Proclamation was no effort "to keep
+straight with both sides"; it was simply the natural, direct, and prompt
+notification to British subjects required in the presence of a _de
+facto_ war.
+
+Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was fortunate
+that the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The theory of the
+Northern administration under which the Civil War was begun and
+concluded was that a portion of the people of the United States were
+striving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance, and that there
+could be no recognition of any Southern _Government_ in the conflict. In
+actual practice in war, the exchange of prisoners and like matters, this
+theory had soon to be discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theory
+nevertheless in looking forward to the purely domestic and
+constitutional problem of the return to the Union, when conquered, of
+the sections in rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreign
+nations, and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet under
+that theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation of
+Neutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded otherwise
+than to protest, officially, against any British declaration of
+neutrality, declaring that his Government did not acknowledge a state of
+war as existing, and threatening to take his leave. It would have been
+his duty to _prevent_, if possible, the issue of the Proclamation.
+Dallas, fortunately, had been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams,
+fortunately, arrived too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely to
+complain. The "premature" issue of the Proclamation averted an
+inevitable rupture of relations on a clash between the American theory
+of "no state of war" and the international fact that war existed. Had
+that rupture occurred, how long would the British Government and people
+have remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of the
+United States[196]?
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 127: Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better informed in the
+early stages of the American conflict than any of his ministerial
+colleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the reviews and his
+unsigned article in the _Edinburgh_, April, 1861, on "The Election of
+President Lincoln and its Consequences," was the first analysis of real
+merit in any of the reviews.]
+
+[Footnote 128: In his _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, Malmesbury makes but
+three important references to the Civil War in America.]
+
+[Footnote 129: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 165.]
+
+[Footnote 130: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, pp. 227-8.]
+
+[Footnote 131: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 132: It was generally whispered in Southern political circles
+that Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him, fearing his
+interference at home. If true, this is further evidence of Davis'
+neglect of foreign policy.]
+
+[Footnote 133: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 134: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, pp. 149-51.]
+
+[Footnote 135: Possibly the best concise statement of the effect on the
+North is given in Carl Schurz, _Reminiscences_, Vol. II, p. 223. Or see
+my citation of this in _The Power of Ideals in American History_, ch. I,
+"Nationality."]
+
+[Footnote 136: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1207-9.]
+
+[Footnote 137: See _ante_, p. 60.]
+
+[Footnote 138: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, pp. 83-4. Dallas
+to Seward, May 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 139: An error. Mann did not arrive in London until May 15. Du
+Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 140: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann was not present at the
+first interview with Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 141: F.O., America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell to Lyons, May
+11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the
+Queen." The greater and essential part has been printed in
+_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil
+War in United States." No. 33.]
+
+[Footnote 142: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 143: Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum sent to Lyons is
+undated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May 4, in which it was
+enclosed, it is presumable that the date of May 3 for the Memorandum
+is correct.]
+
+[Footnote 144: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 145: F.O., Am., Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to Lyons, May 6,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 146: It is to be remembered that the United States had given
+no notice of the existence of a state of war.]
+
+[Footnote 147: In diplomatic usage official notification of neutrality
+to a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters show him to have
+appreciated a peculiar delicacy here.]
+
+[Footnote 148: F.O., France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft. Printed in
+_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on
+International Maritime Law." No. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 149: It is interesting that on this same day Lyons was writing
+from Washington advocating, regretfully, because of his sympathy with
+the North, a strict British neutrality:
+
+     "The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally inclined
+     towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that
+     anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here
+     would place us in a position which would soon become
+     untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they
+     would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of
+     our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt
+     sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to
+     reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce
+     the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all
+     events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might
+     lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all
+     chance of this to be gone for ever."
+
+Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 150: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 677.]
+
+[Footnote 151: _Ibid._, No. 684. Printed in part in _Parliamentary
+Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on International
+Maritime Law." No. 3.]
+
+[Footnote 152: _Times_, May 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 153: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 154: So stated by the _Times_, May 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 155: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1378-9. This blunt
+expression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary offers an interesting
+comparison with the words of the American President Wilson, in a
+parallel statement at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Wilson on
+August 3, 1914, gave a special audience to newspaper correspondents,
+begging them to maintain an attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4
+he issued the first of several neutrality proclamations in which,
+following the customary language of such documents, the people were
+notified that neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expression
+of sympathies in public and in private." But on August 18 in an address
+to the people of the United States, this legal phraseology, required by
+traditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that "we must be
+impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our
+sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as
+a preference of one party to the struggle before another." And three
+weeks later, on September 8, came the proclamation setting aside October
+4 "as a day of prayer to Almighty God," informing Him that war existed
+and asking His intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithy
+expression was better suited to the forthrightness of the
+British public.]
+
+[Footnote 156: Hansard, _ibid_., pp. 1564-7. Gregory, a
+"Liberal-Conservative," though never a "good party man" was then
+supporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in Parliament,
+representing by his prominence in sport and society alike, the
+"gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and was a valuable
+influence for the South.]
+
+[Footnote 157: This subject is developed at length in Chapter V on "The
+Declaration of Paris Negotiation."]
+
+[Footnote 158: See _ante, p_. 88. The chronology of these rapidly
+succeeding events is interesting:
+
+  April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was received
+    this day."
+  May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American waters.
+  May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas.
+  May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake keep out of
+    it."
+  May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and Rost.
+  May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum.
+  May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular war."
+  May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize Southern
+    belligerency.
+  May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize Southern belligerency.
+  May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can not be
+    treated as pirates.
+    [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin in the late
+      afternoons, the instructions to diplomats were drawn before
+      the statement in Parliament.]
+  May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and Rost.
+  May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation of Neutrality
+    will be issued soon.
+  May 13--The Proclamation authorized.
+  May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool.
+  May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the _London Gazette_.
+  May 14--Adams in London "ready for business."
+
+It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2
+indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified to
+Lyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the governmental
+position had become definitely fixed, even though official instructions
+were not sent Lyons until the 6th.]
+
+[Footnote 159: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to Russell, April 19,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 160: F.O., Am., 789, Monson to Alston, received May 21.]
+
+[Footnote 161: F.O., Am., 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell, received May
+26. The full statement is:
+
+     "To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare of
+     this country, the present state of things is peculiarly
+     painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more
+     complete community of race and language, enlist his
+     sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he
+     cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant
+     war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both
+     sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead
+     only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life
+     and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would
+     be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of
+     the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of
+     Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to
+     England than to the Northern States themselves."
+
+[Footnote 162: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, p. 1763.]
+
+[Footnote 163: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34. In the general discussion in the
+Lords there appeared disagreement as to the status of privateering.
+Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it as piracy. Earl Hardwicke
+thought privateering justifiable. The general tone of the debate, though
+only on this matter of international practice, was favourable to
+the North.]
+
+[Footnote 164: For example see Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, Vol.
+I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813 during the
+Spanish-American colonial revolutions.]
+
+[Footnote 165: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, pp. 2077-2088.]
+
+[Footnote 166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 35. Russell to
+Lyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for Lyons' precaution was that while
+his French colleague, Mercier, had been instructed to support the
+British Proclamation, no official French Proclamation was issued until
+June 10, and Lyons, while he trusted Mercier, felt that this French
+delay needed some explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of his
+instructions and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request made
+no official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure.
+This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one, though
+it irritated both the British and French Ministers.]
+
+[Footnote 167: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 85. Adams to
+Seward, May 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 168: Bedford died that day.]
+
+[Footnote 169: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, pp. 90-96. Adams
+to Seward, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 170: Bernard, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the
+American Civil War_, p. 161. The author cites at length despatches and
+documents of the period.]
+
+[Footnote 171: _Spectator_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Spectator_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 173: _Saturday Review_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 174: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 82.]
+
+[Footnote 175: _Ibid._, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June 7, 1861. See also
+p. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 176: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 177: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 178: F.O., Am., Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to Russell, June 17,
+1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with that of Lyons, is in
+_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 106. Seward to Adams, June
+19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 179: Bancroft in his _Seward_ (II, p. 183) prints a portion of
+an unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in Paris, July 1, 1861, as
+"his clearest and most characteristic explanation of what the attitude
+of the government must be in regard to the action of the foreign nations
+that have recognized the belligerency of the 'insurgents.'"
+
+     "Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor both
+     together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the
+     sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor
+     confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to
+     last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the
+     whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for
+     disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and
+     shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign
+     nations to respect and observe the treaties.
+
+     "We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the
+     fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain
+     and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent
+     party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes,
+     but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their
+     public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless,
+     reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that
+     concludes the fact."
+
+[Footnote 180: The _Times_, June 3, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 181: _Ibid._, June 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 182: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 87.]
+
+[Footnote 183: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 56. Lyons to
+Russell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with Seward on June 15.]
+
+[Footnote 184: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, p. 104. Adams to
+Seward, June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 185: Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes the view that
+the protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in regard to privateering
+and against interviews with the Southern commissioners were all
+unjustifiable. The first, he says, was based on "unsound reasoning" (II,
+177). On the second he quotes with approval a letter from Russell to
+Edward Everett, July 12, 1861, showing the British dilemma: "Unless we
+meant to treat them as pirates and to hang them we could not deny them
+belligerent rights" (II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners he
+asserts that Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps he
+remembered that he himself had recently communicated, through three
+different intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners to
+Washington, and would have met them if the President had not forbidden
+it." Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 179.]
+
+[Footnote 186: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 606.]
+
+[Footnote 187: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters, 1861-1865_, Vol. I, p. 11.
+Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr., June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 188: See _ante_, p. 98. Russell's report to Lyons of this
+interview of June 12, lays special emphasis on Adams' complaint of
+haste. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence
+on Civil War in the United States," No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June
+21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 189: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21, March 13,
+1865.]
+
+[Footnote 190: See _ante_, p. 85.]
+
+[Footnote 191: C.F. Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 172. In preparing
+a larger life of his father, never printed, the son later came to a
+different opinion, crediting Russell with foresight in hastening the
+Proclamation to avoid possible embarrassment with Adams on his arrival.
+The quotation from the printed "Life" well summarizes, however, current
+American opinion.]
+
+[Footnote 192: _U.S. Documents_, Ser. No. 347, Doc. 183, p. 6.]
+
+[Footnote 193: The United States Supreme Court in 1862, decided that
+Lincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was "itself official
+and conclusive evidence ... that a state of war existed." (Moore, Int.
+Law Digest, I, p. 190.)]
+
+[Footnote 194: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 16. Henry Adams to
+C.F. Adams, Jnr.]
+
+[Footnote 195: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, III, p. 420
+(_note_) summarizes arguments on this point, but thinks that the
+Proclamation might have been delayed without harm to British interests.
+This is perhaps true as a matter of historical fact, but such fact in no
+way alters the compulsion to quick action felt by the Ministry in the
+presence of probable _immediate_ fact.]
+
+[Footnote 196: This was the later view of C.F. Adams, Jnr. He came to
+regard the delay in his father's journey to England as the most
+fortunate single incident in American foreign relations during the
+Civil War.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD
+
+The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been considered
+solely from the point of view of a formal American contention as to
+correct international practice and the British answer to that
+contention. In fact, however, there were intimately connected wth these
+formal arguments and instructions of the American Secretary of State a
+plan of possible militant action against Great Britain and a suspicion,
+in British Governmental circles, that this plan was being rapidly
+matured. American historians have come to stigmatize this plan as
+"Seward's Foreign War Panacea," and it has been examined by them in
+great detail, so that there is no need here to do more than state its
+main features. That which is new in the present treatment is the British
+information in regard to the plan and the resultant British suspicion of
+Seward's intentions.
+
+The British public, as distinguished from the Government, deriving its
+knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and past
+utterances, might well consider him as traditionally unfriendly to Great
+Britain. He had, in the 'fifties, vigorously attacked the British
+interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized Great
+Britain as "the most grasping and the most rapacious Power in the
+world"; he had long prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to the
+United States; he had not disdained, in political struggles in the State
+of New York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism to
+Great Britain; and more especially and more recently he had been
+reported to have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civil
+conflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by fomenting a
+quarrel with England and engaging in a war against her[197]. Earlier
+expressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a politician
+never over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of foreign nations
+and peoples, for he had been even more outspoken against the France of
+Louis Napoleon, but the Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mind
+as indicative of a probable animus when the politician had become the
+statesman responsible for foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did,
+that he had ever uttered the words alleged[198], and his friend Thurlow
+Weed might describe the words as "badinage," in a letter to the London
+_Times_[199], but the "Newcastle story" continued to be matter for
+frequent comment both in the Press and in private circles.
+
+British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to Seward's
+speeches intended for home political consumption, or to a careless bit
+of social talk, had there not been suspicion of other and more serious
+evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an unusually able and
+well-informed Minister, and from the first he had pictured the
+leadership of Seward in the new administration at Washington, and had
+himself been worried by his inability to understand what policy Seward
+was formulating. But, in fact, he did not see clearly what was going on
+in the camp of the Republican party now dominant in the North. The
+essential feature of the situation was that Seward, generally regarded
+as the man whose wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himself
+thinking this to be his destined function, early found his authority
+challenged by other leaders, and his policies not certain of
+acceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly, the
+situation at Washington.
+
+[Illustration: WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD (_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord
+Lyons," by kind permission_)]
+
+Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been elected as
+a Republican by a political party never before in power. Many of the
+leading members of this party were drawn from the older parties and had
+been in administrative positions in either State or National
+Governments, but there were no party traditions, save the lately created
+one of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the Territories. All
+was new, then, to the men now in power in the National Government, and a
+new and vital issue, that of secession already declared by seven
+Southern States, had to be met by a definite policy. The important
+immediate question was as to whether Lincoln had a policy, or, if not,
+upon whom he would depend to guide him.
+
+In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular estimate,
+were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the Secretary of the
+Treasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of State. Both were
+experienced in political matters and both stood high in the esteem of
+the anti-slavery element in the North, but Seward, all things
+considered, was regarded as the logical leading member of the Cabinet.
+He had been the favoured candidate for Republican Presidential
+nomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln only on the theory that the
+latter as less Radical on anti-slavery, could be more easily elected.
+Also, he now held that position which by American tradition was regarded
+as the highest in the Cabinet.
+
+In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that Seward would
+determine the policy of the new administration. Seward's own attitude is
+well summed up in a despatch to his Government, February 18, 1861, by
+Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from the Republic of Bremen. He described a
+conversation with Seward in regard to his relations with Lincoln:
+
+     "Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever remark,
+     that there is no great difference between an elected
+     president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The
+     latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth,
+     the former through the chances which make his election
+     possible. The actual direction of public affairs belongs to
+     the leader of the ruling party, here as well as in any
+     hereditary principality.
+
+     "The future President is a self-made man and there is
+     therefore as little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial
+     honesty ('honest old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he
+     does not lack common sense. But his other qualities for the
+     highest office are practically unknown. His election may
+     therefore be readily compared with a lottery. It is possible
+     that the United States has drawn the first prize, on the
+     other hand the gain may only have been a small one. But
+     unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may
+     have been merely a blank."
+
+The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; the
+second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later Schleiden
+sent home a further analysis of Lincoln:
+
+     "He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and
+     healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He
+     seems to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which
+     rests upon him. But at the same time it appears as if he had
+     lost some of his famous firmness and resoluteness through the
+     novelty of the conditions which surround him and the hourly
+     renewed attempts from various sides to gain influence over
+     him. He is therefore at present inclined to concede double
+     weight to the superior political experience of his Secretary
+     of State[200]."
+
+This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly described.
+Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not unchallenged and
+soon a decision was called for that in its final solution was to
+completely overthrow his already matured policy towards the seceding
+States. Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possession
+of federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federal
+troops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he
+had refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and
+re-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On
+March 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded
+unless reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and
+indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of his
+Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an issue the
+whole question of Seward's policy and leadership.
+
+For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatory
+delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting to
+time and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and people
+to a less violent attitude. He sincerely believed in the existence of an
+as yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in those
+States which were wavering on secession. He was holding communications,
+through intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in
+Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence that
+State against secession. To all these Southern representatives he now
+conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that Sumter
+would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own "policy"
+would be approved by the President. His argument in reply to Lincoln's
+call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing Fort Sumter, and it
+seemed to meet, for the moment, with the approval of the majority of his
+Cabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself made no pertinent comment, yet did
+not commit himself.
+
+There the matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners,
+regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the maturing
+of Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw[201]," did not care to
+press for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal pledge that
+in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce Sumter, notification
+of that determination would at once be given to South Carolina. The days
+went by, and it was not until the last week of March that Lincoln,
+disillusioned as to the feasibility of Seward's policy of conciliation,
+reached the conclusion that in his conception of his duty as President
+of the United States he must defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt
+to retain them, for the preservation of the Union, and decided to
+reinforce Fort Sumter. On March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and
+learned Lincoln's determination.
+
+This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it also
+threatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet understand fully
+that either supreme leadership, or control of policy, had been assumed
+by Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that astonishing document entitled,
+"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," which at once reveals
+his alarm and his supreme personal self-confidence. This document
+begins, "We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without
+a policy either domestic or foreign." It then advocates as a domestic
+policy, "_Change The Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery,
+Or About Slavery_, for a question upon _Union or Disunion_." Then in a
+second section, headed "For Foreign Nations," there followed:
+
+     "I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
+     categorically, at once.
+
+     "I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and
+     send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse
+     a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this
+     continent against European intervention.
+
+     "And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from
+     Spain and France.
+
+     "Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
+
+     "But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic
+     prosecution of it.
+
+     "For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
+     and direct it incessantly.
+
+     "Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
+     while active in it, or
+
+     "Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
+     debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.
+
+     "It is not in my especial province;
+
+     "But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility[202]."
+
+Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically gentle,
+yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed with his own
+superior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's "domestic policy"
+was exactly his own, except that he did not intend to abandon Fort
+Sumter. As to the warlike foreign policy Lincoln pointed out that this
+would be a sharp reversal of that already being prepared in circulars
+and instructions to Ministers abroad. This was, indeed, the case, for
+the first instructions, soon despatched, were drawn on lines of
+recalling to foreign powers their established and long-continued
+friendly relations with the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated as
+to the required "guiding hand," "I remark that if this must be done, I
+must do it.... I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of
+all the Cabinet[203]."
+
+This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to direct
+affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had he not,
+momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific policy toward
+the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of Lincoln's quiet
+persistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate issue, the relief of
+Sumter (though attempting to divert reinforcements to another quarter)
+but did not as yet wholly yield either his policy of conciliation and
+delay, nor give up immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by
+plunging it into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurances
+to the Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he
+could and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this
+confidence that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up
+to the second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the ships
+despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day Governor
+Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the Northern
+purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon the
+South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemed
+inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel.
+
+The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a day and
+a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13--for
+as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of Sumter changed, as
+in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people. There was now a
+nearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union _by force_. Yet
+Seward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the "sober
+second thought" of the South would offer a way out toward reunion
+without war. In official utterances and acts he was apparently in
+complete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South. Davis'
+proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered by
+the Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet
+officially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at
+least one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation
+Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April
+24 and offered his services as a mediator[204].
+
+Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the South
+until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathing
+spell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides. He had
+consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Seward
+favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the
+Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend,
+Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal. Seward at once took
+Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three men, with Chase (and the Prussian
+Minister) were the only ones in the secret. Lincoln's first comment was
+that he was "willing to make an attempt of contributing to the
+prevention of bloodshed and regretted that Schleiden had not gone to
+Richmond without consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that
+"he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but
+merely the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility
+to govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have enlightened
+Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union. Lincoln
+said he could neither authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, but
+that he would gladly consider any such proposals voluntarily made.
+Schleiden asked for a definite statement as to whether Lincoln would
+recall the blockade proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis would
+recall the letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused to
+commit himself.
+
+This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward still
+thought something might result from the venture, and on that evening,
+April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided by Seward with
+a pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the afternoon of the
+twenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city was convinced that his
+mission would be a failure. All along his journey, at each little
+station, he saw excited crowds assembled enthusiastic for secession,
+bands of militia training, and every indication of preparation for war.
+Already, on that same day, the Virginia secession ordinance had been
+published, and the State convention had ratified the provisional
+constitution of the Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notified
+Stephens of his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, and
+was at once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frank
+and positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settle
+peacefully the differences between the two sections were futile." Formal
+letters were exchanged after this conference, but in these the extent to
+which Stephens would go was to promise to use his influence in favour of
+giving consideration to any indication made by the North of a desire
+"for an amicable adjustment of the questions at issue," and he was
+positive that there could be no return of the South to the Union.
+
+On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington. He found
+that three days had made a great change in the sentiment of the Capitol.
+"During my short absence," he wrote, "many thousands of volunteers had
+arrived from the North. There was not only a feeling of security
+noticeable, but even of combativeness." He found Seward not at all
+disposed to pursue the matter, and was not given an opportunity to talk
+to Lincoln; therefore, he merely submitted copies of the letters that
+had passed between him and Stephens, adding for himself that the South
+was arming _because_ of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers.
+Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that he had
+no fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding that Stephens'
+letters gave no ground for action since the "Union of these States is
+the supreme as it is the organic law of this country," and must be
+maintained.
+
+This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be regarded as
+Seward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued policy of
+conciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden to Richmond,
+but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had encouraged and aided
+Schleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27, hope had vanished, and
+Seward's "domestic policy," as set forth in his "Thoughts for the
+President's Consideration" on April 1, was discredited, and inevitably,
+in some measure, their author also. The dates are important in
+appreciating Seward's purposes. On April 27, the day of Schleiden's
+return to Washington, there was sent to Adams that "sharp" despatch,
+taking issue with British action as foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9,
+and concluding by instructing Adams to lose no time in warning Russell
+that such action would be regarded by the United States as "injurious to
+its rights and derogating from its dignity[205]." It appears, therefore,
+that Seward, defeated on one line of "policy," eager to regain prestige,
+and still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found to
+avert domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick at those
+threads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the Union through
+a foreign war. He was now seeking to force the acceptance of the second,
+and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts for the President."
+
+Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no secret
+at Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to Schleiden this
+fantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse
+for a war with England, France, or Spain," he said "that would be the
+best means of re-establishing internal peace[206]." Again, on February
+10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same topic, and complained that
+there was no foreign complication offering an excuse for a break. Lyons
+knew of this attitude, and by February 4 had sent Russell a warning, to
+which the latter had replied on February 20 that England could afford to
+be patient for a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" must
+not be indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarked
+in his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line,
+addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for established
+friendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction to
+Adams, April 10[207], in the concluding paragraph of which Seward wrote,
+"The United States are not indifferent to the circumstances of common
+descent, language, customs, sentiments, and religion, which recommend a
+closer sympathy between themselves and Great Britain than either might
+expect in its intercourse with any other nation." True, on this basis,
+Seward claimed a special sympathy from Great Britain for the United
+States, that is to say, the North, but most certainly the tone of this
+first instruction was one of established friendship.
+
+Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell "refuses
+to pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to threats. What
+other explanation is possible except that, seeking to save his domestic
+policy of conciliation and to regain his leadership, he now was
+adventuring toward the application of his "foreign war panacea" idea.
+Lyons quickly learned of the changed tone, and that England, especially,
+was to hear American complaint. On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in
+cypher characterizing Seward as "arrogant and reckless toward Foreign
+Powers[208]." Evidently Seward was making little concealment of his
+belligerent attitude, and when the news was received of the speeches in
+Parliament of the first week in May by which it became clear that Great
+Britain would declare neutrality and was planning joint action with
+France, he became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter home
+exhibiting, still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own
+foreign policy.
+
+     "A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save it
+     had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence,
+     needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate
+     position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do
+     too much for my country, lest some advantage may revert
+     indirectly to my own fame.
+
+     "... They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe,
+     Great Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the
+     South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to
+     make war against her, as the ally of the traitors.... I am
+     trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet before
+     it is too late[209]."
+
+The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10," of May 21,
+already commented upon in the preceding chapter. But as sent to Adams
+it varied in very important details from the draft submitted by Seward
+to Lincoln[210].
+
+Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a challenge. Its
+language implied that the United States desired war, and Seward's plan
+was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, give him a copy of it,
+and then discontinue diplomatic relations so long as Russell held either
+official or unofficial intercourse with the Southern Commissioners. This
+last instruction was, indeed, retained in the final form of the
+despatch, but here, as elsewhere, Lincoln modified the stiff expressions
+of the original. Most important of all, he directed Adams to consider
+the whole despatch as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion.
+The despatch, as amended, began with the statement that the United
+States "neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the
+sensibilities of that or any other European nation.... The paper itself
+is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any of
+its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly made
+known. But its spirit will be your guide[211]." Thus were the teeth
+skilfully drawn from the threat of war. Even the positive instructions,
+later in the despatch, as to the Southern Commissioners, need not have
+been acted upon by Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But even
+with alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm
+Adams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The Government
+seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe, and
+almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the Ministers
+here in a certain contingency.... I scarcely know how to understand Mr.
+Seward. The rest of the Government may be demented for all I know; but
+he surely is calm and wise. My duty here is in so far as I can do it
+honestly to prevent the irritation from coming to a downright quarrel.
+It seems to me like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy[212]."
+
+Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the source of
+American belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment of what was
+wise at the moment coincided with that of Lincoln's--though of this he
+had no knowledge. In the event Adams' skilful handling of the situation
+resulted favourably--even to the cessation of intercourse between
+Russell and the Southern Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no more
+than earlier, was to be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's
+"foreign war panacea" was stillborn.
+
+The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Seward
+at last realized that the President intended to control policy, and
+though it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln's
+customary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now established
+between himself and his chief. Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though
+free in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter,
+avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the
+altered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them
+simple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with
+Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a "leak"
+of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to Despatch
+No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence by
+Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This was particularly
+true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England that
+Seward most directed his enmity. There resulted for British diplomats
+both at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long
+after he had made a complete face-about in policy. This suspicion
+influenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War.
+
+On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a long
+twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward's
+warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly ignorant of
+foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward, having lost
+strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recover
+influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet is
+strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought, should maintain a
+stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and make close contacts with
+France. He was evidently anxious to impress upon Russell that Seward
+really might mean war, but he declared the chief danger to lie in the
+fact of American belief that England and France could not be driven into
+war with the United States, and that they would submit to any insult.
+Lyons urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to
+correct this false impression[213]. Again, on the next day, May 21, the
+information in his official despatch was repeated in a private letter to
+Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as mere bluster. Yet
+he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any case insists that the best
+preventative of war with the United States is to show that England is
+ready for it[214].
+
+It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. May 22,
+he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him to make
+defensive preparation[215]. The following day he dilated to Russell,
+privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the bounds of
+decency even in ordinary social intercourse[216] ..." and in an official
+communication of this same day he records Washington rumours of a
+belligerent despatch read by Seward before the Cabinet, of objections by
+other members, and that Seward's insistence has carried the day[217].
+That Seward was, in fact, still smarting over his reverse is shown by a
+letter, written on this same May 23, to his intimate friend and
+political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had evidently cautioned him against
+precipitate action. Seward wrote, "The European phase is bad. But your
+apprehension that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will you
+consent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have audiences
+and compliments in the Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs'
+[Confederate Secretary of State] emissaries have access to his
+bedroom[218]?"
+
+Two interpretations are possible from this: either that Seward knowing
+himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had not yet
+yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the changes made in his
+Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation seems the more likely, for
+though Seward continued to write for a time "vigorous" despatches to
+Adams, they none of them approached the vigour of even the amended
+despatch. Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and the
+complete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24
+to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to
+Bremen of that date[219]. And on the same day Seward himself told
+Schleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a break
+with England[220]." On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspicious
+that an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was able
+to report a better tone from Seward[221].
+
+British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they
+were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the
+American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in
+comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are very
+unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and
+uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political
+calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]." He believed
+that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary
+measure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, be
+local"--a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British
+Ministers. Russell was less perturbed. He had previously expressed
+appreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a
+very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223],"
+and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage
+him in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so
+reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man[224]." But at
+Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As a
+result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not
+Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6,
+stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the
+United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means
+impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]."
+This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the
+probability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should be
+conducted. England should strike at once with the largest possible naval
+force and bring the war to an end before the United States could
+prepare. Otherwise, "the spirit, the energy, and the resources of this
+people" would make them difficult to overcome. England, on her part,
+must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and she
+would be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping
+Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter and
+advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to write
+it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he would exert
+every effort and use every method to conciliate America[226].
+
+In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had so
+renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press reception of
+the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. The Northern people,
+counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy on
+anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at the
+moment loudly voicing their vexation. Had Seward not already been turned
+from his foreign war policy he now would have received strong public
+support in it. But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to his
+own advantage in the Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on
+June 14 that Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with
+the Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington could
+learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from the
+Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. On June
+15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in which
+Seward had positively refused to receive the Queen's Proclamation, but
+had throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so
+reported the conversation[228]. June 15 may, in fact, be taken as the
+date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war. Possibly he
+found it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy to
+fair weather. June 21, he wrote that the "lull" was still
+continuing[229]. June 24, he at last learned and described at length the
+details of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10[230]. He did not
+know the exact date but he expressed the opinion that "a month or three
+weeks ago" war was very near--a misjudgment, since it should be
+remembered that war seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that
+on this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed
+leadership into the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants.
+
+Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of
+American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinking
+that an American attack on England was either imminent or intended.
+Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward's prestige and
+Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. It was long, indeed,
+before he could escape from suspicion of Seward's purposes, though
+dropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war. A month
+later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for a
+confidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that there
+never had been any intention of stirring agitation against England.
+Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take
+official cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerent
+rights of the South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that
+previous strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers
+understand the intensity of Northern feeling[231].
+
+Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change,
+mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all to
+the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmost
+bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London,
+Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen's
+Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams'
+representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" consisted.
+
+Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons was the receipt of a
+despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had reported
+that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that the knowledge
+in Washington of the result of their previous interviews had brought
+satisfaction, and Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had "learned,
+through another member of the diplomatic corps, that no further
+expression of opinion on the subject in question would be
+necessary[232]." This referred, presumably, to the question of British
+intention, for the future, in relation to the Proclamation of
+Neutrality. Adams wrote: "This led to the most frank and pleasant
+conversation which I have yet had with his lordship.... I added that I
+believed the popular feeling in the United States would subside the
+moment that all the later action on this side was known.... My own
+reception has been all that I could desire. I attach value to this,
+however, only as it indicates the establishment of a policy that will
+keep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In
+reply to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his
+interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view that the
+British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was not
+defensible in international law. There was not now, nor later, any
+yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was intended for
+Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer, much
+as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great Britain:
+
+     "I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I may at
+     any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and
+     profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has
+     prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned
+     remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or
+     measure of recognition of the insurgents by the government of
+     Great Britain. I write in the same spirit now; and I invoke
+     on the part of the British government, as I propose to
+     exercise on my own, the calmness which all counsellors ought
+     to practise in debates which involve the peace and happiness
+     of mankind[233]."
+
+Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform oratory leads
+to the suspicion that the writer is thinking, primarily, of the ultimate
+publication of his despatches. Thus Seward seems to have been laying the
+ground for a denial that he had ever developed a foolish foreign war
+policy. History pins him to that folly. But in another respect the
+interview with Lyons on July 20 and the letter to Adams of the day
+following overthrow for both Seward and for the United States the
+accusations sometimes made that it was the Northern disaster at Bull
+Run, July 21, in the first pitched battle with the South, which made
+more temperate the Northern tone toward foreign powers[234]. It is true
+that the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, but
+internal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before there
+was any news from the battle-field, and the interview with Lyons on the
+20th proves that the military set-back had no influence on Seward's
+friendly expressions. Moreover, these expressions officially made were
+but a delayed voicing of a determination of policy arrived at many weeks
+earlier. The chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapter
+will have shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward's
+leadership, and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone,"
+preceded any news whatever from England, lightening the first
+impressions. The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, even
+know that England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knew
+merely of Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and the
+friendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received in
+Washington until the month following.
+
+In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not deserve the
+place in history usually accorded it as a moment of extreme crisis in
+British-American relations. There was never any danger of war from it,
+for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud. The public excitement in
+America over the Queen's Proclamation was, indeed, intense; but this did
+not alter the Governmental attitude. In England all that the public knew
+was this American irritation and clamour. The London press expressed
+itself a bit more cautiously, for the moment, merely defending the
+necessity of British neutrality[235]. But if regarded from the effect
+upon British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly even
+vital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had been
+gravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely alarmed,
+was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in London the
+suspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years of the war, and
+to British Ministers it seemed that at any moment he might recover
+leadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British attitude toward
+America was affected in two opposite ways; Britain was determined not to
+be bullied, and Russell himself sometimes went to the point of arrogance
+in answer to American complaints; this was an unfortunate result. But
+more fortunate, and _also a result_, was the British Government's
+determination to step warily in the American conflict and to give no
+just cause, unless on due consideration of policy, for a rupture of
+relations with the United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, from
+every angle but a short-lived "brain-storm," served America well in the
+first years of her great crisis.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 197: See _ante_, p. 80.]
+
+[Footnote 198: Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, II, p. 378. Seward to
+Weed, December 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 199: _Ibid._, p. 355. Weed's letter was on the _Trent_ affair,
+but he went out of his way to depict Seward as attempting a bit of
+humour with Newcastle.]
+
+[Footnote 200: Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was educated at the
+University of Berlin, and entered the Danish customs service. In the
+German revolution of 1848 he was a delegate from Schleswig-Holstein to
+the Frankfort Parliament. After the failure of that revolution he
+withdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was sent by that Republic to the United
+States as Minister. By 1860 he had become one of the best known and
+socially popular of the Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimate
+relations with leading Americans both North and South. His reports on
+events preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archives
+of Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor's
+thesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten
+Staaten während des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My facts with
+regard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis, in part from an
+article by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond, April 25,
+1861," printed in the _Annual Report of the American Historical
+Association_ for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies of some of Schleiden's
+despatches are on deposit in the Library of Congress among the papers of
+Carl Schurz. Through the courtesy of Mr. Frederic Bancroft, who
+organized the Schurz papers, I have been permitted to take copies of a
+few Schleiden dispatches relating to the visit to Richmond, an incident
+apparently unknown to history until Dr. Lutz called attention to it.]
+
+[Footnote 201: This is Bancroft's expression. _Seward_, II, p. 118.]
+
+[Footnote 202: Lincoln, _Works_, II, 29.]
+
+[Footnote 203: _Ibid._, p. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 204: For references to this whole matter of Schleiden's visit
+to Richmond see _ante_, p. 116, note 1.]
+
+[Footnote 205: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 82. This, and
+other despatches have been examined at length in the previous chapter in
+relation to the American protest on the Queen's Proclamation of
+Neutrality. In the present chapter they are merely noted again in their
+bearing on Seward's "foreign war policy."]
+
+[Footnote 206: Quoted by Lutz, _Am. Hist. Assn. Rep_. 1915, p. 210.]
+
+[Footnote 207: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 80. This
+despatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W. H. Russell, correspondent
+of the _Times_, who commented that it contained some elements of danger
+to good relations, but it is difficult to see to what he could have had
+objection.--Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 103. ]
+
+[Footnote 208: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 209: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 169.]
+
+[Footnote 210: Yet at this very time Seward was suggesting, May 14, to
+Prussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland a joint naval
+demonstration with America against Japan because of anti-foreign
+demonstrations in that country. This has been interpreted as an attempt
+to tie European powers to the United States in such a way as to hamper
+any friendly inclination they may have entertained toward the
+Confederacy (Treat, _Japan and the United States_, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50.
+Also Dennet, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," in _Am. Hist. Rev_., Vol.
+XXVIII, No. 1. Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as in
+harmony with his determined policy in the Far East.) Like Seward's
+overture, made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention to
+guarantee the independence of San Domingo (F.O., Am., Vol. 763, No. 196,
+Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to me to
+have been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude while in the
+process of developing a really serious policy--the plunging of America
+into a foreign war.]
+
+[Footnote 211: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 88. The exact
+facts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10, though soon known in
+diplomatic circles, were not published until the appearance in 1890 of
+Nicolay and Hay's _Lincoln_, where the text of a portion of the
+original draft, with Lincoln's changes were printed (IV, p. 270). Gideon
+Welles, Secretary of the Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a short
+book in 1874, _Lincoln and Seward_, in which the story was told, but
+without dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it.
+Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and the
+contents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and the
+Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sumner.]
+
+[Footnote 212: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 21.
+Reprint from _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 213: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 206. Confidential.]
+
+[Footnote 214: Russell Papers. This letter has been printed, in part, in
+Newton, _Lyons_, I, 41.]
+
+[Footnote 215: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 216: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 217: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209, Confidential, Lyons to
+Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" from this despatch was printed
+in the British _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 48. The
+"extract" in question consists of two short paragraphs only, printed,
+without any indication of important elisions, in each of the
+paragraphs. ]
+
+[Footnote 218: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 174. ]
+
+[Footnote 219: Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's information is
+not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many persons closely in
+touch with events, especially with Sumner, Chairman of the Senate
+Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Blair, a member of
+the Cabinet.]
+
+[Footnote 220: _Ibid._, Schleiden to Republic of Bremen, May 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 221: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 179, sets the date as June 8
+when Seward's instructions for England and France show that he had
+"recovered his balance." This is correct for the change in tone of
+despatches, but the acceptance of Lincoln's policy must have been
+immediate. C.F. Adams places the date for Seward's complete change of
+policy much later, describing his "war mania" as lasting until the
+Northern defeat of Bull Run, July 21. I think this an error, and
+evidence that it is such appears later in the present chapter. See
+Charles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," _Mass.
+Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 222: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 223: Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 224: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 225: F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.]
+
+[Footnote 226: _Ibid._, No. 263, Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 227: See _ante_, p. 106.]
+
+[Footnote 228: See _ante_, p. 102. Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181, using
+Seward's description to Adams _(U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p.
+106) of this interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus
+preventing a joint notification by England and France of their intention
+to act together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as
+"diplomatic skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the
+emphasis is placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt
+that the knowledge of British-French joint action had been made
+sufficiently clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common
+though unofficial representation to Seward.]
+
+[Footnote 229: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 230: _Ibid_, To Russell. Lyons' source of information was not
+revealed.]
+
+[Footnote 231: _Ibid._, To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 232: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 110.]
+
+[Footnote 233: _Ibid._, p. 118. To Adams.]
+
+[Footnote 234: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris." p. 29,
+and so argued by the author throughout this monograph. I think this
+an error.]
+
+[Footnote 235: The _Spectator_, friend of the North, argued, June 15,
+1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next best thing for the
+North to a definite British alliance. Southern privateers could not now
+be obtained from England. And the United States was surely too proud to
+accept direct British aid.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION
+
+If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology there
+accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with Great
+Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the American
+Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite support of
+the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation undertaken by
+Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic service he attached
+to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, to the extent of
+permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate failure of the negotiation
+to distort his usually cool and fair judgment. The matter in question
+was the offer of the United States to accede by a convention to the
+Declaration of Paris of 1856, establishing certain international rules
+for the conduct of maritime warfare.
+
+This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It failed to
+result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be negligible. Yet it
+was at the time of very great importance in affecting the attitude
+toward each other of Great Britain and the United States, and of the men
+who spoke for their respective countries. The bald facts of the
+negotiation appear with exactness in Moore's _Digest of International
+Law_[236], but without comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in
+Bernard's _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil
+War_[237], at the conclusion of which the author writes, with sarcasm,
+"I refrain from any comment on this negotiation[238]." Nicolay and Hay's
+_Lincoln_, and Rhodes' _United States_, give the matter but passing and
+inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in some detail in the American
+argument before the Geneva court of arbitration in the case of the
+_Alabama_, but was there presented merely as a part of the general
+American complaint of British neutrality. In fact, but three historical
+students, so far as the present writer has been able to discover, have
+examined this negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as
+to purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British
+intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly
+spreading in America.
+
+These three, each with an established historical reputation, exhibit
+decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic incidents and
+documents. The first careful analysis was presented by Henry Adams, son
+of the American Minister in London during the Civil War, and then acting
+as his private secretary, in his _Historical Essays_, published in 1891;
+the second study is by Bancroft, in his _Life of Seward_, 1900; while
+the third is by Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American
+Minister), who, in his _Life_ of his father, published 1900, gave a
+chapter to the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid
+down by his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion,
+through further study, that he had earlier been in error and developed a
+very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward and the Declaration
+of Paris."
+
+[Illustration: C.F. ADAMS (_From a photograph in the United States
+Embassy, London, by kind permission_)]
+
+If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking as they
+do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise general in
+treatment, the author's answer is that the personality of two of the
+writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the effect of the
+negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in London are
+themselves important historical data; a further answer is the fact
+that the materials now available from the British Foreign Office
+archives throw much new light both on the course of the negotiation and
+on British purposes. It is here planned, therefore, first to review the
+main facts as previously known; second, to summarize the arguments and
+conclusions of the three historians; third, to re-examine the
+negotiation in the light of the new material; and, finally, to express
+an opinion on its conduct and conclusions as an evidence of
+British policy.
+
+In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the chief
+maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily agreed to
+respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or the enemy's flag.
+This was a distinct step forward in the practice of maritime warfare,
+the accepted international rules of which had not been formally altered
+since the Napoleonic period. The action of Great Britain was due in
+part, according to a later statement in Parliament by Palmerston, March
+18, 1862, to a fear that unless a greater respect were paid than
+formerly to neutral rights, the Allies would quickly win the ill-will of
+the United States, then the most powerful maritime neutral, and would
+run the danger of forcing that country into belligerent alliance with
+Russia[239]. No doubt there were other reasons, also, for the barbarous
+rules and practices of maritime warfare in earlier times were by now
+regarded as semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the
+action of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the
+result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris in
+1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and some
+leading neutrals were gathered.
+
+The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four points:
+
+     "1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
+
+     "2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
+     of contraband of war.
+
+     "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
+     are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
+
+     "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;
+     that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
+     prevent access to the coast of the enemy[240]."
+
+This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia,
+Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed that a general
+invitation to accede should be extended to all nations, but with the
+proviso "that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shall
+accede thereto, shall not in future enter into any arrangement,
+concerning the application of the law of neutrals in time of war, which
+does not rest altogether upon the four principles embodied in the said
+declaration[241]." In other words it must be accepted in whole, and not
+in part, and the powers acceding pledging themselves not to enter into
+any subsequent treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not
+stipulate observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all
+the maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the
+Declaration of Paris.
+
+But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in the
+advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. Little by
+little her avowed principles of international law as regards neutrals,
+first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in treaty stipulations.
+Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in July, 1856, that the United
+States would accede to the Declaration if a fifth article were added to
+it protecting all private property at sea, when not contraband. This
+covered not only cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would
+have been to exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's
+goods under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned.
+Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to battles
+between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule were adopted
+also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States could not forgo
+the right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her most
+effective maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had no
+large navy, were essential to her fighting power."
+
+"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been abolished on
+land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" The American
+proposal met with general support among the smaller maritime nations. It
+was believed that the one great obstacle to the adoption of Marcy's
+amendment lay in the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and that obstacle
+proved insurmountable. Thus the United States refused to accede to the
+Declaration, and there the matter rested until 1861. But on April 17
+Jefferson Davis proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of
+privateers against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed
+representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and expressing the
+hope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, but
+authorizing them to enter into conventions for American adherence to the
+Declaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sent
+to the Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria,
+Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands.
+
+Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his first
+meeting with Russell on May 18, after having developed at length the
+American position relative to the issue of the British Proclamation of
+Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to offer adherence by
+means of a convention, to the Declaration of Paris. Russell replied that
+Great Britain was willing to negotiate, but "seemed to desire to leave
+the subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had
+already transmitted authority[242]...." Adams therefore did not press
+the matter, waiting further information and instruction from Washington.
+Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, approached the Government
+of France with a suggestion that the two leading maritime powers should
+propose to the American belligerents adherence to the second and third
+articles of the Declaration of Paris. France had agreed and the date of
+Russell's instruction to Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with
+Adams. Confusion now arose in both London and Washington as to the place
+where the arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion
+will be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note
+that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London.
+
+On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready to enter
+into a convention with the United States, provided a similar convention
+was signed with France at the same time. This convention, as submitted
+by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by the two powers to abide by the
+four points of the Declaration of Paris, using the exact wording of that
+document[243]. Adams' draft had been communicated to Russell on July 13.
+There then followed a delay required by the necessity of securing
+similar action by Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29
+Adams reported to Russell that this had been done and that he was ready
+to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, was
+ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on the part
+of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not
+invalidate anything already done[244]." It was not until August 8,
+however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to France, reported that
+Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign Minister, that he was
+ready to sign the similar convention with France[245]. With no
+understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, and
+professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's phrase, just
+quoted[246], Adams waited the expected invitation to an official
+interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was a condition of
+the negotiation that this should be done simultaneously in London and
+Paris, the further delay that now occurred caused him no misgivings.
+
+On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day "in the
+course of this week," and prefaced this request with the statement that
+he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he proposed to make in
+writing, upon signing the convention. "You will observe," he wrote,
+"that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of
+the engagement to be taken by Her Majesty." The proposed
+Declaration read:
+
+     "In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day
+     between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland
+     and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares,
+     by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend
+     thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any
+     bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now
+     prevailing in the United States[247]."
+
+Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and simple
+adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now go on to
+official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. Sincerely believing,
+as he stated to Russell in a communication of August 23, that the United
+States was "acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a
+permanent doctrine for all time," and with the object of "ameliorating
+the horrors of warfare all over the globe," he objected "to accompany
+the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the
+face of it seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that
+the United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the
+Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable policy, but
+with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy
+struggle which is going on at home[248]." He also pointed out that
+Russell's proposed declaration either was or was not a part of the
+convention. If it was a part then the Senate of the United States must
+ratify it as well as the convention itself, and he would have gone
+beyond his instructions in submitting it. If not a part of the
+convention there could be no advantage in making the Declaration since,
+unratified by the Senate, it would have no force. Adams therefore
+declined to proceed further with the matter until he had received new
+instructions from Washington.
+
+To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit exposition of
+his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her neutrality in the
+American conflict, thereby recognizing the belligerent rights of the
+South. It followed that the South "might by the law of nations arm
+privateers," and that these "must be regarded as the armed vessels of a
+belligerent." But the United States had refused to recognize the status
+of belligerency, and could therefore maintain that privateers issued by
+the Southern States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a
+European Power signing a convention with the United States, embodying
+the principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat the
+privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates." Hence
+Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from contradictory
+premises as to the status of the conflict in America, might become
+involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of the convention. He
+had therefore merely intended by his suggested declaration to prevent
+any misconception by the United States.
+
+     "It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government decline
+     to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their
+     part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an
+     adoption of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be
+     construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy
+     dissensions now prevailing in the United States; an
+     interference which would be contrary to Her Majesty's public
+     declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which Her
+     Majesty has deliberately sanctioned[249]."
+
+Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the proposed
+declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to Adams, in
+London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar declaration had
+been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue the question save in
+generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed possible "intervention"
+which Great Britain and France seemed to fear they would be called upon
+to make was exactly the action which the United States desired to
+forestall, and he notified Adams that he could not consent since the
+proposed Declaration "would be virtually a new and distinct article
+incorporated into the projected convention[250]." The first formal
+negotiation of the United States during the Civil War, and of the new
+American Minister in London, had come to an inglorious conclusion.
+Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, and
+were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, not at the
+moment informed save on the American offer and the result, paid little
+attention to these "inner circle" controversies[251].
+
+What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the negotiating
+powers. The first answer in historical writing was that offered by Henry
+Adams[252], in an essay entitled "The Declaration of Paris, 1861," in
+the preparation of which the author studied with care all the diplomatic
+correspondence available in print[253]. His treatment presents Russell
+as engaged in a policy of deception with the view of obtaining an
+ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of commercial rivalry
+and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' argument Russell, on May
+9, brought to the attention of France a proposal for a joint request on
+the American belligerents to respect the second and third articles of
+the Declaration of Paris, and received an acquiescent reply. After some
+further exchanges of proposed terms of instructions to the British and
+French Ministers at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to
+Lyons with instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his
+first interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could
+have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to
+negotiate on the Declaration of Paris as a _whole_--that is to say, on
+all four articles--intimated that instructions had already gone to
+Lyons, with directions to assent to any modification of the article on
+privateering that the United States might desire. Adams understood
+Russell to prefer that the negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to
+be) should take place in Washington, and did not press the matter.
+
+This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since the
+interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's country
+house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable supposition the
+despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until the Foreign Secretary's
+return to his office; second because Lyons was not instructed to
+_negotiate_ on the Declaration. The interpretation is justified
+therefore that Russell "evaded the offer of the United States
+Government." The result of this evasion was delay, but when Seward
+learned from Lyons that he had no authority to negotiate a convention
+and Adams received renewed instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his
+temper, but the affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook
+his faith in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In
+renewing his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the
+previous "misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further
+"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview.
+
+Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit and
+evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that Lyons, at
+Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward the South,
+Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a line of policy
+distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each point in the
+negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as follows:
+
+     "The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues ...
+     induced the French Government to violate the pledge in the
+     protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to
+     both belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the
+     United States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of
+     Paris, while it placed both belligerents on the same apparent
+     footing. These steps were taken in haste before Adams could
+     obtain an interview. When Adams by an effort unexpected to
+     Russell obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of
+     Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May
+     21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to
+     the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded the offer, saying
+     that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons,
+     although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they
+     been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his
+     notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made
+     such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as
+     coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams.
+     When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell
+     declared that he had never heard of it before, although he
+     had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to
+     him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration,
+     Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure
+     and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams
+     overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written
+     proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent
+     ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but
+     insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a
+     declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be
+     disregarded[254]."
+
+In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points are
+insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question of
+who first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams'
+conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed by
+Russell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying one
+device after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from the
+written declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference than
+that Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, in
+order to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]." The
+_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been a
+deep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, the
+earlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject
+to belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was the
+American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled Great
+Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now,
+to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's hands, but if there
+were no such complete adherence and only temporary observation of the
+second article, after the war had resulted in the disruption of the
+United States, thus removing the chief supporter of that article, Great
+Britain would feel free to resume her old-time practice when she engaged
+in war. If Great Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she
+would feel bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood
+constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord Malmesbury
+declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect it[256]." Thus
+the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first on
+privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the negotiation
+of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner in which Russell
+received the advances of President Lincoln, no American Minister in
+London could safely act on any other assumption than that the British
+Government meant, at the first convenient opportunity, to revive the
+belligerent pretensions dormant since the War of 1812[257]."
+
+This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly summarized it
+depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude on the part of Russell
+and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, selfish British policy, and
+throughout a blind following on by France, yielding to Russell's
+leadership. The American proposal is regarded merely as a simple and
+sincere offer to join in supporting an improved international practice
+in war-times. But when Frederic Bancroft, the biographer of Seward,
+examined the negotiation he was compelled to ask himself whether this
+was all, indeed, that the American Secretary of State had in view.
+Bancroft's analysis may be stated more briefly[258].
+
+Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April 24,
+nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern
+belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to remove all
+excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward asserted a
+twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with other progressive
+nations in the melioration of the rigours of maritime war," and "to
+remove every cause that any foreign Power could have for the recognition
+of the insurgents as a belligerent Power[259]." This last result was not
+so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the mechanism of operation ever
+openly stated by Seward. But he did write, later, that the proposal of
+accession to the Declaration of Paris was tendered "as the act of this
+Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal
+citizens." "It did not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy
+to tell what would result in case the offer of accession on the part of
+the United States should be accepted[260]."
+
+Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position where
+they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard Southern
+privateers as pirates, and treat them as such. This was a conceivable
+result of the negotiation before European recognition of Southern
+belligerency, but even after that recognition and after Dayton had
+pointed out the impossibility of such a result, Seward pressed for the
+treaty and instructed Dayton not to raise the question with France. He
+still had in mind this main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not
+intended to use the adherence of the United States to the declaration as
+a lever to force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates,
+or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and
+unofficially have removed all such suspicions[261]." In an interview
+with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of the treaty,
+arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could be determined
+afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave warning to Russell.
+"Probably it was this advice that caused Russell to insist on the
+explanatory declaration[262]."
+
+It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the acuteness of
+Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into a trap." Nor
+could his claim "that there was no difference between a nation entirely
+at peace and one in circumstances like those of the United States at
+this time" be taken seriously. "He was furnishing his opponent with
+evidences of his lack of candour." This clouded the effect that would
+have followed "a wise and generous policy toward neutrals, which had
+doubtless been in Seward's mind from the beginning[263]." In the end he
+concluded the negotiation gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of
+American respect for the second and third articles of the Declaration of
+Paris--exactly that which Lyons had originally been instructed by
+Russell to secure.
+
+     "We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag,
+     according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods
+     not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not
+     contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found
+     under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be
+     committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our
+     citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or
+     property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective,
+     must be respected[264]."
+
+Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part the
+result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a concealed purpose
+of Northern advantage. This last he calls a "trap." And it is to be
+noted that in Seward's final pledge to Adams the phrase "those of any of
+our citizens" reserves, for the North, since the negotiation had failed,
+the right to issue privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says
+Bancroft, was not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a
+British commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States
+respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, and
+"if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships and
+goods of citizens of the North, all the better for other commercial
+nations; for it would soon cause the commerce of the United States to be
+carried on under foreign flags, especially the British and French[265]."
+Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed to both parties in the
+negotiation, and that of Seward is treated as conceived at the moment
+when a policy of seeking European friendship was dominant at Washington,
+but with the hope of securing at least negative European support.
+Seward's persistence after European recognition of Southern belligerency
+is regarded as a characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of
+possible resulting dangerous complications.
+
+This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of State and
+it does not completely satisfy the third historian to examine the
+incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of British policy.
+Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, writing in 1899,
+followed in the main the view of his brother, Henry Adams. But in 1912
+he reviewed the negotiation at great length with different
+conclusions[266]. His thesis is that the Declaration of Paris
+negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war policy," in
+that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and France and then
+those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of Southern privateering,
+or at least permitted them access to British and French ports, a good
+ground of complaint leading to war would be established. _This_ was the
+ultimate ulterior purpose in Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a
+method of fixing a quarrel on some foreign Power in case the United
+States should seek, as Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home
+by a foreign war.
+
+In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with Bancroft, but
+with this new interpretation. The opening misunderstanding he ascribed,
+as did Lyons, to the simple fact that Seward "had refused to see the
+despatch" in which Russell's proposals were made[267]. Seward's
+instructions of July 6, after the misunderstanding was made clear to
+him, pushing the negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a
+very high horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st
+of the previous May[268]," and this warlike charger he continued to ride
+until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, put an end to
+his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory he would have gone
+on with his project. Now, with the end of a period of brain-storm and
+the emergence of sanity in foreign policy, "Secretary Seward in due time
+(September 7) pronounced the proposed reservation [by Russell] quite
+'inadmissible.' And here the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and
+not altogether creditable diplomatic farce[269]."
+
+Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and intention.
+Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly said that his
+course throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism[270]." And
+Lyons is quoted as having understood, in the end, the real purpose of
+Seward's policy in seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell
+on December 6 upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying
+the President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading
+the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to the
+effect it would have on the privateering operations of the Southern
+States; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, after
+having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as
+pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground of
+quarrel[271]...." As to Russell, combating Henry Adams' view, it is
+asserted that it was the great good fortune of the United States that
+the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a policy of neutrality,
+was not to be driven from its honest application by irritations, nor
+seduced into a position where the continuation of that policy would be
+difficult.
+
+Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly available
+British materials on the negotiation--materials which will in themselves
+offer sufficient comment on the theories of Henry Adams, and in less
+degree of Bancroft--it is best to note here the fallacy in C.F. Adams'
+main thesis. If the analysis given in the preceding chapter of the
+initiation and duration of Seward's "foreign war policy" is correct,
+then the Declaration of Paris negotiation had no essential relation
+whatever to that policy. The instructions to Adams were sent to eight
+other Ministers. Is it conceivable that Seward desired a war with the
+whole maritime world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate
+proposal of a foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in
+fact stamps the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe
+which Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did
+not come to a head until the news had been received of England's
+determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the second
+week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked the decline,
+not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the President's
+orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh certainly, Seward had
+yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to expressions of
+friendship[272]. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's first
+instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June that the
+"misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were despatched by Seward
+to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations at London and Paris. The
+battle of Bull Run had nothing to do with a new policy. Thus chronology
+forbids the inclusion of this negotiation, either in its inception,
+progress, or conclusion, as an agency intended to make possible, on just
+grounds, a foreign war.
+
+A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and in
+archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the Declaration of
+Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation known in London it
+will be remembered that on May 1 the British Government and Parliament
+became aware that a civil war was inevitable and that the South planned
+to issue privateers. On that day Russell asked the Admiralty to
+reinforce the British fleet in West Indian waters that British commerce
+might be adequately protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in
+the Commons that Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a
+policy of close harmony with France was being matured; and on this day
+he proposed through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each
+ask _both_ the contending parties in America to abide by the second and
+third articles of the Declaration of Paris[273]. If there was ulterior
+motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then or later,
+passing between any of the British diplomats concerned--Russell, Cowley,
+and Lyons. The plain fact was that the United States was not an adherent
+to the Declaration, that the South had announced privateering, and the
+North a blockade, and that the only portions of the Declaration in
+regard to which the belligerents had as yet made no statement were the
+second and third articles.
+
+It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On May 9
+Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's attitude
+toward a British subject serving on a Southern privateer[274]. The next
+day in the Lords there occurred a debate the general burden of which was
+that privateering was in fact piracy, but that under the conditions of
+the American previous stand, it could not be treated as such[275]. Both
+in the Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming
+Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both
+debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to
+Cowley, on May 11[276]. By that despatch France was asked to send an
+instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft instruction
+intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to Cowley, the object
+being to secure from the American belligerents adherence to _all_ the
+articles, privateering included, of the Declaration of Paris[277].
+
+Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original suggestion, it
+met with a prompt check from France. On May 9 Thouvenel had agreed
+heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the practical advice that the
+best method of approach to the Confederacy would be through the consuls
+in the South[278]. Now, on May 13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel
+feared that England and France would get into serious trouble if the
+North agreed to accede on privateering and the South did not. Cowley
+reported that he had argued with Thouvenel that privateers were pirates
+and ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more
+than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles[279]. For the
+moment Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On
+May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in which he
+mentioned a communication about to be made to the South[280]; and on May
+15 the London _Times_, presumably reflecting governmental decision, in
+commenting on the Proclamation of Neutrality, developed at some length
+the idea that British citizens, if they served on Southern privateers,
+could claim no protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat
+them as pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written
+Mercier in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but
+omitting the part about privateering[281], and on this same day Russell
+sent to Cowley a copy of a _new_ draft of instructions to Lyons,
+seemingly in exact accord with the French idea[282]. On the seventeenth,
+Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to Thouvenel[283]. Finally
+on May 18 the completed instruction was despatched.
+
+It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview with
+Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had been
+based on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had no
+knowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams,
+toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority to
+negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So far
+as he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of an
+agreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in fact
+completed, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on the
+sixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a
+completed agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instruction
+already given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams'
+conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought.
+The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status
+of belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been
+wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This required
+consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again open
+up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and
+permanent renunciation of privateering?
+
+For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May
+18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to
+privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to
+Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had already
+transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of the
+only point in issue which the Government of the United States might
+prefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty
+whatever[284]." This clearly referred to privateering. Russell's
+instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in
+reverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by all
+nations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized as
+law, both in Great Britain and in the United States." The second
+article, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the
+history of their independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great
+Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to
+adhere to the principle she then adopted." Thus briefly stating his
+confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles,
+Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the
+American crisis.
+
+     "There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that
+     relating to privateering, from which the Government of the
+     United States withheld their assent. Under these
+     circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on
+     this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be
+     borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or
+     other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and
+     abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the
+     most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no
+     question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship
+     bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry
+     on their hostilities according to the established laws of
+     war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any
+     Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for,
+     and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her
+     Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of
+     vessels sailing under such letters of marque.
+
+     "In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a
+     certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new
+     principle.
+
+     "You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]."
+
+What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to him
+were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that
+Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be
+piracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce
+privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln's
+proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an
+object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russell
+could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in
+treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as
+close to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would use
+vigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might be
+interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the
+_facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern
+activities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in the
+proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's
+criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and
+a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal
+letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was also
+dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British
+Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction
+"to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled
+Confederate States," and he further explained his purpose and the
+British position:
+
+     "... You will not err in encouraging the Government to which
+     you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which
+     they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in
+     regard to privateering....
+
+     "You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government
+     cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of
+     the Government of the United States if coupled with the
+     condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the
+     Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue
+     letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent
+     operations of vessels holding from them such letters of
+     marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the
+     recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of
+     the law of nations[287]."
+
+Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy
+of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared by
+Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a
+half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a
+renunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced of
+the wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenel
+might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this
+same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:
+
+     "I have further to state to you, with reference to my
+     despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first
+     instance inclined to propose to both of the contending
+     parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of
+     Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after
+     communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit
+     our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch.
+
+     "I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M.
+     Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the
+     abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action
+     is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to
+     exercise it[288]."
+
+Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward's
+mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his
+own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only
+as the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatever
+method seemed most "conciliatory." His first private comment on
+receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when he
+finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the
+Southern privateering[289]," and in an official confidential despatch of
+the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward
+expected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did the
+matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a
+time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the
+transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in London
+Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June
+6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he
+understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an
+American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... it may open the way
+to the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But ... we ought
+not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining
+this desirable object[292]." Evidently, in his opinion, the South would
+not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days
+later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in
+Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States
+that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote
+that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].
+Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection
+to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could
+not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared
+neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American
+Secretary of State.
+
+Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had
+specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed
+would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern
+privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to
+impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to
+Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which
+was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the
+two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that
+joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as
+acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he
+read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent
+by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not
+pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons
+told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some
+intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British
+interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its
+eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were
+doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons
+thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal
+knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the
+negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this
+postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date,
+indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution
+of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the
+Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to
+be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor
+of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate
+Government[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated,
+feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous," but believing they had
+prevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of
+an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions
+and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify
+Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, that
+such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to
+issue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions
+to make this clear--let alone any "latitude" to deal with
+privateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward
+his personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was
+not an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the
+"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were being
+sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His only
+subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he
+learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no
+further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in
+case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the
+Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no
+circumstances should a convention be signed without a distinct
+declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern
+privateers[301].
+
+The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' report
+of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to
+Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that
+Adams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, and
+that he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offer
+to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.
+On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step
+indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior
+motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no
+resulting irritations or complications with the United States. He
+recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the
+Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons
+should act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall was
+now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation
+without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already
+started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the
+end[303]."
+
+Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the
+United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American
+adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the
+convention at once. The warnings received from many sources did not
+dismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue,
+believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.
+Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have
+been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he
+telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing
+a Convention with the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to
+the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer
+immediately by telegraph[304]." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that
+Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley in
+a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very
+cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it would be
+better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again
+his fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The same
+objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a
+reply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that
+while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the
+same time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late
+afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your
+despatches to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308],
+and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by
+Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to
+act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of
+Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be
+informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter
+the Proclamation of Neutrality[309].
+
+The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310].
+Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar French
+convention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued
+French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for the
+affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous
+promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
+understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be
+attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton
+refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident
+sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion
+that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"
+from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the
+Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint
+Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had
+been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long
+since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this
+negotiation.
+
+But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that
+in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of
+any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of
+British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting
+to secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this
+was by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True he
+probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing
+privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not
+to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of
+belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six
+months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to
+maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he
+returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their
+proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as
+final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed
+it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would
+be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid
+in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument,
+but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the
+recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply
+could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have
+constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the
+existence of a state of war.
+
+In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simple
+and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a
+conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules
+advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both
+personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed
+toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the
+negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far
+as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was
+concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the
+straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry
+was gone[316]."
+
+And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not,
+it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a
+high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British
+neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually
+effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of
+Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly
+attitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the
+moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with
+the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of
+offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration
+of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a
+portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the
+larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United
+States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against
+warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the
+instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by
+Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France,
+and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting
+declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence
+of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if
+obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly
+admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good
+understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated,
+suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality
+could long be maintained[318].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.]
+
+[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.]
+
+[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275.]
+
+[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562.]
+
+[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, p. 563.]
+
+[Footnote 242: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams to
+Seward, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol
+XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 18.]
+
+[Footnote 244: _Ibid._, No. 25.]
+
+[Footnote 245: _Ibid._, No. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 246: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams to
+Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, No. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 249: _Ibid._, No. 32.]
+
+[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581.]
+
+[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early in
+the London press. Thus the _Saturday Review_. June 8, 1861, commenting
+on the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration of
+Paris, stated that this could have no effect on the present war but
+would be welcomed for its application after this war was over.]
+
+[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the Geneva
+Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British
+diplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gain
+the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and
+third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected
+and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be
+deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in
+Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280.]
+
+[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279.]
+
+[Footnote 254: _Ibid._, p. 271.]
+
+[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 273.]
+
+[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, p. 277.]
+
+[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without stating
+details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of Henry
+Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.]
+
+[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189.]
+
+[Footnote 260: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 261: _Ibid._, p. 193.]
+
+[Footnote 262: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 263: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 264: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward to
+Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is not
+supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. While
+it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out
+by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 266: C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Mass.
+Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 267: _Ibid._, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons
+of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward
+had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and
+considered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts of
+Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The
+incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I
+regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily
+a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality.
+Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to
+be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation,
+thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181.)
+I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the
+negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some
+reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused
+a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and
+Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)]
+
+[Footnote 268: _Ibid._, p. 51.]
+
+[Footnote 269: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
+
+[Footnote 270: _Ibid._, p. 60.]
+
+[Footnote 271: _Ibid._, p. 58.]
+
+[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130.]
+
+[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 1. It was
+with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "If
+any step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feeling
+our way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the men
+who have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who
+is about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political
+friend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but
+still he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any
+step." (Palmerston MS.)]
+
+[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. 1763.]
+
+[Footnote 275: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34.]
+
+[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentary
+papers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion,
+for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against French
+advice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in
+seeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration
+of Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at which
+Russell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 277: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft.]
+
+[Footnote 278: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May
+9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 279: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May
+13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II,
+p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 281: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 733.]
+
+[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 283: _Ibid._, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding document
+are all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendment
+of Russell's plan did not appear.]
+
+[Footnote 284: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward,
+May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons,
+had been officially received in London on May 10.]
+
+[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 288: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. and the
+Queen."]
+
+[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printed
+in Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42.)]
+
+[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 12. Marked
+"Received," June 17.]
+
+[Footnote 291: F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8,
+1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to act
+extended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, which
+they also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to order
+the French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis.
+Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on this
+planned proposal to the Confederacy.]
+
+[Footnote 292: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld.
+Palmerston and the Queen."]
+
+[Footnote 293: In Washington, so different was the point of view, Lyons
+and Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of the
+proposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them their
+passports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward his
+instructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North was
+concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit and
+representation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June
+15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learned
+the effect of this "joint proposal." F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons
+to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 10. Russell
+to Grey, June 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state to
+which the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to a
+serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until results
+were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi mon
+avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)]
+
+[Footnote 296: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.]
+
+[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 14. Lyons to
+Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in this interview that
+Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of the
+proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had no
+instructions to sign a convention.]
+
+[Footnote 298: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.]
+
+[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing
+privately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution"
+in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal,
+rather than official communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's
+idea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had
+agreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with
+France. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 303: F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell was
+writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of the
+British position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding,
+"It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates,
+and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we
+mean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them
+belligerent rights." C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
+pp. 49-50.]
+
+[Footnote 304: F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. Russell to
+Cowley, July 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 305: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.]
+
+[Footnote 306: Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July 16 Cowley
+repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not yet approached
+France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.)]
+
+[Footnote 307: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. Palmerston's
+Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact language is used in
+the last paragraph of the communication to Adams, November 18, as
+printed in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 19.]
+
+[Footnote 308: F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell to Cowley, July
+17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th at 4.30 p.m.]
+
+[Footnote 309: _Ibid._, No. 729.]
+
+[Footnote 310: See _ante_ pp. 142-45.]
+
+[Footnote 311: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley to Russell, July
+26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 312: It should be noted that during this period Russell
+learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall of
+instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at Charleston the
+overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved this action
+(_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence
+respecting International Maritime Law." No. 23.)]
+
+[Footnote 313: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley to Russell,
+August 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 314: Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston, August 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 315: See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
+pp. 58 and 74.]
+
+[Footnote 316: Adams, _Life of C.F. Adams_, p. 209.]
+
+[Footnote 317: The Confederate Commissions on August 14, 1861, just
+before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris negotiation, had
+made vigorous protest against this British order, characterizing it as
+giving a "favour" to the Government at Washington, and thus as lacking
+in neutrality. Quoted by C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of
+Paris," p. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 318: A few facts about Southern privateering not directly
+pertinent to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was no
+case during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer
+(i.e., a private vessel operating under government letters of marque)
+from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p.
+38.) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard,
+_Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general
+instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia in
+August, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to the
+United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen at
+the time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the Russian
+Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U.S. would
+equip privateers in case war should break out with England and France.
+Seward replied 'that is a matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon
+remarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted to
+cruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the
+only state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates
+in accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then
+exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about
+it.'" (Schleiden MS.)]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER
+
+The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the preceding
+chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and Ministers as important
+in themselves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon all
+parties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. But
+the public knew nothing of the details of the inconclusive negotiation
+and the Press merely gave a hint now and then of its reported progress
+and ultimate failure. Newspapers continued to report the news from
+America in unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort
+Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both sides
+in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in arms for
+which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for
+75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 additional. The
+regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy by 18,000 men. Naval
+vessels widely scattered over the globe, were instructed to hasten their
+home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an available land force, however
+badly trained and organized, of over 300,000, though these were widely
+scattered from the Potomac in the east to the Missouri in the west.
+
+In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for 100,000
+volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the newly-born
+Confederacy. The seven states already in secession were soon joined,
+between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas, Virginia, North
+Carolina and Tennessee in order, but the border states of Maryland,
+Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly sympathetic with the rest of the
+South, were held to the Union by the "border state policy" of Lincoln,
+the first pronouncement of which asserted that the North had no purpose
+of attacking slavery where it existed, but merely was determined to
+preserve the Union. The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session on
+July 4, heartily approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized an
+army of 500,000, provided for a loan of $200,000,000, sanctioned the
+issue of $50,000,000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both direct
+and by tariffs to meet these expenditures.
+
+In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed determination of
+the South to secede and the uncertainty of the North had led the British
+press to believe that the decision rested wholly with the South. Now the
+North by its preparations was exhibiting an equally fixed determination
+to preserve the Union, and while the British press was sceptical of the
+permanence of this determination, it became, for a short time, until
+editorial policy was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The
+_Economist_ on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal
+step" rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate
+desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so proud,
+but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of population and
+wealth, be the victor, though this could not conceivably result in any
+real reunion, rather in a conquest requiring permanent military
+occupation. Southern leaders were mad: "to rouse by gratuitous insult
+the mettle of a nation three times as numerous and far more than three
+times as powerful, to force them by aggressive steps into a struggle in
+which the sympathy of every free and civilized nation will be with the
+North, seems like the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and hearts
+hardened by the evil cause they defend."
+
+Two weeks later, the _Economist_, while still maintaining the justice of
+the Northern cause, though with lessened vigour, appealed to the common
+sense of the North to refrain from a civil war whose professed object
+was unattainable. "Everyone knows and admits that the secession is an
+accomplished, irrevocable, fact.... Even if the North were sure of an
+easy and complete victory--short, of course, of actual subjugation of
+the South (which no one dreams of)--the war which was to end in such a
+victory would still be, in the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an
+objectless and unprofitable folly[319]." But by the middle of June the
+American irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly
+and angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press
+resentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of British
+attitude. "We _do_ believe the secession of the Slave States to be a
+_fait accompli_--a completed and irreversible transaction. We believe it
+to be impossible now for the North to lure back the South into the Union
+by any compromise, or to compel them back by any force." "If this is an
+offence it cannot be helped[320]."
+
+The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed through the
+same shifts of opinion and expression as the _Economist_; first
+upbraiding the South, next appealing to the North not to wage a useless
+war, finally committing themselves to the theory of an accomplished
+break-up of the Union and berating the North for continuing, through
+pride alone, a bloody conflict doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer
+attention was diverted from the ethical causes at issue by the
+publication in the _Times_ of Motley's letter analysing the nature of
+the American constitution and defending the legal position of the North
+in its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against the
+general British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness in
+England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our
+downfall, but to accept the fact[321]...."
+
+He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South into
+subjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is written on
+the record of our race. British and American history is made up of
+rebellion and revolution.... There can be nothing plainer, then, than
+the American right of revolution. But, then, it should be called
+revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should find difficulty in
+understanding that the United States Government is a nation among the
+nations of the earth; a constituted authority, which may be overthrown
+by violence, as may be the fate of any state, whether kingdom or
+republic, but which is false to the people if it does not its best to
+preserve them from the horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood."
+
+Motley denied any _right_ of _peaceful_ secession, and his
+constitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view. But he
+was compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the sense of
+Lincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no purpose of
+emancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that slavery within
+a state was sacred from all interference by the general government, or
+by the free states, or by individuals in those states; and the Chicago
+Convention [which nominated Lincoln] strenuously asserted that
+doctrine." Coming at the moment when the British press and public were
+seeking ground for a shift from earlier pro-Northern expressions of
+sympathy to some justification for the South, it may be doubted whether
+Motley's letter did not do more harm than good to the Northern cause.
+His denial of a Northern anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a,
+professedly, more calm and judicial examination of the claimed
+_Southern right_ of secession, and his legal argument could be met, and
+was met, with equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as to
+the nature of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity of
+Lincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even to
+warnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring into
+consideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial that
+there were any great moral principles at stake in the American conflict.
+
+In the meantime the two sections in America were busily preparing for a
+test of strength, and for that test the British press, reporting
+preparations, waited with interest. It came on July 21 in the first
+battle of Bull Run, when approximately equal forces of raw levies,
+30,000 each, met in the first pitched battle of the war, and where the
+Northern army, after an initial success, ultimately fled in disgraceful
+rout. Before Bull Run the few British papers early taking strong ground
+for the North had pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as
+inevitably destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The
+_Daily News_ lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a
+great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all free
+people a question of upholding the eternal principles of liberty,
+morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be civil war, may
+perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most perfect instrument in
+working out a pure intent[322].'" The disaster to the Northern army, its
+apparent testimony that the North lacked real fighting men, bolstered
+that British opinion which regarded military measures against the South
+as folly--an impression reinforced in the next few months by the long
+pause by the North before undertaking any further great effort in the
+field. The North was not really ready for determined war, indeed, until
+later in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the British
+press upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military weakness.
+
+Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment were
+the letters of W.H. Russell to the _Times_. This famous
+war-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 by
+Delane, editor of the _Times_, his first letter, written on March 29,
+appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through the South, was
+met everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man of his reputation and
+one representing the most important organ of British public opinion,
+returned to the North in late June, and at Washington was given intimate
+interviews by Seward and other leaders. For a time his utterances were
+watched for, in both England and America, with the greatest interest and
+expectancy, as the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest,
+dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of slavery,
+terming apologists of that institution "the miserable sophists who
+expose themselves to the contempt of the world by their paltry theiscles
+on the divine origin and uses of Slavery[323]...." and writing "day
+after day ... the impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States
+Rights' meant protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and
+free-trade in slave produce with the other world[324]." But at the same
+time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the South in
+high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in the North.
+The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he rode out from
+Washington to meet the defeated army, and his description of the routed
+rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy toward the Capitol, so ridiculed
+Northern fighting spirit as to leave a permanent sting behind it. At
+the same time it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the
+Northern effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himself
+guarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and France
+think of it?' is the question which is asked over and over again," wrote
+Russell on July 24[325], expatiating on American anxiety and chagrin in
+the face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he recorded in his
+diary the beginnings of the American newspaper storm of personal attack
+because of his description of the battle in the _Times_--an attack which
+before long became the alleged cause of his recall by Delane[326]. In
+fact Russell's letters added nothing in humiliating description to the
+outpourings of the Northern press, itself greedily quoted by
+pro-Southern foreign papers. The impression of Northern military
+incapacity was not confined to Great Britain--it was general throughout
+Europe, and for the remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured to
+assert a Northern success in the war[327].
+
+Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the policy of
+strict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The truth is, the
+North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by professional
+politicians, while the South are fighting for what they consider rightly
+or wrongly vital interests," thus explaining to his own satisfaction why
+a Northern army of brave men had _chosen_ to _run_ away[328], but the
+Government was careful to refrain from any official utterances likely to
+irritate the North. The battle served, in some degree, to bring into the
+open the metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing
+neutrality and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each
+took a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of
+Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of
+British interference[329], and to Gladstone (evidently controverting the
+latter's opinion) that slavery was and would continue to be an object in
+the war[330], but the press, certainly, was not united either as to
+future British policy or on basic causes and objects of the war. The
+_Economist_ believed that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, if
+coming soon, would "so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Union
+that the contest will be abandoned on the instant.... Some day, with
+scarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has been
+agreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been signed[331]." John
+Bright's paper, the _Morning Star_, argued long and feverishly that
+Englishmen must not lose sight of the fact that slavery was an issue,
+and made appeal for expressions, badly needed at the moment, of
+pro-Northern sympathy[332]. To this _John Bull_ retorted:
+
+     "Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery has
+     nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America.... The
+     people of America have erected a political idol. The
+     Northerners have talked and written and boasted so much about
+     their Republic that they have now become perfectly furious to
+     find that their idol can be overthrown, and that the false
+     principles upon which the American Republic is built should
+     be exhibited to the world, that their vaunted democracy
+     should be exposed as a mere bubble or a piece of rotten
+     timber, an abominable and worthless tyranny of the sovereign
+     mob[333]."
+
+Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at issue[334].
+_John Bull_, the "country squire's paper," might venture to voice the
+thought, but more important papers were still cautious in expressing it.
+W.H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is quite obvious, I think,
+that the North will succeed in reducing the South[335]." But Delane
+permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the _Times_. Darwin is
+good testimony of the all-prevalent British feeling: "I hope to God we
+English are utterly wrong in doubting whether the North can conquer the
+South." "How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquer
+the South; and I never meet a soul, even those who would most wish it,
+who think it possible--that is, to conquer and retain it[336]."
+
+In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned, there
+appeared several books and articles on the American question which gave
+opportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and controversy. A Dr.
+Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of St. John's College,
+Oxford," published a work, _The American Crisis Considered_, chiefly
+declamatory, upholding the right of Southern secession, stating that no
+one "who has the slightest acquaintance with the political action of
+history would term the present movement rebellion." With this the
+_Spectator_ begged leave to differ[337]. The _Saturday Review_
+acknowledged that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipation
+to the front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this view
+as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe,
+who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of her
+pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. Under the
+caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the _Saturday Review_
+avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy War" in America. "The North
+does not proclaim abolition and never pretended to fight for
+anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the Sacred
+Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its _cri de guerre_ is not unconditional
+emancipation." "The Governmental course of the British nation ... is not
+yet directed by small novelists and their small talk[338]." Thomas
+Hughes also came in for sarcastic reference in this article, having
+promptly taken up the cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attack
+through the columns of the _Spectator_, reasserting slavery as an issue
+and calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of Americans
+and realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations of mean
+motives," and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A nation engaged in
+a life and death struggle should not be treated in a tone of flippant
+and contemptuous serenity. The British press had chosen "to impute the
+lowest motives, to cull out and exult over all the meanness, and
+bragging, and disorder which the contest has brought out, and while we
+sit on the bank, to make no allowances for those who are struggling in
+the waves[339]."
+
+Besides the _Spectator_, on the Northern side, stood the _Daily News_,
+declaring that the South could not hold out, and adding,
+"The Confederate States may be ten millions, but they _are_
+wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong[340]." The _Daily News_, according
+to its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone in steadfast advocacy of
+the Northern cause[341]. This claim of unique service to the North is
+not borne out by an examination of newspaper files, but is true if only
+metropolitan dailies of large circulation are considered. The
+_Spectator_ was a determined and consistent friend of the North. In its
+issue of September 28 a speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and
+attacked. The speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would
+be beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size
+and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that the
+final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate nations, and
+stated his belief that the friendly emulation of these nations would
+result for Americans in a rapid advance in art and commerce such as had
+been produced in the old commonwealths of Greece. The _Spectator_
+answered that such a breaking up of America was much more likely to
+result in a situation comparable to that in South America, inquired
+caustically whether Bulwer Lytton had heard that slavery was in
+question, and asserted that his speech presumably represented the
+official view of the Tories, and embodied that of the English governing
+class[342].
+
+In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861 there is
+little on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality is approved
+by all papers and public speakers. But as the months passed without
+further important military engagements attention began to be directed
+toward the economic effects on England of the war in America and to the
+blockade, now beginning to be made effective by the North. The _Saturday
+Review_, though pro-Southern, declared for neutrality, but distinguished
+between strict observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognition
+of the _de facto_ government of the Confederacy "as soon as the Southern
+States had achieved for their independence that amount of security with
+which Great Britain had been satisfied in former cases[343]." But
+another article in the same issue contained a warning against forcibly
+raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the North, and
+that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. Two weeks later
+appeared a long review of Spence's _American Union_, a work very
+influential in confirming British pro-Southern belief in the
+constitutional right of the South to secede and in the certainty of
+Southern victory. Spence was "likely to succeed with English readers,
+because all his views are taken from a thoroughly English
+standpoint[344]." The week following compliments are showered upon the
+"young professor" Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the Present
+American War," in which he distinguished between recognition of
+belligerency and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the former
+was inevitable and logical. The _Saturday Review_, without direct
+quotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early recognition
+of Southern independence on the ground that it was _a fait accompli_,
+and expressed approval[345].
+
+These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and reputable
+journals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side or the other
+throughout the months from June to December, 1861. All publications had
+much to say of the American struggle and varied in tone from dignified
+criticism to extreme vituperation, this last usually being the resort of
+lesser journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writing
+in a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was a
+characteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined with a
+supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior nation, gave
+great offence to Americans, whether North or South. But the British
+press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the governmental policy
+of neutrality, and in any event Motley was right in stating "the Press
+is not the Government," adding his opinion that "the present English
+Government has thus far given us no just cause of offence[346]."
+Meanwhile the Government, just at the moment when the Declaration of
+Paris negotiation had reached an inglorious conclusion, especially
+irritating to Earl Russell, was suddenly plunged into a sharp
+controversy with the United States by an incident growing out of
+Russell's first instructions to Lyons in regard to that negotiation and
+which, though of minor importance in itself, aroused an intensity of
+feeling beyond its merits. This was the recall by Seward of the
+exequatur of the British consul Bunch, at Charleston, South Carolina.
+
+It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on the
+Declaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at Charleston, be
+commissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance of the binding force
+of the second and third articles, but that Lyons and Mercier, fearing
+Seward's irritation, had hesitated to proceed in the matter. Later
+Russell had recalled his instructions, but before this recall could
+reach Lyons the latter had decided to act[347]. On July 5 Lyons gave
+explicit directions to Bunch not to approach the Confederate Government
+directly, but to go to Governor Pickens of South Carolina and explain
+the matter to him verbally, adding "you should act with great caution,
+in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new
+Confederation by Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am
+authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this
+matter to you," thus after all implying that a real _negotiation_ with
+the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent similar
+instructions to St. André, the French Acting-Consul at Charleston[348].
+Bunch received Lyons' official letter on July 19[349], together with a
+private one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was to put nothing in
+writing, and that he and his French colleagues were to keep the names of
+Lyons and Mercier out of any talk, even, about the matter. Bunch was to
+talk as if his instructions came directly from Russell. Lyons hoped the
+South would be wise enough not to indulge in undue publicity, since if
+"trumpeted" it might elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal from
+France and England." Both the official and the private letter must,
+however, have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all a
+negotiation and that he had been entrusted with it[350].
+
+Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with the
+Southern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his environment,
+become more friendly to it[351]. He now acted with promptness and with
+some evident exultation at the importance given him personally. In
+place of Governor Pickens an experienced diplomat, William Henry
+Trescott, was approached by Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. André, was
+then the French agent at Charleston[352]. Trescott went directly to
+President Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not been
+made through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhat
+unwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the Confederate
+Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris except for the
+article on privateering[353]. Bunch took great pride in the secrecy
+observed. "I do not see how any clue is given to the way in which the
+Resolutions have been procured.... We made a positive stipulation that
+France and England were not to be alluded to in the event of the
+compliance of the Confederate Govt.[354]," he wrote Lyons on August 16.
+But he failed to take account either of the penetrating power of
+mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On
+this same day, August 16, Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on the
+fourteenth, of one Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage for
+Liverpool carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to the
+British Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. The
+letters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch's
+recent activities and stated that "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy,
+communicated to me also that the first step of recognition was
+taken[355]." The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams to
+Russell with an enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on the
+alleged "negotiation" with the South.
+
+Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as a
+passport, as did the United States. This also was made matter of
+complaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented to
+Russell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the three
+principal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a negotiation
+with the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a passport, not
+countersigned by the Secretary of State as required by the United States
+rules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he had permitted the person
+to whom this passport was issued to carry letters from the enemies of
+the United States to their agents abroad. On these grounds the British
+Government was requested to remove Bunch from his office. On first
+learning of Mure's arrest Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch's
+conduct had been perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be found
+to contain nothing supporting the suspicion of the American
+Government[356]. The language used by Lyons was such as to provide an
+excellent defence in published despatches, and it was later so used. But
+privately neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the
+correctness of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on
+August 18, and at once protested that no passport had been given, but
+merely a "Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British
+Merchant residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was
+carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office[357]. In fact Mure
+had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the
+distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion.
+Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in
+taking charge of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. Bunch's
+confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me not to
+forward himself any letters alluding to military or political events,
+excepting letters to or from British officials[358]." This made good
+reading when put in the published Parliamentary Papers. But in reality
+the sending of private letters by messenger also carrying an official
+pouch was no novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that this
+was his practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for the
+merchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I must
+leave it to your Lordship and H.M.'s Government to support me. My own
+despatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so I take the
+responsibility of aiding British interests by sending the mercantile
+letters as well[359]." And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons on Mure's
+arrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could not consider
+him [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer of a bag to Earl
+Russell, by his doing what everyone who left Charleston was doing
+daily[360]...."
+
+Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation with
+Belligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington, writing,
+"I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult
+and delicate, was managed with great tact and good judgment by the two
+Consuls[361]." But this referred merely to the use of Trescott and its
+results, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British Government was, indeed,
+prepared to defend the action of its agents in securing, _indirectly_,
+from the South, an acknowledgment of certain principles of
+international law. Russell did not believe that Lincoln was "foolhardy
+enough to quarrel with England and France," though Hammond (Under
+Secretary of Foreign Affairs) "is persuaded that Seward wishes to pick a
+quarrel[362]." Enquiry was promptly made of France, through Cowley, as
+to her stand in the matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell
+intimating by an enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as
+to the initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was
+Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through the
+Consuls[363]. This was an error of memory[364], and Cowley was perturbed
+by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. The latter
+stated that if a like American demand were made on France "undoubtedly
+he could not give up an Agent who had done no more than execute the
+orders entrusted to him[365]." This looked like harmony, but the
+situation for the two countries was not the same as no demand had been
+made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley was, in reality, anxious and
+suspicious, for Thouvenel, in conversation, attributed Seward's anger to
+Bunch's alleged indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that France
+would not "stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against the
+fact of a communication (not a _negotiation_) having been held with the
+Confederacy[366]. Before the French reply was secured Russell had
+prepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him that the bag
+from Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain "correspondence of
+the enemies of the Government of the United States" as had been
+suspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's explanation of the reason
+for forwarding private letters[367]. In another letter to Adams of the
+same date Russell avowed the Government's responsibility for Bunch's
+action on the Declaration of Paris, and declined to recall him, adding:
+
+     "But when it is stated in a letter from some person not
+     named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern
+     States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs
+     to decline all responsibility for such a statement.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the
+     belligerent character of the Southern States, and they will
+     continue to recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's
+     Government have not recognized and are not prepared to
+     recognize the so-called Confederate States as a separate and
+     independent State[368]."
+
+Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13[369], and merely
+stated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That Russell
+was anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to Lyons instructing
+him if sent away from Washington "to express in the most dignified and
+guarded terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be
+the result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire
+to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon cease,
+and the former friendly relations be restored[370]." Meantime Russell
+was far from satisfied with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform him
+that the "statements made in regard to his proceedings require
+explanation[371]." The failure of Seward to demand Belligny's recall
+worried Russell. He wrote to Palmerston on September 19, "I cannot
+believe that the Americans, having made no demand on the French to
+disavow Belligny, or Baligny, will send away Lyons," and he thought that
+Seward ought to be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part
+of Bunch's supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending
+reinforcements to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about
+Bunch, we may rest on our oars for the winter[372]." There was nothing
+further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of the British
+refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at Washington was writing
+in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract assertions of principles," but
+accustoming the North to the _practice_ of British recognition of
+Southern belligerent rights[373]. Lyons believed that Seward would not
+go further than to withdraw Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for
+the return of Mercier (long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our
+position is unluckily not exactly the same with that of France[374]." On
+October 12 Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, as
+usual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter just
+received from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not "unfriendly
+to the United States," and "appeared anxious not to pick a quarrel, yet
+hardly knowing how to retract from his original position." Lyons told
+Seward that it would be "impossible to carry on the Diplomatic
+business ... on the false hypothesis that the United States Government"
+did not _know_ England and France had recognized the belligerent rights
+of the South, and he urged Russell to get from France an open
+acknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated" with
+the Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid this, thus
+seeking to bring pressure on the British Government to adopt his plan
+of an early recognition of Southern independence. Like Cowley, Lyons
+was disturbed at the French evasion of direct support in the Bunch
+affair[375].
+
+Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him by the
+United States was confined to three points; he asserted his disbelief
+that Mure carried any despatches from the _de facto_ government at
+Richmond; he protested that "there was not one single paper in my bag
+which was not entirely and altogether on Her Majesty's service"; and he
+explained the alleged "passport" was not intended as such, but was
+merely "a certificate stating that Mr. Mure was charged by me with
+despatches," but he acknowledged that in the certificate's description
+of Mure as a "British merchant" a possible error had been committed,
+adding, however, that he had supposed anyone would understand, since the
+words "British subject" had not been used, that Mure was in reality a
+naturalized citizen of America[376]. This explanation was received by
+Russell on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, made
+without knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, was
+that if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters
+carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I mean
+the distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the distinction
+between a document requesting that the bearer '_may be permitted to pass
+freely and receive all proper protection and assistance_' and a
+passport[377]." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's explanation was also
+dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated Lyons' instructions
+against entrusting despatches to persons carrying private
+correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives no distinct denial" to
+the newspaper stories that he had gossiped about his activities and had
+stated them to be "a first step toward recognition[378]." These
+criticisms were directed entirely to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the
+overture to the South; on the propriety of that act Russell supported
+Bunch with vigour[379]. October 26, Seward read to Lyons the instruction
+to Adams on the revocation of Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken for
+this, reported Lyons, was an evasion of that charge of communicating
+with the South for which Russell had avowed responsibility, and a
+turning to the charge that Bunch was personally unacceptable longer to
+the United States because of his partisanship to the South, as evidenced
+by various acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion that
+Great Britain had taken "a first step to recognition." "Never," wrote
+Lyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation." "No
+one who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to me can
+consider him as in the least degree a partisan of the Southern cause."
+"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent.
+After a short pause I took leave of him courteously, and
+withdrew[380]."
+
+As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American decision
+against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been relieved that this
+would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. His despatch just
+cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the proper British refutation
+of charges, but with acceptance of the American decision. Nevertheless
+he wrote gloomily on the same day of future relations with the United
+States[381]. At the same time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action,
+was not disturbed. He thought it still "not off the cards that the
+Southern Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be
+strictly neutral, and it will be[382]." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch
+and letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach
+much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of Seward to
+feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the most
+grateful food he can offer[383]." For Russell saw clearly that Great
+Britain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personal
+grounds alleged by Seward. There followed in due course the formal
+notification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned of
+the _Trent_ affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarming
+incident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, for
+while both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative
+papers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the
+only point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain
+that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British
+interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the
+Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its citizens,
+but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British agent who
+should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell closed the matter
+by stating that he did "not perceive that any advantage would be
+obtained by the continuance of this correspondence[384]." Bunch was
+expected to leave Charleston as soon as a safe conveyance could be
+provided for him, but this was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he
+remained at Charleston until February, 1863, actively engaged, but
+official papers were signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over
+the _Trent_, he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as
+he did from the public horizon[385].
+
+The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so far as the
+alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had its real
+significance in the effort of Great Britain to make contact with the
+Southern Government--an effort incautiously entered upon, and from which
+an attempt to withdraw had come too late. The result was British
+assertion of a right in case of necessity to make such contact, having
+recognized the South as a belligerent, but a discontinuance of the
+practice, under the American protest[386]. While this controversy was in
+progress the attention of the British Government was directed to a
+proposal urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared to
+have the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so
+Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel expressing
+great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, due
+to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informed
+Lyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, complete
+harmony of action between England and France; second, recognition of
+Southern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade;
+fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment,"
+when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a good
+one[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be
+deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument over
+this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but
+thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the
+idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop
+other sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusive
+dependence on the United States. Mercier answered that France was in
+dire need and could not wait and he urged that mere recognition of the
+South would not secure cotton--it was necessary also to break the
+blockade. In comment to Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but
+thought the fact in itself an argument against accepting Mercier's
+ideas: "The time is far distant when the intervention of England and
+France in the quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion,
+tolerated by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far
+enough in establishing its independence to render a recognition of it
+either proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with
+emphasis that recognition would _not_ end the war unless there was also
+an _alliance_ with the South[388].
+
+In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was being
+directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any push from the
+British manufacturing interest, but because of queries addressed to it
+by the French Minister in London. Russell wrote to Palmerston, referring
+to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree with you that the cotton question
+may become serious at the end of the year," but he added that Lindsay
+had informed him that in any case cotton could not be brought in the
+winter-time from the interior to the Southern ports[389]. In truth any
+serious thought given at this time to the question of cotton appears to
+be the result of the French arguments at London and Washington
+advocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier
+renewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this
+time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons
+insisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any power
+that recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more
+suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage
+of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in
+dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of
+attitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified
+when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward,
+after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward
+said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign
+power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France
+could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He
+acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed
+Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On his
+part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible
+outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel that
+the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and
+"bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to Russell is that
+Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification of
+Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learn
+whether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercier
+replied "no," and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to
+Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--a
+caution with which Lyons was very content[391].
+
+Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at a
+rather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint about
+Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would
+magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before
+Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote to
+Palmerston:
+
+     "There is much good sense in Mercier's observations.
+     But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything,
+     it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England
+     and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting
+     cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents,
+     Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms
+     of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you
+     accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts
+     them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end,
+     and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would
+     be quite ready to hold this language with us.
+
+     "If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it
+     would be the end of the year, or immediately before the
+     meeting of Parliament[392]."
+
+Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat
+carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly held
+thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor
+was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not
+inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell:
+
+     "As to North America, our best and true policy seems to
+     be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the
+     conflict between North and South.... The only
+     excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening
+     parties if the conflict went on; but in the American
+     case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.
+
+     "I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would
+     not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress
+     created by that want was far more serious than it is likely
+     to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way
+     to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply
+     than usual from other quarters.
+
+     "The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars
+     and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel
+     with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights
+     and those of our fellow countrymen[395]."
+
+In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward,
+outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared
+despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was
+one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we
+consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed
+to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what
+the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]."
+Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none
+the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since
+Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which
+Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no
+expanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyons
+by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister
+could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and
+Russell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied.
+Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not
+become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share
+in the discussion[397].
+
+Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still
+another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with
+Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of
+national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views
+became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed with
+more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons
+into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he
+"had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the
+time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the
+South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied
+that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it
+would be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive
+exception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written on
+November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred
+an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than
+any other during the Civil War.
+
+The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression of
+Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and
+determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a
+favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed,
+as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatory
+statement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell felt
+that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell
+learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's
+recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days
+later, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8.
+It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increasing
+uncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also an
+increasing irritation at having to guard their steps with such care in a
+situation where they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was
+the dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the
+news of the _Trent_ affair was received they had pursued a policy, so
+they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and were fixed in the
+determination not to permit minor controversies or economic advantage to
+divert them from it.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 319: _Economist_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 320: _Ibid._, June 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 321: J.L. Motley, _The Causes of the American Civil War_.
+Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 322: _Daily News_, July 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 323: Russell, _My Diary, North and South_, p. 159, Boston,
+1863. This work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the
+_Times_, but contains many intimate descriptions not given in the
+newspaper.]
+
+[Footnote 324: _Ibid._, p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 325: The _Times_, August 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 326: Russell, _My Diary_, London, 1863, II, p. 296. This
+edition varies somewhat from that published at Boston and previously
+cited. The _New York Times_ became Russell's most vicious critic,
+labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a name which stuck, and beginning its
+first article on his sins "The terrible epistle has been read with quite
+as much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcely
+exaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on the
+minds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at _Bull's
+Run_ was, what will Russell say?" _Ibid._, p. 297. As to his recall
+Russell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance of
+opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in sympathy
+and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be examined later when
+Russell's position as an independent editor in London becomes
+important.]
+
+[Footnote 327: For similar German impressions see G.H. Putnam, _Memories
+of My Youth_, N.Y., 1914, p. 187.]
+
+[Footnote 328: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, p. 48. In the same view Russell
+wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of Manassas or Bull's Run seems
+to me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the descendants
+of the men of 1776 and indeed of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage."
+(Lyons Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 329: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 31. August 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 330: Gladstone Papers, August 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 331: _Economist_, Aug. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 332: _Morning Star_, Sept. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 333: _John Bull_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 334: To be discussed fully in Chapter XVIII.]
+
+[Footnote 335: Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, _Delane_, II, p. 34.]
+
+[Footnote 336: Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861. Cited in
+_Rhodes_, III, p. 510.]
+
+[Footnote 337: _Spectator_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 338: _Saturday Review_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 339: _Spectator_, Sept. 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 340: _Daily News_, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1861. The statement
+is in reply to an article in the _Times_ of October 9, arguing that even
+if the South were regarded as in the wrong, they had ten millions, a
+fact that was conclusive.]
+
+[Footnote 341: _The Daily News Jubilee_. By Justin McCarthy and John E.
+Robinson, pp. 69-77.]
+
+[Footnote 342: _Spectator_, Sept. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 343: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 344: _Ibid._, Nov. 16. Spence's book rapidly went through many
+editions, was widely read, and furnished the argument for many a
+pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon became the intimate friend
+and adviser of Mason, the Confederate envoy to England.]
+
+[Footnote 345: _Ibid._, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference from Bernard's la
+guage is perhaps permissible, but not inevitable.]
+
+[Footnote 346: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 37. To his mother, Oct.
+18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 347: See _ante_, Ch. V.]
+
+[Footnote 348: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 21 and
+Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at Charleston who acted
+with Bunch.]
+
+[Footnote 349: F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 2,
+1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days were here required to
+transmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached its
+destination in two days. Lyons states that he does not intend to inform
+Mercier of Russell's attempted recall of instructions.]
+
+[Footnote 350: F.O., Am., Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure No. 2. Private.
+Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to Lyons, also used the
+word "negotiation."]
+
+[Footnote 351: When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch had thought this
+indicated a "low morality" and that Southern privateers would be in
+reality pirates. F.O., Am., Vol. 763. Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch to
+Russell, April 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 352: Bancroft's account, _Seward_, II, pp. 197-203, states
+that Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's account privately was
+that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally unfit to be intrusted with
+anything in which judgment and discretion are at all necessary." (Lyons
+Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 16, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 353: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 198.]
+
+[Footnote 354: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 355: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 4. Adams to
+Russell, Sept. 3, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 356: _Ibid._, No. 2. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 357: Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18, 1861. Copy in
+Lyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 358: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 7. Lyons to
+Russell, Aug. 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 359: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 360: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15.
+Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 361: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting International
+Maritime Law." No. 39. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 362: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 363: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 6. Russell
+to Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 364: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. 17,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 365: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 10. Cowley to
+Russell, Sept. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 366: F.O., France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley to Russell,
+Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept.
+10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 367: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 9. Russell
+to Adams, Sept. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 368: _Ibid._, No. 8. Two days later, September 11, Russell
+wrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant of Seward's intentions, and
+that the Queen wished a modification of the "phrase about not being
+prepared to recognize," but that he was against any change.
+Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 369: _Ibid._, No. 12. Adams to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 370: Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited in Newton,
+_Lyons_, I, p. 52.)]
+
+[Footnote 371: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 11. Russell
+to Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 372: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 373: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. _Private_. Sept. 24,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 374: _Ibid._, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts about Belligny were,
+as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before Bunch's activities became
+known, the French Consul had been recalled and replaced by another man,
+St. André. It will have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent
+their instructions to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was
+addressed to St. André. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus
+there was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft
+(_Seward_, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward "thought
+it important not to give them (England and France) a common grievance."]
+
+[Footnote 375: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 376: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15.
+Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 377: Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and Confidential, Lyons to
+Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in this letter that Mure had
+been set free.]
+
+[Footnote 378: F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to Lyons. Draft.
+Oct. 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 379: The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were not printed in
+the _Parliamentary Papers_. Bunch did later deny specifically that he
+had told anyone of his activities. _(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No.
+22. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 380: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 17. Lyons
+to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting unindicated
+elisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating them in brackets
+the sentences run: first:--
+
+"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges brought
+against Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed proceeding being
+deemed advisable with a view to gratify the American Public, Mr. Bunch
+has merely been selected as a safer object of attack than the British or
+French Government.] I can not help saying that never were more serious
+charges, etc.," and second:--
+
+"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. [I
+allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me to be apparent
+in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward's
+character, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say would
+make so much impression upon him as my maintaining an absolute silence.]
+After a short pause, etc." (F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to
+Russell, Oct. 28, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 381: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 382: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 383: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861. He
+added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of the
+bully and coward."]
+
+[Footnote 384: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 26. Russell
+to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 385: Bonham, _British Consuls in the Confederacy_, p. 45.
+Columbia University, _Studies in History, Economics and Public Law_,
+XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons
+thought. Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privately
+at Charleston. (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. Lyons
+to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the
+United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious
+circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister
+resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United
+States and Colombia." (Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, V, p. 22.)]
+
+[Footnote 386: Bancroft, _Seward, II_, p. 203, says that if Great
+Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that British representatives
+were careful to preserve perfect secrecy." I have found no evidence of
+any similar communication with the South.]
+
+[Footnote 387: As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier as
+urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governments
+authority to recognize the South whenever they thought "the right time"
+had come. Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that
+the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him
+in his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea,
+and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England and France
+had acted. Russia could then also recognize the South without offending
+the North. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861.
+No. 863.)]
+
+[Footnote 388: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 389: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1861. On
+Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the winter and
+spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we shall attain a
+great object." (Lyons Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 390: F.O., America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 21,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 391: _Ibid._, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to Russell.
+Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 392: Walpole, _Russell_, II, 344.]
+
+[Footnote 393: See _ante_, p. 194.]
+
+[Footnote 394: "The Americans certainly seem inclined to pick a quarrel
+with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to oblige us to
+recognize the Southern States. A step further would enable us to open
+the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity."
+(Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 245. Granville to Clarendon. No exact date is
+given but the context shows it to have been in October, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 395: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 218-19. On October 30, Russell
+wrote to Gladstone expressing himself as worried about cotton but
+stating that the North was about to try to take New Orleans and thus
+release cotton. (Gladstone Papers).]
+
+[Footnote 396: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 219. Bancroft cites also a
+letter from Seward to his wife showing that he appreciated thoroughly
+the probability of a foreign war if France should press on in the
+line taken.]
+
+[Footnote 397: F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 623. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Nov. 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 398: _Ibid._, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 8,
+1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that suspicion of France
+indicated by Cowley, and for both men these suspicions date from the
+moment when France seemed lukewarm in support of England in the matter
+of Bunch.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE "TRENT"
+
+The _Trent_ affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax of American
+arrogance[399]. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at the outbreak of
+the Civil War had accomplished little, and after seven months of waiting
+for a more favourable turn in foreign relations, President Davis
+determined to replace them by two "Special Commissioners of the
+Confederate States of America." These were James M. Mason of Virginia,
+for Great Britain, and John Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their
+appointment indicated that the South had at last awakened to the need of
+a serious foreign policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the
+Southern press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North,
+almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to secure
+recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual accomplishment of
+their object.
+
+Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at Charleston on the
+night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate steamer _Theodora_[400],
+and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, on the fourteenth, thence
+proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, Cuba, and from that point
+journeyed overland to Havana, arriving October 22. In the party there
+were, besides the two envoys, their secretaries, McFarland and Eustis,
+and the family of Slidell. On November 7 they sailed for the Danish
+island of St. Thomas, expecting thence to take a British steamer for
+Southampton. The vessel on which they left Havana was the British
+contract mail-packet _Trent_, whose captain had full knowledge of the
+diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 the
+_Trent_ was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United States sloop of
+war, _San Jacinto_, Captain Wilkes commanding, by a shot across the
+bows, and a boarding party took from the _Trent_ Mason and Slidell with
+their secretaries, transferred them to the _San Jacinto_, and proceeded
+to an American port. Protest was made both by the captain of the _Trent_
+and by Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on
+board the ship[401]. The two envoys also declared that they would yield
+only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid upon shoulders
+and coat collars, and, accepting this as the application of _force_,
+they were transferred to the _San Jacinto's_ boats. The scene on the
+_Trent_, as described by all parties, both then and later, partakes of
+the nature of comic opera, yet was serious enough to the participants.
+In fact, the envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction
+that the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early
+realization of the object of their journey--recognition of the South,
+at least by Great Britain[402]. Once on board the _San Jacinto_ they
+were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having "seats at the
+captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an American war-ship.
+
+Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even without any
+recent official information from Washington. He was returning from a
+cruise off the African coast, and had reached St. Thomas on October 10.
+A few days later, when off the south coat of Cuba, he had learned of the
+Confederate appointment of Mason and Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth,
+in Havana harbour, he heard that the Commissioners were to sail on the
+_Trent_. At once he conceived the idea of intercepting the _Trent_,
+exercising the right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the
+alleged objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The
+result was that quite without authority from the United States Navy
+Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was
+addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be accepted
+by that nation as an insult to national prestige and national pride not
+quietly to be suffered.
+
+The _San Jacinto_ reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of November 15.
+The next day the news was known, but since it was Saturday, few papers
+contained more than brief and inaccurate accounts and, there being then
+few Sunday papers, it was not until Monday, the eighteenth, that there
+broke out a widespread rejoicing and glorification in the Northern
+press[403]. America, for a few days, passed through a spasm of
+exultation hard to understand, even by those who felt it, once the first
+emotion had subsided. This had various causes, but among them is evident
+a quite childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and
+Slidell. Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of
+the previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed
+antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a
+leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was a
+United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by birth,
+but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in business there,
+and had for nearly twenty years been the political "boss" of one faction
+of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in the State. With much
+previous experience in diplomacy, especially that requiring intrigue and
+indirect methods (as in the preliminaries of the Mexican War), and
+having held his seat in the United States Senate until the withdrawal of
+Louisiana from the Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more
+detested, but both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the
+personal side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing[404].
+
+Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until the news
+of the capture was received no portion of the public had given serious
+thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise also played its part
+when the affair became known in England, though in official circles
+there had been some warning. It had already been reported in the British
+press that Mason and Slidell had run the blockade at Charleston, were in
+Cuba, and were about to set sail for England on the Confederate steamer
+_Nashville_, but the British Government, considering that the envoys
+might perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for
+Southampton, became much concerned over a possible American interference
+with that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the
+Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the
+presence at Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking whether
+this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be entitled to
+interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with beyond the territorial
+limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond three miles from the
+British Coast."
+
+[Illustration: _Photo: Handy, Washington_ JAMES M. MASON]
+
+     "Whether for instance she might cause the West India Mail
+     Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers,
+     open the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine
+     the luggage of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason
+     and Slidell in person, or seize their Credentials and
+     Instructions and Despatches, or even put a Prize Crew on
+     board the West India Steamer and carry her off to a Port of
+     the United States; in other words what would be the right of
+     the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers and crew
+     and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet on
+     the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and
+     confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches;
+     would the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and
+     everything in her back to America or would she be obliged to
+     land in this Country or in some near port all the people and
+     all the unseizable goods[405]?"
+
+Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an immediate
+reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in Southampton on
+November 12. The opinion of the law officer consulted is best given in
+Palmerston's own words in a letter to Delane, Editor of the _Times_:
+
+     "_94 Piccadilly,
+     November 11, 1861_.
+
+     "MY DEAR DELANE,
+
+     "It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr.
+     Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of
+     Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider
+     what we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no
+     doubt, to search the West Indian packet supposed to be
+     bringing hither the two Southern envoys; and, much to my
+     regret, it appeared that, according to the principles of
+     international law laid down in our courts by Lord Stowell,
+     and practised and enforced by us, a belligerent has a right
+     to stop and search any neutral not being a ship of war, and
+     being found on the high seas and being suspected of carrying
+     enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American
+     cruiser might, by our own principles of international law,
+     stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern
+     men and their despatches and credentials were found on board,
+     either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back
+     to New York for trial. Such being the opinion of our men
+     learned in the law, we have determined to do no more than to
+     order the _Phaeton_ frigate to drop down to Yarmouth Roads
+     and watch the proceedings of the American within our
+     three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, and to prevent
+     her from exercising within that limit those rights which we
+     cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit.
+
+     "In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk
+     this morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and
+     finding it blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the
+     night within Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the
+     Southampton river.
+
+     "I mention these things for your private information.
+
+     Yours sincerely,
+
+     PALMERSTON[406]."
+
+Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to Delane, and
+sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a difficult
+situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to Adams on the
+next day, November 12, and asking for an interview. His note took Adams
+by surprise, but he promptly waited upon Palmerston, and was told of the
+latter's disturbance at the presence of the American ship _James Adger_,
+Captain Marchand commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged
+purpose of stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting the
+journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not pretend
+to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right to stop a
+foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and he urged on
+Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither did the object
+to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it was surely of no
+consequence whether one or two more men were added to the two or three
+who had already been so long here. They would scarcely make a difference
+in the action of the Government after once having made up its
+mind[407]."
+
+The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the same day,
+November 12, was reassuring:
+
+     "MY DEAR DELANE,
+
+     "I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the
+     American paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the _Nashville_
+     if found in these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under
+     a foreign flag. He said he had seen the commander, and had
+     advised him to go straight home; and he believed the steamer
+     to be now on her way back to the United States. This is a
+     very satisfactory explanation.
+
+     Yours sincerely,
+
+     PALMERSTON[408]."
+
+In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded quite
+the same statement as that here attributed to him by Palmerston, and
+this became later, but fortunately after the question of the _Trent_ had
+passed off the stage, a matter of minor dispute. Adams' own statement
+was that he had told Palmerston the _James Adger_ was seeking to
+intercept the _Nashville_ and "had no instruction" to interfere with a
+British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already had
+instructions "not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag[409]."
+But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had been
+warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually happened in the
+case of the _Trent_ should occur, English practice, if followed, would
+compel acquiescence in it[410]. This is not to say that a first legal
+advice thus given on a problematical case necessarily bound the
+Government to a fixed line of action, but that the opinion of the
+Government was one of "no help for it" if the case should actually arise
+is shown by the instructions to Lyons and by his reaction. On November
+16, Hammond wrote to Lyons stating the opinion of the Law Officers that
+"we could do nothing to save the Packet being interfered with outside
+our three miles; so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that
+the American [the _James Adger_] had no instructions to meddle with any
+ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to endeavour to
+take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under foreign colours[411]." On
+receipt of this letter subsequent to the actual seizure of the envoys,
+Lyons hardly knew what to expect. He reported Hammond's account to
+Admiral Milne, writing that the legal opinion was that "Nothing could be
+done to save the Packet's being interfered with outside of the Marine
+league from the British Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that
+the Law Officers decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of
+the Packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being
+interfered with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion
+which was to come _after_ the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so uncertain as
+to what his instructions would be that he thought he "ought to maintain
+the greatest reserve here on the matter of the _Trent_[412]."
+
+This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complication
+occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before that
+fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell, "says it was all a
+false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggerated
+notions[413]." But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that the
+North, especially Seward, was so eager for continued British
+neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes' action
+was received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it a
+continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a direct
+affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, was
+stirred at first to keen resentment, writing "of this wretched piece of
+American folly.... I am all against submitting to any clean breach of
+International Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414]." The
+Law Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon
+the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sending
+the _Trent_ as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415]." This
+was still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could not
+be considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the _Trent_
+as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was
+to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would have
+prohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port for
+trial by a prize court.
+
+But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon
+the United States. The case was one for a quick demand of prompt
+reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was
+couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an
+unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a
+breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without
+orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an
+apology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to
+propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British
+position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy
+of it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russell
+authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward,
+if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether
+"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied
+with[418]." And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons
+instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from
+anything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Government
+hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began
+preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated
+munitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but faint
+hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be
+avoided[420].
+
+It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost
+immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was
+softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point
+being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was
+unauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to the
+receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he
+stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict
+silence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the
+realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could
+divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands
+over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in
+America this was a far-fetched notion. The efforts promptly made by the
+Confederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showed
+how little Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very
+quiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain
+intended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and
+30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but received
+in reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them
+"in the present state of affairs[425]."
+
+The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportation
+before even the first American reaction to the British demand could be
+received in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a more
+careful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really felt
+and desired. Gladstone wrote: "It is a very sad and heart-sickening
+business, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426]."
+Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone
+of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on
+technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a
+calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not only
+ourselves, but all our North American colonies[427]." But war seemed to
+both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by Cornewall
+Lewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in a
+position midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429]. Yet Russell,
+with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's policy, as also
+believing that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was less
+pessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediate
+hostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense.
+On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the
+opinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive
+answer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to ask
+compliance.... I do not think the country would approve an immediate
+declaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand of a
+restoration of the prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada.
+Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430]." And on December 20
+he wrote, "Adams' language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding
+to us, if our tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are
+refused, we must, of course, call Parliament together. The sixth
+of February will do. In any other case we must decide according to
+circumstances[431]."
+
+Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America without
+the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for delay. He was
+reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought which was
+experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager British
+"Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first explosion of
+the Press, on receipt of the news of the _Trent_, had been a terrific
+one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen field of supremacy, the
+sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at first preserving a certain
+slow dignity of motion. Customary "strong leader-writing" became
+vigorous, indeed, in editorial treatment of America and in demand for
+the prompt release of the envoys with suitable apology. The close touch
+of leading papers with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the
+_Times_, by the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28
+there was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much
+questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be doubtful.
+But even if old British practice seemed to support Captain Wilkes, the
+present was not to be controlled by a discarded past, and "essential
+differences" were pointed out. This tone of vexed uncertainty changed to
+a note of positive assurance and militant patriotism on November 30 when
+the Government made its demand. The _Times_ up to December 2, thought it
+absolutely certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted
+much space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy
+toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But on
+December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American news of
+the arrival of the _San Jacinto_ at Fortress Monroe, and this contained
+a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had no orders. The _Times_
+was sceptical, but printed the news as having an important bearing, if
+true, and, at the same time, printed communications by "Justicia" and
+others advising a "go slowly" policy[432]. Yet all British papers
+indulged in sharp reflections on American insults, displayed keen
+resentment, and demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand.
+
+An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward on
+November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of feeling as
+has been created by the news of the boarding of [the Trent]. The people
+are frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men out
+of a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot
+resist the impulse if he would." And another American, in Edinburgh,
+wrote to his uncle in New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling
+of indignation exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may
+make itself heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet
+officers[433]." If such were the British temper, it would require
+skilful handling by even a pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even
+without belligerent newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in
+_Punch's_ cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of
+the water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least
+implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a general
+hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement from the
+American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that he had said the
+action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at Washington before he
+sailed for Europe, and asserting that no orders were given to seize the
+envoys on board any British or foreign vessel[434]. Nevertheless, Adams,
+for the moment intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of
+British policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The
+expression of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great
+Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May she
+drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a few
+spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong enough to hold
+her from driving it home. Little do you understand of this fast-anchored
+isle[435]."
+
+There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and sharper tone
+in the British press was the reception of the counter-exultation of the
+American press on learning of the detention and the exercise of "right
+of search" on a British ship. The American public equally went "off its
+head" in its expressions. Writing in 1911, the son of the American
+Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young
+law-student in Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of
+the half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American
+people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment losing
+possession of their senses, as during the weeks which immediately
+followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell[436]." There were evident two
+principal causes for this elation. The North with much emotion and high
+courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of restoring the Union
+and hoping for quick success, had now passed through a wearisome six
+months with no evident progress towards its object. Northern failure had
+developed a deep mortification when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold
+naval captain, on his own initiative, appeared to have struck a real
+blow at the South. His action seemed to indicate that the fighting
+forces of the North, if free from the trammels of Washington red tape,
+could, and would, carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight
+incident to create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden
+lifting from despondency to elation.
+
+But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on American
+minds the notion that the United States had at last given to Great
+Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had exercised upon
+a British ship that "right of search" which had been so keenly resented
+by America as to have become almost a _permanent_ cause of a sense of
+injury once received and never to be forgotten. There was no clear
+thinking about this; the obnoxious right of search in times of peace for
+vagrant seamen, the belligerent right exercised by Britain while America
+was a neutral, the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as
+necessary in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused
+by the American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to
+this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a general
+American jubilation that the United States had now revenged herself for
+British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain could not
+consistently complain. These two main reasons for exultation were shared
+by all classes, not merely by the uninformed mob of newspaper readers.
+At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in Boston on November 26, Governor
+Andrews of Massachusetts called Wilkes' action "one of the most
+illustrious services that had made the war memorable," and added "that
+there might be nothing left [in the episode] to crown the exultation of
+the American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of
+the ship that bore the British lion at its head[437]."
+
+All America first applauded the act, then plunged into discussion of its
+legality as doubts began to arise of its defensibility--and wisdom. It
+became a sort of temporarily popular "parlour game" to argue the
+international law of the case and decide that Great Britain could have
+no cause of complaint[438]. Meanwhile at Washington itself there was
+evidenced almost equal excitement and approval--but not, fortunately, by
+the Department responsible for the conduct of foreign relations.
+Secretary of the Navy Welles congratulated Wilkes on his "great public
+service," though criticizing him for not having brought the _Trent_ into
+port for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2,
+thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to give
+him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence of
+approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of national
+responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, therefore, and
+on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the Cabinet, like Sumner,
+Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful solution. Thoroughly alarmed
+and despondent, anxious as to the possible fate of Canada[439], he
+advised against any public preparations in Canada for defence, on the
+ground that if the _Trent_ affair did blow over it should not appear
+that we ever thought it an insult which would endanger peace[440]. This
+was very different from the action and attitude of the Government at
+home, as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising
+like caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at
+the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States.
+
+The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became known to
+the British press some six days after its own spasm of anger, and three
+days after the Government had despatched its demand for release of the
+prisoners and begun its hurried military preparations. On December 3 the
+_Times_ contained the first summary of American press outpourings. The
+first effect in England was astonishment, followed by renewed and more
+intense evidences of a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there
+began to appear a note of caution and more sane judgment of the
+situation, though with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had
+suffered an injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of
+delight seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave
+pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright made a
+great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British precedent for
+Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American leadership in democracy,
+and stating his positive conviction that the United States Government
+was as much astonished as was that of Great Britain by the attack on the
+_Trent._[441] To this the _Times_ gave a full column of report on
+December 5 and the day following printed five close-type columns of the
+speech itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the
+speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where the
+orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why Manchester or
+Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the _Times_ was
+attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" Bright as an apostle of
+democracy rather than to fan the flames of irritation over the _Trent_,
+and the prominence given to Bright's speech indicates a greater
+readiness to consider as hopeful an escape from the existing crisis.
+
+After December 3 and up to the ninth, the _Times_ was more caustic about
+America than previously. The impression of its editorials read to-day is
+that more hopeful of a peaceful solution it was more free to snarl. But
+with the issue of December 10 there began a series of leaders and
+communications, though occasionally with a relapse to the former tone,
+distinctly less irritating to Americans, and indicating a real desire
+for peace[442]. Other newspapers either followed the _Times_, or were
+slightly in advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful
+expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw no
+change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction of the
+"insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized in the next
+few days that a slow shift was taking place in the British temper and
+regretted the violence of American utterances. December 12, he wrote to
+his son in America: "It has given us here an indescribably sad feeling
+to witness the exultation in America over an event which bids fair to be
+the final calamity in this contest...." Great Britain "is right in
+principle and only wrong in point of consistency. Our mistake is that we
+are donning ourselves in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth
+wearing[443]." His secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful
+as I am of Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the
+same time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody
+set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable could
+you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an insult. _We_
+should have jumped out of our boots at such a one[444]."
+
+The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope or
+pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for an
+honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they trusted
+the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves aiding a slave as
+against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had written a long account
+of the changes taking place in Northern feeling as regards slavery. He
+thought it very probable that the issue of emancipation would soon be
+forced upon Lincoln, and that the American conflict would then take on a
+new and more ideal character[445]. This letter, arriving in the midst of
+uncertainty about the _Trent_ solution, was in line with news published
+in the British papers calling out editorials from them largely in
+disapproval[446]. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If the prisoners
+were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then to do? Would it be
+wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at once?
+
+"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise the
+blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent the egress
+of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will be sent against
+our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at present not defensible. He
+had been reading Alison on the War of 1812, and found that then the
+American army of invasion had numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect
+40 or 50,000[447]." Two days later he wrote to Gladstone that if America
+would only "let the Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he
+would be satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad
+to make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and
+securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels or to
+persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. This would be
+a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the particular case would be
+decided in our favour[448]."
+
+On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was well-known
+that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of Palmerston's foreign
+policy and, to the initiated, his last effort in this direction--the
+modification of the instruction to Lyons on the _Trent_--was no secret.
+There is no evidence that his death made any change in the British
+position, but it was true, as the American Minister wrote, that "Now
+they [the British public] are beginning to open their eyes to a sense of
+his value. They discover that much of their political quietude has been
+due to the judicious exercise of his influence over the Queen and the
+Court, and they do not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without
+him[449]." The nation was plunged into deep mourning, but not to
+distraction from the American crisis, for on the day when all papers
+were black with mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of
+the approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a summary
+of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their astonishment, made
+no mention of the _Trent_ affair. The Congressional approval caused
+"almost a feeling of consternation among ourselves," but Lincoln's
+silence, it was argued, might possibly be taken as a good omen, since it
+might indicate that he had as yet reached no decision[450]. Evidently
+there was more real alarm caused by the applause given Wilkes by one
+branch of the government than by the outpourings of the American press.
+The next day several papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the
+_Times_ gave a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had
+ignored the issue with Great Britain[451]. On the eighteenth this
+journal also called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the
+report of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not
+unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the increase
+of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The _Times_
+continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance on the _Trent_, but
+devoted most of its energy to combating the suggestions, now being made
+very generally, advocating a recourse to arbitration. This would be
+"weak concession," and less likely to secure redress and peace for the
+future, than an insistence on the original demands.
+
+Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson wrote
+that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute may after
+all be settled without war[452]." Cornewall Lewis thought the "last mail
+from America is decidedly threatening, not encouraging[453]." But on
+December 19, Adams was at last able to give Russell official assurance
+that Wilkes had acted without authorization. Russell at once informed
+Lyons of this communication and that he had now told Adams the exact
+terms of his two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed
+Lyons to accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes'
+action was unauthorized--a very important further British modification,
+but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the
+affair at Washington[454]. Meanwhile a notable change had taken place in
+American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes affair
+unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at all[455]," a
+reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of the
+British demand and the unanimous support given it by the British
+public[456]. On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone
+produced less effect than might have been expected, and this because of
+the persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt,
+would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that he
+had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was the
+time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow Weed,
+Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London and
+attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of the
+_Times_. His communication was printed, but his assertion that Seward's
+unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle story," were
+misunderstood, did not convince the _Times_, which answered him at
+length[457], and asserted its belief "... that upon his ability to
+involve the United States in a war with England, Mr. Seward has staked
+his official, and, most probably, also his political existence." The
+Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's remarks, wrote George Peabody
+later, "has strongly influenced the Government in war preparations for
+several months past[458]." Adams himself, though convinced that Seward's
+supposed animosity "was a mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the
+Duke of Newcastle," acknowledged that: "The Duke has, however,
+succeeded in making everybody in authority here believe it[459]." Surely
+no "joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but
+British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious reasons,
+as previously related[460].
+
+As time passed without an answer from America, British speculation
+turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a war. These were not
+reassuring since even though postulating a British victory, it appeared
+inevitable that England would not escape without considerable damage
+from the American navy and from privateers. Americans were "a powerful
+and adventurous people, strong in maritime resources, and participating
+in our own national familiarity with the risks and dangers of the
+deep[461]." Englishmen must not think that a war would be fought only on
+the shores of America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed
+and intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in
+the _Daily News_ on December 25, 26 and 27, by W. W. Story, an artist
+resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice Story,
+whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain[462]. By the last
+week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager to
+find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to an
+extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave they
+have themselves created[463]." He greatly regretted the death of the
+Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the United
+States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams wrote Seward:
+"I think the signs are clear of a considerable degree of reaction." He
+also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European support of
+England in this contention: "Unquestionably the view of all other
+countries is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new
+and large modifications of international law which will hereafter
+materially restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the
+ocean[464]."
+
+Adams' estimate was correct. Even the _Morning Post_, generally accepted
+as Palmerston's organ[465], and in the _Trent_ crisis the most
+'vigorous' of all metropolitan journals, commented upon the general
+public hope of a peaceful solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a
+Government [the American] elected but a few months since by the popular
+choice, depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford
+to disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question must,
+we fear, be in the negative...." The _Post_ (thereby Palmerston?) did
+indeed, as later charged, "prolong the excitement," but not with its
+earlier animosity to America. The very fact that the _Post_ was accepted
+as Palmerston's organ justified this attitude for it would have been
+folly for the Government to announce prematurely a result of which there
+was as yet no definite assurance. Yet _within_ the Cabinet there was a
+more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell of
+December 19 was practically conclusive[466], and Adams himself now
+thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an American plan to
+inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at least in this case
+nothing of the kind had been intended[467]." Everyone wondered at and
+was vexed with the delay of an answer from America, yet hopefully
+believed that this indicated ultimate yielding. There could be no
+surety until the event. Russell wrote to Palmerston on January 7, "I
+still incline to think Lincoln will submit, but not until the clock is
+59 minutes past 11. If it is war, I fear we must summon Parliament
+forthwith[468]."
+
+The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage of at
+Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for consideration
+by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to Lyons. These were
+received on December 18, and on the next day Lyons unofficially
+acquainted Seward with their nature[469]. The latter expressed
+gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" of Lyons and
+asked for two days' time for consideration. On Saturday, December 21,
+therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a formal presentation of demands
+but was met with a statement that the press of other business had
+prevented sufficient consideration and was asked for a further two days'
+postponement until Monday. Hence December 23 became the day from which
+the seven days permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the
+meantime, Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support
+given by France to the British position.
+
+The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first learning
+of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic fever and for a
+saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written to his brother that if
+the prisoners were not given up, "this nation means to make war." To
+this the brother in America replied "this nation doesn't[470]," an
+answer that sums up public determination no matter how loud the talk or
+deep the feeling. Seward understood the change and had now received
+strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in
+Paris[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America must
+yield. Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in
+an impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released _if the
+demand were made_. The comment of those who were "wise after the event"
+was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the
+prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any
+complaint could be received from Great Britain. This leaves out of
+consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration
+already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the
+war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself
+a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all
+probability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in
+the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems
+to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they
+might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to
+notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].
+
+On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great
+Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden,
+earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of
+British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against
+the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be
+made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede
+what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give
+another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your
+country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on
+Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that
+his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's
+discussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next
+day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his
+associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply in
+the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on
+the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did not
+contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be
+released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great
+Britain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantially
+complied with" that he should remain at his post until he received
+further orders[474].
+
+Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyons
+reported that it was very well received and that the public was calm and
+apparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus the
+preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's argument reviewed
+at great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on many
+points of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated the
+past relations of the two nations on "right of search," and finally took
+the ground that Mason and Slidell were contraband of war and justly
+subject to capture, but that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the
+_Trent_, with her passengers, into port for trial by an American prize
+court. Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed
+over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, says
+Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in argument,
+and contained many contradictions[476], but, he adds, that it was
+intended primarily for the American public and to meet the situation at
+home. Another critic sums up Seward's difficulties: he had to persuade a
+President and a reluctant Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day,
+to reconcile a Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending
+Wilkes, and to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch[477].
+Still more important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of
+contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the _neutral port_
+destination of the _Trent_, was the likening of Mason and Slidell to
+"ambassadors of independent states." For eight months Seward had
+protested to Europe "that the Confederates were not belligerents, but
+insurgents," and now "his whole argument rested on the fact that they
+were belligerents[478].... But this did not later alter a return to his
+old position nor prevent renewed arguments to induce a recall by
+European states of their proclamations of neutrality.
+
+On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was received in
+London, stating that the envoys would be released and the next day came
+his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. The envoys themselves
+did not reach England until January 30, and the delay in their voyage
+gave time for an almost complete disappearance of public interest in
+them[479]. January 10, Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was
+well satisfied with the fact and manner of the American answer, and
+regarded the incident as closed, but that it could not agree with
+portions of Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was
+done on January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of
+interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the legal
+advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes
+contraband[480]. Possibly the British Government was embarrassed by the
+fact that while France had strongly supported England at Washington,
+Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes,
+whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or
+as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of
+all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had
+ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to
+Seward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially
+as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens
+and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main
+reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was
+the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent
+maritime power.
+
+In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated
+that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they
+were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as
+distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious,
+seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own
+house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after
+listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had
+hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart
+from a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested that
+Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does not
+necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is
+exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners
+before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have
+been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell
+and a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence of
+Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also,
+in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarily
+at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "I
+do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosity
+to this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it was
+beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone"
+which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as
+especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based
+upon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit
+of this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations that
+the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign
+interference. The final decision in the _Trent_ affair, such was the
+situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and that
+decision was, from the first, for peace.
+
+Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America in
+general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed,
+was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred and
+the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up the
+traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect the
+discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and then fight Great
+Britain[486]." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his "Bigelow
+Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862:
+
+     "It don't seem hardly right, John,
+     When both my hands was full,
+     To stump me to a fight, John--
+     Your cousin, tu, John Bull!
+          Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess
+     We know it now,' sez he,
+     'The lion's paw is all the law,
+     Accordin' to J.B.,
+     Thet's fit for you an' me[487]!'"
+
+It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and Slidell that
+in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of the British press
+and the preparations of the Government. Even after their surrender
+America was further incensed by British boasting that America had
+yielded to a threat of war, as in the _Punch_ cartoon of a penitent
+small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says he is very sorry and that he didn't mean
+to do it," and so escapes the birching Britannia was about to
+administer. America had, in all truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked
+being told so, and regarded the threat itself as evidence of British
+ill-will[488]. This was long the attitude of the American public.
+
+In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great national
+sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulder
+to the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earlier
+careers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than any
+other men," were responsible for the traditional American "insane
+prejudice against England," an assertion for which no facts were offered
+in proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell
+on American politics before secession. They were "about the most
+worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of the
+American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not
+give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." Continuing, the
+_Times_ argued:
+
+     "What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our
+     conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not
+     suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great
+     war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our
+     eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their
+     own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the
+     swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right
+     to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason
+     and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of
+     these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town,
+     and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen
+     to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have
+     to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation."
+
+This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading British
+newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections save
+the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "The
+first effect of the surrender ... has been extraordinary. The current
+which ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seems
+to be going with equal fury in our favour[489]." Officially on the same
+day he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in the
+crisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet and
+religious citizens of the middle classes," that if Great Britain did
+engage in war with the United States she would be forced to become the
+ally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]."
+
+Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during the
+period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer was
+received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "we
+necessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of the
+South[491]." Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Story
+the British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was with
+the North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery]
+in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one let
+or stop," but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object had
+largely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable
+though a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr.
+Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]." He
+assured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I
+have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay at
+the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with
+America[493]." And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purpose
+of the North is also understood at last; ... there is no longer the
+notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494].'"
+
+A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passed
+resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation of
+Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with a
+slave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not
+_publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, is
+certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touring
+America, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignation
+against Captain Wilkes, wrote:
+
+     "These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our
+     books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image,
+     are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their
+     vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them.
+     They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our
+     greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff
+     of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States
+     would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the
+     world's surface[496]."
+
+The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, be
+regarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions.
+Much more exactly and with more authority as representing that
+thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of John
+Stuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862,
+making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling about
+the _Trent_:
+
+     "We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity,
+     and something more than an indignity, which, not to have
+     resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of
+     insults and injuries from the same and from every other
+     quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done;
+     yet it is impossible to think, without something like a
+     shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of
+     the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in
+     Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until
+     we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us
+     to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... _we_ should have
+     lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding
+     positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only
+     to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."
+
+No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliance
+with the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debate
+upon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lords
+the Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank and
+open apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with having
+yielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" for
+recognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship
+for America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better
+informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speaking
+for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of the
+Washington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted a
+personal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy,
+"although circumstances may arise which may call for a different
+course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like general
+tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby)
+in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult position
+in which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit for
+the energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position of
+strict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an important
+declaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In
+substance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's
+stand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497].
+
+A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February
+17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the military
+contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generously
+trusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, and
+it is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him
+_in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolition
+of slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of
+slavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as a
+necessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American
+consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showing
+that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show of
+force to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would long
+be the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedly
+correct in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And
+looked at from a distance of time it would seem that a British
+Government, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness,
+which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand for
+reparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was
+right in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so
+also were the military preparations.
+
+Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make more
+clear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November,
+1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to be
+weakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the point
+of any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at the
+slow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to
+_think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to
+Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if
+Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reported
+on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the
+peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will
+be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of
+the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the
+_Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It
+brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as
+regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the
+conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British
+public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was
+closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of
+that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the
+Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of
+which England could not possibly take a stand.
+
+This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of
+the public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it did
+indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a
+determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward,
+"I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the
+_Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather
+opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the
+Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us
+incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our
+nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared
+to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss
+we have had about these two men[501]."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of more
+contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of more
+historical writing later, than any other incident of diplomatic
+relations between the United States and Great Britain during the Civil
+War--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account given
+in this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement of
+the facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out by
+hitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of British
+public attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _after
+effect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service to
+list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in all
+histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to
+international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, though
+from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., _The Trent
+Affair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its many
+citations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review is
+that of C.F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts Historical
+Society for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and
+a rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912.]
+
+[Footnote 400: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)]
+
+[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 1. Inclosure. Williams to
+Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes the
+exact _force_ used.]
+
+[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., XLV, pp. 509-22.)]
+
+[Footnote 404: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 39-40.)]
+
+[Footnote 405: F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond to
+Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 406: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)]
+
+[Footnote 407: _Ibid._, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, p. 55.]
+
+[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the American
+volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter with
+Adams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:
+
+"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question that
+Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with any
+vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard to
+vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean to
+dispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War to
+search them; but that the exercise of that right and the right of
+detention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt with
+according to the circumstances of the case, and that it was not
+necessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not in
+point; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War to
+harass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence of
+preventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contraband
+of War.
+
+"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account which
+Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, and
+Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.
+
+"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as to
+Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state the
+real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_.)
+
+This résumé by Russell contained still other variations from the
+original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did not
+think it worth while to call attention to them.]
+
+[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error in
+stating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an American
+war vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port for
+adjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason
+and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue
+her voyage." Certainly Palmerston did not so understand the
+advice given.]
+
+[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O., Private. Nov. 16,
+1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not to
+endeavour, etc.," is in line with Palmerston's understanding of the
+conversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reporting
+Adams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions to
+meddle," which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructions
+not to meddle." Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood.
+He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ at
+Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell that
+Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "I
+had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him to
+intercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to do
+so, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British ships
+as might be going to the United States with contraband of war. Lord
+Palmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this last
+particular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly
+that which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in
+the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., Vol.
+78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter mentions
+also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had
+"sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet...."]
+
+[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 413: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 415: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)]
+
+[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much argued
+international law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _in
+extenso_ by Moore.]
+
+[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 418: _Ibid._, No. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 419: _Ibid._, No. 29. Inclosure.]
+
+[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted,
+after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance which
+permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to Great
+Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St.
+Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. When
+permission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly ordered
+that all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting to
+Canada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind
+without exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press
+made much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by
+Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application from
+a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggage
+at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons
+was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to the
+Governor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia
+and New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward's
+permission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops were
+marched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell,
+Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26.]
+
+[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November
+30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint and
+argument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the
+_Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Acts
+of violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched"
+in the "ordinary way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken
+by force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violating
+neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes.
+(5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship"
+except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court.
+(6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, and
+intended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It
+is essential for British Interests, that consistently with the
+obligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_
+blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of Her
+Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." These seven
+points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to the
+British position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of the
+Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on more
+mature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758.
+No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 78. Russell to
+Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 425: _Ibid._, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec.
+7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec.
+7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 427: _Ibid._, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon,
+Dec. 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec.
+17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _The
+Trent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous,
+anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examination
+of the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequently
+to communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but one
+side of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fair
+treatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the
+_Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers.
+Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-British
+feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. The
+British press made exactly similar quotations from the American
+newspapers.]
+
+[Footnote 433: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the London
+Press, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that there
+were but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue and
+cry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one
+in Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384.)
+This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than the
+picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm,
+sorrowful, astonished determination."]
+
+[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from Percy
+Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements were
+made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure.)]
+
+[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 95.)]
+
+[Footnote 436: _Ibid._, p. 37.]
+
+[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19,
+stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more
+genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the
+capture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea
+that England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud
+the gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and
+such an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended
+and invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let
+the handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him.
+Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and
+costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such
+a victory." Note the "_Fourth_ of July."]
+
+[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861.
+"Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm and
+proving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H.M.'s mail boat."]
+
+[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightened
+me by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at this
+moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on international
+law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling American legal
+argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributed
+very acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the American
+civil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North.
+Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitators
+are still doing their worst." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392.) Cobden was
+himself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess I
+have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or
+Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr.
+Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
+Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a
+very peaceable and safe man." _(ibid._, p. 386, to Lieut.-Col.
+Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that Canadian opinion
+regarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will toward
+Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce"
+(J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the
+_Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that
+if _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was a
+British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life of
+Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348.) Yet the author states that
+in the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the
+_Trent_ as did Great Britain.]
+
+[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2.]
+
+[Footnote 444: _Ibid._, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
+Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first time
+the _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied to
+emancipation.]
+
+[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. On
+the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubt
+that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes.... but I wish
+we had not done them.... It is all terrible and awful, and I hope and
+pray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first natural
+burst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready to
+execrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not taken
+to prevent so fearful a calamity." (Dana, _The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))]
+
+[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ]
+
+[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message,
+on December 16 and 17.]
+
+[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon,
+Dec. 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec.
+19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no
+authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, since
+this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The point
+was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it as
+indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to an
+English Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston,
+1862.) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston had
+intentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes.
+"Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated to
+Russell_ on the 19th]... virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the
+wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, was
+like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley,
+_Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The
+Trent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 107.)]
+
+[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing of
+lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared,
+in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whose
+commanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders"
+not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presence
+was, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the
+_Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and
+to give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great
+Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer
+recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly a
+myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863,
+not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainly
+responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of Thurlow
+Weed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable historians like Rhodes
+make no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russian
+fleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "The
+Russian Fleet and the Civil War," _Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915.]
+
+[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61.]
+
+[Footnote 458: _Ibid._, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV.]
+
+[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp.
+108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured their
+publication through Dicey.]
+
+[Footnote 463: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26,
+1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 109).]
+
+[Footnote 464: _Ibid._, p. 110.]
+
+[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the
+_Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of any
+party or faction.]
+
+[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 467: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan.
+2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reported
+that he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
+_Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 19.
+Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) shows
+that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the
+nineteenth.]
+
+[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C.F. Adams, Jr.,
+to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December
+3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th.]
+
+[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wise
+view, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason and
+Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., Welles, _Lincoln and
+Seward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and
+Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general
+contemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in
+Washington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of
+Bremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst
+had been seen by Lincoln.
+
+"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned them
+with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent on
+war.' At the same time the President has assured my informant that he
+would examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, in
+order that no expression should remain which could create bad blood
+anew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some of
+his former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England"
+(Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first
+glance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he was
+putting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden
+apparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when
+this was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting
+Seward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing
+your answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they
+ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the
+reasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the points
+on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer to
+Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234).]
+
+[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright to
+Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are all
+printed in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the
+_Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University.]
+
+[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec.
+27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 475: F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31,
+1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in the
+Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitter
+feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world ... we ask help of Thee for
+our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and with
+one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and
+reproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained by
+the remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment,
+succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers.
+Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).]
+
+[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53.]
+
+[Footnote 477: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., XLV. p. 75).]
+
+[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250.]
+
+[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered to
+the British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax the
+ship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her to
+St. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.]
+
+[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3,
+Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was
+in possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November
+12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law
+Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).]
+
+[Footnote 481: F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell,
+Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.]
+
+[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73.]
+
+[Footnote 483: F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons,
+Feb. 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 484: F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell to
+Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec.
+27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John." After the
+release of the envoys there was much correspondence between friends
+across the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attempted
+to explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture on
+receiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this is
+in a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field
+and Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between Great
+Britain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote,
+"The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes where
+we thought we had friends," p. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc.,
+XLV, pp. 508-22).]
+
+[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 490: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan.
+10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Also
+expressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid._, Jan. 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105.
+Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 493: _Ibid._, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting
+at Bromley-by-Bow.]
+
+[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862),
+I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the
+spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer,
+and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the
+North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and
+prophesied its victory.]
+
+[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 _seq_., though not
+consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the
+Address to the Throne.]
+
+[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.]
+
+[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward,
+Feb. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE BLOCKADE
+
+The six months following the affair of the _Trent_ constituted a period
+of comparative calm in the relations of Great Britain and America, but
+throughout that period there was steadily coming to the front a Northern
+belligerent effort increasingly effective, increasingly a cause for
+disturbance to British trade, and therefore more and more a matter for
+anxious governmental consideration. This was the blockade of Southern
+ports and coast line, which Lincoln had declared _in intention_ in his
+proclamation of April 19, 1861.
+
+As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the
+relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of
+Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an evasive
+reply[502]. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the possibility of a
+blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent would at least
+require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made great efforts to
+convince Seward that _any_ interference with British trade would be
+disastrous to the Northern cause in England. He even went so far as to
+hint at British intervention to preserve trade[503]. But on April 15,
+Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade was possible, thought
+that the attempt to institute one was less objectionable than
+legislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports of Entry," in reality a
+mere paper blockade and one which would "justify Great Britain and
+France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy...." Thus he began to
+weaken in opposition to _any_ interference[504]. His earlier expressions
+to Seward were but arguments, without committing his Government to a
+line of policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously.
+
+Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a blockade
+campaign. But when the Civil War actually began and Lincoln, on April
+19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade," and
+that when a "competent force" had been posted "so as to prevent entrance
+and exit of vessels," warning would be given to any vessel attempting to
+enter or to leave a blockaded port, with endorsement on her register of
+such warning, followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass the
+blockade, Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonable
+consideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the Law
+of Nations, I suppose it must be recognized[505]." The Proclamation
+named the original seven seceding states, and on April 27 Virginia was
+added. The blockade was actually begun at certain Virginia ports on
+April 30, and by the end of May there were a few war-ships off all the
+more important Southern harbours[506]. This method of putting a blockade
+into effect by warning at the port rather than by a general notification
+communicated to European governments and setting a date, involved a
+hardship on British merchants since they were thereby made uncertain
+whether goods started for a Southern port would be permitted to enter.
+In practice vessels on their first departure from a blockaded harbour
+were warned and permitted to go out, but those seeking to enter were
+warned and turned back. In _effect_, while the blockade was being
+established, Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for the
+timid British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paper
+blockade. This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutrals
+must acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition,"
+but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet" British
+trade could be carried on[507].
+
+Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long conversation on
+April 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3,000 mile coast line, but
+Seward assured him it would be done and effectively[508]. The British
+press was equally sceptical, and in any case believed that the war would
+be of short duration, so that there need be no anxiety over next year's
+supply of cotton[509]. In Parliament Russell took the stand that the
+blockade, if carried on in accordance with international law and made
+effective, required British recognition and respect. He also defended
+Lincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might seem
+a hardship, but was perfectly legal[510]. Thus there was early and easy
+acquiescence in the American effort, but when, in June, there was
+revived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by legislative action,
+Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous opposition. Lyons learned that
+a Bill would be introduced in Congress giving the President authority,
+among other powers, to "proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifying
+foreign nations not to attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpected
+application of the Northern theory that the South was not a belligerent
+and had no rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paper
+blockade[511].
+
+The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not direct
+the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern ports--it merely
+gave him the power to do so. Almost from the first Lyons thought that
+Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue such a proclamation[512].
+Nevertheless it was his duty to be on guard and to oppose the plan. For
+six weeks there was much communication in regard to the "Southern Ports
+Bill," as all parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with
+Cowley in France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter,
+almost rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the
+small importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the
+reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest.
+Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in official
+remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British
+recognition of Southern belligerency.
+
+Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell
+addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged a
+stiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was seemingly
+indifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest, then drew back
+and on three separate occasions promised support only to withdraw such
+promise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to join in a "friendly hint"
+to America because of the touchy sensibilities lately shown by Seward,
+and feared a direct protest might result in an American declaration of
+war. In any case why not wait until the President _did_ act, and even
+then the proper method would be a protest rather than "reprisals." "I
+wish," wrote Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to be
+more _bumptious_, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all times
+rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them on[513]...."
+Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would not
+observe a "legislative closing" of Southern ports[514]. On July 12 Lyons
+telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, and on the
+sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much disturbed over
+its possible consequences since "even Sumner was for it[515]," as this
+indicated a real intention to carry it into effect[516]. On August 8,
+Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to be
+handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise
+discretion as to communicating the despatch[517].
+
+The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised in
+July, concluded with language that might well draw out Thouvenel's
+objection to a threat of "reprisals." It read that "H.M.G. ...
+reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other Nations in
+opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of Commercial Countries
+and so manifest a violation of International Law[518]." This high tone
+had been modified possibly by French opposition, possibly by Lyons'
+early opinion that the Bill would not be made operative. Indeed on July
+24 Russell told Lyons that no final instruction of protest would be sent
+him until the President actually issued a proclamation[519]. Yet in
+spite of being fairly well assured that there was no danger in the
+"Southern Ports Bill," Russell did send the instruction of August 8,
+still distinctly "vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of
+"reprisals." His reason for doing so is difficult to understand.
+Certainly he was hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiff
+instruction would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of the
+American Cabinet[520], or else he strangely misjudged American
+temperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to print
+a Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was exercising in
+guarding British interests.
+
+Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had voluntarily
+reassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons reported this,
+privately, on July 20[521], but on the same day also reported,
+officially, that two days earlier, that is on the eighteenth, he and
+Mercier had discussed the "Southern Ports" Bill and that as a result
+Mercier had then gone, that same day, to Seward to state that France
+must regard such a measure as merely a paper blockade[522]. "We were not
+very sanguine of success," wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him
+[Mercier] with calmness," and personally seemed disinclined to issue the
+required Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England and
+France were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having a
+difficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the Parliamentary
+Papers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and in spite of the
+reassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally not for printing)
+presumably received in the same mail with the official despatch, it
+furnished the basis of his "strong" instruction of August 8.
+
+At Washington also there were indications of an effort to prepare a good
+case for the British public and Parliament. July 23, so Lyons wrote
+privately, Seward had prevented the issue of the "Southern Ports"
+Proclamation[523], and on the next day he was shown by Seward,
+confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers abroad in
+which was maintained the right to close the ports by proclamation, but
+stating the Government's decision not to exercise the right. Lyons
+believed this was the end of the matter[524]. Yet on August 12, he
+presented himself formally at the Department of State and stated that he
+had instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's Government would
+consider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possession
+of the insurgent or Confederate States as null and void, and that they
+would not submit to measures taken on the high seas in pursuance of such
+decree."... "Mr. Seward thanked me for the consideration I had shown;
+and begged me to confine myself for the present to the verbal
+announcement I had just made. He said it would be difficult for me to
+draw up a written communication which would not have the air of a
+threat." To this Lyons agreed[525].
+
+This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the
+"forthright yet friendly" tone of British diplomats when dealing with
+Seward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, not yet received
+by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet there is a
+possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward had
+asked him to play it. On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged the
+receipt of Russell's communication of July 24, in which it was stated
+that while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the "Southern Ports"
+Bill _no final instructions_ would be sent until Lincoln issued a
+Proclamation. Lyons now explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this
+moment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be
+guided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating your
+decision about the matter[526]." Is it possible that Seward really
+wished to have a "strong," yet not "too strong" statement from Lyons in
+order to combat the advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are many
+ramifications of diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government.
+At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no
+question now of issuing the Proclamation[527]." And on the nineteenth
+could write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed
+been issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528].
+
+The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more space in the
+British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from the
+British Government than it would seem to have merited from the
+Washington attitude toward it. The Bill had been drawn by the Secretary
+of the Treasury, and its other sections related to methods of meeting a
+situation where former customs houses and places for the collection of
+import duties were now in the hands of the Confederacy. The fourth
+section alone implied a purpose to declare a paper blockade. The idea
+of proclaiming closed the Southern ports may have at first received the
+sanction of Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a
+war; or it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy[529],
+but the more reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of
+many ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by
+the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any public
+means to attack the South. But the interest attached to the measure in
+this work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt that Russell,
+in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear two
+points: first, the close harmony with France--which in fact was not so
+close as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the Foreign
+Secretary in guarding British interests. Now in fact British trade was
+destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been
+greatly hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade
+feasible. Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the
+"Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_
+blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:
+
+     "If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern
+     Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by
+     agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles,
+     creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run
+     for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be
+     transhipped. But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such
+     plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]."
+
+A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to
+Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the
+remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of
+cotton in any considerable amount. His bays and creeks did indeed long
+provide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for the
+transport of a bulky export like cotton[531]. To Russell, however, the
+blockade appearing negligible in probable effect and also not open to
+objection by neutrals if regularly established, it seemed that any
+immediate danger to British trade was averted by the final American
+action on the "Southern Ports" Bill. It was not until the blockade did
+begin to be thoroughly effective that either the British public or
+Government gave it serious consideration.
+
+Not again until late November did Russell return with any interest to
+the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an American effort
+which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of blockading squadrons and
+a plan to remedy this by unusual, even "uncivilized," if not illegal,
+methods. This was the "Stone Boat Fleet" plan of blocking Charleston
+harbour by sinking vessels across the entrance bar[532]. The plan was
+reported by Lyons and the news received in England at the most uncertain
+moment as to the outcome of the _Trent_ controversy[533]. British press
+and Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of
+the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor matter.
+In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an opinion on
+the blockade, answered:
+
+     "I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer your
+     question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is
+     certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense
+     extent of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose
+     the ships which run it successfully both in and out are more
+     numerous than those which are intercepted. On the other hand
+     it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many
+     vessels are captured; it is a most serious interruption to
+     Trade; and if it were as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis
+     says in his Message, he would not be so very anxious to get
+     rid of it[534]."
+
+This was a very fair description of the blockade situation. Lyons,
+unaffected by irritations resulting from the _Trent_, showed the frame
+of mind of a "determined neutral," as he was fond of describing himself.
+His answer was the first given to Russell indicating a possibility that
+the blockade might, after all, become strictly effective and thus
+exceedingly harmful to British trade. There is no direct _proof_ that
+this influenced Russell to denounce the plan of blocking Southern
+harbours with stone-laden boats sunk in the channel, but the existence
+of such a motive seems probable. Moreover his protest was not made until
+December 20, the _day after_ he had learned officially from Adams that
+Wilkes was unauthorized in searching the _Trent_--a day on which strain
+and uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly lessened.
+Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be stated,
+"apparently on good authority," that the declared purpose of the stone
+boat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for ever." He
+characterized this as implying "utter despair of the restoration of the
+Union," and as being only "a measure of revenge and irremediable injury
+against an enemy."
+
+"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary war,
+such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the commerce of
+nations and the free intercourse of the Southern States of America with
+the civilized world. It is a project worthy only of times of barbarism."
+
+Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it was
+hoped, would disavow the project[535].
+
+There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American newspaper
+extracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation and
+expostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in America the
+project had been characterized as "odious and barbarous," adding, "The
+question seems to depend on the extent to which the harbours will be
+permanently injured[536]." It will be noted that Russell did not refer
+to information received from Lyons (though it was already in hand), but
+to "apparently good authority" in justification of his vigorous
+denunciation. But like vigour, and like characterization of American
+"barbarism" did not appear in the British press until after the news
+arrived of the release of Mason and Slidell. Then the storm broke, well
+summed up in the Punch cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very Sad
+Picture.) War Dance of the I.O.U. Indian," and showing Uncle Sam in
+war-feathers and with war-club, in his hand a flag made of the _New York
+Herald_, dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour across
+which stretched a row of sunken ships[537].
+
+On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the attention
+of the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour had been
+closed by stone boats and urged governmental remonstrance[538]. Hammond
+at once replied quoting the language of Russell's letter of December 20
+and stating that further representations would be made[539]. On the
+sixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but now was
+much less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury in the future
+to the United States itself in case the harbours were permanently
+destroyed since "... the object of war is peace, and the purposes of
+peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous commercial intercourse[540]."
+To-day it seems absurd that any save the most ignorant observer should
+have thought the North contemplated a permanent and revengeful
+destruction of Southern port facilities. Nor was there any just ground
+for such an extreme British view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert
+Browning was affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do," he
+wrote Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again[541]?" a query
+expressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the intense
+bitterness, indicating a long war, of the American belligerents. How
+absurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British concern at an American
+"lapse toward barbarism" was soon made evident. On January II Lyons,
+acting on the instructions of December 20, brought up the matter with
+Seward and was promptly assured that there was no plan whatever "to
+injure the harbours permanently." Seward stated that there had never
+been any plan, even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, but
+merely the lesser channels, because the Secretary of the Navy had
+reported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the 'large
+holes,'" but "could not stop up the 'small ones.'" Seward assured Lyons
+that just as soon as the Union was restored all obstructions would be
+removed, and he added that the best proof that the entrance to
+Charleston harbour had not been destroyed was the fact that in spite of
+blockading vessels and stone boats "a British steamer laden with
+contraband of war had just succeeded in getting in[542]." Again, on
+February 10, this time following Russell's instruction of January 16,
+Lyons approached Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that
+"all the vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared for
+obstructing the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is not
+likely that any others will be used for that purpose[543]." This was no
+yielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's accusation of
+barbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction of harbours,
+extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been undertaken by the
+Navy with little expectation of success, and, on the first appearance of
+new channels made by the wash of waters, was soon abandoned[544].
+
+The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America was
+conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem at first
+glance to have been merely manifestations of a British tendency to
+meddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other states and to
+give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose civilization was
+presumably less advanced than that which stamped the Englishman was,
+according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a characteristic of
+British public and Government alike[545]. But this is scarcely a
+satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the first place it
+is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions in an enemy's
+harbours in order to render more effective a blockade was no novelty in
+maritime warfare, as Russell must have well known, and that there was no
+modern record of such obstructions having permanently destroyed a
+harbour. A far more reasonable explanation is that which connects the
+energy of the British Government in opposing a proposed American closing
+of Southern harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energy
+against the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightly
+regarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but both
+methods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because they were
+very evidently the result of efforts to find a way in which an as yet
+ineffective blockade could be made more rigorous. On the impossibility
+of an effective blockade, if conducted on customary lines, the British
+people and Foreign Secretary had pinned their faith that there would be
+no serious interruption of trade. This was still the view in January,
+1862, though doubts were arising, and the "stone boat" protest must be
+regarded as another evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce with
+the South. The very thought that the blockade might become effective, in
+which case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly caused
+Russell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the North for
+a planned "barbarity."
+
+Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be made
+the subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on the Civil
+War in America. In another three months the Government began to feel a
+pressure from its associate in "joint attitude," France, to examine
+again with much care its asserted policy of strict neutrality, and this
+because of the increased effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhile
+another "American question" was serving to cool somewhat British
+eagerness to go hand in hand with France. For nearly forty years since
+independence from Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thorny
+problem to European nations since it was difficult, in the face of the
+American Monroe Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for the
+satisfaction of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measures
+were being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly in
+the matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures, President
+Buchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1860, had
+sounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that American principles
+would compel the use of force in aid of Mexico if debt-collecting
+efforts were made the excuse for a plan "to deprive our neighbouring
+Republic of portions of her territory." But this was at the moment of
+the break-up of the Union and attracted little attention in the United
+States. For the same reason, no longer fearing an American block to
+these plans, the three European Governments, after their invitation to
+the United States to join them had been refused, signed a convention,
+October 31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledged
+themselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not to
+interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.
+
+In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon III was
+not--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood even by his
+Ministers[546]. A joint expedition under the leadership of the Spanish
+General Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took possession of
+customs houses and began to collect duties. It soon became evident to
+the British and Spanish agents on the spot that France had far other
+objects than the mere satisfaction of debts. The result was a clash of
+interests, followed by separate agreements with Mexico and the
+withdrawal of forces by Great Britain and Spain. This difference of view
+on Mexican policy had become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador at
+Paris, by January, 1862, and from that month until the end of March his
+private letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general are
+almost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley learned
+that earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the Archduke
+Maximilian of Austria upon the _Throne_ of Mexico, far from being
+unfounded, were but faint indications of a great French "colonial
+Empire" scheme, and he thought that there was "some ill-will to the
+United States at the bottom of all this[547]...." He feared that the
+Mexican question would "give us a deal of trouble yet[548]," and by
+March was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt." made by
+France[549].
+
+These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he hastened,
+in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also did Spain. Great
+Britain believed that she had been tricked into a false position in
+Mexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view of the close relation of
+joint policy with France toward the Civil War in America, undertook no
+direct opposition though prophesying an evil result. This situation
+required France to refrain, for a time, from criticism of British policy
+and action toward the North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy,
+rather than one based on its own initiative. On the British side the
+French Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposes
+and objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow to
+accept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to that war
+Great Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a very
+advantageous situation for the North, as the event was to prove. On the
+purely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity to assure Seward
+that Great Britain was "entirely averse to any interference in the
+internal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing could be further from their
+wishes than to impose upon the Mexican Nation any Government not of its
+own choice[550]."
+
+British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to swell the breeze
+of amity toward America that had sprung up once the _Trent_ was beyond
+the horizon, and made, temporarily, for smooth sailing in the relations
+of Great Britain and the North. Lyons wrote on February 7 that the
+"present notion appears to be to overwhelm us with demonstrations of
+friendship and confidence[551]." Adams' son in London thought "our work
+here is past its crisis," and that, "Our victory is won on this side the
+water[552]," while the American Minister himself believed that "the
+prospect of interference with us is growing more and more remote[553]."
+Russell also was optimistic, writing to Lyons, "Our relations have now
+got into a very smooth groove.... There is no longer any excitement here
+upon the question of America. I fear Europe is going to supplant the
+affairs of America as an exciting topic[554]," meaning, presumably,
+disturbances arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic
+duties as "almost in a state of profound calm[555]."
+
+This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter what
+anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the blockade
+there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its legality. That
+there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an urgent letter from
+Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, asserting that if cotton
+brought but four pence at Charleston and thirteen pence at Liverpool
+there must be some truth in its alleged effectiveness:
+
+     "I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do not let
+     us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that they
+     failed thro' our interference.... Patience for a few more
+     weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient
+     policy[556]."
+
+[Illustration: KING COTTON BOUND: Or, The Modern Prometheus. _Reproduced
+by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the blockade
+and on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more weeks" had no
+place in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he wrote to Lyons in
+regard to assertions being made that the blockade was ineffective
+because certain vessels had eluded it:
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that,
+     assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a
+     number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a
+     port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create
+     an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these
+     ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact
+     that various ships may have successfully escaped through it
+     (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of
+     itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by
+     international law[557]."
+
+From this view Russell never departed in official instructions[558].
+England's position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable that
+she should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautious
+in criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history and
+probable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far
+more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to
+British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with the
+South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they would
+do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition of
+the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be made by it, send
+supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails."
+
+But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on the
+Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive at
+his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearly
+took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's position. They
+had now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adams
+he "had no intention of seeing them again." Very angry they planned a
+formal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rost
+counselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559]. On his arrival Mason ignored
+this situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in
+pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private
+reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed,
+somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity for
+evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confident
+of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his arrival he wrote
+unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State "... although the
+Ministry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition through
+the Queen's speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popular
+voice through the House of Commons will demand both."... "I shall be
+disappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by the
+Ministry[560]...."
+
+Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of many
+English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take was
+to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urge
+European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived in Paris, wrote
+Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should "make only a
+passing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating that on that
+point I am not disposed at present to press consideration. But I shall
+insist upon the inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of the
+stone fleet,' etc[561]." Mason was urged to take a like course with
+Russell. Both men were much excited by a document a copy of which had
+been secured by Mann purporting to be a "confidential memorandum"
+addressed by England to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time
+had not come to raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, but
+Slidell and Mason believed it genuine[562]. They had great hopes of the
+opening of Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and
+the only references in debate were to the _Trent_ and its fortunate
+outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It is thought that
+silence as to the blockade was intended to leave that question
+open[563]." This, no doubt, was the consolatory explanation of his
+friends, but the unofficial interview with Russell, at his home, on
+February 10, chilled Mason's hopes.
+
+As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by Mason on
+the blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to Richmond shows
+that he proceeded with great caution, omitting portions of his
+instructions on cotton for fear of arousing antagonism, and venturing
+only a slight departure by expressing the hope that if Great Britain
+wished to renew communication with the Confederacy it might be made
+through him, rather than through the British consuls at the South.
+Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I might find my residence in London
+agreeable." He refused to see Mason's credentials, stating this to be
+"unnecessary, our relations being unofficial." He listened with
+courtesy, asked a few questions, but "seemed utterly disinclined to
+enter into conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and
+only said, in substance, they must await events." Certainly it was a
+cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that Russell's
+"personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy inaction[564]."
+But Mason still counted on parliamentary pressure on the Government, and
+he was further encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at
+Liverpool, stating that he had just received a request to come to London
+"from a government quarter, of all the _most important_[565]."
+
+The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself feared
+somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to Mason that
+interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with Russell, that he had
+unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, while not citing these men
+directly, declared the general "London idea" to be that of
+"postponement"; since it was inevitable that "the North will break down
+in a few months on the score of money," and that "We have only to wait
+three months." Evidently Spence believed he was being used as an
+intermediary and influential adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade
+them to a period of quiet. This, he thought, was unwise since delay
+would be injurious[566]. Of like opinion were the two Members of
+Parliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be his
+closest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former possessing
+somewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class, the latter the
+largest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice also was to press on
+the blockade question[567], as a matter of primary British commercial
+interest, and they believed that France was eager to follow a British
+lead. This was contrary to Slidell's notion at the moment, but of this
+Mason was unaware[568].
+
+The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before Parliament the
+papers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of one hundred and
+twenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3, 1861, to February
+17, 1862. In it were the details of the institution of the blockade,
+reports from British consuls on its effectiveness, lists of vessels
+captured and of vessels evading it, all together furnishing a very
+complete view of this, the principal maritime belligerent effort of the
+North[569]. The Blockade Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired,
+and especially so as almost at the end of this document appeared that
+instruction of February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly stated
+British acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview with
+Russell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had been
+urged vainly to use his influence for "postponement," Russell, so it
+must appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting the
+effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost immediately made known
+to Parliament by the presentation of papers.
+
+Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without further
+protest, in governmental policy they must now make some decided effort.
+This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons, on March 7, of a
+motion by Gregory urging the Government to declare the blockade
+ineffective[570], and of a similar debate on March 10 in the Lords. As
+is inevitable where many speakers participate in a debate the arguments
+advanced were repeated and reiterated. In the Commons important speeches
+for the motion were made by Gregory, Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, Lord
+Robert Cecil and Lindsay, while against it appeared Forster and Monckton
+Milnes. The Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Government
+view. Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that while
+himself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion had no
+essential bearing on that question and was directed wholly to a
+_fact_--that the blockade was not in reality effective and should not be
+recognized as such. He presented and analysed statistics to prove the
+frequency with which vessels passed through the blockade, using the
+summaries given by Mason to Russell in their interview of February 10,
+which were now before Parliament in the document on the blockade just
+presented, and he cited the reports of Bunch at Charleston as further
+evidence. This was the burden of Gregory's argument[571], but he glanced
+in passing at many other points favourable to the South, commenting on
+its free trade principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity,
+asserting the right of the South to secede, declaring that France
+regarded British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking to
+future wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of American
+inconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for all
+those principles of international law, which we have ever upheld, they
+are as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of the
+moment[572]." Gregory concluded with the statement that the United
+States should be treated "with justice and nothing more."
+
+When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree on a
+line of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the blockade was
+that it was wise to minimize the question of recognition, and Gregory
+had laboured to prove that this was not related to a refusal longer to
+recognize the blockade. But Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion,
+promptly undid him for he unhappily admitted that recognition and
+blockade questions were so closely interwoven that they could not be
+considered separately. This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who led
+in opposition. Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearing
+to pieces of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the alleged
+blockade runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which,
+by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then
+make a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade of
+main ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was proved, he
+declared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where it was 100 per
+cent. greater than in the South, and of salt in Charleston, where the
+importer could make a profit of 1,000 per cent. To raise the blockade,
+he argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality. The
+real reason for this motion was not the _ineffectiveness_ of the
+blockade, but the effectiveness, and the real object an English object,
+not a Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion to
+recognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew the
+former would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended to
+secure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of the
+Government in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any other
+conduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would have had to
+fight for slavery against her kinsmen."
+
+Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a judicial tone
+of argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one who knows his
+cause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and was characterized by
+Henry Adams, an interested auditor, as "listened to as you would listen
+to a funeral eulogy."... "The blockade is now universally acknowledged
+to be unobjectionable[573]." This estimate is borne out by the speech
+for the Government by the Solicitor-General, who maintained the
+effectiveness of the blockade and who answered Gregory's argument that
+recognition was not in question by stating that to refuse longer to
+recognize the blockade would result in a situation of "armed
+neutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war." He pictured the disgust of
+Europe if England should enter upon such a war in alliance "with a
+country ... which is still one of the last strongholds of slavery"--an
+admission made in the fervour of debate that was dangerous as tending to
+tie the Government's hands in the future, but which was, no doubt,
+merely a personal and carelessly ventured view, not a governmentally
+authorized one. In general the most interesting feature of this debate
+is the hearty approval given by friends of the North to the Government's
+entire line of policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play at
+the moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy,
+was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make no
+criticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of British
+neutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, in
+specific cases, in neutral duty.
+
+The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for the
+motion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there was no
+indication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a similar
+debate in the Lords was of importance only as offering Russell, since he
+was now a member of the upper chamber, an opportunity to speak for
+himself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any intention to attack the
+blockade since Russell, on February 15, had officially approved it, but
+criticized the sending to Lyons of the despatch itself. Russell upheld
+the strict legality and effectiveness of the blockade, stated that if
+England sided with the South in any way the North would appeal to a
+slave insurrection--the first reference to an idea which was to play a
+very important rôle with Russell and others later--and concluded by
+expressing the opinion that three months would see the end of the
+struggle on lines of separation, but with some form of union between the
+two sovereignties[574]. Russell's speech was an unneeded but emphatic
+negative of the pro-Southern effort.
+
+Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics by
+pressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason were
+dashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to force the
+Government to a decided stand when they preferred, as the summons of
+Spence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance for a time any
+further declaration on the blockade. The refusal of Mason and his
+Southern friends to wait compelled a governmental decision and the
+result was Russell's instruction to Lyons of February 15. The effect of
+the debate on Mason was not to cause distrust of his English advisers,
+but to convince him that the existing Government was more determined in
+unfriendliness than he had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: "... no
+step will be taken by this Government to interfere with it[575]." He
+thought the military news from America in part responsible as: "The late
+reverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate effect
+upon the minds of our friends here[576]...." Spence was opposed to any
+further move in Parliament until some more definite push on the
+Government from France should occur[577]. Slidell, anxiously watching
+from Paris the effort in England, had now altered his view of policy and
+was convinced there was no hope in France until England gave the signal.
+Referring to his previous idea that the Continent could be put in
+opposition to Great Britain on the blockade he wrote:
+
+     "I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was such
+     that any view of the question which he might urge on the
+     British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to
+     change entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all
+     that concerns us the initiative must be taken by England;
+     that the Emperor sets such value on her good will that he
+     will make any sacrifice of his own opinions and policy to
+     retain it[578]."
+
+On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason[579]. It was a correct
+judgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that his was to
+be the first place in importance in any and all operations intended to
+secure European support for the Confederacy, but he could not conceal
+from himself that the first steps undertaken in that direction had been
+premature. From this first failure dated his fixed belief, no matter
+what hopes were sometimes expressed later, that only a change of
+Government in England would help the Southern cause.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 502: See _ante_, p. 52.]
+
+[Footnote 503: See _ante_, pp. 61 and 65-66.]
+
+[Footnote 504: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 505: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell. Private. April 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 506: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain_, pp. 80-1.]
+
+[Footnote 507: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 508: Bernard, p. 229.]
+
+[Footnote 509: _Saturday Review_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 510: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIII, pp. 188-195.]
+
+[Footnote 511: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 512: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, July 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 513: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The important
+correspondence on this subject is found in: F.O., France, Vol. 1393. No.
+796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. _Ibid._, No. 804. Cowley to
+Russell, July 4, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1377. No. 704. Russell to Cowley,
+July 10, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1394. No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17,
+1861. _Ibid._, No. 922. Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. _Ibid._, No.
+923. Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers.
+Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, July 28,
+1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to support England in
+remonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill" appears, through Cowley's
+communications, in the printed Parliamentary Papers. A study of these
+alone would lead to the judgment that France _had been the first_ to
+raise the question with England and had heartily supported England. The
+facts were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions from
+Thouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (_Parliamentary Papers_,
+1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 514: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 61.]
+
+[Footnote 515: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 516: Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to the Bill and
+Sumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact spoken publicly in
+favour of the measure. Probably he told Schleiden that privately he was
+against it. Schleiden reported Sumner as active in urging the Cabinet
+not to issue a Proclamation closing the ports (Schleiden Papers.
+Schleiden to Senate of Bremen, July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier later
+informed Thouvenel that Sumner declared the Bill intended for the
+Northern public only, to show administration "energy," and that there
+was never any intention of putting it into effect. F.O., France, 1394.
+No. 931. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 517: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 70 and 71.
+Thouvenel did finally consent to support Russell's protest.]
+
+[Footnote 518: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168.]
+
+[Footnote 519: F.O., Am., Vol. 756.]
+
+[Footnote 520: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley to Russell, Aug.
+8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 521: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 522: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 68. Lyons to
+Russell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a copy of the six lines of
+Thouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier, dated July 4, the very brevity of
+which shows that this was in fact no instruction at all, but merely a
+comment by Thouvenel to Mercier.]
+
+[Footnote 523: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 524: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, August 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 525: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 81. Lyons to
+Russell, Aug. 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 526: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Aug. 13,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 527: _Ibid._, Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 528: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 83.]
+
+[Footnote 529: Lyons thought this possible. Russell Papers. Lyons to
+Russell. Private. July 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 530: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. Aug. 16, 1861.
+And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent smuggling over 3,000 miles
+of coast and 1,500 miles of land frontier seems to me impossible"
+(_Ibid._, Aug. 17, 1861). Russell had received some two weeks earlier, a
+letter from Bunch at Charleston, urging that England make no objection
+to the blockade in order that the South might be taught the lesson that
+"King Cotton," was not, after all, powerful enough to compel British
+recognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at the
+failure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they both
+could and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F.O., Am., Vol. 781.
+No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on July 23 that the
+South planned to hold back its cotton until Great Britain and France
+raised the blockade (_Ibid._, No. 87). Bunch was now impressed with
+Southern determination.]
+
+[Footnote 531: The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia), Wilmington
+(North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah (Georgia),
+Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston (Texas).]
+
+[Footnote 532: The first important reference to the blockade after
+mid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed through Lyons, not
+to give advice to British merchants in Charleston as to blockade runners
+that had gotten into port having any "right" to go out again (F.O., Am.,
+Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 533: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 125. Lyons to
+Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 534: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 535: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 127.]
+
+[Footnote 536: _Ibid._, No. 126. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861.
+Received Dec. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 537: _Punch_, Feb. 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 538: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 141.]
+
+[Footnote 539: _Ibid._, No. 142. Jan. 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 540: _Ibid._, No. 143.]
+
+[Footnote 541: James, _W. W. Story_, II, p. 111, Jan. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 542: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 153. Lyons to
+Russell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan. 27.]
+
+[Footnote 543: _Ibid., Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Despatch from Lord Lyons
+respecting the Obstruction of the Southern Harbours." Lyons to Russell,
+Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb. 24.]
+
+[Footnote 544: Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of
+G.V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy_, 1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pont
+to Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited as _Fox, Confid. Corresp_. This
+letter shows clearly also that the Navy had no thought of a _permanent_
+obstruction.]
+
+[Footnote 545: _Vide_ Arnold, _Friendship's Garland_.]
+
+[Footnote 546: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 249. Thouvenel
+could mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13, 1862. "Nous ne voulons
+pas cependant imposer une forme de gouvernement aux Mexicains..."]
+
+[Footnote 547: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Jan. 17,
+1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to Flahault in London, hoped
+England would feel that she had a common interest with France in
+preventing Mexico from falling under the yoke of Americans either "unis
+ou secedes." (Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 226).]
+
+[Footnote 548: _Ibid._, Jan. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 549: _Ibid._, March 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 550: F.O., Am., Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 28,
+1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France just as Napoleon's plans
+for Mexico took clearer form has been made the ground for assumptions
+that he immediately gave assurance of Southern acquiescence and
+encouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have found no good evidence of
+this--rather the contrary. The whole plan was clear to Cowley by
+mid-January before Slidell reached Paris, and Slidell's own
+correspondence shows no early push on Mexico. The Confederate agents'
+correspondence, both official and private, will be much used later in
+this work and here requires explanation. But four historical works of
+importance deal with it extensively, (1) Richardson, _Messages and
+Papers of the Confederacy_, 2 vols., 1905, purports to include the
+despatches of Mason and Slidell to Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory.
+Important despatches are missing, and elisions sometimes occur without
+indication. (2) Virginia Mason, _The Public Life and Diplomatic
+Correspondence of James M. Mason_, 1906, contains most of Mason's
+despatches, including some not given by Richardson. The author also used
+the _Mason Papers_ (see below). (3) Callahan, _The Diplomatic History of
+the Southern Confederacy_, 1901, is the most complete and authoritative
+work on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used the collection known
+as the "Pickett Papers," for official despatches, supplementing these
+when gaps occurred by a study of the _Mason Papers_, but his work,
+narrative in form, permits no extended printing of documents. (4) L.M.
+Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. (Am. Hist.
+Rev. Jan., 1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the
+_Mason Papers_. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or packages in
+the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and in addition
+there is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to Richmond. These
+contain the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell while in Europe.
+Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's letters are copies in Slidell's
+hand-writing, made apparently at Mason's request and sent to him in May,
+1865. A complete typed copy of this correspondence was taken by me in
+1913, but this has not hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master's
+degree thesis by Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat,"
+Stanford University, 1915, and for a few citations by C. F. Adams, _A
+Crisis in Downing Street_ (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914).
+The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's English friends,
+Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others.]
+
+[Footnote 551: Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought France also
+included in these demonstrations.]
+
+[Footnote 552: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 113. Henry Adams to
+Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Feb. 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 553: _Ibid._, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 554: Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 555: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son.]
+
+[Footnote 556: Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 557: Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with Russell but adds
+that Great Britain, in the early stages of the blockade, was indulgent
+to the North, and rightly so considering the difficulties of
+instituting it.]
+
+[Footnote 558: He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863, that he saw "no
+reason to qualify the language employed in my despatch to Lord Lyons of
+the 15th of February last." (Bernard, p. 293).]
+
+[Footnote 559: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II,
+p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 560: Mason, _Mason_, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 561: Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 562: Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" to Jefferson
+Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no indication of how
+he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To his astonishment
+Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France knew nothing of such a
+memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by some enterprising "Southern
+friend" in need of money.]
+
+[Footnote 563: Mason, _Mason_, p. 258. Mason to Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 564: _Ibid._, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch No. 4. Feb. 22,
+1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.) Slidell was more
+warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same line of argument and
+apparently made a favourable impression. Cowley reported Thouvenel,
+after the interview, as expressing himself as "hoping that in two or
+three months matters would have reached such a crisis in America that
+both parties would be willing to accept a Mediation...."
+
+(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to Russell,
+Feb. 10, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 565: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, 1862. This was
+that James Spence, author of _The American Union_, a work strongly
+espousing the Southern cause. This book was not only widely read in
+England but portions of it were translated into other languages for use
+on the Continent. Spence was a manufacturer and trader and also operated
+in the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason,
+was early active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in
+England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was much
+less favourably regarded and the impression created by his frequent
+letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre elated by the
+prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he took to be the birth
+of a new State.]
+
+[Footnote 566: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 567: Mason, _Mason p_. 258.]
+
+[Footnote 568: Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging that
+Continental interests and British interests in the blockade were
+"directly antagonistic," basing his argument on England's forward look
+as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862. Richardson, II,
+p. 186).]
+
+[Footnote 569: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Papers
+relating to the Blockade."]
+
+[Footnote 570: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp.
+1233-43.]
+
+[Footnote 571: Mason's authenticated statistics, unfortunately for his
+cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply that
+after that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and which
+certainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective to
+prevent regular and frequent communications between the government at
+Richmond and its agents abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he
+promptly incorporated Mason's figures in the papers presented to
+Parliament? These figures showed that according to reports from four
+Southern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29
+and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date
+December 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from
+Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockade
+running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those reaching Cuba
+were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3
+American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the names
+of the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper though
+apparently included in the list submitted by Mason. These figures did in
+fact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861. The American
+blockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available material
+and were slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy could
+not enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing
+their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render a
+large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive effort
+and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet of
+blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See _Fox, Confid. Corresp._, I,
+pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tribute
+to the energy with which the South for "thirteen long months" had
+defended its important port shore lines.) If Gregory had been able to
+quote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have
+had a strong argument. "The blockade runners are doing a great
+business.... Everything is brought in in abundance. Not a day passes
+without an arrival or a departure. The Richmond Government sent about a
+month ago an order to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from
+Nassau to New York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence
+here, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the
+order. Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are
+all changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and no
+one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed,
+there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862).]
+
+[Footnote 572: I have nowhere found any such statement by Seward.
+Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of May 27, 1861,
+printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds that temporary absence
+of blockading ships does not impair the blockade nor render "necessary a
+new notice of its existence."]
+
+[Footnote 573: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 119-20. Henry Adams
+to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 574: This "three months" statement returned to plague Russell
+later, British merchants complaining that upon it they had based plans
+in the belief that the Government had something definite in view.
+Spence's reference to this "three months" idea, after his conferences in
+London, would indicate that Russell was merely indulging in a
+generalization due to the expected financial collapse of the North. The
+Russian Ambassador in London gave a different interpretation. He wrote
+that the Northern victories in the West had caused Great Britain to
+think the time near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by
+these victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation
+from the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that
+Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken." (Brunow to
+F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so state, but his
+despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk with Russell. If
+so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret Lincoln's "border state
+policy" in a sense that would appear reasonable in the British view that
+there could be no real hope at Washington of restoring the Union.]
+
+[Footnote 575: Mason, _Mason_, p. 264. Despatch No. 6. March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 576: _Ibid._, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken by Grant on
+February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture of these two
+places gave an opening for the advance of the Western army southwards
+into Tennessee and Mississippi.]
+
+[Footnote 577: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 578: Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, March 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 579: Mason Papers.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+ENTER MR. LINDSAY
+
+The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the threatening
+_Trent_ episode, appears to have made Secretary Seward believe that the
+moment was opportune for a renewal of pressure on Great Britain and
+France for the recall of their Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon
+the victories of Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on
+February 28 explaining that as a result the United States, now having
+access to the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas,
+"had determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways
+and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment
+succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the
+sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the
+blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations would
+"go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw their
+"belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as we
+conceive, to the insurgents[580]." This was large talk for a relatively
+unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the door
+in the West and was still far from having "access to the interior
+districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of this
+despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said the
+position and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved and
+notable successes probable, it could not be maintained that hostilities
+were "so near their conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale
+as to disqualify either party for the title of Belligerents[581]." Lyons
+and Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of
+belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received that the
+purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the news quite
+took Thouvenel's breath away[582]. As yet, however, Seward did no more
+than hint and Adams was quick to advise that the moment had not yet come
+"when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use[583]."
+
+Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no doubt
+intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the North, yet also
+truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the South and its "domestic
+institution." This was the negotiation of a Slave-Trade treaty with
+Great Britain, by which America joined, at last, the nations agreeing to
+unite their efforts in suppression of the African Slave Trade. The
+treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons at Washington on April 7. On the
+next day Seward wrote to Adams that had such a treaty been ratified "in
+1808, there would now have been no sedition here, and no disagreement
+between the United States and foreign nations[584]," a melancholy
+reflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsible
+for the long delay of American participation in a world humanitarian
+movement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to
+save the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he
+should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing the
+Union[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of the
+intensity of both Northern and Southern feeling if regarded from our
+present knowledge, but a view natural enough to the foreign observer at
+the moment. Lyons, in this letter, correctly stated the rising
+determination of the North to restore the Union, but underestimated the
+rapid growth of an equal determination against a restoration with
+slavery. The real motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade
+treaty was the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic,
+affairs. Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken
+"the risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had
+indicated[586].
+
+In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over recent
+military successes. The campaign in the West had been followed in the
+East by a great effort under McClellan to advance on Richmond up the
+peninsula of the James river and using Chesapeake Bay as a means of
+water transportation and supply. This campaign had been threatened by
+the appearance of the iron-clad ram _Merrimac_ and her attack on the
+wooden naval vessels operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9
+the _Monitor_, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove the
+_Merrimac_ from her helpless prey, and removed the Southern threat to
+McClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the Civil
+War the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck the
+imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its
+significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been
+the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in
+Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval
+people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in
+warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]."
+The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in British
+eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, and especially
+the ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden ships on the
+day previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future.
+Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle.
+"Only think," he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankees
+turning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphs
+they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight of
+metal[588]."
+
+This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while American
+ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded the
+death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in the character of
+navies was immediately possible. Moreover British shipbuilders could
+surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any other
+nation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the British
+Government as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in the
+North promising further and more important successes on land. The
+Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief
+that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission,
+for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the
+conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The
+idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability
+and realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle,
+was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusion
+that the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation.
+Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the
+"morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]." He
+believed that the end of the war would be hastened by Northern
+victories, and he therefore rejoiced in them.
+
+Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in April,
+began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and to write
+warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the West
+at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, called
+out such a flood of Northern expressions of determination to drive the
+war to the bitter end as to startle Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably
+clear letter of survey, to recast his opinions. He wrote:
+
+     "The general opinion is that the Campaign of this Spring will
+     clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the War. If
+     the Military successes of the North continue, the
+     determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last
+     really put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military
+     reverses, the loss of the Border States, and the occupation
+     of the most important points on the Coast, the Southern men
+     hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their
+     cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be
+     removed and then retire into the interior with their families
+     and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but
+     barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal
+     Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to
+     continue the enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation
+     to protracting the War indefinitely. I confess, however, that
+     I fear that a protraction of the War during another year or
+     longer, is a not less probable result of the present posture
+     of affairs, than either the immediate subjugation of the
+     South or the immediate recognition of its independence[590]."
+
+This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line with
+Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. There was
+indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a hypothetical defensible
+interior which impressed Englishmen, but had no foundation in
+geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention was eagerly fixed on the
+Northern advance, and it was at least generally hoped that the
+projected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsula
+toward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict in
+America. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of any
+conclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance
+of Grant's western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news
+of the capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to
+make up their minds to believe it[591]," but even the capture of this
+the most important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of
+great importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond.
+
+News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching England
+as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during this advance
+and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two remarkable
+adventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly on
+individual initiative, by a Frenchman in America and an Englishman in
+France. Mercier at Washington and Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite
+independently, that the time had come for projects of foreign mediation.
+
+French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have been
+that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result in such a
+rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions of now
+recognizing the _facts_ of the situation and acknowledging the
+independence of the South would not be unfavourably received. In this
+sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, privately, on March 13, but was
+careful to state that the word "mediation" ought not to be uttered. His
+letter dilated, also, on French manufacturing difficulties at home due
+to the lack of cotton[592]. This was in no way an instruction to
+Mercier, but the ideas expressed were broached by him in a conversation
+with Seward, only to be met with such positive assertions of intention
+and ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French
+Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that he
+wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself that there
+also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which the
+latter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier asserted to
+Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eager
+acquiescence in a suggestion made _without previous thought_, but that
+on consideration he returned to Seward and accepted the proposal,
+outlining the substance of what he intended to say at Richmond. He
+should there make clear that the anxiety of France was above all
+directed toward peace as essential to French commercial interests; that
+France had always regarded the separation of North and South with
+regret; that the North was evidently determined in its will to restore
+the Union; and, in repetition, that France wished to aid in any way
+possible the early cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to
+add that he, personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of
+any persons whom the South wished to elect[593].
+
+Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient
+sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the balance
+and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite unnecessarily,
+Seward helped him to make the trip[594]." A circumstance apparently not
+known to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, before
+departure, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and a
+proposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materially
+different from the report made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit
+expanded treatment as new light on a curious episode and especially as
+revealing the British policy of the moment, represented in the person of
+the British Minister in Washington[595].
+
+On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to set out
+for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time thinking of
+making this journey." He told of _making the suggestion to Seward_, and
+that this "rather to his surprise" had been "eagerly" taken up.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital
+     importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed,
+     was to put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and
+     generally to a state of things which caused so grievous an
+     interruption of the trade between Europe and this country. It
+     was, he said, possible that he might hasten the attainment of
+     this object by conferring personally with the Secession
+     leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances
+     their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in
+     all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought
+     to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a
+     state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to
+     Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the
+     European Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed
+     principles. They would recognize any people which
+     established its independence, but they could not encourage
+     the prolongation of a fruitless struggle.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very
+     much discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from
+     the Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down
+     blow ('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them.
+     It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all
+     events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might
+     be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr.
+     Seward his notion of using this language, and had added that
+     of course as a Minister accredited to the United States, and
+     visiting Richmond with the consent of the United States
+     Government, he could not speak to the Southern men of any
+     other terms for ending the War than a return to the Union.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely
+     approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had
+     authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course
+     from the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward,
+     personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to
+     apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to
+     their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of
+     political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so
+     much to any other person, but that he would tell Monsieur
+     Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political station
+     and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards the
+     South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand
+     or fall by it."
+
+This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased the
+American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond to have
+constituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be regarded as
+at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor as expressive of
+Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain from much comment on the
+matter of Mercier's proposed representations at Richmond. He was more
+concerned that the trip was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed
+to it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity of
+French-British attitude which was so desirable. Nor was he without
+suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate
+advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the
+South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to
+accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any
+interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the
+Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea." Lyons
+frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of
+declining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed since
+this certainly looked like a break in "joint policy," and he objected
+positively on the same ground to Stoeckl's going[596]. Mercier yielded
+the latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of his
+consultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objection
+would be obviated. Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons
+thought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts to
+driving home the idea that no opening should be given for a "separate
+agreement" with the South.
+
+     "I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans,
+     and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I
+     said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to
+     remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would
+     be possible to inveigle France or any other great European
+     Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to
+     believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected
+     by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to
+     the exclusion of others. I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson
+     Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish
+     a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any
+     mind in which it had found place[597]."
+
+Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and fourteenth
+and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, "without saying
+anything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it." This
+was intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France,
+and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the result of my communications with
+M. Mercier entitles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmond
+with my acquiescence[598]." Nevertheless he both believed, and declared
+to Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening of
+determination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor South
+was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace.
+He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy proved
+well founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of the
+results of the journey. Mercier returned to Washington on April 24,
+reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day
+called on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate
+Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled
+determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under
+extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected
+European assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders
+professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and that
+confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously adverting
+to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in view French
+commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received any
+proposals of benefit in return for recognition. Mercier answered with a
+simple negative. He then further developed the interview with
+Benjamin[599].
+
+     "He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of
+     the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the
+     particular language which he had intended to hold was
+     entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found
+     the Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that
+     they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for
+     making terms with the North. What he had said to them about
+     the recognition of their Independence was that the principal
+     inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her
+     doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening
+     peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any
+     such effect; that it would embroil France with the United
+     States, and that would be all[600]."
+
+Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercier
+to convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, in
+fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he had
+approached Benjamin with the simple declaration "that the purpose of my
+journey was merely to assure myself, for myself, of the true condition
+of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it."
+Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to
+Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the
+trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make
+them. They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some
+degree also to Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The
+report to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated
+to Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principal
+inducement" thereto[601]. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views on
+recognition:
+
+     "He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration
+     of the old Union was impossible. He believed that, if the
+     Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last
+     for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South
+     must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the
+     Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable
+     opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War.
+     The present opportunity would however, he thought, be
+     particularly unfavourable."
+
+Lyons writes:
+
+     "I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be
+     eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur
+     Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that
+     there was nothing to do at the present moment but to watch
+     events."
+
+On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of Mercier's
+trip and was given a very different view of the situation at Richmond.
+Seward said:
+
+     "He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur Mercier's
+     account of what had passed, that the Confederates were about
+     to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought
+     into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they
+     were now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be
+     offered them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was
+     idle. If the United States were undisputed masters of the
+     Border States and the Sea Coast, there would be no occasion
+     for any more fighting. Those who chose to retire into the
+     interior were welcome to do so, and to stay there till they
+     were tired."
+
+"The truth," wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the South
+probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those of Monsieur
+Mercier." Lyons concluded his report of the whole matter:
+
+     "The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to bring
+     him back precisely to the point at which he was three months
+     ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had
+     somewhat shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the
+     South, and consequently his opinions as to the policy to be
+     adopted by France. The sentiments he now expresses are
+     exactly those which he expressed at the beginning of the
+     year[602]."
+
+In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early recognition of
+the South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons the effect of the
+adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of this; and on Russell also
+its influence was to cause some doubt of Southern success. Appended to
+Lyons' report stands Russell's initialled comment:
+
+     "It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which the
+     Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms
+     they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will
+     cause but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can
+     the country be held permanently by the U.S. Armies if the
+     Confederates have small bodies in Arms resisting the
+     authority of the U.S. Congress?
+
+     Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union
+     feeling in the South will be of great value in forming a
+     judgment on the final issue."
+
+Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid public
+misconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on Mercier's
+trip. This appeared May 6, in the New York _Times_, the paper more
+closely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout the war, representing
+Mercier as having gone to Richmond by order of Napoleon and with
+Lincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to surrender and to
+encourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons commented on this
+article that the language attributed to Mercier was "not very unlike
+that which he intended to hold," but that in fact he had not used
+it[603]. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. Indeed everyone in London
+and Paris was much astonished, and many were the speculations as to the
+meaning of Mercier's unusual procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing
+"Que diable allait il faire dans cette galére[604]?" and Cowley, at
+Paris, could give no light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours
+of Mercier's trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could
+be true[605]." May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable
+unless the Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not
+the case[606]." The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, was
+assured by the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier's
+conduct, and that he greatly regretted it," being especially disturbed
+by a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with the British
+Representative" at Washington[607]. This was reassuring to Russell, yet
+there is no question that Mercier's conduct long left a certain
+suspicion in British official circles. On May 2, also, Thouvenel wrote
+to Flahault in London of the Emperor's displeasure, evidently with the
+intention that this should be conveyed to Russell[608].
+
+Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate agents in
+Europe. At first they believed Mercier must have had secret orders from
+Napoleon, and were delighted; then on denials made to Slidell by
+Thouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an unfavourable sense as
+Seward's agent. Later they returned to the theory of Napoleon's private
+manipulation, and being confident of his friendship were content to wait
+events[609]. Slidell had just received assurance from M. Billault,
+through whom most of his information came, "that the Emperor and all
+the Ministers are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last
+year, and are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M.
+Thouvenel is of course excepted, but then he has no hostility[610]." But
+a greater source of Southern hope at this juncture was another
+"diplomatic adventure," though by no accredited diplomat, which
+antedated Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not only
+the Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well.
+
+This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament, Lindsay, in
+the rôle of self-constituted Southern emissary to Napoleon. Lindsay, as
+one of the principal ship-owners in England, had long been an earnest
+advocate of more free commercial intercourse between nations, supporting
+in general the principles of Cobden and Bright, and being a warm
+personal friend of the latter, though disagreeing with him on the
+American Civil War. He had been in some sense a minor expert consulted
+by both French and British Governments in the preparation of the
+commercial treaty of 1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself
+to Cowley asking that an audience with the Emperor be procured for him
+to talk over some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the request
+seemed reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On the
+twelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon's
+conversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs[611].
+
+The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction that re-union
+between North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he was
+ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him the
+example." More than once he had expressed these ideas to England, but
+"they had not been attended to" and he should not try again. He
+continued:
+
+     "... that France ought not to interfere in the internal
+     affairs of the United States, but that the United States
+     ought equally to abstain from all interference in the
+     internal concerns of France; and that His Majesty considered
+     that the hindrance placed by the Northern States upon the
+     exportation of cotton from the South was not justifiable, and
+     was tantamount to interference with the legal commerce of
+     France."
+
+He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established. He had
+made observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, but they
+had not been replied to." Then "His Majesty asked what were the opinions
+of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her Majesty's Govt. agreed with
+him as to the inefficiency of the blockade, he was ready to send ships
+of war to co-operate with others of Her Majesty to keep the Southern
+ports open." Finally Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and find
+out what he thought of these ideas.
+
+Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever having been
+made by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion was "that it
+might be true that the North and the South would never re-unite, but
+that it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of the blockade was a
+legal and international question, and that upon the whole it had been
+considered by Her Majesty's Govt. as efficient, though doubtless many
+ships had been enabled to run it"; and "that at all events there could
+not be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question both of the
+recognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. The
+time was gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for
+every mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting with
+success upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of the
+blockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her Majesty's Govt.
+would consent to send a squadron to act as the Emperor had indicated,
+but that I could only give a personal opinion, which might be corrected
+if I was in error by Mr. Lindsay himself seeing Lord Russell."
+
+On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay and
+Napoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to Napoleon
+Cowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a contrary view
+of the situation, Napoleon:
+
+     "... repeated the statement that two long despatches with his
+     opinion had been written to M. de Flahault, which had not
+     been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he
+     expressed a desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London,
+     lay His Majesty's views before Lord Palmerston and Lord
+     Russell, and bring their answers direct to him as quickly as
+     possible, His Majesty observing that these matters were
+     better arranged by private than official hands.... Mr.
+     Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be back in
+     Paris on Thursday morning."
+
+In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty intrigue."
+Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and Thouvenel had denied
+all knowledge and declared that certainly no such proposals as Lindsay
+reported the Emperor to have mentioned had ever been sent to England.
+Cowley wrote:
+
+     "My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations with me,
+     which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood
+     hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor
+     his own views, and that those views are supported by the
+     majority of the people of England, and by the present
+     Opposition in Parliament, who would denounce the blockade if
+     in power; that he has found a willing listener in the
+     Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any means; and I
+     am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make
+     political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the
+     Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose
+     no time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over
+     to-night, and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord
+     Palmerston as soon as possible[612]."
+
+The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown by his
+conveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was jubilant, writing
+to Mason:
+
+     "Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor who is
+     prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has
+     always been ready to do so and has twice made representations
+     to England, but has received evasive responses. He has now
+     for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr.
+     Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely
+     confidential but you can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory,
+     etc., that I now have positive and _authoritative_ evidence
+     that France now waits the assent of England for recognition
+     and other more cogent measures[613]."
+
+Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in substance
+very similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though more highly
+coloured as favourable to the South, but he added an important feature
+which, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, but which had not been
+stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to see Derby and Disraeli, the
+leaders of the parliamentary opposition, and inform them of his views--a
+suggestion which if known to the British Ministry as coming from
+Napoleon could not fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believed
+that, failing British participation, the Emperor might act separately in
+recognition of the South[614].
+
+April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval of the
+language used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was about to write
+to Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to bring them also on
+my part officially to your [Russell's] notice[615]." This official
+report does not differ materially from that in Cowley's private letter
+of the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally, aspersions on Lindsay and
+suspicions of the use to which he might put his information[616]. Cowley
+had held a long conversation with Thouvenel, in which it was developed
+that the source of the Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce,
+who was very anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that
+Lindsay in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "_I_ [Cowley]
+_coincided in his views_." This exasperated Cowley, and he resented
+Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that he "was placed
+in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. M. Thouvenel
+exclaimed that his own position was still more false, and that he should
+make a point of seeing the Emperor, on the following morning, and of
+ascertaining the extent of His Majesty's participation in the
+proceeding." This was done, with the result that Napoleon acknowledged
+that on Lindsay's request he had authorized him to recount to Russell
+and Palmerston the views expressed, but asserted that "he had not
+charged him to convey those opinions." Cowley concluded his despatch:
+
+     "Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not understand
+     the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had
+     confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate
+     proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more
+     preoccupied with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's
+     Government seemed to be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in
+     his communications with M. de Flahault, but that he knew too
+     well the general opinions prevailing in England to have made
+     proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what proposals could have
+     been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the Emperor and M.
+     Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the South would
+     not bring Cotton into the markets, while any interference
+     with the blockade would probably have produced a collision.
+     At the same time he could not conceal from me the just
+     anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not
+     the Northern States be induced to declare some one port
+     Neutral, at which the trade could be carried on?
+
+     I said that the events which were now passing in America
+     demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two
+     Governments. The recognition of the South would not have
+     prevented the North from continuing its armaments and
+     undertaking the expedition now in progress, and a refusal to
+     acknowledge the blockade as efficient must have been followed
+     by the employment of force, on a question of extreme
+     delicacy[617]."
+
+Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this Russell
+stated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation was alarming,
+but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so the remedy." He
+assured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish to take no step in
+respect to the Civil War in America except in concert with France and
+upon full deliberation[618]." Meanwhile Lindsay's diplomatic career had
+received a severe jolt in London. Confidently addressing to Russell a
+request for an interview, he received the reply "that I thought the best
+way for two Govts. to communicate with each other was through their
+respective Embassies.... He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you
+[Cowley] had not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the
+proposal through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to
+see me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and the
+French Ambassr. could make the most Confidential as well as Official
+Communications[619]." This rebuff was not regarded as final, though
+exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all being
+agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in their favour.
+Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and on April 18 had
+still another conversation with Napoleon. He reported Russell's refusal
+of an interview, and that he had seen Disraeli, but not Derby, who was
+ill. Disraeli had declared that he believed Russell and Seward to have a
+"secret understanding" on the blockade, but that if France should make a
+definite proposal it would probably be supported by a majority in
+Parliament, and that Russell would be compelled to assent in order to
+avoid a change of Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsay
+expressions of vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon
+(according to Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting to
+learn the result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an event
+which "he did not anticipate," but which, if it occurred, "might render
+it inexpedient to act[620]."
+
+Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to London,
+found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English repetition. He wrote
+that Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had attempted to get at
+Palmerston, but with no success. Thereupon Lindsay turning to the
+Opposition had visited Disraeli a second time and submitted to him
+Palmerston's rebuff. The strongest expression that fell from Disraeli
+was--"if it is found that the Emperor and Russell are at issue on the
+question the session of Parliament would not be as quiet as had been
+anticipated." This was scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all
+important. Yet "on the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in
+conclusion[621]. Within a fortnight following arrived the news of the
+capture of New Orleans, an event upon which Seward had postulated the
+relief of a European scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a
+serious blow. May 13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him,
+personally, that "he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the
+moment but to watch events[622]." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the
+effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, "that
+it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control of
+the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would not in any way
+modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to an
+extermination[623]." Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all from his
+section, never fully realizing the importance of the Confederate
+South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about Richmond, was telling
+the "nervous amongst our friends" that New Orleans would "form a barren
+acquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as a
+stimulant[624]."
+
+If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeated
+doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In England,
+Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, but
+thought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in that
+direction. May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of British
+public opinion, "there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as
+ever that we must ultimately fail[625]," but on May 16, that "the effect
+of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ...
+the _Times_ came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it
+had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it
+has an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first time
+that it sees little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a
+preparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and
+acknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all the
+national territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will
+bring us up to this, I am confident[626]."
+
+This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep pace
+with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry was
+simply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and to
+restrain its French partner in a "wait for events" policy. The "one more
+victory" so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and the
+attention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited
+in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of
+Northern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond.
+McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington
+that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This was treated at
+some length in the semi-official _National Intelligencer_ of May 16 in
+an article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating that
+mediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, but
+would otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly
+represented the situation[627].
+
+There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was largely the
+result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of ultimate Southern
+success and his somewhat free private communications. He may, indeed,
+have been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxiety at
+Northern success, for McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily,
+if slowly, progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent
+instruction from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yet
+he thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan on
+Lyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of the
+situation were as follows:
+
+     "M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility
+     that the South may be victorious both in the battle in
+     Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite
+     confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not
+     give in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his
+     Government to endeavour to put an end to the war by
+     intervening on the first opportunity. He is, however, very
+     much puzzled to devise any mode of intervention, which would
+     have the effect of reviving French trade and obtaining
+     cotton. I should suppose he would think it desirable to go to
+     great lengths to stop the war; because he believes that the
+     South will not give in until the whole country is made
+     desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim
+     immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of
+     cotton for an indefinite time.
+
+     I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It
+     appears to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation.
+     There is a good deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations
+     of evil, but I do not see my way to doing any good.
+
+     If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a
+     month or six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will
+     be at Richmond, having very probably got there without much
+     real fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if
+     so far....
+
+     The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the
+     summer. It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as
+     Trade and Cotton are concerned, we may be next Autumn, just
+     in the situation we are now. If the South really defeated
+     either or both the Armies opposed to them I think it would
+     disgust the North with the war, rather than excite them to
+     fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much from disease,
+     recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the
+     Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it
+     would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is
+     possible, under such circumstances that a Peace Party might
+     arise; and perhaps just _possible_ that England and France
+     might give weight to such a Party[628]."
+
+In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation unless
+a strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and even then
+regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just _possible_." Nor was
+Russell inclined to depart from established policy. He wrote to Lyons at
+nearly the same time:
+
+     "The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth seems to
+     portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see
+     therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population
+     entertain those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which
+     were so freely expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate
+     Statesmen at Richmond. I know not how to answer this
+     question. But there are other questions not less important to
+     be solved in the North. Will the Abolitionists succeed in
+     proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all those who have
+     resisted? I guess not.
+
+     But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and
+     its old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair
+     solution except separation--but that the North will not hear
+     of--nor in the moment of success would it be of any use to
+     give them unpalatable advice[629]."
+
+Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully informed of
+Mercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France had no intention
+to depart from her attitude of strict neutrality and that it was more
+than ever necessary to wait events[630].
+
+Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation were then
+wholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as yet taken up
+this plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern successes were
+continued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction from his former high
+hopes, summed up the situation in a few words: "This Government passive
+and ignorant, France alert and mysterious. The Emperor alone knows what
+is to come out of it, and he keeps his own secret[631]." The Southern
+play, following the ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quiet
+and extended even to discouraging public demonstrations against
+governmental inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration by
+cotton operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matter
+of judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory as I
+think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success and
+power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would have
+resulted[632]." The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell was
+conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediately
+following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions to
+Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of the
+declaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel replied
+with some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strong
+representation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton and
+tobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had little
+expectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute the
+orders," advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customary
+arguments on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual
+refusal to alter British policy[634]. If Seward was sincere in asking
+for a retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook
+European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories to
+return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable in
+causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well chosen.
+Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward's
+renewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there was no immediate
+reason to require his presence in America, ill and fearing the heat of
+summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to take leave of absence
+for a trip home. On June 6 he received this permission, evidence that
+Russell also saw no cause for anxiety, and on June 13 he took leave
+of Lincoln.
+
+     "I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this
+     morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more
+     or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on
+     political matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in
+     England think a great deal more of me than I deserve, pray
+     tell 'em I mean 'em no harm[635].'"
+
+Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of news on any
+striking military event in America. New Orleans was an old story, and
+while in general it was believed that Richmond must fall before
+McClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid declarations that
+they would never submit gave renewed courage to their British friends.
+Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might be wise, after all, to make
+some effort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumours
+were becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motion
+demanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, an
+offer of mediation be made to the contending parties in America.
+Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had
+failed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a
+terrible war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure.
+Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined
+to make the effort[636]. Probably he was still smarting under his
+reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personal
+clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influence
+on governmental attitude--perhaps might even indicate a governmental
+purpose to alter its policy.
+
+This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston to
+Adams on the publication in the _Times_ of General Butler's famous order
+in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as "women of the
+town" those women who publicly insulted Northern troops. The British
+press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similar
+to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the Stone Fleet episode.
+Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies received need no further
+notice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than to
+explain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and with
+great violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, but
+in very dignified if irritating terms[637]. In British opinion Butler's
+order was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans
+understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. In
+fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers,
+whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick to
+accept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if not
+impossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited in
+the mind of every honourable man by the general order of General
+Butler...." "If the Federal government chooses to be served by men
+capable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by the
+deserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]." This
+extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry and
+perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an intention to
+change British policy and that Palmerston was but laying the ground for
+some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, after his wont when striking
+out on a new line. He was further confirmed in this view by an editorial
+in the _Times_ on June 12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news
+from France that Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a
+step. But however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a
+diplomat. His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston
+enquiring whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him
+"officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment between
+gentlemen[639]."
+
+There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were contemplating a
+change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does appear that Palmerston
+wished to be able to state in Parliament that he had taken Adams to task
+for Butler's order, so that he might meet an enquiry already placed on
+the question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This
+question was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell
+wrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that
+Palmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not
+see why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of war
+do not sanction such conduct[640]." This was very different from the
+tone used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way."
+Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:
+
+     "Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you
+     have written him about Butler.
+
+     I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do
+     nothing more till I had seen or written to you.
+
+     What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your
+     interpretation of the order.
+
+     But it is not clear that the President approves of the order,
+     and I think if you could add something to the effect that you
+     respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish
+     to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him.
+
+     If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the
+     best. But this you may not like to do[641]."
+
+It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move against
+Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last,
+he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order,
+was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicion
+proving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended,
+returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was not
+until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far different
+language seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet making
+no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded
+with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being
+official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous
+assertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell,
+who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but
+had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding
+was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June
+19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect
+still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the
+"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organ
+for communications...." In conclusion he expressed gratification that
+reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans had
+been curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpreting
+Palmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that he
+would not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]."
+
+Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew there was
+to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move may
+even have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in that
+policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends of
+the South thought the _Times_ editorial indicated "that some movement is
+to be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor for
+it[644]." But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state
+in Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal from
+France to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it
+on our part[645]." This was the exact language used by Palmerston in
+reply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but was
+assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "still
+hold his motion under consideration[647]." Lindsay, according to his own
+account, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knew
+privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for
+his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone
+it[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead of
+mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to
+Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to
+the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the
+moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in
+despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what
+prospect of success, to _demand_ recognition from France[649]. This
+alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging
+against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there
+would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's
+motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, including
+Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it "has been so far reduced
+and diluted ... as to make it only expressive of the opinion of the
+House that the present posture of affairs in America made the question
+of the recognition of the Confederate States worth the serious
+consideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent the
+Ministry making an issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it
+would be sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined to
+postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from this
+quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' to
+turn the screw still further[651]." On June, 20 Lindsay gave this notice
+of postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was a
+moment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe.
+Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demanding
+recognition and wrote:
+
+     "The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and
+     almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be
+     consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way
+     advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that
+     we would have done better to withdraw after our first
+     interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]."
+
+[Illustration: PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH (_From a photograph by Elliott &
+Fry, Ltd._)]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 580: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 41.]
+
+[Footnote 581: F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 582: F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell,
+March 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 583: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 54.
+Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 584: _Ibid._, p. 65.]
+
+[Footnote 585: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. April 8,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 586: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 587: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son, April 4,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 588: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 589: Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 590: F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. Lyons to Russell,
+April 11, 1802.]
+
+[Footnote 591: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 143. Adams to his son,
+May 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 592: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 247.]
+
+[Footnote 593: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, pp. 120-122. Mercicr to
+Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of this despatch was printed,
+with some minor inaccuracies, in the New York _Tribune_, Feb. 5, 1863,
+and of Mercier's report, April 28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb.
+9, under the caption "The Yellow Book." It is interesting that the
+concluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the
+_Tribune_, are not given in the printed volume of _Documents
+Diplomatiques_, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to
+certain pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences
+with French vessels. How the _Tribune_ secured these paragraphs, if
+authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the publication was an
+attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in an effort to cause his
+removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 371-2.]
+
+[Footnote 594: Bancroft, _Seward_. II, 298-99. Bancroft's account is
+based on the _Tribune_ translation and on Seward's own comments to Weed
+and Bigelow. _Ibid._, 371-72.]
+
+[Footnote 595: Newton. _Lord Lyons_, I, pp. 82-85, gives an account of
+the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints Lyons' private letter to
+Russell of April 25, describing the results, but does not bring out
+sufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks that
+Mercier "whether instructed from home or not ... after the manner of
+French diplomatists of the period ... was probably unable to resist the
+temptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_...."]
+
+[Footnote 596: Stoeckl's report does not agree with Mercier's statement.
+He wrote that he had been asked to accompany Mercier but had refused and
+reported a conversation with Seward in which the latter declared the
+time had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would not
+be accepted in that rôle, and that if ever mediation should become
+acceptable, Russia would be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to
+F.O., April 23-May 5, 1862. No. 927).]
+
+[Footnote 597: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 598: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 599: This suspicion was a natural one but that it was
+unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of Mercier's
+visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the same terms
+that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached by
+Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by the fact that he did
+not write to Slidell about it until July. Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin
+to Slidell, July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 600: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 601: _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, pp. 122-124.]
+
+[Footnote 602: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 603: F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, May 9, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 604: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 605: F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley to Russell,
+April 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 606: _Ibid._, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To Russell. Mercier's
+conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy confidence"
+to Lyons. _Ibid._, No. 566. May 1, 1862. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 607: _Ibid._, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, May 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 608: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 299.]
+
+[Footnote 609: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862.
+Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 610: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, May 16, 1862. Billault was a
+member of the French Ministry, but without portfolio.]
+
+[Footnote 611: Several accounts have been given of this episode. The two
+known to me treating it at greatest length are (1) Callahan, _Diplomatic
+History of the Southern Confederacy_ and (2) Sears, _A Confederate
+Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both
+writers drew their information wholly from Confederate documents, using,
+especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither
+treats the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my
+account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other
+materials only where they offer a side light. The principal new sources
+are Cowley's private and official letters to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 612: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. April 13,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 613: Mason Papers. April 12, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 614: Richardson, II, 239. April 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 615: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private.]
+
+[Footnote 616: F.O., France, Vol. 1437. No. 497. _Confidential_. Cowley
+to Russell April 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 617: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 618: F.O., France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell to Cowley,
+April 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 619: _Ibid._, No. 415. Russell to Cowley, April 16, 1862.
+Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with a mission must
+remain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have prevaricated--or at
+least so officially reported. He had
+
+     "Le 20 Avril, 1862.
+
+     Mon cher Lord Cowley:
+
+     Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'espčre comme vous que
+     bientôt nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de tout
+     été choqué de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas reçu Mr. Lindsay.
+     Celui-ci m'avait demandé l'autorisation de rapporter au
+     principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais
+     consenti et voilŕ tout.
+
+     Croyez ŕ mes sentiments d'amitié.
+
+     Napoleon."
+]
+
+[Footnote 620: Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin, April 18, 1862.
+New Orleans was captured on April 25.]
+
+[Footnote 621: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 622: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 623: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 624: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, May 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 625: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 139.]
+
+[Footnote 626: _Ibid._, p. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 627: F.O., Am., Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to Russell, May 16,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 628: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. May 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 629: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. May 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 630: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, p. 124. May 15.]
+
+[Footnote 631: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 632: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 633: F.O., France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley to Russell, May
+23, 1862, and _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 127. Thouvenel to
+Mercier, May 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 634: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862_, pp. 97-99. Adams to
+Seward, May 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 635: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, 88.]
+
+[Footnote 636: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 637: All the letters are given in Adams, _C.F. Adams_, Ch.
+XIII.]
+
+[Footnote 638: _Ibid._, pp. 248-9.]
+
+[Footnote 639: _Ibid._, p. 251.]
+
+[Footnote 640: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 641: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 642: Adams, _C.F. Adams_, pp. 253-55.]
+
+[Footnote 643: _Ibid._, pp. 256-60.]
+
+[Footnote 644: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 645: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 646: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 543. June 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 647: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 648: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. Lindsay wrote:
+
+     "Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of my
+     motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced
+     the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have
+     told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to
+     him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the
+     House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even
+     if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a
+     majority of votes might have been obtained in its
+     favour--that a majority of votes _would_ be obtained within
+     the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope
+     that the Government would move (as the country, and France,
+     are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the
+     necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which
+     belonged to the Executive.
+
+     "I further told his Lordship that recognition was a _right_
+     which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the
+     fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the
+     majority of the leading men in the Northern States would
+     thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself
+     might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse
+     for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged
+     his people. I further said, that if the question is settled
+     _without_ our recognition of the South, he might _rest
+     certain_ that the Northern Armies _would_ be marched into
+     Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and
+     thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for _sub
+     rosa_, I saw that the House was not _yet_ prepared to vote,
+     and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in
+     idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm."
+]
+
+[Footnote 649: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 650: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 651: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 652: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 810.]
+
+[Footnote 653: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO
+
+
+CHAPTER                                         PAGE
+    X. KING COTTON  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1
+   XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN .  .  .  .  .  .  33
+  XII. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION  .  .  .  .  75
+ XIII. THE LAIRD RAMS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 116
+  XIV. ROEBUCK'S MOTION   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 152
+   XV. THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION   . 186
+  XVI. BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH   .  .  . 219
+ XVII. THE END OF THE WAR .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 247
+XVIII. THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE  .  .  . 274
+       INDEX  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 307
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+PART TWO
+
+PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . _Frontispiece_
+_From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd_.
+
+JOHN SLIDELL  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  _facing p. 24_
+_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham
+Lincoln," by permission of the Century Co., New
+York._
+
+"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD"  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     "    102
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851) .  .  .  .  .  .     "    134
+_From Reid's "Life of Forster" (Chapman & Hall,
+Ltd._)
+
+"THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS--HABET!"   .  .  .  .     "    248
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH COLUMBIA"  .  .  .     "    262
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+JOHN BRIGHT .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     "    294
+_From Trevelyan's  "Life  of John  Bright"
+(Constable & Co., Ltd_.)
+
+
+
+GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+KING COTTON
+
+For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England.
+But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance on
+Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the much
+heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrous
+failure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns in
+the West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored or
+their significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in
+America approached a stalemate. The time had come with the near
+adjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must
+be made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was
+hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily
+increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to the
+Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and private
+efforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review the
+cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern to
+both friend and foe of the North and in less degree to the
+Ministry itself.
+
+"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no great
+revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such convenient and
+soothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the time
+of the organization of the Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities
+could not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what the
+Confederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced to
+aid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terrible
+distress that was sure to follow a blockade[654]." This confidence was
+no new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats of
+secession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of that
+section had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing
+industry of America and as the one product which would compel European
+acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, or
+of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression that
+swept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leading
+financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of the South is
+permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Events
+now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbug
+explodes[655]." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina,
+asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished for
+three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but
+this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole
+civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on
+cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_
+King[656]." Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 in
+which the main question was that of the territorial expansion of
+slavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing
+that "the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the
+world.... Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and
+we have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry
+it out successfully[657]."
+
+These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be
+amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.
+
+Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand in
+hand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter of
+the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In the three million
+bags of cotton," said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, "the slave-labour
+annually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing more
+to advance civilization ... than all the canting philanthropists of New
+England and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of
+the Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturing
+system[658]...." Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the
+Civil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:
+
+     "Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton
+     crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care
+     about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and
+     slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that
+     subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested
+     in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern
+     States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and
+     all Lancashire would deplore a successful insurrection of the
+     slaves, if such a thing were possible[659]."
+
+On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession.
+Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported a
+conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now a
+consistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan of
+close commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation,
+postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South for
+cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I would remark," wrote Bunch, "all
+their calculations are based[660]." Such was, indeed, Southern
+calculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an article
+declaring that "the first demonstration of blockade of the Southern
+ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering
+on the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the
+free flow of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of
+the raw material ... would produce the most disastrous political
+results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of English
+statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cotton
+associations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661]."
+
+The historical student will find but few such British utterances at the
+moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics or
+in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesied
+results accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmental
+foreign policy neglected all other considerations and the first
+Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demand
+recognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt British
+acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidence
+but did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. In
+June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that "Great
+Britain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, to
+prevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of
+an article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: "The
+cards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _the
+bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the
+acknowledgment of our independence_[663]." As late as March, 1862, Bunch
+was still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described the
+newly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly due
+to the fact that he was the leader of the "King Cotton" theory of
+diplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that British
+persistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the
+lack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading
+Richmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of
+Jefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms of
+Confederate foreign policy:
+
+     "'Cotton,' said the Charleston _Mercury_, 'would bring
+     England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that
+     England and France would instinctively or readily fling
+     themselves into a convulsion, which their great politicians
+     saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. But the
+     puerile argument, which even President Davis did not hesitate
+     to adopt, about the power of 'King Cotton,' amounted to this
+     absurdity: that the great and illustrious power of England
+     would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging
+     its dependency on the infant Confederacy of the South, and
+     the subserviency of its empire, its political interests and
+     its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in
+     America[665]!"
+
+But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in cotton
+extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth serious
+enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to Southern
+sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" have
+frequently been treated by historians at much length[666] and need here
+but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the
+erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an examination
+of the extent to which the question of cotton supply affected or
+determined British governmental policy toward America.
+
+English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of importance
+equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on varying statistics
+diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree in emphasizing the
+pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining the general prosperity of
+the nation. Surveying the English, not the whole British, situation it
+is estimated that there were 2,650 factories of which 2,195 were in
+Lancashire and two adjacent counties. These employed 500,000 operatives
+and consumed a thousand million pounds of cotton each year[667]. An
+editorial in the _Times_, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of
+the entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly
+or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts[668], and
+therefore also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South,
+since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton supplied
+from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. of the total
+English importation[669].
+
+The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly 4,000,000
+bales, and the foreign shipments, without question hurried because of
+the storm-cloud rising at home, had been practically completed by April,
+1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received
+the larger portion[670]. There was, then, no immediate shortage of
+supply when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of raw
+stocks, even permitting some reshipment to the Northern manufacturing
+centres of America where the scarcity then brought high prices. In
+addition, from December, 1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been
+somewhat of a slump in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers
+due to an over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had
+been a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial
+crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous demand
+from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running again on full
+time, while many new mills were brought into operation. But by May,
+1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy demands and the rest of the
+year saw uncertainty of operations and brought expressions of fear that
+the "plunge" to produce had been overdone. Manufactured stocks began to
+accumulate, and money was not easy since 1860 brought also a combination
+of events--deficient grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from
+England to France for investment in French public works, demand of
+America for gold in place of goods, due to political uncertainties
+there--which rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per
+cent. in January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861,
+the Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a
+dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased
+exports of goods[671]. The news of war actually begun in America came as
+a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and in the prospect of
+decreased supply prices rose, saving many manufacturers from impending
+difficulties. A few mills had already begun to work on part-time because
+of trade depression. The _immediate_ effect of Lincoln's blockade
+proclamation was to check this movement, but by October it had again
+begun and this time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw
+cotton as compared with the slower advance of the price of goods[672].
+
+In substance the principal effect of the War on the English cotton trade
+for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in the manufacturing
+districts but in the Liverpool speculative and importing markets of raw
+cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a shilling a pound in October,
+1861. On November 23 there was a near panic caused by rumours of British
+intervention. These were denounced as false and in five days the price
+was back above its previous figure. Then on November 27 came the news
+of the _Trent_ and the market was thrown into confusion, not because of
+hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war with
+America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators breathed
+freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative British
+interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and could not
+affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, presumably, a more
+serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or even impossible to obtain,
+a serious situation would demand consideration.
+
+In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at first no
+great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with December, 1861,
+there was almost complete stoppage of supply from America. In the six
+months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500 bales were received, less
+than one per cent. of the amount for the same six months of the previous
+year[673]. The blockade was making itself felt and not merely in
+shipments from the South but in prospects of Southern production, for
+the news came that the negroes were being withdrawn by their masters
+from the rich sea islands along the coast in fear of their capture by
+the Northern blockading squadrons[674]. Such a situation seemed bound in
+the end to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental
+action to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained
+by Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as follows:
+
+     "The immediate result of the American war was, at this time,
+     to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in
+     the raw material and the producers and dealers in
+     manufactures, from a serious and impending difficulty. They
+     had in hand a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption
+     of two-thirds of a year, therefore a rise in the price of the
+     raw material and the partial closing of their establishments,
+     with a curtailment of their working expenses, was obviously
+     to their advantage. But to make their success complete, this
+     rise in the price of cotton was upon the largest stock ever
+     collected in the country at this season. To the cotton trade
+     there came in these days an unlooked for accession of wealth,
+     such as even it had never known before. In place of the hard
+     times which had been anticipated, and perhaps deserved, there
+     came a shower of riches[675]."
+
+This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar analysis,
+no doubt on the explanations offered by his English friends, of "the
+question of cotton supply, which we had supposed would speedily have
+disturbed the level of their neutral policy" was made by Mason in March,
+1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that even in Lancashire and other
+manufacturing districts no open demonstration has been made against the
+blockade[676]." Manufactures other than cotton were greatly prospering,
+in particular those of woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the
+cotton lords were not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited
+by it--was bruited even during the war. _Blackwood's Magazine_, October,
+1864, held this view, while the _Morning Post_ of May 16, 1864, went to
+the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, relieved just in
+the nick of time by the War, preventing a financial crash, "which must
+sooner or later have caused great suffering in Lancashire."
+
+Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the _immediate_
+effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton industry from great
+disaster and that there _immediately_ resulted large profits to the
+manufacturers from the increased price of stocks on hand. In fact his
+description of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages
+show, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are
+concerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For
+though prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any
+large quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no
+transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677].
+Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just
+been abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen
+to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English
+producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking an
+effective market. The importance of this in British foreign policy is
+that at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was there
+likely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America.
+Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern ports
+and a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged great
+losses incurred and patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in
+Parliament the members from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with
+the Government policy of neutrality for in the various debates on
+blockade, mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire,
+Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or
+referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to any
+other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the war[679].
+
+But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. Whatever the
+causes of short-time operation in the mills or of total cessation of
+work the situation was such that from October, 1861, more and more
+operatives were thrown out of employment. As their little savings
+disappeared they were put upon public poor relief or upon private
+charity for subsistence. The governmental statistics do not cover,
+accurately, the relief offered by private charity, but those of public
+aid well indicate the loss of wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called
+"Distressed Districts" of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it
+appears that poor relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times,
+out of a total population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November,
+1861, it was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593;
+thereafter mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of
+113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there was a
+slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief resumed an
+upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, when it reached
+its highest point of 284,418. In this same first week of December
+private relief, now thoroughly organized in a great national effort, was
+extended to 236,000 people, making a grand total at high tide of
+distress of over 550,000 persons, if private relief was not extended to
+those receiving public funds. But of this differentiation there is no
+surety--indeed there are evidences of much duplication of effort in
+certain districts. In general, however, these statistics do exhibit the
+great lack of employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying
+unusual prosperity[680].
+
+The manufacturing operative population of the district was estimated at
+between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest distress some
+412,000 of these were receiving either public or private aid, though
+many were working part-time in the mills or were engaged on public
+enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. But there was no starvation
+and it is absurd to compare the crisis to the Irish famine of the
+'forties. This was a _cotton_ famine in the shortage of that commodity,
+but it was not a _human_ famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was
+passing through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by
+the contributions of the country[681]." Nevertheless a rapid change from
+a condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on charity--a
+change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either directly or
+indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might have been expected
+to arouse popular demonstrations to force governmental action directed
+to securing cotton that trade might revive. That no such popular effect
+was made demands careful analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but
+here the _fact_ is alone important, and the fact was that the operatives
+sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the Cabinet. Thus at
+no time during the war was there any attempt from Lancashire, whether of
+manufacturers or operatives, to force a change of governmental
+policy[682].
+
+As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public discussion and
+consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was little talk of
+governmental interference and such as did appear was promptly met with
+opposition by the leading trade journals. July 13, 1861, the _Economist_
+viewed the cotton shortage as "a _temporary_ and an _immediate_ one....
+We have--on our hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our
+supply for _one_ year, and that the very _next_ year." Would it _pay_,
+asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think myself it would be
+cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United States[683]." This was
+also the notion of the London _Shipping Gazette_ which, while
+acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and France were about to
+be greatly embarrassed, continued: "_But we are not going to add to the
+difficulty by involving ourselves in a naval war with the Northern
+States_[684]...." The _Times_ commented in substance in several issues
+in September, 1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time as a
+precaution against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the
+glutted state of distant markets for manufactured goods[685]." October
+12, the _Economist_ acknowledged that the impatience of some mill-owners
+was quite understandable as was talk of a European compulsion on America
+to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, but then entered upon an
+elaborate discussion of the principles involved and demonstrated why
+England ought not to intervene. In November Bright could write: "The
+notion of getting cotton by interfering with the blockade is abandoned
+apparently by the simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted
+now as a fixed policy that we are to take no part in your
+difficulties[686]." Throughout the fall of 1861 the _Economist_ was
+doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging that due to the "glut" of
+manufactured goods short-time must have ensued anyway, pointing out that
+now an advanced price was possible, and arguing that here was a
+situation likely to result in the development of other sources of supply
+with an escape from the former dependence on America. In view of the
+actual conditions of the trade, already recounted, these were appealing
+arguments to the larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on
+short order supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less
+easily convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence
+and hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the
+new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and
+manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for any
+_immediate_ change[687]."
+
+Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the
+_Trent_ reached England: that of January, 1862, just after that
+controversy had been amicably settled. The _Trent_ had both diverted
+attention from cotton and in its immediate result created a general
+determination to preserve neutrality. It is evident that even without
+this threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon the
+Government. With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes were
+aroused that the war would soon end or that at least some cotton
+districts would be captured to the relief of England. Seward held out
+big promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a time
+calmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that
+the inability to secure the country back of the city, together with the
+Southern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into
+the hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the
+Mississippi valley[688]. This was still not a matter of _immediate_
+concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinion
+that it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for the
+distress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload their
+stocks[689]. But in considering and judging the attitude of the British
+public on this question of cotton it should always be remembered that
+the great mass of the people sincerely believed that America was
+responsible for the distress in Lancashire. The error in understanding
+was more important than the truth.
+
+In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causes
+of distress in England is the more important element. The "Cotton Lords"
+did not choose to reveal it. One must believe that they intentionally
+dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause. In the first important
+parliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of any
+other element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word
+advocating a change in British neutral policy[690]. It is to be noted
+also that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers on
+poor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and the
+general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious it
+was not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it. There was
+not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressed
+governmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I
+believe, get thro' the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland works
+and railroads in India[692]." Moreover the Southern orders to destroy
+cotton rather than permit its capture and export by the North
+disagreeably affected British officials[693]. Up to the end of August,
+1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for
+cotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern
+policy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special official
+consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time came
+wholly from France[694].
+
+It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July of
+the Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695]. June had
+seen the collapse of Lindsay's initial move, and Palmerston's answer to
+Hopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offer
+mediation, appeared final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat,
+that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood
+had withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked
+whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the country,
+the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and the
+hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend to
+take any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise,
+to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?" This was
+differently worded, yet contained little variation from his former
+question of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that the
+Government certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of success
+but that at present "both parties would probably reject it. If a
+different situation should arise the Government would be glad to
+act[696]." This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July
+11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of
+offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and
+insisted upon a debate.
+
+Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours of
+British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams was
+keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presented
+to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote "under the
+President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours were highly
+injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South has
+been encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession. Having
+developed this complaint at some length Seward went on to a brief
+threat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreign
+nations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, the
+North would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used,
+namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters. This was
+clearly a threat of a "servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a
+war which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view
+of her anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams'
+discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from
+presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the
+American Minister anxious[697]. No answer was given by Russell for over
+a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. Soon
+the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope of
+British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny in
+conversation had assured him "that this Government is now more anxious
+than ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour." Slidell
+asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged that
+everything depended on Palmerston: "that august body seems to be as
+afraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their
+pedagogue[698]."
+
+Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private instructions
+now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a visit to London.
+The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croit
+pas le moment venu de reconnaître le Sud[699]." Palmerston had already
+answered this question in Parliament and Thouvenel was personally very
+much opposed to the Emperor's suggestion. There were press rumours that
+he was in London to bring the matter to a head, but his report to
+Mercier was that interference in America was a very dangerous matter and
+that he would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he
+had suggested any change in neutral policy[700].
+
+In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of Foreign
+Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern hopes was the
+knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay chose his time well
+for on July 16 the first thorough report on Lancashire was laid before
+Parliament[701], revealing an extremity of distress not previously
+officially authenticated, and during this week the papers were full of
+an impending disaster to McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his
+vacation trip, was concerned for the future mainly because of cotton,
+but did not believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with
+America[702]. But the great Southern argument of the moment was the
+Northern military failure, the ability of the South to resist
+indefinitely and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18
+all London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news
+from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of his
+entire army.
+
+Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams thought
+the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to carry the
+House of Commons off their feet in its debate to-night[703]." The
+debate itself may be regarded as a serious attempt to push the Ministry
+into a position more favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced
+surveyed the entire ground of the causes of secession and the
+inevitability of the final separation of North and South. They need but
+brief summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement
+because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no
+element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that
+England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring to a
+conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune since
+mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, and he
+quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, stating, "We
+think it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they so
+richly deserve."
+
+Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. Gregory
+said: "We should remember what is impending over Lancashire--what want,
+what woe, what humiliation--and that not caused by the decree of God,
+but by the perversity of man. I leave the statistics of the pauperism
+that is, and that is to be, to my honourable friends, the
+representatives of manufacturing England." No statistics were
+forthcoming from this quarter for not a representative from Lancashire
+participated in the debate save Hopwood who at the very end upbraided
+his fellow members from the district for their silence and was
+interrupted by cries of "Divide, Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was
+met by opponents of mediation with the assertion that the operatives
+were well known to be united against any action and that they could be
+sustained "in luxury" from the public purse for far less a cost than
+that of a war with America.
+
+But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. Forster
+in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a consideration of the
+effect of mediation on _England_, advanced the idea that such a step
+would not end the war but would merely intensify it and so prolong
+English commercial distress. He did state, however, that intervention
+(as distinct from mediation) would bring on a "servile war" in America,
+thus giving evidence of his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of
+Seward's despatch of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were
+content to be silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay.
+This was good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by
+evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive
+result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real _attack_ on
+the Government by his bitter criticisms of Russell's "three months"
+speech[704].
+
+At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, their
+immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to adjourn the
+debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed that everyone
+earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he declared that such
+debates were a great mistake unless something definite was to follow
+since they only served to create irritation in America, both North and
+South. He concluded with a vigorous assertion that if the Ministry were
+to administer the affairs of the nation it ought to be trusted in
+foreign affairs and not have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions
+of opinion at inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet
+securely established its independence and hence could not be recognized.
+This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and thus
+be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention in the
+future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government Palmerston
+did not insist upon a division and the motion was withdrawn[705].
+
+On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in ignominious
+failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think we know here
+sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] to be able to
+come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers should do." But
+the impression left by the debate that there was a strong parliamentary
+opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: "I suppose Mercier will
+open full cry on the scent, and be all for mediation. I am still afraid
+of any attempt of the kind[706]." Very much the same opinion was held by
+Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has again passed by for the moment and
+we breathe more freely. But I think I wrote to you some time ago that if
+July found us still in Virginia, we could no longer escape interference.
+I think now that it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North
+on slavery would bring "the greatest strength in this running
+battle[707]."
+
+In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" the
+"pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and Mason
+and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the Cabinet, reacting
+to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the Northern defeats, and the
+distress in Lancashire, was seriously considering the possibility of
+taking some step toward mediation. On July 16, two days before the
+debate in the Commons, Slidell at last had his first personal contact
+with Napoleon, and came away from the interview with the conviction that
+"if England long persists in her inaction he [Napoleon] would be
+disposed to act without her." This was communicated to Mason on July
+20[708], but Slidell did _not_ as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in
+the interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate
+action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special commercial
+treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for Mexican affairs,"
+this last without any authority from Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary
+of State. On July 23 Slidell made a similar offer to Thouvenel and left
+with him a full memorandum of the Southern proposal[709]. He was
+cautioned that it was undesirable his special offer to France should
+reach the ears of the British Government--a caution which he transmitted
+to Mason on July 30, when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but
+still without revealing the full extent of his own overtures
+to Napoleon.
+
+[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL (_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham
+Lincoln": The Century Co. New York_)]
+
+In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to pull off a
+special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, and in line,
+also, with a persistent theory that the policy most likely to secure
+results was that of inducing France to act alone. But he was repeatedly
+running against advice that France must follow Great Britain, and the
+burden of his July 20 letter to Mason was an urging that a demand for
+recognition be now made simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel,
+not at all enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was
+at least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the demand
+should be made at once[710]. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay,
+Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for
+recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the debate of
+July 18[711]. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell referring to their
+interview of February, 1862, in which he had urged the claims of the
+Confederacy to recognition and again presented them, asserting that the
+subsequent failure of Northern campaigns had demonstrated the power of
+the South to maintain its independence. The South, he wrote, asked
+neither aid nor intervention; it merely desired recognition and
+continuation of British neutrality[712]. On the same day Mason also
+asked for an interview[713], but received no reply until July 31, when
+Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until "after a
+Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem necessary[714].
+
+This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in uncertainty. It
+is significant that Russell took this moment to reply at last to
+Seward's protestations of May 28[715], which had been presented to him
+by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at Washington that his delay
+had been due to a "waiting for military events," but that these had
+been indecisive. He gave a résumé of all the sins of the North as a
+belligerent and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins
+had not "induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an
+impartial neutrality[716]." Here was no promise of a continuance of
+neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one member of
+the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote privately:
+
+     "It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and
+     purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been
+     plain enough that the whole question was whether the South
+     was earnest and united. That has now for some months been
+     demonstrated; and the fact thus established at once places
+     the question beyond the region even of the most brilliant
+     military successes[717]...."
+
+Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial situation.
+Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a change of
+policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to Stuart:
+
+     "...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under which I
+     should think the intervention of England in the quarrel
+     between the North and South advisable....
+
+     "But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is
+     apparent from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other
+     ports. And the distress in the manufacturing districts
+     threatens to be so great that a pressure may be put upon the
+     Government which they will find it difficult to resist[718]."
+
+In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the expense of
+the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to the fury of
+Cobden[719]. Of this period Arnold later sarcastically remarked that,
+"The representatives of Lancashire in the Houses of Parliament did not
+permit the gaieties of the Exhibition season wholly to divert their
+attention from the distress which prevailed in the home county[720]."
+
+Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on August 1 a
+long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, using exactly those
+arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate[721]. The answer, evidently
+given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had been waiting,
+was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to Seward on July 28,
+called attention to the wholly contradictory statements of North and
+South on the status of the war, which, in British opinion, had not yet
+reached a stage positively indicative of the permanence of Southern
+independence. Great Britain, therefore, still "waited," but the time
+might come when Southern firmness in resistance would bring
+recognition[722]. The tone was more friendly than any expressions
+hitherto used by Russell to Southern representatives. The reply does not
+reveal the decision actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote
+to Argyll on August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the
+question "to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil
+War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident the
+prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both parties
+are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish; he would have
+England approach France and Russia, but if they were not ready, wait
+until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done before the hot
+weather is over to stop these frightful horrors[723]."
+
+All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the
+Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at present"
+and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. Apparently one
+Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the need to splutter. On
+the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the Lords moved for the
+production of Russell's correspondence with Mason, making a very
+confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were convinced the war ought
+to end in separation. At one time Campbell argued that reconquest of the
+South was impossible; at another that England should interfere to
+prevent such reconquest. Again he urged that the North was in a
+situation where she could not stop the war without aid from Europe in
+extricating her. Probably the motion was made merely to draw from
+Russell an official statement. Production of the papers was refused.
+Russell stated that the Government still maintained its policy of strict
+neutrality, that if any action was to be taken it should be by all the
+maritime powers and that if, in the parliamentary recess, any new policy
+seemed advisable he would first communicate with those powers. He also
+declared very positively that as yet no proposal had been received from
+any foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect
+accord" between Great Britain and France[724].
+
+Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying and
+naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that France
+would promptly make this clear[725]. But France gave no sign of lack of
+"perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel even discouraged Slidell
+from following Mason's example of demanding recognition and the formal
+communication was withheld, Mason acquiescing[726]. Slidell thought new
+disturbances in Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French
+interest in the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration
+of high hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:
+
+     "You will find by my official correspondence that we are
+     still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off
+     but a strong and continued current of important successes in
+     the field.
+
+     I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she
+     desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the
+     North shall be entirely exhausted and broken down.
+
+     Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen
+     except their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting
+     about their disinterested magnaminity and objection of all
+     other considerations than those dictated by a high-toned
+     morality, while their entire policy is marked by egotism and
+     duplicity. I am getting to be heartily tired of Paris[727]."
+
+On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day of the
+session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire by
+authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. Like
+Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that in August
+there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for a change in
+British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell had merely
+declared that the time for action was "not yet" come, but this was
+regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in informed Southern nor
+Northern circles outside the Cabinet was there any suspicion, _except by
+Adams_, that in the six months elapsed since Lindsay had begun his
+movement the Ministry had been slowly progressing in thoughts of
+mediation.
+
+In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had been
+_favourable_ to mediation when "both parties were ready for it" and that
+such readiness would come soon most Members were convinced. This was a
+convenient and reasonable ground for postponing action but did not
+imply that if the conviction were unrealized no mediation would be
+attempted. McClellan, driven out of the Peninsula, had been removed, and
+August saw the Northern army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now
+Washington and not Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the
+North must soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports
+early in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a
+strong peace party.
+
+But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of enormous new
+Northern levies of men and of renewed courage[728]. By mid-August,
+writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any quantity of
+it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the peace
+party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of the
+Administration[729]. As to recognition, Stuart believed: "There is
+nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous fresh levies, but
+to wait and see what the next two months will bring forth[730]." The
+hopes of the British Ministry based on a supposed Northern weariness of
+the war were being shattered. Argyll, having received from Sumner a
+letter describing the enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote
+to Gladstone:
+
+     "It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the prospects
+     of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any
+     approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of
+     mediation[731]...."
+
+To this Gladstone replied:
+
+     "I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to
+     mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty
+     to determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I
+     cannot subscribe to the opinion of those who think that
+     Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness
+     these horrors and absurdities, which will soon have consumed
+     more men, and done ten times more mischief than the Crimean
+     War; but with the difference that there the end was
+     uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole
+     world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled to point
+     out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled by
+     the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any
+     interference or warning from third powers, and as far as
+     principle goes there never was a case in which warning was so
+     proper and becoming, because of the frightful misery which
+     this civil conflict has brought upon other countries, and
+     because of the unanimity with which it is condemned by the
+     civilized world[732]."
+
+The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were known to
+Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British Ministry.
+Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. Lindsay's
+initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect diplomacy and not
+supported by France officially, had received prompt rejection
+accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart from strict
+neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the Northern victorious
+progress in arms and in the face of increasing distress in Lancashire,
+the second answer to Lindsay was less dogmatic. As given by Palmerston
+the Government desired to offer mediation, but saw no present hope of
+doing so successfully. Finally the Government asked for a free hand,
+making no pledges. Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when
+August dawned plans were already on foot for a decided change. The
+secret was well kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on
+events, two days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence
+with Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was
+writing to Palmerston:
+
+     "Mercier's notion that we should make some move in October
+     agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England
+     before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of
+     course the war may flag before that.
+
+     "I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice
+     should be the first step; but we must be prepared to answer
+     the question on what basis are we to negotiate[733]?"
+
+The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to come, not
+from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the South, but from
+the British Ministry itself.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 654: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 204.]
+
+[Footnote 655: _De Bow's Review_, Dec., 1857, p. 592.]
+
+[Footnote 656: Cited in Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_,
+p. 66.]
+
+[Footnote 657: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
+
+[Footnote 658: Cited in Smith, _Parties and Slavery_, 68. A remarkable
+exposition of the "power of cotton" and the righteousness of slavery was
+published in Augusta, Georgia, in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine
+hundred pages, entitled _Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments_.
+This reproduced seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers
+analysing Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and
+political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology,
+international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united publication
+was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of slavery, the
+prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the power of the United
+States as dependent on its control of the cotton supply. The editor was
+E.N. Elliot, President of Planters' College, Mississippi.]
+
+[Footnote 659: Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p.
+237.]
+
+[Footnote 660: _Am. Hist. Rev._, XVIII, p. 785. Bunch to Russell. No.
+51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here printed this letter shows two
+dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the original in the Public Record Office
+is dated Dec. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 661: pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of Florida.]
+
+[Footnote 662: Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, learned from
+Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to Yancey. Had he been
+instructed to negotiate commercial treaties with European powers? Mr.
+Yancey had received no intimation from any source that authority to
+negotiate commercial treaties would devolve upon the Commission. 'What
+then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be your instructions?' The President, Mr.
+Yancey said, seemed to be impressed with the importance of the cotton
+crop. A considerable part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a
+full crop will soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton,
+so far as he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy
+expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, _Life and Times of Yancey_, 599).]
+
+[Footnote 663: F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to Russell, June 5,
+1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the South in industries
+other than its staple products is well illustrated by a request from
+Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the Confederacy, to Mason, urging him
+to secure _three_ ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote,
+"The reduction of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason
+Papers. Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 664: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. Bunch to
+Russell, March 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 665: p. 130]
+
+[Footnote 666: The two principal British works are: Arnold, _The History
+of the Cotton Famine_, London, 1864; and Watts, _The Facts of the Cotton
+Famine_, Manchester, 1866. A remarkable statistical analysis of the
+world cotton trade was printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner
+seeking to use his study as an argument for British mediation. George
+McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_.]
+
+[Footnote 667: Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, pp. 263-4.]
+
+[Footnote 668: Lack of authentic statistics on indirect interests make
+this a guess by the _Times_. Other estimates run from one-seventh to
+one-fourth.]
+
+[Footnote 669: Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the Civil War," p. 408
+(in _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_, Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent.
+(Hereafter cited as Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton_.) Scherer, _Cotton as a
+World Power_, p. 264, states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, _Cotton
+Famine_, pp. 36-39, estimates 83 per cent.]
+
+[Footnote 670: Great Britain ordinarily ran more than twice as many
+spindles as all the other European nations combined. Schmidt, _Wheat and
+Cotton_, p. 407, _note_.]
+
+[Footnote 671: This Return for April is noteworthy as the first
+differentiating commerce with the North and the South.]
+
+[Footnote 672: These facts are drawn from Board of Trade Reports, and
+from the files of the _Economist_, London, and _Hunt's Merchants
+Magazine_, New York. I am also indebted to a manuscript thesis by T.P.
+Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War Blockade on the Cotton Trade of
+the United Kingdom," Stanford University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented
+at Harvard University a thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The
+Influence of Trade (in Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations,
+1829-1846," but has not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil
+War period.]
+
+[Footnote 673: Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 89.]
+
+[Footnote 674: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to Russell, Jan. 8,
+1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were being transformed to
+corn production and that even the cotton on hand was deteriorating
+because of the lack of bagging, shut off by the blockade.]
+
+[Footnote 675: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 81.]
+
+[Footnote 676: Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 677: Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. _Monthly Accounts
+of Trade and Navigation_ (in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_.
+Vol. LV, and 1863, _Commons_, Vol. LXV).]
+
+[Footnote 678: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, pp. 174 and 215.]
+
+[Footnote 679: In 1861 there were 26 Members from Lancashire in the
+Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. The suffrage was such
+that only 1 in every 27 of the population had the vote. For all England
+the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, 359). _Parliamentary Papers_,
+1867-8, _Lords_, Vol. XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and
+Counties of England."]
+
+[Footnote 680: The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's "Reports on
+Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862. _Parliamentary Papers,
+Commons_, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. _Ibid._, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from
+"Summary of the Number of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from
+November, 1861, to December, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. LII. Farnall's
+reports are less exact than the _Summary_ since at times Liverpool is
+included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do not
+appear in his reports until 1864. The _Summary_ consistently includes
+Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that city whenever weather
+conditions interfered with the ordinary business of the port. It is a
+striking illustration of the narrow margin of living wages among the
+dockers of Liverpool that an annotation at the foot of a column of
+statistics should explain an increase in one week of 21,000 persons
+thrown on poor relief to the "prevalence of a strong east wind" which
+prevented vessels from getting up to the docks.]
+
+[Footnote 681: Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 309. To Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 682: The historians who see only economic causes have
+misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton famine." Recently,
+also, there has been advanced an argument that "wheat defeated
+cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England itself during the war by
+pro-Northern friends who pointed to the great flow of wheat from the
+North as essential in a short-crop situation in Great Britain. Mr.
+Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American
+Relations during the Civil War," a paper read before the American
+Historical Association, Dec. 1917, and since published in the _Iowa
+Journal of History and Politics_, July, 1918, presents with much care
+all the important statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions
+seem to me wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence
+on Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping
+the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious
+statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did not
+escape the attention of the English government," since leading journals
+referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: "But it was
+Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the decisive factor,
+counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in keeping the British
+government from recognizing the Confederacy" (p. 437). "That the wheat
+situation must have exerted a profound influence on the government ..."
+(p. 438). And finally: "In this contest wheat won, demonstrating its
+importance as a world power of greater significance than cotton" (p.
+439). This interesting thesis has been accepted by William Trimble in
+"Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the United States,
+1862-1902" (_Am. Hist. Assoc. Reports_, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think
+Mr. Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition
+of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in
+midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of that
+year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a parity,
+since the former could not be obtained in quantity from _any_ source
+before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the United States, could
+have been obtained from interior Russia, as well as from the maritime
+provinces, in increased supply if Britain had been willing to pay the
+added price of inland transport. There was a real "famine" of cotton;
+there would have been none of wheat, merely a higher cost. (This fact, a
+vital one in determining influence, was brought out by George McHenry in
+the columns of _The Index_, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of
+all Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a
+subject of governmental concern in _memoranda_ and in private notes
+between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one single case of
+the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in negation of Mr.
+Schmidt's thesis.]
+
+[Footnote 683: Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited in _Hunt's
+Merchants Magazine_, Vol. 45, pp. 326-7.]
+
+[Footnote 684: _Ibid._, p. 442.]
+
+[Footnote 685: e.g., The _Times_, Sept. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 686: To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_,
+XLVI, p. 97.]
+
+[Footnote 687: _Ibid._, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. 157.]
+
+[Footnote 688: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to Russell, June 25,
+1862. He reported a general burning of cotton estimating the amount so
+destroyed as nearly one million bales.]
+
+[Footnote 689: Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression that England
+was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton disaster to the War.
+Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was the general public belief
+but not that of the well informed. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it
+was not until January, 1863, that it was "begun to be understood" that
+famine was not wholly caused by the War, but partly by glut.]
+
+[Footnote 690: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. Debate on "The
+Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The principal speakers were
+Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. Another debate on "The Cotton
+Supply" took place June 19, 1862, with no criticism of America. _Ibid._,
+CLXVII, pp. 754-93.]
+
+[Footnote 691: See _ante_, p. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 692: Gladstone Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 693: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to Russell, May 12,
+1862. A description of these orders as inclusive of "foreign owned"
+cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had been purchased and
+stored, waiting export, by British citizens. Molyneaux at Savannah made
+a similar report. _Ibid._, Vol. 849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 694: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 214-18.]
+
+[Footnote 695: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 228, quotes a song in the
+"improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where operatives were being given a
+leisure-time education. One verse was:
+
+     "Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are
+     the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by
+     English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war
+     is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for
+     more."
+]
+
+[Footnote 696: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 1213.]
+
+[Footnote 697: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
+Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 1.
+Reed. June 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 698: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 699: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 352. The exact
+length of Thouvenel's stay in London is uncertain, but he had arrived by
+July 10 and was back in Paris by July 21. The text of the telegram is in
+a letter to Flahault of July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very
+averse to any move which may lead to war with America, "an adventure
+more serious than that of Mexico" (_Ibid._, p. 353).]
+
+[Footnote 700: _Ibid._, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See also résumé in
+Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, II, 55.]
+
+[Footnote 701: Farnall's First Report. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
+_Commons_, Vol. XLIX.]
+
+[Footnote 702: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, 1862.
+
+     "Public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for
+     the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not
+     be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from
+     the U.S. ..."
+
+     "However, the real question of the day is cotton...."
+
+     "The problem is of how to get over _this next_ winter. The
+     prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy."
+
+     "...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton
+     for England before the winter, you will have done a greater
+     service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century;
+     but nobody expects it."
+]
+
+[Footnote 703: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 166. To his son, July 18,
+1862. He noted that the news had come by the _Glasgow_ which had sailed
+for England on July 5, whereas the papers contained also a telegram from
+McClellan's head-quarters, dated July 7, but "the people here are fully
+ready to credit anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings
+were "Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a
+steamer." _Ibid._, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July 19.]
+
+[Footnote 704: Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract from the _Dubuque
+Sun_, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a repudiation of all debts to
+England, and solemnly held this up as evidence of the lack of financial
+morality in America. If he knew of this the editor of the small-town
+American paper must have been tickled at the reverberations of
+his humour.]
+
+[Footnote 705: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, for the entire
+debate.]
+
+[Footnote 706: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 707: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 168-9. To Charles
+Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 708: Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's letter to
+Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of
+Napoleon III," _Am. Hist. Rev._, Jan., 1921, p. 263. C.F. Adams, "A
+Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, p.
+379, is in error in dating this letter April 21, an error for which the
+present writer is responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult
+hand-writing.]
+
+[Footnote 709: Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to Benjamin, July
+25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned the details of
+Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of July 20, wrote:
+"There is an important part of our conversation that I will give you
+through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London to
+enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go to
+London, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he could
+guess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sent
+to him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything on
+Mexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to
+France. In C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is
+stated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of
+Mercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result
+of Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's
+instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, while
+it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it will
+no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informed
+Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as in
+Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons at
+their face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothing
+in French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour,
+while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it.]
+
+[Footnote 710: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 711: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19.]
+
+[Footnote 712: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
+No. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 713: _Ibid._, No. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 714: _Ibid._, No. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 715: See _ante_, p. 18.]
+
+[Footnote 716: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
+Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 2.
+Russell to Stuart, July 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 717: Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 718: Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 719: Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, II, p. 276. July
+31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 720: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 175.]
+
+[Footnote 721: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
+No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 722: _Ibid._, No. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 723: Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, p.
+191.]
+
+[Footnote 724: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 725: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 726: F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley to Russell, Aug.
+8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, 1862. Mason to
+Slidell, Aug. 21.]
+
+[Footnote 727: Richardson, II, p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 728: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 729: _Ibid._, To Russell, Aug. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 730: _Ibid._, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing to be done" refers,
+not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July that the time was ripe
+for recognition. He was wholly at variance with Lyons on
+British policy.]
+
+[Footnote 731: Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 732: _Ibid._, Aug. 29, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 733: Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN
+
+The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental
+inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the
+British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that
+direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna,
+was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private
+correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have
+made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning
+McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign
+he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his
+[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last
+long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _The
+Index_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and
+necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared
+rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of
+England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close
+sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to,
+in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end
+the chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognition
+seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation
+because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public
+manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].
+
+The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are,
+however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were
+based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan
+now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering
+it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is
+here proposed to review them in the light of all available important
+materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more
+citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell
+the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of
+British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great
+Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the
+American conflict[739].
+
+Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18,
+and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the
+North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he
+wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough
+could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will
+only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts.
+The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this
+very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure
+governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the
+South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but
+ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British
+neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's
+fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward.
+On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining
+the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy
+should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to
+Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat
+discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the
+possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of
+such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does
+not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given
+serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a
+very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very
+specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if
+approached by the British Government with propositions implying
+a purpose:
+
+     "To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit
+     or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to
+     debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or
+     transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked
+     an opinion what reception the President would give to such a
+     proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not
+     instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it
+     would be entertained."
+
+This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction
+with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams
+was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote
+Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with
+the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you
+will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]."
+
+This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any
+intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully
+committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the
+need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now
+knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he
+held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He
+did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the
+Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that
+the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the
+presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not
+have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made
+owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation
+and that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was as
+yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.
+
+Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their
+determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from
+Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier,
+that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even
+though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong
+personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially
+any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as
+well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with
+Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of
+straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This,
+thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an
+attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full
+month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an
+emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of
+Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at
+best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to
+influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with
+Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we
+must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before
+we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But
+this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October
+would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in
+attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great
+plan[751].
+
+Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date
+he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel,
+_privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston
+commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall
+Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In
+October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions
+were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same
+reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:
+
+     "The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
+     Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
+     Confederates."
+
+     "If this should happen, would it not be time for us to
+     consider whether in such a state of things England and France
+     might not address the contending parties and recommend an
+     arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"
+
+Russell replied:
+
+     "... I agree with you that the time is come for offering
+     mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the
+     recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree
+     further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to
+     recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For
+     the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must
+     have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit
+     me for the meeting[755]."
+
+The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the
+unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This,
+considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by
+Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a
+long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation
+as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to
+wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier
+apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the
+Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party
+gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far
+committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set
+aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France
+might expect if they recognized the South.
+
+     "I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation,
+     and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and
+     let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
+     recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
+     recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."
+
+     Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.
+
+     "...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
+     Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
+     mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."
+
+     "It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
+     the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."
+
+Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell
+had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than
+formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for
+Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American
+policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded
+conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will,
+if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still
+more important. It was already known through the French press that a
+sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all
+signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude
+Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to
+discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to
+go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently
+in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.
+
+     "I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough
+     for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
+     Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the
+     interval between this time and the middle of next month.
+     These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the
+     first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
+     recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of
+     separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of
+     neutrality[757]."
+
+The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to
+Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be
+sent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone.
+Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen.
+"She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said
+that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed
+was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just
+returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of
+the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe
+would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759].
+Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the
+plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to
+include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might
+probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait
+for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go
+slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:
+
+     "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the
+     north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great
+     effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a
+     great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and
+     the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other
+     hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and
+     see what may follow[760]...."
+
+Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in
+Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not
+been sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26
+indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on
+September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for
+his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for
+an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out
+in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and
+now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being
+"particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word
+_separation_," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With
+full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to
+Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement
+that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers,
+but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the
+Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact
+nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly
+worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by
+Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is
+outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade,
+and negotiation on the basis of separation[765].
+
+Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed
+overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be
+opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen
+at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell
+opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in
+this wise:
+
+     "...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition
+     of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid
+     drifting into it."
+
+     "...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to
+     depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you
+     and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong
+     antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South,
+     and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such
+     general approval from Parliament, the press, and the
+     public[766]."
+
+But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later
+he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:
+
+     "I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it
+     decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to
+     do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it;
+     and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It
+     appears to me a great mistake[767]."
+
+Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived
+confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a
+check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the
+battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland
+campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old
+defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for
+McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for
+an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and
+was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European
+overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:
+
+     "MY DEAR RUSSELL,
+
+     "I return you Granville's letter which contains much
+     deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that
+     the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be
+     accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It
+     would give the South in principle the points for which they
+     are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come
+     from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the
+     principle for which they have been fighting so long as they
+     had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they
+     could carry their point. The condition of things therefore
+     which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be
+     great success of the South against the North. That state of
+     things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has
+     been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course
+     of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about
+     to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer
+     light upon future prospects.
+
+     "As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
+     following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the
+     South, it is quite true that we should have less to care
+     about that resentment in the spring when communication with
+     Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily
+     operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are
+     cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.
+
+     "But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time
+     by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would
+     probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like
+     one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would
+     render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the
+     acknowledgment of which would have caused it.
+
+     "The first communication to be made by England and France to
+     the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of
+     mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not
+     come when it might be well for the two parties to consider
+     whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any
+     other result than separation; and whether it might not
+     therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must
+     necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at
+     once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of
+     separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of
+     the contest, however long it may last.
+
+     "The best thing would be that the two parties should settle
+     details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps
+     with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this
+     might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would
+     do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An
+     armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades,
+     would be all in favour of the North, especially if New
+     Orleans remained in the hands of the North.
+
+     "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be
+     cleared up by some more decided events between the contending
+     armies...."
+
+     PALMERSTON[768]."
+
+Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour
+of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's
+arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much
+more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall
+Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted
+to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also,
+momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:
+
+     "This American question must be well sifted. I send you a
+     letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."
+
+     "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia
+     holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the
+     rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the
+     16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day,
+     but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish
+     to stop it, write to Hammond[769]."
+
+From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that
+Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed
+private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was
+waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so
+his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French
+Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any
+other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal
+retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several
+Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into
+retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The
+Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the
+last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as
+soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a
+serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was
+more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of
+previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].
+
+Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while
+wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that
+England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or
+private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for
+granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by
+the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of
+Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for
+Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to
+return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:
+
+     "I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
+     very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
+     proposing to North and South to come to terms.
+
+     "Two things however must be made clear:
+
+     (i) That we propose separation,
+
+     (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
+     ourselves[775]."
+
+How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made
+clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a
+memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines
+of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became
+evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart,
+written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a
+suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell
+now thought:
+
+     "If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be
+     adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
+     North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
+     course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition
+     if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over
+     on the 25th[777]."
+
+British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign
+Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and
+vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side,
+if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be
+considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content
+with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already
+troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was
+Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was
+devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis
+had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still
+greater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at
+first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the
+intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line
+earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground.
+His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was
+certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental
+action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early
+recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure
+is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth
+is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in
+complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from
+Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any
+hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention
+in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make
+the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did
+not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not
+yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the
+traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without
+authorization and "off his own bat."
+
+The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy,
+immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general
+belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw
+cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them
+to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be
+no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other
+hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone was
+merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and
+Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your
+old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first
+accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and
+generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was
+still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made
+clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be
+supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his
+unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much
+disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was
+reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the
+plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six
+days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a
+memorandum on America[782].
+
+This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its
+power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion
+of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be
+wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing
+of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was
+no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the
+loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile
+war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the
+Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty
+to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly
+the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and
+recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an
+armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about
+and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly
+negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is
+to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and
+now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in
+a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet
+decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on
+October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that
+it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying
+Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office
+memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously
+maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan
+of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his
+speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.
+
+Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he
+treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the
+Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground
+of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his
+arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet
+acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was
+his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must
+acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be
+undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when
+it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of
+international law that the independence of the Southern States had been
+established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet
+decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet
+traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but
+excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had
+forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose
+and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile
+Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in
+uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult,
+indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was
+done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby
+was averse to action.
+
+     "He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_
+     recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
+     ground that recognition would merely irritate the North
+     without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a
+     single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present
+     temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the
+     mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair
+     basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having
+     that which the other declared was vitally essential to its
+     existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out
+     the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of
+     the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant
+     to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of
+     hostility towards the North[789]."
+
+More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess,
+fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was
+Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his
+male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet
+crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after
+Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis
+circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He
+agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in
+America, but added with sarcasm:
+
+     "A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the
+     historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
+     should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between
+     the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any
+     proposal of the English Government will be made, not by
+     dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent
+     partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal
+     indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it
+     would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it
+     is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be
+     addressed."
+
+Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was
+intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument
+against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of
+bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the
+belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the
+only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for
+the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary
+and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict
+neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as
+yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable
+consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we
+may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the
+chances of good, and whether it is not--
+
+     'Better to endure the ills we have
+     Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"
+
+At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on
+the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received
+at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British
+special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States.
+Anderson's reports emphasized three points:
+
+(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of
+ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;
+
+(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing
+cotton for a long time to come;
+
+(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of
+vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met
+with enthusiasm[792].
+
+This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for
+Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on
+Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still
+argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm
+and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition
+"would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now
+heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged
+to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the
+ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was
+the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with
+an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons
+gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the
+extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without
+Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for
+the immediate present, writing to Russell:
+
+     "Your description of the state of things between the two
+     parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much
+     inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no
+     step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition
+     with any advantage."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position
+     would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree
+     to an armistice but whether they might not turn their
+     thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the
+     answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The
+     Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement
+     would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say
+     their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North
+     of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and
+     should only have pledged each party more strongly to the
+     object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined
+     to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the
+     Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am
+     very much come back to our original view of the matter, that
+     we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall
+     have taken a more decided turn[796]."
+
+By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet
+to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a
+few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell
+still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the
+majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was
+possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that
+Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding
+and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon
+of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the
+speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and
+was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change
+its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared
+to Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain and
+has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams'
+confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently
+unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead
+to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require
+any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side
+Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an
+outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe
+and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as
+insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the
+preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his
+approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of
+"no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted
+it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the
+belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the
+winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]."
+
+This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently
+had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of
+Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the
+twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put
+it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the
+present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...."
+
+     "G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never
+     thought of making. He says I propose that England and France
+     and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to
+     suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.
+
+     "I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and
+     England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would
+     not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any
+     specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G.
+     Lewis' invention.
+
+     "I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is
+     much pleased[802]."
+
+Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by
+England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five
+powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired
+a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the
+informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in
+answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly
+interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in
+contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The
+advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted,
+was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved this
+advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer to
+Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite
+plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by
+letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave
+notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also
+circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England,
+France and Russia[804].
+
+Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his
+Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely
+putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member
+of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on
+October 24 wrote to Lewis:
+
+     "Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American
+     question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny
+     [Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is
+     prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in
+     his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for
+     yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to
+     your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position
+     we should occupy, either in having presented our face
+     gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in
+     being asked what practical solution we had to propose after
+     an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no
+     discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the
+     Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to
+     draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]."
+
+On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's
+newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:
+
+     "The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable
+     soreness, for which you are specially bound to make
+     allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He
+     had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out
+     of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was
+     not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is
+     therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a
+     deal more training before he can appear in public again."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as
+     effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by
+     Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the
+     Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did
+     so without in the smallest degree committing either the
+     Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]."
+
+In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's
+complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but
+there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which,
+if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question.
+This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect
+overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an
+opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon
+as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was
+written the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's
+silence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the
+succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion
+of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition"
+was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should
+not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show
+pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to
+the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and
+his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.
+
+On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which
+American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and
+Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had
+no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a
+proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the
+present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported
+that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an
+end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not
+be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to
+America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and
+France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was
+exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if
+officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed
+consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been
+going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push.
+October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the
+Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an
+armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had
+now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's
+orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in
+England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three
+powers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspension
+of the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to European
+commerce[812].
+
+Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not
+regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:
+
+     "As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States,
+     we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets,
+     which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as
+     would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is
+     it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to
+     be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would
+     give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they
+     may want?"
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of
+     runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal
+     which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England
+     would approve of. The French Government are more free from
+     the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these
+     matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would
+     be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over
+     before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to
+     put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning
+     by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from
+     that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]."
+
+But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of
+proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:
+
+     "My notion is that as there is little chance of our good
+     offices being accepted in America we should make them such as
+     would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to
+     answer the French proposal therefore by saying,
+
+     "That in offering our good offices we ought to require both
+     parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any
+     terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the
+     Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there
+     are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.
+
+     "We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it
+     would be essential in our view, that after what has taken
+     place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation
+     being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain
+     emancipated her slaves in 1833.
+
+     "If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
+     slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.
+
+     "This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the
+     Cabinet.
+
+     "It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
+     probably the South will refuse it[814]."
+
+Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and
+South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them
+certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to
+present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the
+previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom
+of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of
+the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of
+Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston,
+again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another
+memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words.
+This was in the main an historical résumé of past British policy in
+relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such
+cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a
+revolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on.
+Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by
+legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own
+interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn
+the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had
+previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a
+concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the
+five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to
+set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to
+satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first
+to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on
+the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might
+find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?
+
+Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its
+appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international
+law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there
+appeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus," on "The
+International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form
+exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and
+advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality.
+"Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter
+who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all
+trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature
+action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the
+"Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."
+
+Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis
+was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer
+was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days
+the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis
+described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that
+Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the
+effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French
+proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not
+cause irritation[819]."
+
+     "Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain
+     his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the
+     recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable
+     opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen
+     their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France,
+     Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with
+     France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of
+     separating France and England. He therefore advised that the
+     proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed
+     Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal.
+     His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy
+     with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of
+     mitigating it [_sic_].
+
+     "The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who
+     proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a
+     stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who
+     supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who
+     expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the
+     proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a
+     suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly
+     unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was
+     no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time,
+     Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was
+     against being a party to the representation, and he
+     capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it
+     certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the
+     Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had
+     been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular
+     sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation,
+     and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came
+     rather late ... I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_
+     at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of
+     the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He
+     admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from
+     Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of
+     displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive
+     was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article
+     in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I
+     take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of
+     the Cabinet[820]."
+
+Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief
+account:
+
+     "Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again
+     to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the
+     business of America. But I will send you definite
+     intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right._
+     Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well.
+     Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without
+     resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we
+     decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in
+     terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov.
+     13. I think the French will make our answer about America
+     public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not
+     take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may
+     themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur
+     with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to
+     Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."
+
+The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France
+and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views
+and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be
+taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but
+remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia
+wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to
+hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any
+overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its
+being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of
+Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though
+earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to
+the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St.
+Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer
+to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason
+for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision
+within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded
+England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion,
+adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result
+reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view
+than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at
+the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to
+the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it
+smoother[824]."
+
+Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet
+decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country
+against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important
+journals are taken into account but not true of all. The _Times_ of
+November 13 declared:
+
+     "We are convinced that the present is not the moment for
+     these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that
+     by means of their own internal action the Americans may
+     themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe
+     could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it
+     would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our
+     self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with
+     Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on
+     turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with
+     the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our
+     back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in
+     defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are
+     as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty
+     or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as
+     this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia
+     belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor
+     of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits
+     in this American mediation league."
+
+This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English
+statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in
+such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On
+the other hand the _Herald_, always intense in its pro-Southern
+utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself
+unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively
+informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to
+them," the _Herald_ declared, "we must hope against hope that they are
+innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire
+(depicted in lurid colours):
+
+     "A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon
+     them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and
+     delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the
+     task before them and the power to perform it in their
+     hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven
+     cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country,
+     dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might
+     do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the
+     infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"
+
+In the non-political _Army and Navy Gazette_ the returned editor, W.H.
+Russell, but lately the _Times_ correspondent in America, jeered at the
+American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of
+England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York
+Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and
+threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must
+expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be
+ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. _Blackwood's_ for
+November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act.
+The _Edinburgh_ for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry
+and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of
+the war. _The Index_ naturally frothed in angry disappointment,
+continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial
+decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or
+the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might
+contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his
+country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the _Richmond_ (Virginia)
+_Whig_ was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as
+"two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in
+America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and
+expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North
+and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation,
+said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous
+fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the
+bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year
+following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a
+statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was
+primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of
+Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never
+shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of
+these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than
+useless[832]."
+
+_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet
+Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed,
+wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the
+only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the
+Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been
+led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so
+much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's
+attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at
+last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer
+to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on
+American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was
+of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a
+plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment,
+save to his correspondent.
+
+In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the
+public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new
+policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when
+the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.
+Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"
+were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it
+would only do harm until there was a change of Government in
+Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation
+useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and
+that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the
+blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].
+Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of
+conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in
+comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern
+arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a
+single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].
+In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and
+England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British
+feeling[839].
+
+The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of
+European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It
+expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to
+animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally
+responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no
+cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific
+instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to
+present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward
+believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He
+wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession
+intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget
+them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by
+Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to
+the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that
+answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that
+Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].
+
+So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed
+to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for
+immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons,
+that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his
+return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening
+the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on
+by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and
+directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the
+tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his
+resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused
+both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control
+which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy
+"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much
+more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man
+more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years
+ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell
+wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a
+remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward
+had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in
+the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"
+being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief
+in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.
+
+Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a
+polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of
+armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The
+projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed
+destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the
+British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South
+was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some
+time come when European recognition would have to be given the
+Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of
+the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the
+attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their
+sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in
+evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the
+expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations
+_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result
+in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised
+good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though
+personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in
+the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which
+determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw
+his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover
+both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as
+the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were
+brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true
+policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].
+
+For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous
+crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been
+adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that
+Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued
+between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other
+respects the independence of the South would have been established.
+Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of
+life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed
+that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to
+servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that
+proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against
+any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there
+serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil
+War[845].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March
+16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a
+purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the
+Confederacy.]
+
+[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report
+of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his
+speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to
+England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not
+come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends.
+(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they
+are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't
+say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I
+am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]
+
+[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much
+length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.
+Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his
+_Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp.
+400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis
+in Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp.
+372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion
+of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]
+
+[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.]
+
+[Footnote 741: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp.
+165-168.]
+
+[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. First
+printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]
+
+[Footnote 743: _Ibid._, p. 390.]
+
+[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32.]
+
+[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862.
+Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the
+newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on
+consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only
+make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next
+spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21,
+1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer
+of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open
+the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before
+leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on
+mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager
+for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the
+other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to
+yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right
+(_Ibid._, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).]
+
+[Footnote 748: _Ibid._, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.]
+
+[Footnote 749: _Ibid._, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22,
+Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely
+political."]
+
+[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a
+letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an
+accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the
+war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).]
+
+[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes
+the date of Russell's letter.]
+
+[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360.]
+
+[Footnote 755: _Ibid._, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This
+is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to
+mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.]
+
+[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.]
+
+[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the
+exact text paraphrased by Morley.]
+
+[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire
+letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes
+much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the
+Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that
+she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to
+Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have
+counted for little.]
+
+[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is
+printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.]
+
+[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized,
+(1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering
+good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much
+importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of
+success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in
+which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed
+likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just
+ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the
+action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay
+it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political
+necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian
+Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.)
+Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter
+from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow
+expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to
+introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the
+differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This
+seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to
+Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of
+extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct.
+3, 1862 (O.S.).)]
+
+[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, pp. 438-9.]
+
+[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 773: _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 774: Even the _Edinburgh Review_ for October, 1862, discussed
+recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against
+such action.]
+
+[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for
+the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to
+postpone. This study reverses the roles.]
+
+[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see _ante_ p. 41. Stuart to Lyons.
+The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.]
+
+[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862.
+Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.]
+
+[Footnote 778: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 79. Morley calls this
+utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who
+himself later so characterized it.]
+
+[Footnote 779: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 402.]
+
+[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a
+Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation
+proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a
+wise measure.]
+
+[Footnote 781: The _Times_, October 9 and 10, while surprised that
+Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as
+equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the _Times_ makes no
+further comment of moment until November 13. The _Morning Post_
+(regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October
+9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much
+laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but _with no mention whatever_ of
+his utterances on America.]
+
+[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that
+he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom
+he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words
+(Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must
+allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all
+speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a
+nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the
+Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very
+topic" _(Ibid.)_]
+
+[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts
+of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September
+22, and an extract from the _National Intelligencer_ of September 26,
+giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.]
+
+[Footnote 784: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 80, narrates the "tradition."
+Walpole, _Twenty-five Years_, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also
+_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an
+anonymous writer in the _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact
+details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in
+Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams,
+_Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, Ch. III, repeats the tradition,
+but in _A Crisis in Downing Street_ he completely refutes his earlier
+opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter,
+especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted
+solely on his own initiative.]
+
+[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the _Edinburgh_, for April, 1861, Lewis
+had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never
+to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer
+the South.]
+
+[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 407.]
+
+[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized
+Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice.
+Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to
+Lewis' speech. Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon,
+Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think
+this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of
+the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. _Ibid._, p. 267.]
+
+[Footnote 788: _The Index_, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of
+Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy,
+asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly
+interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter
+enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord
+Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to _The Index_, was the evil
+genius of the Government.]
+
+[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 790: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 279.]
+
+[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 792: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. I XII.
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862.
+Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British
+subjects into the Northern Army.]
+
+[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's
+organ, the _Morning Post_, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with
+a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also
+reflected upon, but less severely.]
+
+[Footnote 797: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]
+
+[Footnote 798: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223.
+Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in _A Crisis in Downing
+Street_, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was
+"to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive
+assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.]
+
+[Footnote 799: _The Index_, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are
+starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry
+have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands,
+talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and
+wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."]
+
+[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 801: _Ibid._, To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."]
+
+[Footnote 804: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84. Morley was the first to make
+clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto
+accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a
+résumé of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October
+23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally
+agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also
+"complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends
+in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important
+interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this
+was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's _France and the Confederate Navy_,
+p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation
+proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes'
+supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to
+Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is
+evidently erroneous.]
+
+[Footnote 805: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]
+
+[Footnote 806: _Ibid._, p. 266.]
+
+[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.
+Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.]
+
+[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 810: F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28,
+1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de
+Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France
+approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed
+that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America,
+she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and
+was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary
+effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation
+Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral
+support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No.
+320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and
+was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to
+limit his efforts to approval of any _agreement_ by the North and South
+to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as
+Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North
+and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some
+friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending
+parties themselves to begin direct negotiations (_Ibid._, F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)]
+
+[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's
+full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.]
+
+[Footnote 812: F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither
+party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell
+Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley, _Gladstone_, II,
+84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation."
+There was no renewal for this was the _first_ proposal, and it was not
+one of mediation though that was an implied result.]
+
+[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was
+the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.]
+
+[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the
+additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.]
+
+[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case
+of the _Trent_, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they
+were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: _Letters by
+Historicus on some questions of International Law_, London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 817: The _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 818: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch
+respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov.
+13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see _ante_,
+p. 59, _note_ 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that
+the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to
+join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article
+on his overtures that had appeared in the _Journal de Petersbourg_, and
+thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian
+Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)]
+
+[Footnote 820: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is
+dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to
+be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11
+and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined
+on the latter date. The article in the _Times_, referred to by Lewis,
+appeared on Nov. 13.]
+
+[Footnote 821: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85.]
+
+[Footnote 822: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley,
+Nov. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 823: F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The
+same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the
+French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia
+would take no chances of offending the North. _Ibid._, No. 408.]
+
+[Footnote 824: Morley, _Gladstone_, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862.
+Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry
+due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it
+was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because
+of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of
+a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that
+_ten_ Southerners had been executed because of _one_ Northerner seized
+by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a
+series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W."
+(Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if
+Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote,
+"I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This
+is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be
+pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French
+proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of
+the South.]
+
+[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 826: The _Times_, Nov. 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 827: The _Herald_, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by
+Hotze of _The Index_, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying
+to earn his salary.]
+
+[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's
+editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that
+the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he
+was _constantly_ pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in _A
+Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 14l.]
+
+[Footnote 829: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.]
+
+[Footnote 830: _Ibid._, Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.]
+
+[Footnote 831: _Ibid._, Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.]
+
+[Footnote 832: _Ibid._, May 28, 1863, p. 72.]
+
+[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This
+despatch is not in Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+and illustrates the gaps in that publication.]
+
+[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a
+banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it.
+_The Ottawa Sun_, Nov. 16, 1904.]
+
+[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington,
+Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and
+France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the
+South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office:
+"What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports
+were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought
+England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge
+that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be
+merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This
+would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her
+special relationship with the United States. He was against any _joint_
+European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862,
+No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve
+son opinion trčs sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the
+latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell
+had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's
+refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised
+(_Ibid._, to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).]
+
+[Footnote 838: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1832, _Commons_, Vol. LXXII,
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had
+been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt
+that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38.
+Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 839: F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons,
+Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to
+Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and
+jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the
+North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to
+Southern dislike."]
+
+[Footnote 840: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow
+was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern
+confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts
+with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the
+Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and
+judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so
+that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. _Ibid._,
+p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He
+wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the
+American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec.
+12, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell
+expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement
+that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United
+States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed
+her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and
+understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason
+for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1,
+1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow
+knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.]
+
+[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as
+the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will
+be shown.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
+
+The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relative
+to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the moment
+though time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full of
+suggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from France
+since that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with the
+United States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the same
+view, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon
+III, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon
+dictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in
+courteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended
+recognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached
+Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _New
+York Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt this
+would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained in
+French-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons was
+disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise his
+Government to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made no
+comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that the
+Settlement of the Contest should be made without the intervention
+of England."
+
+A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiring
+to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone,
+or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to the
+North[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary of
+war, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did not
+think that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions;
+but he was somewhat suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite
+forget that Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to
+Richmond together last Spring[850]." The day after this despatch was
+written Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on
+February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet polite
+language, but positively declining the proposal[851]. Evidently Lyons
+was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, Napoleon's overture
+to America was officially stated to be unobjectionable, as indeed was
+required by the implications of the reply of November 13, to France.
+Russell, on February 14, answered Lyons' communications in a letter
+marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the Queen":
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at
+     present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer
+     good offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would
+     feel no jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part
+     of France alone[852]."
+
+The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France had
+already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate any
+governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations with France
+on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the case and became
+increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's despatch to Lyons of
+February 14 appears rather to be evidence of the effect of the debates
+in Parliament when its sessions were resumed on February 5, for in both
+Lords and Commons there was given a hearty and nearly unanimous support
+of the Government's decision to make no overture for a cessation of the
+conflict in America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions
+of mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had
+practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action by
+neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be fully
+prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and strict
+neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved strict neutrality
+but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle speech and sharply
+attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable policy--merely a party
+speech. Russell upheld the Government's decision but went out of his way
+to assert that the entire subjugation of the South would be a calamity
+to the United States itself, since it would require an unending use of
+force to hold the South in submission[853]. Later, when news of the
+French offer at Washington had been received, the Government was
+attacked in the Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord
+Campbell, on the ground of a British divergence from close relations
+with France. Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that
+the time had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show
+the possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis
+that recognition of the South could justly be regarded by the North as
+an "unfriendly act[854]."
+
+Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in America,
+basing this attitude on neutral duty and national interests, and with
+barely a reference to the new policy of the North toward slavery,
+declared in the emancipation proclamations of September 22, 1862, and
+January 1, 1863, Had these great documents then no favourable influence
+on British opinion and action? Was the Northern determination to root
+out the institution of slavery, now clearly announced, of no effect in
+winning the favour of a people and Government long committed to a world
+policy against that institution? It is here necessary to review early
+British opinion, the facts preceding the first emancipation
+proclamation, and to examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln.
+
+Before the opening of actual military operations, while there was still
+hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been with the North
+on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as against a slave-owning
+society. But war once begun the disturbance to British trade interests
+and Lincoln's repeated declarations that the North had no intention of
+destroying slavery combined to offer an excuse and a reason for an
+almost complete shift of British opinion. The abolitionists of the North
+and the extreme anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in
+number in both countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause
+of the war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by
+thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct bearing on
+the position of Great Britain when the war was concluded. In May, 1861,
+Palmerston declared that it would be a happy day when "we could succeed
+in putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of our
+North American cousins," but added that the difficulty for England was
+that "_We_ could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment of
+slavery[855]...."
+
+Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, indeed, a
+perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to the final
+outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken for granted.
+Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon largely
+disappeared from British discussion and in its place there cropped out,
+here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as to whether the war
+could long continue without a "servile insurrection," with all its
+attendant horrors.
+
+On July 6, 1861, the _Economist_, reviewing the progress of the war
+preparations to date, asserted that it was universally agreed no
+restoration of the Union was possible and answered British fears by
+declaring it was impossible to believe that even the American madness
+could contemplate a servile insurrection. The friendly _Spectator_ also
+discussed the matter and repeatedly. It was a mistaken idea, said this
+journal, that there could be no enfranchisement without a slave rising,
+but should this occur, "the right of the slave to regain his freedom,
+even if the effort involve slaughter, is as clear as any other
+application of the right of self-defence[856]." Yet English
+abolitionists should not urge the slave to act for himself, since "as
+war goes on and all compromise fails the American mind will harden under
+the white heat and determine that the _cause_ of all conflict must
+cease." That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern
+denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet
+Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to her as
+clear as anything in reason[857]. She had no patience with English
+anti-slavery people who believed Northern protestations, and she did
+not express concern over the horrors of a possible servile insurrection.
+Nevertheless this spectre was constantly appearing. Again the
+_Spectator_ sought to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed
+that even such a contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of
+the slave-power in the South[858].
+
+Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument which
+pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the bulk of the
+British press was constant in holding up this bogie to its readers, even
+going to the point of weakening its argument of the impossibility of a
+Northern conquest of the South by appealing to history to show that
+England in her two wars with America had had a comparatively easy time
+in the South, thus postulating the real danger of some "negro Garibaldi
+calling his countrymen to arms[859]." Nor was this fear merely a
+pretended one. It affected all classes and partisans of both sides. Even
+official England shared in it; January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The
+question is rapidly tending towards the issue either of peace and a
+recognition of the separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the
+raising of a servile insurrection[860]." At nearly the same time
+Russell, returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden,
+expressed his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation,
+meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been since
+the revival of letters[861]." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic
+which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able examination of
+the underlying causes and probable results of the American conflict,
+excused the Northern leaders for early denial of a purpose to attack
+slavery, but expressed complete confidence that even these leaders by
+now understood the "almost certain results of success in the present
+conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and prophesied that "if the
+writers who so severely criticize the present moderation of the
+Free-soilers are desirous to see the war become an abolition war, it is
+probable that if the war lasts long enough they will be gratified[862]."
+John Bright, reaching a wider public, in speech after speech, expressed
+faith that the people of the North were "marching on, as I believe, to
+its [slavery's] entire abolition[863]."
+
+Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition war," and
+believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, feared the same
+development; friends of the North pushed aside the thought of a "negro
+terror," yet even while hoping and declaring that the war would destroy
+slavery, could not escape from apprehensions of an event that appeared
+inevitable. Everywhere, to the British mind, it seemed that emancipation
+was necessarily a provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief
+largely affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact
+almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing.
+
+Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation weaken
+this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great advocate of
+abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake was Charles
+Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He early
+took the ground that a proclamation everywhere emancipating the slaves
+would give to the Northern cause a moral support hitherto denied it in
+Europe and would at the same time strike a blow at Southern resistance.
+This idea was presented in a public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts,
+in October, 1861, but even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him
+mistaken and his expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he
+found at Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date
+Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with
+Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal activities
+for their realization were well known to English friends, as in his
+letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English public in general
+through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long been a well-known figure
+in the British press[864].
+
+Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous utterance in
+the 'fifties that the United States could not indefinitely continue to
+exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in 1861, disapproved and recalled
+the orders of some of the military leaders, like Fremont, who without
+authority had sought to extend emancipation to slaves within the lines
+of their command. But as early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual
+emergence of emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that
+wise "border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the
+slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union and
+to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the time was
+ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the gradual approach
+through legislation and administrative act. In February, 1862, a Bill
+was under discussion in Congress, called the "Confiscation Bill," which,
+among other clauses, provided that all slaves of persons engaged in
+rebellion against the United States, who should by escape, or capture,
+come into the possession of the military forces of the United States,
+should be for ever free; but that this provision should not be operative
+until the expiration of sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity
+to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves[865]. This measure did
+not at first have Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the
+loyalists of the border states. Nevertheless he realized the growing
+strength of anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with
+it where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object
+of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred in a
+measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, freeing the
+slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where there was no
+question of the constitutional power of the national Government.
+
+From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation
+proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict
+between Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation.
+Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadily
+toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery in
+the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation.
+Neither party spoke the word "servile insurrection," yet both realized
+its possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see and
+use it as a threat. A brief summary of measures will indicate the
+contest. March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that a
+joint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national
+Government to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed
+purpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in the
+hope that this might influence the Southern states[866]. Neither the
+House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to this
+resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but it
+passed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved by
+Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme radical element in Congress
+had yielded, momentarily, to the President's insistence on an
+olive-branch offering of compensated emancipation. Both as regards the
+border states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was
+determined to give this line of policy a trial. The prevailing
+sentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive Confiscation
+Bill.
+
+At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department of the
+South," which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina,
+Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in these
+states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln immediately countermanded
+Hunter's order, stating that such action "under my responsibility, I
+reserve to myself[867]." He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnest
+appeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by the
+Congressional resolution of April 10. In truth, border state attitude
+was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary
+emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan.
+Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation
+Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his
+signature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify that
+fact to Congress until July 17._ On this same day of signature, July 12,
+Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in
+voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the
+congressional representatives of the border states seeking their
+definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority were
+emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect the
+border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire to
+free the slaves even if compensated[868].
+
+Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forced
+toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the Confiscation
+Bill. On the day following his failure to win the border state
+representatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him,
+that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issue
+of a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within the
+competence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered a
+few objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more than
+listen to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned
+on July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of an
+emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of which
+referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would be
+rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their
+allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of a
+gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning that
+for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipation
+of slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved except
+Blair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching November
+elections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicated
+purpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recent
+military disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The
+measure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of an
+exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth
+its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to
+the government. It will be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat."
+He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern victory. This
+appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside,
+waiting for victory[871]."
+
+Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at Antietam,
+and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. Five days later,
+September 22, Lincoln issued the proclamation, expanded and altered in
+text from the draft of July 22, but in substance the same[872]. The
+loyal border states were not to be affected, but the proclamation
+renewed the promise of steps to be taken to persuade them to voluntary
+action. On January 1, 1863, a second proclamation, referring to that of
+September 22, was issued by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested
+as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time
+of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the
+United States...." The states affected were designated by name and all
+persons held as slaves within them "are, and henceforward shall be,
+free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to
+abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence...." "And
+upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by
+the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate
+judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God[873]."
+
+Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical Sumner began
+his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when Lincoln's pledge of
+emancipation was made. Did these steps indicate, as British opinion
+unquestionably held, an intention to rouse a servile insurrection? Was
+the Confiscation Bill passed with that purpose in view and had Lincoln
+decided to carry it into effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is,
+indeed, the great marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in
+England only, but in America also. It was the expectation of the North
+and the constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the
+_purpose_ of the emancipation proclamation?
+
+This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American
+historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to motives
+at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are made to cover
+nearly the entire argument for emancipation in September, 1862, but in
+just what manner the military prowess of the North was to be increased
+was not at first indicated. In 1864, Lincoln declared that after the
+failure of successive efforts to persuade the border states to accept
+compensated emancipation he had believed there had arrived the
+"indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the
+blacks[874]." Repeatedly in later defence of the proclamation he urged
+the benefits that had come from his act and asserted that commanders in
+the field "believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured
+troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion[875]." He
+added: "negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do
+anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their
+lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the
+promise of freedom."
+
+There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor did
+Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his mind,
+though the thought of such possible result must have been present--was,
+indeed, present to most minds even without a proclamation of
+emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply to draw away slaves,
+wherever possible, from their rebellious masters, thus reducing the
+economic powers of resistance of the South, and then to make these
+ex-slaves directly useful in winning the war. But after the war, even
+here and there during it, a theory was advanced that an impelling motive
+with the President had been the hope of influencing favourably foreign
+governments and peoples by stamping the Northern cause with a high moral
+purpose. In popular opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a
+far-visioned statesman in anticipating that which ultimately came to
+pass. This has important bearing on the relations of the United States
+and Great Britain.
+
+There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had believed in
+1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize strongly with the
+North. The event did not prove this to be the case, nor could the North
+justly complain in the face of administration denials of an anti-slavery
+purpose. The English Government therefore was widely upheld by British
+opinion in regarding the struggle from the point of view of British
+interests. Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of
+slavery compelled British governmental consideration. As early as
+December, 1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported
+a conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that the
+South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade[876]. This was
+limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which in
+substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition that
+Southern agents in England found it hard to explain[877]. As already
+noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even after
+Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the American
+rupture[878]. By September, 1861, John Bright was writing to his friend
+Sumner that, all indications to the contrary, England would warmly
+support the North if only it could be shown that emancipation was an
+object[879]. Again and again he urged, it is interesting to note, just
+those ideals of gradual and compensated emancipation which were so
+strongly held by Lincoln. In this same month the _Spectator_ thought it
+was "idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all
+disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause
+rather than at the effect[880]." Three weeks later the _Spectator_,
+reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as follows:
+
+     "If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think you
+     madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of
+     Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in
+     holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud
+     your worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set
+     forth continually that you have forfeited all claim to the
+     _popular_ sympathy of England."
+
+This, said the _Spectator_, had been stated in the most objectionable
+style by the _Times_ in particular, which, editorially, had alleged that
+"the North has now lost the chance of establishing a high moral
+superiority by a declaration against slavery." To all this the
+_Spectator_ declared that the North must adopt the bold course and make
+clear that restoration of the Union was not intended with the old canker
+at its roots[881].
+
+Official England held a different view. Russell believed that the
+separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction of slavery
+since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great and prosperous
+free North, with a population united in ideals, would be forced,
+ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He professed that he could
+not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the war and thought she and
+Sumner "animated by a spirit of vengeance[882]." If the South did yield
+and the Union were restored _with_ slavery, Russell thought that
+"Slavery would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish
+for separation[883]." These views were repeated frequently by Russell.
+He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, but was
+careful to state, "I give you these views merely as speculations," and
+it is worthy of note that after midsummer of 1862 he rarely indulged in
+them. Against such speculations, whether by Russell or by others, Mill
+protested in his famous article in _Fraser's_, February, 1862[884].
+
+On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did so.
+Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search off the
+African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression of the
+African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by Great Britain
+but persistently refused by the United States. It could not well be
+declined now by the British Government and was signed by Seward, April
+8, 1862[885], but if he expected any change in British attitude as a
+result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South of that trade might
+be a barrier to British goodwill, but the action of the North was viewed
+as but a weak attempt to secure British sympathy, and to mark the limits
+of Northern anti-slavery efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager
+for the treaty on other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any
+interest in the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have
+done ... they have done grudgingly and imperfectly[886]."
+
+This was written at the exact period when Palmerston and Russell were
+initiating those steps which were to result in the Cabinet crisis on
+mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly the Slave Trade treaty
+with America had not influenced governmental attitude. At this juncture
+there was founded, November, 1862, the London Emancipation Society, with
+the avowed object of stirring anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against
+"favouring the South." But George Thompson, its organizer, had been
+engaged in the preliminary work of organization for some months and the
+Society is therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group
+who were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause
+and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's
+proclamation[887]. Thus for England as a whole and for official England
+the declarations of these few voices were regarded as expressive of a
+wish rather than as consistent with the facts. The moral uplift of an
+anti-slavery object was denied to the North.
+
+This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by the
+emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for so
+believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times, though
+rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, American Minister
+at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September 14, 1861, strongly
+urging the declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war and
+asserting that public opinion in Europe would then be such in favour of
+the North that no government would "dare to place itself, by declaration
+or act, upon the side of a universally condemned institution[888]."
+There is no evidence that Seward showed this despatch to Lincoln, but in
+January, 1862, Schurz returned to America and in conversation with the
+President urged the "moral issue" to prevent foreign intervention. The
+President replied: "You may be right. Probably you are. I have been
+thinking so myself. I cannot imagine that any European power would dare
+to recognize and aid the Southern Confederacy if it became clear that
+the Confederacy stands for slavery and the Union for freedom[889]." No
+doubt others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign
+friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the
+North[890], and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work
+in the spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue."
+The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant
+proclamation of Northern _intention_ to free the slaves[891].
+Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner
+pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition arguments
+which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign effect. On the
+general question of emancipation Lincoln listened, even telling Sumner
+that he "was ahead of himself only a month or six weeks[892]."
+
+Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, 1862, when
+strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the President to issue a
+general proclamation of emancipation, he reasserted in the famous reply
+to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one single purpose to restore the Union
+"with or without slavery."
+
+     "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
+     could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree
+     with them.
+
+     "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
+     could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
+     with them.
+
+     "_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to
+     save or to destroy slavery_[893]."
+
+Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown
+to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed
+in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presented
+abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later,
+September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had
+an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid
+stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was but
+nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied
+much as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede that
+Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are
+incited by something more than ambition[894]." Immediately after the
+event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party,
+Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is
+now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take
+action upon it[895]." Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual
+message to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign
+countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt
+mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896].
+
+Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been
+convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation.
+On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_
+the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lain
+the true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was now
+for "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." After
+all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the
+President's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this
+entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation
+Bill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to the
+Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile
+insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At
+times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at
+times not.
+
+Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal to
+Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could not
+state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had been met with
+what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as unjustifiable
+declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the conflict Lyons and
+Mercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by the
+American war upon the economic interests of their respective countries.
+Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Seward
+kept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the raw
+cotton. He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans,
+but the results were disappointing. As time went on Seward became
+convinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude and
+action of Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand
+in the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when the
+war was over _provided_ the war did not take on an uncivilized and
+sanguinary character through a rising of the slaves. If that occurred
+cotton would be burned and destroyed and cotton supply to Europe would
+be not merely a matter of temporary interruption, but one of
+long-continued dearth with no certainty of early resumption. Fearing the
+growth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward
+threatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not
+so much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the
+material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign
+attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the
+winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of servile
+insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for fear it would
+cause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent.
+
+His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In February, 1862,
+the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in Congress. In April,
+Mercier's trip to Richmond[897] had caused much speculation and started
+many rumours in London of plans of mediation[898]. On May 28, Seward
+wrote to Adams at great length and especially emphasized two points:
+first that while diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from
+discussing slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to
+state that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression
+of slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign
+nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war,
+Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all European
+interests[899]...." A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell on
+June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query about
+mediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adams
+perfectly understood Seward's policy.
+
+On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipation
+proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Seward
+commented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all its
+bearings before committing himself[901]. The day following he
+transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced into
+Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensated
+emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sent
+the Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that this
+method and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with his
+theory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than would
+an outright proclamation of emancipation.
+
+Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British
+neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he had
+learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon
+"take new ground[903]." This despatch if it reached Seward previous to
+the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of
+the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet,
+Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that
+he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a
+Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton's
+notes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to prevent
+the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton.... We break up our
+relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty
+years[904]." These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed
+action. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams
+covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which,
+fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it there
+was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the
+South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Seward
+was clinging to his theory of correct policy.
+
+Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmental
+circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the day before
+Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewing
+military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening
+the South is included a servile war[906]." To this Russell replied: "...
+I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make
+other nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating and
+destructive conflict[907]." This was but brief reiteration of a more
+exact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward's first hint of
+servile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been
+given to Russell on June 20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's
+arguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the American
+conflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:
+
+     "The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr.
+     Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another
+     element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of
+     property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a
+     country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908]."
+
+In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the
+Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart
+presented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909]. On August
+22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as purely a
+manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign
+governments[910]. Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward,
+since he also reported the latter's success in postponing the
+proclamation?
+
+In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in the
+light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both believed such
+an event would add to the argument for foreign intervention. The
+_threat_ Seward had regarded as useful; the _event_ would be highly
+dangerous to the North. Not so, however, did emancipation appear in
+prospect to American diplomats abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in
+attempting to carry out the ideas and plans of his chief, but as early
+as February, 1862, he had urged a Northern declaration in regard to
+slavery in order to meet in England Southern private representations
+that, independence won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual
+emancipation to be applied "to all persons born after some specific
+date[911]." Motley, at Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in
+private letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step on
+slavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into the
+selected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far more
+important was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month after
+he had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward,
+to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention
+would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object in
+the war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offer
+of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery such
+mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an end
+to the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen the
+Northern position abroad[913].
+
+This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it was
+assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on July 24,
+Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote to
+Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not be
+encouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northern
+attempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousand
+times No," and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September
+25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring that
+for Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not
+scarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but
+know what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the
+Government[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree with
+Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when the
+day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. On
+that day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief.
+The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach of
+which he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad," and
+he laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation
+was to convince the South that its true interests were in the
+preservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was
+the return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was far
+from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward's
+first thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrection
+he must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment was
+improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained with vigour, the "high
+moral purpose" argument as evinced in the emancipation proclamation.
+"The interests of humanity," he wrote to Adams, "have now become
+identified with the cause of our country[918]...."
+
+That the material interests of Great Britain were still in Seward's
+thought is shown by the celerity with which under Lincoln's orders he
+grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to liberated slaves. Stuart
+wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, secretary of the colony of
+British Guiana, was coming from Demerara to Washington to secure
+additional labour for the British colony by offering to carry away
+ex-slaves[919]. This scheme was no secret and five days after the issue
+of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a convention by which the
+British Government would be permitted to transport to the West Indies,
+or to any of its colonies, the negroes about to be emancipated. On
+September 30, Adams was instructed to take up the matter at London[920].
+Russell was at first disinclined to consider such a convention and
+discussion dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed,
+this time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate
+influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the
+attitude of the British Government[921].
+
+To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matter
+for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at once
+convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it be
+remembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted, save
+by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt extending even to bitter
+opposition and that British governmental and public opinion had long
+dreaded a servile insurrection--even of late taking its cue from
+Seward's own prophecies--the cool reception given by the Government, the
+vehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem so
+surprising. "This Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September
+23, "seems a brutum fulmen[922]." One of the President's motives, he
+thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no
+pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a
+Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct encouragement
+to servile insurrections[923]." Received in England during the Cabinet
+struggle over mediation the proclamation appears not to have affected
+that controversy, though Russell sought to use it as an argument for
+British action. In his memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove
+to show that the purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both
+on the horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:
+
+     "What will be the practical effect of declaring emancipation,
+     not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed by the
+     Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and
+     retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile
+     community, it is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms
+     of the United States penetrate, a premium will be given to
+     acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge. The
+     military and naval authorities of the United States will be
+     bound by their orders to maintain and protect the
+     perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the
+     Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be
+     disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors
+     of land alike reduced to beggary[924]."
+
+The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating the
+proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one situation in
+the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. Citations setting
+forth such comment have frequently been gathered together illustrative
+of the extent of press condemnation and of its unity in vicious
+editorials[925]. There is no need to repeat many of them here, but a few
+will indicate their tone. The _Times_ greeted the news with an assertion
+that this was a final desperate play by Lincoln, as hope of victory
+waned. It was his "last card[926]," a phrase that caught the fancy of
+lesser papers and was repeated by them. October 21, appeared the
+"strongest" of the _Times_ editorials:
+
+[Illustration: ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR. _Reproduced
+by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+     "... We have here the history of the beginning of the end,
+     but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet
+     to be filled before the inevitable separation is
+     accomplished? Are scenes like those which we a short time
+     since described from Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the
+     reign of the last PRESIDENT to go out amid horrible massacres
+     of white women and children, to be followed by the
+     extermination of the black race in the South? Is LINCOLN yet
+     a name not known to us as it will be known to posterity, and
+     is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue of
+     monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind?
+
+     "... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to
+     what the consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be,
+     except that it certainly will not have the effect of
+     restoring the Union. It will not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the
+     distinctive affix which he will share with many, for the most
+     part foolish and incompetent, Kings and Emperors, Caliphs and
+     Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the Last.'"
+
+The _Times_ led the way; other papers followed on. The _Liverpool Post_
+thought a slave rising inevitable[927], as did also nearly every paper
+acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or professedly neutral, while
+even pro-Northern journals at first feared the same results[928].
+Another striking phrase, "Brutum Fulmen," ran through many editorials.
+The _Edinburgh Review_ talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair[929]," which
+was little different from Seward's feared "last shriek." _Blackwood's_
+thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, devilish." It "justifies
+the South in raising the black flag, and proclaiming a war without
+quarter[930]." But there is no need to expand the citation of the
+well-nigh universal British press pouring out of the wrath of heaven
+upon Lincoln, and his emancipation proclamation[931].
+
+Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at first
+expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is apparent that here
+and there a part of this British wrath was due to a fear that, in spite
+of denials of such influence, the proclamation was intended to arouse
+public opinion against projects of intervention and _might so arouse
+it_. The New York correspondent of the _Times_ wrote that it was
+"promulgated evidently as a sop to keep England and France quiet[932],"
+and on October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very
+important object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition
+cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro or
+the South, but at Europe." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_ believed that it
+was now "the imperative duty of England and France to do what they can
+in order to prevent the possible occurrence of a crime which, if carried
+out, would surpass in atrocity any similar horror the world has ever
+seen[933]." "Historicus," on the other hand, asked: "What is that
+solution of the negro question to which an English Government is
+prepared to affix the seal of English approbation[934]?" Mason, the
+Confederate Agent in London, wrote home that it was generally believed
+the proclamation was issued "as the means of warding off recognition....
+It was seen through at once and condemned accordingly[935]."
+
+This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictum
+that the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate British
+governmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief that
+strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating an
+argument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet the
+new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to his
+friends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in
+favour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is
+not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own
+him unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality
+whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon its
+merits as a political measure[936]." Two weeks later, reporting a public
+speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which
+Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_,
+while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it was
+not to be understood as fully defending a system of government which
+chose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]."
+
+Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though loudly
+applauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincoln
+was disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent,
+though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow up
+the victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November went
+heavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground of
+the President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole was
+not favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as
+but a useless bit of "waste paper[939]." In England, John Bright, the
+most ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud
+heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and even
+then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public interest was
+much aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date set
+by Lincoln for actual enforcement of emancipation[940]. In a speech at
+Birmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emancipation;
+rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South for
+admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was the
+very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and society[941]. A few
+public meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown were
+tried in October and November with some success but with no great show
+of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of public
+opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by the
+proclamation began to veer in favour of the emancipation edict[942]. By
+the end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrified
+hands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]."
+
+Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause of
+emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by Jefferson
+Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared that
+Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection,"
+and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in arms
+be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective
+States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of
+said State." This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for
+his freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave
+a good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944].
+
+Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December that
+the promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hoped
+that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliation
+would be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1
+proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]."
+
+But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an
+"abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week of
+December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, there
+took place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were passed
+enthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emancipation proclamation
+and pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ from
+week to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, noting
+fifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The
+American Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved
+resolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations.
+The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield,
+January 10:
+
+     "_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery
+     is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the
+     American States, and that the object of the leaders of the
+     rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman
+     system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion
+     may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the
+     Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its
+     emancipation policy till not a slave be left on the American
+     soil[947]."
+
+Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of
+"nobodies." Adams commented:
+
+     "They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, but
+     they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most
+     exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave
+     Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol,
+     and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to
+     the complete emancipation of the negro slaves in the British
+     dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of
+     the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I
+     feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective
+     sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]."
+
+Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expression
+of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working classes,"
+and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949].
+The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to the
+emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed communications with
+increasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in the
+public meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press.
+Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letter
+writer to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northern
+cause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just and
+holy[950]." In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the
+proclamation to touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear
+the fact that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict
+to states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalled
+the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetings
+attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spoken
+twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence.
+Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slavery
+feeling, now strongly for the North[952].
+
+Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in an
+address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe now
+replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. A
+largely signed "round robin" letter assured her that English women were
+still the foes of slavery and were indignantly united against
+suggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working class
+Britain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those of
+Manchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of
+thanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships
+resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot"
+he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [of
+human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not
+been surpassed in any age or in any country[954]." Nonconformist England
+now came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London,
+made his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen
+the North; give victory to their arms[955]." Further and more general
+expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letter
+received February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen,
+urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln.
+The London and Manchester Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up
+a document for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption
+at a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An
+Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations
+throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" but
+the address was carried by a large majority and two representatives,
+Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to the
+brethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblical
+sanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading this
+sanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957].
+Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in
+a pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" His
+position and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to
+the North.
+
+Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, became
+aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamation
+made good his pledge of the previous September: other elements of
+opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like measure, and
+everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrection
+largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to such
+lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound and alarm the
+_Saturday Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival of
+cant[959]." More neutral minds were perplexed over the practical
+difficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January,
+1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men
+slaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popular
+approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the
+twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great mass
+meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had been
+advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hall
+was jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptly
+organized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admission
+crowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand.
+Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Hall
+and cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. Newman
+Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted to
+heckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961].
+
+The "carnival of cant," as the _Saturday Review_ termed it, was truly a
+popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported by
+the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its first effect was to
+restore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upper
+classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation, yet with some misgivings. He
+now joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on
+"Slavery and Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.
+
+In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_,
+which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influenced
+largely upper-class attitude in favour of the South, Cairnes had
+published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was a reasoned analysis of
+the basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis of
+Spence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power,
+Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be read
+with more conviction by that class which until now had been coldly
+neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in the Northern cause
+than that stirred by the emotional reception given the emancipation
+proclamation. Yet at bottom it was emancipation that brought this
+reasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logical
+basis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterances
+previously made in private correspondence, or in governmental
+conversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North.
+On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the
+Duke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a
+speech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of
+Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to
+object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," Argyll
+said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of the
+Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that the
+contest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it that
+great blessing to the white race which shall consist in the final
+freedom of the black[963]."
+
+The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America that
+governmental England would show some evidence of a more friendly
+attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas he
+thought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read:
+
+     "Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have
+     tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the
+     world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation,
+     upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental
+     object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery,
+     therefore,
+
+     _Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be
+     recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and
+     civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men
+     everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost,
+     such recognition or admission[964]."
+
+This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Washington, in
+November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation proclamation as a
+political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administration
+he thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This was
+the burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but does
+not appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to give
+offence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the
+correctness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm
+leading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship
+measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound by
+the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at first not
+the slightest conception of the force or effect of emancipation upon the
+public in middle-class England. He feared an American reaction against
+England when it was understood that popular meetings would have no
+influence on the British Government.
+
+     "Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the
+     effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to
+     fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely
+     round to the North that the Government will be obliged to
+     favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do
+     so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it,
+     unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had little
+relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude toward
+emancipation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile war
+might be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain,
+from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emancipation into
+effect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, in
+part by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier British
+newspaper speculations, was strongly associated with emancipation, in
+the English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862,
+proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public
+with apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war
+ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emancipation
+and the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave of
+relief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not so
+quickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that England
+which was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exulted
+and now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affect
+governmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyons
+correctly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press
+the British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the
+same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a head
+a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during the
+war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctly
+unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building in
+British ports of Confederate naval vessels of war.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturing
+Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III.]
+
+[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]
+
+[Footnote 848: F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to be
+already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint of
+it in the interview with Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offer
+of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructions
+and those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelled
+to face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offer
+without England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O.S.)).]
+
+[Footnote 850: F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]
+
+[Footnote 852: F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.]
+
+[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152.]
+
+[Footnote 854: _Ibid._, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs.
+Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 859: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 17, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contest
+in America."]
+
+[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69.]
+
+[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers of
+Abraham Lincoln_, p. 243.]
+
+[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, pp. 229-32.]
+
+[Footnote 867: _Ibid._, p. 233, May 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 868: A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, 1862, on the lines
+of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July 12, but no action was
+taken on it.]
+
+[Footnote 869: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 70-71.]
+
+[Footnote 870: Abraham Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 213.]
+
+[Footnote 871: Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.]
+
+[Footnote 872: As issued September 22, the first paragraph refers to his
+plan of securing legislation to aid compensated voluntary emancipation,
+the next sets the date January 1, 1863, for completed emancipation of
+slaves in states still in rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern
+the carrying out of the confiscation law. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II,
+pp. 237-8.]
+
+[Footnote 873: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, 260-61.]
+
+[Footnote 874: Rhodes, IV, p. 214.]
+
+[Footnote 875: _Ibid._, p. 410. In letter, August 26, 1863, addressed to
+a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional Union men."]
+
+[Footnote 876: American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7. Bunch to Russell,
+Dec. 5, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 877: Southern Commissioners abroad early reported that
+recognition of independence and commercial treaties could not be secured
+unless the South would agree to "mutual right of search" treaties for
+the suppression of the African Slave Trade. Davis' answer was that the
+Confederate constitution gave him no authority to negotiate such a
+treaty; indeed, denied him that authority since the constitution itself
+prohibited the importation of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's
+instructions see Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 591-96.]
+
+[Footnote 878: _Spectator_, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 879: Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol.
+XLVI, p. 95.]
+
+[Footnote 880: Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 881: October 5, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 882: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 883: _Ibid._, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The same ideas are
+officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, 1861, and May 1,
+1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and _Ibid._, Vol. 819, No.
+197, Draft.).]
+
+[Footnote 884: See ante, p. 81.]
+
+[Footnote 885: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.]
+
+[Footnote 886: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, p. 227. Palmerston to Russell,
+Aug. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 887: Garrison, _Garrison_, IV, p. 66. Many distinguished names
+were on the roster of the Society--Mill, Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton,
+Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes,
+Cairns, Herbert Spencer, Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and
+others. Frederick W. Chesson was secretary, and very active in
+the work.]
+
+[Footnote 888: Schurz, _Speeches and Correspondence_, I, 190.]
+
+[Footnote 889: Schurz, _Reminiscences_, II, 309.]
+
+[Footnote 890: Gasparin, _The Uprising of a Great People_, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 891: Gasparin, _America before Europe_, Pt. V, Ch. III. The
+preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work went through three American
+editions in 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 892: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, p. 63. No exact date, but Spring of
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 893: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, p. 253.]
+
+[Footnote 894: _Ibid._, p. 256.]
+
+[Footnote 895: Rhodes, IV, p. 162.]
+
+[Footnote 896: Lincoln's _Complete Works_, II, p. 454. But the
+_after-comment_ by Lincoln as to purpose was nearly always in line with
+an unfinished draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864,
+when the specific object was said to be "inducing the coloured people to
+come bodily over from the rebel side to ours." _Ibid._, p. 564.]
+
+[Footnote 897: See _ante_, Ch. IX.]
+
+[Footnote 898: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 83.
+Adams to Seward, May 8, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 899: _Ibid._, pp. 101-105.]
+
+[Footnote 900: _Ibid._, p. 122. Adams to Seward, July 3, 1862. In his
+despatch Adams states the conversation to have occurred "last Saturday,"
+and with an "unofficial person," who was sounding him on mediation. This
+was Cobden.]
+
+[Footnote 901: Welles, _Diary_, I, p. 70.]
+
+[Footnote 902: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 135.]
+
+[Footnote 903: _Ibid._, p. 133. To Seward. His informant was Baring.]
+
+[Footnote 904: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 333.]
+
+[Footnote 905: See _ante_, p. 35.]
+
+[Footnote 906: _Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." No. 8. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 907: _Ibid._, No. 10. Russell to Stuart, Aug. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 908: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further correspondence
+relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." No. 2.
+To Stuart.]
+
+[Footnote 909: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence
+relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America," No.
+20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 910: See _ante_, p. 37.]
+
+[Footnote 911: State Department, Eng., Vol. 78, No. 119. Adams to
+Seward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar representation made
+on Jan. 17, 1862. (_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I,
+p. 16.)]
+
+[Footnote 912: e.g., Motley, _Correspondence_, II, pp. 64-5. To O.W.
+Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 913: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 140.
+Adams to Seward, July 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 914: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 336.]
+
+[Footnote 915: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 191.
+Adams to Seward, Sept. 12, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 916: _Ibid._, p. 199.]
+
+[Footnote 917: _Ibid._, p. 195.]
+
+[Footnote 918: _Ibid._, p. 202. Seward to Adams, Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons,
+on his return to Washington, wrote that he found Seward's influence much
+lessened, and that he had fallen in public estimation by his "signing
+the Abolition Proclamation, which was imposed upon him, in opposition to
+all his own views, by the Radical Party in the Cabinet." (Russell
+Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 14, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 919: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 920: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 202. The
+instruction went into great detail as to conditions and means. A similar
+instruction was sent to Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen.]
+
+[Footnote 921: There was much talk and correspondence on this project
+from Sept., 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was suspicious of some "trap."
+Russell at one time thought the United States was secretly planning to
+colonize ex-slaves in Central America. Some of the Colonies were in
+favour of the plan. (Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862.
+F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 922: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 923: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 924: Gladstone Papers. British agents still residing in the
+South believed the proclamation would have little practical effect, but
+added that if actually carried out the cultivation of cotton "would be
+as completely arrested as if an edict were pronounced against its future
+growth," and pictured the unfortunate results for the world at large.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 846, No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 925: See Rhodes, IV, 344, _notes_.]
+
+[Footnote 926: October 6, 1862. The _Times_ had used the "last card"
+phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations on the effect of
+Sumner's agitation for emancipation.]
+
+[Footnote 927: Oct. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 928: e.g., _Dublin Nation_, Oct. 11, 1862. _Manchester
+Guardian_, Oct. 7. _London Morning Advertiser_, Oct. 9. _North British
+Review_, Oct., 1862. _London Press_, Oct. 11. _London Globe_, Oct. 6.
+_London Examiner_, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag," and Oct. 18:
+"The Instigation to Servile War." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_, Oct. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 929: October, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 930: November, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 931: It is worthy of note that the French offer of joint
+mediation made to Britain in October specified the danger of servile war
+resulting from the proclamation as a reason for European action.
+(France, _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 142.)]
+
+[Footnote 932: The _Times_, Oct. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 933: Oct. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 934: Communication in the _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 935: Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 936: _Spectator_, Oct. 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 937: _Ibid._, Oct. 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 938: Rhodes, IV, 162-64.]
+
+[Footnote 939: Perry, _Henry Lee Higginson_, p. 175.]
+
+[Footnote 940: Rhodes, IV, p. 349, _note_. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 941: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, pp. 216 ff.]
+
+[Footnote 942: _Liberator_, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a meeting at Leigh,
+Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At Sheffield, Dec. 31,
+1862, an amended resolution calling for recognition of the South was
+voted down and the original pro-Northern resolutions passed. There were
+speakers on both sides. _Liberator_, Jan. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 943: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 113. J.S. Mill to
+Motley, Jan. 26, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 944: Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order applied also to all
+Northern white officers commanding negro troops. It proved an
+idle threat.]
+
+[Footnote 945: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30, 1862. And
+again, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a servile
+insurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move for its
+authors." Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed regret that the
+emancipation proclamation had been issued, since it set up a further
+barrier to the reconciliation of North and South--always the hope of
+Russia. Seward replied that in executing the proclamation, there would
+be, no doubt, many modifications. Stoeckl answered that then the
+proclamation must be regarded as but a futile menace. (Russian Archives.
+Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2171.)]
+
+[Footnote 946: Rhodes, IV, p. 357.]
+
+[Footnote 947: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 55.
+Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863, transmitting this and other resolutions
+presented to him. Adams by March 20 had reported meetings which sent
+resolutions to him, from Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills,
+Salford, Cobham, Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow,
+Liverpool, South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh,
+Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle, Bury,
+Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Huddersfield, Ashford,
+Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton, Newark, and York. See also
+Rhodes, IV, 348-58, for résumé of meetings and opinions expressed.]
+
+[Footnote 948: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 300. Adams to
+Seward, Jan. 22, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 949: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 100.
+Adams to Seward, Feb. 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 950: Goddard, _Letters on the American Rebellion_, p. 287.
+Goddard contributed seventy letters before 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 951: _Ibid._, p. 307. Letter to _Daily Gazette_, May 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 952: _The Liberator_, Feb. 27, 1863. At Bristol the opposition
+element introduced a resolution expressing abhorrence of slavery and the
+hope that the war in America might end in total emancipation, but adding
+that "at the same time [this meeting] cannot but regard the policy of
+President Lincoln in relation to slavery, as partial, insincere,
+inhuman, revengeful and altogether opposed to those high and noble
+principles of State policy which alone should guide the counsels of a
+great people." The resolution was voted down, and one passed applauding
+Lincoln. The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologize
+for slurring remarks on Thompson.]
+
+[Footnote 953: _Atlantic Monthly_, XI, p. 525.]
+
+[Footnote 954: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 302.]
+
+[Footnote 955: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, p. 306. Also Rhodes, IV, p.
+351.]
+
+[Footnote 956: Massie, _America: the Origin of Her Present Conflict_,
+London, 1864. This action and the tour of the two delegates in America
+did much to soothe wounded feelings which had been excited by a
+correspondence in 1862-3 between English, French and American branches
+of similar church organizations. See _New Englander_, April, 1863,
+p. 288.]
+
+[Footnote 957: Jan. 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 958: Published Oxford and London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 959: Rhodes, IV, p. 355.]
+
+[Footnote 960: Lutz, _Notes_. Schleiden's despatch, No. 1, 1863. German
+opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal Germany sympathized
+strongly with the North; while the aristocratic and the landowning class
+stood for the South. The historian Karl Friedrich Neumann wrote a
+three-volume history of the United States wholly lacking in historical
+impartiality and strongly condemnatory of the South. (Geschichte der
+Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 1863-66.) This work had much influence on
+German public opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]
+
+[Footnote 961: _Liberator_, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of J.P. Jewett to W.L.
+Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in England who may still
+sympathize with slavery and the Southern rebels, will be rendered
+absolutely powerless by these grand and powerful uprisings of
+THE PEOPLE."]
+
+[Footnote 962: Duffus, _English Opinion_, p. 51.]
+
+[Footnote 963: Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 196-7.]
+
+[Footnote 964: Trevelyan, _John Bright_. Facsimile, opp. p. 303. Copy
+sent by Sunmer to Bright, April, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 965: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. Lyons
+was slow to favour the emancipation proclamation. The first favourable
+mention I have found was on July 26, 1864. (Russell Papers. To Russell.)
+In this view his diplomatic colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December,
+1863, wrote that slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and
+that even in the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian
+Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But
+immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl
+could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made of
+universal application it would have been a "great triumph for the
+principle of individual liberty," but as issued they could only mean
+"the hope of stirring a servile war in the South." _(Ibid._, Dec. 24,
+1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+THE LAIRD RAMS
+
+The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like the
+_Alabama_ and the subsequent controversy and arbitration in relation
+thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed from every aspect
+of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, and principles of
+international law. There is no need and no purpose here to review in
+detail these matters. The purpose is, rather, to consider the
+development and effect at the time of their occurrence of the principal
+incidents related to Southern ship-building in British yards. The
+_intention_ of the British Government is of greater importance in this
+study than the correctness of its action.
+
+Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a
+belligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in the
+ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite
+application in international law. There were general principles already
+established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its subjects to do,
+anything directly in aid of belligerents. The British Foreign Enlistment
+Act, notification of which had been given in May, 1861, forbade subjects
+to "be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming,
+of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel
+shall be employed in the service ..." of a belligerent, and provided for
+punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this prohibition
+were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such punishment, or
+seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. Here was the weak
+point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were maintained by offenders
+the proof was available only after the offence had been committed and
+one of the belligerents injured by the violation of the law. Over twenty
+years earlier the American Government, seeking to prevent its subjects
+from committing unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion
+of 1837, had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then
+stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and therefore
+limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a more perfect
+law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral duty, had given
+federal officials power to act and seize _on suspicion_, leaving the
+proof of guilt or innocence to be determined later. But the British
+interpretation of her own neutrality laws was that proof was required in
+advance of seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic
+principle that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that
+preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so promptly
+asserted at the beginning of the Civil War[966].
+
+The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, early
+conceived the idea of using neutral ports for the construction of war
+vessels. Advice secured from able British lawyers was to the effect that
+if care were taken to observe the strict letter of the Foreign
+Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike equipment, a ship, even though her
+construction were such as to indicate that she was destined to become a
+ship of war, might be built by private parties in British yards. The
+three main points requiring careful observance by the South were
+concealment of government ownership and destination, no war equipment
+and no enlistment of crew in British waters.
+
+The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these lines was
+Captain J.D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive of his work
+that he never violated British neutrality law and that prevailing legal
+opinion in England supported him in this view[967]. In March, 1862, the
+steamer _Oreto_ cleared from Liverpool with a declared destination of
+"Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica." She was not heard of until
+three months later when she was reported to be at Nassau completing her
+equipment as a Southern war vessel. In June, Adams notified Russell
+"that a new and still more powerful war-steamer was nearly ready for
+departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand[968]." He
+protested that such ships violated the neutrality of Great Britain and
+demanded their stoppage and seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this
+second ship, "No. 290" (later christened the _Alabama_) left Liverpool,
+Adams and the United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in
+securing evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each
+protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been
+referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, when
+there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's Counsel,
+Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive against the
+"290," that Russell appears to have been seriously concerned. On July
+28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for an immediate opinion,
+and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent to Liverpool and to other
+ports to stop and further examine the vessel. But the "290" was well
+away and outside of British waters[969].
+
+The _Alabama_, having received guns and munitions by a ship, the
+_Bahama_, sent out from England to that end, and having enlisted in the
+Confederate Navy most of the British crews of the two vessels, now
+entered upon a career of destruction of Northern commerce. She was not a
+privateer, as she was commonly called at the time, but a Government
+vessel of war specially intended to capture and destroy merchant ships.
+In short her true character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of
+a "commerce destroyer." Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she
+traversed all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal and
+stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she evaded
+battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear that an
+almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to British or other
+foreign register took place, in the mercantile marine. The career of the
+_Alabama_ was followed with increasing anger and chagrin by the North;
+this, said the public, was a British ship, manned by a British crew,
+using British guns and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been
+winked at by the British Government. What further evidence was necessary
+of bad faith in a professed strict neutrality?
+
+Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion and
+anger. At the last moment it had appeared as if the Government were
+inclined to stop the "290." Was the hurried departure of the vessel due
+to a warning received from official sources? On November 21, Adams
+reported that Russell complained in an interview of remarks made
+privately by Bright, to the effect that warning had come from Russell
+himself, and "seemed to me a little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright
+had heard this from me[970]." Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such
+imputation, but at the same time expressed to Russell his conviction
+that there must have been from some source a "leak" of the Government's
+intention[971]. The question of advance warning to Bullock, or to the
+Lairds who built the _Alabama_, was not one which was likely to be
+officially put forward in any case; the real issue was whether an
+offence to British neutrality law had been committed, whether it would
+be acknowledged as such, and still more important, whether repetitions
+of the offence would be permitted. The _Alabama_, even though she might,
+as the American assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us a
+sick turn[972]," could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the
+war; but many _Alabamas_ would be a serious matter. The belated
+governmental order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the future
+since in reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective
+claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop had
+been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and that in
+strict law there had been no neglect of governmental duty[973]. If this
+were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit official
+interference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet of
+Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a real offence to
+the North had taken place. He might write, "I confess the proceedings of
+that vessel [the _Alabama_] are enough to _rile_ a more temperate
+nation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on that
+account[974]," but this was of no value to the North if the governmental
+decision was against interference without complete and absolute proof.
+
+It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringing
+home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in American
+eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were to
+be continued. An immediate downright threat of war would have been
+impolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point of
+resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required of
+Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat as
+would involve the two nations in war--a result that would have marked
+the success of Southern secession. That Seward was able to find the way
+in which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination and
+gift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the
+Civil War[975].
+
+In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the "290,"
+June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contracts
+made with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of two
+vessels far more dangerous than the _Alabama_ to the Northern cause.
+These were the so-called Laird Rams. They were to be two hundred and
+thirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four and
+one-half inch iron plate and be provided with a "piercer" at the prow,
+about seven feet long and of great strength. This "piercer" caused the
+ships to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped
+it was expected the "piercer" would be three feet under the surface of
+the water. This was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was
+unusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at
+sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close blockade
+at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper comment in England
+that the vessels were "new _Alabamas_," and in America that they were
+"floating fortresses," suitable for attack upon defenceless Northern
+cities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockading
+squadrons[976].
+
+Shortly before the escape of the _Alabama_ and at a time when there was
+but little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly after
+the news was received in Washington that still other vessels were
+planned for building in the Lairds' yards, a Bill was introduced in
+Congress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque and
+privateering. This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wrote
+to Adams of the proposed measure specifying that the purpose was to
+permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the _Alabama_ or
+other vessels of a like type. He characterized this as a plan "to
+organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and
+reprisal[977]." Neither here nor at any time did Seward or Adams allege
+in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than the pursuit of
+_Alabamas_, nor is it presumable that in July, 1862, the construction
+plans of the Rams were sufficiently well known to the North to warrant a
+conclusion that the later purpose of the proposed privateering fleet was
+_at first_ quite other than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill
+introduced in July, 1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the
+_Oreto_ (or _Florida_) and to the failure of early protests in the case
+of the _Alabama_. Moreover there had been an earlier newspaper agitation
+for an increase of naval power by the creation of a "militia of the
+seas," though with no clear conception of definite objects to be
+attained. This agitation was now renewed and reinforced and many public
+speeches made by a General Hiram Wallbridge, who had long advocated an
+organization of the mercantile marine as an asset in times of war[978].
+But though introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" was
+not seriously taken up until February, 1863.
+
+In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of introduction,
+Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to encourage
+privateers to pursue British ships when, as was expected, they should
+"turn Confederate." Sumner objected that the true business of privateers
+was to destroy enemy commerce and that the South had no such _bona fide_
+commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his opinion also, but explained
+that the administration wanted the measure passed so that it might have
+in its hands a power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion
+of the Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but
+without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up
+again[979]. Six months later the progress of construction and the
+purpose of the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7,
+1863, the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred
+to the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 was
+passed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March 2 it was
+given a third reading and passed without debate[980]. In the Senate,
+Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the
+Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to
+break our blockade of their coast," and that the privateers were to
+"assist in maintaining blockades." There was no thorough debate but a
+few perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power in
+the hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistent
+opponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to the
+North since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral
+commerce. No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were
+to be used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an
+"administration measure."
+
+Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russell
+at the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge. At first he
+had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment
+Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the
+law officers of the Crown. Russell had even offered to take up with
+America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their
+neutrality laws at the same moment. This was in December, 1862, but now
+on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment
+had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981].
+While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from
+Seward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of the
+privateering bill.
+
+"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of the
+United States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in any
+war in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expected
+that the Bill will become a law. Lord Lyons suggests that the
+transaction may possibly be misapprehended abroad, if it come upon
+foreign powers suddenly and without any explanations. You will be at
+liberty to say that, as the Bill stands, the executive Government will
+be set at liberty to put the law in force in its discretion, and that
+thus far the proper policy in regard to the exercise of that discretion
+has not engaged the President's attention. I have had little hesitation
+in saying to Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there
+will be entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating
+to him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part of
+friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be feared would
+be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall be found expedient
+to put the Act in force against the insurgents of the United
+States[982]."
+
+Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object might
+be asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents," the hint
+was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be "incidentally
+and indirectly affected." And so both Lyons and Seward understood the
+matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a long conversation with
+Seward in which after pointing out the probable "bad effect" on Europe,
+Lyons received the reply that some remedy must be found for the fact
+that "the law did not appear to enable the British Government to
+prevent" the issue of Confederate "privateers[983]." On March 8, Seward
+followed this up by sending to Lyons an autograph letter:
+
+     "I am receiving daily such representations from our sea-ports
+     concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by the
+     vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I
+     do most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into
+     the unhappy condition of affairs, which, with all the best
+     dispositions of your Government and my own, cannot long be
+     controlled to the preservation of peace.
+
+     "If you think well of it, I should like that you should
+     confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more
+     armed vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English
+     ports is a thing to be deprecated above all things."
+
+On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and it
+appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward stated
+that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about the _Alabama_,
+declaring:
+
+     "That no American merchant vessels would get freights--that
+     even war with England was preferable to this--that in that
+     case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least
+     find a profitable employment in cruising against British
+     trade."
+
+Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyons
+protested vigorously and implied that war must result.
+
+     "Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience
+     not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: that he
+     should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity
+     altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came
+     from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure
+     would be unavoidable[984]."
+
+Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must not
+be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling on
+the notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutral
+Mexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruise
+in destruction of French commerce, adding that "one might almost
+suppose" some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for the
+purpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985].
+Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9,
+that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present to
+Russell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance that
+no further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports.
+This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language but
+in no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering
+bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national navigating
+interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ... the enforcement
+of the neutrality law of Great Britain[986]...."
+
+Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was read to
+him. Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateers
+would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interfered
+with neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in an
+awkward position. To this Adams replied that the privateers would seek
+and capture, if possible, vessels like the _Alabama_, but Russell asked
+Lyons to find out "whether in any case they [privateers] will be
+authorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case in
+what case, and to what extent[987]." Three days later, on March 26,
+Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as "not
+unfriendly in tone," but in the long conversation that ensued the old
+result was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent in
+performance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stop
+Southern shipbuilding if full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams
+concluded that "he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but it
+had become a most difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons,
+"Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured for
+peace between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and those
+of the two Governments fail of success[988]."
+
+In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to a
+head both in America and England. At Washington, from March seventh to
+the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisal
+had been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposed
+them was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to the
+intentions of Great Britain. The final decision was to wait later news
+from England[989]. This was Seward's idea as he had not as yet received
+reports of the British reaction to his communications through Lyons and
+Adams. March 27 was the critical day of decision in London, as it was
+also the day upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most
+vigorously debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Preceding
+this other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the first
+days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official assurances
+that if the South wished to build ships in French yards "we should be
+permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea[990]." This
+suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the intention, no
+doubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In the winter of
+1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic fleet to cruise in
+western waters and there was first a suspicion in America, later a
+conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was distinctly friendly to
+the North--that the orders might even extend to actual naval aid in case
+war should arise with England and France. In March, 1863, this
+was but vague rumour, by midsummer it was a confident hope, by
+September-October, when Russian fleets had entered the harbours of New
+York and San Francisco, the rumour had become a conviction and the
+silence of Russian naval officers when banqueted and toasted was
+regarded as discreet confirmation. There was no truth in the rumour, but
+already in March curious surmises were being made even in England, as to
+Russian intentions, though there is no evidence that the Government was
+at all concerned. The truth was that the Russian fleet had been ordered
+to sea as a precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, in
+case the difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead to
+war with France and England[991].
+
+In England, among the people rather than in governmental England, a
+feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the Ministry had been lax
+in regard to the _Alabama_, and as news of her successes was received
+this feeling was given voice. Liverpool, at first almost wholly on the
+side of the Lairds and of Southern ship-building, became doubtful by
+the very ease with which the _Alabama_ destroyed Northern ships.
+Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests might,
+after all, be directly opposed to those of the ship-builders. Meetings
+were held and the matter discussed. In February, 1863, such a meeting at
+Plaistow, attended by the gentry of the neighbourhood, but chiefly by
+working men, especially by dock labourers and by men from the
+ship-building yards at Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman be
+requested to write to the Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestly
+entreating him to put in force, with utmost vigilance, the law of
+England against such ships as the _Alabama_[992]." Such expressions were
+not as yet widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulge
+in much discussion, but British _doubt_ was developing[993].
+
+Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt as to
+Britain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in Parliament
+which Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all the speeches he
+has made since I have been at this post[994]." On March 26, came the
+presentation by Adams of Seward's instruction of which Russell wrote to
+Lyons as made in no unfriendly tone and as a result of which Adams
+wrote: "The conclusion which I draw ... is, that the Government is
+really better disposed to exertion, and feels itself better sustained
+for action by the popular sentiment than ever before[995]." Russell told
+Adams that he had received a note from Palmerston "expressing his
+approbation of every word" of his speech three days before. In a portion
+of the despatch to Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence,
+Adams advised against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the present
+favourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to run the
+risk of changing the current in Great Britain by the presentation of a
+new issue which might rally all national pride against us as was done in
+the _Trent_ case[996]." That Russell was indeed thinking of definite
+action is foreshadowed by the advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27,
+as to the latter's language in the debate scheduled for that day on the
+Foreign Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interview
+with Adams:
+
+     "The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked him
+     what he had to propose in reference to the _Alabama_ was that
+     the Government should declare their disapproval of the
+     fitting out of such ships of war to prey on
+     American commerce.
+
+     "Now, as the fitting out and escape of the _Alabama_ and
+     _Oreto_ was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can
+     have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the
+     Government disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law
+     with a view to assist one of the belligerents[997]."
+
+But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the hopeful view
+of the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to Sumner, "badly
+managed and told against us[998]," and Bright himself participated in
+this "bad management." For over a year he had been advocating the cause
+of the North in public speeches and everywhere pointing out to
+unenfranchised England that the victory of the North was essential to
+democracy in all Europe. Always an orator of power he used freely
+vigorous language and nowhere more so than in a great public meeting of
+the Trades Unions of London in St. James' Hall, on March 26, the evening
+before the parliamentary debate. The purpose of this meeting was to
+bring public pressure on the Government in favour of the North, and the
+pith of Bright's speech was to contrast the democratic instincts of
+working men with the aristocratic inclinations of the Government[999].
+Reviewing "aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said:
+
+     "Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this contest,
+     and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your
+     streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has
+     beheld an afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has
+     beheld thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without
+     emperor, without king, without the surroundings of a court,
+     without nobles, except such as are made by eminence in
+     intellect and virtue, without State bishops and
+     State priests.
+
+     "'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation,' without
+     great armies and great navies, without great debt and without
+     great taxes.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for
+     yourselves.... Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the
+     worst foes of freedom that the world has ever seen.... You
+     will not do this. I have faith in you. Impartial history
+     will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly
+     neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your
+     press--which ought to have instructed and defended--was
+     mainly written to betray, the fate of a Continent and of its
+     vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an
+     unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make
+     it the heritage of all His children[1000]."
+
+The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in support of
+the North held throughout the whole course of the war, and it was also
+the most notable one as indicating the rising tide of popular demand for
+more democratic institutions. That it irritated the Government and gave
+a handle to Southern sympathizers in the parliamentary debate of March
+27 is unquestioned. In addition, if that debate was intended to secure
+from the Government an intimation of future policy against Southern
+shipbuilding it was conducted on wrong lines for _immediate_
+effect--though friends of the North may have thought the method used was
+wise for _future_ effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster,
+leading in the debate[1001], called on Ministers to explain the
+"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer some
+pledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should have been
+active on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead of waiting to
+be urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a certain degree of
+complicity in the escape of the _Alabama_. The Solicitor-General
+answered in a legal defence of the Government, complained of the offence
+of America in arousing its citizens against Great Britain upon
+unjustifiable grounds, but did not make so vigorous a reply as might,
+perhaps, have been expected. Still he stood firmly on the ground that
+the Government could not act without evidence to convict--in itself a
+statement that might well preclude interference with the Rams. Bright
+accused the Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality," and
+referred at length to the public meeting of the previous evening:
+
+     "If you had last night looked in the faces of three thousand
+     of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London, as
+     I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for
+     that country for which you appear to care so little, you
+     would imagine that the more forbearing, the more generous,
+     and the more just the conduct of the Government to the United
+     States, the more it would recommend itself to the magnanimous
+     feelings of the people of this country."
+
+This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the people
+was not likely to win or to convince men, whether pro-Southern or not,
+who were opponents of the speaker's long-avowed advocacy of more
+democratic institutions in England. It is no wonder then that Laird, who
+had been castigated in the speeches of the evening, rising in defence of
+the conduct of his firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I would
+rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen _Alabamas_
+than as a man who applies himself deliberately to set class against
+class, and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when
+they come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the
+very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." This utterance was greeted
+with great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the _Alabama_ as
+in approval of the speaker's defiance of Bright.
+
+[Illustration: WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)]
+
+In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some immediate pledge
+by the Government, had gone the wrong way about to secure it. Vigour in
+attack was no way to secure a favourable response from Palmerston.
+Always a fighting politician in public it was inevitable that he should
+now fight back. Far from making the statement recommended to him by
+Russell, he concluded the debate by reasserting the correctness of
+governmental procedure in the case of the _Alabama_, and himself with
+vigour accused Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as to
+increase rather than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading of
+the speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows that
+while vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they were
+avoiding _any_ pledge of whatever nature, for the future.
+
+Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of the debate
+was "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of Lord Russell's
+speech than to confirm it[1002]." He and his English advisers were very
+uneasy, not knowing whether to trust to Russell's intimations of more
+active governmental efforts, or to accept the conclusion that his advice
+had been rejected by Palmerston[1003]. Possibly if less anxious and
+alarmed they would have read more clearly between the lines of
+parliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to hurry
+the Government into public announcement of a new policy was no proof
+that old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the result in
+Parliament, they forgot that the real pressure on Government was coming
+from an American declaration of an intention to issue privateers unless
+something were done to satisfy that country. Certainly Russell was
+unmoved by the debate for on April 3 he wrote to Palmerston:
+
+     "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the
+     ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have
+     thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained.
+     The Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the
+     measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law.
+
+     "We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we
+     have satisfied the opinion which prevails here as well as in
+     America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be
+     allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it[1004]."
+
+Two days later, on April 5, the _Alexandra_, a vessel being equipped to
+join the _Alabama_ as a commerce destroyer, was seized on the ground
+that she was about to violate the Enlistment Act and a new policy, at
+least to make a test case in law, was thereby made public. In fact, on
+March 30, but three days after the debate of March 27, the case of the
+_Alexandra_ had been taken up by Russell, referred to the law officers
+on March 31, and approved by them for seizure on April 4[1005]. Public
+meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's action,
+as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people applauded the
+seizure of the _Alexandra_, demanded vigorous prosecution of the Lairds
+and others, and urged governmental activity to prevent any further
+ship-building for the South[1006].
+
+On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be
+     procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate
+     service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings
+     which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from
+     justice of the _Oreto_ and _Alabama_[1007]."
+
+It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on _evidence_ to be
+sure, but on evidence of the vessels being "_apparently_ intended" for
+the South. This was far from being the same thing as the previous
+assertion that conclusive evidence was required. What, then, was the
+basic consideration in Russell's mind leading to such a face-about on
+declared policy? Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing
+neutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for the
+rising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful
+than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent in
+application of the American "privateering" Bill. How did Russell, and
+Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foresee
+and fear?
+
+As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had been
+introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason passed
+without serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles,
+Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that
+"something must be done" because vessels were building in England
+intended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under construction were
+clearly understood to have that purpose. If privateers were to offset
+the action of the Rams there must be some definite plan for their use.
+Seward and Adams repeatedly complained of British inaction yet in the
+same breath asserted that the privateers were intended to chase and
+destroy _Alabamas_--a plan so foolish, so it seemed to British
+diplomats, as to be impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of
+Seward. How, in short, _could_ privateers make good an injury to
+blockade about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockading
+squadrons on station off the Southern ports they would but become so
+much more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of
+_Alabamas_ the chances were that they would be the vanquished rather
+than the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile marine for
+them to attack and privateering against "enemy's commerce" was thus out
+of the question since there was no such commerce.
+
+There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended use of
+privateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the close blockade
+the only recourse of the North would be to establish a "cruising
+squadron" blockade remote from the shores of the enemy. If conducted by
+government war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to British
+interpretation of international law[1008]. But the Northern navy,
+conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfere
+seriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy or
+carrying cotton from Southern ports. A "flood of privateers," scouring
+the ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effective
+that closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in the
+Northern war programme.
+
+This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he saw in it
+a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clash
+leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's desire should be
+Russell's reaction, though never specifically explaining the exact
+purpose of the privateers. Moreover, nine-tenths of the actual
+blockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being so
+it was to be presumed that "privateers" searching for possible blockade
+runners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences with
+British merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in
+ordinary trade between non-belligerent ports.
+
+Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill,
+Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raise
+objections though not formally making official protest, and had asked
+for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of such
+vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by the
+Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventing
+unwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce by
+privateers[1009]. The alteration of governmental policy as indicated in
+the arrest of the _Alexandra_, it might be hoped, would at least cause a
+suspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired.
+Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations,
+had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet
+uninformed of the _Alexandra_ action, was still much alarmed. On April
+13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative
+to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last
+effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had made
+imminent[1010]." Lyons had argued with Seward the inadvisability of
+sending such a despatch, since it was now known that Russell had "spoken
+in a satisfactory manner" about Confederate vessels, but Seward was
+insistent. Lyons believed there was real cause for anxiety, writing:
+
+     "A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design
+     of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate
+     England, but still there can be little doubt that the
+     exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute a
+     serious danger. It is fully shared by many important members
+     of the Cabinet--nor are the men in high office exempt from
+     the overweening idea of the naval power of the United States,
+     which reconciles the people to the notion of a war with
+     England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned the flame in
+     order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I believe,
+     seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong
+     measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the
+     Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance
+     to them. If no military success be obtained within a short
+     time, it may become a Party necessity to resort to some means
+     of producing an excitement in the country sufficient to
+     enable the Government to enforce the Conscription Act, and to
+     exercise the extra-legal powers conferred by the late
+     Congress, To produce such an excitement the more ardent of
+     the party would not hesitate to go, to the verge of a war
+     with England. Nay there are not a few who already declare
+     that if the South must be lost, the best mode to conceal the
+     discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be to go
+     to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to
+     English interference[1011]."
+
+On the same day Lyons wrote, privately:
+
+     "I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some
+     better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted
+     out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my
+     opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without
+     leading the people here to think that they had gained their
+     point by threats[1012]."
+
+So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, he
+cipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing[1013], but
+soon his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could report
+that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for
+communication to Russell[1014], and on the twenty-fourth when
+presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the
+privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that the
+"latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of the
+_Alexandra_, had caused Seward to become very conciliatory. Lyons was
+assured that the plan "was for the present at rest[1015]." Apparently
+Seward now felt more security than did Lyons as to future British action
+for three days later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne
+that an American issue of letters of marque would surely come if
+England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a way
+as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps _must_ be taken to
+prevent their escape[1016].
+
+The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show that he
+regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern ship-building in
+British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. Seward became unusually
+friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in August he virtually forced
+Lyons to go on tour with him through the State of New York, thus making
+public demonstration of the good relations of the two Governments. This
+sweet harmony and mutual confidence is wholly contrary to the usual
+historical treatment of the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the
+threat of the privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily
+increasing in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by
+Adams to Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September.
+Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only
+American sources and have been at a loss to understand the privateering
+plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague generalization of its
+object in official utterances. It is the British reaction to that plan
+which reveals the real "threat" made and the actual crisis of
+the incident.
+
+It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires less
+extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The correct
+understanding of this later story is the recognition that Great Britain
+had in April given, a pledge and performed an act which satisfied Seward
+and Adams that the Rams would not be permitted to escape. It was their
+duty nevertheless to be on guard against a British relaxation of the
+promise made, and the delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing the
+Rams, caused American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of the
+sincerity of British actions.
+
+Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against Southern
+ship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the Foreign Office by a
+group of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting an alteration in the
+Foreign Enlistment Act if this were needed to prevent the issue of
+Southern ships, and pointing out that the "present policy" of the
+Government would entail a serious danger to British commerce in the
+future if, when England herself became a belligerent, neutral ports
+could be used by the enemy to build commerce destroyers[1017]. The
+memorial concluded that in any case it was a disgrace that British law
+should be so publicly infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gave
+the old answer that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtained
+of any act done with the intent to violate it[1018]." Evidently
+ship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutely
+alarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the _Alexandra_,
+and on June 22, a decision was rendered against the Government, but was
+promptly appealed.
+
+This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and the
+latter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams. Rumours
+were spread that the vessels were in fact intended for France, and when
+this was disproved that they were being built for the Viceroy of Egypt.
+This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was declared that the real
+owners were certain French merchants whose purpose in contracting for
+such clearly warlike vessels was left in mystery, but with the
+intimation that Egypt was to be the ultimate purchaser. Captain Bullock
+had indeed made such a contract of sale to French merchants but with the
+proviso of resale to him, after delivery. On his part, Russell was
+seeking _proof_ fully adequate to seizure, but this was difficult to
+obtain and such as was submitted was regarded by the law officers as
+inadequate. They reported that there was "no evidence capable of being
+presented to a court of justice." He informed Adams of this legal
+opinion at the moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearing
+completion, and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlier
+determination, began that series of diplomatic protests which very
+nearly approached a threat of war.
+
+At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's decision in
+the _Alexandra_ case, and shortly after the great Northern victories at
+Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11,
+which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war. In substance
+Seward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of Great
+Britain would find a way to nullify the _Alexandra_ decision, but
+renewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northern
+intention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to
+"pursue" Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019]. But there are
+two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative the
+belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not read or communicate
+it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and he
+did not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell. The latter never
+heard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United States
+diplomatic correspondence[1020].
+
+In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidence
+secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urge
+their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed his duty and was in
+fact acting in accordance with Russell's own request[1021]. On July 16
+he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of the
+South[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety
+because of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape,
+Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a
+participant in the war[1023]. Further affidavits were sent to Russell on
+August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that the
+Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in any way with
+these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed his
+regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the grave
+nature of the crisis pending between the United States and Great
+Britain. To this Russell replied that the matter was "under serious and
+anxious consideration," to which, on September 5, in a long
+communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped: "It would be
+superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war."
+
+The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war on
+the explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in the
+war. There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell's
+"change of policy" of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact was
+that on September 1, Russell had already given directions to take steps
+for the detention of the Rams and that on September 3, positive
+instructions were given to that effect[1024], though not carried out
+until some days later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy"
+of April; the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to
+secure evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for
+acting in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to
+be the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the
+_Alabama_. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain Bullock that
+complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was forced, finally, to
+act without it[1025].
+
+It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston, on
+September 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no Cabinet
+approval for this step had yet formally been given, since Russell
+notified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if he
+disapproved, to call a Cabinet at once[1026]. The _plan_ to stop the
+Rams must have long been understood for Palmerston called no Cabinet.
+Moreover it is to be presumed that he was preparing the public for the
+seizure, for on this same September 3, the _Times_, in a long editorial,
+argued that the law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmony
+with true neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to British
+commerce, as had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the _Times_ was at
+this period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at least
+inferential that the editorial was an advance notice of governmental
+intention to apply a policy known in intimate circles to have been for
+some time matured. Four days later, while governmental action was still
+unknown to the public another editorial advocated seizure of the
+Rams[1027]. Russell had acted under the fear that one of the Rams might
+slip away as had the _Alabama_; he had sent orders to stop and
+investigate, but he delayed final seizure in the hope that better
+evidence might yet be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letters
+with Lairds (the builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It was
+only on September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send the
+vessels on a "trial trip," and it was not until September 16 that public
+announcement was made of the Government's action[1028].
+
+Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it was not
+until September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him the Rams would
+be seized, even though three days before, on September 5, this
+information had been sent to Washington. The explanation is Russell's
+eager search for evidence to _convict_, and his correspondence with
+Lairds which did not come to a head until the eighth, when the builders
+refused to give information. To the builders Russell was writing as if a
+governmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no chance
+of a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed, Adams was well
+satisfied though his immediate reaction was to criticize, not Russell,
+but the general "timidity and vacillation" of the law officers of the
+Crown[1029]. Two days later, having learned from Russell himself just
+what was taking place, Adams described the "firm stand" taken by the
+Foreign Secretary, noted the general approval by the public press and
+expressed the opinion that there was now a better prospect of being able
+to preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since his
+arrival in London[1030]. Across the water British officials were
+delighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada expressed his
+approval[1031]. Lyons reported a "great improvement" in the feeling
+toward England and that Seward especially was highly pleased with
+Russell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem for Seward together
+with the hope that he would remain in office[1032].
+
+The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur until
+mid-October, though they had been placed under official surveillance on
+September 9. Both sides were jockeying for position in the expected
+legal battle when the case should be taken up by the courts[1033]. At
+first Russell even thought of making official protest to Mason in London
+and a draft of such protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officers
+and subsequently revised by Palmerston, but finally was not sent[1034].
+Possibly it was thought that such a communication to Mason approached
+too nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for in
+December the protest ultimately directed to be made through
+Consul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond and
+after stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing the
+Confederacy to present the following:
+
+     "It appears from various correspondence the authenticity of
+     which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate Government
+     having no good ports free from the blockade of the Federals
+     have conceived the design of using the ports of the United
+     Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be
+     equipped and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce
+     of the United States of America, a State with which Her
+     Majesty is at peace...."
+
+     "These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity
+     which ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a
+     Neutral Power.
+
+     "Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly
+     to observe it.
+
+     "You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his
+     Government to forbear from all acts tending to affect
+     injuriously Her Majesty's position[1035]."
+
+To carry out this instruction there was required permission for Crawford
+to pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when Lyons made the
+request[1036].
+
+Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's course in
+seizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very generally against
+the act. Adams now pressed either for an alteration of the British law
+or for a convention with America establishing mutual similar
+interpretation of neutral duty. Russell replied that "until the trials
+of the _Alexandra_ and the steam rams had taken place, we could hardly
+be said to know what our law was, and therefore not tell whether it
+required alteration. I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Seward
+that the wish and intention of Government were to make our neutrality an
+honest and bona-fide one[1037]." But save from extreme and avowed
+Southern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less to
+the stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political character,
+attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign Minister and his
+humiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to American threats."
+Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling of Parliament, a party
+attack was made on Russell and the Government by Derby in the House of
+Lords. Derby approved the stopping of the Rams but sought to prove that
+the Government had dishonoured England by failing to act of its own
+volition until threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of July
+II with much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printed
+American diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was not an
+instruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell flat for
+Russell simply replied that Adams had never presented such an
+instruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on February 15
+he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the dates of various
+documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a threat of war and
+Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was brief and to the effect
+that orders to stop the Rams had been given before the communications
+from Adams were received. Finally, on February 23, a motion in the
+Commons called for all correspondence with Adams and with Lairds, The
+Government consented to the first but refused that with Lairds and was
+supported by a vote of 187 to 153.[1038]
+
+Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of Russell the
+Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was virtually a vote
+of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud as was the Government
+in praise of Adams and in approval of the seizure of the Rams. Naturally
+their cause was weakened, and the Ministry, referring to expressions
+made and intentions indicated as far back as March, 1863, thus hinting
+without directly so stating that the real decision had then been made,
+was easily the victor in the vote[1038]. Derby had committed an error as
+a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, 1864, he
+attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on dates of
+documents. Russell's reply ignored that point altogether[1039]. It did
+not suit his purpose to declare, flatly, the fact that in April
+assurances had been given both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward,
+that measures would be taken to prevent the departure of Southern
+vessels from British ports. To have made this disclosure would have
+required an explanation _why_ such assurance had been given and this
+would have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern
+plan to create a _cruising squadron blockade by privateers_. _There_ was
+the real threat. The later delays and seeming uncertainties of British
+action made Adams anxious but there is no evidence that Russell ever
+changed his purpose. He sought stronger evidence before acting and he
+hoped for stronger support from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on
+the Rams and when they had reached the stage where there was danger of
+escape, he seized them even though the desired evidence was still
+lacking[1040]. Seward's "privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon
+in a moment of desperation and with no clear statement from him of its
+exact application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats became
+pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the
+interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the
+cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America complained.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 966: In other respects, also, this question of belligerent
+ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguely
+defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independence
+against Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at
+sea. Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firm
+of Lizardi & Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the
+ships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the
+guns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British
+Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority to
+purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strict
+neutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country.
+Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command. One Mexican vessel,
+the _Guadaloupe_, left England with full equipment as originally
+planned; the other, the _Montezuma_, was forced to strip her equipment.
+But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were
+permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. In
+all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, but
+it is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusion
+as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See my book, _British
+Interests and Activities in Texas_, Ch. IV.]
+
+[Footnote 967: Bullock, _Secret Service under the Confederacy_.]
+
+[Footnote 968: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American
+Civil War_, p. 338-9.]
+
+[Footnote 969: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'" Also _ibid._, "Correspondence
+between Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities at
+Liverpool relating to the 'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to
+the illness of a Crown adviser.]
+
+[Footnote 970: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264. Adams to
+Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 971: Selborne, in his _Memorials: Family and Personal_, II, p.
+430, declared that in frequent official communication with all members
+of the Cabinet at the time, "I never heard a word fall from any one of
+them expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the detention
+of the _Alabama_ were sent too late." Of quite different opinion is
+Brooks Adams, in his "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (_Proceedings_,
+Mass. Hist. Soc., Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, the
+American Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what
+purported to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse,
+Southern agent in England, warning him of danger to his "protegé." "This
+Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office." (_Ibid._, p.
+260, _note_.)]
+
+[Footnote 972: Fox, _Confidential Correspondence_, I, p. 165. Fox to
+Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 973: It is interesting that the opinion of many Continental
+writers on international law was immediately expressed in favour of the
+American and against the British contention. This was especially true of
+German opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]
+
+[Footnote 974: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 975: I am aware that Seward's use of the "Privateering Bill,"
+now to be recounted is largely a new interpretation of the play of
+diplomacy in regard to the question of Southern ship-building in
+England. Its significance became evident only when British
+correspondence was available; but that correspondence and a careful
+comparison of dates permits, and, as I think, requires a revised
+statement of the incident of the Laird Rams.]
+
+[Footnote 976: Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers and laying
+Northern cities under contribution. According to a statement made in
+1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the rams, no instructions as
+to their use had been given him by the Confederate Government, but his
+plans were solely to break the blockade with no thought of attacking
+Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV. 385, _note_.)]
+
+[Footnote 977: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, p. 134.]
+
+[Footnote 978: Wallbridge, _Addresses and Resolutions_. Pamphlet. New
+York, n.d. He began his agitation in 1856, and now received much popular
+applause. His pamphlet quotes in support many newspapers from June,
+1862, to September, 1863. Wallbridge apparently thought himself better
+qualified than Welles to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his
+agitation as instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet.
+Welles professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress
+unknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a statement
+difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon it.]
+
+[Footnote 979: Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. IV, pp.
+3271, 3325 and 3336.]
+
+[Footnote 980: _Ibid._, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, 393, and Part II,
+pp. 960, 1028, 1489.]
+
+[Footnote 981: Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams." (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, pp. 265-6.)]
+
+[Footnote 982: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 116,
+Feb. 19, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 983: F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 984: _Ibid._, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to Russell, March 10,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 985: _Ibid._, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, March 13, 1863.
+Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. (Russell Papers. To
+Russell, March 24, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 986: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 141.
+Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 987: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to Lyons, March 24,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 988: _Ibid._, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell to Lyons, March 27,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 989: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 245-50.]
+
+[Footnote 990: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 634, Slidell to Benjamin,
+March 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 991: For example of American contemporary belief and later
+"historical tradition," see Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, pp. 24-38.
+Also for a curious story that a large part of the price paid for Alaska
+was in reality a repayment of expenses incurred by Russia in sending her
+fleet to America, see _Letters of Franklin K. Lane_, p. 260. The facts
+as stated above are given by F.A. Golder, _The Russian Fleet and the
+Civil War_ (_Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915, pp. 801 _seq_.). The plan was
+to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of aid to the North
+was "born on American soil," and Russian officers naturally did nothing
+to contradict its spread. In one case, however, a Russian commander was
+ready to help the North. Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the
+harbour of San Francisco was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours
+of the approach of the _Alabama_ and gave orders to protect the city. He
+acted without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his
+superiors at home.]
+
+[Footnote 992: _The Liberator_, March 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 993: American opinion knew little of this change. An
+interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan to thwart
+Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by the United
+States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams outright by the offer
+of such a price as, it was thought, would be so tempting to the Lairds
+as to make refusal unlikely. Two men, Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to
+England with funds and much embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetly
+refrained from stating details, but yet permitted him to guess their
+object. The plan of buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic
+protests on England's duty in international law and the agents
+themselves soon saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the
+Navy, wrote to Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in
+England, I think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.)
+Thurlow Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of
+Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 632.) Forbes
+reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on with the plan.
+"We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we have put new fire into
+Mr. Dudley by furnishing _fuel_, and he is hard at it getting
+evidence.... My opinion _to-day_ is that we can and shall stop by legal
+process and by the British Government the sailing of ironclads and other
+war-ships." (Forbes MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department
+plan and was disliked by State Department representatives is shown by
+Dudley's complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately
+discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding
+citations, in his _Studies Military and Diplomatic_, Ch. IX. "An
+Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by Chittenden
+written in 1890, in which bad memory and misunderstanding played sad
+havoc with historical truth.]
+
+[Footnote 994: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To
+Seward, March 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 995: _Ibid._, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 996: State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356. Adams to
+Seward, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 997: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 998: Rhodes, IV, p. 369, _notes_, April 4, 1863. Bright was
+made very anxious as to Government intentions by this debate.]
+
+[Footnote 999: This topic will be treated at length in Chapter XVIII. It
+is here cited merely in relation to its effect on the Government at
+the moment.]
+
+[Footnote 1000: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, 307-8.]
+
+[Footnote 1001: Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for entire debate.]
+
+[Footnote 1002: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 164.
+Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1003: Rhodes, IV, 369-72.]
+
+[Footnote 1004: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 1005: Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in June, and the
+seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government this decision was
+upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It was again appealed, and
+the Government defeated in the House of Lords in April, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1006: _Manchester Examiner and Times_, April 7, 1863. Goldwin
+Smith was one of the principal speakers. Letters were read from Bright,
+Forster, R.A. Taylor, and others.]
+
+[Footnote 1007: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 183.]
+
+[Footnote 1008: "Historicus," in articles in the _Times_, was at this
+very moment, from December, 1862, on, discussing international law
+problems, and in one such article specifically defended the belligerent
+right to conduct a cruising squadron blockade. See _Historicus on
+International Law_, pp. 99-118. He stated the established principle to
+be that search and seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels
+actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but
+those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have
+been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the
+blockade." (_Ibid._, p. 108.)]
+
+[Footnote 1009: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to Lyons, March
+28, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1010: F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 1011: _Ibid._, No. 310. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1012: Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1013: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy enclosed in Lyons to
+Russell, April 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1014: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 1015: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to Russell, April
+24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1016: Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons wrote: "The stories
+in the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England are
+untrue. But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearly
+determined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatches
+sent were not satisfactory. It is very easy to see that if U.S.
+privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on charges
+of breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations would
+have soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must
+have ensued."]
+
+[Footnote 1017: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on Foreign Enlistment Act."]
+
+[Footnote 1018: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1019: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, pp.
+308-10.]
+
+[Footnote 1020: The despatch taken in its entirety save for a few
+vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's phrase-making, is not at
+all warlike. Bancroft, II, 385 _seq_., makes Seward increasingly anxious
+from March to September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to
+Adams, September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivings
+reported in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my
+interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made in
+April would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to Russell
+a communication from Seward denying that his July 11 despatch was
+intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to Great Britain.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons, April 3, 1864.)]
+
+[Footnote 1021: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII.
+"Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels building at Birkenhead."]
+
+[Footnote 1022: See next chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 1023: State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No. 452, and No. 453
+with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1024: Rhodes, IV, 381.]
+
+[Footnote 1025: Many of these details were unknown at the time so that
+on the face of the documents then available, and for long afterwards,
+there appeared ground for believing that Adams' final protests of
+September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to yield. Dudley, as late as 1893,
+thought that "at the crisis" in September, Palmerston, in the absence of
+Russell, had given the orders to stop the rams. (In _Penn. Magazine of
+History_, Vol. 17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England during
+the Late War.")]
+
+[Footnote 1026: Rhodes, IV, p. 382.]
+
+[Footnote 1027: The _Times_, Sept. 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1028: _Ibid._, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863. The Governmental
+correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a motion in Parliament, Feb.
+23, 1864, but the Government was supported in refusing it. A printed
+copy of this correspondence, issued privately, was placed in Adams'
+hands by persons unnamed and sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Seward
+thereupon had this printed in the _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1864-5,
+Pt. I, No. 633.]
+
+[Footnote 1029: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 492. Adams to
+Seward, Sept. 8, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1030: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 370.
+To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at the whole matter of the
+Rams and the alleged "threat of war" of Sept. 5, from the point of view
+of his own anxiety at the time, was naturally inclined to magnify the
+effects of his own efforts and to regard the _crisis_ as occurring in
+September. His notes to Russell and his diary records were early the
+main basis of historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved
+the accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, p. 293, _seq._) ignores Rhodes,
+harks back to the old argument and amplifies it with much new and
+interesting citation, but not to conviction. My interpretation is that
+the real crisis of Governmental decision to act came in April, and that
+events in September were but final applications of that decision.]
+
+[Footnote 1031: Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. 26, 1863. Copy in
+Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1032: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1033: Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You will learn by the
+papers that we have at last seized the Iron Clads. Whether we shall be
+able to bring home to them legally that they were Confederate property
+is another matter. I think we can, but at all events no moral doubt can
+be entertained of the fact, and, therefore, we are under no anxiety
+whether as to the public or Parliamentary view of our proceeding. They
+would have played the devil with the American ships, for they are most
+formidable ships. I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably in
+consequence." (Lyons Papers.) The Foreign Office thought that it had
+thwarted plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine to
+Hammond, Oct. 26, 1863.).]
+
+[Footnote 1034: F.O., Am., Vol. 929. Marked "September, 1863." The draft
+summarized the activities of Confederate ship-building and threatened
+Southern agents in England with "the penalities of the law...."]
+
+[Footnote 1035: F.O., Am., Vol. 932, No. 1. F.O. to Consul-General
+Crawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7, 1863, had already
+"expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to protest against this
+also. (_Ibid._, No. 4.)]
+
+[Footnote 1036: Bonham. _British Consuls in the South_, p. 254.
+(Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43.)]
+
+[Footnote 1037: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5, 1863. Bullock,
+_Secret Service_, declares the British Government to have been neutral
+but with strong leaning toward the North.]
+
+[Footnote 1038: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIII, pp. 430-41, 544-50,
+955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by Brooks Adams,
+_The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, pp. 312-324.]
+
+[Footnote 1039: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXIV, pp. 1862-1913. _The Index_,
+naturally vicious in comment on the question of the Rams, summed up its
+approval of Derby's contentions: "Europe and America alike will
+inevitably believe that it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothing
+else, which induced the Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the
+1st September, and they will draw the necessary conclusion that the way
+to extort concessions from England is by bluster and menace." (Feb. 18,
+1864, p. 106.)]
+
+[Footnote 1040: Lairds brought suit for damages, but the case never
+reached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by the Government.
+This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the Government that it had
+no case. In my view the failure to push the case to a conclusion was due
+to the desire not to commit Great Britain on legal questions, in view of
+the claim for damages certain to be set up by the United States on
+account of the depredations of the _Alabama_.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+ROEBUCK'S MOTION
+
+In the mid-period during which the British Government was seeking to
+fulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards ship-building and
+while the public was unaware that such a promise had been given, certain
+extreme friends of the South thought the time had come for renewed
+pressure upon the Government, looking toward recognition of the
+Confederacy. The _Alexandra_ had been seized in April, but the first
+trial, though appealed, had gone against the Government in June, and
+there was no knowledge that the Ministry was determined in its stand.
+From January to the end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations in
+approval of the emancipation proclamation had somewhat checked
+expressions of Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friends
+had recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came forward
+in the person of Roebuck.
+
+Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends had not
+ceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less vigorous tone. For
+four months after the British refusal of Napoleon's overtures on
+mediation, in November, 1862, the friends of the South were against
+"acting now," but this did not imply that they thought the cause lost or
+in any sense hopeless. Publicists either neutral in attitude or even
+professedly sympathetic with the North could see no outcome of the Civil
+War save separation of North and South. Thus the historian Freeman in
+the preface to the first volume of his uncompleted _History of Federal
+Government_, published in 1863, carefully explained that his book did
+not have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued that the
+breaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent weakness in a
+federal system, but took it for granted that American reunion was
+impossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a long tour of the
+North, beginning in September, 1861, published late in 1862 a two-volume
+work, _North America_, descriptive of a nation engaged in the business
+of war and wholly sympathetic with the Northern cause. Yet he, also,
+could see no hope of forcing the South back into the Union. "The North
+and South are virtually separated, and the day will come in which the
+West also will secede[1041]."
+
+Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual; they
+were, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in November,
+1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to prove it to be so
+for never again was there so near an approach to British intervention.
+Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think that true Southern policy
+was now to make an appeal to the Tories against the Government. In
+January, 1863, he was planning a new move:
+
+     "I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time for a
+     thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a
+     vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body
+     and if so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I
+     have seen Mr. Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself
+     in communication with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for
+     action for this seems to me now our best card[1042]."
+
+That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the attitude
+of the _Index_ which all through the months from November, 1862, to the
+middle of January, 1863, had continued to harp on the subject of
+mediation as if still believing that something yet might be done by the
+existing Ministry, but which then apparently gave up hope of the
+Palmerstonian administration:
+
+     "But what the Government means is evident enough. It does not
+     mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if it
+     can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States,
+     unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over
+     which they have no control,' which leave weak men and weak
+     ministers no choice. They will not, if they are not forced to
+     it, quarrel with Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will
+     let Lancashire starve; they will let British merchantmen be
+     plundered off Nassau and burnt off Cuba; they will submit to
+     a blockade of Bermuda or of Liverpool; but they will do
+     nothing which may tend to bring a supply of cotton from the
+     South, or to cut off the supply of eggs and bacon from the
+     North[1043]."
+
+But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant encouragement
+and was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by the debate in
+Parliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby gave explicit
+approval of the Government's refusal to listen to Napoleon[1044]. By
+February, Russell, having recovered from the smart of defeat within the
+Cabinet, declared himself weary of the perpetual talk about mediation
+and wrote to Lyons, "... till both parties are heartily tired and sick
+of the business, I see no use in talking of good offices. When that time
+comes Mercier will probably have a hint; let him have all the honour and
+glory of being the first[1045]." For the time being Spence's idea was
+laid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from Mason:
+
+     "The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at
+     present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be
+     useless to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North.
+     Any motion on the subject will be received with disfavour,
+     consequently the way in which it will be treated will only
+     make the North more elated, and will irritate the South
+     against us. If I saw the slightest chance of a motion being
+     received with any favour I would not let it go into other
+     hands, but I find the most influential men of all Parties
+     opposed to it[1046]."
+
+Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in France,
+reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the Foreign Office"
+that "It is believed that every possible thing has been done here in
+your behalf--we must now await the action of England, and it is through
+that you must aim all your efforts in that direction[1047]."
+
+With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to move the
+British Government or to stir Parliament, energies were now directed
+toward using financial methods of winning support for the Southern
+cause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken with the double
+object of providing funds for Southern agents in Europe and of creating
+an interested support of the South, which might, it was hoped,
+ultimately influence the British Government.
+
+By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the blockade, for
+the Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its agents abroad.
+Bullock, especially, required large amounts in furtherance of his
+ship-building contracts and was embarrassed by the lack of business
+methods and the delays of the Government at home. The incompetence of
+the Confederacy in finance was a weakness that characterized all of its
+many operations whether at home or abroad[1048] and was made evident in
+England by the confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. At
+first the Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with drafts
+upon the house of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, of Liverpool, a branch of
+the firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina, purchasing its
+bills of exchange with its own "home made" money. But as Confederate
+currency rapidly depreciated this method of transmitting funds became
+increasingly difficult and costly. The next step was to send to Spence,
+nominated by Mason as financial adviser in England, Confederate money
+bonds for sale on the British market, with authority to dispose of them
+as low as fifty cents on the dollar, but these found no takers[1049]. By
+September, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted and
+some new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was found in
+adopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made the basis for
+an advance of Ł60,000, a form of cotton bond being devised which fixed
+the price of cotton at eightpence the pound. These bonds were not put on
+the market but were privately placed by Lindsay & Company with a few
+buyers for the entire sum, the transaction remaining secret[1050].
+
+In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to the
+authorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton should be
+purchased by the Government, stored, and certificates issued to be sold
+abroad, the purchaser being assured of "all facilities of shipment."
+Spence was to be the authorized agent for the sale of these "cotton
+certificates," but before any reached him various special agents of the
+Confederacy had arrived in England by December, 1862, with such
+certificates in their possession and had disposed of some of them,
+calling them "cotton warrants." The difficulties which might arise from
+separate action in the market were at once perceived and following a
+conference with Mason all cotton obligations were turned to Fraser,
+Trenholm & Company. Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but no
+further attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants"
+were considered a better means of raising funds.
+
+It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved a
+governmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants" partook
+of the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point the Richmond
+authorities, after the first failure to sell "money bonds" abroad were
+not keen to attempt anything that could be stamped as a foreign
+"government loan." Their idea was rather that a certain part of the
+produce of the South was being set aside as the property of those who in
+England should extend credit to the South. The sole purpose of these
+earlier operations was to provide funds for Southern agents. By July,
+1862, Bullock had exhausted his earlier credit of a million dollars. The
+Ł60,000 loan secured through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demand
+and this had been followed by a development on similar lines of the
+"cotton certificates" and "warrants" which by December, 1862, had
+secured, through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars or
+thereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of this
+method and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however, there was
+broached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for the definite
+floating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan."
+
+This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by the
+well-established firm of Erlanger & Company. First approached by this
+company in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but found the latter
+strongly committed to his own plans with Spence[1051]. But Slidell
+persisted and Mason gave way[1052]. Representatives of Erlanger
+proceeded to Richmond and proposed a loan of twenty-five million
+dollars; they were surprised to find the Confederate Government
+disinclined to the idea of a foreign loan, and the final agreement, cut
+to fifteen millions, was largely made because of the argument advanced
+that as a result powerful influences would thus be brought to the
+support of the South[1053]. The contract was signed at Richmond, January
+28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the day
+following[1054]. But there was no Southern enthusiasm for the project.
+Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy disclaimed the "desire or
+intention on our part to effect a loan in Europe ... during the war we
+want only such very moderate sums as are required abroad for the
+purchase of warlike supplies and for vessels, and even that is not
+required because of our want of funds, but because of the difficulties
+of remittance"; as for the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would have
+declined it altogether but for the political considerations indicated by
+Mr. Slidell[1055]...."
+
+From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from
+Slidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the purpose
+of establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to suspend the
+operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's offer was learned,
+but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing agent of the Confederacy,
+caused a further sale of "cotton warrants[1056]." Spence, fearing he was
+about to be shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while
+Slidell regarded Spence[1057] as a weak and meddlesome agent[1058]. But
+on February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and
+uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and
+agreed to co-operate in floating the loan[1059]. Then followed a
+remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so much as regards
+the financial returns to the South, for these were negligible, as in
+relation to the declared object of Slidell and the Richmond
+Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would accompany the
+successful flotation of a loan.
+
+Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to receive
+promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress authorizing the
+loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this contract Erlanger &
+Company, sole managers of the loan, had guaranteed flotation of the
+entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77, the profit of the Company to be
+five per cent., plus the difference between 77 and the actual price
+received, but the first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the
+disposal of the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19,
+in London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically
+all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was
+entitled "_Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States of
+America for_ 3 _Millions Sterling at_ 90 _per Cent_." The bonds were to
+bear interest at seven per cent. and were to be exchangeable for cotton
+at the option of the holder at the price of sixpence "for each pound of
+cotton, at any time not later than six months after the ratification of
+a treaty of peace between the present belligerents." There were
+provisions for the gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who
+did not desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on
+application. 10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the
+days, the first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the
+first of August, September and October.
+
+Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound it was
+thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at least a good
+chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. True "the loan was
+looked upon as a wild cotton speculation[1060]," but odds were so large
+as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed hardly conceivable
+that cotton could for some years go below sevenpence per pound, and even
+that figure would have meant profit, _if_ the Confederacy were
+established. Moreover, even though the loan was not given official
+recognition by the London stock exchange, the financial columns of the
+_Times_ and the _Economist_ favoured it and the subscriptions were so
+prompt and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as
+over-subscribed three times in London alone[1061]. With the closing of
+the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. Slidell wrote: "It is a
+financial recognition of our independence, emanating from a class
+proverbially cautious, and little given to be influenced by sentiment or
+sympathy[1062]." On Friday, March 27, the allotment took place and three
+days later Mason wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on
+the triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, _malgré_ all
+detraction and calumny, that cotton is king at last[1063]."
+
+"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble and it
+took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep him in
+state[1064]." On April 1, the flurry of speculation had begun to falter
+and the loan was below par; on the second it dropped to 3-1/2 discount,
+and by the third the promoters and the Southern diplomats were very
+anxious. They agreed that someone must be "bearing" the bonds and
+suspected Adams of supplying Northern funds for that purpose[1065].
+Spence wrote from Liverpool in great alarm and coincidently Erlanger &
+Company urged that Mason should authorize the use of the receipts
+already secured to hold up the price of the bonds. Mason was very
+reluctant to do this[1066], but finally yielded when informed of the
+result of an interview between Spence, Erlanger, and the latter's chief
+London agent, Schroeder. Spence had proposed a withdrawal of a part of
+the loan from the market as likely to have a stabilizing effect, and
+opposed the Erlanger plan of using the funds already in hand. But
+Schroeder coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative
+refused to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market,
+then Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their
+contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued it,
+they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up their
+instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent sacrificed
+is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government at all, but the
+profits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co., actually in their hands, and they
+cannot be expected to take a worse position. At any rate they will not
+do so, and unless the compact can be made on the basis we name, matters
+must take their course[1067]."
+
+In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he "could not
+hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, as
+well as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068]." Mason
+gave the required authorization and this was later approved from
+Richmond. For a time the "bulling" of the loan was successful, but again
+and again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bonds
+and in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy. Some
+$6,000,000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entire
+operation it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the
+Confederacy, although, as stated by the _Economist_, over $12,000,000 of
+the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investors
+at the end of the war[1069].
+
+The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell,
+a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer of
+Southern fortunes[1070]. From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loan
+bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked the
+regard attached to sound investment. This fact in itself denied to the
+loan any such favourable influence, or "financial recognition of the
+Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success,
+attributed to it. The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited it
+and tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus
+"confidence in the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of
+increased by this turning from political to financial methods of
+bringing pressure upon the Government[1071].
+
+Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reserved
+from January to June, 1863. Public attention was distracted from the war
+in America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly during
+the months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relations
+existing between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent on
+going beyond British "meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily
+might lead to war with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America,
+and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish
+question than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was
+still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary "push"
+and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancashire
+little attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have been
+seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration. This was
+a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directed
+against the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees' sufferings.
+Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and
+his brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet
+no effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of the
+South[1072].
+
+In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to make
+advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton loan, though
+fairly strong again because of Confederate governmental aid, was in fact
+a failure in its expected result of public support for the South;
+something must be done to offset that failure. In Polish affairs France
+had drawn back; presumably Napoleon was again eager for some active
+effort. Best of all, the military situation in America was thought to
+indicate Southern success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt
+with the stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at
+Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly
+defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a
+definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance north
+did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in a select
+circle in England and much was expected of it. The time seemed ripe,
+therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck of a motion for
+the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the real purpose of which
+was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' which had been advocated by
+Spence in January, but postponed on the advice of Gregory[1073]. _The
+Index_ clearly indicated where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now
+asks what will be the policy of Great Britain towards America; but
+everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will do."
+
+     "... England to-day pays one of the inevitable penalties of
+     free government and of material prosperity, that of having at
+     times at the head of national affairs statesmen who belong
+     rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and
+     merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details,
+     acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient
+     comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies....
+
+     "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a
+     diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or
+     determination, except where the display of these qualities
+     was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From
+     Great Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet
+     at Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States
+     nothing to expect[1074]."
+
+Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The _Times_
+minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as required for
+political effect to hold the north-western states loyal to the Union,
+and while indulging in no prophecies as to the fate of Vicksburg,
+expressing the opinion that, if forced to surrender it, the South could
+easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at some other point[1075]. Naturally
+_The Index_ was pleased with and supported this view[1076]. Such
+ignorance of the geographic importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful
+misleading of the public; but professed British military experts were
+equally ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at
+Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American campaigns,
+centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia and
+reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, any
+Northern attack[1077]. He dismissed the western campaigns as of no real
+significance. W.H. Russell, now editor of the _Army and Navy Gazette_,
+better understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed
+Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the
+Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the success
+of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck's motion
+for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it.
+
+     "If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the
+     North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and
+     trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it
+     to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can
+     breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered
+     Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who
+     imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South,
+     divide the nations on each side of the black and white line
+     for ever, and bring this war to the end. There is probably
+     not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define
+     the limits of the State to be recognized.... And, over and
+     above all, recognition, unless it meant 'war,' would be an
+     aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid
+     the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity
+     and the fury of the North[1078]."
+
+The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck's
+motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has given notice of
+a motion to recognize the South. But I think it certain that neither
+Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no great
+number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from all parties will compose the
+minority[1079]." Russell was correct in this view but not so did it
+appear to Southern agents who now became active at the request of
+Roebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of
+willingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word.
+There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but there
+seemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one.
+The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. On
+June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuck
+asking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrote
+that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance that
+he, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far he
+might communicate them to "our friends in the House[1081]." Slidell saw
+the Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of "forcing the
+English Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry," asked that an
+interview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury,
+a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in
+a Tory cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid
+in upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested
+interview and declared he would go to the length of officially informing
+the British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss the
+advisability of recognizing the South[1082].
+
+This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from Mocquard
+stating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London, had been
+instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and Lindsay had hurried
+to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the twenty-fifth, Slidell
+reported that they were authorized to state in the House of Commons that
+France was "not only willing but anxious to recognize the Confederate
+States with the co-operation of England[1083]." Slidell added, however,
+that Napoleon had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal
+proposal to Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received by
+Slidell from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance be
+known to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on
+June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and asked
+for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being permitted
+to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed instruction[1084], he received a
+reply indicating confusion somewhere:
+
+     "I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires Etrangeres
+     on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just left me.
+     M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to Baron
+     Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he
+     directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading
+     Members of Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the
+     subject of American affairs were unchanged. That he was
+     disposed with the co-operation of England immediately to
+     recognize the Confederate States; this was in the form of a
+     draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he officially
+     instructed the Baron to sound _Palmerston_ on the subject and
+     to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This was
+     done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the
+     Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait
+     bien d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis décidé ŕ
+     reconnaître le Sud.' This is by far the most significant
+     thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the
+     others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England
+     may do or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press
+     his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's
+     declaration. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute it and
+     the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest
+     entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not heard from
+     Baron Gros the result of his interview with Palmerston. I
+     see that the latter has been unwell and it is probable that
+     the former had not been able to see him. There can be no
+     impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will
+     doubtless give him information which he will use to
+     advantage. I write in great haste; will you do me the favour
+     to let Lord Campbell know the substance of this note,
+     omitting that portion of it which relates to the Emperor's
+     inclination to act alone. Pray excuse me to Lord Campbell for
+     not writing to him, time not permitting me to do so[1085]."
+
+This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, "Can I
+put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by
+Corcoran[1086]." To which Slidell replied by letter:
+
+     "For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write to
+     say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be
+     _used in any way_. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay
+     when they were here and have no objection that they should
+     again see it confidentially[1087]."
+
+On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the information that
+no formal communication had been made to Russell. The next day in an
+effort in some way to secure an admission of what Mason and his friends
+believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell asked Russell in the House of
+Lords if he had received either a document or a verbal communication
+outlining Napoleon's desires. Russell replied that Baron Gros had told
+him "an hour ago" that he had not even received any instruction to
+deliver such a communication[1088]. This was in the hours preceding the
+debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had been an
+error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck and Lindsay,
+or else there was a question of veracity between Russell, Baron Gros
+and Napoleon.
+
+Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the Queen to
+enter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation in
+recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had in
+fact established its independence and that this was greatly to England's
+advantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in the
+West. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancashire--a
+point his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerous
+concern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and
+minimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easy
+victory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the
+Government Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon,
+claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to
+action and asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply
+again to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was
+concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, he
+added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could be
+renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, through
+Lyons, the contents of a former application.
+
+Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat
+perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot with
+all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was direct
+attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate.
+Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, was
+sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field of
+diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in the
+war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality.
+Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government,
+while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or
+South, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster
+to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was
+positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck's
+motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herself
+to any line of policy, especially as military events were "now
+occurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "the
+main result of the contest was not doubtful." Here spoke that element of
+the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success.
+
+If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends
+might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change
+of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself
+than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in
+meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and
+emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home
+Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself
+to be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It early
+became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had
+been committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new
+French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of
+it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to
+unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a
+support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck
+"feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party strongly
+supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere
+party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial
+resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and
+in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government.
+Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British
+emancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most
+powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In
+particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of
+Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his
+"friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by
+recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond
+of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated upon
+the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor
+of France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, he
+asserted, was in great danger of being too much represented in
+Parliament[1091].
+
+The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting to
+Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they
+were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal to
+permit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's assertions.
+Mason wrote:
+
+     "I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of
+     to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was
+     present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell
+     said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair
+     remains in a 'muss,' unless the Emperor will show his hand
+     _on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or
+     derive any benefit from his private and individual
+     revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can
+     be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one language in
+     private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge,'
+     and another to his ambassador here. The debate is adjourned
+     to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his
+     explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no
+     confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from
+     him so far can invite only distrust[1092]."
+
+As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of the
+Confederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic with
+the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no value
+unless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedly
+opposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring that
+premature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war
+by the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to be
+renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and return
+to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layard
+reaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received from
+France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a British
+revelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the document
+in question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward's
+attention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence
+wrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion:
+
+     "I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and
+     great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr.
+     Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated
+     by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the
+     North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the
+     minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North....
+
+     "The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on
+     the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which
+     tells injuriously instead of being the great support....
+
+     "If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to
+     support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In
+     the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and
+     would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members
+     are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the
+     vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]."
+
+On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured an
+agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]."
+Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the
+matter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy
+and actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a
+feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a
+pro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further
+discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrote
+in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9:
+
+     "Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you,
+     and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping
+     altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further
+     mention or discussion of what passed between you and Mr.
+     Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the
+     other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the
+     other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The
+     British Parliament receives messages and communications from
+     their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other
+     countries...."
+
+     "No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor
+     from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the
+     multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused
+     for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr.
+     Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any
+     discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations
+     between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you
+     to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow
+     traveller[1099]."
+
+The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to
+withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the
+uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed
+to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the
+debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of
+the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper
+matters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the French
+Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this
+case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay
+entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the
+accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not
+to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The _Scotia_,
+he said was due and any moment news from America might change the
+governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply
+disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's
+actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for
+continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's
+"diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and
+those of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the
+motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord
+Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this
+was finally done[1100].
+
+All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's
+advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yet
+at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive
+campaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, that
+Lee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met by
+a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and
+eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101].
+Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victorious
+advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came
+out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion,
+arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no
+hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck
+moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the
+impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay,
+his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own
+"amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon
+and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact,
+"employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in
+reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this
+would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his
+duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have
+passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]."
+
+The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of
+the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of
+the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover
+into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal
+veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt
+the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon
+which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a
+deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might
+now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no
+evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any
+consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even to
+the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the
+Government in relation to Southern ship-building.
+
+Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern
+victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be
+overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on
+the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at
+Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_
+two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army
+had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it
+was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope
+there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of
+the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from
+Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though
+efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither
+side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous
+assertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose
+Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the
+capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great
+disaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly a
+British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_
+since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of
+Vicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place renders
+the blow heavier[1107]."
+
+"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week,
+never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that
+the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds
+and that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they had
+refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109].
+
+If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern
+effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from
+the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune
+of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental
+attitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by
+the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was
+acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the
+Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention
+had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the
+Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing
+that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined
+not to receive him:
+
+     "Under these circumstances, your continued residence in
+     London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent
+     with the dignity of this Government, and the President
+     therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end,
+     and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from
+     London[1110]."
+
+A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain
+if there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but since
+the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made
+public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received,
+September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the
+very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though
+there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping
+of Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was with
+the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of
+Roebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "serious
+reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England
+"has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention
+or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict
+neutrality[1111]."
+
+Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction
+and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed
+making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took
+place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the
+regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened to
+join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in
+her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from
+the _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the only
+Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the
+Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all
+hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt
+distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.
+
+On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly
+in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made
+public, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the folly
+of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In
+general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let
+Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal
+understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict
+neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of
+the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy
+but also with seeming finality:
+
+     "I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which
+     have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the
+     overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto
+     prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the
+     accredited Minister of an established State.
+
+     "These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to
+     repeat them.
+
+     "I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating
+     your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of
+     affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and
+     satisfaction[1116]."
+
+Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were
+still to be his, but the chief rôle there was now assigned to others and
+the principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully
+concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is
+evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He
+regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an
+English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of
+Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the
+Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston
+were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of
+action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his
+acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.
+
+If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was
+correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was
+officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same
+private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a
+notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by
+England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_,
+unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of
+a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea
+came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result
+of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the
+war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory
+clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American
+Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing
+difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was
+quick to see the danger. He wrote:
+
+     "Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath
+     from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be
+     denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be
+     founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end
+     firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But
+     then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not
+     allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its
+     being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal
+     on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to
+     break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force
+     the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the
+     United States Government and people would become more
+     difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am
+     going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only
+     an excuse for doing so[1118]."
+
+Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's
+readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of
+1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a
+contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught
+napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general
+speculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think the
+Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any
+European Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it
+will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of
+withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his
+representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the
+matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:
+
+     "I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think
+     this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship
+     which might turn sour like beer if there should be a
+     thunder-storm.
+
+     "But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers
+     with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom
+     our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United
+     States[1121]."
+
+If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there
+was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the
+South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I
+hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the
+past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry
+Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open
+public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two
+pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123].
+Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was
+bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams,
+by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the
+ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125].
+
+Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the
+cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of
+activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the military
+situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely
+negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by
+organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West
+had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September
+18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover
+Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled
+to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen
+back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable
+front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been
+expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.
+Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small
+wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now
+declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count
+much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published
+book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the
+organization of the "Southern Independence Association." Seeking a
+specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first
+fixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appeal
+from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On
+December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to
+town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would
+again be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the
+seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to
+Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or
+on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124.]
+
+[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.]
+
+[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in
+control of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing
+this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the
+support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all
+the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never
+to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made
+notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in
+the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a
+letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a
+copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy
+letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16,
+1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F.
+Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams'
+death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My
+references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and
+transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities
+to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_,
+he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, had
+seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant
+distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American
+whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the
+question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to
+Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his
+regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the
+Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on
+the _Times_.]
+
+[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI.]
+
+[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3,
+1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.]
+
+[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives the
+best analysis and history of Southern financing.]
+
+[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to
+contractors in payment for materials.]
+
+[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to
+Erlanger's son.]
+
+[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in
+recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe
+that even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influence
+will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin,
+Oct. 28, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31.
+Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond,
+since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact
+with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.]
+
+[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1058: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1059: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to
+Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.]
+
+[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._, p. 33. In France permission to advertise the
+loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of
+the Emperor.]
+
+[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at
+Stanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I am
+much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."]
+
+[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the
+real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental
+intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary
+debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other
+hand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4
+they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be
+presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had
+not failed to reach the bond market.]
+
+[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1067: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was
+written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact
+statement of what had occurred.]
+
+[Footnote 1068: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger &
+Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves
+been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the
+presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly
+unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market
+showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to
+Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.]
+
+[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run by
+Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a
+recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per
+cent. discount.]
+
+[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and
+published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which
+appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a serious
+one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his
+_Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many
+writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic
+denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley,
+_Gladstone_, II, p. 83.]
+
+[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.]
+
+[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155.]
+
+[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.]
+
+[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland
+and Virginia_, London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1078: _Army and Navy Gazette_, June 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1080: Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the Southern
+Confederacy_, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England"
+is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in the
+Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himself
+notes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misled
+some historians who have derived from his work the idea that the
+critical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863,
+whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt,
+"Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War," pp. 413 _seq_. Schmidt's thesis
+is largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).]
+
+[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell.]
+
+[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5.]
+
+[Footnote 1083: _Ibid._, p. 186. To Benjamin.]
+
+[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Mason
+wrote: "The question of veracity is raised."]
+
+[Footnote 1085: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1086: _Ibid._, To Slidell.]
+
+[Footnote 1087: _Ibid._, To Mason. "Monday eve." (June 29, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXI, p. 1719.]
+
+[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrier
+labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his enemies.]
+
+[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends.
+They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy their
+friendship.]
+
+[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate of
+June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London on
+his way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before the
+debate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he
+expected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck
+sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story--the
+story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not cross
+swords with me again." Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck given
+by Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I ever
+witnessed." (_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 161-2.)]
+
+[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. 67-73.]
+
+[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli,
+throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing with
+many of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately as
+believing the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrain
+from such comment publicly. (Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, p. 328.)]
+
+[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. 252.]
+
+[Footnote 1098: _The Index_ felt it necessary to combat this, and on
+July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to be
+negligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "All
+the sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been with
+the South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated the
+line which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist
+_Debats_, Republican _Sičcle_, The Palais Royal _Opinion_, all join in
+the halloo against the South."]
+
+[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 _seq_., July 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New York
+correspondent of the _Times_, containing a similar prediction but in
+much stronger terms. For the last half of the war the _Times_ was badly
+served by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation from
+an extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay who
+served the _Times_ in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865.
+(Mackay, _Forty Years' Recollections_, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had
+strict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to
+Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported that
+Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington should
+fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, since
+it would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could no
+doubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southern
+defeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought
+the complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie
+Stephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this
+time. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met
+Seward, being received with much cordiality as a _verbal_ champion in
+England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on the
+war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of the
+friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on political
+economy. (Maitland, _Leslie Stephen_, p. 120.)]
+
+[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent,
+dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, would
+welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride in
+triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiastic
+multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America." The New York
+city which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give some
+ground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless--and New
+York was not the North.]
+
+[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 _seq_. Ever afterwards
+Roebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. At
+a banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "political
+testament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of
+America." (Leader, _Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck_, p. 330.)]
+
+[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce another
+recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance to
+make it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act.
+The reply was a brief negative.]
+
+[Footnote 1105: The _Times_, July 18, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1106: The power of the _Times_ in influencing public opinion
+through its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in the
+lead in its foreign correspondence and the information printed
+necessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the British
+public. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread about
+America by the _Times_, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so
+much as in this matter the enormous power which the _Times_ has, not
+from the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but
+from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to a
+vast number of minds. The _ignorance_ in which it has been able to keep
+a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. Beesly. Haultain,
+_Correspondence of Goldwin Smith_, p. 11.)]
+
+[Footnote 1107: _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics are
+mine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one of
+rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No _Englishman_ would be likely
+to regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing.]
+
+[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1109: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329.
+Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1110: Mason, _Mason_, p. 449.]
+
+[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The _Times_ was now printing American
+correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg
+when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated
+upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the
+writer's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had
+fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).]
+
+[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863.
+Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his
+opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value
+diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all others
+would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason,
+had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his
+family's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.]
+
+[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1115: e.g., _Manchester Guardian_, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in
+_The Index_, Sept. 24, p. 343.]
+
+[Footnote 1116: Mason's _Mason_, p. 456.]
+
+[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1118: _Ibid._, Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a
+despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1119: F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell,
+Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement
+of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States
+and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would
+have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of the
+two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the
+struggle--the coasts of the United States would present few points open
+to attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the
+neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas,
+would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might at
+the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops
+into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been
+immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. It
+seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without
+difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force
+which Great Britain would be likely to place there."]
+
+[Footnote 1120: _Ibid._, Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1123: _The Liberator_, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt upon
+Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in
+"winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a gifted
+public orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majority
+in each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of
+opinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exalt
+Beecher's services.]
+
+[Footnote 1124: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 319. The words are Dodd's.]
+
+[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to
+Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The preface
+in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863.
+For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION
+
+Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public
+meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1,
+1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends,
+confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally
+confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion
+in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public
+expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to
+November, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But by
+the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion
+that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others,
+especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern
+sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his
+initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that
+others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In
+Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist
+meeting in the Free Trade Hall":
+
+     "These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of
+     energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It
+     appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint
+     money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the
+     truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and
+     you will see there are here the germs of important work--but
+     they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good
+     deal of money individually but I see room for the use of Ł30
+     or Ł40 a month or more[1129]."
+
+The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the
+required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate
+secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions
+willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste
+for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat
+dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of
+patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence
+succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24,
+1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course
+of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form
+an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the
+auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
+Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay,
+Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and
+others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and
+postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the
+principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never
+_publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:
+
+     "The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the
+     war is to be worked out to success without the action of
+     Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a
+     power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred
+     up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most
+     agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition
+     signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and
+     brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of
+     4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them
+     completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial
+     to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings,
+     Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We
+     have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury,
+     Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work
+     up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the
+     latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon
+     the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I
+     think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert
+     latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side
+     to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse
+     that power. At any rate the object is worth the
+     effort[1131]."
+
+In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. In
+nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the
+speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were
+voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called
+"indefatigable":
+
+     "The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded
+     with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout
+     the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_
+     policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood
+     are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while
+     England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It
+     remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have
+     any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."
+
+By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation
+was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was
+really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as
+characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement
+lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an
+association which should become the main-spring of further activities.
+Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to
+draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from
+the big blockade-running firms
+
+     "Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific
+     sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in
+     proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was
+     near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote
+     a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the
+     blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once
+     Ł500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and
+     have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you
+     see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."
+
+Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too
+late:
+
+     "Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings
+     make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered
+     round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The
+     _Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more
+     especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York.
+     I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat,
+     so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our
+     side[1135]."
+
+Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:
+
+     "I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to
+     move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the
+     end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible
+     that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our
+     Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say:
+     'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought
+     back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the
+     efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or
+     death what effort should be spared[1136]?"
+
+The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by
+Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts.
+On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) took
+place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster
+referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts
+being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American
+affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and
+plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston,
+Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of
+Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed
+in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the
+district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she
+should lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club.
+"Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be
+formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence
+Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the
+reassembling of Parliament.
+
+The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern
+Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright
+and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily
+the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly
+represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to
+influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from
+Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by
+those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of
+their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in
+the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so
+diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _London
+Confederate States Aid Association_ which came to the attention of Adams
+and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early
+meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who
+reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3
+Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons
+and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome
+guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and
+got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was
+present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing
+a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in
+such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South.
+Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold
+regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a
+shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for
+non-attendance[1142].
+
+Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly
+its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal
+to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence
+Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to
+match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and
+carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles
+of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their
+cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places,
+ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity
+toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of
+America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the
+South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's
+emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers
+of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling
+and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of
+the constitution read:
+
+     "The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation
+     of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of
+     the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily
+     but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition
+     by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system
+     of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England,
+     in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine
+     the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of
+     property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true
+     civilization of the negro race[1144]."
+
+The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of
+heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one
+guinea annually) was large enough to attract the élite, but it remained
+to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet
+the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a
+curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring
+that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000
+at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on
+January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade
+Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to
+a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall
+in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent
+of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their
+resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against
+them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while _The
+Index_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great
+activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The
+reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters,
+from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective
+counties[1146]."
+
+Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association
+programme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of
+standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes
+it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England--already
+largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his
+"Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made
+the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest
+presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of
+Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith
+appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the
+aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the
+Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause.
+Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list
+of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title
+and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for
+its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].
+
+It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern
+Independence Association at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the end
+of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public
+meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy
+organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first
+move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the
+_Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should
+render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On
+January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the
+public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen
+the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the
+Government is entirely wrong":
+
+     "I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the
+     Government persisted in proceeding further, that our
+     Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed)
+     would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if
+     we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that
+     we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the
+     purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the
+     South might not require them. I think public opinion will go
+     with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his
+     failings--loves fair play[1149]."
+
+It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was
+thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the
+_Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's
+policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to
+bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an
+_Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a
+corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a
+Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the
+"acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":
+
+     "Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is
+     blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark.
+     We can trace his influence in the detention of the
+     _Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which
+     have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at
+     Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to
+     alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in
+     accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When
+     one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to
+     marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one
+     reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is
+     Earl Russell[1151]."
+
+But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152],
+the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home
+the meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging the
+Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an
+effort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, to
+belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by
+the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries
+out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent.
+Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus
+on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building.
+Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into
+details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on
+the _policy_ of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of
+the _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the
+uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of
+justice[1153]."
+
+As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff
+manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other
+were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to
+protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language.
+Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the
+North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for
+interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South
+on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate
+debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern
+answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by
+force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were
+already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As
+to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never
+pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great
+Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for
+ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid
+no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in
+political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the
+measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by
+Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of
+establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on
+imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to
+explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great
+Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be
+refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British
+withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold
+Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the
+project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it
+and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a
+matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to
+learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and
+France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly
+at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed
+to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican
+policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of
+helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].
+
+For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a
+firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately
+the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he
+began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the
+South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.
+As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could
+be made to see this.
+
+     "... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it
+     worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they
+     are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or
+     lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it.
+     If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New
+     Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates
+     Charleston and Savannah[1159]."
+
+This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the
+United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the
+warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long
+confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was
+acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"
+must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864,
+Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of
+the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military
+expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the
+arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially
+by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote,
+often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing
+of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to
+avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he
+ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."
+
+Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and
+disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already
+attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety
+to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the
+Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry
+in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an
+increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in
+large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle
+'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply,
+easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few
+Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive
+immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the
+efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid
+resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of
+Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental
+agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into
+the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered
+under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit.
+Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of
+these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to
+secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to
+red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.
+
+As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps
+were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few
+cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of
+_bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations
+in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of
+enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams,
+investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized
+Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been
+dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour
+emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden
+increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and
+public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel
+_Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board
+fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received
+indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men
+had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at
+Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well
+under way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed the
+men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give
+orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation
+against the consul but it still remained a question whether the
+commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British
+neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded
+guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of
+the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise,
+April 11, of further investigation[1166].
+
+The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in
+1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not,
+therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past,
+named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying
+off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly,
+forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject
+of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply
+made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law
+and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations
+than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the
+Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July,
+1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of
+Russell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed on
+many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry
+for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of
+Danish policy.
+
+In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side
+in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question
+which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence
+until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of
+Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the
+Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of
+Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional
+act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The
+law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days
+later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to
+hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from
+Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The
+Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of
+Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had
+given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various
+occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour
+for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point
+of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A
+distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when
+Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her,
+thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed
+command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.
+
+This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's
+utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet
+colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British
+public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain
+could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on
+Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the
+Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time
+threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and
+unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government
+laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that
+should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige.
+Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark,
+broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which
+could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it
+became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the
+defence of the Danish King.
+
+From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier
+stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential
+bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that
+in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association
+on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities,
+Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move
+by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other
+rumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that an
+important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore,
+the herald of this glad news also wrote:
+
+     "Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The
+     Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar
+     the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain
+     in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."
+
+Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme
+Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made
+clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect
+the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant
+and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political
+questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon
+disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and
+threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much
+trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public
+demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be
+known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and
+recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once
+declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties.
+Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break
+up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of
+the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would
+be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready
+to support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ and
+from experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debate
+in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the
+provinces[1175]."
+
+Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began
+anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in
+America. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at the
+very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited
+the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had
+then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no
+moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would
+result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and
+defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to
+Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with
+Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential
+feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a
+_party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing
+Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly
+understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial
+desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to
+find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American
+policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:
+
+     "I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter
+     of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in
+     regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am
+     therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On
+     this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on
+     Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another
+     meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there
+     as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at
+     present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by
+     the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent
+     our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the
+     motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point
+     will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings
+     forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see
+     the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the
+     American question are so well known. As no competent member
+     however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the
+     responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable
+     to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the
+     subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He
+     sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had,
+     therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the
+     result of which was that if I brought forward a motion
+     somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be
+     prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him
+     again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about
+     was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply
+     regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the
+     people of the United States and the Confederate States of
+     North America by the continuance of the war which has been so
+     long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government
+     will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in
+     conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a
+     cessation of hostilities.'"
+
+Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to
+return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this
+Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay
+strongly urged Mason to come over:
+
+     _I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston.
+     It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters
+     I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of
+     much service to the South[1177]."
+
+Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association
+permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _The
+Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letter
+was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had
+come for action:
+
+     "215 _Regent Street,
+     London, W.
+     May 28th_, 1864.
+
+     "SIR,
+
+     "The Society which has the honour to present to you the
+     accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in
+     Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken
+     by the Government of this country in concert with other
+     Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the
+     belligerents in North America.
+
+     "I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you
+     will, before the Session closes, support a motion in
+     Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see
+     evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in
+     this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before
+     you[1178]."
+
+Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred
+the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter,
+following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive.
+The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful.
+Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall,
+that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and
+that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay
+had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to
+shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority
+to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined
+to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation,
+or at least suggestion:
+
+     "Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation
+     with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not
+     have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once
+     acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to
+     a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.
+
+     "Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special
+     Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full
+     powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire
+     to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even
+     without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have
+     had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."
+
+The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last
+paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay
+renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming
+success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston
+and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures
+when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of
+recognition of the Confederacy:
+
+     "I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering
+     that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly
+     hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc.,
+     etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable
+     effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He
+     again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South
+     could not be effected by the North, and he added that he
+     thought the people of the North were becoming more and more
+     alive to the fact every day."
+
+Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell
+and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be
+plain sailing:
+
+     "Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern
+     facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that
+     all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an
+     end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow.
+     He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I
+     ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I
+     may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has
+     been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day,
+     that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion
+     at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared
+     to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed
+     much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it
+     is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is
+     supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby
+     is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive,
+     and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would
+     seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any
+     motion which would not be carried."
+
+Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.
+
+     "Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must
+     earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much
+     wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can
+     do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great
+     service to your country_[1180]."
+
+Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have
+amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his
+"gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary
+motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked
+for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other
+light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from
+joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the
+Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not
+clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been
+hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much
+was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters.
+The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In
+addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over
+Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in
+this the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the
+Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular
+letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on
+Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture.
+Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the
+feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not
+be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in
+Parliament:
+
+     "The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is
+     disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here
+     contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation
+     would strengthen his hands[1182]."
+
+This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later
+objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be
+unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of
+the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern Independence
+Association_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to
+join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some
+specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he
+favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and
+as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the
+mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:
+
+     "Although this quite expresses the object of our Society,
+     still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to
+     have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have
+     consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to
+     bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the
+     Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the
+     resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be
+     allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only
+     quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will
+     avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'
+
+     "This is just leaving the Government where they have been all
+     along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest
+     opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"
+
+Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the
+leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay
+the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his
+motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it.
+Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it
+should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern
+forces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meeting
+fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy
+advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the
+West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in
+England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason
+understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and
+had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the
+interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:
+
+     "Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance
+     that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well
+     disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that
+     the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and
+     that neither could union be restored nor the South brought
+     under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell
+     said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for
+     discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is
+     to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."
+
+This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest
+opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell
+scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It
+must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to
+Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but
+political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming
+contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary
+management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with
+Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to
+suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories,
+and found him unexpectedly in agreement:
+
+     "I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter,
+     editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his
+     connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the
+     latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands
+     and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he
+     would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_.
+     Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon
+     our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay
+     that the movement could not be in better hands and as there
+     were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I
+     thought the better policy would be for the present that he
+     should be silent and to await events[1186]."
+
+Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best
+advantage the South to be rid of Russell:
+
+     "If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful,
+     Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being
+     brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he
+     can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us
+     perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified
+     assent[1187]."
+
+But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British
+policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a
+change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory
+attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of
+course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the
+Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was
+renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster
+followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of
+censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental
+policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the
+Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial
+majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of
+Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was
+needed[1189].
+
+Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with
+Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in
+view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it
+resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the
+South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to
+acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming
+Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have
+said little.
+
+     "At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that
+     he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt
+     obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the
+     obligation would be increased if I could take with me any
+     expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared
+     to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense
+     that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as
+     I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be
+     better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my
+     opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as
+     that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."
+
+Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason
+wrote:
+
+     "My own impressions derived from the whole interview are,
+     that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the
+     separation of the States is final and the independence of the
+     South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under
+     the menaces of the North[1191]."
+
+Slidell's comment was bitter:
+
+     "I am very much obliged for your account of your interview
+     with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had
+     anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said
+     even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has
+     now arrived when it is comparatively of very little
+     importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A
+     plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."
+
+Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had
+nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge
+the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed much
+the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _Morning
+Herald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview
+with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":
+
+     "The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the
+     result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of
+     implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment;
+     that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated,
+     and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."
+
+In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen,
+noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential
+gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a
+cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of
+the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting
+the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution
+_after_ the political storm had passed and not before--when the
+deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no
+deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before
+the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no
+party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received
+Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was
+to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation
+itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this
+demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _The
+Index_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:
+
+     "... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he
+     has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he
+     can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by
+     telling them that
+
+     They who in quarrels interpose
+     Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--
+
+     a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the
+     British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as
+     not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]."
+
+Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into
+personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming
+contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]."
+But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to
+London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad
+taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of those
+who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had
+been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London
+was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument
+for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the
+break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was
+due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and
+recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without
+intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated that
+mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely
+desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet
+one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as
+reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but
+just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the
+powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as
+of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that
+British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of
+the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant
+to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed
+to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"
+was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each
+of the three preceding years.
+
+Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically
+ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but
+British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a
+confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed its
+strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped
+upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1130: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1131: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1132: _The Index_, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518.]
+
+[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London was
+ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My recollection is that
+while many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those who
+favoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open
+(i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South,
+much as its splendid courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in
+Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of
+these pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is
+clear from the reports in _The Index_.]
+
+[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1135: _Ibid._, The _weight_ of the _Times_ is here evident
+even though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence,
+R.I., in 1864, be true that the London _Daily Telegraph_, a paper not
+committed to either side in America, had three times the circulation of
+the _Times_. (_The Liberator_, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made
+on the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown University.]
+
+[Footnote 1136: _Ibid._, That Mason did contribute Confederate funds to
+Spence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount is
+uncertain.]
+
+[Footnote 1137: _The Index_, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance of
+representatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifested
+throughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R.
+Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs.
+Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W.
+Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse,
+Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, the
+Secretary of the Association, was also present. The districts were
+severally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs.
+Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J.
+Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield;
+Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and
+Saddleworth--Mr. Lees, J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge;
+Heywood--Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley
+(Chorley)---Mr. J. Beesley, etc., etc."]
+
+[Footnote 1138: So reported by _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, in
+comment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughout
+Lancashire.]
+
+[Footnote 1139: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22.]
+
+[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason.]
+
+[Footnote 1141: _The Liberator_, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract from
+the London _Morning Star_ of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson.]
+
+[Footnote 1142: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18.
+Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by the
+Association.]
+
+[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women.
+"Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insulted
+virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty and
+omnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object the
+highest human aims--the amelioration and exaltation of humanity."]
+
+[Footnote 1144: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee of
+organization was as follows:--
+
+     The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian,
+     The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath,
+     The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
+     The Lord Eustace Cecil,
+     The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe.
+     The Right Honourable Lord Campbell,
+     The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P.,
+     The Honourable Robt. Bourke,
+     Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax,
+     Colonel Greville, M.P.,
+     W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P.,
+     T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P.,
+     A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.,
+     W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P.,
+     G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.,
+     Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.,
+     James Spence, Esq., Liverpool,
+     William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.
+     Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil.
+]
+
+[Footnote 1145: _The Liberator_, Feb. 26, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1146: _The Index_, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing reply
+from an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. One
+would like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was.
+"An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to
+become a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should take
+that open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to
+the neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and
+responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto
+invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of
+opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by my
+former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from the
+reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of the
+Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectually
+in my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my
+'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunities
+of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself.'"]
+
+[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman had
+much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in the
+Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozanne
+wrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy,
+increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedom
+of discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque,
+patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, it
+favours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class of
+thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends to
+elevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially he
+insisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissed
+slavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higher
+objects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175).]
+
+[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1150: The _Alexandra_, as a result of the Court's decision,
+was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceeded
+to Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of
+the Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the close
+of the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard,
+pp. 354-5.)]
+
+[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.]
+
+[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII.]
+
+[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1154: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1156: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1157: _Ibid._, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1158: _Ibid._, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1160: April, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, and
+F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. A
+Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmed
+Lyons' reports.]
+
+[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The tone
+of the _New York Herald_ might well have given cause for anxiety. "In
+six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to a
+close. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments that
+have either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'the
+belligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid
+which they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how they
+swell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have
+unemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops
+in the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the
+French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our
+powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in European
+affairs." (Quoted by _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 203.)]
+
+[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 563, states that great
+efforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both to
+secure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and even
+since the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreign
+element, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way
+of determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were
+kept. A Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15,
+1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the
+several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at which
+time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), the
+figures of nativity stood: United States, 341,569; Germany, 54,944;
+Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; England, 16,196; and various
+other countries no one of which reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics
+really mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do not
+show _when_ the foreign-born came to America; further, from the very
+first days of the war there had been a large element of American
+citizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the
+British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figures
+given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38,000
+subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862,
+48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, and this
+figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds were
+from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in 1863, considering the
+number of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evident
+that the bulk must have gone into labour supply.]
+
+[Footnote 1164: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of British
+subjects."]
+
+[Footnote 1165: The _Times_, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII.
+"Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen at
+Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
+
+[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney case
+see _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence
+respecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United States
+Army." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
+
+[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353,
+and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, papers
+were asked for on "Emigration to America," and readily granted by the
+Government.]
+
+[Footnote 1169: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
+VI.]
+
+[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell)
+was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at this
+time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of the
+Queen. (Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, Ch. XVI.)]
+
+[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason,
+April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received by
+Delane from Mackay, the _Times_ New York correspondent. The expected
+Southern victory was to come "in about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 1173: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1175: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1180: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a dark
+picture for Northern armies.]
+
+[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed by
+F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.]
+
+[Footnote 1183: _Ibid._, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams to
+Seward, June 2, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Mason
+wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends and
+followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motion
+as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's _Mason_, p. 500. To Benjamin, June
+9, 1864.) Evidently the friend was Hunter.]
+
+[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1188: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1189: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
+VI.]
+
+[Footnote 1190: Mason's _Mason_, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1192: _Ibid._, To Mason, July 17, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1193: _The Index_, July 21, 1864, p. 457.]
+
+[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH
+
+After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and of
+Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but later
+involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, had
+reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To the
+European neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appeared
+to the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years of
+fighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied a
+short conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and with
+each additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increase
+of the forces employed and a psychological change in the people whereby
+war seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American Civil
+War, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources
+employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," to
+date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreign
+observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparent
+check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America had
+become engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope of
+emergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge of
+the steady decline of the resources of the South even though Jefferson
+Davis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, had
+spoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief in
+stalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for
+the function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until its
+independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England both
+felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitude
+of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefinite
+Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions.
+
+There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered these
+Southern champions. The North was at last fully identified with the
+cause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By
+1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject and
+even in the original constitution and address of the Southern
+Independence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for the
+gradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason some
+heartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply
+being that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offered
+gratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that
+the topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand,
+at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, there
+arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "In
+Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and the strongest man on the
+board, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I went
+up to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]."
+
+Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southern
+armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," and by mere
+iteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it was
+repeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled to
+meet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," argued the
+error of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in
+characterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there could
+be no effective British push for Southern independence and it asserted
+that slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not exist
+in the Confederacy.
+
+     "... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the
+     condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and
+     otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending
+     such practices to say that the South does none of these
+     things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in
+     practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a
+     soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in
+     the social order in a subordinate place, and of an
+     intellectual organization which requires guardianship with
+     mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery,
+     because it developed itself out of an older and very
+     different one of that name, but for this the South is not
+     to blame.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so
+     long as they make no determined effort to relieve the
+     Southern character from this false drapery, they will never
+     gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of
+     Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke
+     effective assistance.... The best assurance you can give that
+     the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands
+     is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she
+     has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and
+     benefactor of that race.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such
+     expressions as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from
+     the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As
+     a concession they are useless; as a confession they are
+     untrue.... Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen
+     that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say
+     the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not
+     that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves
+     never were treated before, that she has used power as no
+     nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she
+     has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem
+     which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he
+     might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at
+     hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark
+     and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required
+     all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now
+     is[1200].'"
+
+In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slavery
+was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic
+institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was
+evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation
+edicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March,
+quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon a
+report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read
+before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author
+and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the
+contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and
+placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a
+fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to
+emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American
+War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel
+with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is
+justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate
+a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political
+freedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]...."
+
+Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many
+sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_,
+acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the
+carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and
+intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the
+end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern
+meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief
+period in the fall just before the Presidential election in
+America[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole
+period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were
+almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and
+religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An
+analysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, and
+in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following
+classification[1203]:
+
+     YEAR.      NUMBER.               CHARACTER.
+                             ANTI-SLAVERY
+                             AND RELIGIOUS   WORKING-MEN.
+     1860          3              3              -
+     1861          7              7              -
+     1862         16             11              5
+     1863         82             26             56
+     1864         21             10             11
+     1865          5              4              1
+
+Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as
+speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with
+frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John
+Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A.
+Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and
+Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great
+majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing
+districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old
+anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most
+active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the
+moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompson
+asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and
+energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or
+city[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the
+most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others,
+not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206].
+Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the
+North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament,
+rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and
+became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested
+by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the
+appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred
+Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of
+San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern
+commerce[1207].
+
+This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the
+relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus
+indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation
+of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of
+English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of
+resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was
+exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the
+more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a
+sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in
+opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and
+France[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of
+the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these
+Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He
+wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes
+     of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward
+     should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to
+     distract their attention from the arduous task they have so
+     wantonly undertaken[1209]."
+
+Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought
+that the current of political opinion was running against the
+re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of
+expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the
+"peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any
+solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly
+advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment
+the better[1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he
+stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military
+probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout
+all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of
+warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.
+
+But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory
+of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only
+hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading
+British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in
+the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected
+defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the
+few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily
+professing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of the
+metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from
+the columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming a
+position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the
+war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent,
+Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the
+_Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its
+readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured
+to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance.
+Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation
+throughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlier
+years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year
+of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting
+reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the
+West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. The
+same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to
+be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond
+who wrote in contempt of Grant's army.
+
+     "I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in
+     which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of
+     the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured
+     victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and
+     Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines....
+     The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are
+     contemplating an army which is at once republican and
+     undisciplined[1212]."
+
+At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading
+paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to
+prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers
+to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was either
+ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment
+during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and
+determination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that the
+earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. One
+element in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartiality
+accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and
+wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as
+making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a
+_Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for
+a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared:
+
+     "Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only
+     shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian
+     philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command
+     admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and
+     contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]."
+
+Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was at
+bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said:
+"There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity
+of the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies were
+in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your
+double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus
+in[1216]." In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war the
+Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its
+preachments[1217].
+
+There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not
+greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly
+_Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war
+correspondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after his
+famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after
+the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of
+the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was
+the real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed in
+Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after
+the event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for that
+journal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidents
+unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern
+disaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those in
+the service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation of
+Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite
+readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct
+appreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time to
+time proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in such
+terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with
+the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most
+definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:
+
+     "The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by
+     itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it;
+     and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and
+     resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually
+     dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the
+     Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the
+     matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that
+     its component parts can never again be welded into a
+     Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common
+     executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only
+     that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding
+     States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has
+     arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and
+     spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the
+     Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North
+     be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the
+     action of force for that of free will, we think it will
+     reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...."
+
+Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the
+"Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiate
+the _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description and
+estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them
+and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a
+fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment
+editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:
+
+     "The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North
+     have so long been fixed promises to become a source of
+     fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not
+     advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously
+     with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has
+     eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the
+     enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been
+     nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington
+     civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous
+     spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]."
+
+Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the
+Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's
+defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the
+citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern
+weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed
+in _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, got
+frequent quotation:
+
+     "We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you
+     have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly
+     be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years
+     longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals
+     override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings
+     forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You
+     have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory,
+     and we must have both_[1223]."
+
+It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an
+important bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressing
+admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident
+of his defeat:
+
+     "... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a
+     still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his
+     predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty
+     miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous
+     country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line
+     as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal
+     general having ventured far from water communications. That
+     Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both
+     courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in
+     a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]."
+
+And W.H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approaching
+disaster:
+
+     "The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous
+     as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman.
+     Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an
+     ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank
+     and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking
+     eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer
+     despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to
+     shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know
+     that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful
+     artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners
+     have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of
+     average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]."
+
+On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city of
+Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the
+_Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was
+unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and,
+two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political
+struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted,
+would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226].
+Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks
+earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:
+
+     "General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an
+     able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he
+     won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which
+     carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of
+     Georgia[1227]."
+
+But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would
+acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Not
+so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than he
+would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for some
+time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from the
+summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctly
+interpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a renewed
+determination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured.
+Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected:
+
+     "The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as
+     an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the
+     Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently
+     desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments
+     when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for
+     recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not
+     come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be
+     publicly made[1228]."
+
+The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in the
+election, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicate
+process of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at the
+point where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did
+so by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party
+convention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an
+excellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peace
+afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late
+analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called for
+a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restore
+peace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumed
+temporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its hands
+of further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:
+
+     For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it
+     otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that
+     we are aware of against the present Government of America.
+     Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position,
+     they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights
+     of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from
+     the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we
+     have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly
+     withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade
+     are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an
+     equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the
+     vast impulse that has been given towards the development of
+     the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not
+     been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of
+     our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and
+     without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon
+     itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from
+     his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage
+     his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less
+     and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will
+     ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more
+     likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far
+     beyond the present division between North and South.... Were
+     we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always
+     assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view
+     the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should
+     rejoice that the American people, untaught by past
+     misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end,
+     and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln
+     as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady
+     continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that
+     the people of this country view the prospect of another four
+     years of war in America with very different feelings. They
+     are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of
+     their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the
+     path that leadeth to destruction[1230].
+
+Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would
+again be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledge
+its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting
+that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty
+in escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232],"
+but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and
+results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that
+election day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanism
+known to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it
+continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it
+dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for
+justice and honour throughout the world[1233]." Again official England
+was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adams
+paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief
+informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in
+determining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by
+Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident
+unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was
+inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential election
+in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events.
+Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in
+America to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, as
+always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to
+Russell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreign
+policy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering
+purposes[1236]." Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four
+days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as
+possible all business with him until after the election[1237]." By
+November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in
+replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he was
+entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious
+difficulties with Great Britain.
+
+     "... I do not think the U.S. Government have any
+     ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing
+     themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their
+     existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and
+     buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the
+     popular clamour is over[1238]."
+
+In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212
+electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the
+_Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendous
+majority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Having
+prophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back for
+her behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith"
+against reunion:
+
+     "Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln
+     I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so
+     far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the
+     measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most
+     creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the
+     elections ... passed off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln
+     has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems
+     little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action,
+     or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of
+     his second period of government will find him President of
+     the United States[1239]."
+
+The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious in
+comment:
+
+     "Ever since he found himself firmly established in his
+     office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had
+     begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of
+     the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been
+     less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due
+     allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his
+     situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such
+     been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige
+     of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this
+     country what the necessities of his situation demanded from
+     him, and he has done no more[1240]."
+
+This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the real
+reaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix,
+bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the ashes
+where lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the
+_liberties_ of America[1241].
+
+During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election English
+friends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twitted
+that at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_,
+Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free Trade
+Hall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there
+met with opposition from those who attended. At three other places,
+Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the
+manufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, as
+reported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy,
+leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives,"
+the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, and
+presumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted
+"follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an
+appearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as
+"the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a meeting held at all
+comparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northern
+friends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture this
+meeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned by
+handbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" there
+gathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between
+5,000 and 6,000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children
+in their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment,
+had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to
+be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threatening
+violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed as
+to seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the misery
+and the revolutionary character of the meeting:
+
+     "That in consequence of the widespread distress that now
+     prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the
+     war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's
+     Government should use their influence, together with France
+     and other European powers, to bring both belligerents
+     together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of
+     life and property that is now going on in that unhappy
+     country[1246]."
+
+No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truth
+it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress in
+Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, while
+elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was with
+the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signature
+among the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by the
+administration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on the
+ground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier,
+in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he might
+the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _The
+Index_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congress
+at Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a plan
+of transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and
+thus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was
+hard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in fact
+no evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the
+part of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms
+in defence of his country[1248].
+
+This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon the
+absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however,
+permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, and
+indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in the
+spring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11,
+Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe a
+communication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto," of which the
+blockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth the
+objects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition:
+
+     "'All they ask is immunity from interference with their
+     internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the
+     undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life,
+     liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common
+     ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to
+     the Social compact[1249].'"
+
+Russell replied, November 25:
+
+     "Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception
+     of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both
+     the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement
+     of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's
+     Government have continued to entertain sentiments of
+     friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the
+     causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never
+     presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this
+     sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period
+     of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that
+     they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the
+     rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial
+     Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully
+     maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]."
+
+If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto," and had
+sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let the
+slaves win their freedom," the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yet
+at the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, the
+current of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favour
+of the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him as
+attempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":
+
+     "The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the
+     representatives of the Confederate States without appearing
+     rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to
+     acknowledge the authority of the United States without
+     affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two
+     pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts
+     his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in
+     recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the
+     other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or
+     two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto
+     stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue
+     to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting
+     that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that
+     if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict
+     neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of
+     friendship to either belligerent[1251]."
+
+This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifying
+the allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion to
+which the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed and
+that Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" from
+Atlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were
+appalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The
+son of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron
+wall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a
+step after all[1252]."
+
+The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the event
+falsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after having
+acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the
+_Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that:
+
+     "... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and
+     Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the
+     South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than
+     could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though
+     Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away
+     piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the
+     Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the
+     wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body
+     which now represents the Federal States of North
+     America[1254]."
+
+But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and foretold
+with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_,
+privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, while
+publicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had not
+been heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December
+5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficulties
+to be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on
+December 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his
+inability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta:
+
+     "If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the
+     great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into
+     Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will
+     succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that
+     his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was
+     unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the
+     most remarkable feature of the war, according to the
+     President, is the wild and desperate effort of an
+     out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position
+     which, whatever effect it may have had on the election,
+     should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at
+     all[1255]."
+
+This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review of
+Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that his
+sole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coast
+where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken a
+definite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive that
+Sherman would venture to attack Savannah:
+
+     "For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is
+     essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring
+     point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be
+     equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create
+     it[1256]."
+
+Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowed
+championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserve
+British confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of the
+North were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged in
+by that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superior
+information. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on
+the American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern
+cause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received that
+Savannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_
+recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern
+prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long
+silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial
+wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a
+complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.
+
+For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall of
+Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the
+_Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the South
+waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the
+_Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then but
+half-heartedly.
+
+     "The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's
+     march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of
+     the most singular military achievements of the war.
+
+     "... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the
+     possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his
+     army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the
+     better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as
+     desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of
+     retreat could make it, the command of a point near the
+     sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously
+     an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of
+     subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be
+     commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the
+     Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact
+     that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the
+     capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage
+     of the war.
+
+     "... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would
+     be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression
+     unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]."
+
+Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture
+presented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent,
+printed in this same issue:
+
+     "No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the
+     heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of
+     conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the
+     Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the
+     first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again,
+     and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for
+     the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the
+     next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest destiny is
+     to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to
+     conquer."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233.]
+
+[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192.]
+
+[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.]
+
+[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the
+_Reader_ for March 19.]
+
+[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have found
+record of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour
+Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_.
+Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that
+the South was the best buyer of English goods.]
+
+[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all
+held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of
+1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866.) The list may be
+regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention
+of _The Liberator_ and of Adams.]
+
+[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared
+by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English
+colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy
+and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having
+rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."]
+
+[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum,
+of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An
+Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and
+Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute
+to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with
+the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page
+list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern
+friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren,
+John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them
+Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this
+society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four
+hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the
+activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis
+Train, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-three
+speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in
+England.")]
+
+[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p.
+296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem
+held by the United States of America for the high character and steady
+friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of
+the South have been given in Chapter XV.]
+
+[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the time
+and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the
+thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing
+the development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutrality
+and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States
+and Russia_, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You
+have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you
+have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large
+and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical
+importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.]
+
+[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and
+July 5, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to
+his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the
+atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our
+success is not admitted."]
+
+[Footnote 1214: _Ibid._, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.]
+
+[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles of
+Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more
+marked in 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War ran
+two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every
+three days.]
+
+[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know,
+perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was
+tabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even after
+my return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Army
+and Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be
+weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such
+ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I
+maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment"
+(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865,
+Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the _Times_ followed my advice, how
+different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal,
+but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from
+America." (Atkins, _Life of W.H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also
+Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the
+_Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left
+it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task
+in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ may
+be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to
+the _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding
+the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for
+its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This
+dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A
+Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North
+and South'"), published in London in 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1221: _Ibid._, June 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials
+might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_
+and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not
+examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond
+determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional
+special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to
+warrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencing
+opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:
+
+     (1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in
+     Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,
+     p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_,
+     Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the
+     United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the
+     following facts of circulation are derived:
+
+(A) _Daily Papers_:
+
+  (1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150,000 (neutral).
+
+  (2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern).
+Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but with
+small circulation (Southern).
+
+  (3) The _Times_ (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The
+prestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearing
+in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_."
+Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as
+well-known ... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our
+European kings.... The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarch
+of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)
+
+  (4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000),
+but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the
+Clubs (neutral).
+
+  (5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6,000 (Northern).
+
+  (6) _The Morning Star_, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000)
+(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright
+was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits.
+_The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular.
+
+  (7) _The Morning Post_, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as
+Palmerston's organ.
+
+  (8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties
+(neutral).
+
+(B) _Weekly Papers._--No approximate circulation figures are available,
+but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers.
+
+  (1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny
+paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing
+districts (Northern).
+
+  (2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper."
+
+  (3) _The Spectator_ (Northern).
+
+  (4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern).
+
+  (5) _The Economist_ (Neutral).
+
+  (6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern).
+
+In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment
+_The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _Westminster
+Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester
+Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and some
+few others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863.)
+The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ to
+be like that of the _Times_.
+]
+
+[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231.]
+
+[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention,
+modified this in his letter of acceptance.]
+
+[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1233: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was more
+divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in
+America. The _Sičcle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman as
+about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie,
+Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neither
+occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the
+defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood
+on July 22." (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent
+wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in
+the Shenandoah Valley:
+
+"The _Sičcle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal,
+whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of
+which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the
+American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are
+running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at
+last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to
+the Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high a
+pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_
+
+"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines
+undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what
+will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses
+himself relative to the issues of the coming election?
+
+'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South
+will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to
+barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the
+labour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight,
+and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify and
+regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their
+own hands....'
+
+"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the
+robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for
+the welfare of the American brethren.
+
+"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of
+delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent
+writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France.
+(_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.)
+
+A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money"
+pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, under
+the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business
+of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the
+benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This
+bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State.
+Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully
+deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he
+stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the
+French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in
+the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly
+superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his
+own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty
+toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)]
+
+[Footnote 1235: e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society,
+Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.)]
+
+[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1237: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons
+reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America.
+Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great
+Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave
+offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise
+and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government.
+No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success,
+even though at first sharing in the view that there was small
+possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to
+Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the
+relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the
+Government at home.]
+
+[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of a
+silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is
+an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those
+who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power
+though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.]
+
+[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker
+to Garrison, August 27, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1243: _Ibid._, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the
+meeting at Ashton.]
+
+[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.]
+
+[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.]
+
+[Footnote 1249: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell,
+Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden
+and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).]
+
+[Footnote 1250: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the
+"Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to
+his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233.]
+
+[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping
+up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.]
+
+[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown by
+Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams'
+Letters_, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever
+that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in
+attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is
+enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the
+sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on
+Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."]
+
+[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864.
+Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving
+such deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864,
+p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and
+threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive
+deputations.]
+
+[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for
+the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in
+Ch. XVIII.]
+
+[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+THE END OF THE WAR
+
+     "I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this
+     moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and
+     our people and indeed our Government is more moderately
+     disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from
+     a member of the Government that it is believed that the
+     feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has
+     been steadily improving[1261]."
+
+Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Three
+weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours that
+Europe was still planning some form of intervention to save the South:
+"_All parties and classes_ here are resolved on a strict
+neutrality[1262]...." This was a correct estimate. In spite of a
+temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewed
+assertions from the South that she "would never submit," British opinion
+was now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict was
+soon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina,
+was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, though
+since midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yet
+known to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while his
+ability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedom
+with which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederate
+capital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city.
+Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, by
+illness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could be
+spared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters.
+Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advance
+northwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee,
+to end, it was hoped, in writing _finis_ to the war.
+
+From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in
+Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter date
+he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance and
+easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, was
+burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in North
+Carolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress was
+encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, in
+command of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperate
+effort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was
+at Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to
+cut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an
+energetic offensive.
+
+In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond,
+thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, to
+come out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front.
+The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment of
+Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city on
+the night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of
+joining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at
+Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston
+surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of the
+war and of the Confederacy.
+
+[Illustration: THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET! _Reproduced by permission
+of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865
+when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreign
+observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseen
+from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperate
+courage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equally
+desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederate
+agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery in
+return for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, Southern
+Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and was
+committed to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his
+withdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any
+point to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of
+Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other
+representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than a
+beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond not
+only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messenger
+also of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly and
+with full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction was
+therefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in
+Paris early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such
+an offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London.
+
+The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reached
+London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuation
+of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressed
+by Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wish
+to see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, on
+receiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been
+consulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as ready
+as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay until
+more favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason's
+instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or
+resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13,
+therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview and
+was promptly granted one for the day following.
+
+Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgment
+that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himself
+to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country in
+condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form of
+allusion to the _concession_ we held in reserve, as would make him
+necessarily comprehend it[1266]," and turning again and again to a
+supposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition,
+Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not
+mentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the
+South had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British
+objections to recognition were those which had long since been stated,
+and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called on
+the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he had
+long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston's
+Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery to
+recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone by
+now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spoken
+boldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of
+1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its present
+overture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinion
+clashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to be
+hoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could
+help the South.
+
+There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southern
+effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some such
+move was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southern
+fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attention
+was fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North and
+South and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles in
+a foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society
+and gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen
+enemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The
+Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had
+learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davis
+by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state of
+Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln of
+armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would be
+popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269]
+to-morrow." In London the _Army and Navy Gazette_ declared that Davis
+could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any other
+terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of a
+common aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams pictured
+all British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near,
+and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders of
+public opinion as the _Times_, adding that it was being "whispered about
+that if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army
+left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility to
+this country[1271]."
+
+The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator.
+He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward
+to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. But
+Lincoln made positive in his instructions three points:
+
+     (1) Complete restoration of the Union.
+
+     (2) No receding on emancipation.
+
+     (3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war,
+     and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government."
+
+A few days later the President decided that his own presence was
+desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads
+Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates did
+indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditional
+American object," using the argument that _after_ such a war restoration
+of the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was not
+Great Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There was
+much discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading
+Southern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for
+comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would be
+entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southerners
+urged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessation
+of hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads.
+Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On
+all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect
+about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]."
+
+When news of the holding of this conference reached England there
+occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created by
+the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "The
+consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]." What did the
+United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general that
+peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with this
+country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite
+apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to Seward; and he
+advised that it might be well for the United States "to consider the
+question how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance";
+due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders who
+had been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that might
+now fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the
+United States might aid in the coming elections in retaining the
+Government in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be
+desired[1274].
+
+Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of that
+given earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was then
+in no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent in
+tone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting the
+enemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposed
+of abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and the
+agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were but
+defensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. These
+matters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but with
+discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as
+inopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward's
+complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment
+would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and
+disarming our own friends[1277]." The day before this was written home
+Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the
+agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United
+States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great
+Lakes[1278].
+
+Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over
+a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was
+seriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not share
+this fear, but Delane, of the _Times_, kept it alive in the public mind,
+and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger.
+"I do not know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to
+his American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about
+to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely
+less horrible[1279]." Governmental circles, however, belittled the
+agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was
+assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign
+war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the
+Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as
+but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been
+flatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March
+13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in
+Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with
+America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general
+tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful
+relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left
+criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing
+members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the
+pacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch with
+America his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances that
+the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly
+friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was
+to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to
+and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physical
+power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence and
+moderation in tone[1283]."
+
+Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible
+effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time
+anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee's
+surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the _Times_ and
+other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspaper
+comment on the event followed closely that of the _Times_, rendering
+honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing
+_finis_ to the war:
+
+     "Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the
+     extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other
+     commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this
+     war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count
+     a series of more brilliant victories than the force which,
+     raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia,
+     has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the
+     hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have
+     now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious
+     until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour,
+     and then they fell with honour[1286]."
+
+The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowly
+developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, a
+fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very first
+of military nations[1287]." No one remained to uphold the Southern
+banner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even they
+were hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own
+courage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming
+disaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace
+on the basis of separation; finally, "5th. _I know_ that no terms of
+peace would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the
+conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:
+
+     "I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume,
+     that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived
+     from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace
+     would be entertained that did not rest on
+     _independence_[1288]."
+
+But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:
+
+     "I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning
+     of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With
+     Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular
+     organized armies and I can see no possible good to result
+     from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must
+     submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for
+     vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under
+     our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a
+     soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes.... I am
+     sick, sick at heart[1289]."
+
+The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of a
+serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial on
+the end of the war the _Times_ took occasion to pay a tribute to the
+statesman whom it had been accustomed to berate.
+
+     "There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire
+     to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance
+     of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in
+     the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we
+     trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by
+     gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his
+     term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities
+     which have been raised by these years of war[1290]."
+
+Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of British
+statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to be
+regarded in an aspect far different from that with which he was
+generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports of
+Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was received
+also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attack
+on Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror.
+"Few events of the present century," wrote Adams, "have created such
+general consternation and indignation[1291]."
+
+In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot by Booth,
+a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the box where the
+President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next morning. On the same
+evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man was admitted to Seward's
+house on the plea that he had a message from the physician, passed
+upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's son at the door of the sick room.
+Beating the son into semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had
+missed fire, the stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as
+he lay in bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward
+rolled off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides,
+his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved,
+probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw fractured in
+the runaway accident nine days before[1292]. The assailant fought his
+way out of the house and escaped. For some days Seward's life was
+despaired of, whether from his injuries or from shock.
+
+These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit in the
+hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense represented the
+feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, that abroad so
+horrible a crime should react both to the detriment of the Confederacy
+and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with the North took the form
+of a sudden exaltation of the personality of Lincoln, bringing out
+characterizations of the man far different from those which had been his
+earlier in the war. The presence of a "rural attorney" in the
+Presidential office had seemed like the irony of fate in the great
+crisis of 1861. Even so acute an observer as Lyons could then write,
+"Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto given proof of his possessing any natural
+talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois
+village politics. He seems to be well meaning and conscientious, in the
+measure of his understanding, but not much more[1293]." But Lyons was no
+more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all characterizations,
+whether American or foreign, were of like nature.
+
+But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a different
+estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for the growth of
+his personal authority and for his steadiness of purpose, with criticism
+of his alleged despotism. Now, with his death, following so closely the
+collapse of the Confederacy, there poured out from British press and
+public a great stream of laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a
+national recantation. In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as
+a few dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, _Punch_ led the
+way in a poem by Tom Taylor:
+
+     "_You_ lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier,
+     _You_, who with mocking pencil wont to trace,
+     Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,
+     His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,
+     To lame my pencil and confute my pen--
+     To make me own this hind of princes peer,
+     This rail-splitter a true-born king of men[1294]."
+
+Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of Lincoln,
+stood the _Times_. Severely reprobating the act of Booth and prophesying
+a disastrous effect in the treatment of the conquered South, it
+proceeded:
+
+     "Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest
+     eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a
+     make-shift, simply because Mr. Seward and their other
+     prominent leaders were obnoxious to different sections of
+     the party, it was natural that his career should be watched
+     with jealous suspicion. The office cast upon him was great,
+     its duties most onerous, and the obscurity of his past career
+     afforded no guarantee of his ability to discharge them. His
+     shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The education of a
+     man whose early years had been spent in earning bread by
+     manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults of
+     manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the
+     outset. In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won
+     for himself the respect and confidence of all. His perfect
+     honesty speedily became apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more
+     to his credit, amid the many unstudied speeches which he was
+     called upon from time to time to deliver, imbued though they
+     were with the rough humour of his early associates, he was in
+     none of them betrayed into any intemperance of language
+     towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His utterances
+     were apparently careless, but his tongue was always under
+     command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which
+     served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy
+     of bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way
+     gradually to his conclusions, and those who will compare the
+     different stages of his career one with another will find
+     that his mind was growing throughout the course of it."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "The gradual change of his language and of his policy was
+     most remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who
+     showed the best characteristics of their race in his respect
+     for what is good in the past, acting in unison with a
+     recognition of what was made necessary by the events of
+     passing history[1295]."
+
+This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far warmer
+expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all England, there
+appeared another and longer editorial:
+
+     "If anything could mitigate the distress of the American
+     people in their present affliction, it might surely be the
+     sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We
+     are not using the language of hyperbole in describing the
+     manifestation of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has
+     been witnessed in our generation.... But President Lincoln
+     was only the chief of a foreign State, and of a State with
+     which we were not infrequently in diplomatic or political
+     collision. He might have been regarded as not much more to us
+     than the head of any friendly Government, and yet his end has
+     already stirred the feelings of the public to their
+     uttermost depths."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to
+     fill the country with grief and indignation, but to evoke
+     almost unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted
+     bodies. It was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the
+     murder reached us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and
+     Commons, the Corporation of the City of London, and the
+     people of our chief manufacturing towns in public meeting
+     assembled had recorded their sentiments or expressed their
+     views. In the House of Lords the absence of precedent for
+     such a manifestation was actually made the subject of remark.
+
+     "That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the
+     tragical character of the event and the horror with which the
+     crime is regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble
+     the the fact that the loss which the Americans have sustained
+     is also thought our own loss in so far as one valuable
+     guarantee for the amity of the two nations may have been thus
+     removed. But, upon the whole, it is neither the possible
+     embarrassment of international relations nor the infamous
+     wickedness of the act itself which has determined public
+     feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine
+     sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck
+     down by an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the
+     trouble which at a crisis of their destinies such a
+     catastrophe must bring. Abraham Lincoln was as little of a
+     tyrant as any man who ever lived. He could have been a tyrant
+     had he pleased, but he never uttered so much as an
+     ill-natured speech.... In all America there was, perhaps, not
+     one man who less deserved to be the victim of this revolution
+     than he who has just fallen[1296]."
+
+The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on receipt
+of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and Commons for
+an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next," expressing "sorrow
+and indignation" at the assassination of Lincoln[1297]. April 28,
+Russell instructed Bruce to express at Washington that "the Government,
+the Parliament, and the Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of
+abhorrence of the criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious
+crimes, and sympathy for the Government and People of the United
+States[1298]...." Russell wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The
+Queen wrote a personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce
+had written from Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the
+South in his party[1299]," and he was extremely anxious that Seward's
+recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of Sumner's
+assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss terribly the
+comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward[1300]."
+
+[Illustration: BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA. _Reproduced by
+permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which the
+public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in this
+country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes of
+society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and
+resolutions[1301]...." Indeed all the old sources of "addresses" to
+Adams on emancipation and many organizations having no professed
+interest in that subject now sent to him resolutions--the emancipation
+societies, of horror, indignation, and even accusation against the
+South; the others of sympathy, more moderate in tone, yet all
+evincing an appreciation of the great qualities of Lincoln and of the
+justice of the cause of the North, now victorious. Within two weeks
+Adams reported over four hundred such addresses from Emancipation
+Societies, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities,
+boroughs, churches, indeed from every known type of British
+organizations[1302].
+
+On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for debate. In
+the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving qualities of
+Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost by his death.
+Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of the world at Booth's
+act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the United States, but
+repeated the old phrase about the "North fighting for empire, the South
+for independence," and hinted that the unusual step now being taken by
+Parliament had in it a "political object," meaning that the motion had
+been introduced in the hope of easing American irritation with Great
+Britain[1303]. It was not a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in
+the Commons, Disraeli, saved his party from criticism by what was
+distinctly the most thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day.
+Palmerston was ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who
+incautiously began by asserting that the majority of the people of Great
+Britain had always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of
+"No, no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:
+
+     "There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation
+     approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking,
+     are supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form
+     the happy privilege of private life; and this is one. Under
+     all circumstances we should have bewailed the catastrophe at
+     Washington; under all circumstances we should have shuddered
+     at the means by which it was accomplished. But in the
+     character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his
+     last moments there is something so homely and so innocent
+     that it takes as it were the subject out of all the pomp of
+     history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart
+     of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind.
+
+     "Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this
+     House, and in the country generally on the policy of the late
+     President of the United States, on this, I think, all must
+     agree, that in one of the severest trials which ever tested
+     the moral qualities of man, he fulfilled his duty with
+     simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible for the people of
+     England, at such a moment, to forget that he sprang from the
+     same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue.
+
+     "When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to
+     fall into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of
+     the causes and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one
+     of our duties to reassure the country under unreasoning panic
+     or despondency. Assassination has never changed the history
+     of the world....
+
+     "In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the
+     citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their
+     elected Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of
+     depression, but rather let us express a fervent hope that
+     from out the awful trials of the last four years, of which
+     not the least is this violent demise, the various populations
+     of North America may issue elevated and chastened; rich in
+     that accumulated wisdom, and strong in that disciplined
+     energy which a young nation can only acquire in a protracted
+     and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not merely
+     to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will
+     renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind.
+     It is with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to
+     the Crown[1304]."
+
+Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British popular
+sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and the North
+victorious. But officially the Government had not yet recognized this.
+Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had returned to the old proposal
+that the nations of Europe should withdraw their recognition of
+Southern belligerent rights[1305], and in March he had asked Stoeckl,
+the Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion of
+this measure to England and France[1306]. Meanwhile Sherman's army was
+rapidly advancing northward and reports were arriving of its pillagings
+and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in the Commons whether the
+Government was taking any steps to prevent the destruction of British
+property and received from Layard an evasive reply. Merely a "confident
+hope" had been expressed to the United States that "every facility will
+be given" to British subjects to prove ownership of property[1307].
+Evidently the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at
+a moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events
+of the war.
+
+Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination of
+Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from active
+duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on England--a
+fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great Britain in that it
+gave time for a clearer appreciation of the rapidity and completeness of
+the collapse of the South. May 15, Lord Houghton asked whether the
+Government did not intend, in view of recent events in America, "to
+withdraw the admission of belligerent rights conceded to the so-called
+Confederate States." Russell promptly objected to the form of the
+question: England had not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had
+merely issued a proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared
+the existence of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no
+other recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade,
+and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal of the
+neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official announcement from
+the United States that the war was at an end. Texas was still in arms
+and Galveston still blockaded, and for this section the United States
+would no doubt continue to exercise on neutral vessels a belligerent
+right of search. It followed that if Great Britain did prematurely
+withdraw her proclamation of neutrality and the United States searched a
+British vessel, it would be the exercise of a right of search in time of
+peace--an act against which Great Britain would be bound to make
+vigorous protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming
+the end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at the
+prospect of peace[1308].
+
+But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. Seward,
+though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was eager to
+resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was held at his
+house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some anxiety that America
+was about to _demand_ the withdrawal by Great Britain of belligerent
+rights to the South, that if Great Britain would but act before such a
+demand was made it would serve to continue the existing good feeling in
+America created by the sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially,
+that there was a decided danger to good relations in the fact that
+Confederate cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be
+sent to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and
+supplies[1309]. Three days later Bruce repeated his warning[1310]. This
+was, apparently, a complication unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any
+case Russell at once made a complete face-about from the policy he had
+outlined in reply to Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in
+Paris to notify France that England thought the time had arrived for
+recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the
+question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper treatment
+in British ports[1311]. Thus having given to France notice of his
+intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, on June
+2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was ended and
+stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were to be
+treated[1312]. Here was prompt, even hurried, action though the only
+additional event of war in America which Russell could at the moment
+cite to warrant his change of policy was the capture of Jefferson Davis.
+On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce stating what had been done and
+recognizing the "re-establishment of peace within the whole territory of
+which the United States, before the commencement of the civil war, were
+in undisturbed possession[1313]."
+
+This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's caustic
+criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's previous
+inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government had not stuck to
+its earlier position and calling attention to the fact that the United
+States, while now proclaiming certain ports open to trade, yet specified
+others as still closed and threatened with punishment as pirates, any
+vessel attempting to enter them. Derby desired information as to what
+the Government had done about this remarkable American proclamation.
+Russell, "who was very imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it
+was embarrassing that no "regular communication" had been received from
+America giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two
+Confederate cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to
+various Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had
+consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the United
+States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The "piracy
+proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby pushed for an
+answer as to whether the Government intended to let it go by unnoticed.
+Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce showed that "notice" had been
+taken of it. Derby asked whether the papers would be presented to
+Parliament; Russell "was understood to reply in the affirmative[1314]."
+Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a hectoring of Russell for his quick
+shift from the position taken a month earlier. But the very indifference
+of Russell to this attack, his carelessness and evasion in reply,
+indicate confidence that Parliament was as eager as the Government to
+satisfy the North and to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken
+by Bruce at Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to
+report it to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and
+probably a mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners[1315]. Russell
+instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had been
+captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there was
+presumably no port left where it could be applied[1316].
+
+In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrun
+diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces still in the
+field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington all
+was temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illness
+of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russell
+fortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 as
+ending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essential
+injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South,
+and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he
+yet admitted that normal relations were again established and
+acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of
+search[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament,
+reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the
+United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great
+Britain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not
+expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutrality
+position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood
+and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the
+expression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimate
+friendship between the two nations[1319]."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January,
+1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which
+occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching
+dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of the
+world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto
+blocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or more
+hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her
+plaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal
+dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which
+it has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return
+for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed
+support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the
+slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all
+nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and
+the United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious
+projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]."
+
+This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated
+frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two
+years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The French
+Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzled
+himself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own
+interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint
+action in support of the South[1321].
+
+The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded was
+such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing,
+apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late
+'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to the
+expansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged to
+have been an error and in its place there sprang into being a conviction
+that the might of America would tend toward the greatness of England
+itself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all
+British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the
+quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there were
+those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North and
+South, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy.
+
+The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, was
+prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear of
+maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North,
+which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like that
+of every other European state, believed that a revolution for
+independence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful as
+that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on,
+the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much
+uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire was
+first of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any other
+motive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately
+for America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by cool
+heads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved,
+permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle
+in the American crisis.
+
+This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both North
+and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathy
+and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" is
+evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment,
+could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl,
+who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state," unaffected by popular
+emotions. Aside from race, which could be claimed also by the South, the
+one great argument of the North in appeal to England lay in the cry of
+anti-slavery. But the leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself
+unsympathetic with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the
+British Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of
+strict neutrality.
+
+In all this the Government but pursued that line which is the business
+of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and power of the
+state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and the British
+recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there came, as is evident
+from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone and acts, a growing belief
+that the North might after all succeed in its purpose, at least of
+subjugating the South. This would mean the possibility of continuing
+that policy of friendship for a united America which had been determined
+upon in the 'fifties. Here was no special sympathy, but merely a cool
+calculation of benefits to Great Britain, but there can be no question
+that the general attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was
+distinctly favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began
+to replace a "cold neutrality."
+
+But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard national
+interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own authority and
+seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, never greatly
+stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised an increasing
+pressure by the force of public approval. It made impossible any attempt
+to overthrow the Ministry on the score of non-interference in America,
+or of favouritism toward the North. It gave to an enthusiastic and
+vociferous section of the British public just ground for strong support
+of Lincoln and his cause, and in some degree it affected
+governmental attitude.
+
+There was, however, another question, much more vital than emancipation
+in its relation to British home politics, that ran like a constant
+thread through the whole pattern of British public attitude toward
+America. It had always been so since the days of the American revolution
+and now was accentuated by the American war. This was the question of
+the future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the result of that
+war? And if so where lay British interest? Always present in the minds
+of thoughtful Englishmen, appearing again and again through each
+changing phase of the war, this question was so much a constant that to
+have attempted discussion of it while other topics were being treated,
+would have resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made
+the subject of a separate and concluding chapter.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1261: Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 132).]
+
+[Footnote 1262: To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (_Ibid._, p. 133).]
+
+[Footnote 1263: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 343]
+
+[Footnote 1264: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1265: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, March 5 and 6, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1266: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, March 15, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1267: Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. (Richardson, II, pp.
+709-17.)]
+
+[Footnote 1268: _Ibid._, p. 717.]
+
+[Footnote 1269: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 24, 1865. No.
+187. It is interesting that just at this time Gortchakoff should have
+sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by one, C. Catacazy, employé of
+the Foreign Office and long-time resident in the United States, in which
+was outlined a plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum
+specified that such an offer should be based on the idea that the time
+had come for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both
+North and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's
+interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain.
+Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to Stoeckl's
+judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian Archives. F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1270: Feb. 4, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1271: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 254. To his son, Feb.
+10, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1272: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 410-14.]
+
+[Footnote 1273: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 256. To his son, Feb.
+17, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1274: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182.
+Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1275: _Ibid._, p. 112. Adams to Seward, Feb. 2, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1276: _Ibid._, p. 180. Seward to Adams, Feb. 21, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1277: _Ibid._, p. 199. Adams to Seward, March 9, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1278: _Ibid._, p. 197. Seward to Adams, March 8, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1279: March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, II, p. 361.)]
+
+[Footnote 1280: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. 23 and March
+13, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1281: "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted to
+have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style of
+oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of the
+House, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine,
+which has the aid of a strong and savoury medium to overwhelm the
+nauseous taste." (_U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246.
+Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1282: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1283: _Ibid._, p. 262. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Adams
+wrote of his own situation that it "seems at last to be getting easy and
+comfortable, so far as freedom from anxiety is concerned." (_A Cycle of
+Adams' Letters_, II, p. 258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1284: Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at Washington, reached New
+York on April 7. His first letter to Russell from Washington, dated
+April 14, stated that America was certainly preparing to oust Maximilian
+in Mexico, and that even the Southern prisoners were eager to join the
+United States troops in an expedition for this purpose.
+(Russell Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 1285: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Part II, p. 323.
+Adams to Seward, April 20, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1286: April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1287: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1288: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 23, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1289: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, April 26, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1290: April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1291: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331.
+Adams to Seward, April 28, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1292: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 417.]
+
+[Footnote 1293: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1294: May 6, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1295: April 27, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1296: April 29, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1297: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 and 1081.]
+
+[Footnote 1298: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Correspondence respecting the Assassination of the late President of
+the United States."]
+
+[Footnote 1299: Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April 18, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1300: _Ibid._, April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1301: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 267. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1302: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865-66_, Pt. I, pp. 344,
+361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May 11, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1303: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p. 1219.]
+
+[Footnote 1304: _Ibid._, pp. 1242-46.]
+
+[Footnote 1305: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. 16, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1306: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March 1-13, 1865. No.
+523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.]
+
+[Footnote 1307: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p. 1922.]
+
+[Footnote 1308: _Ibid._, CLXXIX, p. 286.]
+
+[Footnote 1309: F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to Russell, May 16,
+1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1310: _Ibid._, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, May 19, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1311: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North
+America." No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 1312: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting the Cessation of
+Civil War in North America."]
+
+[Footnote 1313: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 1314: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp. 1-6.]
+
+[Footnote 1315: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Correspondence respecting President's Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865."
+Bruce to Russell, May 26, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1316: _Ibid._, June 16, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1317: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9. Seward to Bruce, June
+19, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1318: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p. 1143.]
+
+[Footnote 1319: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1865, _Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North
+America." No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 1320: Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec. 23, 1859/Jan. 4,
+1860. No. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 1321: _Ibid._, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 17-29, 1861. No. 267. He
+reports that he has seen a confidential letter from Thouvenel to Mercier
+outlining exactly his own ideas as to England being the sole gainer by
+the dissolution of the Union.]
+
+[Footnote 1322: For an analysis of this change see _The Cambridge
+History of British Foreign Policy_, Vol II, p. 277, which also quotes a
+remarkable speech by Disraeli.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE
+
+On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's surrender
+to Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the Commons the first
+serious debate in thirty-three years on a proposed expansion of the
+electoral franchise. It was a dramatic coincidence and no mere
+fortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen who had seen in the
+Civil War a struggle as fateful in British domestic policy as in that of
+America herself. Throughout all British political agitation from the
+time of the American revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of the
+American "example" as argument to some for imitation, to others for
+warning. Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing his
+impressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental and
+political institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of what
+was desirable in his own country[1323]. In the ten years immediately
+preceding the Civil War most travellers were laudatory of American
+democracy, and one, the best in acute analysis up to the time of Lord
+Bryce's great work, had much influence on that class in England which
+was discontented with existing political institutions at home. This was
+Mackay's _Western World_ which, first published in 1849, had gone
+through four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was frequently
+reprinted[1324]. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no longer an
+experiment; its success and permanence were evident in the mighty power
+of the United States; Canada would soon follow the American example; the
+"injustice" of British aristocrats to the United States was intentional,
+seeking to discredit democracy:
+
+     "... Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with their
+     judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the
+     interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever
+     it is found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the
+     people have too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided
+     them in their object. They recognize America as the
+     stronghold of republicanism. If they can bring it into
+     disrepute here, they know that they inflict upon it the
+     deadliest blow in Europe[1325]."
+
+On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued the
+inapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain[1326]. The
+theoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects admirable
+but in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of the mob and had
+debased the nation in the estimation of the world; bribery in elections,
+the low order of men in politics and in Congress, were proofs of the
+evils of democracy; those in England who clamoured for a "numerical"
+rather than a class representation should take warning from the American
+experiment. Occasionally, though rarely, there appeared the impressions
+of some British traveller who had no political axe to grind[1327], but
+from 1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing on
+America was coloured by the author's attitude on political institutions
+at home. The "example" of America was constantly on the horizon in
+British politics.
+
+In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb since the
+high tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to have made a
+private agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory parties would
+oppose any movement toward an expansion of the franchise[1328]. Lord
+John Russell, in his youth an eager supporter of the Reform Bill of
+1832, had now gained the name of "Finality John" by his assertion that
+that Reform was final in British institutions. Political reaction was in
+full swing much to the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden and
+their supporters. When the storm broke in America the personal
+characteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and Davis,
+took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme importance as if
+representative of the political philosophies of the two sections.
+Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis' "culture" was
+aristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had "aristocratic" views
+on government[1329]. But that this issue had any vital bearing on the
+quarrel between the American sections was never generally voiced in
+England. Rather, British comment was directed to the lesson, taught to
+the world by the American crisis, of the failure of democratic
+institutions in _national power._ Bright had long preached to the
+unenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and these
+had long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a result of
+democratic institutions. At first the denial was now repeated, the
+_Saturday Review_, February 23, 1861, protesting that there was no
+essential connection between the "shipwreck" of American institutions
+and the movement in England for an expanded franchise. Even, the article
+continued, if an attempt were made to show such a connection it would
+convince nobody since "Mr. Bright has succeeded in persuading a great
+number of influential persons that the admission of working-men into the
+constituencies is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground that
+it has succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panacea
+against the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of old
+Governments in Europe." Yet that the denial was not sincere is shown by
+the further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of Birmingham and
+other kindred platforms must bear the blame of the inference, drawn
+nearly universally at the present moment, that, if the United States
+become involved in hopeless difficulties, it would be madness to lower
+the qualification for the suffrage in England."
+
+This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the American
+struggle and British institutions was not long persisted in. A month
+later the _Saturday Review_ was strong in contemptuous criticism of the
+"promiscuous democracy" of the North[1330]. Less political journals
+followed suit. The _Economist_ thought the people of England would now
+be convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who had
+advocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm,
+gratitude and shame[1331]." Soon W.H. Russell could write, while still
+at Washington "... the world will only see in it all, the failure of
+republican institutions in time of pressure as demonstrated by all
+history--that history which America vainly thought she was going to set
+right and re-establish on new grounds and principles[1332]." "The
+English worshippers of American institutions," said the _Saturday
+Review_, "are in danger of losing their last pretext for preferring the
+Republic to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England.... It now
+appears that the peaceable completion of the secession has become
+impossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground of
+superiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be advantageously
+contrasted with Queen Victoria[1333]."
+
+These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of the war
+and may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers rather than as
+attempts to read a lesson to the public. No such expressions are to be
+found in the letters of leading officials though minor ones occasionally
+indulged in them[1334]. As late as June, 1861, Adams declared that while
+some in England welcomed American disunion as a warning to their
+countrymen it was evident that but a small number as yet saw the cause
+of the North as identical with the world progress of free
+institutions[1335]. Evidently he was disappointed that the followers of
+Bright were not exhibiting more courage and demanding public support of
+the North as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangely
+silent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. It
+required time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the American
+question and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic Britain
+was first to declare a definite lesson to be learned, thereby bringing
+out the fighting qualities of British democracy. Throughout 1861, the
+comment was relatively mild. In July, _Blackwood's_ declared:
+
+     "It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of
+     America for her own institutions and political tendencies
+     that we do not now see in the impending change an event
+     altogether to be deplored. In those institutions and
+     tendencies we saw what our own might be if the most dangerous
+     elements of our Constitution should become dominant. We saw
+     democracy rampant, with no restriction upon its caprices. We
+     saw a policy which received its impulses always from below
+     ... nor need we affect particularly to lament the exhibition
+     of the weak point of a Constitution ... the disruption of
+     which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages which
+     America owes to England, and which have contributed so
+     powerfully to her prosperity...."
+
+     "With a rival Government on the frontier ... with great
+     principles to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we
+     should probably see the natural aristocracy rise from the
+     dead level of the Republic, raising the national character
+     with its own elevation[1336]."
+
+In the same month the _Quarterly_, always more calm, logical and
+convincing than _Blackwood's_, published "Democracy on its Trial[1337]."
+"The example of America kept alive, as it had created, the party of
+progress"; now "it has sunk from the decrepitude of premature old age."
+If England, after such an example, permits herself to be led into
+democracy she "will have perished by that wilful infatuation which no
+warning can dispel."
+
+Adams had complained that few British friends of progress identified the
+cause of the North with their own, but this was true of Americans also.
+The _Atlantic Monthly_ for July 1861, discussed British attitude wholly
+in terms of cotton supply. But soon there appeared in the British press
+so many preachments on the "lesson" of America that the aristocratic
+effort to gain an advantage at home became apparent to all[1338]. The
+_Economist_ moralized on the "untried" character of American
+institutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant as the
+"masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual still more
+worthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral degradation" to the
+level of their constituents[1339]. "The upper and ruling class" wrote
+Bright to Sumner, were observing with satisfaction, "that democracy may
+get into trouble, and war, and debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has done
+for this country[1340]." Thus Bright could not deny the blow to
+democracy; nor could the _Spectator_, upbraiding its countrymen for lack
+of sympathy with the North: "New England will be justified in saying
+that Old England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimental
+pretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with cotton
+against the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her gentle regret
+over the new impulse given to slavery by her lively gratification over
+the paralyzing shock suffered by Democracy[1341]." This was no taking up
+of cudgels for the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for.
+Vigour rested with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a short
+war vanished. The _Saturday Review_ asserted:
+
+     "In that reconstruction of political philosophy which the
+     American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of
+     the popular element will be reduced to its due
+     proportions.... The true guarantee of freedom will be looked
+     for more in the equilibrium of classes than in the equality
+     of individuals.... We may hope, at last, that the delusive
+     confusion between freedom and democracy is finally banished
+     from the minds of Englishmen[1342]."
+
+"The real secret," wrote Motley, "of the exultation which manifests
+itself in the _Times_ and other organs over our troubles and disasters,
+is their hatred, not to America, so much as to democracy in
+England[1343]." It was scarcely a secret in the columns of the journals
+already quoted. But no similar interpretation had as yet appeared in the
+_Times_ and Motley's implication was justified for it and other leading
+daily newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leading
+the attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright and
+his followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis. The
+_Edinburgh_ at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the American
+dispute[1344], then attributed it to the inevitable failure in power of
+a federal system of government, not mentioning democracy as in
+question[1345]. _Blackwood's_ repeatedly pushed home its argument:
+
+     "Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that the end
+     of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than
+     terrible.... But for our own benefit and the instruction of
+     the world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so
+     fatal, of their political system exposed, in the most
+     effective way.... And the venerable Lincoln, the respectable
+     Seward, the raving editors, the gibbering mob, and the
+     swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no malicious tricks
+     of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are all of
+     them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic ...
+     dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the
+     spoiled child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before
+     high heaven, and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises,
+     dies as sheerly from lack of vitality as the oldest of
+     worn-out despotisms.... In the hope that this contest may end
+     in the extinction of mob rule, we become reconciled to the
+     much slighter amount of suffering that war inflicts on
+     America[1346]."
+
+Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the cause of
+the South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished audience" used
+language insulting to the North, fawning upon the South and picturing
+the latter as wholly admirable for its aristocratic tendencies. For this
+he was sharply taken to task by the _Spectator_[1347]. More sedately the
+Earl of Shrewsbury proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracy
+and its failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union is
+inevitable, and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracy
+established in America[1348]." In all countries and at all times there
+are men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but in such
+utterances as these there is manifest not merely the customary desire to
+stand in the limelight of assured knowledge and wisdom, but also the
+happy conviction that events in America were working to the undoing of
+the Radicals of Great Britain. If they would not be supine the Radicals
+must strike back. On December 4, at Rochdale where, as the _Times_
+asserted, he was sure of an audience sympathetic on purely personal
+grounds, Bright renewed his profession of faith in the American Republic
+and sang his accustomed praises of its great accomplishments[1349]. The
+battle, for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challenge
+issued by aristocratic England, accepted.
+
+But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there stood a
+group holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the historical
+significance of the American collapse. To this group belonged Gladstone,
+as yet uncertain of his political philosophy, and regretful, though
+vainly, it would appear, of the blow to democracy. He wrote his thought
+to Brougham, no doubt hoping to influence the view-point of the
+_Edinburgh_.
+
+     "This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor
+     'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier
+     discount since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of
+     the American constitution in the main fact of the rupture.
+     On the contrary it was a great achievement to strike off by
+     the will and wit of man a constitution for two millions of
+     men scattered along a seaboard, which has lasted until they
+     have become more than thirty millions and have covered a
+     whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and follies, not to
+     say worse, with which the rupture has been met in the
+     Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not
+     exposition but) exposure have really given as I have said the
+     old lady in question such a heavy blow and great
+     discouragement that I hope you will in the first vigour of
+     your action be a little merciful and human lest you murder
+     her outright[1350]."
+
+On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions the
+American Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not believing in
+1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade advantage would lead Great
+Britain from just rules of conduct. Even in the crisis of the _Trent_
+affair he was firm in this opinion:
+
+     "Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be
+     disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils,
+     and much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make
+     democracy responsible for them, the inexorable logic of
+     events is contradicting each and every assertion based on
+     these notions, and proving that the American struggle is,
+     after all, the ever-recurring one in human affairs between
+     right and wrong, between labour and capital, between liberty
+     and absolutism. When such an issue comes to be presented to
+     the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the disguises
+     which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to
+     predict at least which side it will _not_ consent to
+     take[1351].
+
+April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on American
+democracy and December its acceptance by Bright. Throughout 1862 he
+practically deserted his seat in Parliament and devoted himself to
+stirring up labour and radical sentiment in favour of the North. In
+January, 1862, a mass meeting at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced the
+daily press and was thought of sufficient moment to be reported by
+Adams. A motion was carried:
+
+     "That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the
+     ill-disguised efforts of the _Times_ and other misleading
+     journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American
+     questions ... to decry democratic institutions under the
+     trials to which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of
+     the working-men especially as unrepresented in the National
+     Senate to express their sympathy with the United States in
+     their gigantic struggle for the preservation of the
+     Union[1352]...."
+
+The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in the
+controversy. The _Morning Post_, stating with conviction its belief that
+there could be no re-union in America, added:
+
+     "... if the Government of the United States should succeed in
+     reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still extensive
+     dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest triumph
+     since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the ample
+     satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is
+     even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate
+     not only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can
+     ride safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf
+     every other craft laden with human destinies; that it can
+     descend to the darkest depths of adversity, and rise from
+     them all the stronger for the descent.... And who can doubt
+     that Democracy will be more arrogant, more aggressive, more
+     levelling and vulgarizing, if that be possible, than it ever
+     had been before[1353]."
+
+By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that the
+political controversy in England had an important bearing on the
+attitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of _Fraser's
+Magazine_ seemed turning to one-sided presentation of the "lesson" of
+America. Mill's defence of the North, appearing in the February number,
+was soon followed in July by the first of a series of articles,
+"Universal Suffrage in the United States and Its Consequences,"
+depicting the war as the result of mob rule and predicting a military
+despotism as its inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losing
+strength, wrote Adams:
+
+     "That the American difficulties have materially contributed
+     to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the
+     leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United
+     States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on.
+     The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate
+     subdivision of America into many separate States which will
+     neutralize each other. This is most visible among the
+     conservative class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of
+     liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the
+     nursery of them[1354]."
+
+From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully aloof at
+least in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell commented to
+Palmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson by De Witt, which
+is both interesting and instructive. It shows how the Great Republic of
+Washington degenerated into the Democracy of Jefferson. They are now
+reaping the fruit[1355]." Was it mere coincidence or was there
+significance in an editorial in Palmerston's alleged "organ," the
+_Morning Post_:
+
+     "That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure to the
+     calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably false.
+     But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful
+     Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United
+     States during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a
+     democratic tyranny compared with which the most corrupt
+     despotisms of the Old World appear realms of idyllic
+     happiness and peace, have gratefully recognized the finger of
+     Providence in the strife by which they have been so
+     frightfully rent asunder[1356]...."
+
+In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again brought
+into action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than heretofore.
+"For a great number of years," said the _Quarterly_, "a certain party
+among us, great admirers of America ... have chosen to fight their
+English battles upon American soil." Now the American Government "has
+disgracefully and ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evident
+that "political equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera[1357]."
+At last, in November, the _Times_ openly took the position which its
+accusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial utterances
+almost from the beginning of the Civil War.
+
+     "These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form of
+     government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city
+     attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if
+     such a terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in
+     England we should at the earliest moment possible have sent
+     the incapables about their business, and put ourselves in the
+     hands of better men...."
+
+     "This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model
+     for imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how
+     it works now, when for the first time it has some work to do.
+     We believe that if the English system of Parliamentary action
+     had existed in America, the war could not have occurred, but
+     we are quite sure that such Ministers would have long since
+     been changed[1358]."
+
+In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the failure of
+democracy, the open friends of the South dilated also upon the
+"gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and society. This was
+the frequent burden of articles in _The Index_ in the early weeks of its
+publication. To this was soon added a picture of Northern democracy as
+composed of and controlled by the "immigrant element" which was the
+source of "the enormous increase of population in the last thirty years"
+from revolutionary areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carried
+with them more than their strong arms, they imported also their theories
+of equality.... The revolutionary party which represents them is at this
+moment master in the States of the North, where it is indulging in all
+its customary licence[1359]." This fact, complained _The Index_, was not
+sufficiently brought out in the English press. Very different was the
+picture painted by Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states:
+
+     "... this man has his romance, his high poetic feeling, and
+     above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him
+     without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers
+     and old flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws
+     the signs of ague and sickness; but he will stand upright
+     before you and speak to you with all the ease of a lettered
+     gentleman in his own library. All the odious incivility of
+     the republican servant has been banished. He is his own
+     master, standing on his own threshold, and finds no need to
+     assert his equality by rudeness. He is delighted to see you,
+     and bids you sit down on his battered bench, without dreaming
+     of any such apology as an English cotter offers to a Lady
+     Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his independence,
+     and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He tells you
+     of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will
+     always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some
+     token of advance in education. When he questions you about
+     the old country he astonishes you by the extent of his
+     knowledge. I defy you not to feel that he is superior to the
+     race from whence he has sprung in England or in Ireland."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "It is always the same story. With us there is no level of
+     society. Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd
+     congregates near the bottom, and the lower steps are very
+     broad. In America men stand upon a common platform, but the
+     platform is raised above the ground, though it does not
+     approach in height the top of our staircase. If we take the
+     average altitude in the two countries, we shall find that the
+     American heads are the more elevated of the two[1360]."
+
+A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative and
+aristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy and its
+lesson to England was most marked and most open at the moment when the
+Government was seriously considering an offer of mediation in the war.
+Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of September, 1862, had
+appeared. It did not immediately affect governmental attitude, save
+adversely to the North, and it gave a handle for pro-Southern outcry on
+the score of a "servile war." Indeed, the radicals were at first
+depressed by it; but when months passed with no appearance of a servile
+war and when the second emancipation proclamation of January, 1863,
+further certified the moral purpose of the North, a great element of
+strength was added to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous
+"addresses" to Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for the
+cause of anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation of
+American political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter Hall,
+January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an American
+paper as largely deriving its strength from the universal
+dissatisfaction of the lower orders of the English people with their
+existing conditions under the Crown:
+
+     "The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing under
+     the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the
+     contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the
+     soil, the grievous effects of the laws of entail and
+     primogeniture, whereby they are kept poor and rendered liable
+     to starvation and pauperism--these have looked to America as
+     the model democracy which proves the poor man's capacity for
+     self-government." The meeting was called for seven o'clock
+     but at half after five the hall was filled, and at six
+     crowded. A second hall was filled and outdoor meetings of two
+     thousand people organized in Exeter Street. "All
+     working-class England was up in arms, not so much against
+     slavery as against British oligarchy[1361]."
+
+The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had caused
+anxious consideration to the managers of the _Times_, and the decision
+to step more warily. No doubt this was exaggeration of the political
+character and effect of the meeting, but certain it is that the
+political element was present joining hands with anti-slavery
+enthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the last confident and vigorous
+expression of the "failure" of democracy, from sources professedly
+neutral, appeared immediately after the St. James' Hall meeting, but was
+necessarily written before that meeting took place. _Blackwood's_, in
+its issue of February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man in
+this country now acknowledges ... that we have already gone as far
+toward democracy as is safe to go.... This is the great moral benefit
+which we have derived from the events in America." John Blackwood was an
+intimate friend of Delane, editor of the _Times_, holding similar views
+on political questions; but the _Times_ was suddenly grown cautious in
+reading English political lessons from America. In truth, attack now
+rested with the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand[1362].
+He now advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North to
+the offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merely
+because it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it desired
+to make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was the
+negro[1363]. It was now Radical purpose to keep the battle raging and
+they were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the United States might well
+recognize its opportunity in this controversy and give aid to
+its friends:
+
+     "After all, this struggle of ours both at home and abroad is
+     but a struggle between the principle of popular government
+     and government by a privileged class. The people therefore
+     all the world over are in a species of solidarity which it is
+     our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost[1364]."
+
+But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the democratic
+movement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise, developed, he yet
+feared that the extremes to which Bright and others were going in
+support of the North might create unfortunate reactions in the
+Government. Especially he was anxious that the United States should not
+offer opportunity for accusation of interference in a British political
+quarrel. It is noteworthy that while many addresses to Lincoln were
+forwarded by him and many were printed in the annual publication of
+diplomatic correspondence, those that thus appeared dealt almost
+exclusively with emancipation. Yet Adams was also forwarding addresses
+and speeches harping on American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh,
+February 19, found place, in its emancipation aspect in the United
+States documents[1365], but the burden of that meeting, democracy, did
+not. It was there proclaimed that the British press misrepresented
+conditions in America, "because the future of free political
+institutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of Independence
+and in the State Constitutions of the Northern States, would be a
+standing argument against the expansion of the franchise and the
+enjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a convenient
+argument in favour of the continued domination of our aristocratic
+parties[1366]." The tide of democratic feeling was rising rapidly in
+England. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a recent debate in
+Parliament that that body was much more judicious in expressions on
+America than it had been before 1862. "It will not escape your
+observation that the question is now felt to be taking a shape which was
+scarcely anticipated by the managers [of the _Times_] when they first
+undertook to guide the British mind to the overthrow of free
+institutions in America[1367]."
+
+On the evening of the day on which this was written there occurred the
+greatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the aristocracy, of
+the meetings held to support the cause of the North. This was the
+spectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of London at St. James' Hall,
+on March 26, usually regarded as the culminating effort in Bright's tour
+of England for the cause of democracy, but whose origin is somewhat
+shrouded in mystery. Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceived
+the idea of the meeting and was responsible for its organization[1368].
+The press generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting." Adams wrote to
+Seward of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the University
+of London, to send a representative from the American Ministry, Beesly
+expanding upon the importance and high standing of the Trades Unions. To
+this Adams demurred but finally sent his son to sit in the audience and
+report the proceedings.
+
+Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the most
+important of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the Civil
+War, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle of
+democracy." Save for some distinguished speakers those in attendance
+consisted almost wholly of three thousand picked representatives of the
+Trades Unions of London. Adams transmitted to Seward his son's report of
+the meeting, its character, composition, names of speakers and their
+emphatic expressions of friendship for the North[1369], but it is again
+noteworthy that Henry Adams' clear analysis of the real significance of
+the meeting was not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence.
+Giving due praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commenting
+on press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were only
+brought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright," Henry Adams
+continued: "That this was not the case must have been evident to every
+person present. In fact, it was only after he closed that the real
+business of the evening began." Then followed speeches and the
+introduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a bricklayer ... Mr. Odgers,
+a shoemaker ... Mr. Mantz, a compositor ... Mr. Cremer, a joiner, who
+was bitter against Lord Palmerston ... Mr. Conolly, a mason...." and
+other labouring men, all asserting "that the success of free
+institutions in America was a political question of deep consequence in
+England and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavourable
+to the North." No one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what was
+intended."
+
+     "The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength and
+     no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a
+     direct political bearing on internal politics in England it
+     needed little of doing so. There was not even a profession of
+     faith in the government of England as at present constituted.
+     Every hostile allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the
+     opinions of the 'privileged classes,' was received with warm
+     cheers. Every allusion to the republican institutions of
+     America, the right of suffrage, the right of self-taxation,
+     the 'sunlight' of republican influence, was caught up by the
+     audience with vehement applause. It may therefore be
+     considered as fairly and authoritatively announced that the
+     class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of
+     the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an
+     act almost without precedent in their history, the principle
+     that they make common cause with the Americans who are
+     struggling for the restoration of the Union and that all
+     their power and influence shall be used on behalf of the
+     North[1370]."
+
+Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege," and his
+appeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America have been
+given in a previous chapter[1371]. Evidently that appeal, though
+enthusiastically received for its oratorical brilliance, was unneeded.
+His was but an eloquent expression of that which was in the minds of his
+audience. Upon the American Minister the effect was to cause him to
+renew warnings against showing too keen an appreciation of the support
+of political radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at once
+stirred anxiety in Parliament and verged:
+
+     "... much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic
+     politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or
+     sympathize with by Foreign Governments.... Hence it seems to
+     me of the greatest consequence that the treatment of all
+     present questions between the two nations should be regulated
+     by a provident forecast of what may follow it [the political
+     struggle in England] hereafter. I am not sure that some
+     parties here would not now be willing even to take the risk
+     of a war in order the more effectually to turn the scale
+     against us, and thus, as they think, to crush the rising
+     spirit of their own population. That this is only a feeling
+     at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a policy
+     may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon
+     the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if
+     possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such
+     hopes.... We owe this duty not less to the great body of
+     those who in this kingdom are friends to us and our
+     institutions, than to ourselves[1372]."
+
+[Illustration: JOHN BRIGHT (_From a photograph taken of him in the
+attitude in which he usually spoke_) (_From Trevelyan's "Life of John
+Bright_")]
+
+Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect to
+democratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received a
+deputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutions
+passed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed fears
+that a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain and
+America, and that this would have a disastrous influence on the
+aspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms of
+appreciation for the sympathies expressed by the meeting but
+carefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose. "He was
+too prudent," said the _Times_ in reporting the deputation, "to appraise
+the importance of the particular demonstration to which his notice was
+invited ..." and his reply was given favourable comment[1373]. This
+reply, wrote Adams, "appears to have had a sedative effect[1374]."
+Meanwhile, Bright continued his preachment to the English people though
+modifying his tone of fierce accusation against "privilege," and
+confining himself to declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in the
+American conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Society
+of London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people in
+this country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I say that
+these have an interest, almost as great and direct as though they were
+living in Massachusetts or New York, in the tremendous struggle for
+freedom which is now shaking the whole North American Continent[1375]."
+Like utterances were repeated at further public meetings and so
+insistent were they as to require reply by the conservative faction,
+even if, as was supposed, the effect of the Trades' Union attitude had
+been to give a halt to the vehemence of those who had been sounding the
+"lesson" of American failure in democracy. Bright became the centre of
+attack. The _Times_ led.
+
+     "His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the
+     Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant
+     Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it
+     must go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives
+     up all his most cherished notions and all his less absorbing
+     principles...."
+
+     "Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion and
+     his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master
+     passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He
+     worshipped it while rising to its culminating point, and he
+     is obliged to turn right round to worship it while setting.
+     He did not himself know, until tested by this great trial,
+     how entirely his opinions as to war and peace, and slavery
+     and freedom, and lust of conquest and hatred of oppression,
+     were all the mere accidents which hung loosely upon him, and
+     were capable of being detached at once in the interest of the
+     ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant Democracy.
+     Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been a
+     failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright
+     up to this time has been but a foolish dream[1376]."
+
+Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness; but an
+"if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American democracy,
+caused less by the progress of the war than by the rising excitement of
+democratic England. The _Times_ editorial just quoted appeared when the
+faith was generally professed that Lee was about to end the war through
+the invasion of Pennsylvania. In the reaction created by the arrival of
+the news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned his
+Government against either a belligerent or interfering attitude toward
+Great Britain, but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supreme
+importance in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is to
+show, by our example to the people of England in particular, and to all
+nations in general, the value of republican institutions." There was
+still a general belief in the incompetency of those institutions. "The
+greatest triumph of all would be to prove these calculations vain. In
+comparison with this, what would be the gain to be derived from any
+collision with the powers of Europe[1377]?"
+
+It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of English
+opinion on American democracy few in America itself appreciated the
+significance of the British controversy. J. M. Forbes, who had been on a
+special mission to England, wrote to Lincoln, on his return[1378]:
+
+     "Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his glorious band
+     of English Republicans see that we are fighting for Democracy
+     or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal
+     institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world
+     are as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have
+     on this side.
+
+     Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and
+     the Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of
+     the People against an Aristocracy[1379]."
+
+But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly always came
+from men who had been abroad and had thus come into direct contact with
+British political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's retreat from Pennsylvania
+had produced a like retreat in the opinions on the failure of democracy
+earlier confidently held by the professedly neutral press. In September,
+having arrived at the point by the usual process of gradually facing
+about, the _Times_ was bold enough to deny that England had any personal
+feeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had anything
+to do with English attitude on the war[1380]. Thenceforth neither the
+_Times_ nor any of the leading papers saw fit to revive with vigour the
+cry of "democracy's failure," no matter how persistent in proclaiming
+ultimate victory for the South. Aristocratic exultation had given place
+to alarm and it seemed wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue[1381]. Not
+so the Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in the
+minds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence but
+increased firmness debated the question in every public meeting
+favourable to the North[1382]. Many Conservatives, Adams reported, were
+now anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a difficult
+one because of their irritation at Bright's taunts[1383]. Bright's star
+was rising. "The very moment the war comes to an end," wrote Adams, "and
+a restoration of the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reaction
+that will make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man in
+England[1384]."
+
+The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly one-sided.
+In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent upon the more
+eager and professed friends of the South to take up the cudgels. Hence,
+in part, came the organization of the Southern Independence Association
+and the attempt to hold public meetings favourable to the South, in the
+early months of 1864. Much talk had been spent on the "British issue"
+involved in the war; there was now to be vigorous work to secure
+it[1385]. _The Index _plunged into vigorous denunciation of "The
+Manchester School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better for
+the future call the American School." Even the Government was attacked
+for its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining as a
+member Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that he shared
+Bright's views on democracy:
+
+     "That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter the
+     Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament
+     despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and
+     vituperation, his vulgarity, and his incurable want of
+     veracity, had made him so hateful to the educated classes
+     that it would have required no common courage to give him
+     office; his insolent sneers at royalty would have made his
+     appointment little less than a personal insult to the Queen;
+     and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable
+     colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a
+     faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other
+     existence but what it borrowed from him, while its previous
+     life and education had accustomed it to the society of
+     statesmen and of gentlemen[1386]."
+
+Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they were
+too evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical and
+pro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the Southern
+Independence Association, analysed with clarity the situation. Answering
+criticisms of the passionate mob spirit of Northern press and people, he
+accused the _Times_ of having
+
+     "... pandered to the hatred of America among the upper
+     classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at
+     least had been taught by what we have lately seen not to
+     shrink from an extension of the suffrage, if the only bad
+     consequence of that measure of justice would be a change in
+     government from the passions of the privileged class to the
+     passions of the people.... History will not mistake the
+     meaning of the loud cry of triumph which burst from the
+     hearts of all who openly or secretly hated liberty and
+     progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the Great
+     Republic." British working men "are for the most part as well
+     aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right
+     of labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can
+     be that the other cause in his[1387]."
+
+The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as an
+institution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the front
+in politics. This was very largely a result of the American Civil War.
+Roebuck, after the failure of his effort for mediation in 1863, was
+obsessed with a fear of the tendency in England. "I have great faith in
+my countrymen," he wrote, "but the experience of America frightens me. I
+am not ashamed to use the word _frightened_. During my whole life I have
+looked to that country as about to solve the great problem of
+self-government, and now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth and
+manhood are destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my political
+philosophy, and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point[1388]."
+More philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule of
+aristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the discovery
+of some middle ground or method--some "influence [which] may help us to
+prevent the English people from becoming, with the growth of democracy,
+_Americanized_[1389]." "There is no longer any sort of disguise
+maintained," wrote Adams, "as to the wishes of the privileged classes.
+Very little genuine sympathy is entertained for the rebels. The true
+motive is apparent enough. It is the fear of the spread of democratic
+feeling at home in the event of our success[1390]."
+
+The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser Conservative
+elements in proclaming the "lesson" of American democracy--a retreat
+caused by alarm at the vigour with which Radicals had taken up the
+challenge. Conservative hopes were still fixed upon Southern success and
+Conservative confidence loudly voiced. Even the pride of the _Times_ in
+the accuracy of its news and in its military forecasts was subordinated
+to the purpose of keeping up the courage of the faction it
+represented[1391]. Small wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving the
+news of Sherman's arrival before Savannah, should be made physically ill
+and write to Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow to us as well
+as to the South." The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed about
+Sherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the mischief[1392]."
+"Attenuation" of Northern progress in arms was, indeed, attempted, but
+the facts of the military situation were too strong for continued
+concealment. From January, 1865, only the most stubborn of Southern
+friends could remain blind to the approaching Northern victory. Lord
+Acton, a hero-worshipper of the great Confederate military leader,
+"broke his heart over the surrender of Lee," but was moved also by keen
+insight as to the political meaning of that surrender[1393].
+
+So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War in
+America was closing in Northern victory that the final event was
+discounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for an
+English political struggle on the great issue heralded as involved in
+the American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a motion in
+Parliament for expansion of the franchise the ultra-Conservatives
+attempted to read a "lesson" from America. The _Quarterly_ for April,
+1865, asserted that even yet "the mass of educated men in England retain
+the sympathy for the South which they have nourished ever since the
+conflict assumed a decided shape." America was plainly headed in the
+direction of a military despotism. Her example should warn England from
+a move in the same direction. "The classes which govern this country are
+in a minority," and should beware of majority rule. But events
+discredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination of
+Lincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring of
+expressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exalt
+Lincoln's leadership in democracy[1394].
+
+In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new Parliament. Not a
+single member who had supported the cause of the North failed of
+re-election, several additional Northern "friends" were chosen, and some
+outspoken members for the South were defeated. Adams thought this a
+matter deserving special notice in America, and prophesied a new era
+approaching in England:
+
+     "As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period marks
+     an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure
+     old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the
+     confidence of the country that it will not appear in that
+     guise any more. Unless some new and foreign element should
+     interpose, I look for decided progress in enlarging the
+     popular features of the constitution, and diminishing the
+     influence of the aristocracy.... It is impossible not to
+     perceive traces of the influence of our institutions upon all
+     these changes.... The progress of the liberal cause, not in
+     England alone, but all over the world, is, in a measure, in
+     our hands[1395]."
+
+The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams anticipated.
+Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October 18, 1865. Russell
+succeeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost immediately declared
+himself in favour of Parliamentary reform even though a majority in both
+Houses was still opposed to such a measure. Russell's desertion of his
+earlier attitude of "finality" on franchise expansion correctly
+represented the acceptance, though unwillingly, by both political
+parties of the necessity of reform. The battle, long waged, but reaching
+its decisive moment during the American Civil War, had finally gone
+against Conservatism when Lee surrendered at Appomatox. Russell's
+Reform Bill of 1866 was defeated by Tory opposition in combination with
+a small Whig faction which refused to desert the "principle" of
+aristocratic government--the "government by the wise," but the Tories
+who came into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voiced
+even to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill.
+Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises,"
+which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to British
+working-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic criticism that all
+the planned advantages to Conservatism were soon thrown overboard, and a
+Bill presented so Radical as to permit a transfer of political power to
+the working classes[1396]. The Reform Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain
+from a government by aristocracy to one by democracy. A new nation came
+into being. The friends of the North had triumphed.
+
+Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the incidental
+frictions, the effect on trade relations, the applications of British
+neutrality, and the general policy of the Government, there existed for
+Great Britain a great issue in the outcome of the Civil War--the issue
+of the adoption of democratic institutions. It affected at every turn
+British public attitude, creating an intensity and bitterness of tone,
+on both sides, unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. In
+America this was little understood, and American writers both during the
+war and long afterwards, gave little attention to it[1397]. Immediately
+upon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during the
+conflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that "the
+territorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of the
+Established Church" would have been excusable "if they could only have
+said frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions opposed to
+their own, instead of talking about their sympathy for the weak, and
+their respect for national independence, and their anxiety for the
+triumph of Free Trade[1398]." This was stated before the democratic hope
+in England had been realized. Three years later the same staunch friend
+of the North, now removed to America and occupying a chair of history at
+Cornell University, wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of their
+attitude: "I fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, that
+their defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But I
+daresay we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been born
+members of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under the
+blessed influence of equality and justice[1399]."
+
+Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian as
+well-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one fought
+first of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue of democracy
+in England seemed of little moment and little to excuse either the "cold
+neutrality" of the Government or the tone of the press. To Americans
+Great Britain appeared friendly to the dissolution of the Union and the
+destruction of a rival power. Nationality was the issue for the North;
+that democracy was an issue in America was denied, nor could it, in the
+intensity of the conflict, be conceived as the vital question
+determining British attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a new
+British nation into existence, the nation decrying American institutions
+was dead and a "sister democracy" holding out hands to the United
+States had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for the
+North long remained blind. Not during the generation when Americans,
+immersed in a life and death struggle for national existence, felt that
+"he who is not for me is against me," could the generally correct
+neutrality of the British Government and the whole-hearted support of
+Radical England be accepted at their true value to the North. For nearly
+half a century after the American Civil War the natural sentiments of
+friendship, based upon ties of blood and a common heritage of literature
+and history and law, were distorted by bitter and exaggerated
+memories.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1323: See my article, "The Point of View of the British
+Traveller in America," _Pol. Sci. Quarterly_, June, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 1324: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World; or Travels in the
+United States in_ 1846-47.]
+
+[Footnote 1325: _Ibid._, Fourth Edition, London, 1850, Vol. III, p. 24.]
+
+[Footnote 1326: Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, _The Constitution of the
+United States compared with Our Own_, London, 1854.]
+
+[Footnote 1327: e.g., William Kelly, _Across the Rocky Mountains from
+New York to California_, London, 1852. He made one acute observation on
+American democracy. "The division of parties is just the reverse in
+America to what it is in England. In England the stronghold of democracy
+is in the large towns, and aristocracy has its strongest supporters in
+the country. In America the ultra-democrat and leveller is the western
+farmer, and the aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst the
+manufacturers and merchants of the eastern cities." (p. 181.)]
+
+[Footnote 1328: Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, pp. 293-4, states a Tory
+offer to support Palmerston on these lines.]
+
+[Footnote 1329: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 217.]
+
+[Footnote 1330: March, 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1331: March 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1332: To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861. (Bigelow,
+_Retrospections_, I, p. 347.)]
+
+[Footnote 1333: April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1334: Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861, that the war in
+America was the "natural result of the much vaunted system of government
+of the United States"; it had "crumbled to pieces," and this result had
+long been evident to the public mind of Europe. (F.O., Am., Vol.
+780, No. 58.)]
+
+[Footnote 1335: State Department, Eng., Vol. 77, No. 9. Adams to Seward,
+June 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1336: I have made an effort to identify writers in
+_Blackwood's_, but am informed by the editors that it is impossible to
+do this for the period before 1870, old correspondence having been
+destroyed.]
+
+[Footnote 1337: July, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1338: The _Atlantic Monthly_ for November, 1861, takes up the
+question, denying that democracy is in any sense "on trial" in America,
+so far as the permanence of American institutions is concerned. It still
+does not see clearly the real nature of the controversy in England.]
+
+[Footnote 1339: Aug. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1340: Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p.
+94.)]
+
+[Footnote 1341: Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1342: Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1343: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 35. To his mother,
+Sept. 22, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1344: April, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1345: Oct., 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1346: Oct., 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching by Example."]
+
+[Footnote 1347: Nov. 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1348: Cited by Harris, _The Trent Affair_, p. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 1349: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, pp. 177 _seq._]
+
+[Footnote 1350: Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1351: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78, No. 95. Adams to Seward,
+Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt.
+I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word "_not_" is unindicated, by the
+failure to use italics.]
+
+[Footnote 1352: _Ibid._, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams to Seward, Jan. 31,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1353: Feb. 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1354: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 80, No. 206. Adams to Seward,
+Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV, 78) writes that "the
+most significant and touching feature of the situation was that the
+cotton operative population was frankly on the side of the North." Lutz,
+_Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten
+während des Sezessionskrieges_, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysis
+of the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude by
+factional political idealisms in Germany.]
+
+[Footnote 1355: Palmerston MS., Aug. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1356: Aug. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1357: October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle and
+Recognition."]
+
+[Footnote 1358: Nov. 4, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1359: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63. (Communication.)]
+
+[Footnote 1360: Anthony Trollope, _North America_, London, 1862, Vol. I,
+p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862, and was in its third
+edition by the end of the year. It was also published in New York in
+1862 and in Philadelphia in 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1361: _The Liberator_, March 13, 1863, quoting a report in the
+_New York Sunday Mercury_.]
+
+[Footnote 1362: Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince, _John Bright_, p.
+204, as stating that Bright "was the greatest master of English oratory
+that this generation--I may say several generations--has seen. I have
+met men who have heard Pitt and Fox, and in whose judgment their
+eloquence at its best was inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright.
+At a time when much speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated,
+eloquence, he maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style in
+which he gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts he
+desired to utter."]
+
+[Footnote 1363: Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863. (Robertson, _Speeches
+of John Bright_, I, pp. 234 _seq._)]
+
+[Footnote 1364: Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863. (Bigelow,
+_Retrospections_, I, p. 600.)]
+
+[Footnote 1365: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 123.]
+
+[Footnote 1366: State Dept., Eng., Adams to Seward. No. 334. Feb. 26,
+1863. enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as printed in _The
+Weekly Herald, Mercury and News_, Feb. 21, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1367: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157.]
+
+[Footnote 1368: Spargo, _Karl Marx, _pp. 224-5. Spargo claims that Marx
+bent every effort to stir working men to a sense of class interest in
+the cause of the North and even went so far as to secure the presence of
+Bright at the meeting, as the most stirring orator of the day, though
+personally he regarded Bright "with an almost unspeakable loathing." On
+reading this statement I wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence and
+received the reply that he believed the tradition unquestionably well
+founded, though "almost the only testimony available consists of a
+reference or two in one of his [Marx's] letters and the ample
+corroborative testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others."
+This is scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talk
+with Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary, and
+who attended and reported the meeting, the information was given that
+Henry Adams himself had then understood and always since believed Marx's
+to have been the guiding hand in organizing the meeting.]
+
+[Footnote 1369: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 162.
+(Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 1370: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 358. Adams to Seward,
+March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams. There was also enclosed
+the printed report, giving speeches at length, as printed by _The Bee
+Hive_, the organ of the London Trades Unions.]
+
+[Footnote 1371: See _ante_, p. 132.]
+
+[Footnote 1372: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 360. Adams to Seward,
+April 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1373: May 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1374: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 243.
+Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1375: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, p. 264. In a
+letter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863, Bright estimated that there were
+seven millions of men of twenty-one years of age and upward in the
+United Kingdom, of whom slightly over one million had the vote.
+(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 610.)]
+
+[Footnote 1376: July 2, 1863. The editorial was written in connection
+with Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise interesting for an
+attempt to characterize each of the speakers in the Commons.]
+
+[Footnote 1377: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Part I, p. 319.
+To Seward, July 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1378: See _ante_, p. 130, _note_ 2.]
+
+[Footnote 1379: MS. letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession of C. F. Adams,
+Jr.]
+
+[Footnote 1380: Sept. 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1381: Even the friendly Russian Minister in Washington was at
+this time writing of the "rule of the mob" in America and trusting that
+the war, "the result of democracy," would serve as a warning to Europe.
+(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900.)]
+
+[Footnote 1382: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and 559. Adams to
+Seward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to "keep out of it."]
+
+[Footnote 1383: _Ibid._, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to Seward, Jan. 29,
+1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was partly the
+aristocratic antipathy to Bright that had _produced_ the ill-will to the
+United States.]
+
+[Footnote 1384: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1385: See Ch. XV.]
+
+[Footnote 1386: _The Index_, Jan. 28, 1864, p. 58.]
+
+[Footnote 1387: Goldwin Smith, _A Letter to a Whig Member of the
+Southern Independence Association_, London, 1864, pp. 14, 68, and 71.]
+
+[Footnote 1388: Leader, _Roebuck_, p. 299. To William Ibbitt, April 26,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1389: Arnold, _Mixed Essays_, p. 17. N.Y., Macmillan, 1883.]
+
+[Footnote 1390: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 86, No. 709. Adams to Seward,
+June 9, 1864]
+
+[Footnote 1391: See _ante_, Ch. XVI.]
+
+[Footnote 1392: Dasent, _Delane_, II, pp. 135-6. Delane to Dasent, Dec.
+25 and 26, 1864. The _Times_ on December 26 pictured Sherman as having
+_escaped_ to the sea, but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements.]
+
+[Footnote 1393: _Lord Acton's Letters to Mary Gladstone_, p. 183.]
+
+[Footnote 1394: These were not confined to Great Britain. The American
+Legation in Berlin received addresses of sympathy from many
+organizations, especially labour unions. One such, drawn by W.
+Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in part: "Members of the
+working-class, we need not affirm to you the sincerity of these our
+sympathies; for with pride we can point to the fact, that, while the
+aristocracy of the Old World took openly the part of the southern
+slaveholder, and while the middle class was divided in its opinions, the
+working-men in all countries of Europe have unanimously and firmly stood
+on the side of the Union." (_U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865_, Pt.
+IV, p. 500.)]
+
+[Footnote 1395: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865_, Pt. I, p. 417.
+Adams to Hunter, July 13, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1396: Disraeli was less disturbed by this than were other Tory
+leaders. He had long before, in his historical novels, advocated an
+aristocratic leadership of democracy, as against the middle class. Derby
+called the Bill "a leap in the dark," but assented to it.]
+
+[Footnote 1397: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 151-153, summarizes the
+factors determining British attitude and places first the fear of the
+privileged classes of the example of America, but his treatment really
+minimizes this element.]
+
+[Footnote 1398: Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in America: An Address
+read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation
+Society." (Jan. 26, 1866.) London, 1866, pp. 71-75.]
+
+[Footnote 1399: Goldwin Smith, _America and England in their present
+relations_, London, 1869, p. 30.]
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Aberdeen, Lord, i. 10, 13, 14, 15; ii. 117 _note_[1]
+Acton, Lord, ii. 301
+Adams, Brooks, _The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, cited, ii. 120
+  _note_[2], 125 _note_[1], 147 _note_[1], 150
+  _note_[1]
+Adams, Charles Francis, i. 49, 62-3, 80-1;
+  attitude in the early days of the American crisis, 49 _and
+    note_, 55, 63;
+  appointed American Minister in London, 62, 80-1, 96;
+  impressions of English opinion on the crisis, 96, 97, 98, 107;
+  alarm at Seward's Despatch No. 10, i. 127;
+  attitude of, to the Palmerston-Russell ministry, 170;
+  controversy on General Butler's order, 302-5;
+  reports to Seward on British public meetings on Emancipation
+    Proclamation, ii. 107 _and note_[3], 223;
+  view of the popular manifestations on Emancipation, 108;
+  view as to decline of British confidence in the South, 184;
+  and the London Confederate States Aid Association, 191, 192;
+  receives deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall
+    of Savannah, 245 _and note_[1];
+  quoted on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war,
+    ii. 251-2, 253;
+  on effect in England of the Hampton Roads Conference, 253;
+  advice of, to Seward on attitude to be observed to Britain, 253-255;
+  attitude to Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences,
+     253-4;
+  comments of, on parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of
+     confidence in Lincoln, 255 _and note_[1];
+  on feeling in Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt
+     on Seward, 257, 262-3;
+  receives addresses of sympathy from British organizations, 262-3;
+  and formal declaration of the end of the war, 268;
+  faith of, in ultimate British opinion on the issues in the Civil
+    War, ii. 283;
+  views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing
+    attitude to America 284, 285;
+  advice to Seward on the political position in relation to
+    democracy, 290, 294, 296, 298 _note_[1];
+  quoted on the rising of democratic feeling in Britain, 291;
+  disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, 278, 279,
+    280;
+  report of, on London mass meeting in favour of the North, 284;
+  and the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292, 294-5;
+  quoted on John Bright, 298;
+  on the attitude of the privileged classes to democracy,
+    298 _note_[2], 300;
+  on the influence of American institutions on the political
+    movement in Great Britain, 302
+
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to:_
+    _Alabama case_: ii. 35, 120 _and note_[2], 121, 131
+    British Foreign Enlistment Act, i. 135, 148-9; ii. 201-2
+    Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190, 193, 195
+    Confederate Commissioners: representations on intercourse with,
+       i. 105-6, 107
+    Confederate Cotton Loan: reported connection with, ii. 161
+      _and note_[4];
+      views on, 179
+    Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. 118,
+      128, 131, 137, 143, 145 _note_[2];
+      and U.S. Navy Department plan to stop, 130 _note_[2];
+      Laird Rams incident, 144, 146, 147 _note_[1], 150
+    Cotton: report on British position, ii. 99
+    Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+      action on proposed convention, i. 141-69 _passim_;
+      view of American intention, 144, 169;
+      failure of his negotiation, 137, 145-6, 169-71
+    Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. 55
+    Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. 201-2
+    Lindsay's efforts for mediation, ii. 34-5. 212
+    Mediation:
+      presents the "servile war" threat against, ii. 18-19, 95;
+      view of England's reply to French proposals on, 71;
+      advantages of an anti-slavery avowal, 98-9
+    Neutrality Law, _See_ British Foreign Enlistment Act _supra_
+    Privateering Bill, ii. 122-3, 125, 127;
+      advises against issue of privateers, 131
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, The:
+      representations on, i. 98-100, 101, 105, 107 _and note_[2], 300-1;
+      despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, 134;
+      protests against British recognition of belligerency, 159;
+      advice to Seward on, 275
+    Roebuck's motion: report on, ii. 144
+    "Servile War" threat, ii. 18-19, 95 _and note_[4]
+    Slavery:
+      urges Northern declaration on, ii. 98-9;
+      comments on _Times_ criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108
+    Southern Ports: plan of collecting duties at, ii. 198
+    _Trent_ Affair, the:
+      interviewed by Palmerston, i. 208-9;
+      statement on the _James Adger_, 209-10;
+      suspicion of British policy in, 218;
+      views on public opinion in, 222-3;
+      officially states Wilkes acted without authorization, 226;
+      report on English hope of peaceful settlement, 228, 229;
+      on British opinion after settlement of, 238, 240;
+      on effect of, in Great Britain, 243;
+      view of popular attitude in Britain in the crisis of, ii. 283
+    Appreciation and criticisms on:
+      Characterized in _The Index_, ii. 196
+      Lord Lyons', report on, i. 62-3;
+        opinion on, ii. 71 _note_[4]
+      Lord Russell's view of his diplomacy, ii. 128
+      Tory approval of, ii. 197
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 1, 2, 129, 198, 263, 274, 276;
+      ii. 31, 100
+Adams, C.F., Jun.,
+  view of British attitude and the Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 109, 110;
+  view of the delay in his father's journey to England, 112 _note_;
+  view on Seward's attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 138,
+    153-6;
+  examination of British action in the negotiation, 154-5;
+  review of the _Trent_ affair, cited, 203 _note, et seq.
+    passim_;
+  on American feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, 218;
+  and the Hotze materials, ii. 154 _note_
+Adams, E.D.:
+  _British Interests and Activities in Mexico_, cited ii. 117 _note_[1]
+  "The Point of View of the British Traveller in America," cited,
+    i. 23 _note_; ii. 274 _note_[1]
+Adams, Henry, i. 138;
+  ii. 292 _note_[1];
+  view of, on W.E. Forster, i. 58 _note_[2];
+  on British Proclamation of Neutrality, 110;
+  on American exultation in _Trent_ affair, 223;
+  on British attitude in _Trent_ affair, 230;
+  view of Gregory's speech on the blockade, 270;
+  on British view of prospects in the War, 297;
+  on possibility of intervention, ii. 23;
+  on advantage of a Northern declaration on slavery, 23;
+  on the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292 _and note_[1] 293
+  "Declaration, The, of Paris,"
+    1861 ... reviewed, 146 _et seq._, 153;
+    view of Russell's policy in, 146-150, 159;
+    view of Lyons, 147, 150
+  _Education of Henry Adams_ quoted, i. 149 _note_[3];
+    ii. 172 _note_[2];
+    cited, ii. 50 _note_[1]
+Adams, John (Second President of the U.S.), i. 62, 81
+Adams, John Quincy, i. 11, 20, 62, 81
+African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. 85-6;
+  ii. 88;
+  suppression of, international efforts for, i. 8-10;
+  punishment to slave traders in American law, 9;
+  American attitude to right of search, 9, 10, 219;
+  British anti-slavery policy, 31-2;
+  wane of British interest in, 10, 32;
+    ii. 90;
+  Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. 10, 275, 276;
+    ii. 90, 91
+Agassiz, L., i. 37 _note_.
+Akroyd, Edward, ii. 193 _note_.
+_Alabama_, The, ii. 35, 116, 119-120;
+  departure of, from Liverpool, 118;
+  British order to stop
+  departure, 119, 120 _and note_[2], 133;
+  Russell's private feelings as to, 121, 124;
+  public opinion in Great Britain on, 129-130;
+  Palmerston's defence of Government action on, 134-5;
+  American anger over, 119, 127;
+  measures against, 121-3, 127;
+  New York Chamber of Commerce protest on, 126;
+  claim for damages on account of, 151 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, i. 138; ii. 129 _note_[1], 131, 134, 136, 145, 146
+_Alexandra_, case, The:
+  Seizure of the vessel, ii. 136, 139, 140, 152, 161 _note_[4];
+    public approval, 136;
+    law actions on, 136 _note_[2], 142, 149, 152, 185, 195;
+    American anxiety at Court decision, 143;
+    final result, 196 _note_[2]
+America, Central: British-American
+  disputes in, i. 16, 17
+American:
+  Civil War: i. 86, 87 _and note_[2], 99;
+    British public and official views at the commencement of, 40-60;
+    origins of; American and British views, i. 47-8;
+    efforts at compromise, 49;
+    British official attitude on outbreak of, 73;
+    European opinion of, after duration of three years, ii. 219;
+    compared with the Great War in Europe, 219;
+    British attitude to democracy as determining attitude to the War,
+      i. 77; ii. 303-5;
+    bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain, 299
+  Union, The: British views of, i. 15;
+    prognostications of its dissolution, 36, 37
+  War of Independence, i. 2-3, 17;
+    adjustments after the Treaty of Peace, 3;
+    as fostering militant patriotism, 7, 8 _note_;
+    commercial relations after, 17-18
+  "War of 1812" i. 4, 7, 18;
+    causes leading to, 5-7;
+    New England opposition to, 7, 18;
+    effect of, on American National unity, 7
+  _See also under_ United States
+Anderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. 117
+Anderson's Mission, ii. 53 _note_[3];
+  reports, ii. 53 _and note_[2]
+Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. 219-20
+Anthropological Society of London, ii. 222
+Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. 43, 85, 105;
+  effect of, on Lord Palmerston, 43
+Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. 63, 64
+Argyll, Duke of, i. 179, 212;
+  anti-slavery attitude of, i. 179, 238; ii. 112;
+  views of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 212, 215, 229, 238;
+  on calamity of war with America, 215, 238;
+  on Northern determination, ii. 30
+Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. 172
+_Army and Navy Gazette_, The, ii. 228, 229;
+  attitude in the conflict, 229-30, 236;
+  on the Presidential election, 235-6, 238;
+  summary of military situation after Atlanta, 243;
+  on "foreign war" rumours, 251;
+  cited or quoted, 68, 166, 232-3, 243.
+  (_See also under_ Russell, W.H.)
+Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. 47;
+  on British "superiority," 258;
+  on the rule of aristocracy and growth of democracy, ii. 300
+Arnold, _The History of the Cotton Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2], 10, 11;
+  quoted: first effects of the war on the cotton trade, 9-10;
+  cotton operatives' song, 17 _note_[6];
+  on the members for Lancashire, 26-7
+Ashburton, Lord, i. 13;
+  Ashburton Mission, i. 13
+Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. 233-5;
+  effect of, on Northern attitude, 233-4;
+  effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, 235
+_Atlantic Monthly_, The, ii. 109 _note_[3]; 279 _and note_[3]
+
+Bagley, Mr., ii. 224
+Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, cited, ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Baligny. _See_ Belligny
+Bancroft, Frederic, cited, i. 117 _note_;
+  analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 150-3;
+  view on Russell's aims in, 152 _and note_[2]
+  _Life of Seward_, cited or quoted, i. 106 _note_[1], 118 _note_,
+    130 _note_[3]; 132 _note_[3], 138, 150-3, 186 _notes_,
+    191 _note_[4], 196 _note_[1], 200 _note_[2],
+    213 _note_[4], 231 _note_[3], 280
+    _and note_[1], 281; ii. 1-2, 96,
+    99 _note_[2], 143 _note_[3], 253 _note_[1],
+    258 _note_[1]
+Banks, Governor, i. 37 _note_
+Baring, ii. 96 _note_[3]
+Bath, Marquis of, ii. 193 _note_
+Beals, Mr., ii. 191
+Bedford, Duke of, i. 96 _and note_[3]
+_Bee Hive, The, _cited, ii. 293 _note_
+Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. 184 _and
+  note_[3]
+Beesly, Professor, speech of, at
+  Trades Unions of London Meeting,
+  ii. 292
+_Belfast Whig_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  231 _note_
+Belligny, French Consul at Charleston,
+  i. 185 _note_[1], 186, 188, 189,
+  191 _and note_[4]
+_Bell's Weekly Messenger_, quoted,
+  ii. 104
+Benjamin, Confederate Secretary
+  of State, ii. 5; Mercier's interview
+  with, i. 284, 285; report of,
+  to Slidell on Mercier's visit,
+  284 _note_[2]; instructions of, to
+  Slidell offering commercial advantages
+  for French intervention,
+  ii. 24 _and note_[2]; on idea
+  of Confederate loan, 158-9; recalls
+  Mason, 179; and recognition
+  of the Confederacy, 217; on the
+  attitude of France to the Confederacy,
+  236 _note_[2]; plan of
+  offering abolition of slavery in
+  return for recognition, 249;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 292;
+  ii. 88 _note_[2], 148, 154 _note_[1], 213
+  _note_[1]
+Bentinck, i. 268, 269
+Bernard, Montague:
+  _Neutrality, The, of Great Britain
+    during the American Civil War_,
+    quoted, i., 100 _and note_[1],
+    137-8; ii. 118; cited, i. 171
+    _note_[1], 245 _note_[3], 246 _note_[2],
+    263 _notes_; ii. 136 _note_[2]; on
+    the American representations
+    on the British Proclamation
+    of Neutrality, i. 100; on
+    Declaration of Paris negotiations,
+    137-8; on the Blockade,
+    263 _and notes_
+   "Two Lectures on the Present
+    American War": on recognition,
+    cited, i. 183
+Bigelow, John, ii. 71 _note_[3]:
+  _France and the Confederate Navy_,
+    cited, ii. 57 _note_[2]
+  _Retrospections of an Active Life_,
+    cited, i. 56 _note_, 217 _note_[2];
+    ii. 71 _note_[3], 88 _note_[2], 128 _note_[3],
+    130 _note_[2]; Gladstone and the
+    Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; U.S.
+    stimulation of immigration,
+    200 _note_[1]; cited, 229 _note_[1];
+  Quoted, ii. 254; advice of, on the
+    political position in Britain;
+    quoted, 290; cited, 295 _note_[3]
+Billault, M., i. 288, 289 _and note_[1]
+Birkbeck, Morris, _Letters from Illinois_,
+  quoted, i. 25
+_Birmingham Post_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_; letters of S.A.
+  Goddard in support of emancipation
+  in, ii. 108-9
+Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. 224
+Bismarck, ii. 203
+Black, Judge, American Secretary
+  of State, i. 52, 244
+Blackwood, John, political views
+  of, ii. 289
+_Blackwood's Magazine_, ii. 279 _note_[1];
+  on cotton and the blockade, 10;
+  on French mediation proposals,
+  68; on the Emancipation Proclamation,
+  103; on democracy
+  as cause of the war, 278-9, 281,
+  289
+Blair, member of the United States
+  Cabinet, i, 130 _note_[1], 231; ii. 85,
+  251, 252
+Blockade of Southern Ports, the:
+  Lincoln's declaration on, i. 83,
+  89, 90, 92, 111, 121, 122, 244,
+  245; commencement of, i. 245;
+  method of warning at the port,
+  245, 246; as involving hardship
+  to British merchants, 245-6;
+  effectiveness of, 252-71 _passim_;
+  effect on British Trade, 252, 254,
+  263; effect on Cotton Trade,
+  262; ii. 8, 9; statistics as to
+  effectiveness, i. 268 _note_[3]
+  Southern Ports Bill, i. 246 _et seq._
+  Stone Boat Fleet Blockade,
+    i. 253 _et seq._, 269, 302
+  British attitude to, i. 95, 244, 245,
+    246, 263 _and note_[2], 267, 270;
+    ii. 5, 265; Parliamentary debate
+    on, i. 267 _et seq._; Gregory's motion
+    268 _et seq._; press attitude,
+    246; Bright's view, ii. 14, 15
+  Confederate representations on,
+    i. 265
+  Napoleon's view of, i. 290
+Booth, assassinator of Lincoln,
+  ii. 258, 259, 263
+Border States, The: efforts at
+  compromise, i. 49; sympathies
+  in, 173; the "Border State
+  policy" of Lincoln, 173, 176,
+  272 _note_[1]; ii. 82; and Confiscation
+  Bill, Lincoln's fears, 82;
+  attitude of, to emancipation,
+  ii. 83, 84, 87; not affected in Proclamation
+  of Emancipation, 86
+Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. 187, 193
+Boynton, Rev. C.B., _English and
+  French Neutrality, etc._, cited
+  and quoted, ii. 225 _note_[1]
+Bright, John, i. 58 _note_[2], 77;
+  quoted on _Times_ attitude towards
+  the United States, 55
+  _note_[3]; view of the Northern
+  attempt at reconquest, 72; views
+  of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality,
+  108, 110; speech on
+  _Trent_ affair, 221-2; letter to
+  Sumner on _Trent_ affair, influence
+  on Lincoln, 232; speech on
+  Britain's attitude on conclusion
+  of _Trent_ affair, 241-2; view on the
+  war as for abolition, 241; on
+  distress in Lancashire, ii. 13, 14;
+  view of the blockade, 14, 15;
+  on the cotton shortage, 15;
+  and Gladstone's Newcastle
+  speech, 48; view of Emancipation
+  Proclamation, 48 _note_[2],
+  105-6, 111-12; on England's
+  support if emancipation an object
+  in the war, 88-9; the escape
+  of the _Alabama_, 120; at Trades
+  Unions of London meeting, 132-3,
+  134, 291-3; support of the
+  North, 132, 283-4, 290, 291-295;
+  on the interests of the unenfranchised
+  in the American conflict,
+  132, 295; on the unfriendly
+  neutrality of the Government,
+  134; rebuked by Palmerston,
+  135; trouncing of Roebuck, 172
+  _and note_[2]; on Britain's neutrality
+  (Nov., 1863), 184; championship
+  of democratic institutions, i.
+  221-2; ii. 132-3, 276-7, 282, 283;
+  popularity of, as advocate of
+  Northern cause, 224, 225; influence
+  of, for the North, i. 58
+  _note_[2]; ii. 224; Lincoln's pardon
+  of Alfred Rubery in honour of,
+  225 _and note_[1]; quoted on feeling
+  of the British Government and
+  people towards United States in
+  Jan., 1865, etc., 247; confidence
+  of, in pacific policy of Lincoln,
+  255 _and note_[1]; quoted on the
+  ruling class and democracy, 280;
+  attack on Southern aristocracy
+  by, 290; heads deputation to
+  Adams, 294; eulogy of George
+  Thompson by, 224 _note_[1]
+  Adams' opinion on, ii. 298;
+    view of, in _The Index_, ii. 298-9;
+    Laird's view of, ii. 134;
+    Karl Marx's view of, 292
+    _note_[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted
+    on the oratory of, 290 _note_[1],
+    the _Times_ attack on, 295-6
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 69, 179,
+    289; ii. 68, 69, 132 _note_[1], 172
+    _note_[1], 186, 187, 191, 278, 281.
+   (See also under _Morning Star_)
+British, _See also under _Great
+  Britain
+British emigration to America, i.
+  23 _et seq_, 35; effect of American
+  political ideals on, 23, 24, 25, 26
+British Foreign Enlistment Act,
+  ii. 116-7, 118; application of, in
+  American crisis, question in
+  Commons, i. 94; Russell's idea
+  of amending, ii. 124, 196;
+  Russell's advice to Palmerston
+  on, 131; debate in Parliament
+  on, 132, 133-4, 135; Forster and
+  the violation of, 133; Government
+  reply to Liverpool shipowners
+  on, 142; _Kearsarge_ incident,
+  202
+British Press. _See under names
+  of Papers and under subject
+  headings_
+_British Standard_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]
+British travellers' views on America,
+  i. 23 _and note_, 24, 28, 30; ii. 274-5
+Brooks, i. 80
+Brougham, i. 94 _note_[2]; ii. 282
+Brougham, Lord, i. 19
+Brown, John, raid of, i. 33 _note_[2]
+Browning, Robert, pro-Northern
+  sentiment of, i. 70; on stone-boat
+  blockade, 256; on Slavery a
+  factor in the struggle, 238-9; on
+  British dismay at prospect of
+  war in _Trent_ crisis, 240; mentioned,
+  228 _note_[4]
+Bruce,--, British Ambassador in
+  Washington, ii. 255 _note_[4]; report
+  of American intentions against
+  France in Mexico, 255 _note_[4];
+  comment of, on Lincoln, Seward
+  and Sumner, 262; warns Russell
+  of probable American demands
+  at end of war, 266, 268; attitude
+  to "piracy" proclamation, 268.
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 262, 269.
+Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador:
+  on British policy,
+  i. 50-1, 74; interpretation of
+  Russell's "three months" statement,
+  272 _note_[1]; report of, on
+  Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45
+  _note_[3]; interview of, with Russell
+  on joint mediation offer, 73
+  _note_[1]
+Bryce, Lord, i. 30; ii. 188 _note_[3], 274
+Buchanan, President, i. 16, 49, 52, 117, 259; ii. 278
+Buckingham, James Silk, _America, Historical, Statistic and Descriptive_,
+  cited, i. 29
+Buckley, Victor, ii. 120 _note_[2]
+Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. 135, 154, 176, 201;
+  as affecting Seward's policy, considered, 154, 155-6;
+  effect of, in Great Britain:
+    press views, 176, 177-8, 179;
+    official views, 178, 179 _and note_[1];
+    public opinion, 201
+Bullock, Captain J.D., Confederate Agent in Britain, ii. 118, 129, 145;
+  on the proposed use of the Laird rams, 122 _note_[1], 143;
+  shipbuilding contracts of, ii. 156, 157;
+  _Secret Service under the Confederacy_, cited, ii. 118, 149 _note_
+Bunch,--, British Consul at Charleston,
+  description of Jockey Club dinner, i. 43;
+  on Southern anti-British sentiment, 44 _note_[2], ii. 71 _note_[2];
+  instructions to, on the secession, i. 53 _note_[1];
+  appeal of, to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, 52;
+  characterizations of Southern leaders, 59;
+  view of President Davis, 59;
+  views on the South and secession, 59, 93;
+  characterizations of Southern Commissioners, 63;
+  negotiations of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris,
+    168 _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 193;
+  attitude of, to the South, 185 _and note_[4], 103, 195 _note_[2];
+  American complaints of, 187, 189, 193-4;
+  recall of exequatur of, 184, 187 _et seq_., 193, 194-5, 201;
+  defence of his action in the Mure case, 187, 188, 192, 199;
+  subsequent history of, 195 _note_[2];
+  view of, as scapegoat, 195 _note_[2];
+  on attitude to the Blockade, 252 _note_[2], 253 _note_[2], 268;
+  on Southern intentions, 252 _note_[2];
+  view of Southern determination, 252 _note_[2];
+  on Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, 63,
+    252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5;
+  on effect of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, 9 _note_[2];
+  on burning of Mississippi cotton, 16 _note_[1], 17 _note_[4];
+  on the American system of government as the cause of the Civil War,
+    278 _note_[2]
+  British attitude to the controversy over, i. 188-9, 190, 191, 194;
+  French attitude, i. 189, 191 _and_ _note_[4], 192, 201 _note_
+  Lyons' views on Bunch controversy, i. 187, 193, 194 _and note_[1]
+  Russell's views, i. 187, 190, 193, 194 _and note_[4]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 66; ii. 88
+Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with America,
+  ii. 254
+Butler, General,
+  order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i. 302-4, 305; ii. 68;
+  Palmerston and Adams controversy on, i. 302-5;
+  Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, 303, 304
+
+Cairnes, Professor, ii. 224 _note_[3];
+  pamphlet by, on "Slave Power," 112
+_Caledonian Mercury_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_
+California, acquisition of, by U.S., i. 15, 16
+Callahan,--, _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_, cited,
+i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 167 _notes_, 169 _note_[4]
+Campbell, Lord, i. 271, 292; ii, 28, 77, 169, 172, 193
+Canada:
+  Rebellion of 1837 in, i. 4, 109; ii. 117;
+  British fear of American attack on, i. 4;
+  sentiment in, as affected by the American Wars against England, 8 _note_;
+  suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U.S., 54-5;
+  "compensation" in, idea in British press, 54-5;
+  and in views of American political leaders, 55;
+  Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. 69-70;
+  military defence of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 213, 241-2;
+  views in, on _Trent_ affair, 222 _note_;
+  on British policy and defence, 222 _note_;
+  view of the _Times_ in, 222 _note_
+  Free Trade policy and, a Southern premonition as to, i. 22
+  Reciprocity Treaty of, with U.S., ii. 198, 253-4
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 251, 254, 275
+Canning, i. II, 12, 20
+Cardwell, ii. 64
+Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. 172
+Carolina, South, secession of, i. 41, 43-44, 55; ii. 3-4;
+  seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. 52;
+  requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter, 117
+"Caroline" affair, The, i. 109
+Case, Walter M., _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_,
+  cited and quoted, i. 261 _note_; ii. 161 _and note_[3]
+Catacazy, C., and mediation by Russia, ii. 251 _note_[1]
+Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. 187, 189, 193
+Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i. 268;
+  supports Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 175-6;
+  on Committee of Southern Independence Association, 187, 193
+Charleston, S.C.:
+  Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. 43, 44 _note_;
+  seizure of customs house at, 52;
+  British appeal on question of port dues at, 52, 244;
+  "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, 253;
+  evacuation of, ii. 248, 249
+Charleston _Mercury_, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. 5
+Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. 115, 121; ii. 72, 283;
+  quarrel with Seward, 72
+Chase, W. H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. 4
+Chattanooga, ii. 185
+Cheever, Rev. Dr., ii. 224
+Chenery, ii. 301
+Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. 165
+Chesson, F. W., ii. 224
+Chicago Convention, the, i. 175
+Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. 49 _note_[3]
+Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. 184
+Chittenden, cited, ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. 203
+Clanricarde, Lord, ii. 168
+Clarendon, Earl of, i. 199 _note_[3], 215;
+  ii. 3, 51-8 _passim_, 63, 203 _note_[2];
+  on Russell's mediation project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, 57-8
+Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation of, i. 113
+Cobden, i. 77; quoted, on the _Times_, 222 _note_;
+  opinion of Seward, 222 _note_;
+  and Sumner, 222 _note_;
+  on Palmerston's action in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[3];
+  letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, 232
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 289; ii. 26, 67, 80, 95 _and note_[4], 166, 276
+Collie, ii. 189
+Collier, legal advice of, on _Alabama_, ii. 118-9
+Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. 83
+Columbia, S.C., burning of, ii. 248, 249
+Combe, George, _Notes on the United States, etc._, cited, i. 29
+Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the:
+  Bunch's characterization of, i. 63;
+  unofficial interview with Russell, 85-6, 106, 158;
+  protest against closing of British ports, 170 _note_[2];
+  replaced by "Special Commissioners," 203;
+  attempt to make use of the _Trent_ affair, 214;
+  British attitude to, not modified by _Trent_ affair, 235;
+  policy of, with regard to recognition and the blockade,
+    i. 264-5, 267, 273, 300;
+  acquire a "confidential" document, 265 _and note_[2];
+  hopes of, from Parliament, 265, 266, 272;
+  instructions of the first Commissioners, ii. 4 _and note_[3];
+  failure of the first Commission, 4-5;
+  suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, 88 _note_[2];
+  slavery abolition offer, 249
+  Confederate Agents' correspondence, collections of, i. 261 _note_[1]
+    _See also under personal names_
+Confederates, _See under_ Southern States
+Confiscation Bill, The, ii. 82, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95;
+  Lincoln's attitude to, 82, 84;
+  Lord Russell's comment on, 97
+_Constitutionel_, The, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Continental Press and American News, ii. 71 _note_[2]
+Corcoran, ii. 169
+Cotton supplies and slavery, i. 13;
+  in British-American commercial relations, 21, 22;
+  British manufacturers' dependence on, 22;
+  effect of the Civil War on, 55, 246; ii. 53;
+  the crop of 1860 ... ii. 7
+  Blockade, The, and, i. 252 _and note_[2], 253; ii. 9;
+    effect of, on price, i. 262, 270;
+    Napoleon's views on, 290
+  England, need of, for, i. 196-7, 200 _note_[1], 294, 296; ii. 17, 99;
+    cotton famine in, 294; ii. 6, II _et seq._, 16 _note_[1];
+    cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii. 6-7, 8;
+    first effects of the war on, 8, 9, 10.
+    _See also under_ Lancashire.
+  France, necessity of, for cotton, i. 279, 290, 293, 294, 296, 300;
+    ii. 17; Mercier's plan to relieve, i. 196-201
+  Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on price of, ii. 48;
+    "King Cotton" theory, i. 63; ii. i _et seq._;
+    belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy, 2-3, 4, 5
+  Southern orders for destruction of, ii. 16, 17 _note_[4];
+    effect of, on British officials, 17
+Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. 88;
+  reports French agreement with British policy on Southern belligerent
+    rights, 88;
+  in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, 88, 143, 156, 157, 158,
+    162, 167;
+  conversations with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, 189;
+  disturbed at French evasion of direct support, 189, 192, 201 _note_[1];
+  in _Trent_ affair fears war with America, 214;
+  communications on Southern Ports Bill, 247 _and note_[2];
+  view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill, 247;
+  on French policy in Mexico, 260, 261 _note_; ii. 46;
+  quoted, on Thouvenel's view on mediation in Feb., 1862 ... i.
+    266 _note_[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 288;
+  statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with Napoleon, 290;
+  on the possibility of reunion, 290;
+  on the blockade, 290-1;
+  denial of Napoleon's "offer" to England, 290, 291;
+  reports of, on Lindsay's mission, 291-2, 293, 295 _note_[1];
+  conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, 291, 293-4;
+  Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted, 295 _note_[2];
+  interview with Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 38, 39
+    _and note_, 46;
+  on Napoleon's suggestion of joint mediation, 59;
+  instructed to notify France of England's view of the war as ended and
+    of attitude to Confederate cruisers, 266-7
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 218 _note_
+Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. 148
+Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce, i. 139
+Crittenden, i. 49
+
+_Daily Gazette_, The, cited, ii. 109 _note_
+_Daily News_,
+  attitude of, during the American Civil War, i. 69-70 _and note_
+    1, 176, 181-2; ii. 230 _note_[3],
+  on Lincoln's message to Congress, i. 176;
+  letters of W.W. Story in, 228
+_Daily Telegraph_, cited, ii. 50 _note_[1],
+  attitude and circulation of, 189 _note_[2], 226, 230 _note_[3]
+Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. 62;
+  lack of instructions on American intentions, 62, 108, 112;
+  communications with Lord Russell, 62, 66, 74;
+  despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions, 66-7;
+  Russell's pledge of delay to, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108;
+  report on proposed British joint action with France, 84-5, 86
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 74, 96, 156 _note_[1]
+Dana, R.H., cited, i. 218;
+  _The Trent Affair_, cited, 203 _note_, 205 _note_[2], 237 _note_
+Danish question, The, ii. 203-5, 214
+Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. 180 _and note_[4]
+Davis, Bancroft, _Times_ correspondent in New York, i. 56
+Davis, Jefferson,
+  personal characteristics of, i. 59, 81, 82: ii. 276;
+  attitude of, in the opening of the crisis, i. 49;
+  elected President of the Southern Government, 59, 81;
+  foreign policy of, 81-2;
+  aristocratic views of, on government, ii. 276;
+  proclamation of, on marque and privateering, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111,
+    121, 122, 141, 160;
+  defensive measures of, in the South, 172;
+  on Bunch's negotiations on Declaration of Paris, 186;
+  replaces Confederate agents to Europe, 203;
+  and the African Slave Trade, ii. 88 _note_[2];
+  proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation,
+    106 _and note_[4];
+  on England's conduct towards the South, 184;
+  on Southern disorganization, 219;
+  flight of, from Richmond, 248;
+  approves plan of offering abolition of slavery in return for
+    recognition, 249;
+  capture of, 267
+  British views on, ii. 276
+  Bunch's characterization of, i. 59, 185 _note_[4]
+  Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. 47
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 163 _note_[1], 185 _note_[4], 254, 265
+    _note_[2], 283; ii. 5, 6, 176 _note_[3], 251, 252, 285
+Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. 129, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 163,
+  165, 167 _note_[3], 168, 200, 231, 300
+de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. _See under_ Brunow
+de Flahault, French Ambassador. _See under _Flahault
+_Debats_:
+  French press views on military situation, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3]
+_De Bow's Review_,
+  eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii. 2, 3, 4;
+  on cotton and slavery, 3;
+  view of England's action on blockade, 4
+Declaration of Paris, The, i. 102, 139-40;
+  attitude of United States to, 140-1, 156;
+  American offer of adherence during the Civil War, 104, 137, 141-2,
+    150, 151
+Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. 137 _et seq._, 184, 201;
+  British suggestion to France in, i. 88, 91, 142, 146-7, 156, 157
+    _and note_[3];
+  American offer of adherence, 104, 137, 141-2, 150, 151;
+  convention agreed between Britain, France, and America, 142-3;
+  addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed
+    by Lord Russell, 143-6, 149, 151, 154, 68, 170, 201;
+  American rejection of convention, 145, 168, 201
+  American argument at Geneva on effect of British diplomacy in, i. 146
+    _note_[2]
+  Confederates:
+    approach of, in the negotiation, i. 161, 164, 165, 166, 168
+      _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 192, 193;
+    Confederate Congress resolution of approval in, 186
+  Convention, the, proposed by U.S.
+    Cowley's opinion on, i. 167 _and note_[3];
+    Thouvenel's opinion on, 167;
+    Palmerston's suggestion on, 167 _and note_[4]
+  Seward's motives in, _See under_ Seward
+Delane, editor of the _Times:_
+  Palmerston's letters to, on American rights in interception of
+    Confederate Commissioners, i. 207-8, 209;
+  close relations of, with Palmerston, 229 _note_[2]; ii. 145;
+  anticipations of Southern victory, ii. 204 _and note_[2];
+  on prospective war with America, 254;
+  effect of Sherman's arrival at Savannah on, 245 _and note_[2], 300-1
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 177, 178, 180; ii. 65, 289
+de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier,
+  ii. 59 _and note_[4], 60, 63 _note_[5], 168
+Democratic element in British Society:
+   lack of press representation, i. 24, 41
+Democracy:
+  British views on American institutions, i. 24, 28, 30, 31; ii. 274-5;
+  view of the American struggle as a failure of, 276 _et seq. passim;_
+  Press comments on the lesson from failure of American democratic
+    institutions, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 297;
+  bearing of the Civil War on, 299;
+  aristocratic and conservative attitude to, 286, 287, 297, 298, 300, 301;
+  rise of democratic feeling in Great Britain, 291;
+  effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, 304
+Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. 76, 77, 79, 94
+  _and note_[2], 240, 241;
+  attitude to recognition and mediation, i. 240; ii. 51, 52, 53, 54, 77;
+  attacks governmental policy in relation to Laird Rams and Southern
+    shipbuilding, 149-50, 197;
+  approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation proposals, 154-5;
+  speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination,
+    263;
+  attacks Government on American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war,
+    267-8;
+  attitude to expansion of the franchise, i. 77;
+    ii. 276, 303 _and note_[1]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 292, 295; ii. 51 _note_[2], 166, 210, 214
+_Dial_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]
+Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. 79;
+  on _Trent_ affair, 241;
+  connection with Lindsay's motion, 292, 295, 296, 306;
+  ii. 213 _and note_[1];
+  approval of neutrality, ii. 77, 174 _note_[1];
+  in Roebuck's motion, 153, 171, 174;
+  attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, 197;
+  speech, of, on the motion for the
+  Address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, 263-4;
+  Reform Bill of (1867) ... 3 03 _and note_[1]
+  Mentioned, ii. 270 _note_[3]
+Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. 204 _and note_[2];
+   reply to Mason, 250-1
+D'Oubril, ii. 59 _note_[4], 62 _note_[5]
+Doyle, Percy, i. 218 _note_[1]
+_Dublin News_, quoted, i. 45, 46 _note_[1]
+_Dubuque Sun_, The, ii. 22 _note_
+Dudley, U.S. Consul at Liverpool,
+  ii. 118, 130 _note_[2], 144, 145 _note_[2]
+Dufferin, Lord, i. 240
+Duffus, R. L., "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the American Civil
+  War," i. 41 _note_[1]; quoted, 41, 48;
+  cited, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 112 _note_[1]
+Dumfermline, Lady, i. 224 _note_[3]
+Dumping of British goods:
+  effect on American feeling, i. 19, 21
+
+_Economist_, The:
+  attitude in the struggle, i. 41, 54, 57, 173-4;
+    ii. 15, 173, 231 _note_;
+  cited or quoted:
+    on Lincoln's election, i. 39 _and note_[1];
+    on impossibility of Northern reconquest, 57;
+    on secession an accomplished fact, 174; ii. 79;
+    on Bull Run, i. 179;
+    on cotton shortage, i. 55; ii. 14, 15;
+    on servile insurrection, 79;
+    on Cotton Loan, 160, 162;
+    on Roebuck's motion, 173;
+    on extension of the franchise, 277;
+    on American institutions and statesmen, 279-80
+_Edinburgh Review_, The:
+  attitude to slavery, i. 33, 45; ii. 281;
+  attitude in the conflict, i. 42; ii. 50 _note_[2], 68;
+  on recognition, 46 _note_[3];
+  on the Emancipation Proclamation, 103;
+  on the causes of the war, 281
+Elliot, chargé, i. 14
+Elliott, E.N., editor of _Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments_,
+  ii. 3 _note_[2]
+Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. 74, 78, 80, 86 _and note_[1], 91;
+  idea of military necessity for, 81, 82, 85, 87;
+  Lincoln's alleged purpose in, 87;
+  purpose of, according to Seward, 99-100;
+  viewed as an incitement to servile insurrection, 49, 74, 98, 101, 103
+    _note_[6]
+  American reception of, ii. 101, 105
+  British attitude to, ii. 101 _et seq._;
+  Press denunciation of, 102-5, 106;
+  public meetings in favour of, 106 _and note_[2], 107, 108;
+  English women's support of, 109;
+  Nonconformist support, 109, 110;
+  Emancipation societies support of, 110
+  Confiscation Bill, _See that heading_
+  _See also_ Border States _and sub-heading under_ Lincoln
+Emigration, British, to America, i. 23-4; ii. 200-1;
+  _Kearsarge_ incident, 200-1
+England: cotton famine. _See under_ Cotton.
+  _See_ Great Britain
+Erlanger & Co. and Confederate Cotton Loan,
+  ii. 158-60, 161, 162 _and note_[3]
+European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years, ii. 219
+Eustis, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]
+Evans, William, ii. 224
+Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of Neutrality,
+  i. 166 _note_[3]
+Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i. 90
+Expatriation, American and British views on, i. 16
+
+Fairfax, Lieut., of the _San Jacinto_, i. 205
+Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts,"
+  ii. 12 _note_, 20
+Fawcett, Prof., ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Featherstonaugh, G.W., _Excursion through the Slave States_, cited, i. 29
+Federals. _See under _Northern
+Ferguson, Sir James, i. 268; ii. 175
+Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii. 164
+_Fishmongers of London_: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii. 223 _note_[1]
+Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. 306; ii. 25
+Fitzwilliam, Hon. C., ii. 193
+Flahault, M. de, French Ambassador, i. 88, 197, 260 _note_[1],
+  288, 291, 293; ii. 19 _note_[3], 45
+Forbes, J.M., and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2], 297
+Forbes, J. M., quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for Democracy,
+  ii. 297
+Forster, William E., i. 58 _and note_[2];
+  a friend of the North, 58 _note_[2]; ii. 224;
+  quoted, on Harriet Martineau, i. 70 _note_[3];
+  question in Commons on privateering, 94, 157;
+  speech against Gregory's motion on blockade, 268, 270;
+  speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion,
+     ii. 22;
+  close touch with Adams, 22, 36;
+  attacks Government in debate on Southern shipbuilding, 133;
+  rebuked by Palmerston, 135;
+  in Roebuck's motion, 171-2, 175;
+  comment on Southern meetings, 190 _and note_[2]
+Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note_[1], 274
+Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note[1]_, 274
+Fox, G.V.: _Confidential Correspondence_, cited,
+  i. 257 _note_[3], 268 _note_[2]; ii. 120 _note_[3];
+  quoted, on Confederate ironclads in England, 130 _note_[2]
+France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. 6;
+  and American contentions on neutral rights, 18;
+  Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2]
+  Cotton: lack of, i. 279, 290, 293-4, 296, 300; ii. 17
+  Mediation and armistice, attitude to British unofficial overture
+     on, ii. 38-9, 45-6, 59-60
+  Ministerial crisis, ii. 39, 45, 59
+  Neutrality of, i. 299;
+  Northern sentiment on, ii. 225 _and note_[2]
+  Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great Britain, i.
+     84, 88, 156, 166 _note_[1], 196, 249-50, 252, 259, 260, 284,
+     294; ii. 28, 75, 198;
+    break in, 77
+  Press of, and the events in U.S., ii. 174 _note_[3], 236
+     _note_[2]
+  _See also under _Mercier, Napoleon, Thouvenel, _and under
+     subject-headings_
+_Fraser's Magazine_, ii. 284;
+  J.S. Mill's articles in, i. 240, 242; ii. 81, 90, 285
+Fraser, Trenholm & Company: Confederate financial agents in
+     Liverpool, ii. 156, 157
+Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203
+Free Trade, i. 21; ii. 304
+Freeman, E.A., _History of Federal Government_, cited, ii. 152-3
+Fremont, ii. 82
+
+Gallenga,----, _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 189
+Gait, Sir J.T., i. 221 _note_[1]; 222 _note_
+Galveston, Tex. i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 266, 268
+Garrison, W.L., American abolitionist, editor of the _Liberator_,
+  i. 31, 33, 46 _and note_[1]
+Garrison, _Garrison_, cited, ii. 91 _note_[1], 111 _note_[3]
+Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. 92 _notes_
+Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British Neutrality,
+     in, i. 138;
+  American argument before, on Declaration of Paris, 146
+     _note_[2]
+German opinion on the Civil War, i. 178 _note_[3]; ii. 111
+     _note_[2];
+  press attitude, 285 _note_[1]
+Germany: the _Index_ quoted on "aid given by, to the North," ii.
+  236 _note_[2]
+Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. 143, 176 _note_[2], 185, 296
+Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the _Times_, i. 32, 33
+  _The Englishman in Kansas_, i. 32 _note_
+Gladstone, W.E., i. 76, 78;
+  fear of war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215;
+  influence of the commercial situation on, ii. 26;
+  attitude to intervention, 26, 27, 30-1, 48, 57;
+  Newcastle speech, 47 _and note_[3], 48, 49, 50 _and
+     note_[1], 51 _and notes_, 55, 58;
+  memorandum in reply to Lewis, 57;
+  supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and blockade, ii. 64,
+     69;
+  account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's suggestion, 65 _and
+     note_[1];
+  idea of offering Canada to the North, 69, 70 _and note_[1];
+  and the Confederate Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2];
+  reply of, in Roebuck's motion, 170-1;
+  quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to democracy, 282-3
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 179, 200 _note_[1], 224, 266; ii. 59,
+     66, 77, 80
+Goddard, S.A., ii. 108
+  _Letters on the American Rebellion_, cited, ii. 108
+     _note_[3], 109 _note_[1]
+Godkin, E.L., _Daily News_ correspondent, i. 70 _and note_[2]
+Golder, Dr. F.A., cited, i. 53 _note_[3].
+  "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," cited, i. 227 _note_[1];
+     ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for foreign war,
+  ii. 199 _note_[3]
+Gorgas, Col., ii. 5 _note_[1]
+Gortchakoff, comment of,
+  on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 _note_[2];
+  and idea of Russian mediation, 251 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, i. 164 _note_[1];
+  ii. 59 _note_[4], 66 _note_[2], 70 _note_[2]
+Grant, General,
+  capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i. 273 _note_[1], 274;
+  victory at Shiloh, 278;
+  captures New Orleans, 279;
+  Western campaign of, ii. 164, 166, 184-5;
+  capture of Vicksburg by, 176 _note_[2], 185;
+  advance to Richmond, 217, 219;
+  siege of Southern lines at Petersburg, 217;
+  capture of Petersburg and Richmond by, 247-8;
+  _Times_ report of reverses to, 212, 227, 243;
+  condition of his army, Southern account in _Times_, 227;
+  W.H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign, 232-3;
+  Henry Adams, quoted, on, 243
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 215, 249, 256
+Grant's _The Newspaper Press_, cited and quoted, ii. 231 _note_
+Granville, Lord, i. 76,
+  quoted, 199 _note_[3];
+  on difficulties in Washington and attitude of neutrality, 241;
+  opposition of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. 42 _and note_[2],
+    43, 44, 46;
+  mentioned, i. 94 _note_[3]; ii. 203 _note_[2]
+Grattan, Thomas Colley,
+  quoted, i. 36;
+  _Civilized America_, i. 36 _note_[1]
+Great Britain:
+  Citizenship, theory of, i. 5-6
+  Colonial system: trade basis of, i. 17, 20, 21
+  Commercial relations with America after independence, i. 17 _et seq_., 22
+  Franchise,
+    expansion of the, in, i. 26, 28; ii. 274, 276-7, 301, 302, 303, 304;
+    effect of the American example on political agitation in, 274;
+    connection of the American struggle with the franchise movement in,
+      276, 277, 278, 286;
+    Radical acceptance of the challenge on democracy, 282, 283, 290, 298,
+      300;
+    aristocratic and conservative attitude to democracy, 286, 287, 298,
+      300, 301
+  Policy toward America:
+    conditions affecting, i. 2 _et seq_. 35; ii. 270;
+    the right of search controversy, i. 6-10;
+    territorial expansion 13-15, 16;
+    extension of slavery, 13, 15;
+    Mexican War, 15-16;
+    commercial interests, 19-22;
+    in the Civil War, 50-4, 58, 59, 79, 84, 136, 178, 199; ii. 270-2;
+    influence of democracy in determining, ii. 303-5;
+    policy of joint action with France. _see under_ France.
+      _See also under_ Lyons, Russell, _and subject-headings._
+  Public opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America,
+    i. 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30
+  Public opinion and official views in,
+    at the opening of the Civil War, i. 40-60;
+    doubts of Northern cause, 48, 50;
+    attitude to recognition of the South, 53 _note_[1],
+    on secession, 54, 55, 57
+  Trade:
+    exclusive basis in, i. 17, 20, 21;
+    effect of American retaliatory system on, 20;
+    free trade theory, 21; ii. 304;
+    hopes from cotton interests, i. 22
+  Working classes in: Northern sympathies of, ii. 284, 285 _note_[1]
+  _See also subject-headings_
+Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. 4; ii. 253, 254
+Greeley, Horace, editor of _New York Times_,
+  attack on Seward by, i. 280 _note_[1];
+  and Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. 75;
+  Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, 92-3
+Gregg, Percy, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South),
+  i. 90, 91 _note_[1], 267;
+  motion of, for recognition of the South, 85, 91, 108;
+  advice to Mason on blockade question, 267;
+  motion to urge the blockade ineffective, 268-72;
+  speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire, ii. 21, 22 _and note_;
+  quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and recognition, 155;
+  view of Roebuck's motion, 175;
+  question of, on the destruction of British property in America, 265;
+  mentioned, i. 292; ii. 153, 164
+Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. 3
+Greville. Colonel, ii. 193 _note_
+Grey, Sir George, i. 163, 207; ii. 171, 263
+Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii. 123-4
+Gros, Baron, ii. 167, 168-9, 170
+Grote, George, quoted, i. 1
+
+Haliburton, T.C., ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Hall, Capt. Basil, _Travels in North America_, cited, i. 26-7
+Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. 111, 224
+Hamilton, R.C., "The English Press and the Civil War," i. 38 _note_[2]
+Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, _Men and Manners in America_, quoted, i. 27
+Hammond, E., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. 189;
+  enquiry as to possible action of American Navy to intercept Southern
+    Commissioners, 206-7, 210, 211 _and note_[1];
+  on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. 142;
+  letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird Rams, 147 _note_[4];
+  quoted, on public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, 66;
+  mentioned, i. 256; ii. 45
+Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. 2-3
+"Hampton Roads Conference," The, ii. 252-3
+Harcourt, Sir William,
+  quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship during the American Civil War,
+    i. 1;
+  letters of, in the _Times_ on questions of International Law,
+    i. 222 _note_; ii. 63 _and note_[2];
+  _and see under_ "Historicus"
+Hardwicke, Earl, i. 94 _note_[2]
+Harris, T.L., _The Trent Affair_,
+  cited, i. 203 _note_, 205 _note_[1], 217 _note_[1],
+    227 _note_[1], 231 _note_[2]; ii. 282 _note_[2];
+  citations of anti-Americanism in _Times_, i. 217 _note_[1]
+Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. 47
+Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. 129, 197 _note_[2]
+Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, cited, i. 94 _note_[3]
+"Historicus," Letters of, to the _Times_, cited and quoted,
+  i. 222 _note_; ii. 63, 104, 138 _note_[1]
+Holmes, O.W., i. 37 _note_
+Hood, General, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Hope, A.J. Beresford, ii. 187, 189, 193 _note_, 281-2
+Hopwood, i. 305; ii. 11, 18, 21
+Horsfall, Mr., ii. 153
+Horton, Wilmot, i. 23;
+  Committee on Emigration to America, 23, 24
+Hotze, H., Confederate agent,
+  quoted on effect of _Trent_ affair, i. 243;
+  descriptive account of his activities, ii. 154 _note_[1];
+  and the "foul blot" phrase, 240;
+  and the Southern arming of negroes, 241;
+  mentioned, ii. 68 _note_[1], 180 _note_[3], 213
+  Hotze Papers, The, ii. 154 _note_[1], 180
+  _note_[2], 185 _note_[1]
+Houghton, Lord, ii. 265-6, 267
+Hughes, Thomas, i. 181; ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Hunt, James, _The Negro's Place in Nature_, cited, ii. 222
+Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. 8 _note_[2], 14 _note_[1]
+Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. 264
+Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. 84
+Hunter, Mr., editor of the _Herald, _ ii. 213 _and note_[1]
+Huse, Caleb, ii. 120 _note_[2], 159
+Huskisson, cited, i. 20
+Huxley's criticism of Hunt's _The Negro's Place in Nature_, ii. 222
+
+Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i. 6, 7, 8, 16
+_Index, The_, ii., 33 _and note_[3];
+  agitation of, for recognition of the South and mediation, 33-4, 153-4;
+  on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 51 _note_[3];
+  views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, 51 _note_[3],
+    55 _and note_[4], 68, 69, 165, 196, 197;
+  on reply to French joint mediation offer, 68-9;
+  on Laird Rams, 150 _note_[2];
+  quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents, 154, 164-5;
+  connection with Hotze, 154 _note_[1];
+  and the fall of Vicksburg, 165, 178 _and note_[1];
+  on French press and policy of France, 174 _note_[3], 180;
+  reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, 188,
+    190 _and notes_, 194 _and note_[2], 195,
+    239 _and note_[4], 240;
+  comments on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 215-6;
+  criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on mediation, 216;
+  view of mediation, 217;
+  defence of slavery in the South, 220-2, 240-1;
+  criticism of the _Times_, 228;
+  quotations from the French press on the war, 236 _note_[2];
+  and the Presidential election, 236 _note_[2];
+  on Germany's aid to the North, 236 _note_[2];
+  on reception of Northern deputations by Adams, 245 _note_[1];
+  on characteristics of Southern leaders and society, 287;
+  view of Northern democracy, 287;
+  denunciation of the Manchester School 298-9;
+  cited, ii. 181 _note_[2], 186, 190 _note_[3], 199
+  _note_[4], 232, 241 _note_[1], 242;
+  quoted, 192, 193 _note_[1]
+Ionian Islands, control of, i. 79
+Ireland:
+  Irish emigration to America, i. 29; ii. 200, 201;
+  enlistments in, for Northern forces, 200, 201;
+  the _Kearsarge_ incident, 201-2;
+  petitions circulated in, in support of the North, 240
+Italy, disturbances in, ii. 29
+
+Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia:
+  effect of, on Russell and Palmerston, ii. 38
+Jackson, W.A., ii. 191
+James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_,
+  quoted, i. 228 _and note_[4];
+  cited, 256 _note_[4]
+_James Adger_, The, American war-ship,
+  i. 208, 209, 210, 211 _note_[1]
+Jameson, Professor J.F., ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Japan:
+  Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against,
+    i. 126 _note_[1]
+Jefferson, President, i. 7, 11, 18
+Jewett, J.P., quoted, ii. 111 _note_[3]
+_John Bull_, ii. 231 _note_;
+  quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. 179;
+  Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. 179-80
+Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. 248, 274
+Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. 193-4. 195. 224
+Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. 198
+"Justicia," letters of, in the _Times_, i. 217
+
+Kansas border struggles, i. 32
+_Kearsarge_ incident, The, ii. 201-2
+Kelly, William, _Across the Rocky Mountains, etc._, cited and quoted,
+  ii. 275 _note_[3]
+Kennedy, William, _Texas, etc._, cited, i. 29
+Kenner, Duncan F., Confederate Commissioner, ii. 249-50
+Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. 173
+Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. 175
+
+_La France_, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Laird Brothers:
+  builders of the _Alabama_ and _Laird Rams_, ii. 120, 121-2, 129;
+  prosecution of, demanded, 136;
+  officially ordered not to send Rams on trial trip, 146, 149;
+  Government's correspondence with, 146 _and note_[2], 149-50
+Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government, ii. 134
+Laird Rams, the, ii. 121-2, 123, 124, 137, 140 _et seq._, 196;
+  description and purpose of, 122 _and_ _note_[1];
+  British Government position, 133, 134;
+  rumours regarding, 142-3;
+  seizure of, 145-50, 179-80, 182;
+  suit for damages, 151 _note_[1];
+  British Government purchase of, 151 _note_[1];
+  U.S. Navy plan to purchase, 130 _note_[2];
+  usual historical treatment of the incident, 141, 147 _and note_[1]
+Lamar, Confederate representative:
+  account of Roebuck and Bright, ii. 172 _note_[2]
+Lancashire:
+  Cotton trade,
+    distress in, ii. 6, 11 _et seq._, 21, 26, 29, 31, 240;
+    attitude in, to Government policy, 10, 11, 13-15;
+    attitude of the "Cotton Lords" to, 10, 16;
+    Farnall report on, 12, 20;
+    Northern sympathies of cotton operatives, 13, 285 _note_[1]
+  Cotton factories, statistics, ii 6
+  Cotton manufacturers, attack on in Commons, ii. 163-4
+_Lane, Franklin K., Letters of_, cited ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Layard, reply of,
+  on Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 173;
+  on destruction of British property in America, 265
+_Le Sičcle_, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 _note_[2]
+Lee, General,
+  turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii. 1;
+  defeated at Antietam, 43, 85;
+  retreat of, through Shenandoah valley, 43;
+  advance in Pennsylvania,
+  163 _note_[1], 164, 176;
+  defeats Hooker at Chancellorsville, 164;
+  retreat from Gettysburg, 163 _note_[1], 178, 179, 297;
+  defence of Richmond, 185, 217, 247, 248;
+  surrender, 248, 255, 256-7, 265, 301, 303
+  _Times_, quoted or cited, on his campaign, ii. 227, 256, 296
+Lees, Mr., ii, 220
+Lempriere, Dr., i. 180; ii. 191
+Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. 76, 78 _and note_, 94; ii. 52;
+  views of, on the Civil War, ii. 50 _and note_[2], 51;
+  article on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences,"
+    i. 78 _note_;
+  fears war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215, 226;
+  objections of, to mediation, ii. 44-6;
+  Hereford speech of, in reply to Gladstone, 50 _and note_[1], 51, 55, 58;
+  view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 52;
+  action of, on Russell's proposed intervention, 52 _et seq_., 73-4;
+  memorandum of, on British policy in opposition to Russell, 62-3;
+  account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion, 63-5;
+  Hereford speech, effect on Adams, ii. 55;
+  Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, 56;
+  Russell's reply to Lewis, 56, 57
+_Liberator, The_,
+  Garrison's abolition organ, i. 31, 33 _and note_[3];
+  46 _and note_[1], 47;
+  cited or quoted, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 106 _note_[2], 107,
+  109 _note_[2]; III _note_[3], 130, 184 _note_[3],
+  189 _note_[2], 191 _note_[2], 194, 223 _and note_[2],
+  224 _note_[2], 237 _note_[1], 239 _notes_, 240
+  _note_[2], 289
+Liebknecht, W., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+Lincoln, President, i. 115
+  Characteristics of, i. 115, 119, 120, 127-8;
+    influence of, in Britain, ii. 276
+  Election and inauguration, i. 36, 38, 39, 48, 51, 64, 82, 110, 115;
+  inaugural address, 38, 50, 71, 175;
+  personal view of terms of election, 49;
+  popular views on 79, 114, 115
+  Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. 117, 118, 119, 120;
+  and defend Federal forts, 118;
+  attitude to Seward's foreign war policy, 119-20, 136;
+  reply to Seward's "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration,"
+    119-20, 124;
+  modifies Despatch No. 10, 126-7;
+  attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, 121 122;
+  emergency measures of, 172, 173
+  _Policy and views of, on:_--
+    Blockade proclamation, i. 83, 110, 111, 244. _See heading_ Blockade
+    Border State policy of, i. 173, 176, 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82
+    Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. 82, 84
+    Emancipation Proclamation of, _See that heading_
+    Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. 252-3
+    Intervention, on, ii. 36
+    Piracy proclamation, i. 83, 111, 160
+    Servile insurrection, ii. 83
+    Slavery:
+      inaugural address on, i. 38. 50, 71, 175;
+      view of the terms of his election regarding, 49;
+      denial of emancipation as an issue, 239; ii. 88;
+      reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. 49 _note_[3];
+      declarations on, 78;
+      conversations with Sumner on, 82;
+      attitude to emancipation, 82, 83-4, 96;
+      and anti-slavery sentiment, 83;
+      denial of, as a cause of the war, 88;
+      reply to Schurz on emancipation, 72;
+      reply to Greeley, 93, 94;
+      orders of, as to liberated slaves, 100
+    _Trent_ affair;
+      attitude to release of envoys, i. 231 _and note_[2],
+      British view of, in, i. 225, 226, 230
+    Union, the:
+      efforts to preserve, i. 49, 121;
+      efforts to restore, ii. 82, 83, 93-5;
+      reply to Greeley on, 92-3
+  Attitude of, to England, i. 301;
+    curtails authority of General Butler, 305;
+    settles quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. 72;
+    letter to Manchester supporters of the North, 109;
+    drafts resolution for use in British public meetings on slavery, 113;
+    British addresses to, 288, 290-1
+  Re-election, ii. 226, 234, 235, 238;
+  expectations of his defeat, 226, 231;
+  British Press views on, 234-5, 238;
+  _Punch_ cartoon, 239 _and note_[1];
+  complaints of his despotism and
+  inefficiency in press, ii. 176, 232;
+  his terms to the South, 251, 252
+  Assassination of, ii. 257-8, 265;
+  political effect of,
+    in Britain, 301,
+    and in Germany, 301 _note_[3];
+  British sympathy, 259-64
+    Appreciations of, ii. 258-61
+      British opinion of, during the War, ii. 239 _note_[1]
+        Bright's confidence in, ii. 255 _and note_[1]
+        Lyons' view on, i. 51; ii. 258-9
+        Press views, i. 38-9; ii. 102-5 _passim_
+      Schleiden's view of, i. 116
+    Influence of Bright's letters on, i. 232;
+      pardons Rubery in honour of Bright, ii. 225 _and note_[1]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 59, 81, 149, 223; ii. 39, 68, 91,
+    109 _note_[2], 126, 225, 251, 278, 281, 297
+Lindsay, William Schaw:
+  descriptive account of, i. 267, 289;
+  on the blockade and French attitude to intervention, 267;
+  project of mediation of, 279;
+  account of interview with Napoleon III, 289-90;
+  interview with Cowley, 290-1;
+  second interview with Napoleon, 291;
+  effect of interviews on Confederate Commissioners, 292;
+  refused an interview by Russell and Palmerston, 294-5, 296;
+  third interview with Napoleon, 295;
+  interview with Disraeli, 295, 296;
+  proposed motion in Parliament, 301-2, 305-6, 307;
+  account of a letter to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion,
+    305 _and note_[5];
+  introduces motion in Parliament on mediation, ii. 18, 20, 21-23;
+  withdrawal of, 23, 34;
+  with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on recognition, 166, 167, 168, 169,
+    172, 173, 174-5, 177;
+  suggestion by, on Confederate finance, 156;
+  proposes a further recognition motion, 178 _note_[1];
+  connection with Southern Independence Association, 193, 195, 204,
+    205, 206, 211;
+  hopes of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern
+    vessels, 185, 195, 196;
+  hopes from Napoleon and from Southern victory, 204;
+  fresh agitation for mediation and recognition, 205-6, 209, 210;
+  interviews Palmerston, 206-7, 209;
+  urges Mason to interview Palmerston, 207, 208, 209;
+  interview with Lord Russell 209-10, 212-13;
+  use of the Danish question, 206, 210;
+  hopes from Disraeli, 213;
+  postponement of his motion, 214, 215, 218
+  Friendship with John Bright, ii. 172 _note_[1];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 197, 268; ii. 25, 181
+Lindsay & Co., ii. 157
+Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the _Alabama_, ii. 129-30
+_Liverpool Post_, The, cited on the Emancipation Proclamation, ii. 103
+Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing of
+  Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats," i. 256
+_London Chronicle_, The, quoted, i. 46
+London Confederate States Aid Association,
+  ii. 191, 192 _and note_[2], 195
+London Emancipation Society, ii. 91, 110;
+  distinguished members of, 91 _note_[1]
+_London Gazette_, The, i. 94
+_London Press_, The, quoted i. 54-5, 68
+_London Review_, The, cited, i. 46 _and note_[4]
+Longfellow, H. W., i. 37 _note_, 55 _note_[2]
+Lothian, Marquis of, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Lousada, letter to Lyons on _Trent_ affair, quoted, i. 220 _note_[2]
+Lowell, J. R., i. 37 _note_, 236
+Lushington, Dr., i. 207
+Lutz, Dr. Ralph H.,
+  cited, i. 117 _note_; ii. 111 _note_[2]; 121 _note_[1]
+  _Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland_, etc., cited, i.
+    117 _note_; ii. 285 _note_[1]
+Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. 42, 51, 114;
+  attitude in the American dispute, 51, 53, 88 _note_[2],
+    93 _and note_[3], 254; ii. 237 _note_[4];
+  on Southern clamour at Lincoln's election, i. 51;
+  views on the personnel of the Northern Government, i. 59-60;
+  view of Seward, 59, 60, 65, 114, 129; ii. 72;
+  fears from Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-36 _passim_;
+  efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the South,
+    i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244;
+  views on the American controversy, 72, 73;
+  advises joint action
+  with France, 84;
+  receives instructions on British policy, 87;
+  and course of action if disavowed by America, i. 190;
+  suspicion of French policy, 201 _and note_;
+  survey of the situation after Shiloh, 278;
+  farewell interview with Lincoln, 301;
+  opinion of Adams, ii. 71 _note_[4];
+  views on Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, 106;
+  friendliness of Seward to, 72, 141, 176 _note_[2];
+  report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, 147, 182;
+  report on "scare" at Lee's advance, 176 _note_[2];
+  view after Gettysburg, 176 _note_[2];
+  protests against Russell's motion to withdraw belligerent rights
+    to the North, 182, 183;
+  attitude to American public animosity towards Great Britain, 197, 198;
+  on Seward's plan to collect import duties at Southern ports, 198;
+  description of American readiness for foreign war,
+    183 _and note_[2], 199;
+  on arrogance of American ministers, 199;
+  advises quiet attitude towards the North, 226;
+  view of Northern determination 226, 233;
+  view of Lincoln's chances of re-election, 226, 233;
+  on effect of the fall of Atlanta, 234;
+  advice on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, 237;
+  illness of, 233, 237;
+  return to London, 237 _note_[4];
+  appreciation of diplomatic service of, 237 _note_[4]
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_:
+    Belligerent rights to the South, i. 87;
+      attitude to request for withdrawal, i. 274-5; ii. 198
+    Blockade, i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244-5; ii. 226;
+      and legislative closing of Southern ports, i. 244, 246;
+      communications with Seward on, 244, 245, 246, 250, 257;
+      opinion on, 254
+      Southern Ports Bill, i. 246-50 _passim_
+    Bunch controversy, i. 184 _et seq._;
+      view on Bunch's conduct, 187;
+      conferences with Seward in, 191-2, 193, 194 _and note_[1];
+      comment on Bunch's explanation, 192-3;
+      attitude to American decision in, 193, 194
+    Cotton, i. 54 _note_[1], 64, 196-7; ii. 20 _and note_[3]
+    Declaration of Paris negotiations:
+      alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. 151, 163 _notes_;
+      view of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, 153 _and note_[2];
+      communications with Confederates in, 161, 163 _notes_,
+        164, 165, 166, 168 _note_[4], 185, 188;
+      view on the American proposal, 154, 162, 164
+    Emancipation, as an issue, i. 223
+    Emancipation proclamation, ii. 106, 113, 114 _and note_
+    Intervention, i. 197; ii. 26, 36;
+      fears commercial influence on policy, 26;
+      _See also_ Mediation _infra_
+    Irish emigrants: enlistment of, ii. 201
+    Mediation, i. 284, 286, 297, 298-9; ii. 23, 37 _note_[1], 70;
+      summary of Mercier's plan of, i. 298-9;
+      report on French isolated offer of, ii. 75-6;
+      on Russian suggestion of, 76
+    Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 281 _et seq. passim_;
+      ii. 24 _note_[2];
+      comment on the result of, i. 286;
+      effect of, on, 287;
+      comment on newspaper report of, 287
+    Privateering Bill, ii. 125, 126, 127
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of, to Seward,
+      i. 102, 103, 132, 133, 163 _note_[3], 164, 184
+    Recognition of the South, i. 65, 66, 73, 197, 198; ii. 70
+    Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-9, 130, 132, 133, 136;
+      advice to Russell on, 128-9, 131;
+      anxiety as to Canada, 128, 129, 131
+    Slave Trade Treaty, i. 276
+    Slavery, i. 52, 73, 93 _and note_[3];
+      account of changes in Northern feeling on, 223
+    Southern Commissioners, i. 65, 72
+    Southern shipbuilding, ii. 127, 139-141;
+      on American War feeling over, 139-40
+    _Trent_ affair, i. 210, 211, 221;
+      instructions in, 212-4;
+      anxiety for Canada in, 221
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 43, 57, 59, 74, 242, 243; ii. 147 _note_[4], 170
+Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. 182
+
+McClellan, General:
+  advance of, on Richmond, i. 276, 279, 297, 298, 301; ii. i, 33;
+  defeat of, by Lee, 1, 18, 33;
+  rumoured capture of, 20, 21 _note_;
+  Adams' opinion on rumours, 20, 21 _note_;
+  British newspaper reports of capture of, 20, 21 _note_;
+  removal of, 30;
+  defeats Lee at Antietam, 43, 85;
+  fails to follow up his victory, 43, 105;
+  as candidate in Presidential election, 234 _note_[2], 238
+McFarland, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]
+McHenry, George, _The Cotton Trade_, cited,
+  ii. 6 _note_[2], 13 _note_[2], 185 _note_[2]
+Mackay, Alexander, _The Western World,_ cited and quoted, i. 30; ii. 274-5
+Mackay, Charles, i. 37 _and note_, 46 _note_[4];
+   as _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 176 _notes_; 189, 226
+  _Forty Years' Recollections_, cited, ii. 176 _note_[2]
+  "John and Jonathan" poem, quoted, i. 37 _note_
+  _Life and Liberty in America_, quoted, i. 37 _note_
+Mackay, Dr., editor of the _London Review_, i. 46 _note_[4]
+McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837), i. 4
+McLaren, Duncan, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. 180 _note_[3]
+Madison, President, i. 11
+"Madison's War," i. 4
+Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. 4, 9
+Malmesbury, Lord, i. 79, 84, 149; ii. 25, 167
+Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. no, 224 _note_[3]
+_Manchester Examiner and Times_, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_; cited, ii. 136 _note_[2]
+_Manchester Guardian_, The, ii. 231 _note_;
+  cited, 181 _note_[2]
+Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of delegates,
+  ii. 190 _and note_[2]
+"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society," The, ii. 110;
+  leading members and activities of, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85 _notes_;
+  264, 265, ii. 24 _note_[2], 241
+  _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners
+Marchand, Captain, of the American ship, _James Adger_, i. 208;
+  instructions of, to intercept the _Nashville_,
+  209, 210, 211 _note_[1]
+Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i. 140-1
+Marryat, Captain Frederick: _A Diary in America_, etc.,
+  cited and quoted, i. 27
+Martin, M. Henri, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Martin, T.P., theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations,
+  ii. 8 _note_[2]
+Martineau, Harriet:
+  faith of, in democracy, i. 27;
+  ardent advocate of the North, 70 _and note_[3];
+  view of slavery as cause of the Civil War, ii. 79-80
+Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii. 291,
+  292 _and note_[1]
+Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i. 173
+Mason, James M., Special Commissioner of the Confederates to Britain,
+  i. 183 _note_[2], 203;
+  relations with Spence, 183 _note_[2], 266 _note_[3];
+  captured in the _Trent_, 204 _et seq._, 234 _and note_[2];
+  reception of, in England, 264;
+  interview with Russell, 265-6, 267, 268;
+  statistics of, on the blockade, 268 _and note_[2];
+  effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, 272, 273;
+  hope in a change of Government, 273;
+  views of, on capture of New Orleans, 296;
+  comment of, on mediation after the Northern successes, 300,
+    and Lindsay's motion, 305, 306-7;
+  on the state of the cotton trade in England, ii. 10;
+  request to Lord Russell for recognition of the South, 25, 28;
+  and Slidell's offer to France, 24 _and note_[2];
+  refused an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, 27;
+  view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 104;
+  nominates Spence as financial adviser in England, 156;
+  and Confederate cotton obligations, 157, 158, 159;
+  and Confederate Cotton Loan, 161, 162;
+  in Roebuck's motion, 167, 168-9, 172-3;
+  opinion of Napoleon, 172-3;
+  recall of, 179, 181-2;
+  determines to remain in Europe,
+  182; hope from a change of
+  Government, 185, 213-4; demonstration
+  against, after a Southern
+  meeting, 191; representations on
+  _Kearsarge_ enlistment of Irishmen,
+  201; interview with Palmerston
+  suggested to, 207, 208-9,
+  214-5; returns to London, 212;
+  opinion of Palmerston and
+  Russell's attitude in interview
+  with Lindsay, 213; suggests
+  Disraeli to handle Lindsay's
+  motion, 213; protests against
+  clause in Southern Independence
+  Association address, 220; attitude
+  of, to slavery, 249, 250;
+  interview of, with Palmerston,
+  on Confederate offer to abolish
+  slavery, 250; interview with
+  Earl of Donoughmore, 250-1;
+  quoted on Lee's surrender, 256
+  Correspondence of, i. 261 _note_
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 255,
+    263 _note_[3], 267, 292; ii. 19, 31,
+    147, 154 _note_[1], 185, 186, 195,
+    206, 241
+Mason Papers, cited, i. 261 _note_[1]:
+  ii. 24, _et passim_
+Massie, Rev., ii. no, 190 _note_[3], 239
+Maximilian, Archduke, i. 260;
+  ii. 255 _note_[1]
+Melish, John, _Travels_, quoted, i. 25
+Mercier, French Minister in Washington:
+  with Lyons attempts
+  official presentation to Seward of
+  Proclamations of Neutrality, i.
+  96 _note_[1], 102, 103, 132, 164; in
+  Declaration of Paris negotiations
+  157, 158, 162, 163 _note_[3], 165;
+  negotiations with Confederates,
+  163 _notes_, 164, 165, 184, 185,
+  191 _note_[4]; plan for recognition
+  of Southern independence, 192;
+  plan to relieve French need for
+  cotton, 196-201; supports British
+  demands in _Trent_ affair, 230;
+  on withdrawal of belligerent
+  rights to South, 275; efforts
+  for mediation, 279, 298, 300;
+  ii, 36, 37 _note_[1], 41, 70 _note_[2], 71 _note_[1]
+  75, 76 _note_[1]; idea of an armistice, 41, 47
+  Richmond visit, i. 280 _ct seq._, ii. 24 _note_[2], 95;
+    Seward's acquiescence
+    in, i. 280, 281, 282; consultation
+    with Lyons on, 281-2,
+    283; result of, 284-5; report to
+    Thouvenel on, 285; effect of,
+    on Lyons and Russell, 287;
+    _New York Times _report
+    of, 287; effect of, in Paris
+    and London, 287-8; ii. 95;
+    effect of, on Confederate agents,
+    i. 288
+  Southern Ports Bill, attitude to,
+  i. 247 _note_[2], 248 _note_[3], 249; views
+  of, on recognition, 285-6; belief
+  of, in ultimate Southern success,
+  298; and isolated French offer of
+  mediation, ii. 75; proposes Russo-French
+  mediation, 76 _note_[1]; precautions
+  of, during Lee's northern
+  advance, 176 _note_[2]
+  Bancroft quoted on, i. 280
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 166 _note_[1]
+    191; ii. 23, 40, 155, 270 _note_[2]
+_Merrimac_, The, i. 276, 277
+Mexican War of 1846, i. 7, 15, 206
+Mexico, British influence in, i. 13;
+  revolt of Texas from, 12-15;
+  ii. 117 _note_[1]; contract of, for
+  ships and equipment in Britain,
+  117 _note_[1]; British policy towards,
+  after revolt of Texas, i. 13-14; war
+  with United States, 1846 ... 7,
+  15, 206; expectation in, of British
+  aid, 15; loss of California by, 15;
+  joint action of France, Great
+  Britain and Spain against, for
+  recovery of debts, 259-60; designs
+  of France in, 260; ii. 46;
+  American idea to oust France
+  from, 198, 251, 252, 255 _note_[4]
+Mill, J.S., ii. 224 _note_[3]; article
+  in defence of the North contributed
+  to _Fraser's Magazine_,
+  cited or quoted, i. 240, 242;
+  ii. 80-1, 90, 285; on _Trent_
+  affair, i. 240, 242; on slavery,
+  i. 240; ii. 80-1
+Milne, Admiral, i. 211; Lyons'
+  letter to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American
+  letters of marque, ii. 140, 141 _and note_
+Milner-Gibson, i. 226; ii. 36;
+  attack on, by _The Index_, 298
+Milnes, Monckton, i. 268
+Missouri, State of, and the Union:
+  effect of the "border state"
+  policy, i. 173
+Mobile, Ala., i. 253 _note_[1]
+Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's
+  proposal on recognition in
+  Roebuck's motion, ii. 167, 168,
+  169, 172
+Monck, Viscount, ii. 140; approves
+  seizure of Laird Rams, 147
+_Monitor_, The: duel of with the
+  _Merrimac_, i. 276; effect of, in
+  Great Britain, 276, 277
+Monroe Doctrine, The, i. 11, 12, 259;
+  as a medium for American territorial expansion, 12
+Monroe, President, i. 11
+Monson, cited, i. 93
+Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. 170;
+  amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, 170, 171
+Montgomery, Ala., i. 81, 82
+Moore, _Digest of International Law_, cited, i. 137, 145,
+  195 _note_[2], 212 _note_[3]
+Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky:
+  speech of, at Liverpool, accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. 105
+_Morning Herald_, The, ii. 67, 68 _note_[1], 231 _note_;
+  quoted, 67-8; cited, 215
+_Morning Post_, The, i. 229;
+  ii. 231 _note_;
+  in _Trent_ crisis, i. 226 _note_[3], 229;
+  views on the conflict and democratic tyranny, 229;
+  ii. 284, 285-6;
+  on the war and the cotton industry, ii. 10;
+  on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 49 _note_[1], 55 _note_[1]
+_Morning Star_, The, i. 69, 70 _note_[1], 179;
+  ii. 191 _note_[2], 231 _note_;
+  criticism of _Times_ war news in, 228
+Motley, J.L., United States Minister at Vienna:
+  letter of, analysing nature of the American constitution, i. 174-6;
+  urges forward step on slavery, ii. 98;
+  reply to Seward on effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, 99;
+  quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in the British Press, 280-1;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 190 _note_[2], 191
+  _Causes, The, of the American Civil War_, i. 174, 175
+  _Correspondence_, i. 179 _note_[2], 184;
+    ii. 33, 98 _note_[4], 106 _note_[3], 280-1
+Motley, Mrs., i. 179
+Mure, Robert:
+  arrest of, i. 186-8, 192, 193 _note_[1], 201;
+  Lyons' views on, 187-8
+
+Napier, Lord, ii. 63, 66
+Napoleon I., Emperor, i. 4, 8;
+  and American contentions on neutral rights, i. 18
+  Napoleonic Wars, i. 4-7, 23
+Napoleon III., Emperor:
+  American policy of, ii. 39;
+  differences with Thouvenel on, ii. 19 _and note_[2], 39
+  Blockade, view of, on the, i. 290
+  British policy:
+    vexation at, i. 295
+  Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2]
+  Mediation:
+    hopes for, ii. 23, 59;
+    suggests an armistice for six months, 59, 60 _et seq._, 69;
+    request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on, 60;
+    British views on, 60-65;
+    British reply, 65 _and_ _note_[1], 66, 152, 155;
+    Russian attitude to, 59 _note_[4], 63 _and _[3], 64, 66;
+    offers friendly mediation, 75-6
+    Interview with Lindsay on, i. 289 _et seq._;
+      reported offer on, to England, 290, 291
+    Interviews with Slidell on, ii. 24, 57 _note_[2], 60
+  Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of with, i. 287, 288;
+    displeasure at, 288
+  Mexican policy of, i. 259-61;
+    ii. 163, 198
+  Polish question, ii. 163, 164
+  Recognition:
+    private desires for, ii. 20;
+    endeavours to secure British concurrence, 19-20, 38;
+    reported action and proposals in Roebuck's motion, 166-77 _passim_;
+    interview with Slidell on abolition in return for recognition, 249-50
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 114, 191;
+    ii. 32, 54, 71, 180, 204, 270
+    Benjamin's view of, ii. 236 _note_[1]
+    Mason's opinion of, ii. 172-3
+    Palmerston's views of, ii. 59
+_National Intelligencer_, The, i. 297;
+  ii. 49 _note_[2]
+Neumann, Karl Friedrich:
+  History of the United States by, cited, ii. 111 _note_[2]
+Neutrality, Proclamations of:
+  British i. 93, 94-6, 100, 110, 111, 134, 157, 168, 174;
+    statements on British position, 99, 111, 163 _note_[3];
+    ii. 265; British Press views on, i. 136 _note_
+  French, i. 96 _note_[1], 102
+  American attitude to, i. 96-110 _passim_, 132, 135, 136, 142, 174;
+    British-French joint action, 102, 132 _and_ _note_[2];
+    Seward's refusal to receive officially, 102, 103, 132 _and note_[2];
+    133, 164, 169;
+    view of, as hasty and premature,
+    107-8, 109, 110, 112; Seward's
+    view of, 134-5; modern American
+    judgment on, 110
+New England States, The, i. 17, 18;
+  opposition of, to war of 1812 ...
+  i. 7
+_New Nation_, The (New York),
+  quoted on Lincoln's despotism,
+  ii. 232
+New Orleans, i. 253 _note_[1]; capture
+  of, 279, 296; ii. 16; effect of, on
+  Confederates, i. 296; Seward's
+  promises based on, ii. 16, 26
+New York, rumour of Russian
+  fleet in harbour of, ii. 129
+New York Chamber of Commerce,
+  The, protest by, on the _Alabama_,
+  ii. 126
+New York City: anti-British attitude
+  of, i. 29; idea of separate
+  secession, 83
+_New York Herald, _The, i. 56, 255;
+  ii. 199 _note_[4]
+_New York Times, _The, attack on
+  W.H. Russell in, i. 178 _note_[2];
+  quoted on _Trent_ affair, 220 _note_[1];
+  report of Mercier's Richmond
+  visit, 287
+Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement
+  to, i. 80, 114, 216, 227
+_Newcastle Chronicle_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_
+Newfoundland fisheries controversy,
+  i. 4
+Newman, Professor, ii. 224
+Newton, Dr., in _Cambridge History
+  of British Foreign Policy_, cited,
+  i. 35 _note_
+Nicaragua, i. 16
+Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, cited,
+  i. 126 _note_[2], 138, 146 _note_[2]
+_Nonconformist_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii.
+  231 _note_
+Nonconformist sympathy with
+  emancipation proclamations, ii.
+  109-10
+Norfolk, Va., i. 253 _note_[1]
+  "No 290," Confederate War Vessel.
+  See _Alabama_
+Northern States:
+  Army, foreign element in, ii.
+    200 _note_[1]
+  Emancipation: identified with,
+    ii. 220
+  Immigration and recruiting in,
+    ii. 200
+  "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War,
+    i. 96, 102, 103 _and note_[1], 111, 246
+  Intervention: determination to
+    resist, ii. 35-6, 71
+  "Piracy" declaration, ii. 267-8
+  Public and Press views in, at
+    the outbreak of the struggle, i.
+    42
+  Union, the: determination to
+    preserve, i. 54, 55, 173, 236;
+    ii. 226
+  Western and Eastern States
+    attitude to the War, compared,
+    ii. 53
+
+_Opinion Nationale_, The, cited, ii.
+  174 _note_[2], 236 _note_[2]
+Oregon territory controversy, i. 15
+_Oreto_, The, Confederate steamer,
+  ii. 118, 123, 131, 136
+_Ottawa Sun_, The, cited, ii, 70 _note_[1]
+Ozanne Rev. T.D., _The South as_
+  _it is, etc._, quoted, ii. 195 _note_[1]
+
+Page, Captain, instructions to,
+  on the use of the Laird Rams, ii. 122 _note_[1]
+Pakenham, British Minister to
+  Mexico, i. 13-14
+Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General,
+  i. 268, 271
+Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government
+  of, in 1859 ... i. 76,
+  77, 78; on Seward's attitude,
+  130; on reinforcement of Canada,
+  130-1; statement of reasons for
+  participation in Declaration of
+  Paris, 139; suggests method
+  of approach in Declaration of
+  Paris negotiations, 156 _note_[1];
+  on the object of the belligerents,
+  178; on British policy and the
+  cotton shortage, 199-200; on
+  possible interception of Mason
+  and Slidell, 207-8, 209; action
+  of, in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[2], 229,
+  241; statement of, on British
+  neutrality, 241; interview with
+  Spence, 266; refusal to interview
+  Lindsay, 295-6; letters
+  to Adams on General Butler's
+  order, 302-5; reply to Hopwood
+  on mediation, ii. 18; definition
+  of British policy in debate on
+  Lindsay's motion, 22-3; sneers
+  at the silent cotton manufacturers,
+  26; views of, on mediation,
+  31; participates in Russell's
+  mediation plan, 34, 36, 40-44, 46,
+  51, 54, 56, 73; traditional connection
+  with Lewis' Hereford
+  speech, 50 _and note_[1]; 51 _note_[2];
+  on the folly of appealing to the
+  belligerents, 56, 59, 73; opinion
+  of Napoleon, 59; views on
+    French proposals for armistice, 60-1;
+    on British position in regard to slavery, 61, 78-9;
+    approves Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, 131;
+    defends Government procedure in _Alabama_ case, 134-5;
+    accusation of, against Forster and Bright, 135;
+    attitude to seizure of Laird Rams, 145;
+    on the use of Napoleon's name in Roebuck's motion, 174-5, 177;
+    the crisis over Danish policy of, 203-4, 210, 214, 216;
+    interviews with Lindsay, 206-8, 209, 210, 213;
+    consents to interview Mason, 207;
+    opinion of, on the ultimate result of the Civil War, 209, 215;
+    attitude to resolution of Southern Societies, 211;
+    interview with Mason, 214-5;
+    reply to joint deputation of Southern Societies, 216;
+    reply to Mason's offer on abolition, 250;
+    assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads
+      Conference, 255;
+    attitude to expansion of the franchise, 276 _and note_[1];
+    death of, 302
+  Characteristics of, as politician, ii. 134
+  Cobden quoted on, i. 226 _note_[2]
+  Delane, close relations with, i. 229 _note_[2]
+  _Index_: criticism of, in the, ii. 216
+  Press organ of, i, 229
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 168, 194, 262;
+    ii. 19, 68, 90, 112, 168, 170, 173, 185, 188, 190, 249, 263, 285, 293
+Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 ... i. 4
+Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Paris, Congress of (1856), i. 139
+Peabody, George, quoted, i. 227
+Peacocke, G.M.W. ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Persigny, i. 303;
+  conversation with Slidell on intervention, ii. 19
+Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. 248
+Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern army,
+  ii. 202 _and note_[2]
+Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina,
+  i. 120, 185, 186 _and note_[1]
+Pickett Papers quoted, i. 243;
+  ii. 155;
+  cited, i. 261 _note_; ii. 69 _note_[5]
+Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question,
+  ii. 129, 163, 164
+Pollard, _The Lost Cause_,
+  quoted on attitude of England on the cotton question, ii. 5-6
+Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. 164, 224, _and note_[3]
+Prescott, i. 37 _note_
+Press, British,
+  the attitude of, in the American Civil War.
+  _See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc._
+Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i. 259
+Prince Consort, The, i. 76, 213, 224-5;
+  influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy, 224;
+  policy of conciliation to United States, 228;
+  Adams, C. F., quoted on, 225, 228
+Privateering, i. 83 _et seq_., 153 _et seq. passim_
+  Russian convention with U.S. on, i. 171 _note_[1]
+  Southern Privateering, i. 86, 89, 153, 156, 164, 165, 167, 171
+    _note_[1], 186.
+    Proclamation on, _see under_ Davis.
+    British attitude to, i. 86, 89-92, 95, 158, 160, 161, 163, 166;
+      Parliamentary discussion on, 94, 95, 157;
+      closing of British ports to, 170 _and note_[2]
+    French attitude to, i. 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165
+    Northern attitude to, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 163;
+      Seward's motive against in Declaration of Paris negotiation,
+        162, 164, 169;
+      Northern accusations against Britain on, 91
+  United States policy on, i. 141, 156.
+    _See_ Privateering Bill, _infra_
+  _See also under_ Declaration of Paris negotiation
+Privateering Bill, The, ii. 122 _et seq_.;
+  purpose of, 122-3, 125, 137;
+  discussion in Senate on, 123-4;
+  passed as an administrative measure, 124, 137;
+  influence of, on Russell's policy, 137;
+  British view of American intentions, 137-8;
+  historical view, 141;
+  Seward's use of, 121 _note_[2]
+Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203-4
+_Punch_, cartoons of, cited:
+  on _Trent_ affair, i. 217-8, 237;
+  on Stone Boat Blockade, 255;
+  suggesting intervention by France, ii. 75 _note_[1];
+  on Roebuck, 170 _note_[1];
+  on Lincoln's re-election, 239 _and note_[1]
+  Poem in, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259
+Putnam, G.H., _Memories of My Youth_, cited, i. 178 _note_[3]
+Putnam, G.P., _Memoirs_, cited, ii. 163 _note_[2]
+
+_Quarterly Review_, The, i. 47;
+  views on the Southern secession, 47;
+  on the lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, 47;
+    ii. 279, 286, 301;
+  attitude in the conflict, 199, 301;
+  on British sympathy for the South, 301
+
+_Reader_, The, cited, ii. 222, _and note_[2]
+Reform Bill of 1832 ... i. 26, 28; ii. 276;
+  of 1867 ... 303, 304
+Republican Party, The, i. 114, 115
+Rhett, cited, ii. 4 _and note_[3], 88
+Rhodes, _United States_, cited or quoted,
+  i. 110 _note_[4], 138, 217 _note_[2], 231 _note_[2];
+  ii. 16 _note_[2], 57 _note_[2], 147 _note_[1],
+  285 _note_[1] _et passim_.
+Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+  cited or quoted, i. 261 _note_, 266 _note_[1];
+  ii. 57 _note_[2], 69 _note_[5], 155 _note_[6],
+  _et passim_.
+Richmond, Va., Southern Government head-quarters at, i. 81;
+  capture of, by Grant, ii. 248
+_Richmond Enquirer_, The, quoted on attitude of France to the
+  Confederacy, ii. 180
+_Richmond Whig_, The, cited, ii. 68
+Right of Search controversy, i. 6-10 _passim_, 16;
+  recrudescence of, in _Trent_ affair, 218, 219, 233, 235
+Robinson, Chas. D., Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. 93 _note_[4]
+Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. 34 _note_[1];
+  motion of, for recognition of the Confederacy,
+  74 _note_[1], 144, 152, 164 _et seq._; 296 _note_[1];
+  W.H. Russell's views on, 166;
+  Lord Russell's opinion on, 166;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, 167;
+  Parliamentary debate on, 170-2, 176-8;
+  withdrawal of motion, 175, 176-7;
+  subsequent attitude of, to America, 177 _note_[1], 299-300;
+  opinion on the failure of democracy in America, 299-300;
+  _Punch_ cartoon on, 170 _note_[1];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 306
+Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. 184
+Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85, 86, 264
+Rouher, M., French Minister of Commerce, i. 293, 294
+Roylance, ii. 110
+Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. 225 _and note_[1]
+Russell, Lord John, i. 42, 76, 77, 78-9, 81;
+  attitude of, in the early days of the American struggle,
+    42, 51, 53, 57, 60, 73-4, 79, 84;
+  views on the secession, 52-3;
+  views and action in anticipation of war, 57-8;
+  instruction on possible jingo policy toward England, 60-1;
+  recommends conciliation, i. 67, 74;
+  refusal to make a pledge as to British policy,
+    67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 125;
+  promise of delay to Dallas, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108;
+  plan of joint action with France, 84, 85;
+  advises Parliament to keep out of the Civil War, 90 _and note_[3];
+  uncertainty as to American intention, 201-2; ii. 237;
+  interview with Spence, i. 266;
+  "three months" statement, 272 _and note_[1]; ii. 22;
+  effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii. 38;
+  effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, 49;
+  idea of withdrawal of belligerent rights to the North, 182, 183;
+  on relations with United States and Seward, 183-4;
+  attitude to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern
+    ports, 198;
+  views on the conflict: belief in ultimate Southern independence,
+    198-9, 212, 271;
+  and the Danish question, 203;
+  action in withdrawing neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights,
+    266-7, 268, 269;
+  attitude to piracy proclamation, 267-8, and the Reform Bill,
+    276, 302, 303;
+  quoted on the degeneration of the American Republic, 285;
+  succeeds to Premiership, 302
+
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_:
+    _Alabama_, the, ii. 120, 121, 124;
+      interview with Adams on, 128, 131;
+      private feelings on 121, 124, 130
+  Belligerent rights to the South, i. 86, 87, _and note_[3];
+    reply to Houghton on, ii. 265-6, 267
+  Blockade, the:
+    views on, i. 58, 91, 246, 252-3;
+    instructions to Lyons on, 58, 244, 248, 263, 267, 271, 272;
+    instructions to Bunch, 253 _note_[2];
+    view on notification at the port method, 246;
+    on British Trade under, 252, 253;
+    aim in presenting Parliamentary Papers on, 252, 267;
+    on irritation caused by, ii. 225-6
+    Southern Ports Bill, protests against, i. 247-51;
+      instructions to Lyons on, 248, 249
+    Stone Boat Fleet, i. 254-5, 256
+  Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190-5;
+    letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture, 190;
+    anxiety in, 190, 191
+  Butler's, General, order to troops:
+    advice to Palmerston on, i. 303-4;
+    reply to Adams, 304
+
+  Confederate Commissioners:
+    attitude to, i. 67, 68;
+    interviews with, i. 85-6, 158;
+    declines official communication with, 214 _and note_[4], 265-6;
+    reception of Mason, 235, 265-6, 267, 268;
+    suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of Slidell, 235;
+    reply to Mason's notification of his recall, ii. 181;
+    reply to Confederate "Manifesto," 241-2
+  Confederate Shipbuilding:
+    reply to Adams' protests, ii. 118, 120-1, 127;
+    advice to Palmerston on, 131;
+    orders detention of contractors, 135;
+    seizure of _Alexandra_, 136;
+    stoppage of, 197;
+    result of _Alexandra_ trial, 197.
+    _See also sub-headings_ Alabama, Laird Rams
+  Confederates:
+    negotiations with, i. 161, 163, 166, 168 _note_[4], 170, 184;
+    attitude to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, 189;
+    explanation to Adams of British attitude to, 190
+  Cotton supply:
+    attitude to French proposals on, i. 197, 199, 294
+
+  Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+    request to France in, i. 142, 146-7, 156, 157 _and note_[3];
+    instructions to Lyons on, 146-62 _passim_, 184;
+    interviews with Adams, 141-8, 158;
+    proposals to the United States, 153 _and note_[2], 170;
+    instructions to Cowley, 156-9 _passim_;
+    suggested declaration in proposed convention, 143-6,
+    146 _note_[1], 149, 151, 154, 168, 170, 201
+  Emancipation Proclamation:
+    views on, ii. 101-2, 107 _and note_[1]
+
+  Foreign Enlistment Act:
+    idea of amending, ii. 124;
+    offer to United States on, 124-5;
+    reply to Adams' pressure for alteration of, 149
+
+  Gregory's motion, i. 108
+
+  Irishmen:
+    recruiting of, ii. 201-2
+
+  Laird Rams:
+    conversations with Adams on, ii. 144;
+    orders detention of, 144-5, 146, 150, 151;
+    correspondence with the Lairds, 146;
+    drafts protest to Mason, 147, 148 _and note_[1];
+    reply to attack on Government policy on, 149-50
+  Lindsay:
+    approval of Cowley's statement to, i. 293, 294;
+    reply to request of, for an interview, 294-5;
+    interview with, on motion for mediation and recognition, ii. 212-13
+
+  Mediation:
+    advice to Palmerston on reported French offer, i. 305;
+    reply to Seward's protest, ii. 19, 25-6, 27;
+    project of, with Palmerston, ii. 31-2, 34, 36 _et seq._, 91, 271;
+    instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel, 38;
+    letters to Gladstone on, 40, 41;
+    points of, 46;
+    responsibility for, 46 _note_[4];
+    Russia approached, 45;
+    memorandum on America, 49 _and note_[3];
+    proposal of an armistice, 31-2, 49, 53-5, 56-7;
+    comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion, 61-2, 64;
+    wish for acceptance, 62, 64;
+    declaration of no change in British policy, 71;
+    end of the project, 72, 155;
+    motive in, 73;
+    viewed as a crisis, 73;
+    comments of, to Brunow
+    on joint mediation offer 73 _note_[1]
+  Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 287, 288
+
+  Privateering, i. 89, 91, 159-63 _passim_;
+    possible interference of, with neutrals, ii. 127, 138-150;
+    opinion of, on intended use of privateers, 138
+  Proclamation of Neutrality.
+    British position in, i. 166 _note_[2]; ii. 265-6
+
+  Recognition of the Confederacy:
+    attitude to, i. 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 242, 243; ii. 54, 59, 77-8;
+    influence of _Trent_ affair on, i. 243;
+    reply to Mason's requests for, ii. 25, 27;
+    opinion of Roebuck's motion on, 166, 177;
+    denies receipt of proposal from France on 168-9, 172
+
+  Servile War, ii. 80, 97, 98
+  Slavery, ii. 89, 90;
+    view of Seward's proposal for transport of emancipated slaves, 100
+
+  _Trent_ affair, view of, i. 212;
+    letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America over, 215;
+    on possible ways of settlement of, 224;
+    instructions to Lyons on learning officially that Wilkes acted
+    without authorization, 226
+  Policy of, in the American Civil War:
+    i. 145, 202, 243, 299; ii. 271-2;
+    declaration to Adams on, 55, 71
+    Attitude to Adams, i. 81;
+      view of, i. 131; ii. 128
+    View of Lincoln, i. 189; ii. 263
+    View of Seward, i. 67, 68, 131, 235-6;
+      improved relations with, ii. 72, 197
+  Criticism and view of, in _The Index_,
+    ii. 51 _note_[2], 68, 69, 196
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 101 _note_[1], 198, 274, 277;
+    ii. 190, 208, 254
+Russell, Lady, quoted on _Trent_ affair, i. 224 _note_[3]
+Russell, W.H., _Times_ correspondent, i. 44, 56, 66, 177;
+  letters of, to the _Times_, 71, 177; ii. 229 _note_[1];
+  on the secession, i. 56, 177;
+  impression of Lincoln, 61 _note_[2];
+  description of Bull Run, 177-8; ii. 229 _note_[1];
+  abhorrence of slavery, i. 71, 177;
+  American newspaper attacks on 178 _and note_[2];
+  recall of, 178 _and note_[2];
+  ii. 228, 229 _note_[1];
+  on Napoleon's mediation offer, 68;
+  on recognition, 166;
+  editor of _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 68, 228, 229 _and note_[1];
+  belief of, in ultimate Northern victory, i. 178 _note_[2], 180;
+    ii. 68 _note_[2], 228, 229 _and note_[1];
+  view of the ending of the War, 229-30;
+  on campaigns of Grant and Sherman, 230, 232-3, 243;
+  quoted on Delane, 254;
+  on prospective war with America, 254;
+  on failure of republican institutions, 277
+  _My Diary North and South_, i. 177 _notes_;
+     quoted 44 _note_[1], 61, 71;
+     cited, 124, 178, ii. 229 _note_[1]
+Russia:
+  attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 164 _note_[1];
+  convention with United States on privateering, 171 _note_[1];
+  attitude to recognition of the South, 196 _note_[2]; ii. 59;
+  and mediation, i. 283 _note_[1];
+  ii. 37 _note_[1], 39, 45 _note_[2];
+  British approach to, on mediation, 40, 45, _and note_[2];
+  attitude to joint mediation, 59 _note_[2], 63 _and note_[5],
+    66 _and note_[2], 70 _note_[2];
+  on joint mediation without Britain, 76 _and note_[1];
+  plan of separate mediation, 251 _note_[1];
+  Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights,
+    265 _and note_[2];
+  policy of friendship to United States,
+    45 _note_[2], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2];
+  United States friendship for, 225
+  Polish question, ii. 129, 163
+  Fleets of, in Western waters:
+    story of, in _Trent_ affair, i. 227 _note_[1];
+    ii. 129 _and note_
+  _See also under_ Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl
+
+St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston,
+  i. 185, 186, 191 _note_[4]
+Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. 290 _note_[1]
+Salt, price of, in Charleston:
+  effect of the blockade, i. 270
+San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention to
+  guarantee independence of, i. 126 _note_[1]
+San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. 129 _and note_[1]
+_San Jacinto_, the, i. 204, 205, 216
+_Saturday Review_, The:
+  views of, on Lincoln's election, i. 39;
+  judgment of Seward, 39;
+  views at outbreak of war, 41, 46;
+  on Southern right of secession, 42;
+  on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100-1;
+  on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, 146 _note_[1];
+  on slavery as an issue: attack on Mrs. H.B. Stowe, 180-1;
+  on blockade and recognition, 183;
+  on duration of war and cotton supply, 246 _note_[3];
+  on servile insurrection, ii. 80;
+  and the relation between the American struggle and British
+    institutions, 276, 277-8, 280;
+  on the promiscuous democracy of the North, 277;
+  on the Republic and the British Monarchy, 277-8;
+  cited, 111, 231 _note_
+Savannah, Ga., i. 253 _note_[1];
+  captured by Sherman, ii. 245, 249, 300-1
+Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, cited, ii. 6
+Schilling, C., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen,
+  i. 115, 116 _note_, 130;
+  views of, on Seward and Lincoln, 115-6;
+  offers services as mediator: plan of an armistice, 121, 122;
+  visit of, to Richmond, 121-3;
+  failure of his mediation, 122-3;
+  report of Russian attitude to privateers, 171 _note_[1];
+  on _Trent_ affair, 231 _note_[2], 242;
+  on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of envoys, 231 _note_[2];
+  on attitude of Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _note_[3];
+  quoted, on slavery, ii. 111 _and note_[2]
+Schleswig-Holstein question, i. 79; ii. 203-4
+Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War_, cited,
+  ii. 7 _notes_; 167 _note_[1];
+  arguments in, examined, 13 _note_[2]
+Scholefield, Wm., ii. 193 _note_
+Schouler,----, on diplomatic controversies between England and America,
+  cited, i. 35
+Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate Cotton
+  Loan, ii. 161-2
+Schurz, Carl,
+  papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i. 117 _note_;
+  advocates declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. 91, 92;
+  cited i. 83 _note_[2]
+Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, cited,
+  ii. 156 _note_[1], 158 _note_[4], 160 _notes_,
+  162 _note_[3]
+Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in _Trent_
+  affair, i. 218
+Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_,
+  cited, i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 24 _note_[1]
+Secession States, ports of, i. 253 _note_[1]
+Semmes, captain of the _Alabama_, ii. 119
+Senior, Nassau W., article on "American Slavery," i. 33;
+  quoted, 33 _note_[1], 34
+Servile insurrection, i. 271; ii. 83, 87;
+  British apprehension of, i. 93; ii. 49, 79, 80, 81, 101, 110;
+  emancipation viewed as provocative of, 49, 81, 86, 98, 101, 114;
+  as an argument for intervention, 98, 101, 103 _note_[6];
+  use of as a threat, 18-19, 83, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 114
+Seward, W.H., American Secretary of State,
+  i. 39, 49, 59, 60, 64, 79, 80, 115;
+  British view of, 60, 80,
+  view of, as unfriendly to Great Britain,
+    39, 67, 68, 113-4, 125 _et seq._ 242;
+  reputation as a politician, 80, 114, 115;
+  efforts of, to secure European support for the North, 67, 137, 152;
+  view of his relation to Lincoln, 114, 115-6, 118, 120, 127-8, 130;
+  document "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration,"
+    118-9, 123, 124;
+  advice on Fort Sumter, 118, 120;
+  his "Despatch No. 10", 125-30, 154, 155;
+  reversal of his policy, 130, 132;
+  action on Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, 164;
+  instructions to American diplomats on slavery as issue, i. 176; ii. 95;
+  offers facilities for transport of British troops, i. 213 _note_[4];
+  change of attitude to England, ii. 72;
+  quarrel with Chase, 72;
+  influence of, lessened by signing Abolition Proclamation, 100 _note_[2];
+  friendliness to Lyons, 72, 141;
+  appreciation of Russell's expression of esteem, 147;
+  attitude to Russell, 197;
+  policy in regard to reunion, 197;
+  plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, 198;
+  tests British-French harmony, 198;
+  anxiety to avoid irritating incidents, 199;
+  considers abrogation of treaties with Canada, 253-4;
+  denies rumours of prospective foreign war, 254;
+  accepts notification of ending of British neutrality, 268-9;
+  meets with an accident, 257;
+  attempted murder of, 257-8, 265
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, with regard to:_
+    Belligerent rights to South
+      denial of, i. 87, 102, 169, 233, ii. 182;
+      remonstrance on concession of, i. 247, 274,
+      proposes withdrawal of, ii. 264-5, 266;
+      _See also under_ Declaration of Paris _and_ Neutrality _infra_.
+    Blockade, i. 54 _note_[1], 65, 246, 295;
+      interviews with Lyons on, 244, 245, 246, 251, 256, 257;
+      suggested alleviation of, i. 274
+      Southern Ports Bill:
+        reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. 249;
+        attitude to issue of, 248 _note_[3], 250, 251, 252;
+        on closing of ports by proclamation, 250, 252
+      Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement on, i. 256-7
+    Bunch affair, i. 184, 189, 191 _and note_[4], 192, 193,
+      194 _and note_[1]
+    Confederate debts: statement on, ii. 197
+    Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i. 105
+    Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. 121, 139, 140;
+      effect of seizure of the _Alexandra_ on, 140;
+      despatch on _Alexandra_ case decision, 143 _and note_[2];
+      refuses to allow British Consul through the blockade, 148
+    Cotton:
+      on proposed French intervention to secure, i. 198, 200;
+      promises of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. 16
+    Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 137, 141, 145, 147, 150 _et seq._;
+      statement in refusing convention as modified by Russell, 145;
+      motives in, 150-2, 153, 169;
+      hope to influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent
+        rights, 150-1, 162, 164, 165, 169;
+      as part of foreign war policy: considered, 153-4, 155-6
+    Emancipation Proclamation:
+      urges postponement of, ii. 37. 85, 95, 96, 98, 114;
+      informed as to effect of, on intervention, 98, 99
+      comments on purpose of, 99-100
+      the "high moral purpose" argument, ii. 100;
+      proposes convention for transport of emancipated slaves, 100
+    Hampton Roads Conference, ii. 252;
+      attitude to Britain after, 253-4
+    Intervention:
+      attitude to, i. 145, 178, 200;
+      threat of servile war and, ii. 18-19, 22, 95;
+      instructions to Adams on, 35-6, 96-7;
+      view of the effect of emancipation, on, 98, 114.
+      _See also_ Mediation _infra_.
+    Irish Emigrants:
+      enlistment of, ii. 201
+    Mediation:
+      attitude to, i. 283 _note_[1], 297; ii. 18, 57 _note_[2];
+      by France, i. 283 _note_[1];
+      by Russia, 283 _note_[1];
+      view of England's refusal to act with France in, ii. 71, 72;
+      declines French offer of, 76
+      _See also_ Intervention _supra_.
+    Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 280-4, 286;
+      statement to Lyons:
+        view of Confederate position, 286;
+      newspaper statement on, 287
+    Napoleon's Mexican policy:
+      attitude to, ii. 198
+    Neutrality Proclamations:
+      representations on, i. 100, 101;
+      despatch on American view of, 101, 103 _note_[1], 134;
+      refusal to receive officially, 102-3, 132, 133,
+        153 _and note_[2], 164;
+      efforts to secure recall of, 152-3, 169, 198, 234, 274-5, 300, 301
+    Privateering, i. 160;
+      convention with Russia, 171 _note_.
+      _See also_ Southern Privateering _infra_.
+    "Privateering Bill:"
+      use of, ii. 121 _note_[3], 141, 151;
+      on the purpose and use of the privateers, 122-3, 125, 137, 143;
+      conversations with Lyons on, 125, 126;
+      on necessity for issuing letters of marque, 126, 143;
+      advised by Adams against issue of privateers, 131, 139
+    Recognition of Southern Independence, i. 65, 74, 198
+    Servile War threat, ii. 18-19, 22, 83, 95, 98
+    Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. 10, 275, 276; ii. 90
+    Southern privateering:
+      view of, i. 104, 105;
+      efforts to influence European attitude to,
+      i. 104, 150-1, 154, 162, 164, 169;
+      attitude on issue of privateers from British ports, ii. 126, 127
+    _Trent_ affair:
+      reception of British demands in, i. 230, 232, 233;
+      on Wilkes' action, 231;
+      attitude to release of envoys, 231 _and note_[2], 232, 233, 234, 236;
+      British opinion on Seward in, 239
+  Foreign Policy:
+    high tone, i. 236, 252 _and note_[1], 301;
+    restoration of the Union as basis of, 236;
+    influences affecting, ii. 95, 100
+  Foreign war panacea, i. 60, 113, 120, 123-4, 125, 126 _note_[1],
+  127, 130, 132, 134-5, 137, 154, 155, 214;
+    appreciation of, 136.
+  Southern conciliation policy of, i. 49, 83, 117, 118, 120-1, 123, 125;
+    expectations from Union sentiment in the South, 60, 117;
+    aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, 121-3;
+    communications with Confederate Commissioners, 117-8, 120
+  Appreciation and criticism of:
+    by British statesmen and press in 1865.... ii. 257;
+    _Times_ tribute to, 257;
+    Horace Greeley's attack on, i. 280 _note_[1];
+    Gregory's attack on, i. 269;
+    Lyons' view of, i. 59, 60;
+    Adams' admiration for i. 80, 127
+  British suspicion of, i. 113, 114, 128, 133, 136, 227, 235-6;
+    ii. 101 _note_[1];
+    the Newcastle story, 80, 114, 216, 227;
+    Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, 227;
+    Adams' view, 227
+  Otherwise mentioned,
+    i. 66, 163 _notes_, 177, 186, 188, 209, 212, 213, 217;
+    ii. 39, 84, 123 _note_[2], 170, 173, 175, 223, 225,
+    245 _note_[1], 259, 281
+Shelburne, Earl of, i. 240
+Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on,
+  ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Sherman, General:
+  Atlanta campaign of, ii. 217;
+  captures Atlanta, 233;
+  march to the sea, 243-5;
+  captures Savannah, 245, 249, 300-1;
+  campaign against Johnston, 248;
+  reports of pillaging and burning by his army, 265;
+    mentioned, 215
+  Russell, W.H., views of, on Sherman's campaigns, ii. 230, 232-3, 243
+  _Times_ view of his campaigns, ii. 212, 227, 232, 243-6
+Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. 278
+Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. 116, 117 _note_[1], 128;
+  Continental opinion of international law on, 121 _note_[1]
+_Shipping Gazette_, quoted, ii. 14
+Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its failure, ii. 282
+Slavery:
+  cotton supplies and, i. 13;
+  controversy in America on, 32, 36;
+  English opinion on, 31-5, 37-8, 40;
+  as an issue in the Civil War, 45, 46, 173, 175, 176, 179, 181, 241, 242;
+    ii. 78, 88-93, 222;
+  Confederates identified with, i. 71; ii. 220;
+  Southern arguments for, 3 _and note_[2];
+  attitude of the North to, 78;
+  growth of anti-slavery sentiment, 83, 84;
+  failure of the slaves to rise, 86;
+  Northern declaration on, urged, 98-9, 107;
+  British public meetings on, 109 _note_[2];
+  Southern declaration on, 106.
+  _See also_ African Slave Trade, Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc.
+Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to France,
+  i. 203; captured on the _Trent_, 204-5, 234 _and note_[2];
+  connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, 261 _note_[1];
+  plan of action of, 264-5;
+  received by Thouvenel, 266 _note_[1];
+  view on Continental and British interests in the blockade,
+    267 _note_[3], 273;
+  view of Mercier's Richmond visit, 228;
+  on Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, 292;
+  views of, on the capture of New Orleans, 296;
+  idea to demand recognition from France, 306, 307; ii. 25, 28;
+  hopes of mediation by France, ii. 19, 25;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, 23, 24;
+  makes offers to Napoleon and to Thouvenel, 24, 25;
+  letter to Benjamin on failure to secure intervention, 29;
+  interview with Napoleon on Armistice, 59 _and note_[2], 60;
+  memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking for separate recognition, 75;
+  on shipbuilding for Confederates in France, 128;
+  quoted on position of France
+    in relation to mediation, 155;
+    and Confederate Cotton Loan, 158 _and note_[3], 159, 161, 163;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition, 167;
+  and Napoleon's instruction on recognition
+    in Roebuck's motion, 168-9, 172;
+    and Mason's recall, 180, 181, 182;
+  opinion of Russell, 213;
+  suggestion on Lindsay's motion, 213;
+  disappointment at result of Mason's interview with Palmerston, 215;
+  opinion on European attitude to the South, 215;
+  interview with Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for
+    recognition, 249-50;
+  quoted on Lee's surrender 256-7;
+  appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii. 25, 180 _note_[3];
+  correspondence of, i. 261 _note_;
+  otherwise mentioned, ii. 154 _note_[1].
+  _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners
+Smith, Goldwin, ii. 136 _note_[2], 189 _note_[2];
+  on Gladstone and Canada, 69, 70 _note_[1];
+  quoted on the influence of the _Times_,
+  178 _note_[3], 189 _note_[2];
+  on the _Daily Telegraph_, 189 _note_[2];
+  tribute of, to T.B. Potter, 224 _note_[3];
+  view of the _Times_ attitude to democracy, 299;
+  criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, 303-4
+  _America and England in their present relations_, quoted,
+    ii. 304, _and note_[2]
+  _Civil War, The, in America_, cited, ii. 223 _note_[2],
+    224 _note_[3]; quoted, 304 _note_[1]
+    Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?" ii. 110
+  _Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence
+    Association_, ii. 194-5; quoted, 299
+Smith, T.C., _Parties and Slavery_, cited, ii. 3 _note_[2]
+Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America, ii. 207;
+  letters of, to Members of Parliament, 207-8, 210-11;
+  deputation of, to Palmerston, 216
+Somerset, Duke of, i. 207
+South Carolina, secession of, i. 41, 44;
+  _Times_ view on, 55;
+  and restoration of Colonial relations: some British misconceptions
+  on, 43, 44 _and note_
+Southern Independence Association, The, ii. 185, 189, 191-5, 204, 220, 298;
+  cessation of meetings of, 193-4, 222-3;
+  apathy and dissension in, 205, 207, 208;
+  resolution and deputation to Palmerston, 210-2, 216;
+  ticket meetings, 239;
+  Oldham meeting, 239, 240
+Southern Ports Bill. _See_ Blockade
+Southern States:
+  attitude of, to protection policy, i. 21, 47;
+  and reciprocity treaty with British-American provinces, 21-2;
+  influences directing British trade to, 22;
+  British press attitude to, 40-48 _passim_;
+  characterization of, 41;
+  right of secession, 42, 82, 175, 176, 269;
+  tariff as a cause for secession, 47;
+  question of recognition considered, 58;
+  secession, 172-3;
+  preparations for war, 172;
+  recognized as belligerents, 190, 191, 172;
+  expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. 148 _note_[2];
+  activities of British friends of, 152, 187-8, 190, 193-4, 239, 298;
+  Conservative hopes for success of, 300;
+  views on French attitude, ii. 236 _note_[2];
+  effect of the fall of Savannah on, 246;
+  end of the Confederacy, 248, 259, 268;
+  hope of, from "foreign war," 252;
+  effect on, of Lincoln's assassination 258;
+  withdrawal of belligerent rights to, 264-6;
+  end of the war; naval policy towards, 266-7
+  Belligerent rights, recognition of,
+    i. 87, 88, 95, 108, 109, 150, 151, 155, 166 _note_[3].
+    _See_ Neutrality Proclamations.
+  Commissioners of, _See under_ Confederate Commissioners
+  Cotton, obsession as to, i. 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5
+  Cotton Loan, ii. 155 _et seq._ 179;
+    reception of, in England, 160-1;
+    amounts realized by, 162
+  Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+    attitude to, i. 186
+  Finance, ii. 156 _et seq._
+  Hampton Roads Conference:
+    suggestions in, ii. 252-3
+  Leaders of:
+    British information on, i. 58-9
+  Manifesto to Europe, ii. 241 _and note_[2], 242
+  Mediation:
+    feeling in, on England's refusal of, ii. 71 _and note_[2];
+    hope of change in British policy on, 213-4
+  Military resources:
+    decline of, ii. 219;
+    desertions from the Army, 222
+  Negroes, arming of, ii. 240-1, 251
+  Privateering. _See that heading._
+  Recognition of independence:
+    anger at failure to secure, i. 252 _note_[2];
+    desire for, without mediation, ii. 217
+  Secret service funds, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+  Shipbuilding in British ports for, ii. 115 _et seq._;
+    British protest to, on, 148.
+    _See also under_ Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc.
+  Slavery attitude, ii. 88 _and note_[3];
+    intention of gradual emancipation, 98;
+    British views on, 220;
+    offer of abolition in return for recognition, 249-51
+Spain, and Mexican debts, i. 259, 260
+Spargo, _Karl Marx_, cited, ii. 292 _note_[1]
+_Spectator_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_;
+  constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. 39;
+  on Lincoln's election, 39;
+  views on the Civil War, 41, 69, 100, 181;
+  on secession, 57;
+  on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100, 136 _note_[1];
+  attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech on dissolution of the Union, 182;
+  on servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. 79, 80;
+  on British Press attitude to emancipation, 89;
+  on declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, 89;
+  on the Emancipation Proclamation, 104-5;
+  on British lack of sympathy with the North, 280;
+  on anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, 280;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 180; ii. 105, 223 _note_[1], 282
+Spence, James, i. 183 _note_[2], 266 _and note_[2];
+  conferences of, in London, 266, 267, 272 _and note_[1], 273;
+  prevents demonstration by cotton operatives, 300;
+  plan to appeal to the Tories, ii. 153, 155, 164;
+  as Confederate financial adviser, 156, 157, 158;
+  and Confederate Cotton Loan, 159, 161-2;
+  urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, 173-4;
+  effect of the fall of Vicksburg on, 179;
+  organization of Southern Clubs by, 186-7, 188, 189, 190;
+  hopes for intervention, 187-8, 189-90;
+  organization of Southern Independence Association by, 191;
+  organization of meetings by, 191, 222-3;
+  organizes petitions to Parliament, 193;
+  comments of, on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 216-7;
+  on slavery clause in Southern Independence Association's address, 220
+  Slidell's opinion of, i. 266 _note_[3]; ii. 159;
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 302; ii. 49 _note_[2], 181, 193
+  _The American Union_, i. 183 _and note_[2], 266 _note_[3];
+    ii. 112
+Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. 38
+Spurgeon, C. H., prayer of, for victory of the North, ii. 109-110
+Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. 42
+Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. 176 _note_[2]
+Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of Southern Government,
+  i. 59, 81, 121;
+  interview of, with Schleiden, 122, 123;
+  discussion of, with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. 252
+Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to Palmerston,
+  quoted, i. 109-10
+Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington:
+  view of the secession, i. 53 _note_[3];
+  on Russian policy in Declaration of Paris negotiations, 164 _note_[1];
+  on privateers in Northern Pacific, 171 _note_[1];
+  and recognition of the South, 196 _note_[3],
+  and Mercier's Richmond visit, 283 _and note_[1];
+  on mediation, 283 _note_[1];
+  ii. 37 _and note_[1], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2], 76;
+  comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation, 107 _note_[1];
+  on the reconciliation of North and South followed by a foreign war, 251;
+  Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, 265;
+  views on probable policy of Britain at the beginning
+  of the Civil War, 269-70, 271;
+  on the Civil War as a warning against democracy, 297 _note_[4];
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 54 _note_[1]; ii. 45 _note_[2]
+Stone Boat Fleet. _See_ Blockade.
+Story, William Wetmore, i. 228, 256;
+  letters of, in _Daily News_, 228 _and note_[4]
+Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the _Saturday Review_, i. 181;
+  mentioned, ii. 89-90, 109
+  _Uncle Tom's Cabin_, i. 33 _and note_[1]
+Stowell, Lord, i. 208
+Stuart--, British Minister at Washington:
+  report of new Northern levies of men, ii. 30;
+  on recognition, 30 _and note_[3];
+  views on British policy, 30 _note_[3];
+  attitude to intervention and recognition, 36, 37, 66 _note_[3];
+  report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, 37, 98;
+  suggestion of armistice, 47;
+  account of Federal "reprisals," 66 _note_[3];
+  on servile insurrection, 97;
+  describes Emancipation proclamation as a _brutum fulmen_, 101
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 25, 26, 66 _note_[3], 70, 100,
+    101 _note_[1]
+Sturge, Joseph, _A Visit to the United States in_ 1841, cited, i. 29
+Sumner, Charles, i. 79, 80;
+  Brooks' attack on, 33, 80;
+  hope of, for appointment as Minister to England, 55 _and note_[2];
+  views on annexation of Canada, 55;
+  in _Trent_ affair, 231, 232, 234 _note_[3];
+  attitude to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _and note_[3];
+  advocacy of abolition, ii. 81, 90;
+  conversations with Lincoln on abolition, 82, 86;
+  attitude to Privateering Bill, 123, 124;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 49 _note_, 83, 130 _note_[1], 220;
+  ii. 80, 132, 184, 247, 262, 280
+Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. 63, 73, 74, 83, 120, 172, 173;
+  Seward's policy on reinforcement of, 118
+Sutherland, Rev. Dr., prayer of in American Senate, i. 233 _note_
+
+Tariff Bill (U.S.) of 1816, i. 19;
+  of 1828, 21
+Taylor, P.A., abolitionist, ii. 224;
+  eulogy of George Thompson, 224 _note_[1]
+Taylor, Tom, poem by, in _Punch_, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259
+Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. 173
+Texas, State of:
+  revolts from Mexico, i. 12;
+  Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular agents to, 12;
+  independence of, as affecting British policy, 13-16;
+  enters the American Union, 14, 15, 16;
+  in War of Independence against Mexico protests against shipbuilding
+  for Mexico in Britain, ii. 117 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, 266
+Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of G.V. Fox,
+  etc._, cited, i. 257 _note_[3]
+Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society, ii. 91;
+  work of, for emancipation, 109, 224 _and note_[1];
+  mentioned, 109 _note_[2], 184, 191
+Thouvenel, M., French Foreign Minister, i. 88, 143;
+  in the Declaration of Paris negotiations,
+    151, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163;
+  initiates negotiations with Confederates, 157, 189;
+  policy of, for relief of French need for cotton, 196, 197, 198;
+  attitude of, in Charleston consuls case, 189;
+  and Southern Ports Bill, 247, 248 _and notes_, 249 _and note_[4];
+  interview with Slidell, 266 _note_[1];
+  attitude of, to mediation, 266 _note_[1], 279; ii. 19-20, 28;
+  on difficulties due to lack of cotton, i. 279, 293-4;
+  conversations on Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, 291, 293;
+  and Mercier's Richmond visit, 280, 281, 282, 285, 288, 299;
+  conversation with Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of
+    the South, 294;
+  on French neutrality, 299;
+  opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii. 19 _and note_[3], 20, 39;
+  Slidell's offer to, on mediation, 24, 25;
+  reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of mediation, 38-9, 46;
+  retirement of, 45, 59;
+  view of England's advantage from dissolution of the Union, 270 _note_[2];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 275, 289
+_Times_, The:
+  characteristics of, as newspaper, i. 42, 229 _note_[2];
+  ii. 178 _note_[2], 228, 230 _note_[2], 234;
+  influence on public opinion, 178 _note_[3], 189 _and note_[2], 228;
+  influence on public press, 226, 230 _note_[3];
+  accuracy of reports in, 226;
+  pro-Southern attitude in last year of the conflict, 226-8, 242, 244
+    _and note_[3];
+  attitude to Hotze, 154 _note_[1];
+  relations of, with W. H. Russell,
+    i. 177, 178, ii. 228, 229 _and note_[1]
+  Criticisms of:
+    John Bright's view of, i. 55 _note_[3];
+    citations of anti-Americanism in, 217 _note_[1];
+    Cobden, on, 222 _note_;
+    Canadian opinion on, 222 _note_;
+    in _Index_, ii. 228;
+    in _Morning Star_, 228;
+    Goldwin Smith's attack on, 299
+  "Historicus," articles by, in. _See under_ "Historicus."
+  _Views expressed in, on:_
+    Civil War: non-idealistic, i. 89, 97;
+    prints Motley's letter on causes of, 174-5
+    Confederate Manifesto, ii. 242
+    Cotton, i. 55; ii. 7 _and note_[1], 14 15
+    Democracy: attitude to, i. 8; ii. 280-1, 284, 289, 297, 300;
+      change of view on, 289-90, 291, 297;
+      comparison of British and United States Governments, 286;
+      attack on John Bright, 295-6
+    Foreign war plans of America on, ii. 252, 254
+    Gladstone's speech, ii. 49 _note_[1]
+    Laird Rams, ii. 146
+    Lincoln:
+      on Slavery speech of, i. 38;
+      on re-election of, ii. 234-5, 238;
+      appreciations of, after his death, ii. 259-61
+    Lindsay's proposed motion: ii. 205-6
+    Mediation, i. 303, 305; ii. 67
+    Military situation, ii. 165, 176 _and note_[2], 178, 297;
+      after Gettysburg, ii. 180 _and note_[1], 228 _note_[3];
+      Lee's Northern advance, 176;
+      on Grant's reverses and Sherman's march on Atlanta,
+        212, 227, 232, 243;
+      capture of Atlanta, 233, 234, 235;
+      fall of Savannah, 245-6, 300-1;
+      Lee's surrender, 255-6;
+      appreciation of Lee's campaign, 256;
+      Northern ability in war, 256;
+      Sherman's campaign, 301 _note_[1]
+    Neutrality in non-idealistic war i. 89, 97
+    Northern ability in war, ii. 256
+    Privateers, i. 158
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 103-4, 158
+    Roebuck's motion, ii. 173, 176, 296 _note_[2]
+    Secession, i. 45, 68
+    Seward, i. 216; ii. 257
+    Slavery:
+      attitude to controversy on, i. 32, 55;
+      condemnation of, 38-9, 40, 71;
+      on Northern attitude to, ii. 89;
+      Emancipation Proclamation, 102-3, 104;
+      criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108;
+      on Biblical sanction of, 110
+    South, The:
+      condemnation of, i. 38-9, 40;
+      lawless element in, 40, 41;
+      changing views on, at opening of the war,
+        55 _and note_[3], 56-7, 68-9;
+      demand of, for recognition, ii. 181;
+      renewed confidence in, ii. 210 _and note_[2]
+    Southern shipbuilding, ii. 145, 146
+    _Trent_ affair, i. 216-7, 225-6, 237
+    War of 1812 ... i. 8
+    "Yankee," The, ii. 246
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 174; ii. 65 _and note_[1],
+  160, 201 _and note_[2], 204 _and note_[2], 295
+Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. 129; ii. 4 _note_[3]
+Toronto _Globe_, the, cited, i. 222 _note_
+Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. 132-3, 134, 291-3
+Train, George Francis, of the _New York Herald_, speeches of,
+  in England, ii. 224 _note_[2]
+Treaty of Washington (1842) i. 4, 9
+Tremenheere, H.S., _The Constitution of the United States_, etc.,
+  cited, ii. 275 _note_[2]
+Tremlett, F.W., quoted, ii. 211-12
+_Trent_ affair. The, i. 195, 203 _and note_, 204 _et seq._
+  British demands in, i. 212-3, 226, 230,
+    points of the complaint, 214 _note_[1];
+    American reply, 232, 234
+  British views on, i. 203, 216, 216-8, 221-4, 225, 226-7;
+    American exultation in, 205-6, 218, 219;
+    effect of in Canada, 222 _note_;
+    Cabinet members' sentiments on, 223;
+    change in American views, 226, 230-1;
+  British speculation on probable war, 228, 229;
+  European support of Britain in, 229, 235;
+  French views on, 230, 234-5;
+  release of envoys, 235;
+  American feeling after settlement of, 236 _and note_[3], 237;
+  Parliamentary debate on conclusion of, 240-1, 262, 265, 274;
+  influence of, on British policy in relation to the Civil War, 242;
+    ii. 15-16;
+  Southerners' action in, i. 211 _note_[1];
+  effect of, on British cotton trade, ii. 9
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 171 _note_[1], 201, 202, 244, 253, 254;
+    ii. 72, 131
+Trescott, William Henry, i. 186, 188
+_Tribune_, The New York, cited, i. 280 _note_[1]
+Trimble, W., "Surplus Food Production of the United States,"
+  cited, ii. 13 _note_[2]
+Trollope, Anthony, i. 239 _and note_[5], 240; ii. 153;
+  description of the United States citizen by, ii. 287-8
+  _North America_, i. 239; ii. 153, 287, 288 _and note_[1]
+Trollope, Mrs., i. 27, 48
+Tyler, President, i. 10
+
+Union and Emancipation Society of London, The:
+  Bright's speech to, ii. 295
+United Empire Loyalists, i. 8 _note_
+United States:
+  Citizenship: theory of, i. 5-6 _and note_
+  Commercial relations with Great Britain, i. 17 _et seq._
+  Democracy in, _See under_ Democracy.
+  International law, influence of U.S. on, belligerent and neutral
+    rights in, i. 5-10, 140
+  Naval power:
+    agitation for increase of, i. 123
+  Policy in the Civil War, ii. 197
+    _See under_ Adams, Lincoln, Seward, _and subject-headings_
+  Political principles of:
+    British sympathy for, i. 3, 26
+  Political institutions in:
+    views of travellers and writers, i. 30; ii. 274 _et seq._
+  Population, growth of, i. 12
+  Protection policy:
+    beginnings of, i. 18-19, 20-1;
+    reaction against in the South, 21
+  Territorial expansion, i. 12 _et seq._
+
+  _See also under subject-headings._
+
+United States Supreme Court:
+  decision on Lincoln's blockade proclamations, i. 110 _note_[3]
+
+Van Buren, President, i. 109
+Vansittart, William, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Vicksburg, capture of,
+  ii. 143, 165, 176 _note_[2], 178, 228 _note_[3], 296;
+  Southern defence of, 164, 165, 178;
+  importance of, in the military situation, 165
+Victoria, Queen, i. 76, 96, 168, 190 _note_[2]; ii. 40, 190, 262;
+  pro-German influence of, 203 _note_[3];
+  writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln, 262
+Vignaud, Henry, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Virginia, State of, i. 121, 122, 172, 245
+Vogt, A., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+
+Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, ... i. 80
+Walker, Mr., and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii. 100
+Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. 123 _and note_[2]
+Warburton, George _Hochelaga_: i. 29
+Washington, President, i. 11
+Watts, _Cotton, Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2]
+Weed, Thurlow, i. 114 _and notes_, 129, 227, 231; ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. 199;
+  in _Trent_ affair, congratulates Wilkes, i. 220;
+  attitude to the "Privateering Bill," ii. 123 _note_[2], 128, 137;
+  mentioned, 84, 96
+West Indian Colonies, i. 3;
+  American trade with, 17, 19, 20, 21;
+  slavery in, 31
+Westbury, Lord, i. 262-3; ii. 64
+_Westminster Review_, The, i. 48, 70 _and note_[1], 71
+Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. 13 _note_[2]
+Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. 26, 28
+White, Andrew D., "A Letter to W.H. Russell,"
+  etc. cited, ii. 229 _note_[1]
+Whittier, J.G., i. 29, 47
+Wilberforce, Samuel, i. 31
+Williams, Commander, R.N., i. 204
+Wilkes, Captain, of the _San Jacinto_, intercepts the _Trent_,
+  i. 204, 216, 219-20;
+  American national approbation of, 219-20;
+  Seward on, 233;
+  his action officially stated to be unauthorized, 226, 254
+Wilmington, N.C., i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 247
+Wilson, President, i. 90 _note_
+Wodehouse, Lord, i. 84
+
+Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. 63, 82 _and note_, 85, 86, 264;
+  ii. 4 _note_[3], 223 _note_[1]
+Yeomans, cited, i. 38
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil
+War, by Ephraim Douglass Adams
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+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil War
+by Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Great Britain and the American Civil War
+
+Author: Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+Release Date: October 18, 2004 [EBook #13789]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Charlie Kirschner and the PG Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+<a name="image01.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image01.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image01.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>LORD JOHN RUSSELL</b><br>
+(<i>From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy</i>")</p>
+<br>
+<h2><i>EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS</i></h2>
+<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br>
+AND<br>
+THE AMERICAN<br>
+CIVIL WAR</h1>
+<h4>TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE</h4>
+<br>
+<h3><a href="#VOLUME_I">VOLUME I.</a><br>
+<a href="#VOLUME_II">VOLUME II.</a></h3>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v"></a>[V1:pg v]</span>
+<h2>PREFACE</h2>
+<p>This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the
+British Museum many newspapers and journals for the years
+1860-1865, and then planned a survey of English public opinion on
+the American Civil War. In the succeeding years as a teacher at
+Stanford University, California, the published diplomatic
+correspondence of Great Britain and of the United States were
+studied in connection with instruction given in the field of
+British-American relations. Several of my students prepared
+excellent theses on special topics and these have been acknowledged
+where used in this work. Many distractions and other writing
+prevented the completion of my original plan; and fortunately, for
+when in 1913 I had at last begun this work and had prepared three
+chapters, a letter was received from the late Charles Francis Adams
+inviting me to collaborate with him in preparing a "Life" of his
+father, the Charles Francis Adams who was American Minister to
+Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams had recently returned
+from England where he had given at Oxford University a series of
+lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as to obtain
+copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. Worthington C.
+Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office
+files in the Public Record Office and from the private papers in
+the possession of various families.</p>
+<p>The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at
+Washington and at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life." Two
+volumes were completed, the first by Mr. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_vi"></a>[V1:pg vi]</span> Adams carrying
+the story to 1848, the second by myself for the period 1848 to
+1860. For the third volume I analysed and organized the new
+materials obtained in England and we were about to begin actual
+collaboration on the most vital period of the "Life" when Mr. Adams
+died, and the work was indefinitely suspended, probably wisely,
+since any completion of the "Life" by me would have lacked that
+individual charm in historical writing so markedly characteristic
+of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr. Adams was
+an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory.</p>
+<p>The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I
+returned to the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the
+American Civil War" in the hope that the English materials obtained
+by Mr. Adams might be made available to me. When copies were
+secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 a restriction had been imposed by the
+Foreign Office to the effect that while studied for information,
+citations and quotations were not permissible since the general
+diplomatic archives were not yet open to students beyond the year
+1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, the whole matter was
+again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exact statement that
+the new request was in no way related to the proposed "Life" of
+Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of the materials.
+Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved the
+request but with the usual condition that my manuscript be
+submitted before publication to the Foreign Office. This has now
+been done, and no single citation censored. Before this work will
+have appeared the limitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic
+correspondence will have been removed, and the date for open
+research have been advanced beyond 1865, the end of the Civil
+War.</p>
+<p>Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made
+through my friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_vii"></a>[V1:pg vii]</span> owners of
+various private papers, and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came
+to England for further study of some of these private papers. The
+Russell Papers, transmitted to the Public Record Office in 1914 and
+there preserved, were used through the courtesy of the Executors of
+the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with the hearty goodwill of Lady
+Agatha Russell, daughter of the late Earl Russell, the only living
+representative of her father, Mr. Rollo Russell, his son, having
+died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved in the Muniment Room at
+Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesy of the Duchess of
+Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor. The Gladstone
+Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used through the
+courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from the
+Palmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved by
+Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M.P.</p>
+<p>The opportunity to study these private papers has been
+invaluable for my work. Shortly after returning from England in
+1913 Mr. Worthington Ford well said: "The inside history of
+diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain
+may be surmised from the official archives; the tinting and shading
+needed to complete the picture must be sought elsewhere." (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 478.) Mr. C.F. Adams
+declared (<i>ibid.</i>, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers
+"... the character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865)
+cannot be understood.... It would appear that the commonly
+entertained impressions as to certain phases of international
+relations, and the proceedings and utterances of English public men
+during the progress of the War of Secession, must be to some extent
+revised."</p>
+<p>In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate
+in the generosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor
+Frank A. Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St.
+Petersburg in 1914, of all <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_viii"></a>[V1:pg viii]</span> Russian diplomatic
+correspondence on the Civil War. Many friends have aided, by
+suggestion or by permitting the use of notes and manuscripts, in
+the preparation of this work. I have sought to make due
+acknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to
+those already named, I should here particularly note the courtesy
+of the late Mr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State
+Department at Washington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of
+Congress, for the transcript of the Correspondence of Mason and
+Slidell, Confederate Commissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles
+Moore, Chief of Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, for the
+use of the Schurz Papers containing copies of the despatches of
+Schleiden, Minister of the Republic of Bremen at Washington during
+the Civil War. Especially thanks are due to my friend, Mr. Herbert
+Hoover, for his early interest in this work and for his generous
+aid in the making of transcripts which would otherwise have been
+beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to the skill and care of
+my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press, and whose
+criticisms were invaluable.</p>
+<p>It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my
+hope that with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence," now
+for the first time available to the historian, a fairly true
+estimate may be made of what the American Civil War meant to Great
+Britain; how she regarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief,
+my work is primarily a study in British history in the belief that
+the American drama had a world significance, and peculiarly a
+British one.</p>
+<p class="loc">EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS.</p>
+<p><i>November 25, 1924</i></p>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix"></a>[V1:pg ix]</span>
+<a name="VOLUME_I"></a>
+<h2>CONTENTS<br>
+OF<br>
+VOLUME ONE</h2>
+<center>
+<table summary="">
+<tr>
+<td align="center">CHAPTER</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td align="right">PAGE</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">I.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_I">BACKGROUNDS</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">II.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_II">FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT,
+1860-61</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">35</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">III.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_III">THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY,
+1861</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">76</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">IV.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">V.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_V">THE DECLARATION OF PARIS
+NEGOTIATION</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">137</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">VI.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND
+MERCIER</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">172</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">VII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">THE "TRENT"</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">203</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">VIII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">THE BLOCKADE</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">244</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">IX.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">ENTER MR. LINDSAY</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">274</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</center>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi"></a>[V1:pg xi]</span>
+<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+<h3>PART ONE</h3>
+<center>
+<table summary="">
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image01.jpg">LORD JOHN RUSSELL</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href=
+"#image01.jpg"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi
+and the Making of Italy</i>"</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image02.jpg">LORD LYONS (1860)</a></td>
+<td align="right"><i>Facing p</i>. <a href=
+"#image02.jpg">42</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Lord Newton's "Life of
+Lord Lyons" (Edward Arnold &amp; Co</i>.)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image03.jpg">SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image03.jpg">90</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Lady Gregory's "Sir
+William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography"</i> (<i>John
+Murray</i>)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image04.jpg">WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image04.jpg">114</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Lord Newton's "Life of
+Lord Lyons"</i> (<i>Edward Arnold &amp; Co.</i>)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image05.jpg">C.F. ADAMS</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image05.jpg">138</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From a photograph in the
+United States Embassy, London</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image06.jpg">JAMES M. MASON</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image06.jpg">206</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From a photograph by L.C.
+Handy, Washington</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image07.jpg">"KING COTTON BOUND"</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image07.jpg">262</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>Reproduced by permission of
+the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</center>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1"></a>[V1:pg 1]</span>
+<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br>
+AND THE<br>
+AMERICAN CIVIL WAR</h1>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2>
+<h3>BACKGROUNDS</h3>
+<br>
+<p>In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in
+London, the American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of
+depression and bitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That
+Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic
+trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly
+professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to
+master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily
+contributing in every indirect way possible to verify its judgment,
+will probably be the verdict made against her by posterity, on calm
+comparison of the evidence<a name="FNanchor1"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1">[1]</a>." Very different were the views of
+Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "The perfect
+neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to me
+almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has
+been shown during the political history of the last two centuries.
+It is the single case in which the English Government and
+public--generally so meddlesome--have displayed most prudent and
+commendable forbearance in spite of great temptations to the
+contrary<a name="FNanchor2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2">[2]</a>." And
+Sir William Harcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord
+Russell's many titles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner
+in which he has steered the vessel of State through the Scylla and
+Charybdis of the American War will, I think, always stand
+conspicuous<a name="FNanchor3"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_3">[3]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2"></a>[V1:pg 2]</span>
+<p>Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason
+somewhat to modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of
+Great Britain was long prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was
+also among the historians and writers of Continental
+Europe--notably those of France and Russia. To what extent was this
+dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite of her long years of
+championship of personal freedom and of leadership in the cause of
+anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in the disruption
+of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms, react
+only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national power?
+In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted by
+historians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in
+both foreign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of
+her statesmen, or the inspirations of her people?</p>
+<p>It was to answer this question that the present work was
+originally undertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became
+progressively more clear that the great crisis in America was
+almost equally a crisis in the domestic history of Great Britain
+itself and that unless this were fully appreciated no just estimate
+was possible of British policy toward America. Still more it became
+evident that the American Civil War, as seen through British
+spectacles, could not be understood if regarded as an isolated and
+unique situation, but that the conditions preceding that
+situation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the two
+nations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when the
+crisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions
+is here possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this
+first chapter is devoted.</p>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<p>On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it is
+unnecessary to dilate, though it should always <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_3"></a>[V1:pg 3]</span> be remembered that
+both during the war and afterwards there existed a minority in
+Great Britain strongly sympathetic with the political ideals
+proclaimed in America--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something
+to be striven for in Britain itself and the conflict with America
+as, in a measure, a conflict in home politics. But independence
+once acknowledged by the Treaty of Peace of 1783, the relations
+between the Mother Country and the newly-created United States of
+America rapidly tended to adjust themselves to lines of contact
+customary between Great Britain and any other Sovereign State. Such
+contacts, fixing national attitude and policy, ordinarily occur on
+three main lines: governmental, determined by officials in
+authority in either State whose duty it is to secure the greatest
+advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial,
+resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the
+business opportunities of either nation in the other's territory,
+or from their rivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of
+comparative development especially in those ideals of political
+structure which determine the nature of the State and the form of
+its government. The more obvious of these contacts is the
+governmental, since the attitude of a people is judged by the
+formal action of its Government, and, indeed, in all three lines of
+contact the government of a State is directly concerned and
+frequently active. But it may be of service to a clearer
+appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if the
+intermingling of elements required by a strict chronological
+account of relations is here replaced by a separate review of each
+of the three main lines of contact.</p>
+<p>Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, the
+interest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs
+American. True, there still remained the valued establishments in
+the West Indies, and the less considered British possessions on the
+continent to the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4"></a>[V1:pg
+4]</span> north of the United States. Meanwhile, there were
+occasional frictions with America arising from uncertain claims
+drawn from the former colonial privileges of the new state, or from
+boundary contentions not settled in the treaty of peace. Thus the
+use of the Newfoundland fisheries furnished ground for an
+acrimonious controversy lasting even into the twentieth century,
+and occasionally rising to the danger point. Boundary disputes
+dragged along through official argument, survey commissions,
+arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of the northern
+limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty of
+Washington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any
+time in the forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an
+agreement creditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both
+countries, was reached establishing small and equal naval armaments
+on the Great Lakes. The British fear of an American attack on
+Canada proved groundless as time went on and was definitely set at
+rest by the strict curb placed by the American Government upon the
+restless activities of such of its citizens as sympathized with the
+followers of McKenzie and Papineau in the Canadian rebellion of
+1837<a name="FNanchor4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4">[4]</a>.</p>
+<p>None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British
+policy toward America. But the "War of 1812," as it is termed in
+the United States, "Mr. Madison's War," as it was derisively named
+by Tory contemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious
+policies in which the respective governments were in definite
+opposition. Briefly, this was a clash between belligerent and
+neutral interests. Britain, fighting at first for the preservation
+of Europe against the spread of French revolutionary influence,
+later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire, held the seas in her
+grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomed rights of a
+naval <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5"></a>[V1:pg 5]</span>
+belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view, and as always in
+the case of the dominant naval belligerent, she stretched
+principles of international law to their utmost interpretation to
+secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral
+of importance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested
+point by point the issue of exceeded belligerent right as
+established in international law. America did more; she advanced
+new rules and theories of belligerent and neutral right
+respectively, and demanded that the belligerents accede to them.
+Dispute arose over blockades, contraband, the British "rule of
+1756" which would have forbidden American trade with French
+colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited by France
+herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching the
+personal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the
+British exercise of a right of search and seizure to recover
+British sailors.</p>
+<p>Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely
+opposed theories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a
+man once born a British subject could never cease to be a
+subject--could never "alienate his duty." It was her practice to
+fill up her navy, in part at least, by the "impressment" of her
+sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, and wherever found--in
+her own coast towns, or from the decks of her own mercantile
+marine. But many British sailors sought security from such
+impressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to
+desert to American merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in the
+rapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became by
+naturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty
+of America to defend them as such in their lives and business.
+America ultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was
+accomplished from Great Britain when American citizenship was
+conferred. On shore they were safe, for Britain did not attempt
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6"></a>[V1:pg 6]</span> to
+reclaim her subjects from the soil of another nation. But she
+denied that the American flag on merchant vessels at sea gave like
+security and she asserted a naval right to search such vessels in
+time of peace, professing her complete acquiescence in a like right
+to the American navy over British merchant vessels--a concession
+refused by America, and of no practical value since no American
+citizen sought service in the British merchant marine.</p>
+<p>This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic
+points of opposition between the two governments. First America
+contested the British theory of "once a citizen always a
+citizen<a name="FNanchor5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5">[5]</a>";
+second, America denied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel
+in <i>time of peace</i> to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying
+the American flag. The <i>right of search in time of war</i>, that
+is, a belligerent right of search, America never denied, but there
+was both then and later much public confusion in both countries as
+to the question at issue since, once at war, Great Britain
+frequently exercised a legal belligerent right of search and
+followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged to be British
+subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially careful to
+make sure that no American-born sailors were included in their
+impressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after
+victim, the American irritation steadily increased. True, France
+was also an offender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was
+lost sight of in view of the, literally, thousands of <i>bona
+fide</i> Americans seized by Great Britain. Here, then, was a third
+cause of irritation connected with impressment, though not a point
+of governmental dispute as to right, for Great Britain professed
+her earnest desire to restore promptly any American-born sailors
+whom her naval officers had seized through error. In fact many such
+sailors were soon liberated, but a large number either continued to
+serve <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7"></a>[V1:pg 7]</span>
+on British ships or to languish in British prisons until the end of
+the Napoleonic Wars<a name="FNanchor6"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_6">[6]</a>.</p>
+<p>There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812,
+most of them arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief
+maritime neutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific
+presidential administration of Jefferson sought by trade
+restrictions, using embargo and non-intercourse acts, to bring
+pressure on both England and France, hoping to force a better
+treatment of neutrals. The United States, divided in sympathy
+between the belligerents, came near to disorder and disruption at
+home, over the question of foreign policy. But through all American
+factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to Great
+Britain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by
+America in 1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one
+section, New England, that war later came to be regarded as of
+great national value as one of the factors which welded the
+discordant states into a national unity. Naturally also, the war
+once ended, its commercial causes were quickly forgotten, whereas
+the individual, personal offence involved in impressment and right
+of search, with its insult to national pride, became a patriotic
+theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, in fact, a
+British "right of search" became a national point of honour, upon
+which no American statesman would have dared to yield to British
+overtures.</p>
+<p>In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war of
+Independence" and also as of international importance in contesting
+an unjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to
+be remembered that no other war of importance was fought by America
+until the Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus
+centred on the two wars fought against Great Britain. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_8"></a>[V1:pg 8]</span> The contemporary
+British view was that of a nation involved in a life and death
+struggle with a great European enemy, irritated by what seemed
+captious claims, developed to war, by a minor power<a name=
+"FNanchor7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7">[7]</a>. To be sure there
+were a few obstinate Tories in Britain who saw in the war the
+opportunity of smashing at one blow Napoleon's dream of empire, and
+the American "democratic system." The London <i>Times</i> urged the
+government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and then deal with Mr.
+Madison and democracy," arguing that it should be England's object
+to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian school." But this
+was not the purpose of the British Government, nor would such a
+purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whig minority
+in Parliament.</p>
+<p>The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of
+the war, quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict.
+Impressment was not mentioned, but it was never again resorted to
+by Great Britain upon American ships. But the principle of right of
+search in time of peace, though for another object than
+impressment, was soon again asserted by Great Britain and for forty
+years was a cause of constant irritation and a source of danger in
+the relations of the two countries. Stirred by philanthropic
+emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for the
+suppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principle
+repudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various
+maritime powers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels
+of each upon the others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade
+was in fact outlawed for the flags of all nations. But America,
+smarting under the memory of impressment injuries, and maintaining
+in any case the doctrine that in time of peace the national flag
+protected a vessel from interference <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_9"></a>[V1:pg 9]</span> or search by the naval vessels of any
+other power, refused to sign mutual right of search treaties and
+denied, absolutely, such a right for any cause whatever to Great
+Britain or to any other nation. Being refused a treaty, Britain
+merely renewed her assertion of the right and continued to exercise
+it.</p>
+<p>Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not
+ended with the war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national
+relations, for Britain alone used her navy with energy to suppress
+the slave trade, and the slave traders of all nations sought
+refuge, when approached by a British naval vessel, under the
+protection of the American flag. If Britain respected the flag, and
+sheered off from search, how could she stop the trade? If she
+ignored the flag and on boarding found an innocent American vessel
+engaged in legal trade, there resulted claims for damages by
+detention of voyage, and demands by the American Government for
+apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seized under the
+American flag, never protested to the United States, nor claimed
+American citizenship, for his punishment in American law for
+engaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any
+other nation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his
+vessel.</p>
+<p>Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British
+contention was that here was a great international humanitarian
+object frustrated by an absurd American sensitiveness on a point of
+honour about the flag. After fifteen years of dispute Great Britain
+offered to abandon any claim to a right of <i>search</i>,
+contenting herself with a right of <i>visit</i>, merely to verify a
+vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted this to
+be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whose
+legality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine
+boundary controversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape.
+Joint cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10"></a>[V1:pg 10]</span>
+Africa, the British to search all suspected vessels except those
+flying the American flag, and these to be searched by the American
+squadron. At once President Tyler notified Congress that Great
+Britain had renounced the right of search. Immediately in
+Parliament a clamour was raised against the Government for the
+"sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and Lord Aberdeen promptly
+made official disclaimer of such surrender.</p>
+<p>Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of
+peace was a steady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty
+of Great Britain, appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose,
+but suspicious of an ulterior "will to rule the seas." After 1830
+no American political leader would have dared to yield the right of
+search. Great Britain for her part, viewing the expansion of
+domestic slavery in the United States, came gradually to attribute
+the American contention, not to patriotic pride, but to the selfish
+business interests of the slave-holding states. In the end, in
+1858, with a waning British enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade
+suppression, and with recognition that America had become a great
+world power, Britain yielded her claim to right of search or visit,
+save when established by Treaty. Four years later, in 1862, it may
+well have seemed to British statesmen that American slavery had
+indeed been the basic cause of America's attitude, for in that year
+a treaty was signed by the two nations giving mutual right of
+search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade. In fact,
+however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State for
+the North, to influence British and European opinion against the
+seceding slave states of the South.</p>
+<p>The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when
+American power reached a point where the British Government must
+take it seriously into account as a factor in general world policy.
+That power had been steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From
+almost the first moment <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_11"></a>[V1:pg 11]</span> of established independence
+American statesmen visualized the separation of the interests of
+the western continent from those of Europe, and planned for
+American leadership in this new world. Washington, the first
+President, emphasized in his farewell address the danger of
+entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations of Europe,
+immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this new
+world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward,
+but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France,
+commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened
+in Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about
+to intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted
+colonies, there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly
+about to draw America and England into closer co-operation.
+Canning, for Britain, proposed to America a joint declaration
+against French intervention in the Americas. His argument was
+against the principle of intervention; his immediate motive was a
+fear of French colonial expansion; but his ultimate object was
+inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influence and position in
+the new world.</p>
+<p>Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The
+ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance,
+but the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this,
+favouring rather a separate declaration by the United States, and
+of this opinion was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe
+Doctrine announcing American opposition to the principle of
+"intervention," and declaring that the American continents were no
+longer to be regarded as open to further colonization by European
+nations. The British emergency situation with France, though
+already quieted, caused Monroe's Message to be greeted in England
+with high approval. But Canning did not so approve it for he saw
+clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_12"></a>[V1:pg 12]</span> not merely to
+continental Europe, but to England as well and he set himself to
+thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policy been
+followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted a
+serious clash with the United States<a name=
+"FNanchor8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8">[8]</a>.</p>
+<p>In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying
+policy of non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the
+United States the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own
+expansion in territory and in influence. But for a time there was
+no need of additional territory for that already hers stretched
+from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, two-thirds of the way
+from ocean to ocean. Her population was growing fast. But four
+millions at the time of the Revolution, there were thirteen
+millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were already across
+the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards new
+lands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first
+definite notice given to Europe of America's preconceived
+"destiny," but the earlier realization of that destiny took place
+on lines of expansion within her own boundaries. To this there
+could be no governmental objection, whether by Great Britain or any
+other nation.</p>
+<p>But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the
+view of British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering
+upon a policy of further territorial expansion, forsaking her
+peaceful progress and turning toward war, there was a quick
+determination on a line of British policy as regards the American
+advance. The first intimation of the new American policy came in
+relation to the State of Texas which had revolted from Mexico in
+1836, and whose independence had been generally recognized by 1842.
+To this new state Britain sent diplomatic and consular agents and
+these reported two factions among the people--one <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_13"></a>[V1:pg 13]</span> seeking admission
+to the American Union, one desiring the maintenance of
+independence.</p>
+<p>In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with
+instructions to secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in
+dispute. Here was a genuine British effort to escape from national
+irritations. But before the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while
+it was in the earlier stages of negotiation, the British Government
+saw, with alarm, quite new questions arising, preventing, to its
+view, that harmonious relation with the United States the desire
+for which had led to the Ashburton mission. This new development
+was the appearance of an American fever for territorial expansion,
+turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced as a "manifest destiny"
+which should carry American power and institutions to the Pacific
+and even into Central America. Among these institutions was that of
+slavery, detested by the public of Great Britain, yet a delicate
+matter for governmental consideration since the great cotton
+manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of raw
+cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself
+a cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon
+slave-grown cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once
+acquired, what was there to prevent further American exploitation,
+followed by slave expansion, into Mexico, where for long British
+influence had been dominant?</p>
+<p>On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole
+British policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to
+Mexico, urged a British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of
+reconquering Texas, and strong British efforts to encourage Texas
+in maintaining her independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful
+buffer Anglo-Saxon state, prohibiting American advance to the
+south-west, releasing Britain from dependence on American cotton,
+and ultimately, he hoped, leading Texas to abolish <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_14"></a>[V1:pg 14]</span> slavery, not yet
+so rooted as to be ineradicable. This policy was approved by the
+British Government, Pakenham was sent to Washington to watch
+events, a <i>charg&eacute;</i>, Elliot, was despatched to Texas,
+and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to
+force the acquiescence of Mexico.</p>
+<p>In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it
+is unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict,
+for such it became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both
+sides. The basic fact was that America was bent upon territorial
+expansion, and that Great Britain set herself to thwart this
+ambition. But not to the point of war. Aberdeen was so incautious
+at one moment as to propose to France and Mexico a triple guarantee
+of the independence of Texas, if that state would acquiesce, but
+when Pakenham notified him that in this case, Britain must clearly
+understand that war with America was not merely possible, but
+probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan of guarantee,
+fortunately not yet approved by Mexico<a name=
+"FNanchor9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9">[9]</a>.</p>
+<p>The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas.
+Did she wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer
+independence? Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas
+would choose independence and British favour. But the people of the
+new state were largely emigrants from the United States, and a
+majority of them wished to re-enter the Union, a step finally
+accomplished in 1846, after ten years of separate existence as a
+Republic. The part played by the British Government in this whole
+episode was not a fortunate one. It is the duty of Governments to
+watch over the interests of their subjects, and to <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_15"></a>[V1:pg 15]</span> guard the
+prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a perfect
+<i>right</i> to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to
+Texas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a
+policy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment.
+The Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a
+policy of preventing the development of the power of the United
+States. Then, fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic
+British public feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy,
+of never again being drawn into war with America, not because of
+fear, but because of important trade relations and also because of
+essential liking and admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms,
+was not appreciated in America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in
+governmental circles, pleaded that the support of Texan
+independence was in reality perfectly in harmony with the best
+interests of the United States, since it would have tended toward
+the limitation of American slavery. And in the matter of national
+power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that the American
+Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two,
+perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South,
+free nations in North and West.</p>
+<p>The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all
+opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted
+northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness.
+Mexico, relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy
+between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon
+territory, expected British aid in her war of 1846 against America.
+But she was sharply warned that such aid would not be given, and
+the Oregon dispute was settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of
+vigorous legal argument, followed by a fair compromise. The Mexican
+war resulted in the acquisition of California by the United States.
+British agents in this province of <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_16"></a>[V1:pg 16]</span> Mexico, and British admirals on the
+Pacific were cautioned to take no active steps in opposition.</p>
+<p>Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier
+to American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the
+extension of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was
+not realized. The United States was soon plunged, as British
+statesmen had prophesied, into internal conflict over the question
+whether the newly-acquired territories should be slave or free.</p>
+<p>The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick
+transit between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned
+across Central America. Here Britain and America acted together, at
+first in amity, though the convention signed in 1850 later
+developed discord as to the British claim of a protectorate over
+the Atlantic end of the proposed canal at San Juan del Nicaragua.
+But Britain was again at war in Europe in the middle 'fifties, and
+America was deep in quarrel over slavery at home. On both sides in
+spite of much diplomatic intrigue and of manifestations of national
+pride there was governmental desire to avoid difficulties. At the
+end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to Nicaragua her
+protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of friction, so
+reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, were happily
+removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition to the
+growth of American power.</p>
+<p>In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were
+seemingly all at an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The
+differing theories of the two Governments on British expatriation
+still remained, but Britain attempted no practical application of
+her view. The right of search in time of peace controversy, first
+eased by the plan of joint cruising, had been definitely settled by
+the British renunciation of 1858. Opposition to American
+territorial advance but briefly manifested by Britain, had ended
+with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17"></a>[V1:pg 17]</span>
+the annexation of Texas, and the fever of expansion had waned in
+America. Minor disputes in Central America, related to the proposed
+canal, were amicably adjusted.</p>
+<p>But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples,
+frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions in
+governmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to
+react to such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the
+commercial relations of the two nations--later to examine their
+political ideals.</p>
+<p>In 1783 America won her independence in government from a
+colonial status. But commercially she remained a British
+colony--yet with a difference. She had formed a part of the British
+colonial system. All her normal trade was with the mother country
+or with other British colonies. Now her privileges in such trade
+were at an end, and she must seek as a favour that which had
+formerly been hers as a member of the British Empire. The direct
+trade between England and America was easily and quickly resumed,
+for the commercial classes of both nations desired it and profited
+by it. But the British colonial system prohibited trade between a
+foreign state and British colonies and there was one channel of
+trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable to
+both sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by
+American independence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and
+farm products desired by the West Indian planters, and these in
+turn offered needed sugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired
+to restore the trade, and in spite of the legal restrictions of the
+colonial system, the trade was in fact resumed in part and either
+permitted or winked at by the British Government, but never to the
+advantageous exchange of former times.</p>
+<p>The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not
+reached until some thirty years after American Independence, but
+the uncertainty of such trade during a <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_18"></a>[V1:pg 18]</span> long period in
+which a portion of it consisted in unauthorized and unregulated
+exchange was a constant irritant to all parties concerned.
+Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with its preliminary check
+upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and its final total
+prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800 the bulk
+of American importation of manufactures still came from Great
+Britain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jefferson
+attempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially on
+England, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation
+Act, 1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were
+so unpopular in the commercial states of New England that they were
+withdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked
+the United States into believing that France had yielded to
+American contentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse
+was proclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America
+finally declared war and trade stopped save in a few New England
+ports where rebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a
+blockading British naval squadron.</p>
+<p>For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had
+steadily decreased, finally almost to extinction during the war.
+But America required certain articles customarily imported and
+necessity now forced her to develop her own manufactures. New
+England had been the centre of American foreign commerce, but now
+there began a trend toward manufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814,
+however, at the end of the war, it was still thought in the United
+States that under normal conditions manufactured goods would again
+be imported and the general cry of "protection for home industries"
+was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, a group of infant industries had
+in fact been started and clamoured for defence now that peace was
+restored. This situation was not unnoticed in Great Britain
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19"></a>[V1:pg 19]</span> where
+merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peace on the
+continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discovered that
+the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking with
+apprehension toward the new industries of America, British
+merchants, following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary
+speech, dumped great quantities of their surplus goods on the
+American market, selling them far below cost, or even on
+extravagant credit terms. One object was to smash the budding
+American manufactures.</p>
+<p>This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry
+patriotic emotions in the circles where American business suffered
+and a demand began to be heard for protection. But the Government
+of the United States was still representative of agriculture, in
+the main, and while a Tariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was
+regarded as a temporary measure required by the necessity of paying
+the costs of the recent war. Just at this juncture, however,
+British policy, now looking again toward a great colonial empire,
+sought advantages for the hitherto neglected maritime provinces of
+British North America, and thought that it had found them by
+encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies. The
+legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now
+enforced and for a time intercourse was practically suspended.</p>
+<p>This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection
+in America. It not only worked against a return by New England from
+manufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks of
+protectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had
+been accustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters
+seeking cheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist
+element was as yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home
+markets" for agriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning
+to be felt, and by 1820 the question <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_20"></a>[V1:pg 20]</span> of West Indian trade became one of
+constant agitation and demanded political action. That action was
+taken on lines of retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law
+excluding from American ports any British vessel coming from a port
+access to which was denied to an American vessel, and placing under
+bond in American ports British vessels with prohibition of their
+proceeding to a British port to which American vessels could not
+go. This act affected not merely direct trade with the West Indies,
+but stopped the general custom of British ships of taking part
+cargoes to Jamaica while <i>en route</i> to and from the United
+States. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson's
+administration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment
+by Britain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial
+system.</p>
+<p>The "retaliatory system" which J.Q. Adams regarded as "a new
+declaration of independence," was, in fact, quickly taken up by
+other non-colonial nations, and these, with America, compelled
+Great Britain to take stock of her interests. Huskisson, rightly
+foreseeing British prosperity as dependent upon her manufactures
+and upon the carrying trade, stated in Parliament that American
+"retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom of trade in British
+ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nations that would
+open their ports within one year on terms of equality to British
+ships. J.Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayed
+acceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and was
+rebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade
+did not take place until 1830, after the close of Adams'
+administration. That trade never recovered its former
+prosperity.</p>
+<p>Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, had
+resulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not
+a sufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice
+of, the theory of protection to attribute <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_21"></a>[V1:pg 21]</span> this alone to
+British checks placed upon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless
+the progress of America toward an established system, reaching its
+highest mark for years in the Tariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly
+related to the events just narrated. After American independence,
+the partially illegal status of West Indian trade hampered
+commercial progress and slightly encouraged American manufactures
+by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutral troubles
+of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increased the
+transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection to
+infant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirred
+patriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial system
+restrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave
+time for the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the
+United States. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for
+the world the common advantage and the justice of a great theory of
+free trade. America was apparently now committed to an opposing
+economic theory, the first great nation definitely to establish it,
+and thus there resulted a clear-cut opposition of principle and a
+clash of interests. From 1846, when free trade ideas triumphed in
+England, the devoted British free trader regarded America as the
+chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptance of his theory.</p>
+<p>The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free
+trader, was in the Southern States, where cotton interests,
+desiring no advantage from protection, since their market was in
+Europe, attacked American protection and sought to escape from it.
+Also slave supplies, without protection, could have been purchased
+more cheaply from England than from the manufacturing North. In
+1833 indeed the South had forced a reaction against protection, but
+it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it was Southern opinion that carried
+through Congress the reciprocity treaty with the British American
+Provinces, partly brought about, no <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_22"></a>[V1:pg 22]</span> doubt, by a Southern fear that
+Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantages in British
+markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join the United
+States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union.
+Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial
+tie with the United States, and the one great hope, to the British
+minds, of a break in the false American system of protection. Thus
+both in economic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of
+slavery, the export trading interests of Great Britain became more
+and more directed toward the Southern States of America. Adding
+powerfully to this was the dependence of British cotton
+manufactures upon the American supply. The British trade attitude,
+arising largely outside of direct governmental contacts, was bound
+to have, nevertheless, a constant and important influence on
+governmental action.</p>
+<p>Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade
+and industrial interests, are the favourite themes of those
+historians who regard nations as determined in their relations
+solely by economic causes--by what is called "enlightened
+self-interest." But governments, no matter how arbitrary, and still
+more if in a measure resting on representation, react both
+consciously and unconsciously to a public opinion not obviously
+based upon either national or commercial rivalry. Sometimes,
+indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter to popular
+attitude in international affairs. In such a case, the historical
+estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmental action, is a
+false one and may do great injustice to the essential friendliness
+of a people.</p>
+<p>How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America
+before 1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British
+Government? Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and
+its reaction to, American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such
+public opinion can <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_23"></a>[V1:pg 23]</span> be found in quantity sufficient to
+base an estimate only in travellers' books, in reviews, and in
+newspapers of the period. When all these are brought together it is
+found that while there was an almost universal British criticism of
+American social customs and habits of life, due to that insularity
+of mental attitude characteristic of every nation, making it prefer
+its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours, summed up in
+the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found that British
+opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as a place
+for emigration and, second, American political ideals and
+institutions<a name="FNanchor10"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_10">[10]</a>.</p>
+<p>British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured
+colonization process before the American revolution, lost that
+favour after 1783, though not at first definitely opposed. But
+emigration still continued and at no time, save during the war of
+1812, was it absolutely stopped. Its exact amount is
+unascertainable, for neither Government kept adequate statistics
+before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic wars there came great
+distress in England from which the man of energy sought escape. He
+turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay at least,
+with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, and
+influenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would find
+people of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier
+emigration to America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825,
+one energetic Member of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the
+Government to appoint a committee to investigate the whole subject,
+the result was a mass of testimony, secured from returned emigrants
+or from their letters home, in which there constantly appeared one
+main argument influencing the labourer type of emigrant; he
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24"></a>[V1:pg 24]</span> got
+good wages, and he was supplied, as a farm hand, with good food.
+Repeatedly he testifies that he had "three meat meals a day,"
+whereas in England he had ordinarily received but one such meal a
+week.</p>
+<p>Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type
+of emigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this type
+remaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity
+surrounding America. But there was a second testimony brought out
+by Horton's Committee, less general, yet to be picked up here and
+there as evidence of another argument for emigration to America.
+The labourer did not dilate upon political equality, nor boast of a
+share in government, indeed generally had no such share, but he did
+boast to his fellows at home of the social equality, though not
+thus expressing it, which was all about him. He was a common farm
+hand, yet he "sat down to meals" with his employer and family, and
+worked in the fields side by side with his "master." This, too, was
+an astounding difference to the mind of the British labourer.
+Probably for him it created a clearer, if not altogether universal
+and true picture of the meaning of American democracy than would
+have volumes of writing upon political institutions. Gradually
+there was established in the lower orders of British society a
+visualization of America as a haven of physical well-being and
+personal social happiness.</p>
+<p>This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium of
+expression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public
+opinion of America, of much latent influence, but for the moment
+largely negligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A
+more important emigrating class in its influence on opinion at
+home, though not a large class, was composed about equally of small
+farmers and small merchants facing ruin in the agricultural and
+trading crises that followed the end of the European war. The
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25"></a>[V1:pg 25]</span>
+British travellers' books from 1810 to 1820 are generally written
+by men of this class, or by agents sent out from co-operative
+groups planning emigration. Generally they were discontented with
+political conditions at home, commonly opposed to a petrified
+social order, and attracted to the United States by its lure of
+prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, a superior type of
+emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant, examining and
+emphasizing industrial opportunity.</p>
+<p>Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior
+political institutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican
+finds here A Republic, and the only Republic on the face of the
+earth that ever deserved the name: where all are under the
+protection of equal laws; of laws made by Themselves<a name=
+"FNanchor11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11">[11]</a>." Another, who
+established an English colony in the Western States of Illinois,
+wrote of England that he objected to "being ruled and taxed by
+people who had no more right to rule and tax us than consisted in
+the power to do it." And of his adopted country he concludes: "I
+love the Government; and thus a novel sensation is excited; it is
+like the development of a new faculty. I am become a patriot in my
+old age<a name="FNanchor12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12">[12]</a>."
+Still another detailed the points of his content, "I am here, lord
+and master of myself and of 100 acres of land--an improvable farm,
+little trouble to me, good society and a good market, and, I think,
+a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry in summer; the parson
+gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and poor rates amount
+to &sect;25.00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I leave my
+door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an ounce
+or a little more<a name="FNanchor13"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_13">[13]</a>."</p>
+<p>From the first days of the American colonial movement
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26"></a>[V1:pg 26]</span>
+toward independence there had been, indeed, a British interest in
+American political principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these
+principles for reasons of home political controversy. Their
+sympathy continued after American independence and by its insistent
+expression brought out equally insistent opposition from Tory
+circles. The British home movement toward a more representative
+Government had been temporarily checked by the extremes into which
+French Liberalism plunged in 1791, causing reaction in England. By
+1820 pressure was again being exerted by British Liberals of
+intelligence, and they found arguments in such reports as those
+just quoted. From that date onward, and especially just before the
+passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, the
+example of a prosperous American democracy was an element in
+British home politics, lauded or derided as the man in England
+desired or not an expansion of the British franchise. In the
+earlier period, however, it is to be remembered that applause of
+American institutions did not mean acceptance of democracy to the
+extent of manhood franchise, for no such franchise at first existed
+in America itself. The debate in England was simply whether the
+step forward in American democracy, was an argument for a similar
+step in Great Britain.</p>
+<p>Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political
+quarrel there grew in force, depicted America favourably or
+otherwise according to political sympathies at home. Both before
+and after the Reform Bill of 1832 this type of effort to mould
+opinion, by citation of America, was widespread. Hence there is in
+such writing, not so much the expression of public opinion, as of
+propaganda to affect that opinion. Book upon book, review upon
+review, might be quoted to illustrate this, but a few notable
+examples will suffice.</p>
+<p>The most widely read and reviewed book on the United
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27"></a>[V1:pg 27]</span>
+States before 1840, except the humorous and flippant
+characterization of America by Mrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil
+Hall's three-volume work, published in 1829<a name=
+"FNanchor14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14">[14]</a>. Claiming an open
+mind, he expected for his adverse findings a readier credence. For
+adverse to American political institutions these findings are in
+all their larger applications. In every line Hall betrays himself
+as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief, and convinced
+of the perfection and unalterableness of the British Constitution.
+Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank in avowal of a
+purpose<a name="FNanchor15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15">[15]</a>. He
+states in his preface:</p>
+<blockquote>"... When I found the institutions and experiences of
+the United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament,
+as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and learned
+that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense, instead of
+encountering merited derision, were listened to with patience and
+approbation by men as ignorant as themselves, I certainly did feel
+that another work on America was yet wanted, and at once determined
+to undertake a task which inferior considerations would probably
+have induced me to decline."</blockquote>
+<p>Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home,
+found in the United States proofs for her faith in
+democracy<a name="FNanchor16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16">[16]</a>.
+Captain Marryat belittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes
+proved himself less a critic of America than an enemy of democracy.
+Answering a review of his earlier volumes, published separately, he
+wrote in his concluding volume: "I candidly acknowledge that the
+reviewer is right in his supposition; my great object has been to
+do serious injury to the cause of democracy<a name=
+"FNanchor17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17">[17]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28"></a>[V1:pg 28]</span>
+<p>The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes
+were suffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step
+toward democracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was
+still limited to a small minority of the population. Britain was
+still ruled by her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile,
+however, just at the moment when dominant Whig influence in England
+carried through that step forward toward democratic institutions
+which Whigs had long lauded in America, the latter country had
+progressed to manhood suffrage, or as nearly all leading
+Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, had plunged into the
+rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening in Whig
+ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before long
+to the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in
+Great Britain that the Reform of 1832 was "final," the last step
+toward democracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange
+that the books and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily
+stress the dangers and crudity of American democracy. They were
+written for what was now a nearly unanimous British reading public,
+fearful lest Radical pressure for still further electoral reform
+should preach the example of the United States.</p>
+<p>Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section
+of the British governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by
+a critical, if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid
+development of the power and wealth of the United States,
+governing-class England, of all factions save the Radical, came to
+view America just as it would have viewed any other rising nation,
+that is, as a problem to be studied for its influence on British
+prosperity and power. Again, expressions in print reflect the
+changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than in travellers'
+books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted, not to
+American political institutions, but to <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_29"></a>[V1:pg 29]</span> studies, many of
+them very careful ones, of American industry and governmental
+policy.</p>
+<p>Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of
+such description. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this
+day to the American historical student<a name=
+"FNanchor18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18">[18]</a>. George Combe,
+philosopher and phrenologist, studied especially social
+institutions<a name="FNanchor19"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_19">[19]</a>. Joseph Sturge, philanthropist and
+abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of the poet Whittier,
+through the Northern and Eastern States<a name=
+"FNanchor20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20">[20]</a>. Featherstonaugh,
+a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southern slave
+states, in terms completely at variance with those of
+Sturge<a name="FNanchor21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21">[21]</a>.
+Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston,
+and Warburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of
+Canada, an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter
+professedly alarmed, at the evidences of power in America<a name=
+"FNanchor22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22">[22]</a>. Amazed at the
+energy, growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the
+anti-British feeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote
+that "they [Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the
+incendiary torch of Republicanism to the nations of Europe<a name=
+"FNanchor23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23">[23]</a>." Soon after this
+was written there began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish
+emigration to America which heavily reinforced the anti-British
+attitude of the City of New York, and largely changed its
+character.</p>
+<p>Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect
+British public opinion, or did they create it? It is <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_30"></a>[V1:pg 30]</span> difficult to
+estimate such matters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these
+books coincided in point of time with a British governmental
+attitude of opposition, though on peaceful lines, to the
+development of American power, and to the adoption to the point of
+faith, by British commercial classes, of free trade as opposed to
+the American protective system. But governing classes were not the
+British public, and to the great unenfranchised mass, finding voice
+through the writings of a few leaders, the prosperity of America
+made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy was again beginning to
+make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was published a study of
+the United States, more careful and exact than any previous to
+Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions.
+This was Mackay's "Western World," and that there was a public
+eager for such estimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went
+through four British editions in 1850<a name=
+"FNanchor24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24">[24]</a>. At the end of the
+decade, then, there appeared once more a vigorous champion of the
+cause of British democracy, comparing the results of "government by
+the wise" with alleged mob rule. Mackay wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"Society in America started from the point to which
+society in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to
+this moment, its corner-stone ... that which develops itself as the
+sympathy of class, becomes in America the general sentiment of
+society.... We present an imposing front to the world; but let us
+tear the picture and look at the canvas. One out of every seven of
+us is a pauper. Every six Englishmen have, in addition to their
+other enormous burdens, to support a seventh between them, whose
+life is spent in consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of
+their common subsistence."</blockquote>
+<p>British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition
+to the advance of American power, found themselves <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_31"></a>[V1:pg 31]</span> involved again,
+as before 1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a
+prosperous American democracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion
+at home. Also, for all Englishmen, of whatever class, in spite of
+rivalry in power, of opposing theories of trade, of divergent
+political institutions, there existed a vague, though influential,
+pride in the advance of a people of similar race, sprung from
+British loins<a name="FNanchor25"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_25">[25]</a>. And there remained for all Englishmen also
+one puzzling and discreditable American institution, slavery--held
+up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficult of
+excuse among her friends.</p>
+<p>Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce,
+had early committed British Government and people to a crusade
+against the African slave trade. This British policy was clearly
+announced to the world in the negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15.
+But Britain herself still supported the institution of slavery in
+her West Indian colonies and it was not until British humanitarian
+sentiment had forced emancipation upon the unwilling sugar
+planters, in 1833, that the nation was morally free to criticize
+American domestic slavery. Meanwhile great emancipation societies,
+with many branches, all virile and active, had grown up in England
+and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack on slavery the world
+over, and especially on American slavery. The great American
+abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than in his
+own country; his weekly paper, <i>The Liberator</i>, is full of
+messages of cheer from British friends and societies, and of
+quotations from a sympathetic, though generally provincial, British
+press.</p>
+<p>From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its
+height. It watched with anxiety the evidence of a developing
+struggle over slavery in the United States, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_32"></a>[V1:pg 32]</span> hopeful, as each
+crisis arose, that the free Northern States would impose their will
+upon the Southern Slave States. But as each crisis turned to
+compromise, seemingly enhancing the power of the South, and
+committing America to a retention of slavery, the hopes of British
+abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to British opinion,
+become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery, but
+after the "great compromise of 1850," where the elder American
+statesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of that
+measure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover,
+after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general
+humanitarian sentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to
+seem hopeless and the earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The
+British Government still maintained its naval squadron for the
+suppression of the African slave trade, but the British official
+mind no longer keenly interested itself either in this effort or in
+the general question of slavery.</p>
+<p>Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still,
+after 1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally
+critical, by English writers. Each renewal of the conflict in
+America, even though local, not national in character, drew out a
+flood of comment. In the public press this blot upon American
+civilization was a steady subject for attack, and that attack was
+naturally directed against the South. The London <i>Times</i>, in
+particular, lost no opportunity of presenting the matter to its
+readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansas during the
+height of the border struggles there, and reported his observations
+in letters to the <i>Times</i>. The writer was wholly on the side
+of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that the
+Kansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantly
+depicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence
+of the North as compared with the South<a name=
+"FNanchor26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26">[26]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33"></a>[V1:pg 33]</span>
+<p>Mrs. Stowe's <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i> excited greater interest
+in England than in America itself. The first London edition
+appeared in May, 1852, and by the end of the year over one million
+copies had been sold, as opposed to one hundred and fifty thousand
+in the United States. But if one distinguished writer is to be
+believed, this great British interest in the book was due more to
+English antipathy to America than to antipathy to slavery<a name=
+"FNanchor27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27">[27]</a>. This writer was
+Nassau W. Senior, who, in 1857, published a reprint of his article
+on "American Slavery" in the 206th number of the <i>Edinburgh
+Review</i>, reintroducing in his book extreme language denunciatory
+of slavery that had been cut out by the editor of the
+<i>Review</i><a name="FNanchor28"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_28">[28]</a>. Senior had been stirred to write by the
+brutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after
+his speech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident
+of the slavery quarrel in America excited British attention.</p>
+<p>Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all
+anti-slavery, the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of
+British understanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the
+citations of the British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison
+in his <i>Liberator</i><a name="FNanchor29"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_29">[29]</a>. Yet for intellectual Britain, at
+least--that Britain which was vocal and whose opinion can be
+ascertained in spite of this constant interest in American slavery,
+there was generally a fixed belief that slavery in the United
+States was so firmly <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_34"></a>[V1:pg 34]</span> established that it could not be
+overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditure of British
+sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at the
+conclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed
+the pessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not
+venture to hope that we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see
+American slavery extirpated, or even materially mitigated<a name=
+"FNanchor30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30">[30]</a>."</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor1">[1]</a>
+State Department, Eng., Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor2">[2]</a>
+Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, Vol. II, p. 367.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor3">[3]</a>
+<i>Life of Lady John Russell</i>, p. 197.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor4">[4]</a>
+There was a revival of this fear at the end of the American Civil
+War. This will be commented on later.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor5">[5]</a>
+This was the position of President and Congress: yet the United
+States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen to
+expatriate himself.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor6">[6]</a>
+Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from American ships,
+102 were retained, 1,042 were discharged, and 805 were held for
+further proof. (Updyke, <i>The Diplomacy of the War of 1812</i>, p.
+21.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor7">[7]</a>
+The people of the British North American Provinces regarded the war
+as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the European
+wars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United
+Empire Loyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the
+same two wars which fostered militant patriotism in America against
+England had the same result in Canadian sentiment against
+America.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor8">[8]</a>
+Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in <i>Am.
+Hist. Rev.</i>, XI, 783. Also <i>Cambridge History of British
+Foreign Policy</i>, Vol. II, ch. 2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor9">[9]</a>
+Much has recently been published on British policy in Texas. See my
+book, <i>British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846</i>,
+Johns Hopkins Press, Balt., 1910. Also Adams, Editor, <i>British
+Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas</i>, The
+Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas,
+1918.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_10"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor10">[10]</a> In my studies on British-American relations,
+I have read the leading British reviews and newspapers, and some
+four hundred volumes by British travellers. For a summary of the
+British travellers before 1860 see my article "The Point of View of
+the British Traveller in America," in the <i>Political Science
+Quarterly</i>, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, June, 1914.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_11"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor11">[11]</a> John Melish, <i>Travels</i>, Vol. I, p.
+148.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_12"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor12">[12]</a> Morris Birkbeck, <i>Letters from
+Illinois</i>, London, 1818, p. 29.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_13"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor13">[13]</a> Letter in Edinburgh <i>Scotsman</i>, March,
+1823. Cited by <i>Niles Register</i>, Vol. XXV, p. 39.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_14"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor14">[14]</a> <i>Travels in North America</i>, 1827-28,
+London, 1829.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_15"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor15">[15]</a> Captain Thomas Hamilton, <i>Men and Manners
+in America</i>, Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_16"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor16">[16]</a> <i>Society in America</i>, London, 1837. 3
+vols. <i>Retrospect of Western Travel</i>, London, 1838. 2
+vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_17"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor17">[17]</a> Captain Frederick Marryat, <i>A Diary in
+America, with Remarks on Its Institutions</i>, Vol. VI, p.
+293.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_18"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor18">[18]</a> James Silk Buckingham, <i>America,
+Historical, Statistic and Descriptive</i>, London, 1841-43. 9
+vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_19"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor19">[19]</a> <i>Notes on the United States of North
+America during a phrenological visit</i>, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh,
+1841. 3 vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_20"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor20">[20]</a> <i>A Visit to the United States in 1841</i>,
+London, 1842.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_21"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor21">[21]</a> George William Featherstonaugh, <i>Excursion
+through the Slave States</i>, London, 1844. 2 vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_22"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor22">[22]</a> William Kennedy, <i>Texas: The Rise,
+Progress and Prospects of the Republic of Texas</i>, London, 1841.
+2 vols. George Warburton, <i>Hochelaga: or, England in the New
+World</i>, London, 1845. 2 vols.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_23"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor23">[23]</a> Warburton, <i>Hochelaga</i>, 5th Edition,
+Vol. II, pp. 363-4.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_24"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor24">[24]</a> Alexander Mackay, <i>The Western World: or,
+Travels through the United States in 1846-47</i>, London,
+1849.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_25"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor25">[25]</a> This is clearly indicated in Parliament
+itself, in the debate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856
+of Crampton, the British Minister at Washington, for enlistment
+activities during the Crimean War.--<i>Hansard</i>, 3rd. Ser.,
+CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_26"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor26">[26]</a> Gladstone's letters were later published in
+book form, under the title <i>The Englishman in Kansas</i>, London,
+1857.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_27"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor27">[27]</a> "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom'
+gratified in England were not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but
+national jealousy and national vanity. We have long been smarting
+under the conceit of America--we are tired of hearing her boast
+that she is the freest and the most enlightened country that the
+world has ever seen. Our clergy hate her voluntary system--our
+Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hate her parvenus--our
+Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, and her ambition.
+All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from the enemy."
+Senior, <i>American Slavery</i>, p. 38.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_28"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor28">[28]</a> The reprint is without date, but the context
+shows the year to be 1857.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_29"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor29">[29]</a> For example the many British expressions
+quoted in reference to John Brown's raid, in <i>The Liberator</i>
+for February 10, 1860, and in succeeding issues.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_30"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor30">[30]</a> Senior, <i>American Slavery</i>, p.
+68.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35"></a>[V1:pg 35]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2>
+<h3>FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61.</h3>
+<br>
+<p>It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, that
+immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomatic
+controversies between England and America had largely been settled,
+and that England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly"
+yielded under American demands. This generalization, as applied to
+what were, after all, minor controversies, is in great measure
+true. In larger questions of policy, as regards spheres of
+influence or developing power, or principles of trade, there was
+difference, but no longer any essential opposition or declared
+rivalry<a name="FNanchor31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31">[31]</a>. In
+theories of government there was sharp divergence, clearly
+appreciated, however, only in governing-class Britain. This sense
+of divergence, even of a certain threat from America to British
+political institutions, united with an established opinion that
+slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforce
+governmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America.
+The British public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in the
+institution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest
+was waning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to
+a degree not true of any other two world-powers, were of the same
+race, had similar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in
+close touch at many points by the steady flow of British emigration
+to the United States.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36"></a>[V1:pg 36]</span>
+<p>When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in
+November, 1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered,
+the situation took both British Government and people by surprise.
+There was not any clear understanding either of American political
+conditions, or of the intensity of feeling now aroused over the
+question of the extension of slave territory. The most recent
+descriptions of America had agreed in assertion that at some future
+time there would take place, in all probability, a dissolution of
+the Union, on lines of diverging economic interests, but also
+stated that there was nothing in the American situation to indicate
+immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, a long-time resident
+in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will
+break the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But
+no man may foretell the period of dissolution.... The many
+restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation. The
+Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are invisible; and it
+seems wondrous that each limb does not act for itself independently
+of its fellows. A closer examination shows the nature of the
+network which keeps the members of this association so tightly
+bound. Any attempt to untangle the ties, more firmly fastens them.
+When any one State talks of separation, the others become
+spontaneously knotted together. When a section blusters about its
+particular rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to
+all. If a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes
+in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which there
+can be danger, there is also found the element of safety." Yet, he
+added, "All attempts to strengthen this federal government at the
+expense of the States' governments must be futile.... The federal
+government exists on sufferance only. Any State may at any time
+constitutionally withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually
+dissolve it<a name="FNanchor32"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_32">[32]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37"></a>[V1:pg 37]</span>
+<p>Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one
+Charles Mackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished
+British poet," who made the usual rapid tour of the principal
+cities of America in 1857-58, and as rapidly penned his
+impressions:</p>
+<blockquote>"Many persons in the United States talk of a
+dissolution of the Union, but few believe in it.... All this is
+mere bravado and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to
+all Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary.... There is
+no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions to
+which over-ardent politicians of the North and South sometimes give
+vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West,' as it is fondly
+called, is in the position even now to arbitrate between North and
+South, should the quarrel stretch beyond words, or should
+anti-slavery or any other question succeed in throwing any
+difference between them which it would take revolvers and rifles
+rather than speeches and votes to put an end to<a name=
+"FNanchor33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33">[33]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be
+regarded in England as a constant quarrel between North and South,
+but of no immediate danger to the Union. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_38"></a>[V1:pg 38]</span> Each outbreak of
+violent American controversy produced a British comment sympathetic
+with the North. The turmoil preceding and following the election of
+Lincoln in 1860, on the platform of "no extension of slavery," was
+very generally noted by the British press and public, as a sign
+favourable to the cause of anti-slavery, but with no understanding
+that Southern threat would at last be realized in definite action.
+Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May 15, 1862, to his American
+friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had the means of judging, the
+feeling here was at first <i>very decidedly</i> on the side of the
+North<a name="FNanchor34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34">[34]</a> ..."
+The British metropolitan press, in nearly every issue of which for
+at least two years after December, 1860, there appeared news items
+and editorial comment on the American crisis, was at first nearly
+unanimous in condemning the South<a name="FNanchor35"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_35">[35]</a>. The <i>Times</i>, with accustomed vigour,
+led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated:</p>
+<blockquote>"When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject
+of Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments it
+expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation, for the
+feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we see how
+entirely he narrows his opposition to the single point of the
+admission of Slavery into the Territories, we cannot help being
+forcibly struck by the absurdity of breaking up a vast and glorious
+confederacy like that of the United States from the dread and anger
+inspired by the election of such a man to the office of Chief
+Magistrate.... We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it
+[the election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad
+to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone which
+its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom, has been at
+length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a vast community of
+our own race has at <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_39"></a>[V1:pg 39]</span> length given an authoritative
+expression to sentiments which are entertained by everyone in this
+country. We trust to see the American Government employed in tasks
+more worthy of a State founded on the doctrines of liberty and
+equality than the invention of shifts and devices to perpetuate
+servitude; and we hear in this great protest of American freedom
+the tardy echo of those humane doctrines to which England has so
+long become a convert."</blockquote>
+<p>Other leading journals, though with less of patronizing
+self-complacency, struck the same note as the <i>Times</i>. The
+<i>Economist</i> attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the
+sympathies of the "lower orders" in the electorate who had now
+deserted their former leaders, the slave-owning aristocracy of the
+South, and allied themselves with the refined and wise leaders of
+the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not an extremist in any sense.
+His plan of action lay within the limits of statesmanlike
+moderation<a name="FNanchor36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36">[36]</a>.
+The <i>Saturday Review</i> was less sure that England should
+rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had suffered some hard
+blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but at least
+England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no more
+discourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The
+Republican party, however, had no policy, except that of its
+leader, Seward, and from him might be expected extreme
+insolence<a name="FNanchor37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37">[37]</a>.
+This was a very early judgment of Seward, and one upon which the
+<i>Saturday Review</i> preened itself later, as wholly justified.
+The <i>Spectator</i>, the only one of the four journals thus far
+considered which ultimately remained constant in advocacy of the
+Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment, regarding the
+1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as in reality a
+mere contest between parties for political power<a name=
+"FNanchor38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38">[38]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40"></a>[V1:pg 40]</span>
+<p>Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press
+issue for several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding
+varying notes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said
+the <i>Times</i>, it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred
+thousand slave-owners, trembling nightly with visions of murder and
+pillage, backed by a dissolute population of 'poor whites,' are no
+match for the hardy and resolute populations of the Free
+States<a name="FNanchor39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39">[39]</a>,"
+and if the South hoped for foreign aid it should be undeceived
+promptly: "Can any sane man believe that England and France will
+consent, as is now suggested, to stultify the policy of half a
+century for the sake of an extended cotton trade, and to purchase
+the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville by recognizing what has
+been called 'the isothermal law, which impels African labour toward
+the tropics' on the other side of the Atlantic<a name=
+"FNanchor40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40">[40]</a>?" Moreover all
+Americans ought to understand clearly that British respect for the
+United States "was not due to the attitude of the South with its
+ruffian demonstrations in Congress.... All that is noble and
+venerable in the United States is associated with its Federal
+Constitution<a name="FNanchor41"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_41">[41]</a>."</p>
+<p>Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no
+direct evidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography
+or letters upon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent
+on the struggle in America for the first few months and presumably
+public opinion, less informed even than the press, received its
+impressions from the journals customarily read. Both at this period
+and all through the war, also, it should be remembered, clearly,
+that most newspapers, all the reviews, in fact nearly all vehicles
+of British expression, were in the early 'sixties "in the hands of
+the educated classes, and these educated <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_41"></a>[V1:pg 41]</span> classes
+corresponded closely with the privileged classes." The more
+democratic element of British Society lacked any adequate press
+representation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by
+such comparatively crude methods as public meetings and
+demonstrations, but it was hampered in literary and political
+expression<a name="FNanchor42"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_42">[42]</a>." The opinion of the press was then,
+presumably, the opinion of the majority of the educated British
+public.</p>
+<p>Thus British comment on America took the form, at first of
+moralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet
+very generally asserting the essential justice of the Northern
+position. But it was early evident that the newspapers, one and
+all, were quite unprepared for the determined front soon put up by
+South Carolina and other Southern States. Surprised by the violence
+of Southern declarations, the only explanation found by the British
+press was that political control had been seized by the uneducated
+and lawless element. The <i>Times</i> characterized this element of
+the South as in a state of deplorable ignorance comparable with
+that of the Irish peasantry, a "poor, proud, lazy, excitable and
+violent class, ever ready with knife and revolver<a name=
+"FNanchor43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43">[43]</a>." The fate of the
+Union, according to the <i>Saturday Review</i>, was in the hands of
+the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, and most lawless [class] in
+the world--the poor or mean whites of the Slave States<a name=
+"FNanchor44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44">[44]</a>." Like judgments
+were expressed by the <i>Economist</i> and, more mildly, by the
+<i>Spectator</i><a name="FNanchor45"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_45">[45]</a>. Subsequently some of these journals found
+difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle to
+expressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of
+the South; but all, especially <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_42"></a>[V1:pg 42]</span> the <i>Times</i>, were skilled by
+long practice in the journalistic art of facing about while
+claiming perfect consistency. In denial of a Southern right of
+secession, also, they were nearly a unit<a name=
+"FNanchor46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46">[46]</a>, though the
+<i>Saturday Review</i> argued the case for the South, making a
+pointed parallel between the present situation and that of the
+American Colonies in seceding from England<a name=
+"FNanchor47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47">[47]</a>.</p>
+<p>The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an
+initial confusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the
+theory of an "enlightened press." The Reviews, by the conditions of
+publication, came into action more slowly and during 1860 there
+appeared but one article, in the <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, giving
+any adequate idea of what was really taking place in
+America<a name="FNanchor48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48">[48]</a>.
+The lesser British papers generally followed the tone of the
+leading journals, but without either great interest or much acumen.
+In truth the depth of British newspaper ignorance, considering
+their positiveness of utterance, appears utterly astonishing if
+regarded from the view-point of modern historical knowledge. But is
+this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there not equal
+confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself,
+certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They
+also had come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were
+slow to understand that the great conflict of ideals and interests
+was at last begun.</p>
+<p>The British press both influenced and reflected educated class
+opinion, and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John
+Russell at the Foreign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at
+Washington, were exchanging anxious letters, and the latter was
+sending home reports remarkable for their clear analysis of the
+American controversy. Yet even he was slow to appreciate the
+inevitability of secession.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image02.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image02.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image02.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>LORD LYONS</b><br>
+(<i>From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S.A., in 1860) (From Lord
+Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind permission</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43"></a>[V1:pg 43]</span>
+<p>Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the
+United States, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to
+that of the press. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a
+far-fetched view of causes, is supplied in a letter of February 2,
+1860, from Consul Bunch, at Charleston, S.C., to Lord Lyons, the
+British Minister at Washington<a name="FNanchor49"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_49">[49]</a>. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had
+been given the evening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston.
+Being called upon for a speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the
+Turf at home, and had referred especially to the Plates run for the
+various British colonies. Continuing, he said:</p>
+<blockquote>"'... I cannot help calling your attention to the great
+loss you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial
+Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had continued
+to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure in sending you
+some Plates too.'<br>
+<br>
+"Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke, calculated
+to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my amazement, the company
+chose to take me literally, and applauded for about ten minutes--in
+fact I could not go on for some time."</blockquote>
+<p>Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration.
+He could with difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be
+re-annexed as a colony of Great Britain, and comments upon the
+episode in a somewhat humorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his
+letter, he solemnly assures Lord Lyons that</p>
+<blockquote>"... The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people'
+of South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents,
+therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of universal
+suffrage."</blockquote>
+<p>It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in
+England there was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a
+resumption of colonial relations, though <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_44"></a>[V1:pg 44]</span> W.H. Russell,
+correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, reported in the spring, 1861,
+that he frequently heard the same sentiment in the South<a name=
+"FNanchor50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50">[50]</a>. For general
+official England, as for the press, the truth is that up to the
+time of the secession of South Carolina no one really believed that
+a final rupture was about to take place between North and South.
+When, on December 20, 1860, that State in solemn convention
+declared the dissolution "of the Union now existing between South
+Carolina and the other States, under the name of the 'United States
+of America,'" and when it was understood that other Southern States
+would soon follow this example, British opinion believed and hoped
+that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until it became
+clear that war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45"></a>[V1:pg
+45]</span> would ensue, the South was still damned by the press as
+seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery was even
+more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In the
+number for April, 1861, the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> attributed the
+whole difficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would
+be with the anti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the
+very dissolution of the Union would hasten the ultimate extinction
+of slavery since economic competition with a neighbouring free
+state, the North, would compel the South itself to abandon its
+beloved "domestic institution<a name="FNanchor51"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_51">[51]</a>."</p>
+<p>Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the <i>Times</i>,
+in a long and carefully worded editorial, took up one by one the
+alleged causes of secession, dismissed them as inadequate, and
+concluded, "... we cannot disguise from ourselves that, apart from
+all political complications, there is a right and a wrong in this
+question, and that the right belongs, with all its advantages, to
+the States of the North<a name="FNanchor52"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_52">[52]</a>." Three days later it asserted, "The North
+is for freedom of discussion, the South represses freedom of
+discussion with the tar-brush and the pine-fagot." And again, on
+January 10, "The Southern States expected sympathy for their
+undertaking from the public opinion of this country. The tone of
+the press has already done much to undeceive them...."</p>
+<p>In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press
+expressed similar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The
+<i>Dublin News</i> published with approval a long communication
+addressed to Irishmen at home and abroad: "... there is no power on
+earth or in heaven which can keep in peace this unholy
+co-partnership.... I hope ... that the North will quietly permit
+the South to retire from the confederacy and bear alone the odium
+of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46"></a>[V1:pg 46]</span>
+all mankind<a name="FNanchor53"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_53">[53]</a>...." The <i>Saturday Review</i> thought
+that deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social
+structure of the South which now visioned a re-opening of the
+African Slave Trade, and the occupation by slavery of the whole
+southern portion of North America. "A more ignoble basis for a
+great Confederacy it is impossible to conceive, nor one in the long
+run more precarious.... Assuredly it will be the Northern
+Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with a policy
+untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, that
+will be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the
+New World<a name="FNanchor54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54">[54]</a>."
+The <i>London Chronicle</i> was vigorous in denunciation. "No
+country on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or a
+treachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the
+new Southern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in
+itself<a name="FNanchor55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55">[55]</a>. The
+<i>London Review</i> more moderately stigmatized slavery as the
+cause, but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding
+the whole matter as one of diverging economic systems and in any
+case as inevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some
+time. The inevitable might as well come now as later and would
+result in benefit to both sections as well as to the world fearing
+the monstrous empire of power that had grown up in America<a name=
+"FNanchor56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56">[56]</a>.</p>
+<p>The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in
+truth, definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was
+particularly true of the provincial press. Garrison's
+<i>Liberator</i>, advocating extreme abolition action, had long
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47"></a>[V1:pg 47]</span> made
+a practice of presenting excerpts from British newspapers, speeches
+and sermons in support of its cause. In 1860 there were thirty-nine
+such citations; in the first months of 1861 many more, all
+condemning slavery and the South. For the most part these citations
+represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section, both
+in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnold
+was among the first of men of letters to record his faith that
+secession was final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the
+North, looking to the purity of race and the opportunity for
+unhampered advance<a name="FNanchor57"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_57">[57]</a>. If English writers were in any way
+influenced by their correspondents in the United States they may,
+indeed, have well been in doubt as to the origin and prospects of
+the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently at home again after
+seven years' consulship in England, was writing that abolition was
+not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittier wrote to
+<i>his</i> English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was the
+basic issue<a name="FNanchor58"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_58">[58]</a>. But literary Britain was slow to express
+itself save in the Reviews. These, representing varying shades of
+British upper-class opinion and presenting articles presumably more
+profound than the newspaper editorials, frequently offered more
+recondite origins of the American crisis. The <i>Quarterly
+Review</i>, organ of extreme Conservatism, in its first article,
+dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions, a topic not here
+treated at length since it will be dealt with in a separate chapter
+as deserving special study. The <i>Quarterly</i> is also the first
+to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated by
+the North, was a real cause for Southern secession<a name=
+"FNanchor59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59">[59]</a>; an idea made much
+of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_48"></a>[V1:pg 48]</span> but not hitherto
+advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, there was
+frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory.</p>
+<blockquote>"At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern
+planters did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country
+gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with him
+on the part of those in England who represented the old traditions
+of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman' theory, containing
+as it did an undeniable element of truth, is much harped upon by
+certain of the reviewers, and one can easily conceive of its
+popularity in the London Clubs.... The 'American,' so familiar to
+British readers, during the first half of the century, through the
+eyes of such travellers as Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee,'
+and is located north of Mason and Dixon's line<a name=
+"FNanchor60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60">[60]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of
+the Tory organs alone, and the Radical <i>Westminster</i> took
+pains to deny the truth of the picture, asserting again and again
+that the vital and sole cause of the conflict was slavery. Previous
+articles are summed up in that of October, 1863, as a profession of
+the <i>Westminster's</i> opinion throughout: "... the South are
+fighting for liberty to found a Slave Power. Should it prove
+successful, truer devil's work, if we may use the metaphor, will
+rarely have been done<a name="FNanchor61"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_61">[61]</a>."</p>
+<p>Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British
+opinion generally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had
+not soon found cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from
+the trend of events in America. Lincoln had been elected on a
+platform opposing the further territorial expansion of slavery. On
+that point the North was fairly well united. But the great majority
+of those who voted for Lincoln would have indignantly <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_49"></a>[V1:pg 49]</span> repudiated any
+purpose to take active steps toward the extinction of slavery where
+it already existed. Lincoln understood this perfectly, and whatever
+his opinion about the ultimate fate of slavery if prohibited
+expansion, he from the first took the ground that the terms of his
+election constituted a mandate limiting his action. As secession
+developed he rightly centred his thought and effort on the
+preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to the
+Presidency.</p>
+<p>Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at
+still another great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing
+President, Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until
+March 4, 1861, there were still some Southern leaders, like
+Jefferson Davis, seeking either a complete surrender to Southern
+will, or advantages for Southern security in case secession was
+accomplished. Buchanan appealed hysterically to the old-time love
+of the Union and to the spirit of compromise. Great congressional
+committees of both Senate and House of Representatives were formed
+seeking a solution. Crittenden for the border states between North
+and South, where, more than anywhere else, there was division of
+opinion, proposed pledges to be given to the South. Seward,
+long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was active in the
+Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended to conciliate
+by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler, in the
+House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republican
+colleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of
+slavery as then established<a name="FNanchor62"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_62">[62]</a>. A constitutional amendment was drafted to
+this effect and received Lincoln's preliminary <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_50"></a>[V1:pg 50]</span> approval. Finally
+Lincoln, in his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere
+with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I
+believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination
+to do so."</blockquote>
+<p>It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these
+efforts were observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began
+to replace the earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of
+slavery was at stake in America. This offered an easy excuse for a
+switch-about of sympathy as British commercial and other interests
+began to be developed, and even dismayed the ardent friends of the
+anti-slavery North. Meanwhile the Government of Great Britain, from
+the very first appearance of the cloud of civil war, had focused
+its attention on the point of what the events in America portended
+to British interests and policy. This is the business of
+governments, and their agents would be condemned as inefficient did
+they neglect it. But did British governmental policy go beyond this
+entirely justifiable first thought for immediate British interests
+to the point of positive hope that England would find an advantage
+in the breaking up of the great American Republic? American
+opinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of this
+offence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the
+Civil War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an
+unfriendly one because of his official position, made emphatic
+declaration to like effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow,
+Russian Ambassador at London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the
+English Government, at the bottom of its heart, desires the
+separation of North America into two republics, which will watch
+each other jealously and counterbalance one the other. Then
+England, on terms of peace and commerce with both, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_51"></a>[V1:pg 51]</span> would have
+nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them,
+restraining them by their rival ambitions<a name=
+"FNanchor63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63">[63]</a>."</p>
+<p>If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as
+to the springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of
+official and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no
+proof for such accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell,
+Foreign Secretary, nor Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington,
+reveal any animus against the United States. Considering his many
+personal ties with leaders of both factions Lyons, from the first,
+reported events with wonderful impartiality, and great clarity. On
+November 12, 1860, he sent to Russell a full description of the
+clamour raised in the South over the election of Lincoln,
+enumerated the resignation of Federal officials (calling these
+"ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that Lincoln was
+no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without damage to
+the Union<a name="FNanchor64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64">[64]</a>.
+Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct Lyons and the British
+consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather than the other,"
+and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless asked for by
+the State Governments, in which case the advice should be against
+all violent action as tending toward civil war<a name=
+"FNanchor65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65">[65]</a>.</p>
+<p>This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an
+eager readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the
+dissolution of the Union, but such an interpretation is not borne
+out by a reading of his instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and
+anxious that British agents should not gain the ill-will of either
+American faction, an ill-will that would be alike detrimental in
+the future, whether the Union remained unbroken or was
+destroyed.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52"></a>[V1:pg 52]</span>
+<p>Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore
+repeated frequently<a name="FNanchor66"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_66">[66]</a>. Meanwhile the first concrete problem
+requiring British action came from the seizure by South Carolina of
+the Federal customs house at the port of Charleston, and the
+attempt of the State authorities to collect port dues customarily
+paid to Federal officials. British shipowners appealed to Consul
+Bunch for instructions, he to Lyons, and the latter to the American
+Secretary of State, Judge Black. This was on December 31, 1860,
+while Buchanan was still President, and Black's answer was evasive,
+though asserting that the United States must technically regard the
+events in South Carolina as acts of violent rebellion<a name=
+"FNanchor67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67">[67]</a>. Black refused to
+state what action would be taken if Bunch advised British
+shipowners to pay, but a way out of the embarrassment was found by
+advising such payment to State authorities "under protest" as done
+"under compulsion." To one of his letters to Bunch on this topic,
+Lyons appended an expression indicative of his own early attitude.
+"The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pill which it will
+be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the Slave
+Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish British
+stomach will reject it<a name="FNanchor68"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_68">[68]</a>."</p>
+<p>Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon
+followed by other Southern States, made a deep impression on
+Russell, especially when compared with the uncertainty and
+irresolution manifested in the attempted compromise measures of
+Northern statesmen. In a private letter to Lyons, January 10, 1861,
+he wrote "I do not see how the United States can be cobbled
+together again by any compromise.... I cannot see any mode of
+reconciling such <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53"></a>[V1:pg
+53]</span> parties as these. The best thing <i>now</i> would be
+that the right to secede should be acknowledged.... I hope sensible
+men will take this view.... But above all I hope no force will be
+used<a name="FNanchor69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69">[69]</a>." And
+again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of the Union is
+now inevitable<a name="FNanchor70"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_70">[70]</a>." To Russell, as to most foreign observers,
+it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous
+extent of territory, and its five and one-half millions of
+population, were determined to leave the Union, no force whatever
+could compel a return. History failed to record any revolution on
+so large a scale which had not succeeded. His desire, therefore,
+was that the North would yield to the inevitable, and would not
+plunge into a useless civil war disastrous alike to the prosperity
+of America and of foreign nations. Russell's first hope was that
+the South would forgo secession; his second, this accomplished,
+that there would be no war, and in this sense he instructed Lyons.
+The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and more aware
+of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his entire
+service at Washington that there was at least a <i>chance</i> that
+the North could subdue the South by might of arms<a name=
+"FNanchor71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71">[71]</a>, but he also,
+looking to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke,
+in cautious suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from
+January to March, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_54"></a>[V1:pg 54]</span> 1861, British effort and indirect
+advice were based on the hope that British trade interests might
+escape the tribulations inevitable from a civil conflict in
+America. Beyond that point there was no grasp of the complications
+likely to arise in case of war, and no clear formulation of British
+policy<a name="FNanchor72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72">[72]</a>.</p>
+<p>In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and
+official British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any
+determined Northern effort to recover the South. Early British
+attitude was, therefore, based on a misconception. As this became
+clear, public opinion began to break from a united humanitarian
+pro-Northern sentiment and to show, in some quarters, quite another
+face. Even as early as January the <i>Economist</i> expressed
+wonder that the Northern States had not availed themselves gladly
+of the chance to "shake off such an incubus, and to purify
+themselves of such a stain<a name="FNanchor73"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_73">[73]</a>." and a month later professed to believe
+that Great Britain would willingly permit the North to secure
+compensation for loss of territory by annexing Canada--provided the
+Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was argued, would
+directly benefit England herself by cutting down military
+expenditures<a name="FNanchor74"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_74">[74]</a>. The <i>London Press</i> indulged in
+similar speculation, though from the angle of a Canadian annexation
+of the Northern States, whose more sober citizens must by now be
+weary of the sham of American democracy, and disgusted with the
+rowdyism of political elections, which "combine the morals of a
+horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the passions of a tap-room,
+and the emotions of a gambling <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_55"></a>[V1:pg 55]</span> house<a name=
+"FNanchor75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75">[75]</a>." Probably such
+suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the moment, but
+it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in Canada
+should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the
+same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles
+Sumner held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the
+face of the growing Northern determination to preserve the Union.
+It lay at the bottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old
+friend Charles Francis Adams, now busy in schemes intended,
+apparently, to restore the Union by compromise, and it led Sumner
+to hope for appointment as Minister to England<a name=
+"FNanchor76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76">[76]</a>.</p>
+<p>The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the
+<i>Times</i>, was one of the first to begin the process of "face
+about," as civil war in America seemed imminent<a name=
+"FNanchor77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77">[77]</a>. Viewed from the
+later attitude of the <i>Times</i>, the earlier expressions of that
+paper, and in truth of many British journals, seem merely the
+customary platitudinous British holding up of horrified hands at
+American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strong editorial still
+proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting "without law,
+without justice," but displayed a real dismay at the possible
+consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January 22,
+the <i>Times</i> reprinted an article from the <i>Economist</i>, on
+a probable cessation of cotton supply and editorially professed
+great alarm, even advocating an early recognition of the Southern
+confederacy if needed to maintain that supply. From this time on
+there <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56"></a>[V1:pg 56]</span>
+is no further note in the <i>Times</i> of the righteousness of the
+Northern cause; but while it is still asserted that war would be
+folly, the strength of the South, its superiority as a military
+nation, are depicted.</p>
+<p>A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial
+comment. Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written
+by Bancroft Davis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause,
+was discontinued. W.H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the
+Crimea, was summoned to London and, according to his own story,
+upon being given papers, clippings, and correspondence (largely
+articles from the <i>New York Herald</i>) supporting the right of
+the South to secede, hastily took his departure for America to
+report upon the situation<a name="FNanchor78"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_78">[78]</a>. He sailed from Queenstown on March 3, and
+arrived in New York on March 16. At last on March 12, the
+<i>Times</i> took positive ground in favour of the justice of the
+Southern cause.</p>
+<blockquote>"No treachery has been at work to produce the
+disruption, and the principles avowed are such as to command the
+sympathies of every free and enlightened people. Such are the
+widely different auspices under which the two rival Republics start
+into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these things
+by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly swayed by their
+own interest, and the two Republics must be weighed, not by their
+professions or their previous history, but by the conduct they
+pursue and the position they maintain among the Powers of the
+earth. Their internal institutions are their own affair; their
+financial and political arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil
+is a slave-holding Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct
+it has contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy
+of nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free from
+this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy of America
+evinces a determination to act in a narrow, exclusive, and unsocial
+spirit, while its Southern competitor <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_57"></a>[V1:pg 57]</span> extends the hand
+of good fellowship to all mankind, with the exception of its own
+bondsmen, we must not be surprised to see the North, in spite of
+the goodness of its cause and the great negative merit of the
+absence of Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the
+sympathy and regard of mankind."</blockquote>
+<p>This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral
+tone earlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that
+England would not "stultify the policy of half a century for the
+sake of an extended cotton trade<a name="FNanchor79"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_79">[79]</a>."</p>
+<p>The <i>Economist</i>, with more consistency, still reported the
+violence and recklessness of the South, yet in logical argument
+proved to its own satisfaction the impossibility of Northern
+reconquest, and urged a peaceful separation<a name=
+"FNanchor80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80">[80]</a>. The
+<i>Spectator</i>, even though pro-Northern, had at first small hope
+of reunion by force, and offered consolation in the thought that
+there would still remain a United States of America "strong,
+powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the Black
+South<a name="FNanchor81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81">[81]</a>." In
+short from all quarters the public press, whatever its sympathy,
+united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failure if
+undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion,
+however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was
+indeed more slow to make up its mind and more considerate in
+expressing itself. When it became clear that in all probability the
+North would fight, there was still no conception, any more than in
+the United States itself, of the duration and intensity of the
+conflict. Indeed, Russell yet hoped, as late as the end of January,
+that no protracted war would occur. Nevertheless he was compelled
+to face the situation in its relation to British commerce.</p>
+<p>On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of
+possible war which would at once call for a determination
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58"></a>[V1:pg 58]</span> of
+British policy. "Above all things," he wrote, "endeavour to prevent
+a blockade of the Southern coast. It would produce misery, discord,
+and enmity incalculable<a name="FNanchor82"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_82">[82]</a>." Within a week Forster, a thorough friend
+of the North throughout the whole war, was interrogating the
+Ministry in the House of Commons in regard to the situation at
+Charleston, and expressing the hope that England would not in any
+way attempt to interfere<a name="FNanchor83"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_83">[83]</a>. This was the first reference in
+Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the long vacation,
+to the American conflict, but British commercial interests were
+being forced to a keener attention, and already men in many circles
+were asking themselves what should be the proper governmental
+attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could justly claim
+European recognition; how far and how fast European governments
+ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be the
+proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a
+declaration of neutrality ought to be issued.</p>
+<p>With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became
+important for British statesmen to know something about the leaders
+in this new Southern movement, the attitude of the people in
+general, and the purposes of the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_59"></a>[V1:pg 59]</span> new Government. Here,
+unfortunately, Lord Lyons could be no guide. The consuls in the
+South, however, were in a position to give their impressions. On
+February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell, describing the election
+of Davis and Stephens<a name="FNanchor84"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_84">[84]</a>, to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of
+the Confederacy, and giving a personal characterization of many
+members of the Government. He was rather caustic. Davis, he said,
+was the only <i>able</i> man, and he, unfortunately, was a
+confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunch
+prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had
+acquiesced in a Southern State and the fear of the North had
+passed. Bunch had no faith in any future greatness of the South,
+asserting that it would be a State despised among nations for its
+maintenance of slavery, and that it could not hope for any
+encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations of Europe; in
+fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to the South.
+Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned that
+the South had already actually established its independence. This
+he seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter,
+there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to
+the Civil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity
+long preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and
+her certainty that a new State was being born.</p>
+<p>For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to
+report, but up to the end of January he had not written in any
+great detail with regard to the new administration and its make-up,
+though on January 7, he had informed Russell that Seward would be
+the Secretary of State and had expressed the fear that with regard
+to Great Britain he would be "a dangerous Foreign Minister<a name=
+"FNanchor85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85">[85]</a>." Lincoln was
+still in Illinois and the constituency of the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_60"></a>[V1:pg 60]</span> Cabinet was yet
+uncertain, but Seward's voice was sure to be a powerful one.
+Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to talk with him. On
+February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell, Lyons reported
+at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter had
+expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was
+but superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon
+prevail<a name="FNanchor86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86">[86]</a>. In
+a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons asserted that
+Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary of State.
+He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to
+protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in
+order to resist such interference<a name="FNanchor87"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_87">[87]</a>. Again, on February 12, while himself
+expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties
+in America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would
+solve these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign
+governments refused to acknowledge a United States declaration
+without formal blockade closing the Southern ports<a name=
+"FNanchor88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88">[88]</a>. Writing
+privately, Lyons exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's
+attitude and suggested that the best safeguard would be close union
+by England and France, for if these two governments took exactly
+the same stand in regard to trade, Seward would hardly dare to
+carry out his threat<a name="FNanchor89"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_89">[89]</a>.</p>
+<p>Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an
+instruction in which it was repeated that advice to either party
+should be withheld and a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and
+Russell concluded by an assertion that if the United States
+attempted a jingo policy toward England, the British Cabinet would
+be tolerant because of its feeling of strength but that "blustering
+demonstrations" must <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_61"></a>[V1:pg 61]</span> not be carried too far<a name=
+"FNanchor90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90">[90]</a>. Even as early as
+December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the possibility of what he
+considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in America. Now,
+however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons that this
+might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct Lyons
+not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same
+time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American
+antagonism. Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have
+passed away for a time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone
+was waiting to see what Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that
+there was still hope of compromise, and that in his own view this
+was still possible. In this letter the tone is more important than
+the matter, and so far as Lyons is concerned the tone is all
+distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a resumption of normal
+relations between the North and South. He at least had no hope of
+disruption, and no happiness in it<a name="FNanchor91"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_91">[91]</a>.</p>
+<p>Before this communication could reach England Russell had
+thoroughly awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in
+relation to British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to
+Lyons, he stated, "I hope you are <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_62"></a>[V1:pg 62]</span> getting on well with the new
+President. If he blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a
+difficulty. But according to all American doctrine it must be an
+actual blockade kept up by an efficient force<a name=
+"FNanchor92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92">[92]</a>." Thus, before any
+act had really occurred in America, the matter of a blockade was
+occupying the attention of British statesmen. One difficulty at the
+time was that there was no one in England qualified to speak for
+the new administration at Washington. Dallas, the American Minister
+appointed under the Buchanan administration, while, unlike some
+other diplomatic representatives abroad, faithful to the cause of
+the United States, was nevertheless not wholly trusted by Lincoln
+or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in representing to Russell
+American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had very little
+communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England was known
+to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell,
+"Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister
+in London. I think it a very good appointment<a name=
+"FNanchor93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93">[93]</a>." This news was
+received in London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to
+elapse before Adams reached his post. The appointment of Adams,
+however, seemed to Lyons a matter of congratulation in his hope
+that no vicious anti-British policy would be indulged in by Seward.
+Ten days after his telegram, he wrote at length to Russell, making
+an excellent statement and analysis in regard to the character of
+Adams.</p>
+<blockquote>"Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. of
+the U.S., and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The grandfather
+was the first Am. minister in England. The father was one of the
+Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the Convention of the 3rd
+July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of the H. of R. for one of the
+districts of Mass., acted with the less violent section of the
+'Republican' Party. During the last session of Congress he made a
+very <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63"></a>[V1:pg 63]</span>
+remarkable speech on the state of the Union, denying the
+reasonableness of the complaints of the Southern States, but
+stating his desire that every concession not inconsistent with
+honour and principle should be made to them. He is considered to be
+a man of great independence of character, and has the reputation of
+being very tenacious of his own opinions. In manner he is quiet and
+unassuming. He is a man of good fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a
+considerable family in Mass., of the name of Brooks. The late wife
+of Mr. Edward Everett, who, as your L. is aware, has held the
+offices of Minister in London and Secretary of State, was her
+sister<a name="FNanchor94"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_94">[94]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the
+same time by Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now
+being despatched to London, but they were not so favourable. Mann,
+wrote Bunch, was the son of a "bankrupt grocer." His personal
+character was "not good," yet he alone of the three Commissioners
+appointed had had diplomatic experience. Yancey, it was stated, was
+an able lawyer, a stirring orator, and a recognized leader of the
+secession movement, but he was also extremely pro-slavery in his
+views, had expressed himself in favour of a renewal of the slave
+trade, and throughout his career had been a "manifest destiny" man.
+Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusion Bunch described the
+extreme confidence expressed in the South in "King Cotton," and in
+rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern Commissioners
+thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be compelled to
+bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get
+cotton<a name="FNanchor95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95">[95]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an
+astonishingly pro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald,
+consul at New York, wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter,
+an exceedingly strong statement of his <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_64"></a>[V1:pg 64]</span> faith in the
+power of the North and its fixed and unalterable determination to
+force the South back into the Union, his confidence in Northern
+success, and his belief in the justice of the Northern cause. He
+ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to pursue, viz.,
+to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly and
+clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did not
+feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such a
+consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for the
+North as would help in shortening the war<a name=
+"FNanchor96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96">[96]</a>. The British
+Consul at Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far,
+indeed, did these men go in expressing their sympathy with the
+North, that Lyons, on April 27, commented to Russell that these
+consuls had "taken the Northern War Fever," and that he had mildly
+reproved Archibald<a name="FNanchor97"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_97">[97]</a>.</p>
+<p>With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the
+installation of Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for
+Lyons to become more active in his efforts to prevent a disruption
+of British Trade. On March 20 he told Seward in a confidential
+conversation:</p>
+<blockquote>"... If the United States determined to stop by force
+so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the
+cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might
+happen.<br>
+<br>
+"... It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to
+England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were to
+take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at
+the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an immense pressure
+would be put upon Her Majesty's Government to use all the means in
+their power to open those ports. If Her Majesty's Government felt
+it to be their duty to do so, they would naturally endeavour to
+effect their object in a manner as consistent as possible, first
+with their friendly feelings towards both Sections of this Country,
+and secondly with <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_65"></a>[V1:pg 65]</span> the recognized principles of
+International Law. As regards the latter point in particular, it
+certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the only way, would
+be to recognize the Southern Confederacy<a name=
+"FNanchor98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98">[98]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the
+South did not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five
+days later, on March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number
+of the foreign Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about
+seizing any and all ships that tried to trade with the South, even
+if there was no blockade, made Lyons very anxious. As a host he
+diverted the conversation lest it become too acrimonious, but he
+himself told Seward</p>
+<blockquote>"... that it was really a matter so very serious that I
+was unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount
+in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast
+comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an
+enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase the
+gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in the dilemma
+of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of submitting to the
+interruption of their commerce<a name="FNanchor99"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_99">[99]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the
+Southern Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they
+be treated well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his
+folly. Still Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be
+so vigorous as his language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he
+wrote that "prudent counsels" were in the ascendant, that there
+would be no interference with trade "<i>at present</i>," and that a
+quieter tone was everywhere perceptible in Washington<a name=
+"FNanchor100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100">[100]</a>.</p>
+<p>From the point of view of the British Minister at <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_66"></a>[V1:pg 66]</span> Washington, the
+danger spot in relations between the United States and Great
+Britain lay in this matter of interference with trade to Southern
+ports. Naturally, and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that
+trade. At first, indeed, he seems to have thought that even though
+a civil war really ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted.
+Certainly he bore hard and constantly on this one point, seeking to
+influence not only officials at Washington but the public press.
+Thus, in a letter to Bunch dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he
+knew that W.H. Russell, the <i>Times</i> correspondent, would
+shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed Bunch to remember that
+in talking to Russell he must especially impress him with the idea
+that any interruption of trade might and probably would result in a
+British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, "... the <i>only</i>
+chance, if chance there still be of preventing an interruption of
+the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained here, that
+it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.<a name=
+"FNanchor101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101">[101]</a>" In these words
+is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the
+fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade
+rather than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result
+in a British recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen,
+when the blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause
+for recognition and was most tolerant of its early
+ineffectiveness.</p>
+<p>While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the
+relations between England and America at London were exceedingly
+meagre. All that the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's
+intentions is summed up in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and
+April 9, 1861<a name="FNanchor102"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_102">[102]</a>. On the former date, he gave an account
+of an interview with Russell in which the latter simply refused to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67"></a>[V1:pg 67]</span>
+pledge himself against a recognition of the Confederacy; in the
+latter, presenting a long memorial written by Seward to all of the
+larger European Governments arguing in friendly spirit the cause of
+the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell merely a
+general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the United
+States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful solution.
+Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English
+policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be
+better for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any
+definite action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though
+the latter later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There
+is no doubt, however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say
+to Dallas, the separation in America was an accomplished fact and
+the hope of Great Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful
+separation.</p>
+<p>Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting
+that no definite stand was yet being taken by the American
+Government. At the same time Russell was continuing his
+instructions to Lyons to recommend conciliation "but never to
+obtrude advice unasked<a name="FNanchor103"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_103">[103]</a>." Yet Russell was not wholly undisturbed
+by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a private
+letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to Lyons, "I
+rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us through
+the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr. Seward
+must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the
+Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a
+proper distance<a name="FNanchor104"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_104">[104]</a>." It is an interesting query, whether
+this fear thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct
+benefit to the United States at the moment when the Southern
+Commissioners <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68"></a>[V1:pg
+68]</span> arrived in England. The inference would seem to be
+clear, that in spite of Lyons' advice to treat them well, the
+effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude was to treat them coolly.
+Russell was indeed distinctly worried by Seward's unfriendly
+attitude.</p>
+<p>In the meantime the British press and public, while still
+uncertain and divided as to the merits of the conflict were now
+substantially a unit in accepting separation as final. The
+<i>Times</i>, with judicial ponderosity declared: "The new
+nationality has been brought forth after a very short period of
+gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted
+themselves a nation<a name="FNanchor105"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_105">[105]</a> ..." At the other end of the scale in
+newspaper "tone," the <i>London Press</i> jeered at the Northern
+American eagle as having "had his tail pulled out and his wings
+clipped--yet the meek bird now holds out his claws to be pared,
+with a resignation that would be degrading in the most henpecked of
+domestic fowls<a name="FNanchor106"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_106">[106]</a>." Having now veered about to expressions
+of confidence in the permanency of the Southern Confederacy the
+<i>Times</i> was also compelled to alter its opinion of Southern
+Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate
+Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far
+superior to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to
+resist making the customary reference to manners traditionally
+American;</p>
+<blockquote>"With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain
+from quoting the <i>na&iuml;ve</i> testimony of a visitor in its
+favour. 'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in
+Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such
+industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant Congressional
+action. <i>Not one member has appeared in his seat under the
+influence of liquors or wines</i>, not a harsh word <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_69"></a>[V1:pg 69]</span> has been uttered
+in debate, and all exhibit the most unflagging energy and
+determination<a name="FNanchor107"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_107">[107]</a>.'"</blockquote>
+<p>The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the
+<i>Times</i>, forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the
+control of "ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike
+directness and sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the
+stupidity of the North, displayed in its tariff policy<a name=
+"FNanchor108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108">[108]</a>. A few journals
+thought that the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle
+but that such a victory would be disastrous to the principles of
+federalism<a name="FNanchor109"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_109">[109]</a>, and, in any case, that this civil war
+was one without "a noble cause to sustain either side<a name=
+"FNanchor110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110">[110]</a>." By May nearly
+all the older journals were aligned on the right of the South to
+secede, and on the fact of a successful secession, though still
+differing as to the basic causes and essential justice involved. In
+this same month, however, there emerged a few vigorous champions of
+the Northern cause and prospects. In April the <i>Spectator</i>
+agreed that the Great Republic was at an end<a name=
+"FNanchor111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111">[111]</a>; in May it
+urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of
+ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of
+all European nations<a name="FNanchor112"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_112">[112]</a>. A small newspaper of limited
+circulation, the <i>Morning Star</i>, organ of John Bright, had
+from the first championed the Northern cause. Now, as the armed
+conflict broke in America, it was joined by a more important paper,
+the <i>Daily News</i>, which set itself the task of controverting
+the <i>Times</i>. Moreover the <i>Daily News</i> was all the more
+influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet
+consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause
+and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70"></a>[V1:pg 70]</span>
+principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling
+for a low price, twopence-halfpenny, the <i>Daily News</i>, like
+the <i>Westminster</i> among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and
+more popular constituency than the older publications, especially
+to a constituency not yet vocal, since still unrepresented, in
+Parliament<a name="FNanchor113"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_113">[113]</a>.</p>
+<p>The <i>Daily News</i> was fortunate in having, after 1862, the
+best-informed New York correspondent writing to the London press.
+This was an Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in
+America, was the intimate friend of literary men, and himself,
+later, a great moulder of public opinion<a name=
+"FNanchor114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114">[114]</a>. Harriet
+Martineau further aided the <i>Daily News</i> by contributing
+pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical circles<a name=
+"FNanchor115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115">[115]</a>. But literary
+England in general, was slow to express itself with conviction,
+though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was firmly determined in
+his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was writing in letters of
+the "good cause<a name="FNanchor116"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_116">[116]</a>." But Browning was a rare exception and
+it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many months
+that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make
+comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was
+negligible<a name="FNanchor117"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_117">[117]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71"></a>[V1:pg 71]</span>
+<p>In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike
+indicative of a widespread conviction that Southern independence
+was assured, there still remained both in those circles where
+anti-slavery sentiment was strong, and in others more neutral in
+sympathy, a distaste for the newly-born State as the embodiment of
+a degrading institution. Lincoln's inaugural address denying an
+intention to interfere with slavery was a weapon for the friends of
+the South, but it could not wholly still that issue. Even in the
+<i>Times</i>, through the medium of W.H. Russell's descriptive
+letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his
+"Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and
+perfect the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the
+more hateful and odious does slavery become<a name=
+"FNanchor118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118">[118]</a>," and in his
+letter of May 8, from Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale
+of slaves he stated:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor
+negro worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill
+through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar with the
+fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as absolutely the
+owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew, flesh and brains as of
+the horse which stood by my side. There was no sophistry which
+could persuade me the man was not a man--he was, indeed, by no
+means my brother, but assuredly he was a fellow creature<a name=
+"FNanchor119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119">[119]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was hard printing for the <i>Times</i>, in its new advocacy
+of the South, and Russell's description was made much of by the
+<i>Westminster Review</i> and other publications that soon began to
+sound again the "issue" of slavery<a name=
+"FNanchor120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120">[120]</a>. Yet the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72"></a>[V1:pg 72]</span>
+<i>Westminster</i> itself in the same article decried the folly of
+the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also thought even John
+Bright at the moment, when expressing himself privately to friends
+in America<a name="FNanchor121"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_121">[121]</a>.</p>
+<p>Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British
+public, but of what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world
+State were in fact born? And if a State in power, why not give it
+prompt recognition? The extreme British anti-slavery opponents
+feared that this was just what the Government was inclined to do,
+and with promptness. Here and there meetings were hurriedly called
+to protest against recognition<a name="FNanchor122"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_122">[122]</a>. This fear was unfounded. Neither in
+London nor at Washington was there any official inclination to
+hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward the logic of such
+action, if British trade were illegally interfered with. By April 9
+Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the Cabinet
+would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer be
+attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to
+follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in
+Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would <i>not</i>
+interfere to protect its trade that they were willing to venture
+any act embarrassing to that trade. He himself was still insisting,
+but with dwindling confidence, that the trade must not be
+interfered with under any circumstances. And in a second letter of
+this same date, he repeated to Russell his advice of treating the
+Southern Commissioners with deference. Any rebuff to them, he
+asserts again, will but increase the Northern confidence that they
+may do anything without provoking the resistance of England<a name=
+"FNanchor123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123">[123]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73"></a>[V1:pg 73]</span>
+<p>Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for
+all it was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet
+if that injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of
+nations) he did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant
+precipitate action by Great Britain. When indeed the Southern
+capture of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour finally brought the
+actual clash of arms, Lyons expressed himself with regard to other
+elements in the struggle previously neglected in his
+correspondence. On April 15 describing to Russell the fall of
+Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun. The North he
+believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the South
+more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of
+slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the
+civilized world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the
+cotton States is of vital importance to manufacturing
+nations<a name="FNanchor124"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_124">[124]</a>...." but Lyons was now facing an actual
+situation rather than a possible one, and as will be seen later, he
+soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this "commercial
+intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of the
+South.</p>
+<p>With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a
+civil war was actually under way in America, a large number of new
+and vexing problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them
+furnishes the subject matter of later chapters. For the period
+previous to April, 1861, British official attitude may be summed up
+in the statement that the British Minister at Washington hoped
+against hope that some solution might be found for the preservation
+of the Union, but that at the same time, looking to future British
+interests and possibly believing also that his attitude would tend
+to preserve the Union, he asserted vehemently the impossibility of
+any Northern interference with British trade to Southern ports.
+Across <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74"></a>[V1:pg
+74]</span> the water, Russell also hoped faintly that there might
+be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that separation
+inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed his hope
+on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this, however,
+he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else in
+England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a
+long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering
+the arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new,
+independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the
+future is no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of
+British governmental pleasure in American disruption was
+justified<a name="FNanchor125"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_125">[125]</a>. Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge
+himself to Dallas, was using exactly such caution as a Foreign
+Secretary was bound to exercise. He would have been a rash man who,
+in view of the uncertainty and irresolution of Northern statesmen,
+would have committed Great Britain in March, 1861, to a definite
+line of policy.</p>
+<p>On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend
+reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an
+instruction from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of
+"traditional friendship" against a British recognition of the
+Confederacy. Russell again refused to pledge his Government, but on
+April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British Ministers were "in no hurry
+to recognize the separation as complete and final<a name=
+"FNanchor126"></a><a href="#Footnote_126">[126]</a>." In the early
+morning of that same day the armed conflict in America had begun,
+and on the day following, April 13, the first Southern victory had
+been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The important question
+which the man at the head of the British Foreign Office had now
+immediately to decide was, what was to be England's attitude, under
+international <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75"></a>[V1:pg
+75]</span> law, toward the two combatants in America. In deciding
+this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of morality, nor
+humanitarianism need play any part; England's <i>first</i> need and
+duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens
+the correct position, under International law, which must be
+assumed in the presence of certain definite facts.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_31"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor31">[31]</a> Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the
+'fifties Great Britain made a sharp change of policy. (<i>Cambridge
+History of British Foreign Policy</i>, Vol. II, p.
+283.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_32"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor32">[32]</a> Thomas Colley Grattan, <i>Civilized
+America</i>, 2 vols. 2nd ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The
+first edition was printed in 1859 and a third in 1861. In some
+respects the work is historically untrustworthy since internal
+evidence makes clear that the greater part of it was written before
+1846, in which year Grattan retired from his post in Boston. In
+general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his son succeeded to
+the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it wiser to
+postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which
+treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This
+fact and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work
+importance as influencing British knowledge and
+opinions.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_33"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor33">[33]</a> Charles Mackay, <i>Life and Liberty in
+America: or, Sketches of a Tour in the United States and Canada in
+1857-8</i>, one vol., New York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at
+least of sufficient repute as a poet to be thought worthy of a
+dinner in Boston at which there were present, Longfellow, Holmes,
+Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks, and others. He preached
+"hands across the seas" in his public lectures, occasionally
+reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance copy of
+Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding
+verse, "John" speaking, was:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"And I have strength for nobler work<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;Than e'er my hand has done,<br>
+And realms to rule and truths to plant<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;Beyond the rising sun.<br>
+Take you the West and I the East;<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;We'll spread ourselves abroad,<br>
+With trade and spade and wholesome laws,<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;And faith in man and God."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_34"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor34">[34]</a> Duncan, <i>Life and Letters of Herbert
+Spencer</i>, Vol. I, p. 140.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_35"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor35">[35]</a> R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes
+on "The English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work
+on this subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford
+University before completing his thesis. His notes have been of
+considerable value, both for suggested citations from the English
+Press, and for points of interpretation.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_36"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor36">[36]</a> <i>Economist</i>, November 24, 1860. Six
+months later, however, the <i>Economist</i> pictured Lincoln as
+merely an unknown "sectionalist," with no evidence of
+statesmanship--<i>Economist</i>, June 1, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_37"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor37">[37]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, November 24,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_38"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor38">[38]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, November 24,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_39"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor39">[39]</a> The <i>Times</i>, November 26,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_40"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor40">[40]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, November 29,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_41"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor41">[41]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_42"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor42">[42]</a> R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular
+Opinion on the American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in
+fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts,
+Stanford University, 1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a
+valuable study of the Reviews and of the writings of men of
+letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus "English Opinion."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_43"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor43">[43]</a> The <i>Times</i>, January 12,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_44"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor44">[44]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, January 12,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_45"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor45">[45]</a> <i>Economist</i>, December 8, 1860.
+<i>Spectator</i>, January 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_46"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor46">[46]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, December 1, 1860.
+<i>Times</i>, January 29, 1861. <i>Economist</i>, May 25,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_47"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor47">[47]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, January 19,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_48"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor48">[48]</a> <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, Vol. 112, p.
+545.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_49"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor49">[49]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_50"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor50">[50]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary North and South</i>,
+Boston, 1863, p. 134. "Then cropped out again the expression of
+regret for the rebellion of 1776, and the desire that if it came to
+the worst, England would receive back her erring children, or give
+them a prince under whom they could secure a monarchical form of
+government. There is no doubt about the earnestness with which
+these things are said." Russell's <i>Diary</i> is largely a
+condensation of his letters to the <i>Times</i>. In the letter of
+April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a
+column on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of
+colonial relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported
+a Charleston sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club
+in February. He wrote to Lyons:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration
+of a<br>
+newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the<br>
+<i>nefastus ille dies</i> in which the bloody Britishers left<br>
+Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for<br>
+about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos
+<i>de</i><br>
+nothing at all."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic
+demonstration. Returning to his home one evening, he met a military
+company, which from curiosity he followed, and which<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of
+my<br>
+friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium<br>
+of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto<br>
+Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very<br>
+brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life<br>
+an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded,<br>
+to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr.<br>
+Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the<br>
+amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (<i>dia<br>
+stomatos</i>) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back<br>
+into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a<br>
+blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy<br>
+that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over<br>
+the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to<br>
+the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit<br>
+on the floor."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the
+British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than
+the clamour of the orator, that offended him? (<i>Lyons
+Papers</i>.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_51"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor51">[51]</a> <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, Vol. 113, p.
+555.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_52"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor52">[52]</a> The <i>Times</i>, January 4,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_53"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor53">[53]</a> Letter to <i>Dublin News</i>, dated January
+26, 1861. Cited in <i>The Liberator</i>, March 1, 1861. Garrison,
+editor of <i>The Liberator</i>, was then earnest in advocating
+"letting the South go in peace" as a good riddance.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_54"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor54">[54]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, March 2, 1861, p.
+216.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_55"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor55">[55]</a> <i>London Chronicle</i>, March 14, 1861.
+Cited in <i>The Liberator</i>, April 12, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_56"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor56">[56]</a> <i>London Review</i>, April 20, 1861. Cited
+in Littel's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the
+<i>Review</i> was a Dr. Mackay, but I have been unable to identify
+him, as might seem natural from his opinions, as the Mackay
+previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York correspondent of
+the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_57"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor57">[57]</a> Matthew Arnold, <i>Letters</i>, Vol. I., p.
+150. Letter to Mrs. Forster, January 28, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_58"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor58">[58]</a> Julian Hawthorne, <i>Nathaniel Hawthorne and
+his Wife</i>, Vol. II, pp. 271-78. <i>Life and Letters of John
+Greenleaf Whittier</i>, Vol. II, pp. 439 seq.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_59"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor59">[59]</a> <i>Quarterly Review</i>, Vol. 110, p. 282.
+July, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_60"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor60">[60]</a> Duffus, "English Opinion," p.
+7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_61"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor61">[61]</a> <i>Westminster</i>, Vol. LXXX, p.
+587.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_62"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor62">[62]</a> Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his
+former intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of
+Adams was, foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so
+strongly the arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create
+greater unity of Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could
+not be declared and both at home and abroad his action, and that of
+other former anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith
+that the North was in earnest on the general issue of
+slavery.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_63"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor63">[63]</a> <i>Services rendered by Russia to the
+American People during the War of the Rebellion</i>, Petersburg,
+1904, p. 5.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_64"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor64">[64]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States," No. 1.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_65"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor65">[65]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 6. Russell to Lyons,
+December 26, 1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_66"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor66">[66]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, No. 9,
+January 5, 1861, and No. 17, February 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_67"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor67">[67]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1861,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XVIII. Correspondence with U.S. Government
+respecting suspension of Federal Customs House at the Port of
+Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_68"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor68">[68]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_69"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor69">[69]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, The same day official
+instructions were sent permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston,
+but directing him, if asked to recognize South Carolina, to refer
+the matter to England. F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to
+Lyons, January 10, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_70"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor70">[70]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_71"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor71">[71]</a> This view was not shared by Lyons'
+colleagues at Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early
+declared the Union permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact,
+yet hoped the North would soon accept the inevitable and seek close
+co-operation with the South in commerce and in foreign relations.
+This view was repeated by him many times and most emphatically as
+late as the first month of 1863. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to
+F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No. 342.) It was not until
+September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope for a Northern
+reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A. Golder, of
+Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts
+covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the
+United States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this
+material the English translation is mine.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_72"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor72">[72]</a> Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with
+Lyons, at which he, Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had
+asserted that if Civil War came all foreign commerce with the South
+would be interrupted. To this Lyons protested that England could
+not get along without cotton and that she would secure it in one
+way or another. Seward made no reply. (<i>Ibid.</i>, March 25-April
+9, 1861, No. 810.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_73"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor73">[73]</a> <i>Economist</i>, January 12,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_74"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor74">[74]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, February 23,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_75"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor75">[75]</a> <i>London Press</i>, March 23, 1861. Cited
+in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_76"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor76">[76]</a> Before Adams' selection as Minister to
+England was decided upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were
+urging him for the place. Longfellow was active in this interest.
+<i>H.W. Longfellow</i>, by Samuel Longfellow, Vol. II, pp.
+412-13.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_77"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor77">[77]</a> John Bright later declared "his conviction
+that the leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or
+friendly article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to
+office." Dasent, <i>Life of Delane</i>, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is
+approximately correct, but the shift in policy began earlier, when
+it came to be feared that the North would not submit to peaceable
+secession.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_78"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor78">[78]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, Vol. I, pp.
+344-45.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_79"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor79">[79]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 40.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_80"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor80">[80]</a> <i>Economist</i>, March 2,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_81"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor81">[81]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, March 16,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_82"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor82">[82]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_83"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor83">[83]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February
+22, 1861. William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early
+taken part in public meetings called to express humanitarian
+sentiment. From 1850 on he was an acceptable public speaker in all
+matters liberal, as free trade, social reform, and anti-slavery.
+Elected to Parliament in 1859 and again in 1861 from Bradford,
+where he was engaged in business as a woollen manufacturer, he
+sought, after the fashion of new Members, a cause to represent and
+found it in championship of the North. Having great native ability,
+as shown by his later distinguished career, it was the good fortune
+of the United States thus to enlist so eager a champion. Forster
+and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the North" in
+Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but was
+more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a
+reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved
+prestige for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and
+private secretary of the American Minister to England, once told
+the writer that he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole,
+the most valuable rendered by any Englishman to the
+North.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_84"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor84">[84]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_85"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor85">[85]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, Vol. I, p.
+30.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_86"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor86">[86]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_87"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor87">[87]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February
+4, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_88"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor88">[88]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_89"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor89">[89]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February
+12, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_90"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor90">[90]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States," No. 17. Russell to Lyons, February 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_91"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor91">[91]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March
+11. It is curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no
+extended characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with
+the new President were insufficient to justify it. The first record
+of personal impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later
+printed in his "Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the
+<i>Times</i>. Russell was taken to the White House. "Soon
+afterwards there entered, with a shambling, loose, irregular,
+almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean man, considerably over six
+feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long pendulous arms,
+terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, however,
+were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression
+produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and
+wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of
+kindliness, sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes
+dark, full, and deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an
+expression which almost amounts to tenderness.... A person who met
+Mr. Lincoln in the street would not take him to be what--according
+to usages of European society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at
+the same time, it would not be possible for the most indifferent
+observer to pass him in the street without notice."--<i>My
+Diary</i>, I, pp. 37-8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_92"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor92">[92]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_93"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor93">[93]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 761.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_94"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor94">[94]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30,
+1861. Received April 16.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_95"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor95">[95]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861.
+Received April 9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_96"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor96">[96]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_97"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor97">[97]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_98"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor98">[98]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26,
+1861. Printed in Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, Vol. I., p.
+31.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_99"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor99">[99]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_100"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor100">[100]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_101"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor101">[101]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_102"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor102">[102]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1861-2, pp, 80-81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_103"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor103">[103]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to
+Lyons, April 6, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_104"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor104">[104]</a> Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_105"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor105">[105]</a> The <i>Times</i>, February 26,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_106"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor106">[106]</a> <i>London Press</i>, March 30, 1861, Cited
+in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. 69, p. 379.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_107"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor107">[107]</a> The <i>Times</i>, March 26,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_108"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor108">[108]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, May 11, 1861, pp.
+465-6.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_109"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor109">[109]</a> <i>Economist</i>, May 4,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_110"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor110">[110]</a> <i>Examiner</i>, January 5 and (as quoted)
+April 27, 1861. Cited in Littell's <i>Living Age</i>, Vol. 68, p.
+758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_111"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor111">[111]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, April 27,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_112"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor112">[112]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, May 4, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_113"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor113">[113]</a> These four publications, the
+<i>Spectator</i>, the <i>Westminster</i>, the <i>Daily News</i>,
+and the <i>Morning Star</i>, were the principal British
+pro-Northern organs. In addition <i>The Liberator</i> names among
+the lesser and provincial press the following: <i>Nonconformist,
+British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner,
+Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury</i> and <i>Belfast
+Whig</i>. Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 40.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_114"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor114">[114]</a> Godkin had joined the staff of the
+<i>Daily News</i> in 1853. During the Crimea War he was special war
+correspondent. He had travelled extensively in America in the late
+'fifties and was thoroughly well informed. From 1862 to 1865 his
+letters to the <i>Daily News</i> were of great value in encouraging
+the British friends of the North. In 1865 Godkin became editor of
+the New York <i>Nation</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_115"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor115">[115]</a> W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet
+Martineau alone who was keeping English opinion about America on
+the right side through the Press." The <i>Daily News</i> Jubilee
+Edition, p. 46.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_116"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor116">[116]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and His
+Friends</i>, Vol. II, p. 92.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_117"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor117">[117]</a> Moncure D. Conway's <i>Autobiography</i>
+asserts that two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union
+cause, some of them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes,
+Sir Charles Lyell, Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton,
+Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the
+Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406. This is probably true of ultimate,
+though not of initial, interest and attitude. But for many writers
+their published works give no clue to their opinions on the Civil
+War--as for example the works of Dickens, Thackeray, William
+Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion," p.
+103.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_118"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor118">[118]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary</i>, I, p.
+398.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_119"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor119">[119]</a> The <i>Times</i>, May 30,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_120"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor120">[120]</a> <i>Westminster Review</i>, Vol. 76, pp.
+487-509, October, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_121"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor121">[121]</a> Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited
+in Rhodes, <i>United States</i>, Vol. III, p. 509.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_122"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor122">[122]</a> A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861,
+declared that anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the
+South. Reported in <i>Liberator</i>, May 31, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_123"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor123">[123]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and
+142.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_124"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor124">[124]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 146.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_125"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor125">[125]</a> See <i>ante</i>, pp. 50-51.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_126"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor126">[126]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76"></a>[V1:pg 76]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2>
+<h3>THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861</h3>
+<br>
+<p>In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under the
+leadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" Liberal
+Government, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so
+constituted that almost equal influence was attributed to the
+Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held
+the Premiership, and, as they represented different wings of the
+Whig-Liberal party, it was prophesied by political wiseacres that
+personal friction would soon lead to a new disruption. Nor were the
+possible elements of discord confined to these two. Gladstone,
+formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a time uncertain whether to return
+to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals, had yielded to
+Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters, and had
+joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed to him
+in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadership
+among the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home
+Secretary until July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April,
+1863, Secretary for War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and
+conciliator between these divergent interests stood Lord Granville,
+President of Council, then a "Conservative-Liberal," especially
+valuable to the Cabinet for the confidence reposed in him by Queen
+Victoria and Prince Albert.</p>
+<p>In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this
+he had built his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism,"
+assertive of England's honour and <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_77"></a>[V1:pg 77]</span> jealous for British advantage. Now,
+however, as head of a Government requiring the most delicate
+handling to maintain itself, he devoted his energies to details of
+political management in which he had great skill. His ambition was,
+primarily, to retain office, and in this purpose he was fortunate
+because, unknown to his ministerial colleagues, he had received an
+indirect pledge from Lord Derby, the Opposition leader, that there
+would be, for a time at least, no determined effort to unseat him
+so long as his Ministry brought forward no Bill for a further
+expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingness to make any
+further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerston was
+wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so,
+was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John," gained by his
+assertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step
+toward democracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchise
+question. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the
+"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political
+faith, and none were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The
+outspoken Radicals in Parliament, like John Bright, and his friend
+Cobden, who had refused to take office under Palmerston, gave a
+lukewarm support to the Ministry, but would not pledge themselves
+to steadfast adherence. They had hopes of Gladstone, believed that
+he would ultimately come into their group, but meanwhile watched
+with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeed Palmerston desired
+it, in the details of financial management to the exclusion of
+other questions.</p>
+<p>The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward
+democracy as affecting British policy during the American Civil War
+will be considered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had
+not become a clear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as
+historical evidence can determine, affect early governmental policy
+toward America. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78"></a>[V1:pg
+78]</span> The outstanding feature of the British Government in
+1861 is that it was made up of various so-called "Liberal"
+elements, the representatives of each of which carried on the
+business of his own department much as he pleased. Palmerston's
+was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever he cared to express
+it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern was to keep his
+all-star associates running smoothly together and thus to give no
+occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followed that
+Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreign
+affairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed the
+Government was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell
+Ministry." These two were the leaders of the team; next came
+Gladstone and Cornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation,
+and each eager to lead when their elders should retire from
+harness. Gladstone's great ability was already recognized, but his
+personal political faith was not yet clear. Lewis, lacking his
+rival's magnetic and emotional qualities, cold, scholarly, and
+accurate in performance, was regarded as a statesman of high
+promise<a name="FNanchor127"></a><a href="#Footnote_127">[127]</a>.
+Other Cabinet members, as is the custom of coalitions, were more
+free in opinion and action than in a strict party ministry where
+one dominating personality imposes his will upon his
+colleagues.</p>
+<p>Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the
+main voice of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme
+crisis, governmental foreign policy was Russell's policy. This was
+even more true as regards American than European affairs, for the
+former were little understood, and dependence was necessarily
+placed upon the man whose business it was to be familiar with them.
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79"></a>[V1:pg 79]</span>
+Indeed there was little actual parliamentary or governmental
+interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American question,
+attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian
+expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian
+islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in
+Schleswig-Holstein. Neither did the opposition party venture to
+express a policy as regards America. Lord Derby, able but indolent,
+occasionally indulged in caustic criticism, but made no attempt to
+push his attack home. Malmesbury, his former Foreign Secretary, was
+active and alert in French affairs, but gave no thought to
+relations across the Atlantic<a name="FNanchor128"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_128">[128]</a>. Disraeli, Tory leader in the Commons,
+skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the Government's
+policy, but never on the American question, though frequently urged
+to do so by the friends of the South. In short for the first year
+of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward America
+was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend or
+foe.</p>
+<p>This being the case, what did Russell know about the American
+crisis? Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived
+from the reports of British officials in the United States, and
+from the pages of the public press. The salient facts known to
+Russell were few. Lincoln's Cabinet had been named. Lincoln himself
+was absolutely an unknown quantity, but it was unbelievable that a
+man of his origins and history could be more than a mere
+figurehead--an opinion then held as widely in America as in
+England. But someone must determine American policy, and by
+universal consent, this would be Seward.</p>
+<p>The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in
+England than any other American statesman, with the possible
+exception of Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had
+established a circle of British <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_80"></a>[V1:pg 80]</span> friendships. Both men were accepted
+as champions of anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations
+and his so-called "martyrdom" under the physical violence of the
+South Carolinan, Brooks; and Seward for his clever political
+anti-Southern leadership in the United States Senate. But Seward's
+reputation in this respect was offset by the belief that he was
+anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at least that he was
+very ready to arouse for political ends the customary anti-British
+sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New York. In
+1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the
+Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of
+Newcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then
+"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat,
+whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious
+speculation in British governmental circles<a name=
+"FNanchor129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129">[129]</a>. Moreover
+Seward's reputation was that of a wily, clever politician, rather
+unscrupulous in methods which British politicians professed to
+disdain--a reputation serving to dim somewhat, as indeed it did in
+America also, the sincere idealisms and patriotism of the
+statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in Great Britain as a
+rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding power in the
+new Republican administration.</p>
+<p>This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but
+not by all. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis
+Adams, himself a most stiffly upright politician, both regarded
+Seward as the only possible leader of Republican party policy and
+rejoiced that this was so, having great confidence in his chief's
+integrity and wisdom. Adams himself was well suited to his new
+post. He was known as having early in 1849 fought the battle of
+anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig," and later as a leading
+Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_81"></a>[V1:pg 81]</span> Principally,
+however, he was suited to his post by education, family, and
+character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father's
+ministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England.
+His father and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, both
+Presidents of the United States, had both, also, been American
+Ministers at London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide
+acquaintance through training and study with European affairs,
+especially those of Britain, and equipped with high intellectual
+gifts, Adams was still further fitted to his new post by his power
+of cool judgment and careful expression in critical times. His very
+coolness, sometimes appearing as coldness and stiff dignity,
+rendered him an especially fit agent to deal with Russell, a man of
+very similar characteristics. The two men quickly learned to
+respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose in national
+policies.</p>
+<p>But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in
+London. The Southern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama,
+but soon transferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson
+Davis as President and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President.
+Neither man was well known in England, though both had long been
+prominent in American politics. The little British information on
+Davis, that he had served in the United States Senate and as a
+Cabinet member, seemed to indicate that he was better fitted to
+executive duties than his rival, Lincoln. But Davis' foreign policy
+was wholly a matter for speculation, and his Cabinet consisted of
+men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. In truth it was not a
+Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune of the South that
+everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southern gentlemen sought
+reputation and glory in the army rather than in political position.
+Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the importance to
+the South of a <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82"></a>[V1:pg
+82]</span> well-considered and energetic foreign policy. At first,
+indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention to the
+exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southern patriotism,
+Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary in
+denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to
+appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on
+both slavery and secession<a name="FNanchor130"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_130">[130]</a>. "The single exception to this general
+policy<a name="FNanchor131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131">[131]</a>"
+was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and Mann,
+all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Of
+these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic
+experience. Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he
+at least was known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern
+orator, demanding for ten years past, that Southern action in
+defence of states rights and Southern "interests," which now, at
+last, the South was attempting<a name="FNanchor132"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_132">[132]</a>.</p>
+<p>Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached
+London on April 29<a name="FNanchor133"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_133">[133]</a>. Meanwhile in this same month of April,
+conditions in America, so long confused and uncertain, were being
+rapidly clarified. The South, earlier than the North, had come to a
+determined policy, for while during January and February, at the
+Montgomery convention, there had been uncertainty as to actively
+applying the doctrinaire right of secession, by March the party of
+action had triumphed, and though there was still talk of
+conferences with the North, and commissioners actually appointed,
+no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In the North,
+the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincoln was
+not inaugurated <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83"></a>[V1:pg
+83]</span> until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was earlier
+possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed.
+European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing
+to let the South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was
+discussing the advisability of a separate secession by that
+financial centre from Nation and State alike--and of setting up as
+a "free town." Seward, just appointed Secretary of State, was
+repudiating in both official and private talk any intention to
+coerce the South by force of arms<a name="FNanchor134"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_134">[134]</a>. It is no wonder that British statesmen
+were largely at sea over the American situation.</p>
+<p>But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort
+Sumter in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal
+fortress under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That
+event drove away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and
+removed the last vestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of
+militant patriotism swept over both sections<a name=
+"FNanchor135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135">[135]</a>. Hurriedly both
+North and South prepared for war, issuing calls for volunteers and
+organizing in all accustomed warlike preparations. The news of
+Sumter reached London on April 27, and that civil war seemed
+certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis, since the South
+lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue letters of
+marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a Northern
+intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such
+letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to
+be instituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British
+officials and public after the long delay and uncertainty of
+months, events in America had precipitated a state of war, though
+in fact there were still to elapse other months in which both North
+and South laboured to transform <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_84"></a>[V1:pg 84]</span> a peaceful society into one capable
+of waging effective battle.</p>
+<p>The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to
+alter, almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British
+policy, though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting
+the turn of events, had given careful consideration to the steps
+required of it in just such a situation as had now arisen.
+Certainly both Lyons and Russell had been deeply anxious for some
+time, and had visualized a proper British policy. The movement in
+Great Britain now became rapid. On April 29, Malmesbury, in the
+Lords, spoke of the news of civil war which had arrived "this
+morning," and asked if the Government had tried to prevent it, or
+had set on foot negotiations with other powers to check it.
+Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United
+States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions
+from Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be
+extremely careful about offering advice unless "asked for by the
+contending parties themselves." Both speakers commented on the
+"ties of blood" rendering Britain especially anxious in this
+American quarrel, and regretted the conflict<a name=
+"FNanchor136"></a><a href="#Footnote_136">[136]</a>. Malmesbury's
+query as to the approach to another government, meaning France, was
+evaded. That some such approach, in accordance with the earlier
+advice of Lyons<a name="FNanchor137"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_137">[137]</a>, had already been made, is evident from
+the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas learned from
+Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though what that
+action would be was not made clear<a name=
+"FNanchor138"></a><a href="#Footnote_138">[138]</a>. As Dallas'
+report was soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be
+considered, the paragraph referring to this matter is
+important:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85"></a>[V1:pg 85]</span>
+<blockquote>"The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the
+effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by
+the President induced him to request me to call at his private
+residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three
+representatives of the Southern confederacy were here<a name=
+"FNanchor139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139">[139]</a>; that he had
+not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, <i>unofficially</i>;
+that there existed an understanding between this government and
+that of France which would lead both to take the same course as to
+recognition, whatever that course might be; and he then referred to
+the rumour of a meditated blockade of Southern ports and their
+discontinuance as ports of entry--topics on which I had heard
+nothing. But as I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of
+his intention to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara,'
+which left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive
+in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his lordship
+acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour, and
+waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor. The
+motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his
+lordship's suggestion."</blockquote>
+<p>May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two
+Southern commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As
+reported by them<a name="FNanchor140"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_140">[140]</a>, Russell listened with attention to their
+representation, but made no informing comment. They argued the
+constitutional right of secession, depicted the firm determination
+of the South, were confident of early acquiescence by the North,
+and especially laid stress on the Southern desire for free trade.
+Russell's own report to Lyons on this interview and on one held six
+days later, May 9, is in substantial agreement, but much more is
+made by him than by the Commissioners of a question put by Russell
+as to a Southern plan of reviving the African slave-trade<a name=
+"FNanchor141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141">[141]</a>. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_86"></a>[V1:pg 86]</span> Yancey and Rost
+denied this and asserted "that they had prohibited the slave-trade,
+and did not mean to revive it." Their report to Richmond does not
+depict this matter as of special significance in the interview;
+Russell's report to Lyons lays stress upon it. The general result
+of the interview was that Russell listened, but refused, as to
+Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But the Southern
+Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were
+content to wait on British action<a name="FNanchor142"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_142">[142]</a>.</p>
+<p>On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the
+Attorney-General a memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing
+the belligerency of the South and as to the right of the South to
+issue letters of marque and reprisal. The memorandum notes that
+Southern privateering would be dangerous to British commerce with
+the North, but sees no help for it. "The best solution," wrote the
+Attorney-General, "would be for the European nations to determine
+that the war between the two Confederacies shall be carried on on
+the principles of 'Justum Bellum,' and shall be conducted according
+to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize the Southern States
+as a Belligerent on this condition only<a name=
+"FNanchor143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143">[143]</a>." The next day,
+referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law
+officers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in
+America as regular war<a name="FNanchor144"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_144">[144]</a>," but he does <i>not</i> comment on the
+legal advice to press the South to abandon privateering before
+recognizing her belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning
+that can be attached to the last sentence quoted <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_87"></a>[V1:pg 87]</span> from the
+Attorney-General's memorandum. This advice, however, in view of the
+opinion that there was "no help for it," was presumably but a
+suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre with little
+confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" was not the
+probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily
+yield its only naval weapon.</p>
+<p>In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and
+announced. The letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to
+be a "regular war" was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction
+giving Lyons advance notice of the determination reached by the
+Cabinet to recognize the belligerent rights of the South. Russell
+indulged in many expressions of regret and sympathy, but Lyons was
+not to conceal that this British action represented the
+Government's view of the actualities of the American situation. Yet
+while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he was not instructed
+to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of Southern
+belligerency<a name="FNanchor145"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_145">[145]</a>. Here was a correct understanding of the
+difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a
+permitted avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground<a name=
+"FNanchor146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146">[146]</a>. Russell was
+not then aware of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a
+theory, not yet clearly formulated for foreign governments, that
+the Civil War was a rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of
+governments, but he does appear to have understood the delicacy of
+formal notification to the constituted government at
+Washington<a name="FNanchor147"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_147">[147]</a>. Moreover his instructions were in line
+with the British policy of refusing, at present, a recognition of
+Southern sovereignty.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88"></a>[V1:pg 88]</span>
+<p>On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was
+sent to Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to
+request France to join, promptly, in recognizing Southern
+belligerent rights. Cowley was also instructed that the blockade
+and privateering required precautions by European governments, and
+it was suggested that France and England unite in requesting both
+belligerents to accede to the second and third articles of the
+Declaration of Paris<a name="FNanchor148"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_148">[148]</a>. These articles refer to the exemption
+from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a neutral
+flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag<a name=
+"FNanchor149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149">[149]</a>. This day,
+also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to
+recognize the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the
+measure as a necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified
+Russell that Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in
+complete agreement with England's policy<a name=
+"FNanchor150"></a><a href="#Footnote_150">[150]</a>, and on May 9,
+in a more extended communication, Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's
+suggestion that both powers issue a declaration that they "intended
+to abstain from all interference," and that M. de Flahault, French
+Ambassador at London, had <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_89"></a>[V1:pg 89]</span> been given instructions to act in
+close harmony with Russell<a name="FNanchor151"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_151">[151]</a>.</p>
+<p>The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days
+from May 1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and
+press somewhat by surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper
+comment even after Russell's parliamentary announcement of policy
+on the last-named date. But on May 9 the <i>Times</i> set the
+fashion of general approval in an editorial stating that Great
+Britain was now coming to see the American conflict in a new
+light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals
+involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were
+now more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though
+greatly to be regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business
+to keep strictly out of it and to maintain neutrality<a name=
+"FNanchor152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152">[152]</a>. This
+generalization was no doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the
+Government and in Parliament men who were thinking seriously of
+specific difficulties realized that the two main problems
+immediately confronting a British neutral policy were privateering
+and blockade. The South had declared its <i>intention</i> to use
+privateers. The North had declared its <i>intention</i>, first to
+hang those who engaged in privateering, and second to establish a
+blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been put into effect.</p>
+<p>The first action of the British Government was directed toward
+privateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords
+Commissioners of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern
+plan to issue letters of marque and reprisal and directing that
+reinforcements be sent to the British fleet in American waters.
+This was prompt action on unofficial information, for Davis'
+proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons' despatch containing
+copies of it, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90"></a>[V1:pg
+90]</span> sent on April 22, was not received by Russell until May
+10<a name="FNanchor153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153">[153]</a>.
+Ordinary news from the United States required ten days to get into
+print in London<a name="FNanchor154"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_154">[154]</a>, but official messages might be sent more
+rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer to
+Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram to
+Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was
+occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best the
+exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln
+proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been
+received only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce
+the British fleet.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image03.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image03.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image03.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br>
+<i>Photo: F. Hollyer</i>.<br>
+<b>SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.</b><br>
+(<i>From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An
+Autobiography," by kind permission</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<p>The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers
+sailing under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with
+as Pirates," thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at
+the Davis and Lincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a
+British fleet had been sent to protect British interests and took
+occasion to indicate British policy by adding, "we have not been
+involved in any way in that contest by any act or giving any advice
+in the matter, and, for God's sake, let us if possible keep out of
+it<a name="FNanchor155"></a><a href="#Footnote_155">[155]</a>." May
+6, Gregory, a friend of the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_91"></a>[V1:pg 91]</span> South, who had already given notice
+of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy as an
+independent State, asked whether the United States had been
+informed that a blockade of Southern ports would not be recognized
+unless effective, and whether there would be acquiescence in the
+belligerent right of the South to issue letters of marque and
+reprisal<a name="FNanchor156"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_156">[156]</a>. Russell replied that Lincoln had
+<i>not</i> been informed that a blockade must be effective to be
+respected since the Washington Government did not need to be told
+of an international rule which it had itself long proclaimed. As to
+the second point, he now announced what heretofore had not been
+clearly stated, that Southern privateers could not be regarded by
+Great Britain as pirates, for if so regarded Britain would herself
+have to treat them as pirates and would thus be unneutral. This was
+in fact, in spite of Northern bitter accusations that Britain was
+exhibiting governmental sympathy with the South by her tolerance of
+the plan of Southern privateering, an inescapable conclusion.
+Russell added, however, that the matter of privateering involved
+some new questions under the Declaration of Paris upon which the
+Government had not yet decided what stand to take<a name=
+"FNanchor157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157">[157]</a>. It was on this
+same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley to take up
+with France the question of the Declaration of Paris<a name=
+"FNanchor158"></a><a href="#Footnote_158">[158]</a>, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_92"></a>[V1:pg 92]</span> Privateering and
+blockade, declared in America months before there was any
+possibility of putting them into effect, and months before there
+were any military operations in the field, forced this rapid
+European action, especially the action of Great Britain, which,
+more than any other European nation, feared belligerent
+interference with her carrying and export trade. How was the
+British Government to know that Davis would not bend every energy
+in sending out privateers, and Lincoln to establish a blockade? The
+respective declarations of Davis and Lincoln were the <i>first</i>
+evidences offered of belligerent status. It was reasonable to
+assume that here would come the first energetic efforts of the
+belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence
+sufficiently informed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled
+few ships that could be fitted out as privateers, or that
+two-thirds of the Northern navy was at the moment widely scattered
+in foreign seas, making impossible a prompt blockade.</p>
+<p>To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial
+interests lay in this announced maritime war, and it felt the
+necessity of defining its neutral position with speed. The
+underlying fact of the fixity of Southern <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_93"></a>[V1:pg 93]</span> determination to
+maintain secession had in the last few weeks become clearly
+recognized.</p>
+<p>Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in
+America, some of it received just before the issue of the
+Proclamation of Neutrality, some just after, was all confirmative
+of the rapid approach of a great war. A letter from Bunch, at
+Charleston, was received on May 10, depicting the united Southern
+will to resist Northern attack, and asserting that the South had no
+purpose save to conduct a strictly defensive war. Bunch was no
+longer caustic; he now felt that a new nation was in process of
+birth<a name="FNanchor159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159">[159]</a>.
+May 4, Monson, writing from Washington, and just returned from a
+trip through the South, in the course of which he had visited
+Montgomery, stated "<i>no reconstruction</i> of the Union is
+possible," and added that there was no danger of a servile
+insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb the
+British Government and public<a name="FNanchor160"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_160">[160]</a>. A few days later on, May 12, Lyons
+expressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons of
+anti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from
+expressions of sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern
+Cabinet in its plan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would
+be frightful in its consequences both to America and to
+England<a name="FNanchor161"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_161">[161]</a>.</p>
+<p>Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94"></a>[V1:pg 94]</span> of
+Neutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action
+was necessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that
+action had been wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series
+of questions as to the application of the British Foreign
+Enlistment Act in the American crisis. What would be the status of
+British citizens serving on Confederate privateers? How would the
+Government treat citizens who aided in equipping such privateers?
+Did not the Government intend to take measures to prevent the
+infringement of law in British ports? Here was pressure by a friend
+of the North to hasten an official announcement of the policy
+already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis replied stating
+that the Government was about to issue a general proclamation
+warning British subjects not to take any part in the war<a name=
+"FNanchor162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162">[162]</a>. Similar
+questions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received
+a similar answer<a name="FNanchor163"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_163">[163]</a>. The few days' delay following Russell's
+statement of May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law
+Officers to the exact form required. The Proclamation as issued was
+dated May 13, and was officially printed in the <i>London
+Gazette</i> on May 14.</p>
+<p>In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not
+differ from customary usage<a name="FNanchor164"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_164">[164]</a>. It spoke of the Confederacy as "states
+styling themselves the Confederate States of America," prohibited
+to Englishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist
+others, or equipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to
+such ships. War vessels being equipped in British ports would be
+seized and forfeited to the British Government. If a belligerent
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95"></a>[V1:pg 95]</span>
+war-ship came into a British port, no change or increase of
+equipment was to be permitted. If a subject violated the
+Proclamation he was both punishable in British courts and forfeited
+any claim to British protection. The Parliamentary discussion on
+May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimity of opinion
+the policy of the Government in application of the Proclamation;
+the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, but
+recognition of independence was for the future to determine; the
+right of the South to send out privateers was regretfully
+recognized; such privateers could not be regarded as pirates and
+the North would have no right to treat them as such, but if the
+North in defiance of international opinion did so treat them, Great
+Britain had at least warned its subjects that they, if engaged in
+service on a Southern privateer, had no claim to British
+protection; a blockade of the South to be respected must be
+effective at least to the point where a vessel attempting to pass
+through was likely to be captured; the plan of blockading the
+entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of coast line,
+was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members of
+Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of
+the Southern seaboard<a name="FNanchor165"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_165">[165]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for
+one side in the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly
+on legal questions and their probable application. On May 15
+Russell sent to Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but
+did not instruct him to communicate it officially to Seward,
+leaving this rather to Lyons' discretion. This was discretionary in
+diplomatic usage since in strict fact the Proclamation was
+addressed to British subjects and need not be communicated
+officially to the belligerents. In the result the discretion
+permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition of
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96"></a>[V1:pg 96]</span>
+Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the
+Northern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then,
+or later, make official communication to Seward of the
+Proclamation<a name="FNanchor166"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_166">[166]</a>. The fact soon appeared that the United
+States seriously objected to the Proclamation of Neutrality,
+protesting first, its having been issued at all, and, in the second
+place, resenting what was considered its "premature" announcement
+by a friendly nation. This matter developed so serious a criticism
+by both American Government and public, both during and after the
+Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did the British
+Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a
+"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality?</p>
+<p>On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on
+the morning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in
+London<a name="FNanchor167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167">[167]</a>,
+but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was
+prevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of
+Bedford<a name="FNanchor168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168">[168]</a>.
+All that was immediately possible was to make official notification
+of arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen.
+This was promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented,
+Palmerston attending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams'
+first report to Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that
+public opinion was "not exactly what we would wish." In this
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97"></a>[V1:pg 97]</span> he
+referred to the utterances of the press, particularly those of the
+<i>Times</i>, which from day to day and with increasing vigour
+sounded the note of strict neutrality in a "non-idealistic" war. On
+May 30 the <i>Times</i>, asserting that both parties in America
+were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion as
+follows:</p>
+<blockquote>"We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians,
+that it does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern
+leaders that they are half inclined to become British once more.
+Both sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans
+over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily.<br>
+<br>
+"For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of events
+has induced us to regard the dispute as a more commonplace kind of
+quarrel than it at first appeared to be. The real motives of the
+belligerents, as the truth transpires; appear to be exactly such
+motives as have caused wars in all times and countries. They are
+essentially selfish motives--that is to say, they are based upon
+speculations of national power, territorial aggrandizement,
+political advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim
+any superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of
+patriotism....<br>
+<br>
+"We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to remove
+the case from the common category of national or monarchical
+quarrels. The representations of the North might be made word for
+word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous of 'rectifying' his
+frontier, consolidating his empire, or retaining a disaffected
+province in subjection. The manifestos of the South might be put
+forth by any State desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion
+or exchanging union for independence....<br>
+<br>
+"It is just such a question as has been left times out of mind in
+this Old World to the decision of the sword. The sword will be the
+arbitrator in the New World too; but the event teaches us plainly
+enough that Republics and Democracies enjoy no exemption from the
+passions and follies of humanity."</blockquote>
+<p>Under these impressions Adams presented himself <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_98"></a>[V1:pg 98]</span> on May 18 for his
+first interview with Russell<a name="FNanchor169"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_169">[169]</a>. He stated that he had come with the idea
+that there was</p>
+<blockquote>".... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the
+relations actually existing between the two nations from the risk
+of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate domestic
+disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was not without pain
+that I was compelled to admit that from the day of my arrival I had
+felt in the proceedings of both houses of Parliament, in the
+language of Her Majesty's ministers, and in the tone of opinion
+prevailing in private circles, more of uncertainty about this than
+I had before thought possible,"</blockquote>
+<p>Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to
+Dallas refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South
+implied a British purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the
+effect to widen, if not to make irreparable, a breach [between
+North and South] which we believed yet to be entirely manageable by
+ourselves."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99"></a>[V1:pg 99]</span>
+<p>Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had
+simply meant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not
+disposed in any way to interfere." To this Adams answered that:</p>
+<blockquote>".... it was deserving of grave consideration whether
+great caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might,
+even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage the
+hopes of the disaffected in America.... It was in this view that I
+must be permitted to express the great regret I had felt on
+learning the decision to issue the Queen's proclamation, which at
+once raised the insurgents to the level of a belligerent State, and
+still more the language used in regard to it by Her Majesty's
+ministers in both houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever
+might be the design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the
+effect of these events had been to encourage the friends of the
+disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private opinion
+indicated it strongly."</blockquote>
+<p>Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on
+recent events than they deserved. The Government had taken the
+advice of the Law Officers and as a result had concluded that "as a
+question merely of <i>fact</i>, a war existed.... Under such
+circumstances</p>
+<blockquote>it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this
+in the technical sense as <i>justum bellum</i>, that is, a war of
+two sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice,
+as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to bring
+the management of it within the rules of modern civilized warfare.
+This was all that was contemplated by the Queen's proclamation. It
+was designed to show the purport of existing laws, and to explain
+to British subjects their liabilities in case they should engage in
+the war."</blockquote>
+<p>To this Adams answered "... that under other circumstances</p>
+<blockquote>I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to
+this view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to
+remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a little
+more rapid than was absolutely called for by the occasion.... And
+furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to be a belligerent State
+before they had ever shown their capacity to maintain any kind of
+warfare whatever, except within one of their own harbours, and
+under every possible advantage. It considered them a marine power
+before they had ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean....
+The rule was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any
+organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its power
+to defend and protect itself against the assaults of enemies, and
+at the same time to manifest a capacity to maintain binding
+relations with foreign nations, then a measure of recognition could
+not be justly objected to on any side. The case was very different
+when such an interference should take place, prior to the
+establishment of the proof required, as to bring about a result
+which would not probably have happened but for that external
+agency."</blockquote>
+<p>This representation by the American Minister, thus <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_100"></a>[V1:pg 100]</span> early made,
+contains the whole argument advanced against the British
+Proclamation of Neutrality, though there were many similar
+representations made at greater length both by Adams later, and by
+Seward at Washington. They are all well summarized by Bernard as "a
+rejection ... of the proposition that the existence of war is a
+simple matter of fact, to be ascertained as other facts are--and an
+assertion ... of the dogma that there can be no war, so far as
+foreign nations are concerned, and, therefore, no neutrality, so
+long as there is a sovereignty <i>de jure</i><a name=
+"FNanchor170"></a><a href="#Footnote_170">[170]</a>." But in this
+first representation Adams, in the main, laid stress upon the
+<i>haste</i> with which the Proclamation of Neutrality had been
+issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that British
+sympathies were with the South.</p>
+<p>One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing
+exactly those opinions advanced by Adams. The <i>Spectator</i>
+declared that while the Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared
+to be one of strict neutrality, it in reality tended "directly to
+the benefit of the South<a name="FNanchor171"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_171">[171]</a>." A fortnight later this paper asserted,
+"The quarrel, cover it with cotton as we may, is between freedom
+and slavery, right and wrong, the dominion of God and the dominion
+of the Devil, and the duty of England, we submit, is clear." She
+should, even though forced to declare her neutrality, refuse for
+all time to recognize the slave-holding Confederacy<a name=
+"FNanchor172"></a><a href="#Footnote_172">[172]</a>. But the
+<i>Spectator</i> stood nearly alone in this view. The <i>Saturday
+Review</i> defended in every respect the issue of the Proclamation
+and added, "In a short time, it will be necessary further to
+recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but the United
+States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall be
+postponed until the failure of the effort <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_101"></a>[V1:pg 101]</span> which they
+assert or believe that they are about to make has resulted in an
+experimental proof that subjugation is impossible<a name=
+"FNanchor173"></a><a href="#Footnote_173">[173]</a>." A few
+provincial papers supported the view of the <i>Spectator</i>, but
+they were of minor importance, and generally the press heartily
+approved the Proclamation.</p>
+<p>At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has
+just received an instruction from Seward written under the
+impression aroused by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April
+8 to make any pledge as to British policy on the recognition of
+Southern independence. Seward was very much disturbed by what
+Russell had said to Dallas. In this instruction, dated April
+27<a name="FNanchor174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174">[174]</a>, he
+wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"When you shall have read the instructions at large
+which have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that
+these last remarks of his lordship are by no means satisfactory to
+this government. Her Britannic Majesty's government is at liberty
+to choose whether it will retain the friendship of this government
+by refusing all aid and comfort to its enemies, now in flagrant
+rebellion against it, as we think the treaties existing between the
+two countries require, or whether the government of Her Majesty
+will take the precarious benefits of a different course.<br>
+<br>
+<p>"You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic
+Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of his
+lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this government would
+be obliged to deem injurious to its rights and derogating from its
+dignity."</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood
+them, Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and
+especially in the Government, stating that this improvement was
+due, in part, to the vigour now being shown by the Northern
+Government, in part "to a sense that the preceding action of Her
+Majesty's ministers has been construed to mean more than they
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102"></a>[V1:pg 102]</span>
+intended by it<a name="FNanchor175"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_175">[175]</a>." But at Washington the American
+irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was reporting Seward
+and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the Proclamation
+of Neutrality<a name="FNanchor176"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_176">[176]</a>. On June 14, Lyons had a long
+conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that
+the South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the
+conference feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and
+England on this point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious
+because France was so long delaying her own Proclamation<a name=
+"FNanchor177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177">[177]</a>. To meet the
+situation, he and Mercier, the French Minister, went the next day,
+June 15, on an official visit to Seward with the intention of
+formally presenting the British Proclamation and Thouvenel's
+instructions to Mercier to support it<a name=
+"FNanchor178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178">[178]</a>. But Seward
+"said at once that he could not receive from us a communication
+founded on the assumption that</p>
+<blockquote>the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as
+Belligerents; that this was a determination to which the Cabinet
+had come deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events
+had in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers and
+the Southern States; that he would not discuss the question with
+us, but that he should give instructions to the United States
+Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be enabled to state
+the reasons for the course taken by their Government to Your
+Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you should be desirous to hear
+them.... He should not take Official cognizance of the recognition
+of the Belligerent Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and
+France, unless he should be forced to do so by an Official
+communication addressed to the Government of the United States
+itself."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103"></a>[V1:pg 103]</span>
+<p>In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward
+"for his own use only." They did not regard the moment well chosen
+"to be punctilious." Lyons reported that Seward's language and
+demeanour throughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good
+humoured," but the fact remained that the United States had not
+been officially notified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and
+that the American Government, sensitive to popular excitement in
+the matter and committed to the theory of a rebellion of peoples,
+was thus left free to continue argument in London without any
+necessity of making formal protest and of taking active steps to
+support such protest<a name="FNanchor179"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_179">[179]</a>. The official relation was eased by the
+conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger of America,
+expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and,
+temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs.
+The <i>Times</i> told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that
+the utmost care and circumspection must be used by every man or
+party in England to avoid giving offence to either of the two
+incensed belligerents<a name="FNanchor180"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_180">[180]</a>." In answer to the Northern outcry at the
+lack of British sympathy, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_104"></a>[V1:pg 104]</span> it declared "Neutrality--strict
+neutrality--is all that the United States Government can
+claim<a name="FNanchor181"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_181">[181]</a>."</p>
+<p>While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward
+the British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two
+other matters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of
+the British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing
+given by Russell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward,
+on May 21, wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in
+the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question
+exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own
+citizens, or persons employed by our own citizens, preying on the
+commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize
+them as lawful belligerents and give them shelter from our pursuit
+and punishment, the law of nations affords an adequate and proper
+remedy<a name="FNanchor182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182">[182]</a>."
+This was threatening language, but was for Adams' own eye, and in
+the next sentence of his letter Seward stated that avoidance of
+friction on this point was easy, since in 1856 Great Britain had
+invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration of Paris
+everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United States
+was now ready to accede.</p>
+<p>What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made
+clear for the question of privateering did not constitute the main
+point of his belligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed
+treatment of privateers as pirates might have resulted in very
+serious complications, for though the Proclamation of Neutrality
+had warned British subjects that they would forfeit any claim to
+protection if they engaged in the conflict, it is obvious that the
+hanging as a pirate of a British seaman would have aroused a
+national outcry almost certain to have forced the Government into
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105"></a>[V1:pg 105]</span>
+protest and action against America. Fortunately the cooler judgment
+of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of the plan of
+treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of giving
+"shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from
+Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such
+shelter would be available in British ports<a name=
+"FNanchor183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183">[183]</a>.</p>
+<p>In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that
+the Southern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially,"
+instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that:
+"You will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever,
+unofficial as well as official, with the British Government, so
+long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the
+domestic enemies of this country." Here was a positive instruction
+as to the American Minister's conduct in a given situation, and a
+very serious instruction, nearly equivalent to "taking leave" after
+a rupture of diplomatic relations, but the method to be used in
+avoiding if possible the necessity of the serious step was left to
+Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment, when reporting the
+outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion of my
+task<a name="FNanchor184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184">[184]</a>."
+Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as to British
+intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, but
+added that he had not been able to convince himself of the
+existence of an unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised
+that the fact of the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in
+this city, and still more the knowledge that they had been admitted
+to more or less interviews with his lordship, was calculated to
+excite uneasiness. Indeed, it had already given great
+dissatisfaction to my <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_106"></a>[V1:pg 106]</span> Government. I added, as
+moderately as I could, that in all frankness any further
+protraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us
+as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action
+accordingly." Russell replied that both France and England had long
+been accustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the
+case of "Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc.," to hear what they had
+to say. "But this did not imply recognition in their case any more
+than in ours. He added that he had seen the gentlemen once some
+time ago, and once more some time since; he had no expectation of
+seeing them any more<a name="FNanchor185"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_185">[185]</a>."</p>
+<p>For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions
+might have brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of
+Adams and the acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been
+given; Russell merely stated that he had "no expectation" of
+further interviews with the Southern commissioners; he was still
+ready to hear from them in writing. This caused a division of
+opinion between the commissioners; Yancey argued that Russell's
+concession to Adams was itself a violation of the neutrality the
+British Government had announced, and that it should be met by a
+formal protest. But the other members insisted on a reference to
+Richmond for instructions<a name="FNanchor186"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_186">[186]</a>. On the same day that Adams reported the
+result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107"></a>[V1:pg 107]</span>
+<blockquote>"My position here thus far has not been difficult or
+painful. If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in
+the diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high road
+to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to me to be
+expedient so to play into the hands of our opponents. Although
+there has been and is more or less of sympathy with the
+slave-holders in certain circles, they are not so powerful as to
+overbear the general sentiment of the people. The ministry has been
+placed in rather delicate circumstances, when a small loss of power
+on either extreme would have thrown them out<a name=
+"FNanchor187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187">[187]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly,
+at least, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he
+therefore considered it best not to press too harshly upon the
+Government.</p>
+<p>But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant:
+"I wait with patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to
+engage a house for more than a month at a time...." He might
+himself be inclined to view more leniently the Proclamation of
+Neutrality and be able to find excuses for the alleged haste with
+which it had been issued, but his instructions required strong
+representations, especially on the latter point. Adams' report to
+Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interview with Russell of
+June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southern
+commissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of
+delay given by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that
+pledge in a hasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on
+the line already taken on May 18<a name="FNanchor188"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_188">[188]</a>. From this time on, throughout and after
+the war, this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing
+bitterness. British friends of the North joined in the American
+outcry. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108"></a>[V1:pg
+108]</span> By mere reiteration it became in the popular mind on
+both sides of the Atlantic an accepted and well-founded evidence of
+British governmental unfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion
+of the Civil War, John Bright in Parliament, commenting on the
+causes of American ill-will, declared that the Government of 1861,
+knowing that Adams was on his way, should in mere courtesy, have
+waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, the Proclamation, entirely
+justifiable in itself, might have been issued without offence and
+without embittering the United States<a name=
+"FNanchor189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189">[189]</a>.</p>
+<p>Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was the
+Proclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had
+given any such pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the
+interview of May 1 would seem to support that denial<a name=
+"FNanchor190"></a><a href="#Footnote_190">[190]</a>. On that day
+Russell for the second time told Dallas that England would not
+commit herself, as yet, as regards Southern recognition, clearly
+meaning a recognition of <i>sovereignty</i>, not of belligerency,
+and immediately asked Dallas what the rumours of a blockade meant.
+Dallas replied that he had no information on this point, and
+Russell "acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour,
+and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor. The
+motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his
+lordship's suggestion."</p>
+<p>The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that
+Russell refrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of
+which Dallas knew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by
+Adams, and especially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's
+motion, which was one for <i>recognizing the independence and
+sovereignty of the South</i>, would be postponed. If there was a
+pledge here it was a pledge not to recognize Southern sovereignty
+until after Adams' arrival.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109"></a>[V1:pg 109]</span>
+<p>But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no
+question," writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his
+father, "that the proclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly
+haste.... The purpose was manifest. It was to have the status of
+the Confederacy as a belligerent an accomplished fact before the
+arrival of the newly accredited minister. This precipitate action
+was chiefly significant as indicating an animus; that animus being
+really based on ... the belief, already matured into a conviction,
+that the full recognition of the Confederacy as an independent
+power was merely a question of time, and probably of a very short
+time<a name="FNanchor191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191">[191]</a>."
+The author does not, however, support the contemporary American
+contention that <i>any</i> Proclamation was contrary to
+international custom and that no recognition of belligerent status
+was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced the
+mother country itself to recognize the division as fully
+accomplished, even while war still continued. Indeed American
+practice was flatly contradictory of the argument, as in the very
+pertinent example of the petty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when
+President Van Buren had promptly issued a proclamation of
+neutrality. It is curious that in his several replies to Seward's
+complaints Russell did not quote a letter from Stevenson, the
+American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May 22, 1838.
+Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the "Caroline"
+affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible
+principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars,
+as to belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same
+ground, and are governed by the same principles; that whenever
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110"></a>[V1:pg 110]</span> a
+portion of a State seek by force of arms to overthrow the
+Government, and maintain independence, the contest becomes one
+<i>de facto</i> of war<a name="FNanchor192"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_192">[192]</a>." This was as exact, and correct, a
+statement of the British view as could have been desired<a name=
+"FNanchor193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193">[193]</a>.</p>
+<p>The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did
+not then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July
+2, 1861, his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our
+side; of that I have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of
+this.] But they thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and
+as we seemed to have made up our minds to it, that their
+Proclamation was just the thing to keep them straight with both
+sides, and when it turned out otherwise they did their best to
+correct their mistake<a name="FNanchor194"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_194">[194]</a>." The modern historical judgment of the
+best American writers likewise exonerates the British Government of
+"unfriendly animus<a name="FNanchor195"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_195">[195]</a>," but is still apt to refer to the
+"premature" issue of the Proclamation.</p>
+<p>This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the
+Government be criticized even as exercising an unwise (not
+unfriendly) haste? Henry Adams wrote that the British thought the
+"dissolution seemed inevitable" and "we seemed to have made up our
+minds to it." Certainly this was a justifiable conclusion from the
+events in America from Lincoln's election in November, 1860, to his
+inauguration in March, 1861--and even to a later date, almost in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111"></a>[V1:pg 111]</span>
+fact to the first week in April. During this period the British
+Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy. Then, suddenly,
+actual conflict begins and at once each side in America issues
+declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and
+piracy, indicative that <i>maritime</i> war, the form of war at
+once most dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in
+British citizens, was the method first to be tried by the
+contestants. Unless these declarations were mere bluff and bluster
+England could not dare wait their application. She must at once
+warn her citizens and make clear her position as a neutral. The
+Proclamation was no effort "to keep straight with both sides"; it
+was simply the natural, direct, and prompt notification to British
+subjects required in the presence of a <i>de facto</i> war.</p>
+<p>Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was
+fortunate that the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The
+theory of the Northern administration under which the Civil War was
+begun and concluded was that a portion of the people of the United
+States were striving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance,
+and that there could be no recognition of any Southern
+<i>Government</i> in the conflict. In actual practice in war, the
+exchange of prisoners and like matters, this theory had soon to be
+discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theory nevertheless in
+looking forward to the purely domestic and constitutional problem
+of the return to the Union, when conquered, of the sections in
+rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreign nations,
+and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet under that
+theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation of
+Neutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded
+otherwise than to protest, officially, against any British
+declaration of neutrality, declaring that his Government did not
+acknowledge a state of war as existing, and threatening
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112"></a>[V1:pg 112]</span> to
+take his leave. It would have been his duty to <i>prevent</i>, if
+possible, the issue of the Proclamation. Dallas, fortunately, had
+been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams, fortunately, arrived
+too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely to complain. The
+"premature" issue of the Proclamation averted an inevitable rupture
+of relations on a clash between the American theory of "no state of
+war" and the international fact that war existed. Had that rupture
+occurred, how long would the British Government and people have
+remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of the
+United States<a name="FNanchor196"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_196">[196]</a>?</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_127"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor127">[127]</a> Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better
+informed in the early stages of the American conflict than any of
+his ministerial colleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the
+reviews and his unsigned article in the <i>Edinburgh</i>, April,
+1861, on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences,"
+was the first analysis of real merit in any of the
+reviews.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_128"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor128">[128]</a> In his <i>Memoirs of an Ex-Minister</i>,
+Malmesbury makes but three important references to the Civil War in
+America.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_129"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor129">[129]</a> Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>, p.
+165.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_130"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor130">[130]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, pp.
+227-8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_131"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor131">[131]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_132"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor132">[132]</a> It was generally whispered in Southern
+political circles that Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him,
+fearing his interference at home. If true, this is further evidence
+of Davis' neglect of foreign policy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_133"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor133">[133]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p.
+604.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_134"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor134">[134]</a> Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>, pp.
+149-51.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_135"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor135">[135]</a> Possibly the best concise statement of the
+effect on the North is given in Carl Schurz, <i>Reminiscences</i>,
+Vol. II, p. 223. Or see my citation of this in <i>The Power of
+Ideals in American History</i>, ch. I, "Nationality."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_136"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor136">[136]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp.
+1207-9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_137"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor137">[137]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 60.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_138"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor138">[138]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-62</i>, pp. 83-4. Dallas to Seward, May 2, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_139"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor139">[139]</a> An error. Mann did not arrive in London
+until May 15. Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p. 604.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_140"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor140">[140]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the
+Confederacy</i>, Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann
+was not present at the first interview with Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_141"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor141">[141]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell
+to Lyons, May 11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord
+Palmerston and the Queen." The greater and essential part has been
+printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in United States." No.
+33.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_142"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor142">[142]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p.
+604.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_143"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor143">[143]</a> Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum
+sent to Lyons is undated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May
+4, in which it was enclosed, it is presumable that the date of May
+3 for the Memorandum is correct.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_144"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor144">[144]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, May 4,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_145"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor145">[145]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to
+Lyons, May 6, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_146"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor146">[146]</a> It is to be remembered that the United
+States had given no notice of the existence of a state of
+war.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_147"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor147">[147]</a> In diplomatic usage official notification
+of neutrality to a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters
+show him to have appreciated a peculiar delicacy here.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_148"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor148">[148]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft.
+Printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol.
+XXV. "Correspondence on International Maritime Law." No.
+1.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_149"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor149">[149]</a> It is interesting that on this same day
+Lyons was writing from Washington advocating, regretfully, because
+of his sympathy with the North, a strict British neutrality:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally
+inclined<br>
+towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that<br>
+anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here<br>
+would place us in a position which would soon become<br>
+untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they<br>
+would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of<br>
+our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt<br>
+sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to<br>
+reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce<br>
+the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all<br>
+events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might<br>
+lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all<br>
+chance of this to be gone for ever."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_150"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor150">[150]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No.
+677.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_151"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor151">[151]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 684. Printed in part in
+<i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence
+on International Maritime Law." No. 3.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_152"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor152">[152]</a> <i>Times</i>, May 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_153"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor153">[153]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 31.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_154"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor154">[154]</a> So stated by the <i>Times</i>, May 9,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_155"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor155">[155]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp.
+1378-9. This blunt expression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary
+offers an interesting comparison with the words of the American
+President Wilson, in a parallel statement at the outbreak of the
+Great War in 1914. Wilson on August 3, 1914, gave a special
+audience to newspaper correspondents, begging them to maintain an
+attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4 he issued the first of
+several neutrality proclamations in which, following the customary
+language of such documents, the people were notified that
+neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expression of
+sympathies in public and in private." But on August 18 in an
+address to the people of the United States, this legal phraseology,
+required by traditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that
+"we must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a
+curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that
+might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle
+before another." And three weeks later, on September 8, came the
+proclamation setting aside October 4 "as a day of prayer to
+Almighty God," informing Him that war existed and asking His
+intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithy expression
+was better suited to the forthrightness of the British
+public.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_156"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor156">[156]</a> Hansard, <i>ibid</i>., pp. 1564-7.
+Gregory, a "Liberal-Conservative," though never a "good party man"
+was then supporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in
+Parliament, representing by his prominence in sport and society
+alike, the "gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and
+was a valuable influence for the South.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_157"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor157">[157]</a> This subject is developed at length in
+Chapter V on "The Declaration of Paris Negotiation."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_158"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor158">[158]</a> See <i>ante, p</i>. 88. The chronology of
+these rapidly succeeding events is interesting:<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was
+received<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; this day."<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American
+waters.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake
+keep out of<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; it."<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and
+Rost.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular
+war."<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize
+Southern<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; belligerency.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize
+Southern belligerency.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can
+not be<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; treated as pirates.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin
+in the late<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; afternoons, the instructions to
+diplomats were drawn before<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the statement in Parliament.]<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and
+Rost.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation
+of Neutrality<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; will be issued soon.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 13--The Proclamation authorized.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the
+<i>London Gazette</i>.<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;May 14--Adams in London "ready for business."<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2
+indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified
+to Lyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the
+governmental position had become definitely fixed, even though
+official instructions were not sent Lyons until the
+6th.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_159"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor159">[159]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to
+Russell, April 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_160"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor160">[160]</a> F.O., Am., 789, Monson to Alston, received
+May 21.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_161"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor161">[161]</a> F.O., Am., 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell,
+received May 26. The full statement is:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare
+of<br>
+this country, the present state of things is peculiarly<br>
+painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more<br>
+complete community of race and language, enlist his<br>
+sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he<br>
+cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant<br>
+war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both<br>
+sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead<br>
+only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life<br>
+and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would<br>
+be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of<br>
+the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of<br>
+Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to<br>
+England than to the Northern States themselves."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_162"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor162">[162]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, p.
+1763.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_163"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor163">[163]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1830-34. In the general
+discussion in the Lords there appeared disagreement as to the
+status of privateering. Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it
+as piracy. Earl Hardwicke thought privateering justifiable. The
+general tone of the debate, though only on this matter of
+international practice, was favourable to the North.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_164"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor164">[164]</a> For example see Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe
+by Treaty</i>, Vol. I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813
+during the Spanish-American colonial revolutions.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_165"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor165">[165]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, pp.
+2077-2088.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_166"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor166">[166]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 35. Russell to Lyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for
+Lyons' precaution was that while his French colleague, Mercier, had
+been instructed to support the British Proclamation, no official
+French Proclamation was issued until June 10, and Lyons, while he
+trusted Mercier, felt that this French delay needed some
+explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of his instructions
+and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request made no
+official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure.
+This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one,
+though it irritated both the British and French
+Ministers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_167"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor167">[167]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 85. Adams to Seward, May 17, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_168"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor168">[168]</a> Bedford died that day.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_169"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor169">[169]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, pp. 90-96. Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_170"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor170">[170]</a> Bernard, <i>The Neutrality of Great
+Britain during the American Civil War</i>, p. 161. The author cites
+at length despatches and documents of the period.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_171"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor171">[171]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, May 18,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_172"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor172">[172]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, June 1,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_173"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor173">[173]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, June 1,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_174"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor174">[174]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 82.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_175"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor175">[175]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June
+7, 1861. See also p. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_176"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor176">[176]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_177"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor177">[177]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, June 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_178"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor178">[178]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to
+Russell, June 17, 1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with
+that of Lyons, is in <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2</i>, p.
+106. Seward to Adams, June 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_179"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor179">[179]</a> Bancroft in his <i>Seward</i> (II, p. 183)
+prints a portion of an unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in
+Paris, July 1, 1861, as "his clearest and most characteristic
+explanation of what the attitude of the government must be in
+regard to the action of the foreign nations that have recognized
+the belligerency of the 'insurgents.'"<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor
+both<br>
+together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the<br>
+sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor<br>
+confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to<br>
+last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the<br>
+whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for<br>
+disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and<br>
+shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign<br>
+nations to respect and observe the treaties.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+"We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the<br>
+fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain<br>
+and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent<br>
+party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes,<br>
+but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their<br>
+public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless,<br>
+reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that<br>
+concludes the fact."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_180"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor180">[180]</a> The <i>Times</i>, June 3,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_181"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor181">[181]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 11, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_182"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor182">[182]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 87.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_183"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor183">[183]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No.
+56. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with
+Seward on June 15.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_184"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor184">[184]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-62</i>, p. 104. Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_185"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor185">[185]</a> Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes
+the view that the protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in
+regard to privateering and against interviews with the Southern
+commissioners were all unjustifiable. The first, he says, was based
+on "unsound reasoning" (II, 177). On the second he quotes with
+approval a letter from Russell to Edward Everett, July 12, 1861,
+showing the British dilemma: "Unless we meant to treat them as
+pirates and to hang them we could not deny them belligerent rights"
+(II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners he asserts that
+Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps he remembered
+that he himself had recently communicated, through three different
+intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners to Washington,
+and would have met them if the President had not forbidden it."
+Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, 179.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_186"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor186">[186]</a> Du Bose, <i>Yancey</i>, p.
+606.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_187"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor187">[187]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters,
+1861-1865</i>, Vol. I, p. 11. Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr., June 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_188"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor188">[188]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 98. Russell's report
+to Lyons of this interview of June 12, lays special emphasis on
+Adams' complaint of haste. <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States," No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_189"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor189">[189]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21,
+March 13, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_190"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor190">[190]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 85.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_191"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor191">[191]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>Charles Francis Adams</i>,
+p. 172. In preparing a larger life of his father, never printed,
+the son later came to a different opinion, crediting Russell with
+foresight in hastening the Proclamation to avoid possible
+embarrassment with Adams on his arrival. The quotation from the
+printed "Life" well summarizes, however, current American
+opinion.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_192"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor192">[192]</a> <i>U.S. Documents</i>, Ser. No. 347, Doc.
+183, p. 6.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_193"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor193">[193]</a> The United States Supreme Court in 1862,
+decided that Lincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was
+"itself official and conclusive evidence ... that a state of war
+existed." (Moore, Int. Law Digest, I, p. 190.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_194"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor194">[194]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p.
+16. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_195"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor195">[195]</a> Rhodes, <i>History of the United
+States</i>, III, p. 420 (<i>note</i>) summarizes arguments on this
+point, but thinks that the Proclamation might have been delayed
+without harm to British interests. This is perhaps true as a matter
+of historical fact, but such fact in no way alters the compulsion
+to quick action felt by the Ministry in the presence of probable
+<i>immediate</i> fact.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_196"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor196">[196]</a> This was the later view of C.F. Adams,
+Jnr. He came to regard the delay in his father's journey to England
+as the most fortunate single incident in American foreign relations
+during the Civil War.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113"></a>[V1:pg 113]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+<h3>BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been
+considered solely from the point of view of a formal American
+contention as to correct international practice and the British
+answer to that contention. In fact, however, there were intimately
+connected wth these formal arguments and instructions of the
+American Secretary of State a plan of possible militant action
+against Great Britain and a suspicion, in British Governmental
+circles, that this plan was being rapidly matured. American
+historians have come to stigmatize this plan as "Seward's Foreign
+War Panacea," and it has been examined by them in great detail, so
+that there is no need here to do more than state its main features.
+That which is new in the present treatment is the British
+information in regard to the plan and the resultant British
+suspicion of Seward's intentions.</p>
+<p>The British public, as distinguished from the Government,
+deriving its knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his
+career and past utterances, might well consider him as
+traditionally unfriendly to Great Britain. He had, in the 'fifties,
+vigorously attacked the British interpretation of the
+Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized Great Britain as "the most
+grasping and the most rapacious Power in the world"; he had long
+prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to the United States;
+he had not disdained, in political struggles in the State of New
+York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism to Great
+Britain; and more especially and more recently he had been reported
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114"></a>[V1:pg 114]</span> to
+have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civil
+conflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by
+fomenting a quarrel with England and engaging in a war against
+her<a name="FNanchor197"></a><a href="#Footnote_197">[197]</a>.
+Earlier expressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a
+politician never over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of
+foreign nations and peoples, for he had been even more outspoken
+against the France of Louis Napoleon, but the Newcastle
+conversation stuck in the British mind as indicative of a probable
+animus when the politician had become the statesman responsible for
+foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did, that he had ever
+uttered the words alleged<a name="FNanchor198"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_198">[198]</a>, and his friend Thurlow Weed might
+describe the words as "badinage," in a letter to the London
+<i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor199"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_199">[199]</a>, but the "Newcastle story" continued to
+be matter for frequent comment both in the Press and in private
+circles.</p>
+<p>British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to
+Seward's speeches intended for home political consumption, or to a
+careless bit of social talk, had there not been suspicion of other
+and more serious evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an
+unusually able and well-informed Minister, and from the first he
+had pictured the leadership of Seward in the new administration at
+Washington, and had himself been worried by his inability to
+understand what policy Seward was formulating. But, in fact, he did
+not see clearly what was going on in the camp of the Republican
+party now dominant in the North. The essential feature of the
+situation was that Seward, generally regarded as the man whose
+wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himself thinking
+this to be his destined function, early found his authority
+challenged by other leaders, and his <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_115"></a>[V1:pg 115]</span> policies not certain of
+acceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly,
+the situation at Washington.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image04.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image04.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image04.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD</b><br>
+(<i>From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind
+permission</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<p>Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been
+elected as a Republican by a political party never before in power.
+Many of the leading members of this party were drawn from the older
+parties and had been in administrative positions in either State or
+National Governments, but there were no party traditions, save the
+lately created one of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the
+Territories. All was new, then, to the men now in power in the
+National Government, and a new and vital issue, that of secession
+already declared by seven Southern States, had to be met by a
+definite policy. The important immediate question was as to whether
+Lincoln had a policy, or, if not, upon whom he would depend to
+guide him.</p>
+<p>In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular
+estimate, were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the
+Secretary of the Treasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of
+State. Both were experienced in political matters and both stood
+high in the esteem of the anti-slavery element in the North, but
+Seward, all things considered, was regarded as the logical leading
+member of the Cabinet. He had been the favoured candidate for
+Republican Presidential nomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln
+only on the theory that the latter as less Radical on anti-slavery,
+could be more easily elected. Also, he now held that position which
+by American tradition was regarded as the highest in the
+Cabinet.</p>
+<p>In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that
+Seward would determine the policy of the new administration.
+Seward's own attitude is well summed up in a despatch to his
+Government, February 18, 1861, by Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from
+the Republic of Bremen. He described a conversation with Seward in
+regard to his relations with Lincoln:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116"></a>[V1:pg 116]</span>
+<blockquote>"Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever
+remark, that there is no great difference between an elected
+president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The
+latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth, the
+former through the chances which make his election possible. The
+actual direction of public affairs belongs to the leader of the
+ruling party, here as well as in any hereditary principality.<br>
+<br>
+"The future President is a self-made man and there is therefore as
+little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial honesty ('honest
+old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he does not lack common
+sense. But his other qualities for the highest office are
+practically unknown. His election may therefore be readily compared
+with a lottery. It is possible that the United States has drawn the
+first prize, on the other hand the gain may only have been a small
+one. But unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may
+have been merely a blank."</blockquote>
+<p>The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion;
+the second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later
+Schleiden sent home a further analysis of Lincoln:</p>
+<blockquote>"He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and
+healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He seems
+to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which rests upon
+him. But at the same time it appears as if he had lost some of his
+famous firmness and resoluteness through the novelty of the
+conditions which surround him and the hourly renewed attempts from
+various sides to gain influence over him. He is therefore at
+present inclined to concede double weight to the superior political
+experience of his Secretary of State<a name=
+"FNanchor200"></a><a href="#Footnote_200">[200]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117"></a>[V1:pg 117]</span>
+<p>This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly
+described. Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not
+unchallenged and soon a decision was called for that in its final
+solution was to completely overthrow his already matured policy
+towards the seceding States. Buchanan had been pressed by South
+Carolina to yield possession of federal property in that State and
+especially to withdraw Federal troops from Fort Sumter in
+Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he had refused to do
+this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and re-supply the weak
+garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On March 5, Lincoln
+learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded unless
+reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and
+indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of
+his Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an
+issue the whole question of Seward's policy and leadership.</p>
+<p>For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of
+conciliatory delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue,
+and trusting to time and a sobering second thought to bring
+Southern leaders and people to a less violent attitude. He
+sincerely believed in the existence of an as yet unvoiced strong
+Union sentiment in the South, especially in those States which were
+wavering on secession. He was holding communications, through
+intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in
+Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence
+that State against secession. To all these Southern representatives
+he now conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that
+Sumter would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own
+"policy" would be approved by the President. His argument in reply
+to Lincoln's call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing
+Fort Sumter, and it seemed to meet, for the moment, with the
+approval of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself
+made no pertinent comment, yet did not commit himself. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_118"></a>[V1:pg 118]</span> There the
+matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners,
+regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the
+maturing of Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw<a name=
+"FNanchor201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201">[201]</a>," did not care
+to press for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal
+pledge that in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce
+Sumter, notification of that determination would at once be given
+to South Carolina. The days went by, and it was not until the last
+week of March that Lincoln, disillusioned as to the feasibility of
+Seward's policy of conciliation, reached the conclusion that in his
+conception of his duty as President of the United States he must
+defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt to retain them, for the
+preservation of the Union, and decided to reinforce Fort Sumter. On
+March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and learned Lincoln's
+determination.</p>
+<p>This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it
+also threatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet
+understand fully that either supreme leadership, or control of
+policy, had been assumed by Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that
+astonishing document entitled, "Some Thoughts for the President's
+Consideration," which at once reveals his alarm and his supreme
+personal self-confidence. This document begins, "We are at the end
+of a month's administration, and yet without a policy <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_119"></a>[V1:pg 119]</span> either domestic
+or foreign." It then advocates as a domestic policy, "<i>Change The
+Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery, Or About
+Slavery</i>, for a question upon <i>Union or Disunion</i>." Then in
+a second section, headed "For Foreign Nations," there followed:</p>
+<blockquote>"I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
+categorically, at once.<br>
+<br>
+"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send
+agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse a vigorous
+continental spirit of independence on this continent against
+European intervention.<br>
+<br>
+"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and
+France.<br>
+<br>
+"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.<br>
+<br>
+"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic prosecution
+of it.<br>
+<br>
+"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and
+direct it incessantly.<br>
+<br>
+"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while
+active in it, or<br>
+<br>
+"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on
+it must end, and all agree and abide.<br>
+<br>
+"It is not in my especial province;<br>
+<br>
+"But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility<a name=
+"FNanchor202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202">[202]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically
+gentle, yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed
+with his own superior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's
+"domestic policy" was exactly his own, except that he did not
+intend to abandon Fort Sumter. As to the warlike foreign policy
+Lincoln pointed out that this would be a sharp reversal of that
+already being prepared in circulars and instructions to Ministers
+abroad. This was, indeed, the case, for the first instructions,
+soon despatched, were drawn on lines of recalling to foreign powers
+their established and long-continued friendly <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_120"></a>[V1:pg 120]</span> relations with
+the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated as to the required
+"guiding hand," "I remark that if this must be done, I must do
+it.... I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all
+the Cabinet<a name="FNanchor203"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_203">[203]</a>."</p>
+<p>This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to
+direct affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had
+he not, momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific
+policy toward the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of
+Lincoln's quiet persistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate
+issue, the relief of Sumter (though attempting to divert
+reinforcements to another quarter) but did not as yet wholly yield
+either his policy of conciliation and delay, nor give up
+immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by plunging it
+into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurances to the
+Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he could
+and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this confidence
+that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up to the
+second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the ships
+despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day
+Governor Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the
+Northern purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow
+upon the South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war
+seemed inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the
+quarrel.</p>
+<p>The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a
+day and a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on
+April 13--for as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of
+Sumter changed, as in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern
+people. There was now a nearly unanimous cry for the preservation
+of the Union <i>by force</i>. Yet Seward still clung, privately, to
+his belief that even now the "sober second thought" of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121"></a>[V1:pg 121]</span>
+South would offer a way out toward reunion without war. In official
+utterances and acts he was apparently in complete harmony with the
+popular will to reconquer the South. Davis' proclamation on marque
+and privateering, of April 17, was answered by the Lincoln blockade
+proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet officially
+seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at least
+one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation
+Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of
+April 24 and offered his services as a mediator<a name=
+"FNanchor204"></a><a href="#Footnote_204">[204]</a>.</p>
+<p>Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the
+South until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving
+a breathing spell and permitting saner second judgment to both
+sides. He had consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved,
+and he found Seward favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens,
+Vice-President of the Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to
+him, as an old friend, Schleiden proposed to go and make the same
+appeal. Seward at once took Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three
+men, with Chase (and the Prussian Minister) were the only ones in
+the secret. Lincoln's first comment was that he was "willing to
+make an attempt of contributing to the prevention of bloodshed and
+regretted that Schleiden had not gone to Richmond without
+consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that "he did not
+have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but merely
+the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility to
+govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have
+enlightened Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the
+Union. Lincoln said he could neither authorize negotiations nor
+invite proposals, but that he would gladly consider any such
+proposals voluntarily made. Schleiden asked for a definite
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122"></a>[V1:pg 122]</span>
+statement as to whether Lincoln would recall the blockade
+proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis would recall the
+letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused to commit
+himself.</p>
+<p>This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward
+still thought something might result from the venture, and on that
+evening, April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided
+by Seward with a pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the
+afternoon of the twenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city
+was convinced that his mission would be a failure. All along his
+journey, at each little station, he saw excited crowds assembled
+enthusiastic for secession, bands of militia training, and every
+indication of preparation for war. Already, on that same day, the
+Virginia secession ordinance had been published, and the State
+convention had ratified the provisional constitution of the
+Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notified Stephens of
+his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, and was at
+once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frank and
+positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settle
+peacefully the differences between the two sections were futile."
+Formal letters were exchanged after this conference, but in these
+the extent to which Stephens would go was to promise to use his
+influence in favour of giving consideration to any indication made
+by the North of a desire "for an amicable adjustment of the
+questions at issue," and he was positive that there could be no
+return of the South to the Union.</p>
+<p>On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington.
+He found that three days had made a great change in the sentiment
+of the Capitol. "During my short absence," he wrote, "many
+thousands of volunteers had arrived from the North. There was not
+only a feeling of security noticeable, but even of combativeness."
+He found <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123"></a>[V1:pg
+123]</span> Seward not at all disposed to pursue the matter, and
+was not given an opportunity to talk to Lincoln; therefore, he
+merely submitted copies of the letters that had passed between him
+and Stephens, adding for himself that the South was arming
+<i>because</i> of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers.
+Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that
+he had no fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding
+that Stephens' letters gave no ground for action since the "Union
+of these States is the supreme as it is the organic law of this
+country," and must be maintained.</p>
+<p>This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be
+regarded as Seward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued
+policy of conciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden
+to Richmond, but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had
+encouraged and aided Schleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27,
+hope had vanished, and Seward's "domestic policy," as set forth in
+his "Thoughts for the President's Consideration" on April 1, was
+discredited, and inevitably, in some measure, their author also.
+The dates are important in appreciating Seward's purposes. On April
+27, the day of Schleiden's return to Washington, there was sent to
+Adams that "sharp" despatch, taking issue with British action as
+foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9, and concluding by instructing
+Adams to lose no time in warning Russell that such action would be
+regarded by the United States as "injurious to its rights and
+derogating from its dignity<a name="FNanchor205"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_205">[205]</a>." It appears, therefore, that Seward,
+defeated on one line of "policy," eager to regain prestige, and
+still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found to
+avert <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124"></a>[V1:pg
+124]</span> domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick
+at those threads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the
+Union through a foreign war. He was now seeking to force the
+acceptance of the second, and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts
+for the President."</p>
+<p>Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no
+secret at Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to
+Schleiden this fantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the
+United States an excuse for a war with England, France, or Spain,"
+he said "that would be the best means of re-establishing internal
+peace<a name="FNanchor206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206">[206]</a>."
+Again, on February 10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same
+topic, and complained that there was no foreign complication
+offering an excuse for a break. Lyons knew of this attitude, and by
+February 4 had sent Russell a warning, to which the latter had
+replied on February 20 that England could afford to be patient for
+a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" must not be
+indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarked in
+his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line,
+addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for established
+friendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction
+to Adams, April 10<a name="FNanchor207"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_207">[207]</a>, in the concluding paragraph of which
+Seward wrote, "The United States are not indifferent to the
+circumstances of common descent, language, customs, sentiments, and
+religion, which recommend a closer sympathy between themselves and
+Great Britain than either might expect in its intercourse with any
+other nation." True, on this basis, Seward claimed a special
+sympathy from Great Britain for the United States, that is to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125"></a>[V1:pg 125]</span>
+say, the North, but most certainly the tone of this first
+instruction was one of established friendship.</p>
+<p>Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell
+"refuses to pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to
+threats. What other explanation is possible except that, seeking to
+save his domestic policy of conciliation and to regain his
+leadership, he now was adventuring toward the application of his
+"foreign war panacea" idea. Lyons quickly learned of the changed
+tone, and that England, especially, was to hear American complaint.
+On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in cypher characterizing Seward as
+"arrogant and reckless toward Foreign Powers<a name=
+"FNanchor208"></a><a href="#Footnote_208">[208]</a>." Evidently
+Seward was making little concealment of his belligerent attitude,
+and when the news was received of the speeches in Parliament of the
+first week in May by which it became clear that Great Britain would
+declare neutrality and was planning joint action with France, he
+became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter home exhibiting,
+still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own foreign
+policy.</p>
+<blockquote>"A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to
+save it had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence,
+needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate
+position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do too
+much for my country, lest some advantage may revert indirectly to
+my own fame.<br>
+<br>
+"... They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe, Great
+Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the South, for
+the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to make war against
+her, as the ally of the traitors.... I am trying to get a bold
+remonstrance through the Cabinet before it is too late<a name=
+"FNanchor209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209">[209]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10," of May
+21, already commented upon in the preceding <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_126"></a>[V1:pg 126]</span> chapter. But as
+sent to Adams it varied in very important details from the draft
+submitted by Seward to Lincoln<a name="FNanchor210"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_210">[210]</a>.</p>
+<p>Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a
+challenge. Its language implied that the United States desired war,
+and Seward's plan was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell,
+give him a copy of it, and then discontinue diplomatic relations so
+long as Russell held either official or unofficial intercourse with
+the Southern Commissioners. This last instruction was, indeed,
+retained in the final form of the despatch, but here, as elsewhere,
+Lincoln modified the stiff expressions of the original. Most
+important of all, he directed Adams to consider the whole despatch
+as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion. The despatch,
+as amended, began with the statement that the United States
+"neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the
+sensibilities of that or any other European nation.... The paper
+itself is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of
+State, nor any of its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily,
+or indiscreetly made known. But its spirit will be your
+guide<a name="FNanchor211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211">[211]</a>."
+Thus were the teeth <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_127"></a>[V1:pg 127]</span> skilfully drawn from the threat
+of war. Even the positive instructions, later in the despatch, as
+to the Southern Commissioners, need not have been acted upon by
+Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But even with
+alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm
+Adams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The
+Government seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of
+Europe, and almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with
+the Ministers here in a certain contingency.... I scarcely know how
+to understand Mr. Seward. The rest of the Government may be
+demented for all I know; but he surely is calm and wise. My duty
+here is in so far as I can do it honestly to prevent the irritation
+from coming to a downright quarrel. It seems to me like throwing
+the game into the hands of the enemy<a name=
+"FNanchor212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212">[212]</a>."</p>
+<p>Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the
+source of American belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment
+of what was wise at the moment coincided with that of
+Lincoln's--though of this he had no knowledge. In the event Adams'
+skilful handling of the situation resulted favourably--even to the
+cessation of intercourse between Russell and the Southern
+Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no more than earlier, was to
+be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's "foreign war
+panacea" was stillborn.</p>
+<p>The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for
+Seward at last realized that the President intended to control
+policy, and though it was yet long before he came to appreciate
+fully Lincoln's customary calm judgment, he did understand the
+relation now established between <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_128"></a>[V1:pg 128]</span> himself and his chief.
+Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though free in suggestion and
+criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter, avowedly ignorant
+of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the altered
+despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them simple
+and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with
+Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a
+"leak" of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard
+to Despatch No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of
+influence by Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This
+was particularly true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was
+against England that Seward most directed his enmity. There
+resulted for British diplomats both at Washington and in London a
+deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long after he had made a complete
+face-about in policy. This suspicion influenced relations greatly
+in the earlier years of the Civil War.</p>
+<p>On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote
+a long twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of
+Seward's warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly
+ignorant of foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward,
+having lost strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking
+to recover influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the
+Cabinet is strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought,
+should maintain a stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and
+make close contacts with France. He was evidently anxious to
+impress upon Russell that Seward really might mean war, but he
+declared the chief danger to lie in the fact of American belief
+that England and France could not be driven into war with the
+United States, and that they would submit to any insult. Lyons
+urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to
+correct this false impression<a name="FNanchor213"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_213">[213]</a>. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_129"></a>[V1:pg 129]</span> Again, on the next day, May 21,
+the information in his official despatch was repeated in a private
+letter to Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as
+mere bluster. Yet he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any
+case insists that the best preventative of war with the United
+States is to show that England is ready for it<a name=
+"FNanchor214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214">[214]</a>.</p>
+<p>It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington.
+May 22, he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him
+to make defensive preparation<a name="FNanchor215"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_215">[215]</a>. The following day he dilated to Russell,
+privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the
+bounds of decency even in ordinary social intercourse<a name=
+"FNanchor216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216">[216]</a> ..." and in an
+official communication of this same day he records Washington
+rumours of a belligerent despatch read by Seward before the
+Cabinet, of objections by other members, and that Seward's
+insistence has carried the day<a name="FNanchor217"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_217">[217]</a>. That Seward was, in fact, still smarting
+over his reverse is shown by a letter, written on this same May 23,
+to his intimate friend and political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had
+evidently cautioned him against precipitate action. Seward wrote,
+"The European phase is bad. But your apprehension that I may be too
+decisive alarms me more. Will you consent, or advise us to consent,
+that Adams and Dayton have audiences and compliments in the
+Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs' [Confederate Secretary of
+State] emissaries have access to his bedroom<a name=
+"FNanchor218"></a><a href="#Footnote_218">[218]</a>?"</p>
+<p>Two interpretations are possible from this: either <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_130"></a>[V1:pg 130]</span> that Seward
+knowing himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had
+not yet yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the
+changes made in his Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation
+seems the more likely, for though Seward continued to write for a
+time "vigorous" despatches to Adams, they none of them approached
+the vigour of even the amended despatch. Moreover, the exact facts
+of the Cabinet of May 21, and the complete reversal of Seward's
+policy were sufficiently known by May 24 to have reached the ears
+of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to Bremen of that
+date<a name="FNanchor219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219">[219]</a>.
+And on the same day Seward himself told Schleiden that he did "not
+fear any longer that it would come to a break with England<a name=
+"FNanchor220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220">[220]</a>." On May 27
+Lyons himself, though still suspicious that an attempt was being
+made to separate France and England, was able to report a better
+tone from Seward<a name="FNanchor221"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_221">[221]</a>.</p>
+<p>British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons,
+but they were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a
+suspicion of the American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston
+wrote to Russell in comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These
+communications are very unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that
+either from foolish and uncalculating arrogance and
+self-sufficiency or from political calculation Mr. Seward may bring
+on a quarrel with us<a name="FNanchor222"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_222">[222]</a>." He believed that more troops ought
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131"></a>[V1:pg 131]</span> to
+be sent to Canada, as a precautionary measure, but, he added, "the
+main Force for Defence must, of course, be local"--a situation
+necessarily a cause for anxiety by British Ministers. Russell was
+less perturbed. He had previously expressed appreciation of Adams'
+conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a very favourable
+impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man<a name=
+"FNanchor223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223">[223]</a>," and he now
+wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage him
+in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so
+reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man<a name=
+"FNanchor224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224">[224]</a>." But at
+Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As
+a result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians,
+not Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June
+6, stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of
+war by the United States against Great Britain appears to me by no
+means impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to
+invasion<a name="FNanchor225"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_225">[225]</a>." This was followed two days later by a
+despatch dilating upon the probability of war, and ending with
+Lyons' opinion of how it should be conducted. England should strike
+at once with the largest possible naval force and bring the war to
+an end before the United States could prepare. Otherwise, "the
+spirit, the energy, and the resources of this people" would make
+them difficult to overcome. England, on her part, must be prepared
+to suffer severely from American privateers, and she would be
+forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping
+Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter
+and advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled
+to write it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he
+would exert every effort and use every method to conciliate
+America<a name="FNanchor226"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_226">[226]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132"></a>[V1:pg 132]</span>
+<p>In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that
+had so renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press
+reception of the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality.
+The Northern people, counting beyond all reasonable expectation
+upon British sympathy on anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily
+disappointed, and were at the moment loudly voicing their vexation.
+Had Seward not already been turned from his foreign war policy he
+now would have received strong public support in it. But he made no
+effort to utilize public excitement to his own advantage in the
+Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on June 14 that
+Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with the
+Southern Commissioners<a name="FNanchor227"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_227">[227]</a>, but before anyone in Washington could
+learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from
+the Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed.
+On June 15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and
+Mercier, in which Seward had positively refused to receive the
+Queen's Proclamation, but had throughout evinced the greatest
+courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so reported the conversation<a name=
+"FNanchor228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228">[228]</a>. June 15 may,
+in fact, be taken as the date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over
+an immediate war. Possibly he found it a little difficult to report
+so sudden a shift from stormy to fair weather. June 21, he wrote
+that the "lull" was still continuing<a name=
+"FNanchor229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229">[229]</a>. June 24, he at
+last learned and described at length the details of Lincoln's
+alteration of Despatch No. 10<a name="FNanchor230"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_230">[230]</a>. He <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_133"></a>[V1:pg 133]</span> did not know the exact date but
+he expressed the opinion that "a month or three weeks ago" war was
+very near--a misjudgment, since it should be remembered that war
+seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that on this issue he
+had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed leadership into
+the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants.</p>
+<p>Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of
+American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in
+thinking that an American attack on England was either imminent or
+intended. Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering
+Seward's prestige and Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did.
+It was long, indeed, before he could escape from suspicion of
+Seward's purposes, though dropping, abruptly, further comment on
+the chances of war. A month later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward
+had himself asked for a confidential and unofficial interview, in
+order to make clear that there never had been any intention of
+stirring agitation against England. Personally, Seward took credit
+for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take official cognizance of
+the recognition [by England] of the belligerent rights of the
+South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that previous
+strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers
+understand the intensity of Northern feeling<a name=
+"FNanchor231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231">[231]</a>.</p>
+<p>Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change,
+mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all
+to the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the
+utmost bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in
+London, Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of
+the Queen's Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to
+Adams' representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone"
+consisted.</p>
+<p>Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_134"></a>[V1:pg 134]</span> was the receipt
+of a despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had
+reported that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that
+the knowledge in Washington of the result of their previous
+interviews had brought satisfaction, and Russell, for his part,
+said that Lyons had "learned, through another member of the
+diplomatic corps, that no further expression of opinion on the
+subject in question would be necessary<a name=
+"FNanchor232"></a><a href="#Footnote_232">[232]</a>." This
+referred, presumably, to the question of British intention, for the
+future, in relation to the Proclamation of Neutrality. Adams wrote:
+"This led to the most frank and pleasant conversation which I have
+yet had with his lordship.... I added that I believed the popular
+feeling in the United States would subside the moment that all the
+later action on this side was known.... My own reception has been
+all that I could desire. I attach value to this, however, only as
+it indicates the establishment of a policy that will keep us at
+peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In reply
+to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his
+interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view
+that the British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel
+was not defensible in international law. There was not now, nor
+later, any yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was
+intended for Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by
+a disclaimer, much as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great
+Britain:</p>
+<blockquote>"I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I
+may at any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and
+profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has
+prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned
+remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or measure of
+recognition of the insurgents by the government of Great Britain. I
+write in the same spirit now; and I invoke on the part of the
+British government, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_135"></a>[V1:pg 135]</span> as I propose to exercise on my
+own, the calmness which all counsellors ought to practise in
+debates which involve the peace and happiness of mankind<a name=
+"FNanchor233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233">[233]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform
+oratory leads to the suspicion that the writer is thinking,
+primarily, of the ultimate publication of his despatches. Thus
+Seward seems to have been laying the ground for a denial that he
+had ever developed a foolish foreign war policy. History pins him
+to that folly. But in another respect the interview with Lyons on
+July 20 and the letter to Adams of the day following overthrow for
+both Seward and for the United States the accusations sometimes
+made that it was the Northern disaster at Bull Run, July 21, in the
+first pitched battle with the South, which made more temperate the
+Northern tone toward foreign powers<a name=
+"FNanchor234"></a><a href="#Footnote_234">[234]</a>. It is true
+that the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, but
+internal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before
+there was any news from the battle-field, and the interview with
+Lyons on the 20th proves that the military set-back had no
+influence on Seward's friendly expressions. Moreover, these
+expressions officially made were but a delayed voicing of a
+determination of policy arrived at many weeks earlier. The
+chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapter will have
+shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward's leadership,
+and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone," preceded
+any news whatever from England, lightening the first impressions.
+The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, even know that
+England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knew merely of
+Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and the
+friendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received in
+Washington until the month following.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136"></a>[V1:pg 136]</span>
+<p>In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not
+deserve the place in history usually accorded it as a moment of
+extreme crisis in British-American relations. There was never any
+danger of war from it, for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud.
+The public excitement in America over the Queen's Proclamation was,
+indeed, intense; but this did not alter the Governmental attitude.
+In England all that the public knew was this American irritation
+and clamour. The London press expressed itself a bit more
+cautiously, for the moment, merely defending the necessity of
+British neutrality<a name="FNanchor235"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_235">[235]</a>. But if regarded from the effect upon
+British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly even
+vital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had
+been gravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely
+alarmed, was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in
+London the suspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years
+of the war, and to British Ministers it seemed that at any moment
+he might recover leadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British
+attitude toward America was affected in two opposite ways; Britain
+was determined not to be bullied, and Russell himself sometimes
+went to the point of arrogance in answer to American complaints;
+this was an unfortunate result. But more fortunate, and <i>also a
+result</i>, was the British Government's determination to step
+warily in the American conflict and to give no just cause, unless
+on due consideration of policy, for a rupture of relations with the
+United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, from every angle but
+a short-lived "brain-storm," served America well in the first years
+of her great crisis.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_197"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor197">[197]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 80.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_198"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor198">[198]</a> Barnes, <i>Life of Thurlow Weed</i>, II,
+p. 378. Seward to Weed, December 27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_199"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor199">[199]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 355. Weed's letter was on
+the <i>Trent</i> affair, but he went out of his way to depict
+Seward as attempting a bit of humour with Newcastle.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_200"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor200">[200]</a> Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was
+educated at the University of Berlin, and entered the Danish
+customs service. In the German revolution of 1848 he was a delegate
+from Schleswig-Holstein to the Frankfort Parliament. After the
+failure of that revolution he withdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was
+sent by that Republic to the United States as Minister. By 1860 he
+had become one of the best known and socially popular of the
+Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimate relations with
+leading Americans both North and South. His reports on events
+preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archives of
+Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor's
+thesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten
+Staaten w&auml;hrend des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My
+facts with regard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis,
+in part from an article by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to
+Richmond, April 25, 1861," printed in the <i>Annual Report of the
+American Historical Association</i> for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies
+of some of Schleiden's despatches are on deposit in the Library of
+Congress among the papers of Carl Schurz. Through the courtesy of
+Mr. Frederic Bancroft, who organized the Schurz papers, I have been
+permitted to take copies of a few Schleiden dispatches relating to
+the visit to Richmond, an incident apparently unknown to history
+until Dr. Lutz called attention to it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_201"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor201">[201]</a> This is Bancroft's expression.
+<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 118.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_202"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor202">[202]</a> Lincoln, <i>Works</i>, II,
+29.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_203"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor203">[203]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 30.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_204"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor204">[204]</a> For references to this whole matter of
+Schleiden's visit to Richmond see <i>ante</i>, p. 116, note
+1.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_205"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor205">[205]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1861-2, p. 82. This, and other despatches have been examined at
+length in the previous chapter in relation to the American protest
+on the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. In the present chapter
+they are merely noted again in their bearing on Seward's "foreign
+war policy."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_206"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor206">[206]</a> Quoted by Lutz, <i>Am. Hist. Assn.
+Rep</i>. 1915, p. 210.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_207"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor207">[207]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1861-2, p. 80. This despatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W.H.
+Russell, correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, who commented that it
+contained some elements of danger to good relations, but it is
+difficult to see to what he could have had objection.--Russell,
+<i>My Diary</i>, I, p. 103.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_208"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor208">[208]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_209"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor209">[209]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+169.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_210"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor210">[210]</a> Yet at this very time Seward was
+suggesting, May 14, to Prussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and
+Holland a joint naval demonstration with America against Japan
+because of anti-foreign demonstrations in that country. This has
+been interpreted as an attempt to tie European powers to the United
+States in such a way as to hamper any friendly inclination they may
+have entertained toward the Confederacy (Treat, <i>Japan and the
+United States</i>, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50. Also Dennet, "Seward's Far
+Eastern Policy," in <i>Am. Hist. Rev</i>., Vol. XXVIII, No. 1.
+Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as in harmony with
+his determined policy in the Far East.) Like Seward's overture,
+made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention to
+guarantee the independence of San Domingo (F.O., Am., Vol. 763, No.
+196, Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to
+me to have been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude
+while in the process of developing a really serious policy--the
+plunging of America into a foreign war.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_211"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor211">[211]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1861-2, p. 88. The exact facts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch
+No. 10, though soon known in diplomatic circles, were not published
+until the appearance in 1890 of Nicolay and Hay's <i>Lincoln</i>,
+where the text of a portion of the original draft, with Lincoln's
+changes were printed (IV, p. 270). Gideon Welles, Secretary of the
+Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a short book in 1874,
+<i>Lincoln and Seward</i>, in which the story was told, but without
+dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it.
+Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and the
+contents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and
+the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
+Sumner.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_212"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor212">[212]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of
+Paris," p. 21. Reprint from <i>Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings</i>,
+XLVI, pp. 23-81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_213"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor213">[213]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 206.
+Confidential.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_214"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor214">[214]</a> Russell Papers. This letter has been
+printed, in part, in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 41.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_215"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor215">[215]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_216"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor216">[216]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, May 23,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_217"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor217">[217]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209,
+Confidential, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract"
+from this despatch was printed in the British <i>Parliamentary
+Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil
+War in the United States," No. 48. The "extract" in question
+consists of two short paragraphs only, printed, without any
+indication of important elisions, in each of the
+paragraphs.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_218"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor218">[218]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+174.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_219"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor219">[219]</a> Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's
+information is not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many
+persons closely in touch with events, especially with Sumner,
+Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and with
+Blair, a member of the Cabinet.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_220"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor220">[220]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Schleiden to Republic of
+Bremen, May 27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_221"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor221">[221]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 179, sets
+the date as June 8 when Seward's instructions for England and
+France show that he had "recovered his balance." This is correct
+for the change in tone of despatches, but the acceptance of
+Lincoln's policy must have been immediate. C.F. Adams places the
+date for Seward's complete change of policy much later, describing
+his "war mania" as lasting until the Northern defeat of Bull Run,
+July 21. I think this an error, and evidence that it is such
+appears later in the present chapter. See Charles Francis Adams,
+"Seward and the Declaration of Paris," <i>Mass. Hist. Soc.
+Proceedings</i>, XLVI, pp. 23-81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_222"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor222">[222]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_223"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor223">[223]</a> Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_224"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor224">[224]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, May 25,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_225"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor225">[225]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_226"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor226">[226]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 263, Lyons to Russell,
+June 8, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_227"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor227">[227]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 106.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_228"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor228">[228]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 102. Bancroft,
+<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 181, using Seward's description to Adams
+<i>(U.S. Messages and Documents</i>, 1861-2, p. 106) of this
+interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus preventing a
+joint notification by England and France of their intention to act
+together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as "diplomatic
+skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the emphasis is
+placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt that the
+knowledge of British-French joint action had been made sufficiently
+clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common though
+unofficial representation to Seward.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_229"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor229">[229]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_230"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor230">[230]</a> <i>Ibid</i>, To Russell. Lyons' source of
+information was not revealed.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_231"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor231">[231]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_232"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor232">[232]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 110.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_233"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor233">[233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 118. To
+Adams.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_234"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor234">[234]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of
+Paris." p. 29, and so argued by the author throughout this
+monograph. I think this an error.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_235"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor235">[235]</a> The <i>Spectator</i>, friend of the North,
+argued, June 15, 1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next
+best thing for the North to a definite British alliance. Southern
+privateers could not now be obtained from England. And the United
+States was surely too proud to accept direct British
+aid.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137"></a>[V1:pg 137]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2>
+<h3>THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION</h3>
+<br>
+<p>If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology
+there accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with
+Great Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the
+American Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite
+support of the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation
+undertaken by Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic
+service he attached to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly,
+to the extent of permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate
+failure of the negotiation to distort his usually cool and fair
+judgment. The matter in question was the offer of the United States
+to accede by a convention to the Declaration of Paris of 1856,
+establishing certain international rules for the conduct of
+maritime warfare.</p>
+<p>This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It
+failed to result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be
+negligible. Yet it was at the time of very great importance in
+affecting the attitude toward each other of Great Britain and the
+United States, and of the men who spoke for their respective
+countries. The bald facts of the negotiation appear with exactness
+in Moore's <i>Digest of International Law</i><a name=
+"FNanchor236"></a><a href="#Footnote_236">[236]</a>, but without
+comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in Bernard's
+<i>Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil
+War</i><a name="FNanchor237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237">[237]</a>,
+at the conclusion of which the author <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_138"></a>[V1:pg 138]</span> writes, with
+sarcasm, "I refrain from any comment on this negotiation<a name=
+"FNanchor238"></a><a href="#Footnote_238">[238]</a>." Nicolay and
+Hay's <i>Lincoln</i>, and Rhodes' <i>United States</i>, give the
+matter but passing and inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in
+some detail in the American argument before the Geneva court of
+arbitration in the case of the <i>Alabama</i>, but was there
+presented merely as a part of the general American complaint of
+British neutrality. In fact, but three historical students, so far
+as the present writer has been able to discover, have examined this
+negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as to
+purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British
+intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly
+spreading in America.</p>
+<p>These three, each with an established historical reputation,
+exhibit decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic
+incidents and documents. The first careful analysis was presented
+by Henry Adams, son of the American Minister in London during the
+Civil War, and then acting as his private secretary, in his
+<i>Historical Essays</i>, published in 1891; the second study is by
+Bancroft, in his <i>Life of Seward</i>, 1900; while the third is by
+Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American Minister), who, in
+his <i>Life</i> of his father, published 1900, gave a chapter to
+the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid down by
+his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion,
+through further study, that he had earlier been in error and
+developed a very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward
+and the Declaration of Paris."</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image05.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image05.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image05.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>C.F. ADAMS</b><br>
+(<i>From a photograph in the United States Embassy, London, by kind
+permission</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<p>If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking
+as they do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise
+general in treatment, the author's answer is that the personality
+of two of the writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the
+effect of the negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in
+London are themselves <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_139"></a>[V1:pg 139]</span> important historical data; a
+further answer is the fact that the materials now available from
+the British Foreign Office archives throw much new light both on
+the course of the negotiation and on British purposes. It is here
+planned, therefore, first to review the main facts as previously
+known; second, to summarize the arguments and conclusions of the
+three historians; third, to re-examine the negotiation in the light
+of the new material; and, finally, to express an opinion on its
+conduct and conclusions as an evidence of British policy.</p>
+<p>In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the
+chief maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily
+agreed to respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or
+the enemy's flag. This was a distinct step forward in the practice
+of maritime warfare, the accepted international rules of which had
+not been formally altered since the Napoleonic period. The action
+of Great Britain was due in part, according to a later statement in
+Parliament by Palmerston, March 18, 1862, to a fear that unless a
+greater respect were paid than formerly to neutral rights, the
+Allies would quickly win the ill-will of the United States, then
+the most powerful maritime neutral, and would run the danger of
+forcing that country into belligerent alliance with Russia<a name=
+"FNanchor239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239">[239]</a>. No doubt there
+were other reasons, also, for the barbarous rules and practices of
+maritime warfare in earlier times were by now regarded as
+semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the action
+of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the
+result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris
+in 1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and
+some leading neutrals were gathered.</p>
+<p>The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four
+points:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140"></a>[V1:pg 140]</span>
+<blockquote>"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.<br>
+<br>
+"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
+contraband of war.<br>
+<br>
+"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not
+liable to capture under enemy's flag.<br>
+<br>
+"4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is
+to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access
+to the coast of the enemy<a name="FNanchor240"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_240">[240]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain,
+Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed
+that a general invitation to accede should be extended to all
+nations, but with the proviso "that the powers which shall have
+signed it, or which shall accede thereto, shall not in future enter
+into any arrangement, concerning the application of the law of
+neutrals in time of war, which does not rest altogether upon the
+four principles embodied in the said declaration<a name=
+"FNanchor241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241">[241]</a>." In other
+words it must be accepted in whole, and not in part, and the powers
+acceding pledging themselves not to enter into any subsequent
+treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not stipulate
+observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all the
+maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the
+Declaration of Paris.</p>
+<p>But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in
+the advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights.
+Little by little her avowed principles of international law as
+regards neutrals, first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in
+treaty stipulations. Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in
+July, 1856, that the United <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_141"></a>[V1:pg 141]</span> States would accede to the
+Declaration if a fifth article were added to it protecting all
+private property at sea, when not contraband. This covered not only
+cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would have been to
+exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's goods
+under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned.
+Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to
+battles between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule
+were adopted also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States
+could not forgo the right to send out privateers, which in the past
+had proved her most effective maritime weapon in time of war, and
+which, since she had no large navy, were essential to her fighting
+power."</p>
+<p>"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been
+abolished on land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?"
+The American proposal met with general support among the smaller
+maritime nations. It was believed that the one great obstacle to
+the adoption of Marcy's amendment lay in the naval supremacy of
+Great Britain, and that obstacle proved insurmountable. Thus the
+United States refused to accede to the Declaration, and there the
+matter rested until 1861. But on April 17 Jefferson Davis
+proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of privateers
+against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed
+representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and
+expressing the hope that it still might meet with a favourable
+reception, but authorizing them to enter into conventions for
+American adherence to the Declaration of 1856 on the four points
+alone. This instruction was sent to the Ministers in Great Britain,
+France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and
+on May 10 to the Netherlands.</p>
+<p>Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his
+first meeting with Russell on May 18, after having <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_142"></a>[V1:pg 142]</span> developed at
+length the American position relative to the issue of the British
+Proclamation of Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to
+offer adherence by means of a convention, to the Declaration of
+Paris. Russell replied that Great Britain was willing to negotiate,
+but "seemed to desire to leave the subject in the hands of Lord
+Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had already transmitted
+authority<a name="FNanchor242"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_242">[242]</a>...." Adams therefore did not press the
+matter, waiting further information and instruction from
+Washington. Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact,
+approached the Government of France with a suggestion that the two
+leading maritime powers should propose to the American belligerents
+adherence to the second and third articles of the Declaration of
+Paris. France had agreed and the date of Russell's instruction to
+Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with Adams. Confusion
+now arose in both London and Washington as to the place where the
+arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion will
+be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note
+that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London.</p>
+<p>On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready
+to enter into a convention with the United States, provided a
+similar convention was signed with France at the same time. This
+convention, as submitted by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by
+the two powers to abide by the four points of the Declaration of
+Paris, using the exact wording of that document<a name=
+"FNanchor243"></a><a href="#Footnote_243">[243]</a>. Adams' draft
+had been communicated to Russell on July 13. There then followed a
+delay required by the necessity of securing similar action by
+Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29 Adams
+reported to Russell that this had <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_143"></a>[V1:pg 143]</span> been done and that he was ready
+to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also,
+was ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on
+the part of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and
+will not invalidate anything already done<a name=
+"FNanchor244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244">[244]</a>." It was not
+until August 8, however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to
+France, reported that Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign
+Minister, that he was ready to sign the similar convention with
+France<a name="FNanchor245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245">[245]</a>.
+With no understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay,
+and professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's
+phrase, just quoted<a name="FNanchor246"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_246">[246]</a>, Adams waited the expected invitation to
+an official interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was
+a condition of the negotiation that this should be done
+simultaneously in London and Paris, the further delay that now
+occurred caused him no misgivings.</p>
+<p>On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day
+"in the course of this week," and prefaced this request with the
+statement that he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he
+proposed to make in writing, upon signing the convention. "You will
+observe," he wrote, "that it is intended to prevent any
+misconception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by Her
+Majesty." The proposed Declaration read:</p>
+<blockquote>"In affixing his signature to the Convention of this
+day between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and
+the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order
+of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend thereby to
+undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or
+indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United
+States<a name="FNanchor247"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_247">[247]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144"></a>[V1:pg 144]</span>
+<p>Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and
+simple adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now
+go on to official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so.
+Sincerely believing, as he stated to Russell in a communication of
+August 23, that the United States was "acting with the single
+purpose of aiding to establish a permanent doctrine for all time,"
+and with the object of "ameliorating the horrors of warfare all
+over the globe," he objected "to accompany the act with a
+proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the face of it
+seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that the
+United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the
+Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable
+policy, but with the view of securing some small temporary object
+in the unhappy struggle which is going on at home<a name=
+"FNanchor248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248">[248]</a>." He also
+pointed out that Russell's proposed declaration either was or was
+not a part of the convention. If it was a part then the Senate of
+the United States must ratify it as well as the convention itself,
+and he would have gone beyond his instructions in submitting it. If
+not a part of the convention there could be no advantage in making
+the Declaration since, unratified by the Senate, it would have no
+force. Adams therefore declined to proceed further with the matter
+until he had received new instructions from Washington.</p>
+<p>To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit
+exposition of his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her
+neutrality in the American conflict, thereby recognizing the
+belligerent rights of the South. It followed that the South "might
+by the law of nations arm privateers," and that these "must be
+regarded as the armed vessels of a belligerent." But the United
+States had refused to recognize the status of belligerency, and
+could therefore maintain that privateers issued by the Southern
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145"></a>[V1:pg 145]</span>
+States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a European Power
+signing a convention with the United States, embodying the
+principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat
+the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates."
+Hence Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from
+contradictory premises as to the status of the conflict in America,
+might become involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of
+the convention. He had therefore merely intended by his suggested
+declaration to prevent any misconception by the United States.</p>
+<blockquote>"It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government
+decline to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their
+part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an adoption of
+the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be construed as an
+engagement to interfere in the unhappy dissensions now prevailing
+in the United States; an interference which would be contrary to
+Her Majesty's public declarations, and would be a reversal of the
+policy which Her Majesty has deliberately sanctioned<a name=
+"FNanchor249"></a><a href="#Footnote_249">[249]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the
+proposed declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to
+Adams, in London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar
+declaration had been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue
+the question save in generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed
+possible "intervention" which Great Britain and France seemed to
+fear they would be called upon to make was exactly the action which
+the United States desired to forestall, and he notified Adams that
+he could not consent since the proposed Declaration "would be
+virtually a new and distinct article incorporated into the
+projected convention<a name="FNanchor250"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_250">[250]</a>." The first formal negotiation of the
+United States during the Civil War, and of the new American
+Minister in London, had come <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_146"></a>[V1:pg 146]</span> to an inglorious conclusion.
+Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed,
+and were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public,
+not at the moment informed save on the American offer and the
+result, paid little attention to these "inner circle"
+controversies<a name="FNanchor251"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_251">[251]</a>.</p>
+<p>What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the
+negotiating powers. The first answer in historical writing was that
+offered by Henry Adams<a name="FNanchor252"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_252">[252]</a>, in an essay entitled "The Declaration of
+Paris, 1861," in the preparation of which the author studied with
+care all the diplomatic correspondence available in print<a name=
+"FNanchor253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253">[253]</a>. His treatment
+presents Russell as engaged in a policy of deception with the view
+of obtaining an ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of
+commercial rivalry and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams'
+argument Russell, on May 9, brought to the attention of France a
+proposal for a joint request on the American belligerents to
+respect the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris,
+and received an acquiescent reply. After some further exchanges of
+proposed terms of instructions to the British and French Ministers
+at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to Lyons with
+instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his first
+interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could
+have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to
+negotiate <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147"></a>[V1:pg
+147]</span> on the Declaration of Paris as a <i>whole</i>--that is
+to say, on all four articles--intimated that instructions had
+already gone to Lyons, with directions to assent to any
+modification of the article on privateering that the United States
+might desire. Adams understood Russell to prefer that the
+negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to be) should take place
+in Washington, and did not press the matter.</p>
+<p>This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since
+the interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's
+country house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable
+supposition the despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until
+the Foreign Secretary's return to his office; second because Lyons
+was not instructed to <i>negotiate</i> on the Declaration. The
+interpretation is justified therefore that Russell "evaded the
+offer of the United States Government." The result of this evasion
+was delay, but when Seward learned from Lyons that he had no
+authority to negotiate a convention and Adams received renewed
+instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his temper, but the
+affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook his faith
+in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In renewing
+his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the previous
+"misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further
+"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview.</p>
+<p>Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit
+and evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that
+Lyons, at Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward
+the South, Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a
+line of policy distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each
+point in the negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as
+follows:</p>
+<blockquote>"The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues
+... induced the French Government to violate the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_148"></a>[V1:pg 148]</span> pledge in the
+protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to both
+belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the United
+States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of Paris, while
+it placed both belligerents on the same apparent footing. These
+steps were taken in haste before Adams could obtain an interview.
+When Adams by an effort unexpected to Russell obtained an interview
+at Pembroke Lodge at noon of Saturday, May 18, and according to
+Russell's report of May 21, said that the United States were
+'disposed to adhere to the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded
+the offer, saying that he had already sent sufficient instructions
+to Lyons, although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had
+they been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his
+notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made such
+changes in it as should represent the first proposal as coming from
+himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams. When at last
+obliged to read the American offer, Russell declared that he had
+never heard of it before, although he had himself reported it to
+Lyons and Lyons had reported it to him. When compelled to take the
+offer for consideration, Russell, though always professing to
+welcome adhesion pure and simple, required the co-operation of
+Dayton. When Adams overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed
+a written proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent
+ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but
+insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a
+declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be
+disregarded<a name="FNanchor254"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_254">[254]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor
+points are insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as
+the question of who first made the proposal--that are not essential
+to Henry Adams' conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the
+delays interposed by Russell, Adams must conclude that the British
+Cabinet was trying one device after another to evade the
+proposition; and finally, from the written declaration of August
+19, he could draw no other inference than that Russell had resorted
+to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149"></a>[V1:pg 149]</span>
+the only defensive weapon left to him, in order to avoid the avowal
+of his true motives and policy<a name="FNanchor255"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_255">[255]</a>." The <i>motive</i> of this tortuous
+proceeding, the author believed to have been a deep-laid scheme to
+revive, <i>after</i> the American War was ended, the earlier
+international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject to
+belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was
+the American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled
+Great Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American
+adherence, now, to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's
+hands, but if there were no such complete adherence and only
+temporary observation of the second article, after the war had
+resulted in the disruption of the United States, thus removing the
+chief supporter of that article, Great Britain would feel free to
+resume her old-time practice when she engaged in war. If Great
+Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she would feel
+bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood
+constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord
+Malmesbury declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect
+it<a name="FNanchor256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256">[256]</a>."
+Thus the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first
+on privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the
+negotiation of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner
+in which Russell received the advances of President Lincoln, no
+American Minister in London could safely act on any other
+assumption than that the British Government meant, at the first
+convenient opportunity, to revive the belligerent pretensions
+dormant since the War of 1812<a name="FNanchor257"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_257">[257]</a>."</p>
+<p>This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly
+summarized it depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150"></a>[V1:pg 150]</span> on
+the part of Russell and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former,
+selfish British policy, and throughout a blind following on by
+France, yielding to Russell's leadership. The American proposal is
+regarded merely as a simple and sincere offer to join in supporting
+an improved international practice in war-times. But when Frederic
+Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, examined the negotiation he was
+compelled to ask himself whether this was all, indeed, that the
+American Secretary of State had in view. Bancroft's analysis may be
+stated more briefly<a name="FNanchor258"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_258">[258]</a>.</p>
+<p>Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April
+24, nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern
+belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to
+remove all excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward
+asserted a twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with
+other progressive nations in the melioration of the rigours of
+maritime war," and "to remove every cause that any foreign Power
+could have for the recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent
+Power<a name="FNanchor259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259">[259]</a>."
+This last result was not so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the
+mechanism of operation ever openly stated by Seward. But he did
+write, later, that the proposal of accession to the Declaration of
+Paris was tendered "as the act of this Federal Government, to be
+obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal citizens." "It did
+not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy to tell what
+would result in case the offer of accession on the part of the
+United States should be accepted<a name="FNanchor260"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_260">[260]</a>."</p>
+<p>Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position
+where they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard
+Southern privateers as pirates, and treat <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_151"></a>[V1:pg 151]</span> them as such.
+This was a conceivable result of the negotiation before European
+recognition of Southern belligerency, but even after that
+recognition and after Dayton had pointed out the impossibility of
+such a result, Seward pressed for the treaty and instructed Dayton
+not to raise the question with France. He still had in mind this
+main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not intended to use
+the adherence of the United States to the declaration as a lever to
+force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates, or at
+least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and
+unofficially have removed all such suspicions<a name=
+"FNanchor261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261">[261]</a>." In an
+interview with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of
+the treaty, arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could
+be determined afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave
+warning to Russell. "Probably it was this advice that caused
+Russell to insist on the explanatory declaration<a name=
+"FNanchor262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262">[262]</a>."</p>
+<p>It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the
+acuteness of Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into
+a trap." Nor could his claim "that there was no difference between
+a nation entirely at peace and one in circumstances like those of
+the United States at this time" be taken seriously. "He was
+furnishing his opponent with evidences of his lack of candour."
+This clouded the effect that would have followed "a wise and
+generous policy toward neutrals, which had doubtless been in
+Seward's mind from the beginning<a name="FNanchor263"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_263">[263]</a>." In the end he concluded the negotiation
+gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of American respect for the
+second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris--exactly that
+which Lyons had originally been instructed by Russell to
+secure.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152"></a>[V1:pg 152]</span>
+<blockquote>"We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's
+flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods
+not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not
+contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found under
+a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be committed by
+our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we
+can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects.
+Our blockade, being effective, must be respected<a name=
+"FNanchor264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264">[264]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part
+the result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a
+concealed purpose of Northern advantage. This last he calls a
+"trap." And it is to be noted that in Seward's final pledge to
+Adams the phrase "those of any of our citizens" reserves, for the
+North, since the negotiation had failed, the right to issue
+privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says Bancroft, was
+not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a British
+commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States
+respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of
+Paris, and "if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and
+seize the ships and goods of citizens of the North, all the better
+for other commercial nations; for it would soon cause the commerce
+of the United States to be carried on under foreign flags,
+especially the British and French<a name="FNanchor265"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_265">[265]</a>." Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed
+to both parties in the negotiation, and that of Seward is treated
+as conceived at the moment when a policy of seeking European
+friendship was dominant at Washington, but with the hope of
+securing at least negative European support. Seward's persistence
+after European recognition of Southern belligerency is <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_153"></a>[V1:pg 153]</span> regarded as a
+characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of possible resulting
+dangerous complications.</p>
+<p>This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of
+State and it does not completely satisfy the third historian to
+examine the incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of
+British policy. Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father,
+writing in 1899, followed in the main the view of his brother,
+Henry Adams. But in 1912 he reviewed the negotiation at great
+length with different conclusions<a name="FNanchor266"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_266">[266]</a>. His thesis is that the Declaration of
+Paris negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war
+policy," in that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and
+France and then those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of
+Southern privateering, or at least permitted them access to British
+and French ports, a good ground of complaint leading to war would
+be established. <i>This</i> was the ultimate ulterior purpose in
+Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a method of fixing a quarrel
+on some foreign Power in case the United States should seek, as
+Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home by a foreign
+war.</p>
+<p>In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with
+Bancroft, but with this new interpretation. The opening
+misunderstanding he ascribed, as did Lyons, to the simple fact that
+Seward "had refused to see the despatch" in which Russell's
+proposals were made<a name="FNanchor267"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_267">[267]</a>. Seward's instructions <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_154"></a>[V1:pg 154]</span> of July 6,
+after the misunderstanding was made clear to him, pushing the
+negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a very high
+horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st of
+the previous May<a name="FNanchor268"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_268">[268]</a>," and this warlike charger he continued
+to ride until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21,
+put an end to his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory
+he would have gone on with his project. Now, with the end of a
+period of brain-storm and the emergence of sanity in foreign
+policy, "Secretary Seward in due time (September 7) pronounced the
+proposed reservation [by Russell] quite 'inadmissible.' And here
+the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and not altogether
+creditable diplomatic farce<a name="FNanchor269"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_269">[269]</a>."</p>
+<p>Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and
+intention. Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly
+said that his course throughout seems to furnish no ground for
+criticism<a name="FNanchor270"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_270">[270]</a>." And Lyons is quoted as having
+understood, in the end, the real purpose of Seward's policy in
+seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell on December 6
+upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying the
+President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading
+the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to
+the effect it would have on the privateering operations of the
+Southern States; and that a refusal on the part of England and
+France, after having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern
+privateers as pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if
+not a ground of quarrel<a name="FNanchor271"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_271">[271]</a>...." As to <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_155"></a>[V1:pg 155]</span> Russell, combating Henry Adams'
+view, it is asserted that it was the great good fortune of the
+United States that the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a
+policy of neutrality, was not to be driven from its honest
+application by irritations, nor seduced into a position where the
+continuation of that policy would be difficult.</p>
+<p>Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly
+available British materials on the negotiation--materials which
+will in themselves offer sufficient comment on the theories of
+Henry Adams, and in less degree of Bancroft--it is best to note
+here the fallacy in C.F. Adams' main thesis. If the analysis given
+in the preceding chapter of the initiation and duration of Seward's
+"foreign war policy" is correct, then the Declaration of Paris
+negotiation had no essential relation whatever to that policy. The
+instructions to Adams were sent to eight other Ministers. Is it
+conceivable that Seward desired a war with the whole maritime
+world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate proposal of a
+foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in fact stamps
+the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe which
+Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did
+not come to a head until the news had been received of England's
+determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the
+second week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked
+the decline, not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the
+President's orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh
+certainly, Seward had yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to
+expressions of friendship<a name="FNanchor272"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_272">[272]</a>. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's
+first instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June
+that the "misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were
+despatched by Seward to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations
+at London and Paris. The battle of Bull Run <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_156"></a>[V1:pg 156]</span> had nothing to
+do with a new policy. Thus chronology forbids the inclusion of this
+negotiation, either in its inception, progress, or conclusion, as
+an agency intended to make possible, on just grounds, a foreign
+war.</p>
+<p>A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and
+in archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the
+Declaration of Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation
+known in London it will be remembered that on May 1 the British
+Government and Parliament became aware that a civil war was
+inevitable and that the South planned to issue privateers. On that
+day Russell asked the Admiralty to reinforce the British fleet in
+West Indian waters that British commerce might be adequately
+protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in the Commons that
+Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a policy of close
+harmony with France was being matured; and on this day he proposed
+through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each ask
+<i>both</i> the contending parties in America to abide by the
+second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris<a name=
+"FNanchor273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273">[273]</a>. If there was
+ulterior motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then
+or later, passing between any of the British diplomats
+concerned--Russell, Cowley, and Lyons. The plain fact was that the
+United States was not an adherent to the Declaration, that the
+South had announced privateering, and the North a blockade, and
+that the only portions of the Declaration in regard to which the
+belligerents had as yet made no statement were the second and third
+articles.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157"></a>[V1:pg 157]</span>
+<p>It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On
+May 9 Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's
+attitude toward a British subject serving on a Southern
+privateer<a name="FNanchor274"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_274">[274]</a>. The next day in the Lords there occurred
+a debate the general burden of which was that privateering was in
+fact piracy, but that under the conditions of the American previous
+stand, it could not be treated as such<a name=
+"FNanchor275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275">[275]</a>. Both in the
+Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming
+Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both
+debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to
+Cowley, on May 11<a name="FNanchor276"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_276">[276]</a>. By that despatch France was asked to
+send an instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft
+instruction intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to
+Cowley, the object being to secure from the American belligerents
+adherence to <i>all</i> the articles, privateering included, of the
+Declaration of Paris<a name="FNanchor277"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_277">[277]</a>.</p>
+<p>Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original
+suggestion, it met with a prompt check from France. On May 9
+Thouvenel had agreed heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the
+practical advice that the best method of approach to the
+Confederacy would be through the consuls in the South<a name=
+"FNanchor278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278">[278]</a>. Now, on May
+13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel feared that England and
+France would get into serious trouble if the North agreed to accede
+on privateering and the South did not. Cowley reported that he had
+argued with Thouvenel that privateers were <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_158"></a>[V1:pg 158]</span> pirates and
+ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more
+than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles<a name=
+"FNanchor279"></a><a href="#Footnote_279">[279]</a>. For the moment
+Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On
+May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in
+which he mentioned a communication about to be made to the
+South<a name="FNanchor280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280">[280]</a>;
+and on May 15 the London <i>Times</i>, presumably reflecting
+governmental decision, in commenting on the Proclamation of
+Neutrality, developed at some length the idea that British
+citizens, if they served on Southern privateers, could claim no
+protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat them as
+pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written Mercier
+in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but
+omitting the part about privateering<a name=
+"FNanchor281"></a><a href="#Footnote_281">[281]</a>, and on this
+same day Russell sent to Cowley a copy of a <i>new</i> draft of
+instructions to Lyons, seemingly in exact accord with the French
+idea<a name="FNanchor282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282">[282]</a>. On
+the seventeenth, Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to
+Thouvenel<a name="FNanchor283"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_283">[283]</a>. Finally on May 18 the completed
+instruction was despatched.</p>
+<p>It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first
+interview with Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain
+and France had been based on their estimate of the necessity of the
+situation. They had no knowledge of Seward's instructions of April
+24. When therefore Adams, toward the conclusion of his interview,
+stated his authority to negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took
+Russell by surprise. So far as he was concerned a suggestion to the
+North, the result of an agreement made with France <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_159"></a>[V1:pg 159]</span> after some
+discussion and delay, was in fact completed, and the draft finally
+drawn <i>two days before</i>, on the sixteenth. Even if not
+actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a completed agreement.
+Russell might well speak of it as an instruction already given to
+Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams' conversation of the
+eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought. The first was
+Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status of
+belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it
+been wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This
+required consideration. And in the second place did not Adams'
+offer again open up the prospect of somehow getting from the North
+at least a formal and permanent renunciation of privateering?</p>
+<p>For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons
+of May 18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that
+reference to privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own
+instructions to Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that
+he "had already transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any
+modification of the only point in issue which the Government of the
+United States might prefer. On that matter he believed that there
+would be no difficulty whatever<a name="FNanchor284"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_284">[284]</a>." This clearly referred to privateering.
+Russell's instructions to Lyons took up the points of the
+Declaration of Paris in reverse order. That on blockades was now
+generally accepted by all nations. The principle of the third
+article had "long been recognized as law, both in Great Britain and
+in the United States." The second article, "sanctioned by the
+United States in the earliest period of the history of their
+independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great Britain, but
+having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to adhere
+to the principle she then adopted." <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_160"></a>[V1:pg 160]</span> Thus briefly stating his
+confidence that the United States would agree on three of the
+articles, Russell explained at length his views as to privateering
+in the American crisis.</p>
+<blockquote>"There remains only to be considered Article I, namely,
+that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the
+United States withheld their assent. Under these circumstances it
+is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the
+general law of nations. Now it must be borne in mind that
+privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may
+be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the
+sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages.
+There can be no question, however, but that the commander and crew
+of a ship bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations,
+carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of
+war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any Government
+issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make
+good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects in consequence
+of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of
+marque.<br>
+<br>
+"In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a
+certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new
+principle.<br>
+<br>
+"You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward<a name=
+"FNanchor285"></a><a href="#Footnote_285">[285]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts
+known to him were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of
+marque and that Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern
+privateering to be piracy<a name="FNanchor286"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_286">[286]</a>. He did not know that Seward was prepared
+to renounce privateering, but he must have thought it likely from
+Lincoln's proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to
+strike for an object desired by all the European maritime nations
+since 1856. Russell could not, while Great Britain was neutral,
+join the United States in treating Southern privateers as pirates,
+but he here offered to come as close <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_161"></a>[V1:pg 161]</span> to it as he dared, by asserting
+that Great Britain would use vigilance in upholding the law of
+nations. This language might be interpreted as intended for the
+admonition of the North also, but the <i>facts</i> of the then
+known situation make it applicable to Southern activities alone.
+Russell had desired to include privateering in the proposals to the
+United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's criticisms forced
+him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and a full
+statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal
+letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was
+also dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the
+British Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official
+instruction "to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of
+the so-styled Confederate States," and he further explained his
+purpose and the British position:</p>
+<blockquote>"... You will not err in encouraging the Government to
+which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which
+they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in regard to
+privateering....<br>
+<br>
+"You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot
+accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the
+Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that
+they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States,
+either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by
+interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from
+them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities
+according to the recognized principles and under the admitted
+liabilities of the law of nations<a name="FNanchor287"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_287">[287]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British
+policy of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication
+feared by Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the
+North and a half-threat to the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_162"></a>[V1:pg 162]</span> South to secure from both
+belligerents a renunciation of privateering. In short he was not
+yet fully convinced of the wisdom of the French limitation.
+Moreover he believed that Thouvenel might yet be won to his own
+opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this same private letter to
+Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have further to state to you, with reference to my
+despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first instance
+inclined to propose to both of the contending parties to adopt the
+first clause of the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering is
+renounced. But after communication with the French Govt. it
+appeared best to limit our propositions in the manner explained in
+my despatch.<br>
+<br>
+"I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M. Mercier is
+not absolutely instructed to advert to the abolition of
+privateering, yet that some latitude of action is left to him on
+that point should he deem it advisable to exercise it<a name=
+"FNanchor288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288">[288]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in
+Seward's mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited
+to use his own discretion as to joint action with the French
+Minister so long only as the two countries took the same stand. He
+was to pursue whatever method seemed most "conciliatory." His first
+private comment on receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward
+will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the Declaration
+of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering<a name=
+"FNanchor289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289">[289]</a>," and in an
+official confidential despatch of the same day, June 4, he gave
+Russell clear warning of what Seward expected from his overture
+through Adams<a name="FNanchor290"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_290">[290]</a>. So delicate did the matter appear to
+Lyons and Mercier that <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_163"></a>[V1:pg 163]</span> they agreed to keep quiet for a
+time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by
+the transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris<a name=
+"FNanchor291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291">[291]</a>. But in London
+Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On
+June 6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris)
+that he understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in
+London, for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "...
+it may open the way to the abolition of Privateering all over the
+world. But ... we ought not to use any menace to the Confederate
+States with a view of obtaining this desirable object<a name=
+"FNanchor292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292">[292]</a>." Evidently, in
+his opinion, the South would not dare to hold out and no "menace"
+would be required<a name="FNanchor293"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_293">[293]</a>. Six days later, however, having learned
+from the French Ambassador that Dayton in Paris had made clear to
+Thouvenel the expectation of the United States that France would
+treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote that England,
+of course, could not agree to any such conclusion<a name=
+"FNanchor294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294">[294]</a>. Nevertheless
+this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection to
+concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could
+not believe that so obvious an inconsistency <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_164"></a>[V1:pg 164]</span> with the
+declared neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by
+the American Secretary of State.</p>
+<p>Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that
+Seward had specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a
+convention signed would bind England and France to aid in
+suppressing Southern privateering<a name="FNanchor295"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_295">[295]</a>. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier
+was to impress upon them the advisability of an <i>official</i>
+notification to Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step
+not yet taken and which was still postponed, awaiting further
+instructions<a name="FNanchor296"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_296">[296]</a>. On June 15 the two Ministers finally
+concluded they could no longer delay and made that joint visit to
+Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as acting
+together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he
+read these for his private information. The remainder of June was
+spent by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis,
+yet not pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger.
+June 17, Lyons told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great
+Britain <i>must</i> have some intercourse with the South if only
+for the protection of British interests. Seward's reply was that
+the United States might "shut its eyes" to this, but that if
+notified of what England and France were doing, the United States
+would be compelled to make protest. Lyons thereupon urged Seward to
+distinguish between his official and personal knowledge, but Lyons
+and Mercier again postponed beginning the negotiation with the
+Confederacy<a name="FNanchor297"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_297">[297]</a>. Yet while thus reporting this
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165"></a>[V1:pg 165]</span>
+postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same
+date, indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found
+a solution of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate
+with, the Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the
+South were to be instructed to go, not to the Southern President,
+but to the Governor of the State selected, thus avoiding any
+overture to the Confederate Government<a name=
+"FNanchor298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298">[298]</a>. Even with this
+solution possible they still hesitated, feeling as Lyons wrote "a
+little pusillanimous," but believing they had prevented an
+explosion<a name="FNanchor299"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_299">[299]</a>. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because
+of an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal
+instructions and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had
+Lyons, to notify Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made
+in Washington, that such agreement would not affect the belligerent
+right of the South to issue privateers<a name=
+"FNanchor300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300">[300]</a>. Apparently
+Mercier had been given no instructions to make this clear--let
+alone any "latitude" to deal with privateering--although, as a
+matter of fact, he had already given Seward his personal opinion in
+accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was not an official
+French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the
+"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were
+being sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His
+only subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8,
+when he learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been
+directed to raise no further question as to what would or would not
+be demanded of France in case a convention were signed for an
+American adherence to the Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated
+his former advice that under no circumstances should a convention
+be signed without a distinct declaration of no <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_166"></a>[V1:pg 166]</span> British
+responsibility or duty as regards Southern privateers<a name=
+"FNanchor301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301">[301]</a>.</p>
+<p>The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris.
+Lyons' report of the misunderstanding and that new instructions
+were being sent to Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied
+to Lyons on July 5 that Adams had "never made any proposition" on
+the Declaration of Paris, and that he would now await one<a name=
+"FNanchor302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302">[302]</a>. July 11, Adams
+made his formal offer to sign a convention and communicated a draft
+of it on the thirteenth. On the day intervening, the twelfth,
+Russell took a very important step indicative of his sincerity
+throughout, of his lack of any ulterior motive, and of his anxiety
+to carry through the negotiation with no resulting irritations or
+complications with the United States. He recalled his instructions
+to Lyons about communicating with the Confederacy, stating that in
+any case he had never intended that Lyons should act without first
+officially notifying Seward. This recall was now made, he wrote,
+because to go on might "create fresh irritation without any
+adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already started
+negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the
+end<a name="FNanchor303"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_303">[303]</a>."</p>
+<p>Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction
+with the United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure
+American adherence to the Declaration in <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_167"></a>[V1:pg 167]</span> full, was ready
+to conclude the convention at once. The warnings received from many
+sources did not dismay him. He probably thought that no actual
+difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not
+venture to continue privateering. Even if France were disinclined
+to make a convention he appears to have been ready for signature by
+Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he telegraphed Cowley, "I
+conclude there can be no objection to my signing a Convention with
+the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to the
+Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer
+immediately by telegraph<a name="FNanchor304"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_304">[304]</a>." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that
+Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move<a name=
+"FNanchor305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305">[305]</a>. Cowley in a
+private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very
+cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it
+would be better to wait until France could be brought in, and he
+expressed again his fear of the danger involved in Adams'
+proposal<a name="FNanchor306"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_306">[306]</a>. The same objection was promptly made by
+Palmerston when shown the draft of a reply to Adams. Palmerston
+suggested the insertion of a statement that while ready to sign a
+convention Great Britain would do so only at the same time with
+France<a name="FNanchor307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307">[307]</a>.
+Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late afternoon of the
+sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your despatches
+to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams<a name=
+"FNanchor308"></a><a href="#Footnote_308">[308]</a>, and on the
+seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_168"></a>[V1:pg 168]</span> approved by
+Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire
+to act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those
+of Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might
+be informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way
+alter the Proclamation of Neutrality<a name=
+"FNanchor309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309">[309]</a>.</p>
+<p>The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been
+narrated<a name="FNanchor310"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_310">[310]</a>. Russell informed Adams of the
+requirement of a similar French convention, Adams secured action by
+Dayton, and in spite of continued French reluctance and
+suspicion<a name="FNanchor311"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_311">[311]</a> all was ready in mid-August for the
+affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous
+promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
+understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing
+to be attached to the convention<a name="FNanchor312"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_312">[312]</a>. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton
+refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident
+sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British
+suspicion that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had
+"hardly concealed" from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was
+the very object of the Convention<a name="FNanchor313"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_313">[313]</a>. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams'
+complaint Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if
+a trap had been prepared<a name="FNanchor314"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_314">[314]</a>." He, too, at last, was forced to a
+conclusion long since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams,
+engaged in this negotiation.</p>
+<p>But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169"></a>[V1:pg 169]</span>
+appear that in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he
+then thought of any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any
+knowledge by Seward of British or French policy on neutrality, and
+he was engaged in attempting to secure a friendly attitude by
+foreign Powers. One means of doing this was by giving assurances on
+maritime law in time of war. True he probably foresaw an advantage
+through expected aid in repressing privateering, but primarily he
+hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not to recognize Southern
+belligerency. It was in fact this question of belligerency that
+determined all his policy throughout the first six months of the
+American conflict. He was obstinately determined to maintain that
+no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he returned
+again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their
+proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign
+neutrality as final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the
+hope that if completed it would place Great Britain and France in a
+position where they would be forced to reconsider their declared
+policy. A demand upon them to aid in suppressing privateering might
+indeed then be used as an argument, but the object was not
+privateering in itself; that object was the recall of the
+recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply could
+not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have constituted
+an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the existence of a
+state of war.</p>
+<p>In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the
+simple and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing
+a conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international
+rules advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt
+both personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was
+directed toward the American overtures<a name=
+"FNanchor315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315">[315]</a>. For him the
+failure of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170"></a>[V1:pg
+170]</span> negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate
+result: "So far as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the
+United States was concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes.
+His faith in the straightforwardness of any portion of the
+Palmerston-Russell Ministry was gone<a name=
+"FNanchor316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316">[316]</a>."</p>
+<p>And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain
+disillusionment, not, it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for
+whom he still preserved a high regard. Russell felt that his policy
+of a straightforward British neutrality, his quick acquiescence in
+the blockade, even before actually effective, his early order
+closing British ports to prizes of Confederate privateers<a name=
+"FNanchor317"></a><a href="#Footnote_317">[317]</a>, were all
+evidences of at least a friendly attitude toward the North. He may,
+as did nearly every Englishman at the moment, think the re-union of
+America impossible, but he had begun with the plan of strict
+neutrality, and certainly with no thought of offensive action
+against the North. His first thought in the Declaration of Paris
+negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a
+portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw
+the larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the
+United States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he
+persisted against warnings and obstacles. Because of this he
+attempted to recall the instruction to approach the South, was
+ready even, until prohibited by Palmerston, to depart from a policy
+of close joint action with France, and in the end was forced by
+that prohibition to make a limiting declaration guarding British
+neutrality. In it all there is no evidence of any hidden motive nor
+of any other than a straightforward, even if obstinately blind,
+procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly admitting that
+there had been a "trap," <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_171"></a>[V1:pg 171]</span> was as unfortunate for good
+understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated,
+suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict
+neutrality could long be maintained<a name=
+"FNanchor318"></a><a href="#Footnote_318">[318]</a>.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_236"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor236">[236]</a> VII., pp. 568-583.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_237"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor237">[237]</a> Ch. 8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_238"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor238">[238]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 181.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_239"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor239">[239]</a> Henry Adams, <i>Historical Essays</i>, p.
+275.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_240"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor240">[240]</a> Text as given in Moore, <i>Digest</i>,
+VII, p. 562.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_241"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor241">[241]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 563.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_242"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor242">[242]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 94. Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_243"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor243">[243]</a> Text given in <i>Parliamentary Papers,
+1862, Lords</i>, Vol XXV. "Correspondence respecting International
+Maritime Law." No. 18.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_244"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor244">[244]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 25.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_245"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor245">[245]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 26.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_246"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor246">[246]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 124. Adams to Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_247"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor247">[247]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV, "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 28.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_248"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor248">[248]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 31.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_249"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor249">[249]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 32.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_250"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor250">[250]</a> Moore, <i>Digest</i>. VII, pp. 578 and
+581.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_251"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor251">[251]</a> The point of Russell's Declaration was
+made very early in the London press. Thus the <i>Saturday
+Review</i>. June 8, 1861, commenting on the report that America was
+ready to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, stated that this could
+have no effect on the present war but would be welcomed for its
+application after this war was over.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_252"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor252">[252]</a> In the general American argument before
+the Geneva Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical
+effect of British diplomacy in this connection was that "Great
+Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the
+recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers
+and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized,
+while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon
+of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in Nicolay and Hay,
+<i>Lincoln</i>, IV, p. 280.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_253"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor253">[253]</a> Henry Adams, <i>Historical Essays</i>, pp.
+237-279.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_254"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor254">[254]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 271.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_255"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor255">[255]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 273.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_256"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor256">[256]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 277.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_257"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor257">[257]</a> This same view was maintained, though
+without stating details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his
+"Education of Henry Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_258"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor258">[258]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, Ch.
+31.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_259"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor259">[259]</a> Cited by Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+189.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_260"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor260">[260]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_261"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor261">[261]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 193.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_262"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor262">[262]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_263"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor263">[263]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_264"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor264">[264]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, p. 1431 Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_265"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor265">[265]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 196. This
+speculation is not supported by any reference to documents
+revealing such a purpose. While it may seem a reasonable
+speculation it does not appear to be borne out by the new British
+materials cited later in this chapter.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_266"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor266">[266]</a> C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of
+Paris" <i>Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings</i>, XLVI, pp.
+23-81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_267"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor267">[267]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 57. The quotation is from
+a despatch by Lyons of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language.
+It is true that Seward had refused to receive officially this
+despatch, but he had read and considered it in private. Hence he
+knew <i>privately</i> the facts of Russell's proposal and that
+Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The incident of this
+despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I regard
+Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily a
+refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of
+neutrality. Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever
+refusal by Seward to be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier
+in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action.
+(Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 181.) I agree with C.F. Adams that
+the only effect of this, so far as the negotiation is concerned was
+that "Seward, by what has always, for some reason not at once
+apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused a transfer of
+the whole negotiation from Washington to London and Paris."
+("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_268"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor268">[268]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 51.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_269"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor269">[269]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_270"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor270">[270]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 60.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_271"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor271">[271]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 58.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_272"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor272">[272]</a> Bancroft says June 8. But see <i>ante</i>,
+p. 130.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_273"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor273">[273]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 1. It was with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5,
+wrote to Russell: "If any step were thought advisable, perhaps the
+best mode of our feeling our way would be to communicate
+confidentially with the South by the men who have come over here
+from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who is about to return
+in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political friend of
+Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but still
+he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any
+step." (Palmerston MS.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_274"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor274">[274]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p.
+1763.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_275"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor275">[275]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1830-34.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_276"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor276">[276]</a> This instruction never got into the
+printed Parliamentary papers, nor did any others of the many
+containing the like suggestion, for they would have revealed a
+persistence by Russell against French advice--to which he
+ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in seeking to bind
+the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration of Paris,
+as well as on articles two and three. The points at which Russell
+returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_277"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor277">[277]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563.
+Draft.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_278"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor278">[278]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley
+to Russell, May 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_279"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor279">[279]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley
+to Russell, May 13, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_280"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor280">[280]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the
+Confederacy</i>, II, p. 40.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_281"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor281">[281]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No.
+733.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_282"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor282">[282]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 5.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_283"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor283">[283]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 6. Note that this and
+the preceding document are all that appeared in the Parliamentary
+Papers. Thouvenel's amendment of Russell's plan did not
+appear.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_284"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor284">[284]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1861-2</i>, Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_285"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor285">[285]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_286"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor286">[286]</a> The text of these proclamations,
+transmitted by Lyons, had been officially received in London on May
+10.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_287"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor287">[287]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_288"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor288">[288]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld.
+P. and the Queen."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_289"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor289">[289]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4,
+1861. (Printed in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 42.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_290"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor290">[290]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 12. Marked "Received," June 17.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_291"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor291">[291]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to
+Russell, June 8, 1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This
+disinclination to act extended also to the matter of getting in
+touch with the South, which they also postponed. It appeared that
+Mercier was instructed to order the French Consul at New Orleans to
+go in person to President Davis. Both diplomats were very fearful
+of an "outbreak" from Seward on this planned proposal to the
+Confederacy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_292"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor292">[292]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft.
+"Seen by Ld. Palmerston and the Queen."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_293"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor293">[293]</a> In Washington, so different was the point
+of view, Lyons and Mercier were now convinced they could not let
+Seward know of the proposal to be made to the South. They feared he
+would send them their passports. Mercier in informal talk had
+explained to Seward his instructions on the Declaration of Paris in
+so far as the North was concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a
+joint visit and representation to Seward--that which was actually
+attempted on June 15--but were decided to say nothing about the
+South, until they learned the effect of this "joint proposal."
+F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_294"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor294">[294]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 10. Russell to Grey, June 12, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_295"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor295">[295]</a> Stoeckl was writing his Government that
+the state to which the negotiation had come was full of danger and
+might lead to a serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out
+of it until results were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff
+margined "C'est aussi mon avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to
+F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_296"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor296">[296]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_297"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor297">[297]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 14. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in
+this interview that Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to
+the position of the proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward
+that he had no instructions to sign a convention.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_298"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor298">[298]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_299"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor299">[299]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_300"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor300">[300]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, June 21,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_301"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor301">[301]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International
+Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing privately on the same day Lyons
+comments on Mercier's "extreme caution" in his relations with
+Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal, rather than official
+communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's idea, and that
+he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had agreed to it
+because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with France.
+Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_302"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor302">[302]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_303"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor303">[303]</a> F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same
+day Russell was writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a
+clear statement of the British position, defending the Proclamation
+of Neutrality and adding, "It is not our practice to treat five
+millions of freemen as pirates, and to hang their sailors if they
+stop our merchantmen. But unless we mean to treat them as pirates
+and to hang them, we could not deny them belligerent rights." C.F.
+Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," pp.
+49-50.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_304"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor304">[304]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft.
+Russell to Cowley, July 15, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_305"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor305">[305]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No.
+871.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_306"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor306">[306]</a> Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July
+16 Cowley repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not
+yet approached France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No.
+871.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_307"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor307">[307]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure.
+Palmerston's Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact
+language is used in the last paragraph of the communication to
+Adams, November 18, as printed in <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>,
+1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting
+International Maritime Law." No. 19.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_308"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor308">[308]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell
+to Cowley, July 17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th
+at 4.30 p.m.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_309"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor309">[309]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 729.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_310"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor310">[310]</a> See <i>ante</i> pp. 142-45.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_311"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor311">[311]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley
+to Russell, July 26, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_312"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor312">[312]</a> It should be noted that during this period
+Russell learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall
+of instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at
+Charleston the overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved
+this action (<i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No.
+23.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_313"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor313">[313]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley
+to Russell, August 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_314"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor314">[314]</a> Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston,
+August 26, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_315"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor315">[315]</a> See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the
+Declaration of Paris," pp. 58 and 74.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_316"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor316">[316]</a> Adams, <i>Life of C.F. Adams</i>, p.
+209.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_317"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor317">[317]</a> The Confederate Commissions on August 14,
+1861, just before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris
+negotiation, had made vigorous protest against this British order,
+characterizing it as giving a "favour" to the Government at
+Washington, and thus as lacking in neutrality. Quoted by C.F.
+Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 31.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_318"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor318">[318]</a> A few facts about Southern privateering
+not directly pertinent to this chapter are yet not without
+interest. There was no case during the Civil War of a vessel
+actually going out as a privateer (i.e., a private vessel operating
+under government letters of marque) from a foreign port. (Adams,
+"Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 38.) No Southern
+privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard, <i>Neutrality of
+Great Britain</i>, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general
+instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with
+Russia in August, but it was not presented by Seward for
+ratification to the United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to
+the Senate of Bremen at the time of the <i>Trent</i> affair, Nov.
+14, 1861, stated that the Russian Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired
+of Seward "whether the U.S. would equip privateers in case war
+should break out with England and France. Seward replied 'that is a
+matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon remarked that in any case
+no American privateer would be permitted to cruise in the northern
+part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the only state that
+has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates in
+accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then
+exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about
+it.'" (Schleiden MS.)</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172"></a>[V1:pg 172]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+<h3>BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the
+preceding chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and
+Ministers as important in themselves and as indicative of national
+policy and purpose. Upon all parties concerned they left a feeling
+of irritation and suspicion. But the public knew nothing of the
+details of the inconclusive negotiation and the Press merely gave a
+hint now and then of its reported progress and ultimate failure.
+Newspapers continued to report the news from America in
+unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort
+Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both
+sides in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in
+arms for which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln
+called for 75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000
+additional. The regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy
+by 18,000 men. Naval vessels widely scattered over the globe, were
+instructed to hasten their home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an
+available land force, however badly trained and organized, of over
+300,000, though these were widely scattered from the Potomac in the
+east to the Missouri in the west.</p>
+<p>In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for
+100,000 volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the
+newly-born Confederacy. The seven states already in secession were
+soon joined, between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas,
+Virginia, North Carolina and <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_173"></a>[V1:pg 173]</span> Tennessee in order, but the
+border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly
+sympathetic with the rest of the South, were held to the Union by
+the "border state policy" of Lincoln, the first pronouncement of
+which asserted that the North had no purpose of attacking slavery
+where it existed, but merely was determined to preserve the Union.
+The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session on July 4, heartily
+approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized an army of
+500,000, provided for a loan of $200,000,000, sanctioned the issue
+of $50,000,000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both direct
+and by tariffs to meet these expenditures.</p>
+<p>In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed
+determination of the South to secede and the uncertainty of the
+North had led the British press to believe that the decision rested
+wholly with the South. Now the North by its preparations was
+exhibiting an equally fixed determination to preserve the Union,
+and while the British press was sceptical of the permanence of this
+determination, it became, for a short time, until editorial policy
+was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The <i>Economist</i>
+on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal step"
+rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate
+desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so
+proud, but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of
+population and wealth, be the victor, though this could not
+conceivably result in any real reunion, rather in a conquest
+requiring permanent military occupation. Southern leaders were mad:
+"to rouse by gratuitous insult the mettle of a nation three times
+as numerous and far more than three times as powerful, to force
+them by aggressive steps into a struggle in which the sympathy of
+every free and civilized nation will be with the North, seems like
+the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and hearts hardened by
+the evil cause they defend."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174"></a>[V1:pg 174]</span>
+<p>Two weeks later, the <i>Economist</i>, while still maintaining
+the justice of the Northern cause, though with lessened vigour,
+appealed to the common sense of the North to refrain from a civil
+war whose professed object was unattainable. "Everyone knows and
+admits that the secession is an accomplished, irrevocable, fact....
+Even if the North were sure of an easy and complete victory--short,
+of course, of actual subjugation of the South (which no one dreams
+of)--the war which was to end in such a victory would still be, in
+the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an objectless and
+unprofitable folly<a name="FNanchor319"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_319">[319]</a>." But by the middle of June the American
+irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly and
+angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press
+resentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of
+British attitude. "We <i>do</i> believe the secession of the Slave
+States to be a <i>fait accompli</i>--a completed and irreversible
+transaction. We believe it to be impossible now for the North to
+lure back the South into the Union by any compromise, or to compel
+them back by any force." "If this is an offence it cannot be
+helped<a name="FNanchor320"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_320">[320]</a>."</p>
+<p>The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed
+through the same shifts of opinion and expression as the
+<i>Economist</i>; first upbraiding the South, next appealing to the
+North not to wage a useless war, finally committing themselves to
+the theory of an accomplished break-up of the Union and berating
+the North for continuing, through pride alone, a bloody conflict
+doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer attention was diverted
+from the ethical causes at issue by the publication in the
+<i>Times</i> of Motley's letter analysing the nature of the
+American constitution and defending the legal position of the North
+in its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against the
+general <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175"></a>[V1:pg
+175]</span> British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness
+in England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our
+downfall, but to accept the fact<a name="FNanchor321"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_321">[321]</a>...."</p>
+<p>He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South
+into subjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is
+written on the record of our race. British and American history is
+made up of rebellion and revolution.... There can be nothing
+plainer, then, than the American right of revolution. But, then, it
+should be called revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should
+find difficulty in understanding that the United States Government
+is a nation among the nations of the earth; a constituted
+authority, which may be overthrown by violence, as may be the fate
+of any state, whether kingdom or republic, but which is false to
+the people if it does not its best to preserve them from the
+horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood."</p>
+<p>Motley denied any <i>right</i> of <i>peaceful</i> secession, and
+his constitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view.
+But he was compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the
+sense of Lincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no
+purpose of emancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that
+slavery within a state was sacred from all interference by the
+general government, or by the free states, or by individuals in
+those states; and the Chicago Convention [which nominated Lincoln]
+strenuously asserted that doctrine." Coming at the moment when the
+British press and public were seeking ground for a shift from
+earlier pro-Northern expressions of sympathy to some justification
+for the South, it may be doubted whether Motley's letter did not do
+more harm than good to the Northern cause. His denial of a Northern
+anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a, professedly, more calm
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176"></a>[V1:pg 176]</span> and
+judicial examination of the claimed <i>Southern right</i> of
+secession, and his legal argument could be met, and was met, with
+equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as to the nature
+of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity of
+Lincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even to
+warnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring into
+consideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial
+that there were any great moral principles at stake in the American
+conflict.</p>
+<p>In the meantime the two sections in America were busily
+preparing for a test of strength, and for that test the British
+press, reporting preparations, waited with interest. It came on
+July 21 in the first battle of Bull Run, when approximately equal
+forces of raw levies, 30,000 each, met in the first pitched battle
+of the war, and where the Northern army, after an initial success,
+ultimately fled in disgraceful rout. Before Bull Run the few
+British papers early taking strong ground for the North had
+pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as inevitably
+destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The <i>Daily
+News</i> lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a
+great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all
+free people a question of upholding the eternal principles of
+liberty, morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be
+civil war, may perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most
+perfect instrument in working out a pure intent<a name=
+"FNanchor322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322">[322]</a>.'" The disaster
+to the Northern army, its apparent testimony that the North lacked
+real fighting men, bolstered that British opinion which regarded
+military measures against the South as folly--an impression
+reinforced in the next few months by the long pause by the North
+before undertaking any further great effort in the field. The North
+was not really ready for determined war, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_177"></a>[V1:pg 177]</span> indeed, until
+later in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the
+British press upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military
+weakness.</p>
+<p>Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment
+were the letters of W.H. Russell to the <i>Times</i>. This famous
+war-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 by
+Delane, editor of the <i>Times</i>, his first letter, written on
+March 29, appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through
+the South, was met everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man
+of his reputation and one representing the most important organ of
+British public opinion, returned to the North in late June, and at
+Washington was given intimate interviews by Seward and other
+leaders. For a time his utterances were watched for, in both
+England and America, with the greatest interest and expectancy, as
+the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest,
+dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of
+slavery, terming apologists of that institution "the miserable
+sophists who expose themselves to the contempt of the world by
+their paltry theiscles on the divine origin and uses of
+Slavery<a name="FNanchor323"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_323">[323]</a>...." and writing "day after day ... the
+impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States Rights' meant
+protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and free-trade
+in slave produce with the other world<a name=
+"FNanchor324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324">[324]</a>." But at the
+same time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the
+South in high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in
+the North. The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he
+rode out from Washington to meet the defeated army, and his
+description of the routed rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy
+toward the Capitol, so ridiculed Northern fighting spirit as to
+leave a permanent <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_178"></a>[V1:pg 178]</span> sting behind it. At the same time
+it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the Northern
+effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himself
+guarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and
+France think of it?' is the question which is asked over and over
+again," wrote Russell on July 24<a name="FNanchor325"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_325">[325]</a>, expatiating on American anxiety and
+chagrin in the face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he
+recorded in his diary the beginnings of the American newspaper
+storm of personal attack because of his description of the battle
+in the <i>Times</i>--an attack which before long became the alleged
+cause of his recall by Delane<a name="FNanchor326"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_326">[326]</a>. In fact Russell's letters added nothing
+in humiliating description to the outpourings of the Northern
+press, itself greedily quoted by pro-Southern foreign papers. The
+impression of Northern military incapacity was not confined to
+Great Britain--it was general throughout Europe, and for the
+remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured to assert a Northern
+success in the war<a name="FNanchor327"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_327">[327]</a>.</p>
+<p>Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the
+policy of strict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The
+truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by
+professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what
+they consider rightly or wrongly vital interests," thus explaining
+to his own satisfaction why a Northern army of brave men had
+<i>chosen</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179"></a>[V1:pg
+179]</span> to <i>run</i> away<a name="FNanchor328"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_328">[328]</a>, but the Government was careful to
+refrain from any official utterances likely to irritate the North.
+The battle served, in some degree, to bring into the open the
+metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing neutrality
+and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each took
+a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of
+Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of
+British interference<a name="FNanchor329"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_329">[329]</a>, and to Gladstone (evidently
+controverting the latter's opinion) that slavery was and would
+continue to be an object in the war<a name=
+"FNanchor330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330">[330]</a>, but the press,
+certainly, was not united either as to future British policy or on
+basic causes and objects of the war. The <i>Economist</i> believed
+that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, if coming soon, would
+"so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Union that the
+contest will be abandoned on the instant.... Some day, with
+scarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has
+been agreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been
+signed<a name="FNanchor331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331">[331]</a>."
+John Bright's paper, the <i>Morning Star</i>, argued long and
+feverishly that Englishmen must not lose sight of the fact that
+slavery was an issue, and made appeal for expressions, badly needed
+at the moment, of pro-Northern sympathy<a name=
+"FNanchor332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332">[332]</a>. To this
+<i>John Bull</i> retorted:</p>
+<blockquote>"Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery
+has nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America.... The
+people of America have erected a political idol. The Northerners
+have talked and written and boasted so much about their Republic
+that they have now become perfectly furious to find that their idol
+can be overthrown, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_180"></a>[V1:pg 180]</span> and that the false principles
+upon which the American Republic is built should be exhibited to
+the world, that their vaunted democracy should be exposed as a mere
+bubble or a piece of rotten timber, an abominable and worthless
+tyranny of the sovereign mob<a name="FNanchor333"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_333">[333]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at
+issue<a name="FNanchor334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334">[334]</a>.
+<i>John Bull</i>, the "country squire's paper," might venture to
+voice the thought, but more important papers were still cautious in
+expressing it. W.H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is
+quite obvious, I think, that the North will succeed in reducing the
+South<a name="FNanchor335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335">[335]</a>."
+But Delane permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the
+<i>Times</i>. Darwin is good testimony of the all-prevalent British
+feeling: "I hope to God we English are utterly wrong in doubting
+whether the North can conquer the South." "How curious it is that
+you seem to think that you can conquer the South; and I never meet
+a soul, even those who would most wish it, who think it
+possible--that is, to conquer and retain it<a name=
+"FNanchor336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336">[336]</a>."</p>
+<p>In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned,
+there appeared several books and articles on the American question
+which gave opportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and
+controversy. A Dr. Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of
+St. John's College, Oxford," published a work, <i>The American
+Crisis Considered</i>, chiefly declamatory, upholding the right of
+Southern secession, stating that no one "who has the slightest
+acquaintance with the political action of history would term the
+present movement rebellion." With this the <i>Spectator</i> begged
+leave to differ<a name="FNanchor337"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_337">[337]</a>. The <i>Saturday Review</i> <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_181"></a>[V1:pg 181]</span> acknowledged
+that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipation to the
+front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this view
+as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher
+Stowe, who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of
+her pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North.
+Under the caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the
+<i>Saturday Review</i> avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy
+War" in America. "The North does not proclaim abolition and never
+pretended to fight for anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for
+its oriflamme the Sacred Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its <i>cri
+de guerre</i> is not unconditional emancipation." "The Governmental
+course of the British nation ... is not yet directed by small
+novelists and their small talk<a name="FNanchor338"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_338">[338]</a>." Thomas Hughes also came in for
+sarcastic reference in this article, having promptly taken up the
+cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attack through the
+columns of the <i>Spectator</i>, reasserting slavery as an issue
+and calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of
+Americans and realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations
+of mean motives," and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A
+nation engaged in a life and death struggle should not be treated
+in a tone of flippant and contemptuous serenity. The British press
+had chosen "to impute the lowest motives, to cull out and exult
+over all the meanness, and bragging, and disorder which the contest
+has brought out, and while we sit on the bank, to make no
+allowances for those who are struggling in the waves<a name=
+"FNanchor339"></a><a href="#Footnote_339">[339]</a>."</p>
+<p>Besides the <i>Spectator</i>, on the Northern side, stood the
+<i>Daily News</i>, declaring that the South could not hold out, and
+adding, "The Confederate States may be ten millions, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_182"></a>[V1:pg 182]</span> but they
+<i>are</i> wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong<a name=
+"FNanchor340"></a><a href="#Footnote_340">[340]</a>." The <i>Daily
+News</i>, according to its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone
+in steadfast advocacy of the Northern cause<a name=
+"FNanchor341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341">[341]</a>. This claim of
+unique service to the North is not borne out by an examination of
+newspaper files, but is true if only metropolitan dailies of large
+circulation are considered. The <i>Spectator</i> was a determined
+and consistent friend of the North. In its issue of September 28 a
+speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and attacked. The
+speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would be
+beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size
+and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that
+the final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate
+nations, and stated his belief that the friendly emulation of these
+nations would result for Americans in a rapid advance in art and
+commerce such as had been produced in the old commonwealths of
+Greece. The <i>Spectator</i> answered that such a breaking up of
+America was much more likely to result in a situation comparable to
+that in South America, inquired caustically whether Bulwer Lytton
+had heard that slavery was in question, and asserted that his
+speech presumably represented the official view of the Tories, and
+embodied that of the English governing class<a name=
+"FNanchor342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342">[342]</a>.</p>
+<p>In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861
+there is little on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality
+is approved by all papers and public speakers. But as the months
+passed without further important military engagements attention
+began to be directed toward the economic effects on England of the
+war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183"></a>[V1:pg 183]</span>
+in America and to the blockade, now beginning to be made effective
+by the North. The <i>Saturday Review</i>, though pro-Southern,
+declared for neutrality, but distinguished between strict
+observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognition of the
+<i>de facto</i> government of the Confederacy "as soon as the
+Southern States had achieved for their independence that amount of
+security with which Great Britain had been satisfied in former
+cases<a name="FNanchor343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343">[343]</a>."
+But another article in the same issue contained a warning against
+forcibly raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the
+North, and that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman.
+Two weeks later appeared a long review of Spence's <i>American
+Union</i>, a work very influential in confirming British
+pro-Southern belief in the constitutional right of the South to
+secede and in the certainty of Southern victory. Spence was "likely
+to succeed with English readers, because all his views are taken
+from a thoroughly English standpoint<a name=
+"FNanchor344"></a><a href="#Footnote_344">[344]</a>." The week
+following compliments are showered upon the "young professor"
+Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the Present American
+War," in which he distinguished between recognition of belligerency
+and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the former was
+inevitable and logical. The <i>Saturday Review</i>, without direct
+quotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early
+recognition of Southern independence on the ground that it was <i>a
+fait accompli</i>, and expressed approval<a name=
+"FNanchor345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345">[345]</a>.</p>
+<p>These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and
+reputable journals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side
+or the other throughout the months from June to December, 1861. All
+publications had much <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_184"></a>[V1:pg 184]</span> to say of the American struggle
+and varied in tone from dignified criticism to extreme
+vituperation, this last usually being the resort of lesser
+journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writing
+in a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was a
+characteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined
+with a supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior
+nation, gave great offence to Americans, whether North or South.
+But the British press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the
+governmental policy of neutrality, and in any event Motley was
+right in stating "the Press is not the Government," adding his
+opinion that "the present English Government has thus far given us
+no just cause of offence<a name="FNanchor346"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_346">[346]</a>." Meanwhile the Government, just at the
+moment when the Declaration of Paris negotiation had reached an
+inglorious conclusion, especially irritating to Earl Russell, was
+suddenly plunged into a sharp controversy with the United States by
+an incident growing out of Russell's first instructions to Lyons in
+regard to that negotiation and which, though of minor importance in
+itself, aroused an intensity of feeling beyond its merits. This was
+the recall by Seward of the exequatur of the British consul Bunch,
+at Charleston, South Carolina.</p>
+<p>It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on
+the Declaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at
+Charleston, be commissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance
+of the binding force of the second and third articles, but that
+Lyons and Mercier, fearing Seward's irritation, had hesitated to
+proceed in the matter. Later Russell had recalled his instructions,
+but before this recall could reach Lyons the latter had decided to
+act<a name="FNanchor347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347">[347]</a>. On
+July 5 Lyons gave explicit directions to Bunch not to approach the
+Confederate Government directly, but to go <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_185"></a>[V1:pg 185]</span> to Governor
+Pickens of South Carolina and explain the matter to him verbally,
+adding "you should act with great caution, in order to avoid
+raising the question of the recognition of the new Confederation by
+Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am authorized by
+Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to
+you," thus after all implying that a real <i>negotiation</i> with
+the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent
+similar instructions to St. Andr&eacute;, the French Acting-Consul
+at Charleston<a name="FNanchor348"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_348">[348]</a>. Bunch received Lyons' official letter on
+July 19<a name="FNanchor349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349">[349]</a>,
+together with a private one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was
+to put nothing in writing, and that he and his French colleagues
+were to keep the names of Lyons and Mercier out of any talk, even,
+about the matter. Bunch was to talk as if his instructions came
+directly from Russell. Lyons hoped the South would be wise enough
+not to indulge in undue publicity, since if "trumpeted" it might
+elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal from France and
+England." Both the official and the private letter must, however,
+have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all a
+negotiation and that he had been entrusted with it<a name=
+"FNanchor350"></a><a href="#Footnote_350">[350]</a>.</p>
+<p>Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with
+the Southern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his
+environment, become more friendly to it<a name=
+"FNanchor351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351">[351]</a>. He now acted
+with promptness and with some <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_186"></a>[V1:pg 186]</span> evident exultation at the
+importance given him personally. In place of Governor Pickens an
+experienced diplomat, William Henry Trescott, was approached by
+Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. Andr&eacute;, was then the French
+agent at Charleston<a name="FNanchor352"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_352">[352]</a>. Trescott went directly to President
+Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not been made
+through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhat
+unwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the
+Confederate Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris
+except for the article on privateering<a name=
+"FNanchor353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353">[353]</a>. Bunch took
+great pride in the secrecy observed. "I do not see how any clue is
+given to the way in which the Resolutions have been procured.... We
+made a positive stipulation that France and England were not to be
+alluded to in the event of the compliance of the Confederate
+Govt.<a name="FNanchor354"></a><a href="#Footnote_354">[354]</a>,"
+he wrote Lyons on August 16. But he failed to take account either
+of the penetrating power of mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the
+efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On this same day, August 16,
+Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on the fourteenth, of one
+Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage for Liverpool
+carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to the British
+Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. The
+letters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch's
+recent activities and stated that "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy,
+communicated to me also that the first step of recognition was
+taken<a name="FNanchor355"></a><a href="#Footnote_355">[355]</a>."
+The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams to Russell
+with an <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187"></a>[V1:pg
+187]</span> enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on the
+alleged "negotiation" with the South.</p>
+<p>Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as a
+passport, as did the United States. This also was made matter of
+complaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented to
+Russell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the three
+principal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a
+negotiation with the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a
+passport, not countersigned by the Secretary of State as required
+by the United States rules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he
+had permitted the person to whom this passport was issued to carry
+letters from the enemies of the United States to their agents
+abroad. On these grounds the British Government was requested to
+remove Bunch from his office. On first learning of Mure's arrest
+Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch's conduct had been
+perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be found to contain
+nothing supporting the suspicion of the American Government<a name=
+"FNanchor356"></a><a href="#Footnote_356">[356]</a>. The language
+used by Lyons was such as to provide an excellent defence in
+published despatches, and it was later so used. But privately
+neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the correctness
+of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on August 18,
+and at once protested that no passport had been given, but merely a
+"Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British Merchant
+residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was
+carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office<a name=
+"FNanchor357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357">[357]</a>. In fact Mure
+had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the
+distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion.
+Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in
+taking charge <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188"></a>[V1:pg
+188]</span> of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr.
+Bunch's confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me
+not to forward himself any letters alluding to military or
+political events, excepting letters to or from British
+officials<a name="FNanchor358"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_358">[358]</a>." This made good reading when put in the
+published Parliamentary Papers. But in reality the sending of
+private letters by messenger also carrying an official pouch was no
+novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that this was his
+practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for the
+merchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I
+must leave it to your Lordship and H.M.'s Government to support me.
+My own despatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so
+I take the responsibility of aiding British interests by sending
+the mercantile letters as well<a name="FNanchor359"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_359">[359]</a>." And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons
+on Mure's arrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could
+not consider him [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer
+of a bag to Earl Russell, by his doing what everyone who left
+Charleston was doing daily<a name="FNanchor360"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_360">[360]</a>...."</p>
+<p>Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation
+with Belligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington,
+writing, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which
+was difficult and delicate, was managed with great tact and good
+judgment by the two Consuls<a name="FNanchor361"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_361">[361]</a>." But this referred merely to the use of
+Trescott and its results, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British
+Government was, indeed, prepared to defend the action of its agents
+in securing, <i>indirectly</i>, from the South, an <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_189"></a>[V1:pg 189]</span> acknowledgment
+of certain principles of international law. Russell did not believe
+that Lincoln was "foolhardy enough to quarrel with England and
+France," though Hammond (Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs) "is
+persuaded that Seward wishes to pick a quarrel<a name=
+"FNanchor362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362">[362]</a>." Enquiry was
+promptly made of France, through Cowley, as to her stand in the
+matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell intimating by an
+enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as to the
+initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was
+Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through
+the Consuls<a name="FNanchor363"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_363">[363]</a>. This was an error of memory<a name=
+"FNanchor364"></a><a href="#Footnote_364">[364]</a>, and Cowley was
+perturbed by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question.
+The latter stated that if a like American demand were made on
+France "undoubtedly he could not give up an Agent who had done no
+more than execute the orders entrusted to him<a name=
+"FNanchor365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365">[365]</a>." This looked
+like harmony, but the situation for the two countries was not the
+same as no demand had been made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley
+was, in reality, anxious and suspicious, for Thouvenel, in
+conversation, attributed Seward's anger to Bunch's alleged
+indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that France would not
+"stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against the fact
+of a communication (not a <i>negotiation</i>) having been held with
+the Confederacy<a name="FNanchor366"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_366">[366]</a>. Before the French reply was secured
+Russell had prepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him
+that the bag from Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain
+"correspondence of the enemies <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_190"></a>[V1:pg 190]</span> of the Government of the United
+States" as had been suspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's
+explanation of the reason for forwarding private letters<a name=
+"FNanchor367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367">[367]</a>. In another
+letter to Adams of the same date Russell avowed the Government's
+responsibility for Bunch's action on the Declaration of Paris, and
+declined to recall him, adding:</p>
+<blockquote>"But when it is stated in a letter from some person not
+named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern
+States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs to
+decline all responsibility for such a statement.<br>
+<br>
+"Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the belligerent
+character of the Southern States, and they will continue to
+recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's Government have
+not recognized and are not prepared to recognize the so-called
+Confederate States as a separate and independent State<a name=
+"FNanchor368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368">[368]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13<a name=
+"FNanchor369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369">[369]</a>, and merely
+stated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That
+Russell was anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to
+Lyons instructing him if sent away from Washington "to express in
+the most dignified and guarded terms that the course taken by the
+Washington Government must be the result of a misconception on
+their part, and that you shall retire to Canada in the persuasion
+that the misunderstanding will soon cease, and the former friendly
+relations be restored<a name="FNanchor370"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_370">[370]</a>." Meantime Russell was far from satisfied
+with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform him that the "statements made
+in regard to his proceedings <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_191"></a>[V1:pg 191]</span> require explanation<a name=
+"FNanchor371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371">[371]</a>." The failure
+of Seward to demand Belligny's recall worried Russell. He wrote to
+Palmerston on September 19, "I cannot believe that the Americans,
+having made no demand on the French to disavow Belligny, or
+Baligny, will send away Lyons," and he thought that Seward ought to
+be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part of Bunch's
+supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending reinforcements
+to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about Bunch, we
+may rest on our oars for the winter<a name=
+"FNanchor372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372">[372]</a>." There was
+nothing further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of
+the British refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at
+Washington was writing in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract
+assertions of principles," but accustoming the North to the
+<i>practice</i> of British recognition of Southern belligerent
+rights<a name="FNanchor373"></a><a href="#Footnote_373">[373]</a>.
+Lyons believed that Seward would not go further than to withdraw
+Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for the return of Mercier
+(long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our position is
+unluckily not exactly the same with that of France<a name=
+"FNanchor374"></a><a href="#Footnote_374">[374]</a>." On October 12
+Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, as
+usual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter just
+received from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not
+"unfriendly to the United States," and "appeared anxious not to
+pick a quarrel, yet hardly knowing how to retract from his original
+position." Lyons told <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_192"></a>[V1:pg 192]</span> Seward that it would be
+"impossible to carry on the Diplomatic business ... on the false
+hypothesis that the United States Government" did not <i>know</i>
+England and France had recognized the belligerent rights of the
+South, and he urged Russell to get from France an open
+acknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated"
+with the Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid
+this, thus seeking to bring pressure on the British Government to
+adopt his plan of an early recognition of Southern independence.
+Like Cowley, Lyons was disturbed at the French evasion of direct
+support in the Bunch affair<a name="FNanchor375"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_375">[375]</a>.</p>
+<p>Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him
+by the United States was confined to three points; he asserted his
+disbelief that Mure carried any despatches from the <i>de facto</i>
+government at Richmond; he protested that "there was not one single
+paper in my bag which was not entirely and altogether on Her
+Majesty's service"; and he explained the alleged "passport" was not
+intended as such, but was merely "a certificate stating that Mr.
+Mure was charged by me with despatches," but he acknowledged that
+in the certificate's description of Mure as a "British merchant" a
+possible error had been committed, adding, however, that he had
+supposed anyone would understand, since the words "British subject"
+had not been used, that Mure was in reality a naturalized citizen
+of America<a name="FNanchor376"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_376">[376]</a>. This explanation was received by Russell
+on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, made without
+knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, was that
+if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters
+carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I
+mean the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193"></a>[V1:pg
+193]</span> distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the
+distinction between a document requesting that the bearer '<i>may
+be permitted to pass freely and receive all proper protection and
+assistance</i>' and a passport<a name="FNanchor377"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_377">[377]</a>." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's
+explanation was also dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated
+Lyons' instructions against entrusting despatches to persons
+carrying private correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives
+no distinct denial" to the newspaper stories that he had gossiped
+about his activities and had stated them to be "a first step toward
+recognition<a name="FNanchor378"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_378">[378]</a>." These criticisms were directed entirely
+to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the overture to the South; on the
+propriety of that act Russell supported Bunch with vigour<a name=
+"FNanchor379"></a><a href="#Footnote_379">[379]</a>. October 26,
+Seward read to Lyons the instruction to Adams on the revocation of
+Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken for this, reported Lyons, was
+an evasion of that charge of communicating with the South for which
+Russell had avowed responsibility, and a turning to the charge that
+Bunch was personally unacceptable longer to the United States
+because of his partisanship to the South, as evidenced by various
+acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion that Great
+Britain had taken "a first step to recognition." "Never," wrote
+Lyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation."
+"No one who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to
+me can consider him as in the least degree a partisan of the
+Southern cause." "When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch
+I remained silent. After a <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_194"></a>[V1:pg 194]</span> short pause I took leave of him
+courteously, and withdrew<a name="FNanchor380"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_380">[380]</a>."</p>
+<p>As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American
+decision against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been
+relieved that this would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell.
+His despatch just cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the
+proper British refutation of charges, but with acceptance of the
+American decision. Nevertheless he wrote gloomily on the same day
+of future relations with the United States<a name=
+"FNanchor381"></a><a href="#Footnote_381">[381]</a>. At the same
+time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action, was not disturbed.
+He thought it still "not off the cards that the Southern
+Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be
+strictly neutral, and it will be<a name="FNanchor382"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_382">[382]</a>." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch and
+letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach
+much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of
+Seward to feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to
+be the most grateful food he can offer<a name=
+"FNanchor383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383">[383]</a>." For Russell
+saw clearly that Great Britain could not object to the removal of
+Bunch on the purely personal grounds alleged by Seward. There
+followed in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195"></a>[V1:pg
+195]</span> due course the formal notification by Adams on November
+21, just six days before he learned of the <i>Trent</i> affair,
+which had occurred on November 8. That alarming incident no doubt
+coloured the later communications of both parties, for while both
+Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative papers,
+such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the only
+point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain
+that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British
+interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the
+Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its
+citizens, but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British
+agent who should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell
+closed the matter by stating that he did "not perceive that any
+advantage would be obtained by the continuance of this
+correspondence<a name="FNanchor384"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_384">[384]</a>." Bunch was expected to leave Charleston
+as soon as a safe conveyance could be provided for him, but this
+was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he remained at Charleston
+until February, 1863, actively engaged, but official papers were
+signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over the <i>Trent</i>,
+he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as he did
+from the public horizon<a name="FNanchor385"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_385">[385]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so
+far as the alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had
+its real significance in the effort of Great <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_196"></a>[V1:pg 196]</span> Britain to make
+contact with the Southern Government--an effort incautiously
+entered upon, and from which an attempt to withdraw had come too
+late. The result was British assertion of a right in case of
+necessity to make such contact, having recognized the South as a
+belligerent, but a discontinuance of the practice, under the
+American protest<a name="FNanchor386"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_386">[386]</a>. While this controversy was in progress
+the attention of the British Government was directed to a proposal
+urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared to have
+the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so
+Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel
+expressing great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton
+from America, due to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The
+latter now informed Lyons that his reply had outlined the following
+steps: first, complete harmony of action between England and
+France; second, recognition of Southern independence; third,
+refusal longer to recognize the blockade; fourth, England and
+France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment," when the North
+became disheartened, the present moment not being a good
+one<a name="FNanchor387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387">[387]</a>.
+This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be
+deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument
+over this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for
+cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and
+also advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by
+being forced to develop other sources of <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_197"></a>[V1:pg 197]</span> supply, thus
+being freed from such exclusive dependence on the United States.
+Mercier answered that France was in dire need and could not wait
+and he urged that mere recognition of the South would not secure
+cotton--it was necessary also to break the blockade. In comment to
+Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but thought the fact in
+itself an argument against accepting Mercier's ideas: "The time is
+far distant when the intervention of England and France in the
+quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion, tolerated
+by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far enough in
+establishing its independence to render a recognition of it either
+proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with
+emphasis that recognition would <i>not</i> end the war unless there
+was also an <i>alliance</i> with the South<a name=
+"FNanchor388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388">[388]</a>.</p>
+<p>In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was
+being directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any
+push from the British manufacturing interest, but because of
+queries addressed to it by the French Minister in London. Russell
+wrote to Palmerston, referring to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree
+with you that the cotton question may become serious at the end of
+the year," but he added that Lindsay had informed him that in any
+case cotton could not be brought in the winter-time from the
+interior to the Southern ports<a name="FNanchor389"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_389">[389]</a>. In truth any serious thought given at
+this time to the question of cotton appears to be the result of the
+French arguments at London and Washington advocating a vigorous
+American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier renewed debate on
+exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this time reading to
+Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons insisted
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198"></a>[V1:pg 198]</span>
+that the North would most certainly declare war on any power that
+recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more
+suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the
+shortage of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and
+conciliation in dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to
+preserve close harmony of attitude<a name=
+"FNanchor390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390">[390]</a>. A few clays
+later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified when Mercier reported
+to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left
+with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward said plainly
+that the United States would go to war with any foreign power that
+tried to interfere and that the only way in which France could get
+cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He acknowledged
+that the United States might be defeated, but he informed Mercier
+that France would at least know there had been a war. On his part
+Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible
+outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel
+that the true policy of England and France was to recognize the
+South and "bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to
+Russell is that Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident
+justification of Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had
+been very eager to learn whether England knew of Thouvenel's
+instruction, to which Mercier replied "no," and was now anxious
+that Russell should not reveal to Adams that Lyons had known the
+contents before delivery to Seward--a caution with which Lyons was
+very content<a name="FNanchor391"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_391">[391]</a>.</p>
+<p>Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in
+London at a rather critical moment. On October 17, just after
+Adams' complaint about Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to
+see whether Seward would magnify <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_199"></a>[V1:pg 199]</span> that incident into a cause of
+rupture, and four days before Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation"
+had been received, Russell wrote to Palmerston:</p>
+<blockquote>"There is much good sense in Mercier's
+observations.<br>
+But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything,<br>
+it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England<br>
+and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting<br>
+cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents,<br>
+Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms<br>
+of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you<br>
+accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts<br>
+them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end,<br>
+and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would<br>
+be quite ready to hold this language with us.<br>
+<br>
+"If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it<br>
+would be the end of the year, or immediately before the<br>
+meeting of Parliament<a name="FNanchor392"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_392">[392]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was
+somewhat carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a
+briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already
+cited<a name="FNanchor393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393">[393]</a>.
+Nor was he alone in ministerial uncertainty<a name=
+"FNanchor394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394">[394]</a>, but Palmerston
+was not inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to
+Russell:</p>
+<blockquote>"As to North America, our best and true policy seems
+to<br>
+be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the<br>
+conflict between North and South.... The only<br>
+excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the
+intervening<br>
+parties if the conflict went on; but in the American<br>
+case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.<br>
+<br>
+"I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would<br>
+not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200"></a>[V1:pg 200]</span>
+created by that want was far more serious than it is likely<br>
+to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way<br>
+to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply<br>
+than usual from other quarters.<br>
+<br>
+"The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars<br>
+and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel<br>
+with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights<br>
+and those of our fellow countrymen<a name=
+"FNanchor395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395">[395]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward,
+outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully
+prepared despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of
+Seward thinks was one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his
+greatest, if we consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way
+in which he seemed to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly
+let Thouvenel see what the result would be if the implied threats
+should be carried out<a name="FNanchor396"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_396">[396]</a>." Seward argued with skill the entire
+matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic
+defiance of foreign intervention. Since Great Britain had taken no
+part in the French scheme--a point which Seward was careful to make
+clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no expanded treatment here. Its
+significance is that when reported to Lyons by Mercier (for Seward
+had read it to the latter) the British Minister could pride himself
+on having already pointed out to both Mercier and Russell that
+Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied. Mercier
+again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not
+become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any
+share in the discussion<a name="FNanchor397"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_397">[397]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201"></a>[V1:pg 201]</span>
+<p>Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had
+still another communication, and apparently a last on this topic,
+with Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground
+of national policy toward America, and in which their divergent
+views became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but
+expressed with more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have
+attempted to "rush" Lyons into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons
+finally observed to him that he "had no reason to suppose that Her
+Majesty's Government considered the time was come for entertaining
+at all the question of recognizing the South" and asked what good
+such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied that he did not
+believe that the North would declare war, and so it would be a step
+toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive exception<a name=
+"FNanchor398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398">[398]</a>. Lyons' report
+of this conversation was written on November 8, a date which was
+soon to stand out as that on which occurred an event more
+immediately threatening to British-American relations than any
+other during the Civil War.</p>
+<p>The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression
+of Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and
+determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a
+favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had
+failed, as he well knew when he attached to the convention that
+explanatory statement limiting its action in point of time. In the
+end Russell felt that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks
+after this Russell learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the
+demand for Bunch's recall, finally and formally made by Adams on
+November 21. Just six days later, on November 27, London heard of
+the <i>Trent</i> affair of November 8. It is small wonder that
+Russell <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202"></a>[V1:pg
+202]</span> and his colleagues felt an increasing uncertainty as to
+the intent of the United States, and also an increasing irritation
+at having to guard their steps with such care in a situation where
+they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was the
+dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the
+news of the <i>Trent</i> affair was received they had pursued a
+policy, so they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and
+were fixed in the determination not to permit minor controversies
+or economic advantage to divert them from it.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_319"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor319">[319]</a> <i>Economist</i>, May 18,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_320"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor320">[320]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 29, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_321"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor321">[321]</a> J.L. Motley, <i>The Causes of the American
+Civil War</i>. Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_322"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor322">[322]</a> <i>Daily News</i>, July 19,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_323"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor323">[323]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary, North and South</i>,
+p. 159, Boston, 1863. This work is in effect a condensation of
+Russell's letters to the <i>Times</i>, but contains many intimate
+descriptions not given in the newspaper.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_324"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor324">[324]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 315.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_325"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor325">[325]</a> The <i>Times</i>, August 10,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_326"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor326">[326]</a> Russell, <i>My Diary</i>, London, 1863,
+II, p. 296. This edition varies somewhat from that published at
+Boston and previously cited. The <i>New York Times</i> became
+Russell's most vicious critic, labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a
+name which stuck, and beginning its first article on his sins "The
+terrible epistle has been read with quite as much avidity as an
+average President's message. We scarcely exaggerate the fact when
+we say, the first and foremost thought on the minds of a very large
+portion of our people after the repulse at <i>Bull's Run</i> was,
+what will Russell say?" <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 297. As to his recall
+Russell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance of
+opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in
+sympathy and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be
+examined later when Russell's position as an independent editor in
+London becomes important.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_327"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor327">[327]</a> For similar German impressions see G.H.
+Putnam, <i>Memories of My Youth</i>, N.Y., 1914, p.
+187.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_328"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor328">[328]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I, p. 48. In
+the same view Russell wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of
+Manassas or Bull's Run seems to me to show a great want of zeal.
+For I cannot believe the descendants of the men of 1776 and indeed
+of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage." (Lyons
+Papers.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_329"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor329">[329]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 31.
+August 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_330"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor330">[330]</a> Gladstone Papers, August 29,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_331"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor331">[331]</a> <i>Economist</i>, Aug. 17,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_332"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor332">[332]</a> <i>Morning Star</i>, Sept. 10,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_333"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor333">[333]</a> <i>John Bull</i>, Sept. 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_334"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor334">[334]</a> To be discussed fully in Chapter
+XVIII.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_335"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor335">[335]</a> Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, <i>Delane</i>, II,
+p. 34.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_336"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor336">[336]</a> Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11,
+1861. Cited in <i>Rhodes</i>, III, p. 510.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_337"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor337">[337]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_338"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor338">[338]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Sept. 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_339"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor339">[339]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 21,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_340"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor340">[340]</a> <i>Daily News</i>, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10,
+1861. The statement is in reply to an article in the <i>Times</i>
+of October 9, arguing that even if the South were regarded as in
+the wrong, they had ten millions, a fact that was
+conclusive.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_341"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor341">[341]</a> <i>The Daily News Jubilee</i>. By Justin
+McCarthy and John E. Robinson, pp. 69-77.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_342"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor342">[342]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Sept. 28,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_343"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor343">[343]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Nov. 2,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_344"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor344">[344]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 16. Spence's book
+rapidly went through many editions, was widely read, and furnished
+the argument for many a pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon
+became the intimate friend and adviser of Mason, the Confederate
+envoy to England.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_345"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor345">[345]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference
+from Bernard's la guage is perhaps permissible, but not
+inevitable.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_346"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor346">[346]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 37.
+To his mother, Oct. 18, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_347"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor347">[347]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. V.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_348"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor348">[348]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law."
+No. 21 and Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at
+Charleston who acted with Bunch.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_349"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor349">[349]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to
+Russell, Aug. 2, 1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days
+were here required to transmit a letter that in ordinary times
+would have reached its destination in two days. Lyons states that
+he does not intend to inform Mercier of Russell's attempted recall
+of instructions.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_350"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor350">[350]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure
+No. 2. Private. Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to
+Lyons, also used the word "negotiation."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_351"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor351">[351]</a> When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch
+had thought this indicated a "low morality" and that Southern
+privateers would be in reality pirates. F.O., Am., Vol. 763.
+Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch to Russell, April 18,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_352"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor352">[352]</a> Bancroft's account, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp.
+197-203, states that Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's
+account privately was that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally
+unfit to be intrusted with anything in which judgment and
+discretion are at all necessary." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons,
+Aug. 16, 1861.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_353"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor353">[353]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+198.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_354"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor354">[354]</a> Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_355"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor355">[355]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No.
+4. Adams to Russell, Sept. 3, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_356"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor356">[356]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 2. Lyons to Russell,
+Aug. 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_357"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor357">[357]</a> Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18,
+1861. Copy in Lyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_358"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor358">[358]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 7. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_359"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor359">[359]</a> Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_360"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor360">[360]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 15. Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_361"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor361">[361]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Correspondence respecting
+International Maritime Law." No. 39. Lyons to Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_362"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor362">[362]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston,
+Sept. 6, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_363"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor363">[363]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 6. Russell to Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_364"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor364">[364]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.
+Private. Sept. 17, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_365"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor365">[365]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No.
+10. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_366"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor366">[366]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley
+to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.
+Private. Sept. 10, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_367"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor367">[367]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 9. Russell to Adams, Sept. 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_368"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor368">[368]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 8. Two days later,
+September 11, Russell wrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant
+of Seward's intentions, and that the Queen wished a modification of
+the "phrase about not being prepared to recognize," but that he was
+against any change. Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_369"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor369">[369]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 12. Adams to
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_370"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor370">[370]</a> Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited
+in Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, p. 52.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_371"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor371">[371]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 11. Russell to Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_372"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor372">[372]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston,
+Sept. 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_373"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor373">[373]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell.
+<i>Private</i>. Sept. 24, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_374"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor374">[374]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts
+about Belligny were, as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before
+Bunch's activities became known, the French Consul had been
+recalled and replaced by another man, St. Andr&eacute;. It will
+have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent their instructions
+to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was addressed to St.
+Andr&eacute;. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus there
+was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft
+(<i>Seward</i>, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward
+"thought it important not to give them (England and France) a
+common grievance."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_375"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor375">[375]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_376"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor376">[376]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 15. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_377"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor377">[377]</a> Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and
+Confidential, Lyons to Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in
+this letter that Mure had been set free.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_378"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor378">[378]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to
+Lyons. Draft. Oct. 26, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_379"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor379">[379]</a> The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were
+not printed in the <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>. Bunch did later
+deny specifically that he had told anyone of his activities.
+<i>(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 22.
+Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_380"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor380">[380]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 17. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting
+unindicated elisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating
+them in brackets the sentences run: first:--<br>
+<br>
+"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges
+brought against Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed
+proceeding being deemed advisable with a view to gratify the
+American Public, Mr. Bunch has merely been selected as a safer
+object of attack than the British or French Government.] I can not
+help saying that never were more serious charges, etc.," and
+second:--<br>
+<br>
+"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained
+silent. [I allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me
+to be apparent in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my
+knowledge of Mr. Seward's character, I was sure that at the moment
+nothing which I could say would make so much impression upon him as
+my maintaining an absolute silence.] After a short pause, etc."
+(F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28,
+1861).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_381"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor381">[381]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_382"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor382">[382]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_383"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor383">[383]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov.
+12. 1861. He added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular
+mixture of the bully and coward."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_384"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor384">[384]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur."
+No. 26. Russell to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_385"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor385">[385]</a> Bonham, <i>British Consuls in the
+Confederacy</i>, p. 45. Columbia University, <i>Studies in History,
+Economics and Public Law</i>, XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that
+Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons thought. Lyons had suggested
+that Bunch be permitted to remain privately at Charleston.
+(<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29.
+Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded
+by the United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious
+circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister
+resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the
+United States and Colombia." (Moore, <i>Int. Law Digest</i>, V, p.
+22.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_386"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor386">[386]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward, II</i>, p. 203, says
+that if Great Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that
+British representatives were careful to preserve perfect secrecy."
+I have found no evidence of any similar communication with the
+South.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_387"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor387">[387]</a> As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported
+Mercier as urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective
+Governments authority to recognize the South whenever they thought
+"the right time" had come. Lyons did not wish to have this
+responsibility, arguing that the mere fact of such a decision being
+left to him would embarrass him in his relations with the North.
+Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea, and added that Russia could
+well afford to wait until England and France had acted. Russia
+could then also recognize the South without offending the North.
+(Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861. No.
+863.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_388"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor388">[388]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_389"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor389">[389]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct.
+8, 1861. On Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the
+winter and spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we
+shall attain a great object." (Lyons Papers.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_390"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor390">[390]</a> F.O., America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to
+Russell, Oct. 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_391"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor391">[391]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to
+Russell. Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_392"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor392">[392]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II,
+344.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_393"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor393">[393]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 194.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_394"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor394">[394]</a> "The Americans certainly seem inclined to
+pick a quarrel with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to
+oblige us to recognize the Southern States. A step further would
+enable us to open the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless
+be a great calamity." (Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, 245.
+Granville to Clarendon. No exact date is given but the context
+shows it to have been in October, 1861.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_395"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor395">[395]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, 218-19. On
+October 30, Russell wrote to Gladstone expressing himself as
+worried about cotton but stating that the North was about to try to
+take New Orleans and thus release cotton. (Gladstone
+Papers).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_396"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor396">[396]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 219.
+Bancroft cites also a letter from Seward to his wife showing that
+he appreciated thoroughly the probability of a foreign war if
+France should press on in the line taken.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_397"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor397">[397]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 623.
+Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 4, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_398"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor398">[398]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons
+to Russell, Nov. 8, 1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that
+suspicion of France indicated by Cowley, and for both men these
+suspicions date from the moment when France seemed lukewarm in
+support of England in the matter of Bunch.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203"></a>[V1:pg 203]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2>
+<h3>THE "TRENT"</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The <i>Trent</i> affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax
+of American arrogance<a name="FNanchor399"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_399">[399]</a>. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at
+the outbreak of the Civil War had accomplished little, and after
+seven months of waiting for a more favourable turn in foreign
+relations, President Davis determined to replace them by two
+"Special Commissioners of the Confederate States of America." These
+were James M. Mason of Virginia, for Great Britain, and John
+Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their appointment indicated that
+the South had at last awakened to the need of a serious foreign
+policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the Southern
+press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North,
+almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to
+secure recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual
+accomplishment of their object.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204"></a>[V1:pg 204]</span>
+<p>Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at
+Charleston on the night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate
+steamer <i>Theodora</i><a name="FNanchor400"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_400">[400]</a>, and arrived at New Providence, Nassau,
+on the fourteenth, thence proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas,
+Cuba, and from that point journeyed overland to Havana, arriving
+October 22. In the party there were, besides the two envoys, their
+secretaries, McFarland and Eustis, and the family of Slidell. On
+November 7 they sailed for the Danish island of St. Thomas,
+expecting thence to take a British steamer for Southampton. The
+vessel on which they left Havana was the British contract
+mail-packet <i>Trent</i>, whose captain had full knowledge of the
+diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8
+the <i>Trent</i> was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United
+States sloop of war, <i>San Jacinto</i>, Captain Wilkes commanding,
+by a shot across the bows, and a boarding party took from the
+<i>Trent</i> Mason and Slidell with their secretaries, transferred
+them to the <i>San Jacinto</i>, and proceeded to an American port.
+Protest was made both by the captain of the <i>Trent</i> and by
+Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on
+board the ship<a name="FNanchor401"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_401">[401]</a>. The two envoys also declared that they
+would yield only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid
+upon shoulders and coat collars, and, accepting this as the
+application of <i>force</i>, they were transferred to the <i>San
+Jacinto's</i> boats. The scene on the <i>Trent</i>, as described by
+all parties, both then and later, partakes of the nature of comic
+opera, yet was serious enough to the participants. In fact, the
+envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction that
+the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early
+realization of the object of their <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_205"></a>[V1:pg 205]</span> journey--recognition of the
+South, at least by Great Britain<a name="FNanchor402"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_402">[402]</a>. Once on board the <i>San Jacinto</i>
+they were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having
+"seats at the captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an
+American war-ship.</p>
+<p>Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even
+without any recent official information from Washington. He was
+returning from a cruise off the African coast, and had reached St.
+Thomas on October 10. A few days later, when off the south coat of
+Cuba, he had learned of the Confederate appointment of Mason and
+Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth, in Havana harbour, he heard that
+the Commissioners were to sail on the <i>Trent</i>. At once he
+conceived the idea of intercepting the <i>Trent</i>, exercising the
+right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the alleged
+objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The result
+was that quite without authority from the United States Navy
+Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was
+addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be
+accepted by that nation as an insult to national prestige and
+national pride not quietly to be suffered.</p>
+<p>The <i>San Jacinto</i> reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of
+November 15. The next day the news was known, but since it was
+Saturday, few papers contained more than brief and inaccurate
+accounts and, there being then few Sunday papers, it was not until
+Monday, the eighteenth, that there broke out a widespread rejoicing
+and glorification in the Northern press<a name=
+"FNanchor403"></a><a href="#Footnote_403">[403]</a>. America, for a
+few days, passed through a spasm of exultation hard to understand,
+even by those who felt it, once the first emotion had subsided.
+This had various causes, but among them is evident a quite
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206"></a>[V1:pg 206]</span>
+childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and Slidell.
+Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of the
+previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed
+antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a
+leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was
+a United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by
+birth, but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in
+business there, and had for nearly twenty years been the political
+"boss" of one faction of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in
+the State. With much previous experience in diplomacy, especially
+that requiring intrigue and indirect methods (as in the
+preliminaries of the Mexican War), and having held his seat in the
+United States Senate until the withdrawal of Louisiana from the
+Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more detested, but
+both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the personal
+side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing<a name=
+"FNanchor404"></a><a href="#Footnote_404">[404]</a>.</p>
+<p>Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until
+the news of the capture was received no portion of the public had
+given serious thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise
+also played its part when the affair became known in England,
+though in official circles there had been some warning. It had
+already been reported in the British press that Mason and Slidell
+had run the blockade at Charleston, were in Cuba, and were about to
+set sail for England on the Confederate steamer <i>Nashville</i>,
+but the British Government, considering that the envoys might
+perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for Southampton,
+became much concerned over a possible American interference with
+that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the
+Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the
+presence at <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207"></a>[V1:pg
+207]</span> Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking
+whether this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be
+entitled to interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with
+beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond
+three miles from the British Coast."</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image06.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image06.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image06.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<i>Photo: Handy, Washington</i><br>
+<b>JAMES M. MASON</b></p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Whether for instance she might cause the West India
+Mail Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers, open
+the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine the luggage
+of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason and Slidell in
+person, or seize their Credentials and Instructions and Despatches,
+or even put a Prize Crew on board the West India Steamer and carry
+her off to a Port of the United States; in other words what would
+be the right of the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers
+and crew and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet
+on the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and
+confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches; would
+the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and everything
+in her back to America or would she be obliged to land in this
+Country or in some near port all the people and all the unseizable
+goods<a name="FNanchor405"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_405">[405]</a>?"</blockquote>
+<p>Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an
+immediate reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in
+Southampton on November 12. The opinion of the law officer
+consulted is best given in Palmerston's own words in a letter to
+Delane, Editor of the <i>Times</i>:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<blockquote>"<i>94 Piccadilly,<br>
+November 11, 1861</i>.</blockquote>
+<br>
+"MY DEAR DELANE,<br>
+<br>
+"It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr.
+Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of
+Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider what
+we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no doubt, to
+search the West Indian packet <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_208"></a>[V1:pg 208]</span> supposed to be bringing hither
+the two Southern envoys; and, much to my regret, it appeared that,
+according to the principles of international law laid down in our
+courts by Lord Stowell, and practised and enforced by us, a
+belligerent has a right to stop and search any neutral not being a
+ship of war, and being found on the high seas and being suspected
+of carrying enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American
+cruiser might, by our own principles of international law, stop the
+West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern men and their
+despatches and credentials were found on board, either take them
+out, or seize the packet and carry her back to New York for trial.
+Such being the opinion of our men learned in the law, we have
+determined to do no more than to order the <i>Phaeton</i> frigate
+to drop down to Yarmouth Roads and watch the proceedings of the
+American within our three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction,
+and to prevent her from exercising within that limit those rights
+which we cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit.<br>
+<br>
+"In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk this
+morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and finding it
+blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the night within
+Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the Southampton river.<br>
+<br>
+"I mention these things for your private information.<br>
+<br>
+Yours sincerely,<br>
+<br>
+PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor406"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_406">[406]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to
+Delane, and sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a
+difficult situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to
+Adams on the next day, November 12, and asking for an interview.
+His note took Adams by surprise, but he promptly waited upon
+Palmerston, and was told of the latter's disturbance at the
+presence of the American ship <i>James Adger</i>, Captain Marchand
+commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged purpose of
+stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209"></a>[V1:pg 209]</span> the
+journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not
+pretend to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right
+to stop a foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and
+he urged on Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither
+did the object to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it
+was surely of no consequence whether one or two more men were added
+to the two or three who had already been so long here. They would
+scarcely make a difference in the action of the Government after
+once having made up its mind<a name="FNanchor407"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_407">[407]</a>."</p>
+<p>The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the
+same day, November 12, was reassuring:</p>
+<blockquote>"MY DEAR DELANE,<br>
+<br>
+"I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the American
+paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the <i>Nashville</i> if found in
+these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag.
+He said he had seen the commander, and had advised him to go
+straight home; and he believed the steamer to be now on her way
+back to the United States. This is a very satisfactory
+explanation.<br>
+<br>
+Yours sincerely,<br>
+<br>
+PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor408"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_408">[408]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded
+quite the same statement as that here attributed to him by
+Palmerston, and this became later, but fortunately after the
+question of the <i>Trent</i> had passed off the stage, a matter of
+minor dispute. Adams' own statement was that he had told Palmerston
+the <i>James Adger</i> was seeking to intercept the
+<i>Nashville</i> and "had no instruction" to interfere with a
+British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already
+had instructions "not to meddle with any ship <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_210"></a>[V1:pg 210]</span> under a foreign
+flag<a name="FNanchor409"></a><a href="#Footnote_409">[409]</a>."
+But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had
+been warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually
+happened in the case of the <i>Trent</i> should occur, English
+practice, if followed, would compel acquiescence in it<a name=
+"FNanchor410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410">[410]</a>. This is not to
+say that a first legal advice thus given on a problematical case
+necessarily bound the Government to a fixed line of action, but
+that the opinion of the Government was one of "no help for it" if
+the case should actually arise is shown by the instructions to
+Lyons and by his reaction. On November 16, Hammond wrote to Lyons
+stating the opinion of the Law Officers that "we could do nothing
+to save the Packet being interfered with outside our three miles;
+so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that the
+American [the <i>James Adger</i>] had no instructions to meddle
+with any ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to
+endeavour to take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211"></a>[V1:pg 211]</span>
+foreign colours<a name="FNanchor411"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_411">[411]</a>." On receipt of this letter subsequent to
+the actual seizure of the envoys, Lyons hardly knew what to expect.
+He reported Hammond's account to Admiral Milne, writing that the
+legal opinion was that "Nothing could be done to save the Packet's
+being interfered with outside of the Marine league from the British
+Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that the Law Officers
+decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of the Packet,
+but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being interfered
+with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion which
+was to come <i>after</i> the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so
+uncertain as to what his instructions would be that he thought he
+"ought to maintain the greatest reserve here on the matter of the
+<i>Trent</i><a name="FNanchor412"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_412">[412]</a>."</p>
+<p>This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous
+complication occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two
+weeks before that fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell,
+"says it was all a false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility
+and exaggerated notions<a name="FNanchor413"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_413">[413]</a>." But Russell was not equally convinced
+with Adams that the North, especially Seward, was so eager
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212"></a>[V1:pg 212]</span> for
+continued British neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of
+Captain Wilkes' action was received, Russell and many others in the
+Cabinet saw in it a continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now
+culminating in a direct affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of
+the North in the Cabinet, was stirred at first to keen resentment,
+writing "of this wretched piece of American folly.... I am all
+against submitting to any clean breach of International Law, such
+as I can hardly doubt this has been<a name=
+"FNanchor414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414">[414]</a>." The Law
+Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon
+the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of
+sending the <i>Trent</i> as a prize into port for judicial
+adjudication<a name="FNanchor415"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_415">[415]</a>." This was still later further expanded
+by an opinion that the envoys could not be considered as
+contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the <i>Trent</i> as
+having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was
+to a neutral, not to an enemy port<a name=
+"FNanchor416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416">[416]</a>. This opinion
+would have prohibited even the carrying of the <i>Trent</i> into an
+American port for trial by a prize court.</p>
+<p>But the British Government did not argue the matter in its
+demand upon the United States. The case was one for a quick demand
+of prompt reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on
+November 30, was couched in coldly correct language, showing
+neither a friendly nor an unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the
+envoys was asserted to be a breach of international law, which, it
+was hoped, had occurred without orders, and Lyons was to demand the
+restoration of the prisoners with an apology. If Seward had not
+already offered these terms Lyons was to propose them, but as a
+preliminary step in making clear the British position, he might
+read the instruction to Seward, leaving <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_213"></a>[V1:pg 213]</span> him a copy of
+it if desired<a name="FNanchor417"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_417">[417]</a>. In another instruction of the same date
+Russell authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an
+answer by Seward, if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty
+to determine whether "the requirements of Her Majesty's Government
+are substantially complied with<a name="FNanchor418"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_418">[418]</a>." And on December 1, Russell writing
+privately to Lyons instructed him, while upholding English dignity,
+to abstain from anything like menace<a name=
+"FNanchor419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419">[419]</a>. On November
+30, also, the Government hurriedly sent out orders to hold the
+British Fleet in readiness, began preparations for the sending of
+troops to Canada, and initiated munitions and supply activities.
+Evidently there was at first but faint hope that a break in
+relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be avoided<a name=
+"FNanchor420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420">[420]</a>.</p>
+<p>It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost
+immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was
+softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material
+point being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain
+Wilkes was unauthorized<a name="FNanchor421"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_421">[421]</a>. That instruction had been sent previous
+to <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214"></a>[V1:pg 214]</span>
+the receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of
+results, he stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a
+strict silence<a name="FNanchor422"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_422">[422]</a>. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who
+feared the realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I
+wish I could divest myself of the idea that the North and South
+will not shake hands over a war with us<a name=
+"FNanchor423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423">[423]</a>." Considering
+the bitterness of the quarrel in America this was a far-fetched
+notion. The efforts promptly made by the Confederate agents in
+London to make use of the <i>Trent</i> affair showed how little
+Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very quiet
+since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain
+intended remaining strictly neutral<a name=
+"FNanchor424"></a><a href="#Footnote_424">[424]</a>, they now, on
+November 27 and 30, renewed their argument and application for
+recognition, but received in reply a curt letter declining any
+official communication with them "in the present state of
+affairs<a name="FNanchor425"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_425">[425]</a>."</p>
+<p>The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of
+transportation before even the first American reaction to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215"></a>[V1:pg 215]</span> the
+British demand could be received in London gave time for a
+lessening of excitement and a more careful self-analysis by British
+statesmen as to what they really felt and desired. Gladstone wrote:
+"It is a very sad and heart-sickening business, and I sincerely
+trust with you that war may be averted<a name=
+"FNanchor426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426">[426]</a>." Argyll
+hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone
+of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on
+technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a
+calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not
+only ourselves, but all our North American colonies<a name=
+"FNanchor427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427">[427]</a>." But war
+seemed to both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by
+Cornewall Lewis<a name="FNanchor428"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_428">[428]</a> and by Clarendon, the latter standing at
+the moment in a position midway between the Whig and Tory
+parties<a name="FNanchor429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429">[429]</a>.
+Yet Russell, with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's
+policy, as also believing that he had more cause, personally, to
+resent it, was less pessimistic and was already thinking of at
+least postponing immediate hostilities in the event of an American
+refusal to make just recompense. On December 16 he wrote to
+Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the opinion that if the
+answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive answer, we should
+send once more across the Atlantic to ask compliance.... I do not
+think the country would approve an immediate declaration of war.
+But I think we must abide by our demand of a restoration of the
+prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada. Your foresight
+of last year is amply justified<a name="FNanchor430"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_430">[430]</a>." And on December 20 he wrote, "Adams'
+language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding to us, if our
+tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are refused, we must,
+of course, call Parliament <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_216"></a>[V1:pg 216]</span> together. The sixth of February
+will do. In any other case we must decide according to
+circumstances<a name="FNanchor431"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_431">[431]</a>."</p>
+<p>Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America
+without the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for
+delay. He was reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought
+which was experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager
+British "Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first
+explosion of the Press, on receipt of the news of the <i>Trent</i>,
+had been a terrific one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen
+field of supremacy, the sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at
+first preserving a certain slow dignity of motion. Customary
+"strong leader-writing" became vigorous, indeed, in editorial
+treatment of America and in demand for the prompt release of the
+envoys with suitable apology. The close touch of leading papers
+with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the <i>Times</i>, by
+the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28 there
+was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much
+questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be
+doubtful. But even if old British practice seemed to support
+Captain Wilkes, the present was not to be controlled by a discarded
+past, and "essential differences" were pointed out. This tone of
+vexed uncertainty changed to a note of positive assurance and
+militant patriotism on November 30 when the Government made its
+demand. The <i>Times</i> up to December 2, thought it absolutely
+certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted much
+space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy
+toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But
+on December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American
+news of the arrival of the <i>San Jacinto</i> at Fortress Monroe,
+and this contained a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had
+no orders. The <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217"></a>[V1:pg
+217]</span> <i>Times</i> was sceptical, but printed the news as
+having an important bearing, if true, and, at the same time,
+printed communications by "Justicia" and others advising a "go
+slowly" policy<a name="FNanchor432"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_432">[432]</a>. Yet all British papers indulged in sharp
+reflections on American insults, displayed keen resentment, and
+demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand.</p>
+<p>An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward
+on November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of
+feeling as has been created by the news of the boarding of [the
+Trent]. The people are frantic with rage, and were the country
+polled, I fear 999 men out of a thousand would declare for
+immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot resist the impulse if he
+would." And another American, in Edinburgh, wrote to his uncle in
+New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling of indignation
+exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may make itself
+heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet officers<a name=
+"FNanchor433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433">[433]</a>." If such were
+the British temper, it would require skilful handling by even a
+pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even without belligerent
+newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in <i>Punch's</i>
+cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218"></a>[V1:pg 218]</span>
+water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least
+implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a
+general hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement
+from the American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that
+he had said the action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at
+Washington before he sailed for Europe, and asserting that no
+orders were given to seize the envoys on board any British or
+foreign vessel<a name="FNanchor434"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_434">[434]</a>. Nevertheless, Adams, for the moment
+intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of British
+policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The expression
+of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great
+Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May
+she drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a
+few spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong
+enough to hold her from driving it home. Little do you understand
+of this fast-anchored isle<a name="FNanchor435"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_435">[435]</a>."</p>
+<p>There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and
+sharper tone in the British press was the reception of the
+counter-exultation of the American press on learning of the
+detention and the exercise of "right of search" on a British ship.
+The American public equally went "off its head" in its expressions.
+Writing in 1911, the son of the American Minister to Great Britain,
+Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young law-student in
+Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of the
+half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American
+people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment
+losing possession of their senses, as during the weeks which
+immediately followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell<a name=
+"FNanchor436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436">[436]</a>." There were
+evident two principal causes for <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_219"></a>[V1:pg 219]</span> this elation. The North with much
+emotion and high courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of
+restoring the Union and hoping for quick success, had now passed
+through a wearisome six months with no evident progress towards its
+object. Northern failure had developed a deep mortification when,
+suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold naval captain, on his own
+initiative, appeared to have struck a real blow at the South. His
+action seemed to indicate that the fighting forces of the North, if
+free from the trammels of Washington red tape, could, and would,
+carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight incident to
+create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden lifting
+from despondency to elation.</p>
+<p>But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on
+American minds the notion that the United States had at last given
+to Great Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had
+exercised upon a British ship that "right of search" which had been
+so keenly resented by America as to have become almost a
+<i>permanent</i> cause of a sense of injury once received and never
+to be forgotten. There was no clear thinking about this; the
+obnoxious right of search in times of peace for vagrant seamen, the
+belligerent right exercised by Britain while America was a neutral,
+the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as necessary
+in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused by the
+American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to
+this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a
+general American jubilation that the United States had now revenged
+herself for British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain
+could not consistently complain. These two main reasons for
+exultation were shared by all classes, not merely by the uninformed
+mob of newspaper readers. At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in
+Boston on November 26, Governor Andrews of Massachusetts called
+Wilkes' action <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220"></a>[V1:pg
+220]</span> "one of the most illustrious services that had made the
+war memorable," and added "that there might be nothing left [in the
+episode] to crown the exultation of the American heart, Commodore
+Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the
+British lion at its head<a name="FNanchor437"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_437">[437]</a>."</p>
+<p>All America first applauded the act, then plunged into
+discussion of its legality as doubts began to arise of its
+defensibility--and wisdom. It became a sort of temporarily popular
+"parlour game" to argue the international law of the case and
+decide that Great Britain could have no cause of complaint<a name=
+"FNanchor438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438">[438]</a>. Meanwhile at
+Washington itself there was evidenced almost equal excitement and
+approval--but not, fortunately, by the Department responsible for
+the conduct of foreign relations. Secretary of the Navy Welles
+congratulated Wilkes on his "great public service," though
+criticizing him for not having brought the <i>Trent</i> into port
+for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2,
+thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to
+give him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence
+of approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of
+national responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him,
+therefore, and on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the
+Cabinet, like Sumner, Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful
+solution. Thoroughly alarmed and <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_221"></a>[V1:pg 221]</span> despondent, anxious as to the
+possible fate of Canada<a name="FNanchor439"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_439">[439]</a>, he advised against any public
+preparations in Canada for defence, on the ground that if the
+<i>Trent</i> affair did blow over it should not appear that we ever
+thought it an insult which would endanger peace<a name=
+"FNanchor440"></a><a href="#Footnote_440">[440]</a>. This was very
+different from the action and attitude of the Government at home,
+as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising like
+caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at
+the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States.</p>
+<p>The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became
+known to the British press some six days after its own spasm of
+anger, and three days after the Government had despatched its
+demand for release of the prisoners and begun its hurried military
+preparations. On December 3 the <i>Times</i> contained the first
+summary of American press outpourings. The first effect in England
+was astonishment, followed by renewed and more intense evidences of
+a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there began to appear a
+note of caution and more sane judgment of the situation, though
+with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had suffered an
+injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of delight
+seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave
+pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright
+made a great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British
+precedent for Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American
+leadership in democracy, and stating his positive conviction that
+the United States Government was as much astonished as was that of
+Great Britain by the attack on the <i>Trent.</i><a name=
+"FNanchor441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441">[441]</a> To this the
+<i>Times</i> gave a full column of report on December 5
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222"></a>[V1:pg 222]</span> and
+the day following printed five close-type columns of the speech
+itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the
+speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where
+the orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why
+Manchester or Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the
+<i>Times</i> was attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy"
+Bright as an apostle of democracy rather than to fan the flames of
+irritation over the <i>Trent</i>, and the prominence given to
+Bright's speech indicates a greater readiness to consider as
+hopeful an escape from the existing crisis.</p>
+<p>After December 3 and up to the ninth, the <i>Times</i> was more
+caustic about America than previously. The impression of its
+editorials read to-day is that more hopeful of a peaceful solution
+it was more free to snarl. But with the issue of December 10 there
+began a series of leaders and communications, though occasionally
+with a relapse to the former tone, distinctly less irritating to
+Americans, and indicating a real desire for peace<a name=
+"FNanchor442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442">[442]</a>. Other
+newspapers either followed the <i>Times</i>, or were slightly in
+advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful
+expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223"></a>[V1:pg 223]</span> no
+change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction
+of the "insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized
+in the next few days that a slow shift was taking place in the
+British temper and regretted the violence of American utterances.
+December 12, he wrote to his son in America: "It has given us here
+an indescribably sad feeling to witness the exultation in America
+over an event which bids fair to be the final calamity in this
+contest...." Great Britain "is right in principle and only wrong in
+point of consistency. Our mistake is that we are donning ourselves
+in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth wearing<a name=
+"FNanchor443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443">[443]</a>." His
+secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful as I am of
+Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the same
+time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody
+set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable
+could you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an
+insult. <i>We</i> should have jumped out of our boots at such a
+one<a name="FNanchor444"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_444">[444]</a>."</p>
+<p>The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope
+or pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for
+an honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they
+trusted the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves
+aiding a slave as against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had
+written a long account of the changes taking place in Northern
+feeling as regards slavery. He thought it very probable that the
+issue of emancipation would soon be forced upon Lincoln, and that
+the American conflict would then take on a new and more ideal
+character<a name="FNanchor445"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_445">[445]</a>. This letter, arriving in the midst of
+uncertainty about the <i>Trent</i> solution, was in line with news
+published in the British papers calling out <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_224"></a>[V1:pg 224]</span> editorials from
+them largely in disapproval<a name="FNanchor446"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_446">[446]</a>. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If
+the prisoners were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then
+to do? Would it be wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at
+once?</p>
+<p>"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise
+the blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent
+the egress of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will
+be sent against our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at
+present not defensible. He had been reading Alison on the War of
+1812, and found that then the American army of invasion had
+numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect 40 or 50,000<a name=
+"FNanchor447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447">[447]</a>." Two days
+later he wrote to Gladstone that if America would only "let the
+Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he would be
+satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad to
+make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and
+securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels
+or to persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another.
+This would be a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the
+particular case would be decided in our favour<a name=
+"FNanchor448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448">[448]</a>."</p>
+<p>On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was
+well-known that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of
+Palmerston's foreign policy and, to the initiated, his last effort
+in this direction--the modification of the instruction to Lyons on
+the <i>Trent</i>--was no secret. There is no evidence that his
+death made any change in the British <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_225"></a>[V1:pg 225]</span> position, but it was true, as the
+American Minister wrote, that "Now they [the British public] are
+beginning to open their eyes to a sense of his value. They discover
+that much of their political quietude has been due to the judicious
+exercise of his influence over the Queen and the Court, and they do
+not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without him<a name=
+"FNanchor449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449">[449]</a>." The nation
+was plunged into deep mourning, but not to distraction from the
+American crisis, for on the day when all papers were black with
+mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of the
+approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a
+summary of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their
+astonishment, made no mention of the <i>Trent</i> affair. The
+Congressional approval caused "almost a feeling of consternation
+among ourselves," but Lincoln's silence, it was argued, might
+possibly be taken as a good omen, since it might indicate that he
+had as yet reached no decision<a name="FNanchor450"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_450">[450]</a>. Evidently there was more real alarm
+caused by the applause given Wilkes by one branch of the government
+than by the outpourings of the American press. The next day several
+papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the <i>Times</i> gave
+a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had ignored
+the issue with Great Britain<a name="FNanchor451"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_451">[451]</a>. On the eighteenth this journal also
+called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the report
+of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not
+unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the
+increase of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The
+<i>Times</i> continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance
+on the <i>Trent</i>, but devoted most of its energy to combating
+the suggestions, now being made very generally, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_226"></a>[V1:pg 226]</span> advocating a
+recourse to arbitration. This would be "weak concession," and less
+likely to secure redress and peace for the future, than an
+insistence on the original demands.</p>
+<p>Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson
+wrote that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute
+may after all be settled without war<a name=
+"FNanchor452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452">[452]</a>." Cornewall
+Lewis thought the "last mail from America is decidedly threatening,
+not encouraging<a name="FNanchor453"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_453">[453]</a>." But on December 19, Adams was at last
+able to give Russell official assurance that Wilkes had acted
+without authorization. Russell at once informed Lyons of this
+communication and that he had now told Adams the exact terms of his
+two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed Lyons to
+accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes' action
+was unauthorized--a very important further British modification,
+but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the
+affair at Washington<a name="FNanchor454"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_454">[454]</a>. Meanwhile a notable change had taken
+place in American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes
+affair unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at
+all<a name="FNanchor455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455">[455]</a>," a
+reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of
+the British demand and the unanimous <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_227"></a>[V1:pg 227]</span> support given it by the British
+public<a name="FNanchor456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456">[456]</a>.
+On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone produced less
+effect than might have been expected, and this because of the
+persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt,
+would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that
+he had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was
+the time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow
+Weed, Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London
+and attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of
+the <i>Times</i>. His communication was printed, but his assertion
+that Seward's unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle
+story," were misunderstood, did not convince the <i>Times</i>,
+which answered him at length<a name="FNanchor457"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_457">[457]</a>, and asserted its belief "... that upon
+his ability to involve the United States in a war with England, Mr.
+Seward has staked his official, and, most probably, also his
+political existence." The Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's
+remarks, wrote George Peabody later, "has strongly influenced the
+Government in war preparations for several months past<a name=
+"FNanchor458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458">[458]</a>." Adams
+himself, though convinced that Seward's supposed animosity "was a
+mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the Duke of Newcastle,"
+acknowledged <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228"></a>[V1:pg
+228]</span> that: "The Duke has, however, succeeded in making
+everybody in authority here believe it<a name=
+"FNanchor459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459">[459]</a>." Surely no
+"joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but
+British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious
+reasons, as previously related<a name="FNanchor460"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_460">[460]</a>.</p>
+<p>As time passed without an answer from America, British
+speculation turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a
+war. These were not reassuring since even though postulating a
+British victory, it appeared inevitable that England would not
+escape without considerable damage from the American navy and from
+privateers. Americans were "a powerful and adventurous people,
+strong in maritime resources, and participating in our own national
+familiarity with the risks and dangers of the deep<a name=
+"FNanchor461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461">[461]</a>." Englishmen
+must not think that a war would be fought only on the shores of
+America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed and
+intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in
+the <i>Daily News</i> on December 25, 26 and 27, by W.W. Story, an
+artist resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice
+Story, whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462">[462]</a>. By the last
+week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager
+to find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to
+an extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave
+they have themselves created<a name="FNanchor463"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_463">[463]</a>." He greatly regretted the death of the
+Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the
+United States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams
+wrote Seward: "I think the signs are clear of a <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_229"></a>[V1:pg 229]</span> considerable
+degree of reaction." He also explained the causes of the nearly
+unanimous European support of England in this contention:
+"Unquestionably the view of all other countries is that the
+opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new and large
+modifications of international law which will hereafter materially
+restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the
+ocean<a name="FNanchor464"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_464">[464]</a>."</p>
+<p>Adams' estimate was correct. Even the <i>Morning Post</i>,
+generally accepted as Palmerston's organ<a name=
+"FNanchor465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465">[465]</a>, and in the
+<i>Trent</i> crisis the most 'vigorous' of all metropolitan
+journals, commented upon the general public hope of a peaceful
+solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a Government [the
+American] elected but a few months since by the popular choice,
+depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford to
+disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question
+must, we fear, be in the negative...." The <i>Post</i> (thereby
+Palmerston?) did indeed, as later charged, "prolong the
+excitement," but not with its earlier animosity to America. The
+very fact that the <i>Post</i> was accepted as Palmerston's organ
+justified this attitude for it would have been folly for the
+Government to announce prematurely a result of which there was as
+yet no definite assurance. Yet <i>within</i> the Cabinet there was
+a more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell
+of December 19 was practically conclusive<a name=
+"FNanchor466"></a><a href="#Footnote_466">[466]</a>, and Adams
+himself now thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an
+American plan to inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at
+least in this case nothing of the kind had been intended<a name=
+"FNanchor467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467">[467]</a>." Everyone
+wondered at and was vexed with the delay of an answer from America,
+yet hopefully believed that this indicated <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_230"></a>[V1:pg 230]</span> ultimate
+yielding. There could be no surety until the event. Russell wrote
+to Palmerston on January 7, "I still incline to think Lincoln will
+submit, but not until the clock is 59 minutes past 11. If it is
+war, I fear we must summon Parliament forthwith<a name=
+"FNanchor468"></a><a href="#Footnote_468">[468]</a>."</p>
+<p>The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage
+of at Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for
+consideration by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to
+Lyons. These were received on December 18, and on the next day
+Lyons unofficially acquainted Seward with their nature<a name=
+"FNanchor469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469">[469]</a>. The latter
+expressed gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner"
+of Lyons and asked for two days' time for consideration. On
+Saturday, December 21, therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a
+formal presentation of demands but was met with a statement that
+the press of other business had prevented sufficient consideration
+and was asked for a further two days' postponement until Monday.
+Hence December 23 became the day from which the seven days
+permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the meantime,
+Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support
+given by France to the British position.</p>
+<p>The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first
+learning of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic
+fever and for a saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written
+to his brother that if the prisoners were not given up, "this
+nation means to make war." To this the brother in America replied
+"this nation doesn't<a name="FNanchor470"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_470">[470]</a>," an answer that sums up public
+determination no matter how loud the talk or deep the feeling.
+Seward understood <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_231"></a>[V1:pg 231]</span> the change and had now received
+strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in
+Paris<a name="FNanchor471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471">[471]</a>,
+but these were not needed to convince him that America must yield.
+Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in an
+impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released <i>if
+the demand were made</i>. The comment of those who were "wise after
+the event" was that true policy would have dictated an immediate
+release of the prisoners as seized in violation of international
+law, before any complaint could be received from Great Britain.
+This leaves out of consideration the political difficulties at home
+of an administration already seriously weakened by a long-continued
+failure to "press the war," and it also fails to recognize that in
+the American Cabinet itself a proposal by Seward to release, made
+immediately, would in all probability have been negatived. Blair,
+in the Cabinet, and Sumner in the Senate, were, indeed, in favour
+of prompt release, but Lincoln seems to have thought the prisoners
+must be held, even though he feared they might become "white
+elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to notify Adams
+that Wilkes had acted without instructions<a name=
+"FNanchor472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472">[472]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232"></a>[V1:pg 232]</span>
+<p>On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to
+Great Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and
+Cobden, earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the
+strength of British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to
+succeed against the South, <i>have no war with England</i>; make
+every concession that can be made; don't even hesitate to tell the
+world <i>that you will even concede what two years ago no Power
+would have asked of you</i>, rather than give another nation a
+pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your country<a name=
+"FNanchor473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473">[473]</a>." Without doubt
+Bright's letters had great influence on Lincoln and on other
+Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that his task was
+difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's discussion
+brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next day and
+after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his
+associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply
+in the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by
+Seward on the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to
+Russell. It did not contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since
+the prisoners were to be released and acknowledgment was made that
+reparation was due to Great Britain, he considered that British
+demands were "so far substantially complied with" that he should
+remain at his post until he received further orders<a name=
+"FNanchor474"></a><a href="#Footnote_474">[474]</a>.</p>
+<p>Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers.
+Lyons reported that it was very well received and that the public
+was calm and apparently contented with the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_233"></a>[V1:pg 233]</span> outcome<a name=
+"FNanchor475"></a><a href="#Footnote_475">[475]</a>. He thought
+that "thus the preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's
+argument reviewed at great length all the conditions of the
+incident, dilated on many points of international law both relevant
+and irrelevant, narrated the past relations of the two nations on
+"right of search," and finally took the ground that Mason and
+Slidell were contraband of war and justly subject to capture, but
+that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the <i>Trent</i>, with her
+passengers, into port for trial by an American prize court.
+Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed
+over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was,
+says Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in
+argument, and contained many contradictions<a name=
+"FNanchor476"></a><a href="#Footnote_476">[476]</a>, but, he adds,
+that it was intended primarily for the American public and to meet
+the situation at home. Another critic sums up Seward's
+difficulties: he had to persuade a President and a reluctant
+Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day, to reconcile a
+Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending Wilkes, and
+to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch<a name=
+"FNanchor477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477">[477]</a>. Still more
+important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of
+contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the <i>neutral
+port</i> destination of the <i>Trent</i>, was the likening of Mason
+and Slidell to "ambassadors of independent states." For eight
+months Seward had protested to Europe "that the Confederates were
+not belligerents, but insurgents," and now "his whole argument
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234"></a>[V1:pg 234]</span>
+rested on the fact that they were belligerents<a name=
+"FNanchor478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478">[478]</a>.... But this
+did not later alter a return to his old position nor prevent
+renewed arguments to induce a recall by European states of their
+proclamations of neutrality.</p>
+<p>On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was
+received in London, stating that the envoys would be released and
+the next day came his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer.
+The envoys themselves did not reach England until January 30, and
+the delay in their voyage gave time for an almost complete
+disappearance of public interest in them<a name=
+"FNanchor479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479">[479]</a>. January 10,
+Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was well satisfied with
+the fact and manner of the American answer, and regarded the
+incident as closed, but that it could not agree with portions of
+Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was done on
+January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of
+interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the
+legal advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes
+contraband<a name="FNanchor480"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_480">[480]</a>. Possibly the British Government was
+embarrassed by the fact that while France had strongly supported
+England at Washington, Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the
+conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes, whether the United States claimed
+to be considered as Belligerents, <i>or as a Government engaged in
+putting down a rebellion</i>, was a violation of all those
+principles of Maritime international law, which France had
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235"></a>[V1:pg 235]</span>
+ever supported<a name="FNanchor481"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_481">[481]</a> ..." and had instructed Mercier to so
+state to Seward. This implied a reflection on former British
+practice, especially as regards the exercise of a right of search
+to recover its own citizens and is indicative of the correctness of
+Adams' judgment that one main reason for European support of Great
+Britain in the <i>Trent</i> crisis, was the general desire to tie
+her to a limitation of belligerent maritime power.</p>
+<p>In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had
+stated that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying
+them that they were "not to be received with honours or treated
+otherwise than as distinguished <i>private</i> gentlemen<a name=
+"FNanchor482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482">[482]</a>." Russell was
+equally cautious, seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London,
+"unofficially at my own house," on February 10, refusing to read
+his credentials, and after listening to a statement of his
+instructions, replying that "nothing had hitherto occurred which
+would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart from a position of
+neutrality<a name="FNanchor483"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_483">[483]</a>. Russell had already suggested that
+Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell<a name=
+"FNanchor484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484">[484]</a>. This procedure
+does not necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude,
+for it is exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate
+Commissioners before the <i>Trent</i>; but the <i>Trent</i>
+controversy might naturally have been expected to have brought
+about an <i>easier</i> relation between Russell and a Southern
+representative. That it did not do so is evidence of Russell's care
+not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also, in relief
+at the outcome of the <i>Trent</i>, he was convinced, momentarily
+at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was
+unfounded. "I do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward
+has any animosity <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_236"></a>[V1:pg 236]</span> to this country. It is all
+buncom" (<i>sic</i>)<a name="FNanchor485"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_485">[485]</a>. Apparently it was beginning to be
+realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone" which they
+had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as especially
+inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based upon one
+object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit of
+this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations
+that the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign
+interference. The final decision in the <i>Trent</i> affair, such
+was the situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone
+and that decision was, from the first, for peace.</p>
+<p>Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America
+in general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud
+passed, was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of
+intense hatred and the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we
+must give up the traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our
+navy, perfect the discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and
+then fight Great Britain<a name="FNanchor486"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_486">[486]</a>." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of
+his "Bigelow Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862:</p>
+<blockquote>"It don't seem hardly right, John,<br>
+When both my hands was full,<br>
+To stump me to a fight, John--<br>
+Your cousin, tu, John Bull!<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess<br>
+We know it now,' sez he,<br>
+'The lion's paw is all the law,<br>
+Accordin' to J.B.,<br>
+Thet's fit for you an' me<a name="FNanchor487"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_487">[487]</a>!'"</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237"></a>[V1:pg 237]</span>
+<p>It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and
+Slidell that in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of
+the British press and the preparations of the Government. Even
+after their surrender America was further incensed by British
+boasting that America had yielded to a threat of war, as in the
+<i>Punch</i> cartoon of a penitent small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says
+he is very sorry and that he didn't mean to do it," and so escapes
+the birching Britannia was about to administer. America had, in all
+truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked being told so, and
+regarded the threat itself as evidence of British ill-will<a name=
+"FNanchor488"></a><a href="#Footnote_488">[488]</a>. This was long
+the attitude of the American public.</p>
+<p>In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great
+national sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the
+cold shoulder to the released envoys. On January 11, the
+<i>Times</i> recounted the earlier careers of Mason and Slidell,
+and stated that these two "more than any other men," were
+responsible for the traditional American "insane prejudice against
+England," an assertion for which no facts were offered in proof,
+and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell on
+American politics before secession. They were "about the most
+worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of
+the American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen
+will not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation."
+Continuing, the <i>Times</i> argued:</p>
+<blockquote>"What they and their secretaries are to do here passes
+our conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not
+suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to
+rescue them, that therefore they are <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_238"></a>[V1:pg 238]</span> precious in our eyes. We should
+have done just as much to rescue two of their own Negroes, and, had
+that been the object of the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Caesar
+would have had just the same right to triumphal arches and
+municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So, please,
+British public, let's have none of these things. Let the
+Commissioners come up quietly to town, and have their say with
+anybody who may have time to listen to them. For our part, we
+cannot see how anything they have to tell can turn the scale of
+British duty and deliberation."</blockquote>
+<p>This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading
+British newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all
+sections save the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished,
+writing privately: "The first effect of the surrender ... has been
+extraordinary. The current which ran against us with such extreme
+violence six weeks ago now seems to be going with equal fury in our
+favour<a name="FNanchor489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489">[489]</a>."
+Officially on the same day he explained this to Seward as caused by
+a late development in the crisis of a full understanding,
+especially "among the quiet and religious citizens of the middle
+classes," that if Great Britain did engage in war with the United
+States she would be forced to become the ally of a "slave-holding
+oligarchy<a name="FNanchor490"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_490">[490]</a>."</p>
+<p>Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during
+the period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer
+was received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll,
+"we necessarily became virtually the <i>Allies</i> of the
+<i>Scoundrelism</i> of the South<a name="FNanchor491"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_491">[491]</a>." Robert Browning, attempting to explain
+to his friend Story the British attitude, declared that early in
+the war Britain was with the North, expecting "that the pure and
+simple rights [of anti-slavery] in the case would be declared and
+vigorously carried out without one let or stop," but <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_239"></a>[V1:pg 239]</span> that Lincoln's
+denial of emancipation as an object had largely destroyed this
+sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable though a mistaken
+judgment since at least: "The <i>spirit</i> of all of Mr. Lincoln's
+acts is altogether against Slavery in the end<a name=
+"FNanchor492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492">[492]</a>." He assured
+Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I
+have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay
+at the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with
+America<a name="FNanchor493"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_493">[493]</a>." And after the affair was over he
+affirmed: "The purpose of the North is also understood at last; ...
+there is no longer the notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with
+it<a name="FNanchor494"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_494">[494]</a>.'"</p>
+<p>A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and
+passed resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and
+moderation of Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not
+taken sides with a slave power<a name="FNanchor495"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_495">[495]</a>. In general, however, such sentiments
+were not <i>publicly</i> expressed. That they were keenly felt,
+nevertheless, is certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony
+Trollope, then touring America, even while sharing fully in the
+intense British indignation against Captain Wilkes, wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"These people speak our language, use our prayers, read
+our books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image,
+are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their vices
+are our own too, loudly as we call out against them. They are our
+sons and our daughters, the source of our greatest pride, and as we
+grow old they should be the staff of our age. Such a war as we
+should now wage with the States would be an unloosing of hell upon
+all that is best upon the world's surface<a name=
+"FNanchor496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496">[496]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240"></a>[V1:pg 240]</span>
+<p>The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not
+indeed, be regarded as typical of either governmental or general
+public reactions. Much more exactly and with more authority as
+representing that thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the
+conclusions of John Stuart Mill. In an article in <i>Fraser's
+Magazine</i>, February, 1862, making a strong plea for the North,
+he summarized British feeling about the <i>Trent</i>:</p>
+<blockquote>"We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an
+indignity, and something more than an indignity, which, not to have
+resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of
+insults and injuries from the same and from every other quarter. We
+could have acted no otherwise than we have done; yet it is
+impossible to think, without something like a shudder, from what we
+have escaped. We, the emancipators of the slave--who have wearied
+every Court and Government in Europe and America with our protests
+and remonstrances, until we goaded them into at least ostensibly
+co-operating with us to prevent the enslaving of the negro ...
+<i>we</i> should have lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most
+commanding positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not
+only to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."</blockquote>
+<p>No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible
+alliance with the South were made officially by the Government, or
+in a debate upon the <i>Trent</i>, February 6, when Parliament
+reassembled. In the Lords the Earl of Shelburne thought that
+America should have made a frank and open apology. The Earl of
+Derby twitted the United States with having yielded to force alone,
+but said the time "had not yet come" for recognizing the
+Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship for America
+and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241"></a>[V1:pg 241]</span>
+informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville,
+speaking for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at
+home of the Washington administration in pacifying public opinion
+and asserted a personal belief that strict neutrality was England's
+best policy, "although circumstances may arise which may call for a
+different course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of
+a like general tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed
+from his chief (Derby) in that he thought America had been placed
+in a very difficult position in which she had acted very
+honourably. Palmerston took much credit for the energetic military
+preparations, but stated "from that position of strict neutrality,
+it is not our intention to depart "--an important declaration if
+taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In substance
+all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's stand,
+and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome<a name=
+"FNanchor497"></a><a href="#Footnote_497">[497]</a>.</p>
+<p>A further debate on the <i>Trent</i> was precipitated by Bright
+on February 17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost
+of the military contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that
+England by generously trusting to American honour, might have won
+her lasting friendship, and it is worthy of note that for the first
+time in any speech made by him <i>in Parliament</i>, Bright
+declared that the war was one for the abolition of slavery.
+Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of slavery, but
+energetically defended the military preparations as a necessary
+precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American
+consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by
+showing that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of
+that show of force to which America so much objected. He foresaw
+that this would long be the basis of American bitterness. But
+Palmerston was undoubtedly <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_242"></a>[V1:pg 242]</span> correct in characterizing
+Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And looked at from a distance
+of time it would seem that a British Government, impressed as it
+was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness, which had not prepared
+for war when making so strong a demand for reparation, would have
+merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was right in stating
+that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so also were
+the military preparations.</p>
+<p>Upon the Government the <i>Trent</i> acted to bring to a head
+and make more clear the British relation to the Civil War in
+America. By November, 1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted
+in May, had begun to be weakened for various reasons already
+recited--weakened not to the point of any Cabinet member's advocacy
+of change, but in a restlessness at the slow development of a
+solution in America. Russell was beginning to <i>think</i>, at
+least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to Lyons
+who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if
+Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden
+reported on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much
+pleasure at the peaceful conclusion of the <i>Trent</i> affair, and
+had added, "England will be too generous not to postpone the
+recognition of the independence of the South as long as possible
+after this experience<a name="FNanchor498"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_498">[498]</a>." But the <i>Trent</i> operated like a
+thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It brought out plainly the
+practical difficulties and dangers, at least as regards Canada, of
+a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the conviction
+that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British public an
+even greater expression of relief, when the incident was closed,
+than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of that
+public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the
+Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support
+of which England could not possibly take a stand.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243"></a>[V1:pg 243]</span>
+<p>This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large
+section of the public, believed the North could conquer the South.
+But it did indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality
+and a determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote
+to Seward, "I am inclined to believe that the happening of the
+affair of the <i>Trent</i> just when it did, with just the issue
+that it had, was rather opportune than otherwise<a name=
+"FNanchor499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499">[499]</a>." Hotze, the
+confidential agent of the Confederacy in London, stated, "the
+<i>Trent</i> affair has done us incalculable injury," Russell is
+now "an avowed enemy of our nationality<a name=
+"FNanchor500"></a><a href="#Footnote_500">[500]</a>." Hotze was
+over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared to Lyons: "At all events
+I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss we have had about
+these two men<a name="FNanchor501"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_501">[501]</a>."</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_399"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor399">[399]</a> The <i>Trent</i> was the cause of the
+outpouring of more contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been
+the subject of more historical writing later, than any other
+incident of diplomatic relations between the United States and
+Great Britain during the Civil War--possibly more than all other
+incidents combined. The account given in this chapter, therefore,
+is mainly limited to a brief statement of the facts together with
+such new sidelights as are brought out by hitherto unknown letters
+of British statesman; to a summary of British public attitude as
+shown in the press; and to an estimate of the <i>after effect</i>
+of the <i>Trent</i> on British policy. It would be of no service to
+list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in
+all histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to
+international law. The contemporary American view is well stated,
+though from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L.,
+<i>The Trent Affair</i>, but this monograph is lacking in exact
+reference for its many citations and can not be accepted as
+authoritative. The latest review is that of C.F. Adams in the
+<i>Proceedings</i> of the Massachusetts Historical Society for
+November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and a
+rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the <i>Proceedings</i> for March,
+1912.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_400"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor400">[400]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>.
+(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_401"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor401">[401]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the <i>Trent</i>." No. 1.
+Inclosure. Williams to Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_402"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor402">[402]</a> Harris, <i>The Trent Affair</i>, pp.
+103-109, describes the exact <i>force</i> used.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_403"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor403">[403]</a> Dana, <i>The Trent Affair</i>.
+(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp.
+509-22.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_404"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor404">[404]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>.
+(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp.
+39-40.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_405"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor405">[405]</a> F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond
+to Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_406"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor406">[406]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>.
+(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_407"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor407">[407]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS.
+Nov. 12, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_408"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor408">[408]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 55.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_409"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor409">[409]</a> A full year later, after the publication
+of the American volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell
+took up this matter with Adams and as a result of an interview
+wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:<br>
+<br>
+"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question
+that Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference
+with any vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that
+with regard to vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government
+did not mean to dispute the Belligerent right of the United States
+Ships of War to search them; but that the exercise of that right
+and the right of detention in certain conditions must in each case
+be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case, and that
+it was not necessary for him to discuss such matters then because
+they were not in point; but that it would not do for the United
+States Ships of War to harass British Commerce on the High Seas
+under the pretence of preventing the Confederates from receiving
+things that are Contraband of War.<br>
+<br>
+"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account
+which Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had
+thus held, and Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.<br>
+<br>
+"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements
+as to Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will
+state the real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295.
+<i>Draft</i>.)<br>
+<br>
+This r&eacute;sum&eacute; by Russell contained still other
+variations from the original reports of both Palmerston and Adams,
+but the latter did not think it worth while to call attention to
+them.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_410"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor410">[410]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. 357, is
+evidently in error in stating that the law officers, while
+admitting the right of an American war vessel to carry the British
+Packet into an American port for adjudication, added, "she would
+have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and carry them
+off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage." Certainly
+Palmerston did not so understand the advice given.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_411"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor411">[411]</a> Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F.O.,
+Private. Nov. 16, 1861. This statement about explicit orders to
+Captain Marchand "not to endeavour, etc.," is in line with
+Palmerston's understanding of the conversation with Adams. But that
+there was carelessness in reporting Adams is evident from Hammond's
+own language for "no instructions to meddle," which Adams did
+state, is not the same thing as "instructions not to meddle." Adams
+had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood. He was himself
+very anxious over the presence of the <i>James Adger</i> at
+Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell
+that Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told
+Palmerston, "I had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions,
+which directed him to intercept the <i>Nashville</i> if he could,
+and in case of inability to do so, to return at once to New York,
+keeping his eye on such British ships as might be going to the
+United States with contraband of war. Lord Palmerston's
+recollections and mine differed mainly in this last particular.
+Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly that
+which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in
+the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng.,
+Vol. 78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter
+mentions also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and
+that they had "sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the
+Packet...."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_412"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor412">[412]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_413"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor413">[413]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_414"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor414">[414]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone,
+Nov. 29, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_415"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor415">[415]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>.
+(<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_416"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor416">[416]</a> Moore, <i>Int. Law Digest</i>, VII, p.
+772. The much argued international law points in the case of the
+<i>Trent</i> are given <i>in extenso</i> by Moore.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_417"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor417">[417]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the
+<i>Trent</i>." No. 2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_418"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor418">[418]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 4.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_419"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor419">[419]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 29.
+Inclosure.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_420"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor420">[420]</a> Troops were in fact shipped for Canada.
+This resulted, after the <i>Trent</i> affair had blown over, in a
+circumstance which permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a
+courtesy to Great Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these
+troops "finding the St. Lawrence river full of ice, had entered
+Portland harbour. When permission was asked for them to cross
+Maine, Seward promptly ordered that all facilities should be
+granted for 'landing and transporting to Canada or elsewhere
+troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind without
+exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press made
+much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by
+Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application
+from a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some
+Officers' Baggage at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell,
+Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's.
+He wrote to the Governor-General of Canada and the
+Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, protesting
+against an acceptance of Seward's permission, and finally informed
+Russell that no English troops were marched across the State of
+Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons
+Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_421"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor421">[421]</a> Martin, <i>Life of the Prince Consort</i>,
+V, pp. 418-26.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_422"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor422">[422]</a> Still another letter from Russell to Lyons
+on November 30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of
+complaint and argument, (1) The <i>San Jacinto</i> did not happen
+to fall in with the <i>Trent</i>, but laid in wait for her. (2)
+"Unnecessary and dangerous Acts of violence" were used. (3) The
+<i>Trent</i>, when stopped was not "searched" in the "ordinary
+way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken by force.
+(4) No charge was made that the <i>Trent</i> was violating
+neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain
+Wilkes. (5) No force ought to be used against an
+"<i>unresisting</i> Neutral Ship" except just so much as is
+necessary to bring her before a prize court. (6) In the present
+case the British vessel had done nothing, and intended nothing,
+warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It is essential
+for British Interests, that consistently with the obligations of
+neutrality, and of observing any <i>legal</i> and <i>effective</i>
+blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of
+Her Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States."
+These seven points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no
+strength to the British position and reflect the uncertainty and
+confusion of the Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the
+essence of what, on more mature reflection, was to be the British
+argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758. No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons
+Nov. 30, 1861).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_423"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor423">[423]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_424"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor424">[424]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 78. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_425"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor425">[425]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 124. Russell to Yancey,
+Rost and Mann, Dec. 7, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_426"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor426">[426]</a> Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson
+Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_427"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor427">[427]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Argyll to Gladstone,
+Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_428"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor428">[428]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 255.
+Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_429"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor429">[429]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess
+of Manchester, Dec. 17, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_430"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor430">[430]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_431"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor431">[431]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell to Palmerston, Dec.
+20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_432"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor432">[432]</a> Many citations from the <i>Times</i> are
+given in Harris, <i>The Trent Affair</i>, to show a violent, not to
+say scurrilous, anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not
+cited, and an examination of the files of the paper shows that
+Harris' references are frequently to communications, not to
+editorials. Also his citations give but one side of these
+communications even, for as many argued caution and fair treatment
+as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the
+<i>Times</i> itself, but used quotations appearing in American
+papers. Naturally these would print, in the height of American
+anti-British feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust
+British temper. The British press made exactly similar quotations
+from the American newspapers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_433"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor433">[433]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair
+(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow,
+at Paris, reported that the London Press, especially the Tory, was
+eager to make trouble, and that there were but two British papers
+of importance that did not join the hue and cry--these being
+controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one in
+Manchester (Bigelow, <i>Retrospections of An Active Life</i>, I, p.
+384.) This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than
+the picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in
+a "calm, sorrowful, astonished determination."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_434"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor434">[434]</a> Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a
+letter from Percy Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which
+these statements were made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404.
+Inclosure.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_435"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor435">[435]</a> Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent
+Affair. (Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p.
+95.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_436"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor436">[436]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 37.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_437"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor437">[437]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 49. The <i>New York
+Times</i>, November 19, stated, "We do not believe the American
+heart ever thrilled with more genuine delight than it did
+yesterday, at the intelligence of the capture of Messrs. Slidell
+and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea that England will even
+remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud the gallant act of
+Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and such an exact
+imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended and
+invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let
+the handsome thing be done, consecrate another <i>Fourth</i> of
+July to him. Load him down with services of plate and swords of the
+cunningest and costliest art. Let us encourage the happy
+inspiration that achieved such a victory." Note the "<i>Fourth</i>
+of July."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_438"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor438">[438]</a> Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston,
+Nov. 17, 1861. "Every other man is walking about with a Law Book
+under his arm and proving the <i>right</i> of the Ss. Jacintho to
+stop H.M.'s mail boat."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_439"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor439">[439]</a> "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He
+has frightened me by his account of the defencelessness of the
+Province at this moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell.
+Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_440"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor440">[440]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_441"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor441">[441]</a> Rogers, <i>Speeches by John Bright</i>, I,
+p. 189 <i>seq</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_442"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor442">[442]</a> Among the communications were several on
+international law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling
+American legal argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym,
+frequently contributed very acute and very readable articles to the
+<i>Times</i> on the American civil war. The <i>Times</i> was
+berated by English friends of the North. Cobden wrote Sumner,
+December 12, "The <i>Times</i> and its yelping imitators are still
+doing their worst." (Morley, <i>Cobden</i>, II, 392.) Cobden was
+himself at one with the <i>Times</i> in suspicion of Seward. "I
+confess I have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American
+Thiers or Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my
+friend Mr. Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee
+on Foreign Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of
+Seward, is a very peaceable and safe man." <i>(ibid.</i>, p. 386,
+to Lieut.-Col. Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that
+Canadian opinion regarded the <i>Times</i> as the great cause of
+American ill-will toward Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that
+the "war talk" was all a "farce" (J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861)
+and the Toronto <i>Globe</i> attacked the <i>Times</i> for the
+creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that if
+<i>British</i> policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it
+was a British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence
+(Skelton, <i>Life of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait</i>, pp. 340, 348.)
+Yet the author states that in the beginning Canada went through the
+same phases of feeling on the <i>Trent</i> as did Great
+Britain.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_443"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor443">[443]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp.
+81-2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_444"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor444">[444]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to
+Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_445"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor445">[445]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private.
+Nov. 29, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_446"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor446">[446]</a> See the <i>Times</i>, Dec. 14, 1861. Here
+for the first time the <i>Times</i> used the expression "the last
+card" as applied to emancipation.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_447"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor447">[447]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec.
+11, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_448"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor448">[448]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone,
+Dec. 13, 1861. On the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline:
+"There can be no doubt that we have done deeds very like that of
+Captain Wilkes.... but I wish we had not done them.... It is all
+terrible and awful, and I hope and pray war may be averted--and
+whatever may have been the first natural burst of indignation in
+this country, I believe it would be ready to execrate the Ministry
+if all right and honourable means were not taken to prevent so
+fearful a calamity." (Dana, <i>The Trent Affair. (Proceedings</i>,
+Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_449"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor449">[449]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p.
+87. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_450"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor450">[450]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Dec. 16,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_451"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor451">[451]</a> The <i>Times</i> twice printed the full
+text of the message, on December 16 and 17.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_452"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor452">[452]</a> Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to
+Gladstone, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_453"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor453">[453]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 225.
+Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_454"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor454">[454]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the
+<i>Trent</i>." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 19, 1861. The
+Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no
+authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so,
+since this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements.
+The point was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who
+regarded it as indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude.
+(Willard, <i>Letter to an English Friend on the Rebellion in the
+United States</i>, p. 23. Boston, 1862.) Also by English friends;
+Cobden thought Palmerston had intentionally prolonged British
+feeling for political purposes. "Seward's despatch to Adams on the
+19th December [<i>communicated to Russell</i> on the 19th]...
+virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the wicked passions in
+this country as Palmerston and his <i>Post</i> did, was like the
+man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley,
+<i>Cobden</i>, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan.,
+1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_455"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor455">[455]</a> Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861.
+C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair, (Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., XLV, p. 107.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_456"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor456">[456]</a> There has crept into American historical
+writing of lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture
+there appeared, in the harbours of New York and San Francisco,
+Russian fleets whose commanders let it be understood that they had
+come under "sealed orders" not to be opened except in a certain
+grave event and that their presence was, at least, not an
+unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the <i>Trent</i>
+crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and to
+give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great
+Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer
+recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly
+a myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of
+1863, not in 1861. Harris, <i>The Trent Affair,</i> pp. 208-10, is
+mainly responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of
+Thurlow Weed. (<i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable
+historians like Rhodes make no mention of such an incident. The
+whole story of the Russian fleets with their exact instructions is
+told by F.A. Colder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," <i>Am.
+Hist. Rev</i>., July, 1915.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_457"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor457">[457]</a> Weed, <i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp.
+354-61.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_458"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor458">[458]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 365. Peabody to Weed,
+Jan, 17, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_459"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor459">[459]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p.
+91. Charles Francis Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_460"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor460">[460]</a> See <i>ante</i>. Ch. IV.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_461"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor461">[461]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Dec. 25,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_462"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor462">[462]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and his
+Friends</i>, II, pp. 108-9. The letters were sent to Robert
+Browning, who secured their publication through Dicey.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_463"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor463">[463]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair</i>. Adams
+to Motley, Dec. 26, 1861. (<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc.,
+XLV, p. 109).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_464"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor464">[464]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 110.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_465"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor465">[465]</a> Palmerston had very close relations with
+Delane, of the <i>Times</i>, but that paper carefully maintained
+its independence of any party or faction.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_466"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor466">[466]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone,
+Dec. 30, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_467"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor467">[467]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams
+to Seward, Jan. 2, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_468"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor468">[468]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_469"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor469">[469]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 233. Lyons
+officially reported that he carried no papers with him
+(<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the <i>Trent</i>." No. 19. Lyons to
+Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (<i>Lyons</i>, I, pp. 55-78) shows
+that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the
+nineteenth.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_470"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor470">[470]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, p.
+86. C.F. Adams, Jr., to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_471"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor471">[471]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p. 234.
+Adams' letter of December 3 was received on December 21; Dayton's
+of December 3, on the 24th.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_472"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor472">[472]</a> Much ink has flowed to prove that
+Lincoln's was the wise view, seeing from the first the necessity of
+giving up Mason and Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g.,
+Welles, <i>Lincoln and Seward</i>, and Harris, <i>The Trent
+Affair</i>. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>,
+II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general contemporary
+suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in Washington, is
+shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen. On
+December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst had
+been seen by Lincoln.<br>
+<br>
+"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned
+them with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is
+not bent on war.' At the same time the President has assured my
+informant that he would examine the answer of his Secretary of
+State, word for word, in order that no expression should remain
+which could create bad blood anew, because the strong language
+which Mr. Seward had used in some of his former despatches seems to
+have irritated and insulted England" (Schleiden Papers). No doubt
+Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first glance Lincoln's
+reported language would seem to imply that he was putting pressure
+on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden apparently so
+interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when this was
+written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting Seward's
+view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing your
+answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they
+ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating
+the reasons why they ought <i>not</i> to be given up. We will
+compare the points on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to
+return an answer to Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft,
+<i>Seward</i>, II, 234).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_473"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor473">[473]</a> Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLV,
+155. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the
+<i>Trent</i> are all printed in this volume of the
+<i>Proceedings</i>. The originals are in the <i>Sumner Papers</i>
+in the library of Harvard University.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_474"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor474">[474]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the
+<i>Trent</i>." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 27,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_475"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor475">[475]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to
+Russell, Dec. 31, 1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a
+"shocking prayer" in the Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr.
+Sutherland, which showed a bitter feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of
+the world ... we ask help of Thee for our rulers and our people,
+that we may patiently, resolutely, and with one heart abide our
+time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and reproach--a day when
+the high principle of human equity constrained by the remorseless
+sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment, succumb
+under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers. Lyons
+to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_476"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor476">[476]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II,
+249-53.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_477"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor477">[477]</a> C.F. Adams, <i>The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV. p. 75).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_478"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor478">[478]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II,
+250.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_479"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor479">[479]</a> Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were
+delivered to the British ship <i>Rinaldo</i>, January 1, 1862.
+<i>En route</i> to Halifax the ship encountered a storm that drove
+her south and finally brought her to St. Thomas, where the
+passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_480"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor480">[480]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the
+<i>Trent</i>." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3, Lyons reported that
+Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was in possession
+of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November 12 and 28
+respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law
+Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_481"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor481">[481]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley
+to Russell, Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_482"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor482">[482]</a> Newton, <i>Lyons</i>, I, 73.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_483"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor483">[483]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft.
+Russell to Lyons, Feb. 11, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_484"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor484">[484]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft.
+Russell to Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_485"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor485">[485]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone,
+Jan. 26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_486"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor486">[486]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 424.
+Bowen to Bigelow, Dec. 27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_487"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor487">[487]</a> <i>Poems. Bigelow Papers</i>. "Jonathan to
+John." After the release of the envoys there was much
+correspondence between friends across the water as to the merits of
+the case. British friends attempted to explain and to soothe,
+usually to their astonished discomfiture on receiving angry
+American replies. An excellent illustration of this is in a
+pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field
+and Loring, <i>Correspondence on the Present Relations between
+Great Britain and the United States of America</i>. The American,
+Loring, wrote, "The conviction is nearly if not quite universal
+that we have foes where we thought we had friends," p.
+7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_488"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor488">[488]</a> Dana, <i>The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 508-22).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_489"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor489">[489]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 99.
+To his son, Jan. 10, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_490"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor490">[490]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams
+to Seward, Jan. 10, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_491"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor491">[491]</a> Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone,
+Dec. 7, 1861, Also expressed again to Gladstone. <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan.
+1, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_492"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor492">[492]</a> James, <i>William Wetmore Story and His
+Friends</i>, II, 105. Browning to Story, Dec. 17,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_493"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor493">[493]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_494"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor494">[494]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_495"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor495">[495]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an
+account of a meeting at Bromley-by-Bow.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_496"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor496">[496]</a> Trollope, <i>North America</i> (Chapman
+&amp; Hall, London, 1862), I, p. 446. Trollope left England in
+August, 1861, and returned in the spring of 1862. He toured the
+North and the West, was a close observer, and his work, published
+in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the North, since he both
+stated the justice of the Northern cause and prophesied its
+victory.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_497"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor497">[497]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12
+<i>seq</i>., though not consecutive as the speeches were made in
+the course of the debate on the Address to the Throne.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_498"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor498">[498]</a> Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate
+of Bremen.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_499"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor499">[499]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams
+to Seward, Feb. 13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_500"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor500">[500]</a> Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_501"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor501">[501]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244"></a>[V1:pg 244]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2>
+<h3>THE BLOCKADE</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The six months following the affair of the <i>Trent</i>
+constituted a period of comparative calm in the relations of Great
+Britain and America, but throughout that period there was steadily
+coming to the front a Northern belligerent effort increasingly
+effective, increasingly a cause for disturbance to British trade,
+and therefore more and more a matter for anxious governmental
+consideration. This was the blockade of Southern ports and coast
+line, which Lincoln had declared <i>in intention</i> in his
+proclamation of April 19, 1861.</p>
+<p>As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the
+relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of
+Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an
+evasive reply<a name="FNanchor502"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_502">[502]</a>. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the
+possibility of a blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent
+would at least require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made
+great efforts to convince Seward that <i>any</i> interference with
+British trade would be disastrous to the Northern cause in England.
+He even went so far as to hint at British intervention to preserve
+trade<a name="FNanchor503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503">[503]</a>.
+But on April 15, Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade
+was possible, thought that the attempt to institute one was less
+objectionable than legislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports
+of Entry," in reality a mere paper blockade and one which would
+"justify Great Britain and France in recognizing the Southern
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245"></a>[V1:pg 245]</span>
+Confederacy...." Thus he began to weaken in opposition to
+<i>any</i> interference<a name="FNanchor504"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_504">[504]</a>. His earlier expressions to Seward were
+but arguments, without committing his Government to a line of
+policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously.</p>
+<p>Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a
+blockade campaign. But when the Civil War actually began and
+Lincoln, on April 19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set
+on foot a blockade," and that when a "competent force" had been
+posted "so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels," warning
+would be given to any vessel attempting to enter or to leave a
+blockaded port, with endorsement on her register of such warning,
+followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass the blockade,
+Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonable
+consideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the
+Law of Nations, I suppose it must be recognized<a name=
+"FNanchor505"></a><a href="#Footnote_505">[505]</a>." The
+Proclamation named the original seven seceding states, and on April
+27 Virginia was added. The blockade was actually begun at certain
+Virginia ports on April 30, and by the end of May there were a few
+war-ships off all the more important Southern harbours<a name=
+"FNanchor506"></a><a href="#Footnote_506">[506]</a>. This method of
+putting a blockade into effect by warning at the port rather than
+by a general notification communicated to European governments and
+setting a date, involved a hardship on British merchants since they
+were thereby made uncertain whether goods started for a Southern
+port would be permitted to enter. In practice vessels on their
+first departure from a blockaded harbour were warned and permitted
+to go out, but those seeking to enter were warned and turned back.
+In <i>effect</i>, while the blockade was being established,
+Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_246"></a>[V1:pg 246]</span> the timid
+British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paper blockade.
+This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutrals must
+acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition,"
+but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet"
+British trade could be carried on<a name="FNanchor507"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_507">[507]</a>.</p>
+<p>Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long
+conversation on April 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3,000
+mile coast line, but Seward assured him it would be done and
+effectively<a name="FNanchor508"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_508">[508]</a>. The British press was equally sceptical,
+and in any case believed that the war would be of short duration,
+so that there need be no anxiety over next year's supply of
+cotton<a name="FNanchor509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509">[509]</a>.
+In Parliament Russell took the stand that the blockade, if carried
+on in accordance with international law and made effective,
+required British recognition and respect. He also defended
+Lincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might
+seem a hardship, but was perfectly legal<a name=
+"FNanchor510"></a><a href="#Footnote_510">[510]</a>. Thus there was
+early and easy acquiescence in the American effort, but when, in
+June, there was revived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by
+legislative action, Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous
+opposition. Lyons learned that a Bill would be introduced in
+Congress giving the President authority, among other powers, to
+"proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifying foreign nations not to
+attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpected application of the
+Northern theory that the South was not a belligerent and had no
+rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paper
+blockade<a name="FNanchor511"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_511">[511]</a>.</p>
+<p>The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not
+direct the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern
+ports--it merely gave him the power to do so. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_247"></a>[V1:pg 247]</span> Almost from the
+first Lyons thought that Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue
+such a proclamation<a name="FNanchor512"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_512">[512]</a>. Nevertheless it was his duty to be on
+guard and to oppose the plan. For six weeks there was much
+communication in regard to the "Southern Ports Bill," as all
+parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with Cowley in
+France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter, almost
+rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the small
+importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the
+reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest.
+Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in official
+remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British
+recognition of Southern belligerency.</p>
+<p>Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell
+addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged
+a stiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was
+seemingly indifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest,
+then drew back and on three separate occasions promised support
+only to withdraw such promise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to
+join in a "friendly hint" to America because of the touchy
+sensibilities lately shown by Seward, and feared a direct protest
+might result in an American declaration of war. In any case why not
+wait until the President <i>did</i> act, and even then the proper
+method would be a protest rather than "reprisals." "I wish," wrote
+Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to be more
+<i>bumptious</i>, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all
+times rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them
+on<a name="FNanchor513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513">[513]</a>...."
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248"></a>[V1:pg 248]</span>
+Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would
+not observe a "legislative closing" of Southern ports<a name=
+"FNanchor514"></a><a href="#Footnote_514">[514]</a>. On July 12
+Lyons telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress,
+and on the sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much
+disturbed over its possible consequences since "even Sumner was for
+it<a name="FNanchor515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515">[515]</a>," as
+this indicated a real intention to carry it into effect<a name=
+"FNanchor516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516">[516]</a>. On August 8,
+Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to
+be handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise
+discretion as to communicating the despatch<a name=
+"FNanchor517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517">[517]</a>.</p>
+<p>The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised
+in July, concluded with language that might well draw out
+Thouvenel's objection to a threat of "reprisals." It read that
+"H.M.G. ... reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other
+Nations in opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of
+Commercial Countries and so manifest a violation of International
+Law<a name="FNanchor518"></a><a href="#Footnote_518">[518]</a>."
+This <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249"></a>[V1:pg
+249]</span> high tone had been modified possibly by French
+opposition, possibly by Lyons' early opinion that the Bill would
+not be made operative. Indeed on July 24 Russell told Lyons that no
+final instruction of protest would be sent him until the President
+actually issued a proclamation<a name="FNanchor519"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_519">[519]</a>. Yet in spite of being fairly well
+assured that there was no danger in the "Southern Ports Bill,"
+Russell did send the instruction of August 8, still distinctly
+"vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of "reprisals." His
+reason for doing so is difficult to understand. Certainly he was
+hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiff instruction
+would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of the
+American Cabinet<a name="FNanchor520"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_520">[520]</a>, or else he strangely misjudged American
+temperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to
+print a Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was
+exercising in guarding British interests.</p>
+<p>Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had
+voluntarily reassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons
+reported this, privately, on July 20<a name=
+"FNanchor521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521">[521]</a>, but on the
+same day also reported, officially, that two days earlier, that is
+on the eighteenth, he and Mercier had discussed the "Southern
+Ports" Bill and that as a result Mercier had then gone, that same
+day, to Seward to state that France must regard such a measure as
+merely a paper blockade<a name="FNanchor522"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_522">[522]</a>. "We were not very sanguine of success,"
+wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him [Mercier] with
+calmness," and personally seemed disinclined to issue the required
+Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250"></a>[V1:pg 250]</span> and
+France were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having
+a difficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the
+Parliamentary Papers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and
+in spite of the reassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally
+not for printing) presumably received in the same mail with the
+official despatch, it furnished the basis of his "strong"
+instruction of August 8.</p>
+<p>At Washington also there were indications of an effort to
+prepare a good case for the British public and Parliament. July 23,
+so Lyons wrote privately, Seward had prevented the issue of the
+"Southern Ports" Proclamation<a name="FNanchor523"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_523">[523]</a>, and on the next day he was shown by
+Seward, confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers
+abroad in which was maintained the right to close the ports by
+proclamation, but stating the Government's decision not to exercise
+the right. Lyons believed this was the end of the matter<a name=
+"FNanchor524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524">[524]</a>. Yet on August
+12, he presented himself formally at the Department of State and
+stated that he had instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's
+Government would consider a decree closing the ports of the South
+actually in possession of the insurgent or Confederate States as
+null and void, and that they would not submit to measures taken on
+the high seas in pursuance of such decree."... "Mr. Seward thanked
+me for the consideration I had shown; and begged me to confine
+myself for the present to the verbal announcement I had just made.
+He said it would be difficult for me to draw up a written
+communication which would not have the air of a threat." To this
+Lyons agreed<a name="FNanchor525"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_525">[525]</a>.</p>
+<p>This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the
+"forthright yet friendly" tone of British <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_251"></a>[V1:pg 251]</span> diplomats when
+dealing with Seward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8,
+not yet received by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet
+there is a possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his
+part as Seward had asked him to play it. On the next day, August
+13, he acknowledged the receipt of Russell's communication of July
+24, in which it was stated that while Great Britain could not
+acquiesce in the "Southern Ports" Bill <i>no final instructions</i>
+would be sent until Lincoln issued a Proclamation. Lyons now
+explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this moment opposed to
+closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be guided by him for
+the present as to the mode of communicating your decision about the
+matter<a name="FNanchor526"></a><a href="#Footnote_526">[526]</a>."
+Is it possible that Seward really wished to have a "strong," yet
+not "too strong" statement from Lyons in order to combat the
+advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are many ramifications of
+diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government. At any rate
+on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no question
+now of issuing the Proclamation<a name="FNanchor527"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_527">[527]</a>." And on the nineteenth could write
+officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed been
+issued, but without the objectionable fourth section<a name=
+"FNanchor528"></a><a href="#Footnote_528">[528]</a>.</p>
+<p>The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more
+space in the British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more
+attention from the British Government than it would seem to have
+merited from the Washington attitude toward it. The Bill had been
+drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, and its other sections
+related to methods of meeting a situation where former customs
+houses and places for the collection of import duties were now in
+the hands of the Confederacy. The fourth section alone <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_252"></a>[V1:pg 252]</span> implied a
+purpose to declare a paper blockade. The idea of proclaiming closed
+the Southern ports may have at first received the sanction of
+Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a war; or
+it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy<a name=
+"FNanchor529"></a><a href="#Footnote_529">[529]</a>, but the more
+reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of many
+ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by
+the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any
+public means to attack the South. But the interest attached to the
+measure in this work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt
+that Russell, in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of
+making clear two points: first, the close harmony with
+France--which in fact was not so close as was made to appear;
+second, the care and vigour of the Foreign Secretary in guarding
+British interests. Now in fact British trade was destined to be
+badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been greatly
+hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade feasible.
+Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the "Southern
+Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "<i>regular</i>
+blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:</p>
+<blockquote>"If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the
+Southern Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by
+agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles,
+creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run for
+Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be transhipped. But
+it is not for Downing Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and
+Tooley Street<a name="FNanchor530"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_530">[530]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253"></a>[V1:pg 253]</span>
+<p>A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear
+to Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively
+blockaded the remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless
+for the export of cotton in any considerable amount. His bays and
+creeks did indeed long provide access to small vessels, but these
+were not adequate for the transport of a bulky export like
+cotton<a name="FNanchor531"></a><a href="#Footnote_531">[531]</a>.
+To Russell, however, the blockade appearing negligible in probable
+effect and also not open to objection by neutrals if regularly
+established, it seemed that any immediate danger to British trade
+was averted by the final American action on the "Southern Ports"
+Bill. It was not until the blockade did begin to be thoroughly
+effective that either the British public or Government gave it
+serious consideration.</p>
+<p>Not again until late November did Russell return with any
+interest to the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an
+American effort which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of
+blockading squadrons and a plan to remedy this by unusual, even
+"uncivilized," if not illegal, methods. This was the "Stone Boat
+Fleet" plan of blocking Charleston harbour by sinking vessels
+across the entrance bar<a name="FNanchor532"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_532">[532]</a>. The plan was reported by Lyons and the
+news received in England at the most uncertain moment as to the
+outcome of the <i>Trent</i> controversy<a name=
+"FNanchor533"></a><a href="#Footnote_533">[533]</a>. British press
+and <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254"></a>[V1:pg 254]</span>
+Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of
+the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor
+matter. In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an
+opinion on the blockade, answered:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer
+your question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is
+certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense extent
+of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose the ships
+which run it successfully both in and out are more numerous than
+those which are intercepted. On the other hand it is very far from
+being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many vessels are captured; it
+is a most serious interruption to Trade; and if it were as
+ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis says in his Message, he would
+not be so very anxious to get rid of it<a name=
+"FNanchor534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534">[534]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was a very fair description of the blockade situation.
+Lyons, unaffected by irritations resulting from the <i>Trent</i>,
+showed the frame of mind of a "determined neutral," as he was fond
+of describing himself. His answer was the first given to Russell
+indicating a possibility that the blockade might, after all, become
+strictly effective and thus exceedingly harmful to British trade.
+There is no direct <i>proof</i> that this influenced Russell to
+denounce the plan of blocking Southern harbours with stone-laden
+boats sunk in the channel, but the existence of such a motive seems
+probable. Moreover his protest was not made until December 20, the
+<i>day after</i> he had learned officially from Adams that Wilkes
+was unauthorized in searching the <i>Trent</i>--a day on which
+strain and uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly
+lessened. Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be
+stated, "apparently on good authority," that the declared purpose
+of the stone boat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255"></a>[V1:pg 255]</span>
+ever." He characterized this as implying "utter despair of the
+restoration of the Union," and as being only "a measure of revenge
+and irremediable injury against an enemy."</p>
+<p>"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary
+war, such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the
+commerce of nations and the free intercourse of the Southern States
+of America with the civilized world. It is a project worthy only of
+times of barbarism."</p>
+<p>Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it
+was hoped, would disavow the project<a name=
+"FNanchor535"></a><a href="#Footnote_535">[535]</a>.</p>
+<br>
+<p>There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American
+newspaper extracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation
+and expostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in
+America the project had been characterized as "odious and
+barbarous," adding, "The question seems to depend on the extent to
+which the harbours will be permanently injured<a name=
+"FNanchor536"></a><a href="#Footnote_536">[536]</a>." It will be
+noted that Russell did not refer to information received from Lyons
+(though it was already in hand), but to "apparently good authority"
+in justification of his vigorous denunciation. But like vigour, and
+like characterization of American "barbarism" did not appear in the
+British press until after the news arrived of the release of Mason
+and Slidell. Then the storm broke, well summed up in the Punch
+cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very Sad Picture.) War Dance of
+the I.O.U. Indian," and showing Uncle Sam in war-feathers and with
+war-club, in his hand a flag made of the <i>New York Herald</i>,
+dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour across which
+stretched a row of sunken ships<a name="FNanchor537"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_537">[537]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256"></a>[V1:pg 256]</span>
+<p>On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the
+attention of the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour
+had been closed by stone boats and urged governmental
+remonstrance<a name="FNanchor538"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_538">[538]</a>. Hammond at once replied quoting the
+language of Russell's letter of December 20 and stating that
+further representations would be made<a name=
+"FNanchor539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539">[539]</a>. On the
+sixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but
+now was much less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury
+in the future to the United States itself in case the harbours were
+permanently destroyed since "... the object of war is peace, and
+the purposes of peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous
+commercial intercourse<a name="FNanchor540"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_540">[540]</a>." To-day it seems absurd that any save
+the most ignorant observer should have thought the North
+contemplated a permanent and revengeful destruction of Southern
+port facilities. Nor was there any just ground for such an extreme
+British view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert Browning was
+affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do," he wrote
+Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again<a name=
+"FNanchor541"></a><a href="#Footnote_541">[541]</a>?" a query
+expressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the
+intense bitterness, indicating a long war, of the American
+belligerents. How absurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British
+concern at an American "lapse toward barbarism" was soon made
+evident. On January II Lyons, acting on the instructions of
+December 20, brought up the matter with Seward and was promptly
+assured that there was no plan whatever "to injure the harbours
+permanently." Seward stated that there had never been any plan,
+even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, but merely the
+lesser channels, because the Secretary of <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_257"></a>[V1:pg 257]</span> the Navy had
+reported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the
+'large holes,'" but "could not stop up the 'small ones.'" Seward
+assured Lyons that just as soon as the Union was restored all
+obstructions would be removed, and he added that the best proof
+that the entrance to Charleston harbour had not been destroyed was
+the fact that in spite of blockading vessels and stone boats "a
+British steamer laden with contraband of war had just succeeded in
+getting in<a name="FNanchor542"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_542">[542]</a>." Again, on February 10, this time
+following Russell's instruction of January 16, Lyons approached
+Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that "all the
+vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared for obstructing
+the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is not likely that
+any others will be used for that purpose<a name=
+"FNanchor543"></a><a href="#Footnote_543">[543]</a>." This was no
+yielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's
+accusation of barbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction
+of harbours, extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been
+undertaken by the Navy with little expectation of success, and, on
+the first appearance of new channels made by the wash of waters,
+was soon abandoned<a name="FNanchor544"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_544">[544]</a>.</p>
+<p>The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America
+was conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem
+at first glance to have been merely manifestations of a British
+tendency to meddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other
+states and to give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose
+civilization was presumably less advanced than that which stamped
+the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258"></a>[V1:pg 258]</span>
+Englishman was, according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a
+characteristic of British public and Government alike<a name=
+"FNanchor545"></a><a href="#Footnote_545">[545]</a>. But this is
+scarcely a satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the
+first place it is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions
+in an enemy's harbours in order to render more effective a blockade
+was no novelty in maritime warfare, as Russell must have well
+known, and that there was no modern record of such obstructions
+having permanently destroyed a harbour. A far more reasonable
+explanation is that which connects the energy of the British
+Government in opposing a proposed American closing of Southern
+harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energy against
+the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightly
+regarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but
+both methods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because
+they were very evidently the result of efforts to find a way in
+which an as yet ineffective blockade could be made more rigorous.
+On the impossibility of an effective blockade, if conducted on
+customary lines, the British people and Foreign Secretary had
+pinned their faith that there would be no serious interruption of
+trade. This was still the view in January, 1862, though doubts were
+arising, and the "stone boat" protest must be regarded as another
+evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce with the South. The
+very thought that the blockade might become effective, in which
+case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly caused
+Russell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the
+North for a planned "barbarity."</p>
+<p>Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be
+made the subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on
+the Civil War in America. In another three months the Government
+began to feel a pressure from its associate in "joint attitude,"
+France, to examine again <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_259"></a>[V1:pg 259]</span> with much care its asserted
+policy of strict neutrality, and this because of the increased
+effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhile another "American
+question" was serving to cool somewhat British eagerness to go hand
+in hand with France. For nearly forty years since independence from
+Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thorny problem to European
+nations since it was difficult, in the face of the American Monroe
+Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for the satisfaction
+of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measures were
+being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly in
+the matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures,
+President Buchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3,
+1860, had sounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that
+American principles would compel the use of force in aid of Mexico
+if debt-collecting efforts were made the excuse for a plan "to
+deprive our neighbouring Republic of portions of her territory."
+But this was at the moment of the break-up of the Union and
+attracted little attention in the United States. For the same
+reason, no longer fearing an American block to these plans, the
+three European Governments, after their invitation to the United
+States to join them had been refused, signed a convention, October
+31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledged
+themselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not to
+interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.</p>
+<p>In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon
+III was not--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood
+even by his Ministers<a name="FNanchor546"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_546">[546]</a>. A joint expedition under the leadership
+of the Spanish General Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took
+possession of customs houses and began to collect duties. It soon
+became evident <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260"></a>[V1:pg
+260]</span> to the British and Spanish agents on the spot that
+France had far other objects than the mere satisfaction of debts.
+The result was a clash of interests, followed by separate
+agreements with Mexico and the withdrawal of forces by Great
+Britain and Spain. This difference of view on Mexican policy had
+become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, by January,
+1862, and from that month until the end of March his private
+letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general are
+almost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley
+learned that earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the
+Archduke Maximilian of Austria upon the <i>Throne</i> of Mexico,
+far from being unfounded, were but faint indications of a great
+French "colonial Empire" scheme, and he thought that there was
+"some ill-will to the United States at the bottom of all
+this<a name="FNanchor547"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_547">[547]</a>...." He feared that the Mexican question
+would "give us a deal of trouble yet<a name=
+"FNanchor548"></a><a href="#Footnote_548">[548]</a>," and by March
+was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt." made by
+France<a name="FNanchor549"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_549">[549]</a>.</p>
+<p>These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he
+hastened, in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also
+did Spain. Great Britain believed that she had been tricked into a
+false position in Mexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view
+of the close relation of joint policy with France toward the Civil
+War in America, undertook no direct opposition though prophesying
+an evil result. This situation required France to refrain, for a
+time, from criticism of British policy and action toward the
+North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy, rather than one
+based on its own initiative. On the British side <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_261"></a>[V1:pg 261]</span> the French
+Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposes
+and objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow
+to accept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to
+that war Great Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a
+very advantageous situation for the North, as the event was to
+prove. On the purely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity
+to assure Seward that Great Britain was "entirely averse to any
+interference in the internal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing
+could be further from their wishes than to impose upon the Mexican
+Nation any Government not of its own choice<a name=
+"FNanchor550"></a><a href="#Footnote_550">[550]</a>."</p>
+<p>British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262"></a>[V1:pg 262]</span>
+swell the breeze of amity toward America that had sprung up once
+the <i>Trent</i> was beyond the horizon, and made, temporarily, for
+smooth sailing in the relations of Great Britain and the North.
+Lyons wrote on February 7 that the "present notion appears to be to
+overwhelm us with demonstrations of friendship and
+confidence<a name="FNanchor551"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_551">[551]</a>." Adams' son in London thought "our work
+here is past its crisis," and that, "Our victory is won on this
+side the water<a name="FNanchor552"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_552">[552]</a>," while the American Minister himself
+believed that "the prospect of interference with us is growing more
+and more remote<a name="FNanchor553"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_553">[553]</a>." Russell also was optimistic, writing to
+Lyons, "Our relations have now got into a very smooth groove....
+There is no longer any excitement here upon the question of
+America. I fear Europe is going to supplant the affairs of America
+as an exciting topic<a name="FNanchor554"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_554">[554]</a>," meaning, presumably, disturbances
+arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic duties
+as "almost in a state of profound calm<a name=
+"FNanchor555"></a><a href="#Footnote_555">[555]</a>."</p>
+<p>This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter
+what anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the
+blockade there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its
+legality. That there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an
+urgent letter from Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade,
+asserting that if cotton brought but four pence at Charleston and
+thirteen pence at Liverpool there must be some truth in its alleged
+effectiveness:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do
+not let us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that
+they failed thro' our interference.... Patience for <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_263"></a>[V1:pg 263]</span> a few more
+weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient
+policy<a name="FNanchor556"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_556">[556]</a>."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<a name="image07.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image07.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image07.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>KING COTTON BOUND:</b><br>
+Or, The Modern Prometheus.<br>
+<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p>
+<br>
+<p>This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the
+blockade and on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more
+weeks" had no place in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he
+wrote to Lyons in regard to assertions being made that the blockade
+was ineffective because certain vessels had eluded it:</p>
+<blockquote>"Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion
+that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a
+number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port,
+sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident
+danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not
+voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships
+may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular
+instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade
+from being an effective one by international law<a name=
+"FNanchor557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557">[557]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>From this view Russell never departed in official
+instructions<a name="FNanchor558"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_558">[558]</a>. England's position as the leading
+maritime Power made it inevitable that she should promptly approve
+the Northern blockade effort and be cautious in criticizing its
+legitimate operation. Both her own history and probable future
+interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far more
+important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to
+British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with
+the South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed
+they would do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a
+tradition of the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be
+made by it, send supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their
+sails."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264"></a>[V1:pg 264]</span>
+<p>But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on
+the Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should
+arrive at his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London
+very nearly took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's
+position. They had now learned through public documents that
+Russell had informed Adams he "had no intention of seeing them
+again." Very angry they planned a formal protest to the British
+Government, but in the end Mann and Rost counselled silence,
+outvoting Yancey<a name="FNanchor559"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_559">[559]</a>. On his arrival Mason ignored this
+situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in
+pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private
+reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed,
+somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity
+for evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was
+confident of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his
+arrival he wrote unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of
+State "... although the Ministry may hang back in regard to the
+blockade and recognition through the Queen's speech, at the opening
+of Parliament next week the popular voice through the House of
+Commons will demand both."... "I shall be disappointed if the
+Parliament does not insist on definite action by the
+Ministry<a name="FNanchor560"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_560">[560]</a>...."</p>
+<p>Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of
+many English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line
+to take was to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition
+and to urge European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived
+in Paris, wrote Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel
+he should "make only a passing allusion to the question of
+recognition, intimating that on that point I am not disposed at
+present <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265"></a>[V1:pg
+265]</span> to press consideration. But I shall insist upon the
+inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of the stone fleet,'
+etc<a name="FNanchor561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561">[561]</a>."
+Mason was urged to take a like course with Russell. Both men were
+much excited by a document a copy of which had been secured by Mann
+purporting to be a "confidential memorandum" addressed by England
+to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time had not come to
+raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, but Slidell and
+Mason believed it genuine<a name="FNanchor562"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_562">[562]</a>. They had great hopes of the opening of
+Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and the
+only references in debate were to the <i>Trent</i> and its
+fortunate outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It
+is thought that silence as to the blockade was intended to leave
+that question open<a name="FNanchor563"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_563">[563]</a>." This, no doubt, was the consolatory
+explanation of his friends, but the unofficial interview with
+Russell, at his home, on February 10, chilled Mason's hopes.</p>
+<p>As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by
+Mason on the blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to
+Richmond shows that he proceeded with great caution, omitting
+portions of his instructions on cotton for fear of arousing
+antagonism, and venturing only a slight departure by expressing the
+hope that if Great Britain wished to renew communication with the
+Confederacy it might be made through him, rather than through the
+British consuls at the South. Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I
+might find my residence in London agreeable." He refused to see
+Mason's credentials, stating this to be "unnecessary, our relations
+being unofficial." He listened with courtesy, asked a few
+questions, but "seemed utterly <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_266"></a>[V1:pg 266]</span> disinclined to enter into
+conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and only
+said, in substance, they must await events." Certainly it was a
+cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that
+Russell's "personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy
+inaction<a name="FNanchor564"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_564">[564]</a>." But Mason still counted on
+parliamentary pressure on the Government, and he was further
+encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at Liverpool,
+stating that he had just received a request to come to London "from
+a government quarter, of all the <i>most important</i><a name=
+"FNanchor565"></a><a href="#Footnote_565">[565]</a>."</p>
+<p>The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself
+feared somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to
+Mason that interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with
+Russell, that he had unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and,
+while not citing these men directly, declared the general "London
+idea" to be that of "postponement"; since it was inevitable that
+"the North will break down in a few months on the score of money,"
+and that "We have only to wait three months." Evidently Spence
+believed he was being used as an intermediary and influential
+adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade them to a period of
+quiet. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267"></a>[V1:pg
+267]</span> This, he thought, was unwise since delay would be
+injurious<a name="FNanchor566"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_566">[566]</a>. Of like opinion were the two Members of
+Parliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be
+his closest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former
+possessing somewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class,
+the latter the largest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice
+also was to press on the blockade question<a name=
+"FNanchor567"></a><a href="#Footnote_567">[567]</a>, as a matter of
+primary British commercial interest, and they believed that France
+was eager to follow a British lead. This was contrary to Slidell's
+notion at the moment, but of this Mason was unaware<a name=
+"FNanchor568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568">[568]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before
+Parliament the papers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of
+one hundred and twenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3,
+1861, to February 17, 1862. In it were the details of the
+institution of the blockade, reports from British consuls on its
+effectiveness, lists of vessels captured and of vessels evading it,
+all together furnishing a very complete view of this, the principal
+maritime belligerent effort of the North<a name=
+"FNanchor569"></a><a href="#Footnote_569">[569]</a>. The Blockade
+Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired, and especially so
+as almost at the end of this document appeared that instruction of
+February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly stated British
+acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview with
+Russell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had
+been urged vainly to use his influence for "postponement," Russell,
+so it must appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by
+asserting the effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost
+immediately made known to Parliament by the presentation of
+papers.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268"></a>[V1:pg 268]</span>
+<p>Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without
+further protest, in governmental policy they must now make some
+decided effort. This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons,
+on March 7, of a motion by Gregory urging the Government to declare
+the blockade ineffective<a name="FNanchor570"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_570">[570]</a>, and of a similar debate on March 10 in
+the Lords. As is inevitable where many speakers participate in a
+debate the arguments advanced were repeated and reiterated. In the
+Commons important speeches for the motion were made by Gregory,
+Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, Lord Robert Cecil and Lindsay, while
+against it appeared Forster and Monckton Milnes. The
+Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Government view.
+Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that while
+himself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion
+had no essential bearing on that question and was directed wholly
+to a <i>fact</i>--that the blockade was not in reality effective
+and should not be recognized as such. He presented and analysed
+statistics to prove the frequency with which vessels passed through
+the blockade, using the summaries given by Mason to Russell in
+their interview of February 10, which were now before Parliament in
+the document on the blockade just presented, and he cited the
+reports of Bunch at Charleston as further evidence. This was the
+burden of Gregory's argument<a name="FNanchor571"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_571">[571]</a>, but he glanced in passing at many
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269"></a>[V1:pg 269]</span>
+other points favourable to the South, commenting on its free trade
+principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity, asserting
+the right of the South to secede, declaring that France regarded
+British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking to
+future wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of American
+inconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for all
+those principles of international law, which we have ever upheld,
+they are as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of
+the moment<a name="FNanchor572"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_572">[572]</a>." Gregory concluded with the statement
+that the United States should be treated "with justice and nothing
+more."</p>
+<p>When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree
+on a line of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the
+blockade was that it was wise to minimize the question of
+recognition, and Gregory had laboured to prove that this was not
+related to a refusal longer to recognize the blockade. But
+Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion, promptly undid him for
+he unhappily <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270"></a>[V1:pg
+270]</span> admitted that recognition and blockade questions were
+so closely interwoven that they could not be considered separately.
+This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who led in opposition.
+Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearing to pieces
+of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the alleged blockade
+runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which, by
+use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then
+make a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade
+of main ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was
+proved, he declared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where
+it was 100 per cent. greater than in the South, and of salt in
+Charleston, where the importer could make a profit of 1,000 per
+cent. To raise the blockade, he argued, would be a direct violation
+by Britain of her neutrality. The real reason for this motion was
+not the <i>ineffectiveness</i> of the blockade, but the
+effectiveness, and the real object an English object, not a
+Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion to
+recognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew the
+former would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended
+to secure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of
+the Government in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any
+other conduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would
+have had to fight for slavery against her kinsmen."</p>
+<p>Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a
+judicial tone of argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one
+who knows his cause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and
+was characterized by Henry Adams, an interested auditor, as
+"listened to as you would listen to a funeral eulogy."... "The
+blockade is now universally acknowledged to be
+unobjectionable<a name="FNanchor573"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_573">[573]</a>." This estimate is <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_271"></a>[V1:pg 271]</span> borne out by
+the speech for the Government by the Solicitor-General, who
+maintained the effectiveness of the blockade and who answered
+Gregory's argument that recognition was not in question by stating
+that to refuse longer to recognize the blockade would result in a
+situation of "armed neutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war." He
+pictured the disgust of Europe if England should enter upon such a
+war in alliance "with a country ... which is still one of the last
+strongholds of slavery"--an admission made in the fervour of debate
+that was dangerous as tending to tie the Government's hands in the
+future, but which was, no doubt, merely a personal and carelessly
+ventured view, not a governmentally authorized one. In general the
+most interesting feature of this debate is the hearty approval
+given by friends of the North to the Government's entire line of
+policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play at the
+moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy,
+was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make no
+criticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of British
+neutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, in
+specific cases, in neutral duty.</p>
+<p>The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for
+the motion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there
+was no indication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a
+similar debate in the Lords was of importance only as offering
+Russell, since he was now a member of the upper chamber, an
+opportunity to speak for himself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any
+intention to attack the blockade since Russell, on February 15, had
+officially approved it, but criticized the sending to Lyons of the
+despatch itself. Russell upheld the strict legality and
+effectiveness of the blockade, stated that if England sided with
+the South in any way the North would appeal to a slave
+insurrection--the first reference to an idea <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_272"></a>[V1:pg 272]</span> which was to
+play a very important r&ocirc;le with Russell and others later--and
+concluded by expressing the opinion that three months would see the
+end of the struggle on lines of separation, but with some form of
+union between the two sovereignties<a name=
+"FNanchor574"></a><a href="#Footnote_574">[574]</a>. Russell's
+speech was an unneeded but emphatic negative of the pro-Southern
+effort.</p>
+<p>Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics
+by pressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason
+were dashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to
+force the Government to a decided stand when they preferred, as the
+summons of Spence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance
+for a time any further declaration on the blockade. The refusal of
+Mason and his Southern friends to wait compelled a governmental
+decision and the result was Russell's instruction to Lyons of
+February 15. The effect of the debate on Mason was not to cause
+distrust of his English advisers, but to convince him that the
+existing Government was more determined in unfriendliness than he
+had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: "... no step will be taken
+by this Government to interfere with it<a name=
+"FNanchor575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575">[575]</a>." He thought
+the military news from America in part responsible as: "The late
+reverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate
+effect upon the minds of our friends <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_273"></a>[V1:pg 273]</span> here<a name=
+"FNanchor576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576">[576]</a>...." Spence was
+opposed to any further move in Parliament until some more definite
+push on the Government from France should occur<a name=
+"FNanchor577"></a><a href="#Footnote_577">[577]</a>. Slidell,
+anxiously watching from Paris the effort in England, had now
+altered his view of policy and was convinced there was no hope in
+France until England gave the signal. Referring to his previous
+idea that the Continent could be put in opposition to Great Britain
+on the blockade he wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was
+such that any view of the question which he might urge on the
+British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to change
+entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all that concerns
+us the initiative must be taken by England; that the Emperor sets
+such value on her good will that he will make any sacrifice of his
+own opinions and policy to retain it<a name=
+"FNanchor578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578">[578]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason<a name=
+"FNanchor579"></a><a href="#Footnote_579">[579]</a>. It was a
+correct judgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that
+his was to be the first place in importance in any and all
+operations intended to secure European support for the Confederacy,
+but he could not conceal from himself that the first steps
+undertaken in that direction had been premature. From this first
+failure dated his fixed belief, no matter what hopes were sometimes
+expressed later, that only a change of Government in England would
+help the Southern cause.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_502"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor502">[502]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 52.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_503"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor503">[503]</a> See <i>ante</i>, pp. 61 and
+65-66.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_504"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor504">[504]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April
+15, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_505"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor505">[505]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell. Private.
+April 23, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_506"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor506">[506]</a> Bernard, <i>Neutrality of Great
+Britain</i>, pp. 80-1.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_507"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor507">[507]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April
+27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_508"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor508">[508]</a> Bernard, p. 229.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_509"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor509">[509]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, May 18,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_510"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor510">[510]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIII, pp.
+188-195.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_511"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor511">[511]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_512"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor512">[512]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, July 2,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_513"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor513">[513]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The
+important correspondence on this subject is found in: F.O., France,
+Vol. 1393. No. 796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>,
+No. 804. Cowley to Russell, July 4, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1377.
+No. 704. Russell to Cowley, July 10, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1394.
+No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 922.
+Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 923.
+Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers.
+Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. <i>Ibid.</i>, Cowley to Russell,
+July 28, 1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to
+support England in remonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill"
+appears, through Cowley's communications, in the printed
+Parliamentary Papers. A study of these alone would lead to the
+judgment that France <i>had been the first</i> to raise the
+question with England and had heartily supported England. The facts
+were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions from
+Thouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (<i>Parliamentary
+Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil
+War in the United States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20,
+1861).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_514"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor514">[514]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 61.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_515"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor515">[515]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_516"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor516">[516]</a> Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to
+the Bill and Sumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact
+spoken publicly in favour of the measure. Probably he told
+Schleiden that privately he was against it. Schleiden reported
+Sumner as active in urging the Cabinet not to issue a Proclamation
+closing the ports (Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to Senate of Bremen,
+July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier later informed Thouvenel that Sumner
+declared the Bill intended for the Northern public only, to show
+administration "energy," and that there was never any intention of
+putting it into effect. F.O., France, 1394. No. 931. Cowley to
+Russell, Aug. 1, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_517"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor517">[517]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." Nos. 70 and 71. Thouvenel did finally consent to support
+Russell's protest.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_518"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor518">[518]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_519"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor519">[519]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 756.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_520"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor520">[520]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley
+to Russell, Aug. 8, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_521"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor521">[521]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_522"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor522">[522]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a
+copy of the six lines of Thouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier,
+dated July 4, the very brevity of which shows that this was in fact
+no instruction at all, but merely a comment by Thouvenel to
+Mercier.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_523"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor523">[523]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_524"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor524">[524]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, August 1,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_525"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor525">[525]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 12, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_526"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor526">[526]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private.
+Aug. 13, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_527"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor527">[527]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_528"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor528">[528]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 83.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_529"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor529">[529]</a> Lyons thought this possible. Russell
+Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. July 20, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_530"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor530">[530]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private.
+Aug. 16, 1861. And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent
+smuggling over 3,000 miles of coast and 1,500 miles of land
+frontier seems to me impossible" (<i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 17, 1861).
+Russell had received some two weeks earlier, a letter from Bunch at
+Charleston, urging that England make no objection to the blockade
+in order that the South might be taught the lesson that "King
+Cotton," was not, after all, powerful enough to compel British
+recognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at the
+failure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they
+both could and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F.O., Am.,
+Vol. 781. No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on
+July 23 that the South planned to hold back its cotton until Great
+Britain and France raised the blockade (<i>Ibid.</i>, No. 87).
+Bunch was now impressed with Southern determination.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_531"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor531">[531]</a> The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia),
+Wilmington (North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah
+(Georgia), Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston
+(Texas).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_532"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor532">[532]</a> The first important reference to the
+blockade after mid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed
+through Lyons, not to give advice to British merchants in
+Charleston as to blockade runners that had gotten into port having
+any "right" to go out again (F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell
+to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_533"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor533">[533]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 125. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec.
+9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_534"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor534">[534]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_535"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor535">[535]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 127.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_536"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor536">[536]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 126. Lyons to Russell,
+Nov. 29, 1861. Received Dec. 12.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_537"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor537">[537]</a> <i>Punch</i>, Feb. 1, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_538"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor538">[538]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 141.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_539"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor539">[539]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 142. Jan. 15,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_540"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor540">[540]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 143.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_541"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor541">[541]</a> James, <i>W.W. Story</i>, II, p. 111, Jan.
+21, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_542"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor542">[542]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 153. Lyons to Russell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan.
+27.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_543"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor543">[543]</a> <i>Ibid., Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Despatch
+from Lord Lyons respecting the Obstruction of the Southern
+Harbours." Lyons to Russell, Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb.
+24.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_544"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor544">[544]</a> Thompson and Wainwright, <i>Confidential
+Correspondence of G.V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy</i>,
+1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pont to Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited
+as <i>Fox, Confid. Corresp</i>. This letter shows clearly also that
+the Navy had no thought of a <i>permanent</i>
+obstruction.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_545"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor545">[545]</a> <i>Vide</i> Arnold, <i>Friendship's
+Garland</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_546"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor546">[546]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>,
+II, 249. Thouvenel could mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13,
+1862. "Nous ne voulons pas cependant imposer une forme de
+gouvernement aux Mexicains..."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_547"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor547">[547]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.
+Private. Jan. 17, 1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to
+Flahault in London, hoped England would feel that she had a common
+interest with France in preventing Mexico from falling under the
+yoke of Americans either "unis ou secedes." (Thouvenel, <i>Le
+Secret de l'Empereur</i>, II, 226).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_548"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor548">[548]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 24, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_549"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor549">[549]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, March 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_550"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor550">[550]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to
+Russell, Feb. 28, 1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France
+just as Napoleon's plans for Mexico took clearer form has been made
+the ground for assumptions that he immediately gave assurance of
+Southern acquiescence and encouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have
+found no good evidence of this--rather the contrary. The whole plan
+was clear to Cowley by mid-January before Slidell reached Paris,
+and Slidell's own correspondence shows no early push on Mexico. The
+Confederate agents' correspondence, both official and private, will
+be much used later in this work and here requires explanation. But
+four historical works of importance deal with it extensively, (1)
+Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the Confederacy</i>, 2 vols.,
+1905, purports to include the despatches of Mason and Slidell to
+Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory. Important despatches are
+missing, and elisions sometimes occur without indication. (2)
+Virginia Mason, <i>The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of
+James M. Mason</i>, 1906, contains most of Mason's despatches,
+including some not given by Richardson. The author also used the
+<i>Mason Papers</i> (see below). (3) Callahan, <i>The Diplomatic
+History of the Southern Confederacy</i>, 1901, is the most complete
+and authoritative work on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used
+the collection known as the "Pickett Papers," for official
+despatches, supplementing these when gaps occurred by a study of
+the <i>Mason Papers</i>, but his work, narrative in form, permits
+no extended printing of documents. (4) L.M. Sears, <i>A Confederate
+Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III</i>. (Am. Hist. Rev. Jan.,
+1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the
+<i>Mason Papers</i>. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or
+packages in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and
+in addition there is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to
+Richmond. These contain the private correspondence of Mason and
+Slidell while in Europe. Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's
+letters are copies in Slidell's hand-writing, made apparently at
+Mason's request and sent to him in May, 1865. A complete typed copy
+of this correspondence was taken by me in 1913, but this has not
+hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master's degree thesis by
+Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat," Stanford
+University, 1915, and for a few citations by C.F. Adams, <i>A
+Crisis in Downing Street</i> (Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>,
+May, 1914). The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's
+English friends, Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_551"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor551">[551]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought
+France also included in these demonstrations.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_552"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor552">[552]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 113.
+Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Feb. 14,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_553"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor553">[553]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_554"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor554">[554]</a> Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_555"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor555">[555]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 123.
+To his son.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_556"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor556">[556]</a> Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_557"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor557">[557]</a> Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with
+Russell but adds that Great Britain, in the early stages of the
+blockade, was indulgent to the North, and rightly so considering
+the difficulties of instituting it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_558"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor558">[558]</a> He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863,
+that he saw "no reason to qualify the language employed in my
+despatch to Lord Lyons of the 15th of February last." (Bernard, p.
+293).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_559"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor559">[559]</a> Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the
+Confederacy</i>, II, p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_560"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor560">[560]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_561"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor561">[561]</a> Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_562"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor562">[562]</a> Mann sent this "confidential memorandum"
+to Jefferson Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no
+indication of how he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To
+his astonishment Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France
+knew nothing of such a memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by
+some enterprising "Southern friend" in need of money.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_563"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor563">[563]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p. 258. Mason to
+Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_564"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor564">[564]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch
+No. 4. Feb. 22, 1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.)
+Slidell was more warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same
+line of argument and apparently made a favourable impression.
+Cowley reported Thouvenel, after the interview, as expressing
+himself as "hoping that in two or three months matters would have
+reached such a crisis in America that both parties would be willing
+to accept a Mediation...."<br>
+<br>
+(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to
+Russell, Feb. 10, 1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_565"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor565">[565]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13,
+1862. This was that James Spence, author of <i>The American
+Union</i>, a work strongly espousing the Southern cause. This book
+was not only widely read in England but portions of it were
+translated into other languages for use on the Continent. Spence
+was a manufacturer and trader and also operated in the Liverpool
+Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason, was early
+active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in
+England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was
+much less favourably regarded and the impression created by his
+frequent letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre
+elated by the prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he
+took to be the birth of a new State.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_566"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor566">[566]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_567"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor567">[567]</a> Mason, <i>Mason p</i>. 258.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_568"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor568">[568]</a> Slidell in France at first took the tack
+of urging that Continental interests and British interests in the
+blockade were "directly antagonistic," basing his argument on
+England's forward look as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26,
+1862. Richardson, II, p. 186).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_569"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor569">[569]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Papers relating to the
+Blockade."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_570"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor570">[570]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230,
+and pp. 1233-43.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_571"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor571">[571]</a> Mason's authenticated statistics,
+unfortunately for his cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a
+fact which might imply that after that date the blockade was
+rapidly becoming effective and which certainly did indicate that it
+was at least sufficiently effective to prevent regular and frequent
+communications between the government at Richmond and its agents
+abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he promptly incorporated
+Mason's figures in the papers presented to Parliament? These
+figures showed that according to reports from four Southern ports,
+sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29 and October
+31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date December
+31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from
+Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in
+blockade running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those
+reaching Cuba were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate,
+3 Spanish, 3 American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these
+statistics were the names of the vessels given, for obvious
+reasons, in the printed paper though apparently included in the
+list submitted by Mason. These figures did in fact but reveal a
+situation existing even after 1861. The American blockading fleets
+had to be created from all sorts of available material and were
+slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy could not
+enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing
+their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render
+a large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive
+effort and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large
+fleet of blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See <i>Fox, Confid.
+Corresp.</i>, I, pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May
+31, 1862, pays tribute to the energy with which the South for
+"thirteen long months" had defended its important port shore
+lines.) If Gregory had been able to quote a report by Bunch from
+Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have had a strong argument.
+"The blockade runners are doing a great business.... Everything is
+brought in in abundance. Not a day passes without an arrival or a
+departure. The Richmond Government sent about a month ago an order
+to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from Nassau to New
+York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence here, and was
+on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the order.
+Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are all
+changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and no
+one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed,
+there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5,
+1862).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_572"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor572">[572]</a> I have nowhere found any such statement by
+Seward. Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of
+May 27, 1861, printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds
+that temporary absence of blockading ships does not impair the
+blockade nor render "necessary a new notice of its
+existence."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_573"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor573">[573]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp.
+119-20. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_574"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor574">[574]</a> This "three months" statement returned to
+plague Russell later, British merchants complaining that upon it
+they had based plans in the belief that the Government had
+something definite in view. Spence's reference to this "three
+months" idea, after his conferences in London, would indicate that
+Russell was merely indulging in a generalization due to the
+expected financial collapse of the North. The Russian Ambassador in
+London gave a different interpretation. He wrote that the Northern
+victories in the West had caused Great Britain to think the time
+near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by these
+victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation from
+the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that
+Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken."
+(Brunow to F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so
+state, but his despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk
+with Russell. If so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret
+Lincoln's "border state policy" in a sense that would appear
+reasonable in the British view that there could be no real hope at
+Washington of restoring the Union.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_575"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor575">[575]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p. 264. Despatch No.
+6. March 11, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_576"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor576">[576]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken
+by Grant on February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture
+of these two places gave an opening for the advance of the Western
+army southwards into Tennessee and Mississippi.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_577"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor577">[577]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_578"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor578">[578]</a> Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter,
+March 26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_579"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor579">[579]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274"></a>[V1:pg 274]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2>
+<h3>ENTER MR. LINDSAY</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the
+threatening <i>Trent</i> episode, appears to have made Secretary
+Seward believe that the moment was opportune for a renewal of
+pressure on Great Britain and France for the recall of their
+Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon the victories of Grant at
+Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on February 28
+explaining that as a result the United States, now having access to
+the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, "had
+determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways
+and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment
+succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the
+sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the
+blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations
+would "go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw
+their "belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded,
+as we conceive, to the insurgents<a name="FNanchor580"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_580">[580]</a>." This was large talk for a relatively
+unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the
+door in the West and was still far from having "access to the
+interior districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy
+of this despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might
+be said the position and the spirit of the Northern armies were
+greatly improved and notable successes probable, it could not be
+maintained that hostilities were "so near <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_275"></a>[V1:pg 275]</span> their
+conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale as to disqualify
+either party for the title of Belligerents<a name=
+"FNanchor581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581">[581]</a>." Lyons and
+Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of
+belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received
+that the purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the
+news quite took Thouvenel's breath away<a name=
+"FNanchor582"></a><a href="#Footnote_582">[582]</a>. As yet,
+however, Seward did no more than hint and Adams was quick to advise
+that the moment had not yet come "when such a proceeding might seem
+to me likely to be of use<a name="FNanchor583"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_583">[583]</a>."</p>
+<p>Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no
+doubt intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the
+North, yet also truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the
+South and its "domestic institution." This was the negotiation of a
+Slave-Trade treaty with Great Britain, by which America joined, at
+last, the nations agreeing to unite their efforts in suppression of
+the African Slave Trade. The treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons
+at Washington on April 7. On the next day Seward wrote to Adams
+that had such a treaty been ratified "in 1808, there would now have
+been no sedition here, and no disagreement between the United
+States and foreign nations<a name="FNanchor584"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_584">[584]</a>," a melancholy reflection intended to
+suggest that the South alone had been responsible for the long
+delay of American participation in a world humanitarian movement.
+But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to save the
+credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he
+should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing
+the Union<a name="FNanchor585"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_585">[585]</a>"--an erroneous view evincing a
+misconception of <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_276"></a>[V1:pg 276]</span> the intensity of both Northern
+and Southern feeling if regarded from our present knowledge, but a
+view natural enough to the foreign observer at the moment. Lyons,
+in this letter, correctly stated the rising determination of the
+North to restore the Union, but underestimated the rapid growth of
+an equal determination against a restoration with slavery. The real
+motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade treaty was
+the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic, affairs.
+Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken "the
+risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had
+indicated<a name="FNanchor586"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_586">[586]</a>.</p>
+<p>In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over
+recent military successes. The campaign in the West had been
+followed in the East by a great effort under McClellan to advance
+on Richmond up the peninsula of the James river and using
+Chesapeake Bay as a means of water transportation and supply. This
+campaign had been threatened by the appearance of the iron-clad ram
+<i>Merrimac</i> and her attack on the wooden naval vessels
+operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9 the
+<i>Monitor</i>, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove
+the <i>Merrimac</i> from her helpless prey, and removed the
+Southern threat to McClellan's communications. More than any other
+one battle of the Civil War the duel between the <i>Merrimac</i>
+and the <i>Monitor</i> struck the imagination of the British
+people, and justly so because of its significance in relation to
+the power of the British Navy. It "has been the main talk of the
+town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in Parliament, in
+the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval people. The
+impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in
+warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over
+again<a name="FNanchor587"></a><a href="#Footnote_587">[587]</a>."
+The victory of the <i>Monitor</i> was relatively unimportant in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277"></a>[V1:pg 277]</span>
+British eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships,
+and especially the ease with which the <i>Merrimac</i> had
+vanquished wooden ships on the day previous, were cause of anxious
+consideration for the future. Russell was more concerned over the
+immediate lessons of the battle. "Only think," he wrote, "of our
+position if in case of the Yankees turning upon us they should by
+means of iron ships renew the triumphs they achieved in 1812-13 by
+means of superior size and weight of metal<a name=
+"FNanchor588"></a><a href="#Footnote_588">[588]</a>."</p>
+<p>This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while
+American ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed,
+sounded the death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in
+the character of navies was immediately possible. Moreover British
+shipbuilders could surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with
+America or any other nation. The success of the <i>Monitor</i> was
+soon regarded by the British Government as important mainly as
+indicative of a new energy in the North promising further and more
+important successes on land. The Government hoped for such Northern
+success not because of any belief that these would go to the extent
+of forcing the South into submission, for they were still, and for
+a long time to come, obsessed with the conviction that Southern
+independence must ultimately be achieved. The idea was, rather,
+that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability and
+realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle,
+was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the
+conclusion that the game was not worth the price and would consent
+to separation. Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he
+thought that the "morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined
+for the time<a name="FNanchor589"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_589">[589]</a>." He believed that the end of the war
+would be hastened by Northern victories, and he therefore rejoiced
+in them.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278"></a>[V1:pg 278]</span>
+<p>Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in
+April, began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and
+to write warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won
+victory in the West at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched
+battle of the war, called out such a flood of Northern expressions
+of determination to drive the war to the bitter end as to startle
+Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably clear letter of survey, to
+recast his opinions. He wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"The general opinion is that the Campaign of this
+Spring will clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the
+War. If the Military successes of the North continue, the
+determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last really
+put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military reverses, the
+loss of the Border States, and the occupation of the most important
+points on the Coast, the Southern men hold out, if they destroy as
+they threaten to do, their cotton, tobacco and all other property
+which cannot be removed and then retire into the interior with
+their families and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be
+but barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal Armies.
+The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to continue the
+enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation to protracting the
+War indefinitely. I confess, however, that I fear that a
+protraction of the War during another year or longer, is a not less
+probable result of the present posture of affairs, than either the
+immediate subjugation of the South or the immediate recognition of
+its independence<a name="FNanchor590"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_590">[590]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line
+with Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black.
+There was indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a
+hypothetical defensible interior which impressed Englishmen, but
+had no foundation in geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention
+was eagerly fixed on the Northern advance, and it was at least
+generally hoped <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279"></a>[V1:pg
+279]</span> that the projected attack on New Orleans and
+McClellan's advance up the peninsula toward Richmond would bring to
+a more definite status the conflict in America. Extreme Southern
+sympathizers scouted the possibility of any conclusive Northern
+success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance of Grant's
+western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news of the
+capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to make
+up their minds to believe it<a name="FNanchor591"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_591">[591]</a>," but even the capture of this the most
+important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of great
+importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond.</p>
+<p>News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching
+England as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during
+this advance and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two
+remarkable adventures toward a solution in America were made,
+apparently wholly on individual initiative, by a Frenchman in
+America and an Englishman in France. Mercier at Washington and
+Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite independently, that the time had
+come for projects of foreign mediation.</p>
+<p>French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have
+been that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result
+in such a rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions
+of now recognizing the <i>facts</i> of the situation and
+acknowledging the independence of the South would not be
+unfavourably received. In this sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier,
+privately, on March 13, but was careful to state that the word
+"mediation" ought not to be uttered. His letter dilated, also, on
+French manufacturing difficulties at home due to the lack of
+cotton<a name="FNanchor592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592">[592]</a>.
+This was in no way an instruction to Mercier, but the ideas
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280"></a>[V1:pg 280]</span>
+expressed were broached by him in a conversation with Seward, only
+to be met with such positive assertions of intention and ability
+soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French
+Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that
+he wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself
+that there also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements,
+upon which the latter at once offered to further such a trip.
+Mercier asserted to Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having
+foreseen no such eager acquiescence in a suggestion made <i>without
+previous thought</i>, but that on consideration he returned to
+Seward and accepted the proposal, outlining the substance of what
+he intended to say at Richmond. He should there make clear that the
+anxiety of France was above all directed toward peace as essential
+to French commercial interests; that France had always regarded the
+separation of North and South with regret; that the North was
+evidently determined in its will to restore the Union; and, in
+repetition, that France wished to aid in any way possible the early
+cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to add that he,
+personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of any
+persons whom the South wished to elect<a name=
+"FNanchor593"></a><a href="#Footnote_593">[593]</a>.</p>
+<p>Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient
+sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the
+balance and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite
+unnecessarily, Seward <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_281"></a>[V1:pg 281]</span> helped him to make the
+trip<a name="FNanchor594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594">[594]</a>." A
+circumstance apparently not known to Bancroft was Mercier's
+consultation with Lyons, before departure, in which were revealed
+an initiative of the adventure, and a proposed representation to
+the authorities in Richmond materially different from the report
+made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit expanded treatment as new
+light on a curious episode and especially as revealing the British
+policy of the moment, represented in the person of the British
+Minister in Washington<a name="FNanchor595"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_595">[595]</a>.</p>
+<p>On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to
+set out for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time
+thinking of making this journey." He told of <i>making the
+suggestion to Seward</i>, and that this "rather to his surprise"
+had been "eagerly" taken up.</p>
+<blockquote>"Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital
+importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed, was to
+put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and generally to
+a state of things which caused so grievous an interruption of the
+trade between Europe and this country. It was, he said, possible
+that he might hasten the attainment of this object by conferring
+personally with the Secession leaders. He should frankly tell them
+that to all appearances their cause was desperate; that their
+Armies were beaten in all quarters; and that the time had arrived
+when they ought to come to some arrangement, which would put an end
+to a state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to
+Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the European
+Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed principles. They
+would recognize any people which <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_282"></a>[V1:pg 282]</span> established its independence, but
+they could not encourage the prolongation of a fruitless
+struggle.<br>
+<br>
+"Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very much
+discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from the
+Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down blow
+('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them. It might
+induce them to come to terms with the North. At all events it might
+lead to an Armistice, under which trade might be immediately
+resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr. Seward his notion of
+using this language, and had added that of course as a Minister
+accredited to the United States, and visiting Richmond with the
+consent of the United States Government, he could not speak to the
+Southern men of any other terms for ending the War than a return to
+the Union.<br>
+<br>
+"Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely
+approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had
+authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course from
+the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward, personally,
+that they had no spirit of vengeance to apprehend, that they would
+be cordially welcomed back to their Seats in the Senate, and to
+their due share of political influence. Mr. Seward added that he
+had not said so much to any other person, but that he would tell
+Monsieur Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political
+station and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards
+the South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand
+or fall by it."</blockquote>
+<p>This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased
+the American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond
+to have constituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be
+regarded as at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor
+as expressive of Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain
+from much comment on the matter of Mercier's proposed
+representations at Richmond. He was more concerned that the trip
+was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed to it, fearing that
+it would appear like a break in that unity of French-British
+attitude which was so desirable. Nor was <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_283"></a>[V1:pg 283]</span> he without
+suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and
+separate advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations
+with the South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask
+Lyons to accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility"
+to any interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking
+Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with
+the idea." Lyons frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of
+the necessity of declining to go and was sorry Mercier was
+determined to proceed since this certainly looked like a break in
+"joint policy," and he objected positively on the same ground to
+Stoeckl's going<a name="FNanchor596"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_596">[596]</a>. Mercier yielded the latter point, but
+argued that by informing Seward of his consultation with Lyons,
+which he proposed doing, the former objection would be obviated.
+Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons thought it best not
+to object too much and confined his efforts to driving home the
+idea that no opening should be given for a "separate agreement"
+with the South.</p>
+<blockquote>"I therefore entered with him into the details of his
+plans, and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I
+said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to remove
+from the minds of men in the South, was that it would be possible
+to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an
+exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to believe that some of
+them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great
+commercial privileges to one Power, to the exclusion of others. I
+hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, or men of his
+stamp could entertain so foolish a notion, but still it might be
+well to eradicate it from any mind in which it had found
+place<a name="FNanchor597"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_597">[597]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284"></a>[V1:pg 284]</span>
+<p>Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and
+fourteenth and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip,
+"without saying anything to lead him to suppose that I had any
+objection to it." This was intended to preserve the impression of
+close harmony with France, and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the
+result of my communications with M. Mercier entitles him to say
+that he makes his journey to Richmond with my acquiescence<a name=
+"FNanchor598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598">[598]</a>." Nevertheless
+he both believed, and declared to Mercier, that the views expressed
+on Southern weakening of determination were wholly erroneous, and
+that neither North nor South was ready for any efforts, still less
+mediation, looking toward peace. He prophesied failure of Mercier's
+avowed hopes. His prophecy proved well founded. On April 28 Lyons
+reported Mercier's account to him of the results of the journey.
+Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, reported at once to
+Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day called on
+Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate
+Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled
+determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under
+extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected
+European assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders
+professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and
+that confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously
+adverting to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in
+view French commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had
+received any proposals of benefit in return for recognition.
+Mercier answered with a simple negative. He then further developed
+the interview with Benjamin<a name="FNanchor599"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_599">[599]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285"></a>[V1:pg 285]</span>
+<blockquote>"He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a
+friend of the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the
+particular language which he had intended to hold was entirely
+inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found the
+Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that they were
+worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with
+the North. What he had said to them about the recognition of their
+Independence was that the principal inducement to France to
+recognize it would be a hope that her doing so would have a great
+moral effect towards hastening peace; that at this moment it would
+certainly not have any such effect; that it would embroil France
+with the United States, and that would be all<a name=
+"FNanchor600"></a><a href="#Footnote_600">[600]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by
+Mercier to convince the South of the uselessness of further
+resistance had, in fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel,
+Mercier stated that he had approached Benjamin with the simple
+declaration "that the purpose of my journey was merely to assure
+myself, for myself, of the true condition of things; and that I
+called to beg him to aid me in attaining it." Since the proposed
+strong representations were not reported to Thouvenel, either, in
+the explanation given of the initiation of the trip, the doubt must
+be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make them. They bear
+the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some degree also to
+Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The report to
+Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated to
+Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principal
+inducement" thereto<a name="FNanchor601"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_601">[601]</a>. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own
+views on recognition:</p>
+<blockquote>"He was himself more than ever convinced that the
+restoration of the old Union was impossible. He believed
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286"></a>[V1:pg 286]</span>
+that, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would
+last for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South
+must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the
+Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable
+opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War. The
+present opportunity would however, he thought, be particularly
+unfavourable."</blockquote>
+<p>Lyons writes:</p>
+<blockquote>"I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be
+eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur
+Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that there was
+nothing to do at the present moment but to watch
+events."</blockquote>
+<p>On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of
+Mercier's trip and was given a very different view of the situation
+at Richmond. Seward said:</p>
+<blockquote>"He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur
+Mercier's account of what had passed, that the Confederates were
+about to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought
+into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they were
+now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be offered
+them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was idle. If the
+United States were undisputed masters of the Border States and the
+Sea Coast, there would be no occasion for any more fighting. Those
+who chose to retire into the interior were welcome to do so, and to
+stay there till they were tired."</blockquote>
+<p>"The truth," wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the
+South probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those
+of Monsieur Mercier." Lyons concluded his report of the whole
+matter:</p>
+<blockquote>"The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to
+bring him back precisely to the point at which he was three months
+ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had somewhat
+shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the South, and
+consequently his opinions as to <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_287"></a>[V1:pg 287]</span> the policy to be adopted by
+France. The sentiments he now expresses are exactly those which he
+expressed at the beginning of the year<a name=
+"FNanchor602"></a><a href="#Footnote_602">[602]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early
+recognition of the South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons
+the effect of the adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of
+this; and on Russell also its influence was to cause some doubt of
+Southern success. Appended to Lyons' report stands Russell's
+initialled comment:</p>
+<blockquote>"It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which
+the Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms
+they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will cause
+but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can the country
+be held permanently by the U.S. Armies if the Confederates have
+small bodies in Arms resisting the authority of the U.S.
+Congress?<br>
+<br>
+Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union feeling in
+the South will be of great value in forming a judgment on the final
+issue."</blockquote>
+<p>Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid
+public misconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on
+Mercier's trip. This appeared May 6, in the New York <i>Times</i>,
+the paper more closely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout
+the war, representing Mercier as having gone to Richmond by order
+of Napoleon and with Lincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to
+surrender and to encourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons
+commented on this article that the language attributed to Mercier
+was "not very unlike that which he intended to hold," but that in
+fact he had not used it<a name="FNanchor603"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_603">[603]</a>. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move.
+Indeed everyone in London and Paris was much astonished, and many
+were <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288"></a>[V1:pg
+288]</span> the speculations as to the meaning of Mercier's unusual
+procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing "Que diable allait il faire
+dans cette gal&eacute;re<a name="FNanchor604"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_604">[604]</a>?" and Cowley, at Paris, could give no
+light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours of Mercier's
+trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could be
+true<a name="FNanchor605"></a><a href="#Footnote_605">[605]</a>."
+May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable unless the
+Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not the
+case<a name="FNanchor606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606">[606]</a>."
+The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, was assured by
+the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier's
+conduct, and that he greatly regretted it," being especially
+disturbed by a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with
+the British Representative" at Washington<a name=
+"FNanchor607"></a><a href="#Footnote_607">[607]</a>. This was
+reassuring to Russell, yet there is no question that Mercier's
+conduct long left a certain suspicion in British official circles.
+On May 2, also, Thouvenel wrote to Flahault in London of the
+Emperor's displeasure, evidently with the intention that this
+should be conveyed to Russell<a name="FNanchor608"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_608">[608]</a>.</p>
+<p>Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate
+agents in Europe. At first they believed Mercier must have had
+secret orders from Napoleon, and were delighted; then on denials
+made to Slidell by Thouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an
+unfavourable sense as Seward's agent. Later they returned to the
+theory of Napoleon's private manipulation, and being confident of
+his friendship were content to wait events<a name=
+"FNanchor609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609">[609]</a>. Slidell had
+just received assurance from M. Billault, through whom most of his
+information came, "that the Emperor and all <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_289"></a>[V1:pg 289]</span> the Ministers
+are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last year, and
+are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M. Thouvenel is
+of course excepted, but then he has no hostility<a name=
+"FNanchor610"></a><a href="#Footnote_610">[610]</a>." But a greater
+source of Southern hope at this juncture was another "diplomatic
+adventure," though by no accredited diplomat, which antedated
+Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not only the
+Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well.</p>
+<p>This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament,
+Lindsay, in the r&ocirc;le of self-constituted Southern emissary to
+Napoleon. Lindsay, as one of the principal ship-owners in England,
+had long been an earnest advocate of more free commercial
+intercourse between nations, supporting in general the principles
+of Cobden and Bright, and being a warm personal friend of the
+latter, though disagreeing with him on the American Civil War. He
+had been in some sense a minor expert consulted by both French and
+British Governments in the preparation of the commercial treaty of
+1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself to Cowley asking
+that an audience with the Emperor be procured for him to talk over
+some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the request seemed
+reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On the
+twelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon's
+conversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs<a name=
+"FNanchor611"></a><a href="#Footnote_611">[611]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_290"></a>[V1:pg 290]</span> that re-union
+between North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he
+was ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him
+the example." More than once he had expressed these ideas to
+England, but "they had not been attended to" and he should not try
+again. He continued:</p>
+<blockquote>"... that France ought not to interfere in the internal
+affairs of the United States, but that the United States ought
+equally to abstain from all interference in the internal concerns
+of France; and that His Majesty considered that the hindrance
+placed by the Northern States upon the exportation of cotton from
+the South was not justifiable, and was tantamount to interference
+with the legal commerce of France."</blockquote>
+<p>He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established.
+He had made observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government,
+but they had not been replied to." Then "His Majesty asked what
+were the opinions of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her
+Majesty's Govt. agreed with him as to the inefficiency of the
+blockade, he was ready to send ships of war to co-operate with
+others of Her Majesty to keep the Southern ports open." Finally
+Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and find out what he
+thought of these ideas.</p>
+<p>Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever
+having been made by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion
+was "that it might be true that the North and the South would never
+re-unite, but that it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of
+the blockade was a legal and international question, and that upon
+the whole it had been considered by Her Majesty's Govt. as
+efficient, though doubtless many ships had been enabled to run it";
+and "that at all events there could not be a more inopportune
+moment for mooting the question both of the recognition of the
+South and of the efficiency of the blockade. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_291"></a>[V1:pg 291]</span> The time was
+gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for
+every mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting with
+success upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of
+the blockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her
+Majesty's Govt. would consent to send a squadron to act as the
+Emperor had indicated, but that I could only give a personal
+opinion, which might be corrected if I was in error by Mr. Lindsay
+himself seeing Lord Russell."</p>
+<p>On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay and
+Napoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to
+Napoleon Cowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a
+contrary view of the situation, Napoleon:</p>
+<blockquote>"... repeated the statement that two long despatches
+with his opinion had been written to M. de Flahault, which had not
+been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he expressed a
+desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London, lay His Majesty's
+views before Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and bring their
+answers direct to him as quickly as possible, His Majesty observing
+that these matters were better arranged by private than official
+hands.... Mr. Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be
+back in Paris on Thursday morning."</blockquote>
+<p>In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty
+intrigue." Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and
+Thouvenel had denied all knowledge and declared that certainly no
+such proposals as Lindsay reported the Emperor to have mentioned
+had ever been sent to England. Cowley wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations
+with me, which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood
+hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor his own
+views, and that those views are supported by the majority of the
+people of England, and by the present Opposition in Parliament, who
+would denounce <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292"></a>[V1:pg
+292]</span> the blockade if in power; that he has found a willing
+listener in the Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any
+means; and I am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make
+political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the
+Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose no
+time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over to-night,
+and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord Palmerston as soon
+as possible<a name="FNanchor612"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_612">[612]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown
+by his conveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was
+jubilant, writing to Mason:</p>
+<blockquote>"Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor
+who is prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has
+always been ready to do so and has twice made representations to
+England, but has received evasive responses. He has now for the
+third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. Lindsay will
+give you all the particulars. This is entirely confidential but you
+can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory, etc., that I now have
+positive and <i>authoritative</i> evidence that France now waits
+the assent of England for recognition and other more cogent
+measures<a name="FNanchor613"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_613">[613]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in
+substance very similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though
+more highly coloured as favourable to the South, but he added an
+important feature which, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley,
+but which had not been stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to
+see Derby and Disraeli, the leaders of the parliamentary
+opposition, and inform them of his views--a suggestion which if
+known to the British Ministry as coming from Napoleon could not
+fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believed that, failing
+British participation, the Emperor might act separately in
+recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor614"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_614">[614]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293"></a>[V1:pg 293]</span>
+<p>April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval
+of the language used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was
+about to write to Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to
+bring them also on my part officially to your [Russell's]
+notice<a name="FNanchor615"></a><a href="#Footnote_615">[615]</a>."
+This official report does not differ materially from that in
+Cowley's private letter of the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally,
+aspersions on Lindsay and suspicions of the use to which he might
+put his information<a name="FNanchor616"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_616">[616]</a>. Cowley had held a long conversation with
+Thouvenel, in which it was developed that the source of the
+Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce, who was very
+anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that Lindsay
+in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "<i>I</i> [Cowley]
+<i>coincided in his views</i>." This exasperated Cowley, and he
+resented Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that
+he "was placed in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference.
+M. Thouvenel exclaimed that his own position was still more false,
+and that he should make a point of seeing the Emperor, on the
+following morning, and of ascertaining the extent of His Majesty's
+participation in the proceeding." This was done, with the result
+that Napoleon acknowledged that on Lindsay's request he had
+authorized him to recount to Russell and Palmerston the views
+expressed, but asserted that "he had not charged him to convey
+those opinions." Cowley concluded his despatch:</p>
+<blockquote>"Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not
+understand the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had
+confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate
+proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more preoccupied
+with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's Government seemed to
+be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in his communications with M.
+de <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294"></a>[V1:pg 294]</span>
+Flahault, but that he knew too well the general opinions prevailing
+in England to have made proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what
+proposals could have been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the
+Emperor and M. Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the
+South would not bring Cotton into the markets, while any
+interference with the blockade would probably have produced a
+collision. At the same time he could not conceal from me the just
+anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not the
+Northern States be induced to declare some one port Neutral, at
+which the trade could be carried on?<br>
+<br>
+I said that the events which were now passing in America
+demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two
+Governments. The recognition of the South would not have prevented
+the North from continuing its armaments and undertaking the
+expedition now in progress, and a refusal to acknowledge the
+blockade as efficient must have been followed by the employment of
+force, on a question of extreme delicacy<a name=
+"FNanchor617"></a><a href="#Footnote_617">[617]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this
+Russell stated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation
+was alarming, but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so
+the remedy." He assured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish
+to take no step in respect to the Civil War in America except in
+concert with France and upon full deliberation<a name=
+"FNanchor618"></a><a href="#Footnote_618">[618]</a>." Meanwhile
+Lindsay's diplomatic career had received a severe jolt in London.
+Confidently addressing to Russell a request for an interview, he
+received the reply "that I thought the best way for two Govts. to
+communicate with each other was through their respective
+Embassies.... He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you [Cowley] had
+not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the proposal
+through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to see
+me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and
+the French Ambassr. could make the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_295"></a>[V1:pg 295]</span> most Confidential as well as
+Official Communications<a name="FNanchor619"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_619">[619]</a>." This rebuff was not regarded as final,
+though exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all
+being agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in
+their favour. Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and
+on April 18 had still another conversation with Napoleon. He
+reported Russell's refusal of an interview, and that he had seen
+Disraeli, but not Derby, who was ill. Disraeli had declared that he
+believed Russell and Seward to have a "secret understanding" on the
+blockade, but that if France should make a definite proposal it
+would probably be supported by a majority in Parliament, and that
+Russell would be compelled to assent in order to avoid a change of
+Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsay expressions of
+vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon (according to
+Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting to learn the
+result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an event
+which "he did not anticipate," but which, if it occurred, "might
+render it inexpedient to act<a name="FNanchor620"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_620">[620]</a>."</p>
+<p>Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to
+London, found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English
+repetition. He wrote that Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had
+attempted to get at Palmerston, but <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_296"></a>[V1:pg 296]</span> with no success. Thereupon
+Lindsay turning to the Opposition had visited Disraeli a second
+time and submitted to him Palmerston's rebuff. The strongest
+expression that fell from Disraeli was--"if it is found that the
+Emperor and Russell are at issue on the question the session of
+Parliament would not be as quiet as had been anticipated." This was
+scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all important. Yet "on
+the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in conclusion<a name=
+"FNanchor621"></a><a href="#Footnote_621">[621]</a>. Within a
+fortnight following arrived the news of the capture of New Orleans,
+an event upon which Seward had postulated the relief of a European
+scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a serious blow. May
+13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him, personally, that
+"he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the moment but to
+watch events<a name="FNanchor622"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_622">[622]</a>." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the
+effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer,
+"that it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the
+control of the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would
+not in any way modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on
+the war even to an extermination<a name="FNanchor623"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_623">[623]</a>." Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all
+from his section, never fully realizing the importance of the
+Confederate South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about
+Richmond, was telling the "nervous amongst our friends" that New
+Orleans would "form a barren acquisition to the enemy, and will on
+our side serve only as a stimulant<a name=
+"FNanchor624"></a><a href="#Footnote_624">[624]</a>."</p>
+<p>If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting
+repeated doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In
+England, Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory
+opposition, but thought it wiser to postpone for a time further
+pressure in that direction. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_297"></a>[V1:pg 297]</span> May 8, Henry Adams could write to
+his brother of British public opinion, "there is no doubt that the
+idea here is as strong as ever that we must ultimately fail<a name=
+"FNanchor625"></a><a href="#Footnote_625">[625]</a>," but on May
+16, that "the effect of the news here [of New Orleans] has been
+greater than anything yet ... the <i>Times</i> came out and gave
+fairly in that it had been mistaken; it had believed Southern
+accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it has an article
+still more remarkable and intimates for the first time that it sees
+little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a preparation
+for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and acknowledging
+again the authority of the Federal Government over all the national
+territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will
+bring us up to this, I am confident<a name=
+"FNanchor626"></a><a href="#Footnote_626">[626]</a>."</p>
+<p>This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep
+pace with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British
+Ministry was simply made more determined to preserve strict
+neutrality and to restrain its French partner in a "wait for
+events" policy. The "one more victory" so eagerly desired by Henry
+Adams was not forthcoming, and the attention, now all focused on
+McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited in vain for the
+demonstration of another and more striking evidence of Northern
+power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond.
+McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at
+Washington that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This
+was treated at some length in the semi-official <i>National
+Intelligencer</i> of May 16 in an article which Lyons thought
+inspired by Seward, stating that mediation would be welcome if
+offered for the purpose of re-union, but would otherwise be
+resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly represented the
+situation<a name="FNanchor627"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_627">[627]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298"></a>[V1:pg 298]</span>
+<p>There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was
+largely the result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of
+ultimate Southern success and his somewhat free private
+communications. He may, indeed, have been talking more freely than
+usual exactly because of anxiety at Northern success, for
+McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily, if slowly,
+progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent instruction
+from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yet he
+thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan on
+Lyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of the
+situation were as follows:</p>
+<blockquote>"M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of
+possibility that the South may be victorious both in the battle in
+Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite
+confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not give
+in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his Government to
+endeavour to put an end to the war by intervening on the first
+opportunity. He is, however, very much puzzled to devise any mode
+of intervention, which would have the effect of reviving French
+trade and obtaining cotton. I should suppose he would think it
+desirable to go to great lengths to stop the war; because he
+believes that the South will not give in until the whole country is
+made desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim
+immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of cotton
+for an indefinite time.<br>
+<br>
+I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears
+to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good
+deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not
+see my way to doing any good.<br>
+<br>
+If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a month or
+six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will be at
+Richmond, having very probably got there without much real
+fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if so
+far....<br>
+<br>
+The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the summer.
+It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as Trade and
+Cotton are concerned, we may be next <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_299"></a>[V1:pg 299]</span> Autumn, just in the situation we
+are now. If the South really defeated either or both the Armies
+opposed to them I think it would disgust the North with the war,
+rather than excite them to fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much
+from disease, recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the
+Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it would not
+stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible, under
+such circumstances that a Peace Party might arise; and perhaps just
+<i>possible</i> that England and France might give weight to such a
+Party<a name="FNanchor628"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_628">[628]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation
+unless a strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and
+even then regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just
+<i>possible</i>." Nor was Russell inclined to depart from
+established policy. He wrote to Lyons at nearly the same time:</p>
+<blockquote>"The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth
+seems to portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see
+therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population entertain
+those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which were so freely
+expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate Statesmen at Richmond. I
+know not how to answer this question. But there are other questions
+not less important to be solved in the North. Will the
+Abolitionists succeed in proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all
+those who have resisted? I guess not.<br>
+<br>
+But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and its
+old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair solution
+except separation--but that the North will not hear of--nor in the
+moment of success would it be of any use to give them unpalatable
+advice<a name="FNanchor629"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_629">[629]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully
+informed of Mercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France
+had no intention to depart from her attitude of strict neutrality
+and that it was more than ever necessary to wait events<a name=
+"FNanchor630"></a><a href="#Footnote_630">[630]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300"></a>[V1:pg 300]</span>
+<p>Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation
+were then wholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as
+yet taken up this plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern
+successes were continued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction
+from his former high hopes, summed up the situation in a few words:
+"This Government passive and ignorant, France alert and mysterious.
+The Emperor alone knows what is to come out of it, and he keeps his
+own secret<a name="FNanchor631"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_631">[631]</a>." The Southern play, following the
+ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quiet and extended
+even to discouraging public demonstrations against governmental
+inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration by cotton
+operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matter
+of judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory
+as I think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with
+success and power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would
+have resulted<a name="FNanchor632"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_632">[632]</a>." The wrong time for Southern pressure on
+Russell was conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North.
+Immediately following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive
+instructions to Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the
+withdrawal of the declaration admitting Southern belligerent
+rights. Thouvenel replied with some asperity on the folly of
+Seward's demand, and made a strong representation of the necessity
+of France to obtain cotton and tobacco<a name=
+"FNanchor633"></a><a href="#Footnote_633">[633]</a>. Adams, with
+evident reluctance, writing, "I had little expectation of success,
+but I felt it my duty at once to execute the orders," advanced with
+Russell the now threadbare and customary arguments on the
+Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual refusal to alter
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301"></a>[V1:pg 301]</span>
+British policy<a name="FNanchor634"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_634">[634]</a>. If Seward was sincere in asking for a
+retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook
+European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories
+to return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable
+in causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well
+chosen. Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously
+Seward's renewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there
+was no immediate reason to require his presence in America, ill and
+fearing the heat of summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to
+take leave of absence for a trip home. On June 6 he received this
+permission, evidence that Russell also saw no cause for anxiety,
+and on June 13 he took leave of Lincoln.</p>
+<blockquote>"I had quite an affectionate parting with the President
+this morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more
+or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on political
+matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in England think a
+great deal more of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em I mean 'em no
+harm<a name="FNanchor635"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_635">[635]</a>.'"</blockquote>
+<p>Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of
+news on any striking military event in America. New Orleans was an
+old story, and while in general it was believed that Richmond must
+fall before McClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid
+declarations that they would never submit gave renewed courage to
+their British friends. Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might
+be wise, after all, to make some effort in Parliament, and since
+the Washington mediation rumours were becoming current in London
+also, notice was given of a motion demanding of the Government
+that, associating itself with France, an offer of mediation be made
+to the contending <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page_302"></a>[V1:pg 302]</span> parties in America. Motions on
+recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had failed. Now
+the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a terrible
+war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure. Spence
+advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined to
+make the effort<a name="FNanchor636"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_636">[636]</a>. Probably he was still smarting under his
+reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp
+personal clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be
+without influence on governmental attitude--perhaps might even
+indicate a governmental purpose to alter its policy.</p>
+<p>This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston
+to Adams on the publication in the <i>Times</i> of General Butler's
+famous order in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat
+as "women of the town" those women who publicly insulted Northern
+troops. The British press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing
+about this order similar to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the
+Stone Fleet episode. Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies
+received need no further notice here, since they did not in fact
+affect British policy, than to explain that Palmerston wrote in
+extreme anger, apparently, and with great violence of language, and
+that Adams replied with equal anger, but in very dignified if
+irritating terms<a name="FNanchor637"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_637">[637]</a>. In British opinion Butler's order was an
+incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans
+understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for
+insult. In fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on
+Northern soldiers, whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased.
+Palmerston was quick to accept the British view, writing to Adams,
+"it is difficult if not impossible to express adequately the
+disgust which must be excited in the mind of every honourable man
+by the general order of General Butler...." <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_303"></a>[V1:pg 303]</span> "If the Federal
+government chooses to be served by men capable of such revolting
+outrages, they must submit to abide by the deserved opinion which
+mankind will form of their conduct<a name=
+"FNanchor638"></a><a href="#Footnote_638">[638]</a>." This
+extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry
+and perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an
+intention to change British policy and that Palmerston was but
+laying the ground for some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament,
+after his wont when striking out on a new line. He was further
+confirmed in this view by an editorial in the <i>Times</i> on June
+12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news from France that
+Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a step. But
+however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a diplomat.
+His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston enquiring
+whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him
+"officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment
+between gentlemen<a name="FNanchor639"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_639">[639]</a>."</p>
+<p>There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were
+contemplating a change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does
+appear that Palmerston wished to be able to state in Parliament
+that he had taken Adams to task for Butler's order, so that he
+might meet an enquiry already placed on the question paper as to
+the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This question was due for
+the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell wrote to Palmerston
+that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that Palmerston
+might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not see
+why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of
+war do not sanction such conduct<a name="FNanchor640"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_640">[640]</a>." This was very different from the tone
+used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way."
+Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304"></a>[V1:pg 304]</span>
+<blockquote>"Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the
+letter you have written him about Butler.<br>
+<br>
+I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do nothing more
+till I had seen or written to you.<br>
+<br>
+What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your
+interpretation of the order.<br>
+<br>
+But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, and I
+think if you could add something to the effect that you respect the
+Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish to impute to them
+the fault of Butler it might soothe him.<br>
+<br>
+If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the best.
+But this you may not like to do<a name="FNanchor641"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_641">[641]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move
+against Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as
+to the last, he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving
+Butler's order, was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter,
+Adams, the suspicion proving unfounded that an immediate change of
+policy was intended, returned to the attack as a matter of personal
+prestige. It was not until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams
+and then in far different language seeking to smooth the Minister's
+ruffled feathers, yet making no apology and not answering Adams'
+question. Adams promptly responded with vigour, June 16, again
+asking his question as to the letter being official or personal,
+and characterizing Palmerston's previous assertions as "offensive
+imputations." He also again approached Russell, who stated that he
+too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but had received no
+reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding was
+"altogether irregular<a name="FNanchor642"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_642">[642]</a>." In the end Palmerston was brought, June
+19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect
+still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305"></a>[V1:pg 305]</span> the
+"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official
+organ for communications...." In conclusion he expressed
+gratification that reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's
+authority at New Orleans had been curtailed by Lincoln. The next
+day Adams answered interpreting Palmerston as withdrawing his
+"imputations" but stating plainly that he would not again submit
+"to entertain any similar correspondence<a name=
+"FNanchor643"></a><a href="#Footnote_643">[643]</a>."</p>
+<p>Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew
+there was to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's
+whole move may even have been intended to ease the pressure for a
+change in that policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with
+Russell, friends of the South thought the <i>Times</i> editorial
+indicated "that some movement is to be made at last, and I doubt
+not we are to thank the Emperor for it<a name=
+"FNanchor644"></a><a href="#Footnote_644">[644]</a>." But on this
+day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state in Parliament
+that "We have not received at present any proposal from France to
+offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it on
+our part<a name="FNanchor645"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_645">[645]</a>." This was the exact language used by
+Palmerston in reply to Hopwood<a name="FNanchor646"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_646">[646]</a>. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but
+was assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would
+"still hold his motion under consideration<a name=
+"FNanchor647"></a><a href="#Footnote_647">[647]</a>." Lindsay,
+according to his own account, had talked very large in a letter to
+Russell, but knew privately, and so informed Mason, that the
+Commons would not vote for his motion if opposed by the Government,
+and so intended to postpone it<a name="FNanchor648"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_648">[648]</a>. The proposed motion <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page_306"></a>[V1:pg 306]</span> was now one for
+recognition instead of mediation, a temporary change of plan due to
+Palmerston's answer to Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms
+of the motion favourable to the South, it was evident the
+Government did not wish discussion at the moment, and hesitancy
+came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in despair, declared that
+for his part he intended, no matter with what prospect of success,
+to <i>demand</i> recognition from France<a name=
+"FNanchor649"></a><a href="#Footnote_649">[649]</a>. This alarmed
+Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging
+against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused
+there would be no recourse but to depart for home<a name=
+"FNanchor650"></a><a href="#Footnote_650">[650]</a>. He thought
+Lindsay's motion dying away for on consultation with "different
+parties, including Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it
+"has been so far reduced and diluted ... as to make it only
+expressive of the opinion of the House that the present posture of
+affairs in America made the question of the recognition of the
+Confederate States worth the serious consideration of the
+Government. It was so modified to prevent the Ministry making an
+issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it would be
+sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307"></a>[V1:pg 307]</span> to
+postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from
+this quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King
+Cotton' to turn the screw still further<a name=
+"FNanchor651"></a><a href="#Footnote_651">[651]</a>." On June, 20
+Lindsay gave this notice of postponement, and no parliamentary
+comment was made<a name="FNanchor652"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_652">[652]</a>. It was a moment of extreme depression
+for the Confederate agents in Europe. Slidell, yielding to Mason's
+pleas, gave up his idea of demanding recognition and wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"The position of our representatives in Europe is
+painful and almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could
+be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way
+advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that we
+would have done better to withdraw after our first interview with
+Russell and Thouvenel<a name="FNanchor653"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_653">[653]</a>."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_580"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor580">[580]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 41.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_581"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor581">[581]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155.
+March 3, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_582"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor582">[582]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley
+to Russell, March 18, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_583"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor583">[583]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 54. Adams to Seward, March 27,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_584"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor584">[584]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 65.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_585"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor585">[585]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private.
+April 8, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_586"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor586">[586]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_587"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor587">[587]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 123.
+To his son, April 4, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_588"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor588">[588]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston,
+March 31, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_589"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor589">[589]</a> Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_590"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor590">[590]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract.
+Lyons to Russell, April 11, 1802.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_591"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor591">[591]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 143.
+Adams to his son, May 16, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_592"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor592">[592]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>,
+II, p. 247.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_593"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor593">[593]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>, 1862, pp.
+120-122. Mercicr to Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of
+this despatch was printed, with some minor inaccuracies, in the New
+York <i>Tribune</i>, Feb. 5, 1863, and of Mercier's report, April
+28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb. 9, under the caption "The
+Yellow Book." It is interesting that the concluding paragraphs of
+this report of April 28, as printed in the <i>Tribune</i>, are not
+given in the printed volume of <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>,
+1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to certain
+pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences
+with French vessels. How the <i>Tribune</i> secured these
+paragraphs, if authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the
+publication was an attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in
+an effort to cause his removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft,
+<i>Seward</i>, II, 371-2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_594"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor594">[594]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>. II, 298-99.
+Bancroft's account is based on the <i>Tribune</i> translation and
+on Seward's own comments to Weed and Bigelow. <i>Ibid.</i>,
+371-72.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_595"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor595">[595]</a> Newton. <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I, pp. 82-85,
+gives an account of the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints
+Lyons' private letter to Russell of April 25, describing the
+results, but does not bring out sufficiently Lyons' objections and
+misgivings. Newton thinks that Mercier "whether instructed from
+home or not ... after the manner of French diplomatists of the
+period ... was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying
+to effect a striking <i>coup</i>...."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_596"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor596">[596]</a> Stoeckl's report does not agree with
+Mercier's statement. He wrote that he had been asked to accompany
+Mercier but had refused and reported a conversation with Seward in
+which the latter declared the time had not yet come for mediation,
+that in any case France would not be accepted in that r&ocirc;le,
+and that if ever mediation should become acceptable, Russia would
+be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., April 23-May 5,
+1862. No. 927).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_597"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor597">[597]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250.
+Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 14, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_598"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor598">[598]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_599"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor599">[599]</a> This suspicion was a natural one but that
+it was unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of
+Mercier's visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the
+same terms that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance
+was attached by Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by
+the fact that he did not write to Slidell about it until July.
+Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin to Slidell, July 19,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_600"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor600">[600]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284.
+Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 24, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_601"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor601">[601]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>, pp.
+122-124.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_602"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor602">[602]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284.
+Confidential. Lyons to Russell, April 28, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_603"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor603">[603]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315.
+Confidential. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_604"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor604">[604]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_605"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor605">[605]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley
+to Russell, April 28, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_606"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor606">[606]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To
+Russell. Mercier's conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy"
+and "tardy confidence" to Lyons. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 566. May 1,
+1862. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_607"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor607">[607]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 574. Cowley to Russell,
+May 2, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_608"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor608">[608]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>,
+II, p. 299.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_609"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor609">[609]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14
+and 16, 1862. Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_610"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor610">[610]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, May 16,
+1862. Billault was a member of the French Ministry, but without
+portfolio.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_611"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor611">[611]</a> Several accounts have been given of this
+episode. The two known to me treating it at greatest length are (1)
+Callahan, <i>Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy</i> and
+(2) Sears, <i>A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon
+III</i>. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both writers drew their
+information wholly from Confederate documents, using, especially,
+the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither treats
+the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my
+account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other
+materials only where they offer a side light. The principal new
+sources are Cowley's private and official letters to
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_612"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor612">[612]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.
+Private. April 13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_613"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor613">[613]</a> Mason Papers. April 12, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_614"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor614">[614]</a> Richardson, II, 239. April 14,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_615"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor615">[615]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.
+Private.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_616"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor616">[616]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1437. No. 497.
+<i>Confidential</i>. Cowley to Russell April 15, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_617"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor617">[617]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_618"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor618">[618]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell
+to Cowley, April 16, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_619"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor619">[619]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 415. Russell to Cowley,
+April 16, 1862. Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with
+a mission must remain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have
+prevaricated--or at least so officially reported. He had<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Le 20 Avril, 1862.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+Mon cher Lord Cowley:<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'esp&egrave;re comme vous
+que<br>
+bient&ocirc;t nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de
+tout<br>
+&eacute;t&eacute; choqu&eacute; de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas
+re&ccedil;u Mr. Lindsay.<br>
+Celui-ci m'avait demand&eacute; l'autorisation de rapporter au<br>
+principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais<br>
+consenti et voil&agrave; tout.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+Croyez &agrave; mes sentiments d'amiti&eacute;.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+Napoleon."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_620"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor620">[620]</a> Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin,
+April 18, 1862. New Orleans was captured on April 25.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_621"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor621">[621]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_622"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor622">[622]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_623"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor623">[623]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_624"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor624">[624]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, May 14,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_625"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor625">[625]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I,
+139.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_626"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor626">[626]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 146.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_627"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor627">[627]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to
+Russell, May 16, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_628"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor628">[628]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private.
+May 16, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_629"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor629">[629]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private.
+May 17, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_630"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor630">[630]</a> <i>Documents Diplomatiques</i>, 1862, p.
+124. May 15.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_631"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor631">[631]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_632"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor632">[632]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_633"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor633">[633]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley
+to Russell, May 23, 1862, and <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>,
+p. 127. Thouvenel to Mercier, May 21, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_634"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor634">[634]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862</i>,
+pp. 97-99. Adams to Seward, May 22, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_635"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor635">[635]</a> Newton, <i>Lord Lyons</i>, I,
+88.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_636"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor636">[636]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_637"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor637">[637]</a> All the letters are given in Adams,
+<i>C.F. Adams</i>, Ch. XIII.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_638"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor638">[638]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 248-9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_639"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor639">[639]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 251.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_640"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor640">[640]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_641"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor641">[641]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_642"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor642">[642]</a> Adams, <i>C.F. Adams</i>, pp.
+253-55.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_643"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor643">[643]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 256-60.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_644"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor644">[644]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_645"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor645">[645]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_646"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor646">[646]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 543. June
+13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_647"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor647">[647]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_648"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor648">[648]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, June 18,
+1862. Lindsay wrote:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of
+my<br>
+motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced<br>
+the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have<br>
+told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to<br>
+him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the<br>
+House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even<br>
+if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a<br>
+majority of votes might have been obtained in its<br>
+favour--that a majority of votes <i>would</i> be obtained
+within<br>
+the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope<br>
+that the Government would move (as the country, and France,<br>
+are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the<br>
+necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which<br>
+belonged to the Executive.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+"I further told his Lordship that recognition was a
+<i>right</i><br>
+which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the<br>
+fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the<br>
+majority of the leading men in the Northern States would<br>
+thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself<br>
+might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse<br>
+for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged<br>
+his people. I further said, that if the question is settled<br>
+<i>without</i> our recognition of the South, he might <i>rest<br>
+certain</i> that the Northern Armies <i>would</i> be marched
+into<br>
+Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and<br>
+thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for <i>sub<br>
+rosa</i>, I saw that the House was not <i>yet</i> prepared to
+vote,<br>
+and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in<br>
+idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_649"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor649">[649]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, June 17,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_650"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor650">[650]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, June 19,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_651"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor651">[651]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_652"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor652">[652]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p.
+810.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_653"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor653">[653]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<a name="image08.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image08.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image08.jpg" width="45%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH</b><br>
+(<i>From a photograph by Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_v"></a>[V2:pg v]</span>
+<a name="VOLUME_II"></a>
+<h2>CONTENTS<br>
+OF<br>
+VOLUME TWO</h2>
+<center>
+<table summary="">
+<tr>
+<td align="center">CHAPTER</td>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td align="right">PAGE</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">X.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_X">KING COTTON</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">XI.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">33</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">XII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">75</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">XIII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">THE LAIRD RAMS</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">116</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">XIV.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">ROEBUCK'S MOTION</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">152</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">XV.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE
+ASSOCIATION</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">186</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">XVI.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVI">219</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">XVII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">THE END OF THE WAR</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVII">247</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">XVIII.</a></td>
+<td><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH
+ATTITUDE</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#CHAPTER_XVIII">274</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#INDEX">307</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</center>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_vii"></a>[V2:pg vii]</span>
+<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+<h3>PART TWO</h3>
+<center>
+<table summary="">
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image08.jpg">PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href=
+"#image08.jpg"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From a photograph by Elliott
+&amp; Fry, Ltd</i>.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image09.jpg">JOHN SLIDELL</a></td>
+<td align="right"><i>facing p. <a href=
+"#image09.jpg">24</a></i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Nicolay and Hay's "Life
+of Abraham Lincoln," by permission of the Century Co., New
+York.</i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image10.jpg">"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD"</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image10.jpg">102</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>Reproduced by permission of
+the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image11.jpg">WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image11.jpg">134</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Reid's "Life of Forster"
+(Chapman &amp; Hall, Ltd.</i>)</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image12.jpg">"THE AMERICAN
+GLADIATORS--HABET!"</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image12.jpg">248</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>Reproduced by permission of
+the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image13.jpg">"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH
+COLUMBIA"</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image13.jpg">262</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>Reproduced by permission of
+the Proprietors of "Punch</i>"</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="#image14.jpg">JOHN BRIGHT</a></td>
+<td align="right"><a href="#image14.jpg">294</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <i>From Trevelyan's "Life of
+John Bright" (Constable &amp; Co., Ltd</i>.)</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</center>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_1"></a>[V2:pg 1]</span>
+<h1>GREAT BRITAIN<br>
+AND THE<br>
+AMERICAN CIVIL WAR</h1>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X</h2>
+<h3>KING COTTON</h3>
+<br>
+<p>For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in
+England. But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his
+advance on Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of
+Virginia, and the much heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized
+to have been a disastrous failure. Earlier Northern victories were
+forgotten and the campaigns in the West, still progressing
+favourably for the North, were ignored or their significance not
+understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in America approached a
+stalemate. The time had come with the near adjournment of
+Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must be made,
+and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was
+hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily
+increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to
+the Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary
+and private efforts by the friends of the South it is here
+necessary to review the cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a
+matter of anxious concern to both friend and foe of the North and
+in less degree to the Ministry itself.</p>
+<p>"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no
+great revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such
+convenient and soothing theories as those <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_2"></a>[V2:pg 2]</span> that were
+expounded and believed at the time of the organization of the
+Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities could not last long, for
+France and Great Britain must have what the Confederacy alone could
+supply, and therefore they could be forced to aid the South, as a
+condition precedent to relief from the terrible distress that was
+sure to follow a blockade<a name="FNanchor654"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_654">[654]</a>." This confidence was no new development.
+For ten years past whenever Southern threats of secession had been
+indulged in, the writers and politicians of that section had
+expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing industry of
+America and as the one product which would compel European
+acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860,
+or of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression
+that swept the Northern States in 1857 <i>De Bow's Review</i>, the
+leading financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of
+the South is permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and
+fictitious. Events now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug
+after humbug explodes<a name="FNanchor655"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_655">[655]</a>." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of
+South Carolina, asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton
+was furnished for three years? I will not stop to depict what
+everyone can imagine, but this is certain: England would topple
+headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her save the
+South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares
+make war upon it. Cotton <i>is</i> King<a name=
+"FNanchor656"></a><a href="#Footnote_656">[656]</a>." Two years
+later, writing before the elections of 1860 in which the main
+question was that of the territorial expansion of slavery, this
+same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing that "the
+slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world....
+Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and we
+have sense enough to know <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_3"></a>[V2:pg 3]</span> it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to
+carry it out successfully<a name="FNanchor657"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_657">[657]</a>."</p>
+<p>These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be
+amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.</p>
+<p>Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went
+hand in hand with the conviction that the South, more than any
+other quarter of the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In
+the three million bags of cotton," said a writer in <i>De Bow's
+Review</i>, "the slave-labour annually throws upon the world for
+the poor and naked, we are doing more to advance civilization ...
+than all the canting philanthropists of New England and Old England
+will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of the Northern
+commercial as it is of the British manufacturing system<a name=
+"FNanchor658"></a><a href="#Footnote_658">[658]</a>...." Nor was
+this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the Civil War was under
+way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:</p>
+<blockquote>"Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the
+cotton crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care
+about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and slave-owners, and
+our continual self-laudation on that subject, we are just as
+anxious for, and as much interested in, the prosperity of the
+slavery interest in the Southern States as the Carolinan and
+Georgian planters themselves, and all Lancashire would deplore a
+successful insurrection of the slaves, if such a thing were
+possible<a name="FNanchor659"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_659">[659]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_4"></a>[V2:pg 4]</span>
+secession. Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston,
+Bunch, reported a conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the
+Southern cause and now a consistent advocate of secession, in which
+Rhett developed a plan of close commercial alliance with England as
+the most favoured nation, postulating the dependence of Great
+Britain on the South for cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I
+would remark," wrote Bunch, "all their calculations are
+based<a name="FNanchor660"></a><a href="#Footnote_660">[660]</a>."
+Such was, indeed, Southern calculation. In January, 1861, <i>De
+Bow's Review</i> contained an article declaring that "the first
+demonstration of blockade of the Southern ports would be swept away
+by the English fleets of observation hovering on the Southern
+coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the free flow
+of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of the raw
+material ... would produce the most disastrous political
+results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of
+English statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and
+at cotton associations' debates, and it discloses the truth<a name=
+"FNanchor661"></a><a href="#Footnote_661">[661]</a>."</p>
+<p>The historical student will find but few such British utterances
+at the moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in
+politics or in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession
+and prophesied results accordingly. So strong was this obsession
+that governmental foreign policy neglected all other considerations
+and the first Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save
+to demand recognition<a name="FNanchor662"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_662">[662]</a>. The failure of that Commission,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_5"></a>[V2:pg 5]</span> the
+prompt British acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to
+Southern confidence but did not for a long time destroy the faith
+in the power of cotton. In June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was
+still a firm belief that "Great Britain will make any sacrifice,
+even of principle or of honour, to prevent the stoppage of the
+supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of an article in the
+<i>Charleston Mercury</i> of June 4, proclaiming: "The cards are in
+our hands, and we intend to play them out to <i>the bankruptcy of
+every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the
+acknowledgment of our independence</i><a name=
+"FNanchor663"></a><a href="#Footnote_663">[663]</a>." As late as
+March, 1862, Bunch was still writing of this Southern faith in
+cotton and described the newly-made appointment of Benjamin as
+Secretary of State as partly due to the fact that he was the leader
+of the "King Cotton" theory of diplomacy<a name=
+"FNanchor664"></a><a href="#Footnote_664">[664]</a>. It was not
+until the war was well nigh over that British persistence in
+neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the lack of
+cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading Richmond
+newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of Jefferson
+Davis, summed up in <i>The Lost Cause</i> his earlier criticisms of
+Confederate foreign policy:</p>
+<blockquote>"'Cotton,' said the Charleston <i>Mercury</i>, 'would
+bring England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that
+England and France would instinctively or readily fling themselves
+into a convulsion, which their great politicians <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_6"></a>[V2:pg 6]</span> saw was the most
+tremendous one of modern times. But the puerile argument, which
+even President Davis did not hesitate to adopt, about the power of
+'King Cotton,' amounted to this absurdity: that the great and
+illustrious power of England would submit to the ineffable
+humiliation of acknowledging its dependency on the infant
+Confederacy of the South, and the subserviency of its empire, its
+political interests and its pride, to a single article of trade
+that was grown in America<a name="FNanchor665"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_665">[665]</a>!"</blockquote>
+<p>But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in
+cotton extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth
+serious enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to
+Southern sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine"
+have frequently been treated by historians at much length<a name=
+"FNanchor666"></a><a href="#Footnote_666">[666]</a> and need here
+but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the
+erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an
+examination of the extent to which the question of cotton supply
+affected or determined British governmental policy toward
+America.</p>
+<p>English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of
+importance equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on
+varying statistics diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree
+in emphasizing the pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining
+the general prosperity of the nation. Surveying the English, not
+the whole British, situation it is estimated that there were 2,650
+factories of which 2,195 were in Lancashire and two adjacent
+counties. These employed 500,000 operatives and consumed a thousand
+million pounds of cotton each year<a name=
+"FNanchor667"></a><a href="#Footnote_667">[667]</a>. An editorial
+in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_7"></a>[V2:pg 7]</span>
+<i>Times</i>, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of the
+entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly
+or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts<a name=
+"FNanchor668"></a><a href="#Footnote_668">[668]</a>, and therefore
+also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South,
+since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton
+supplied from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent.
+of the total English importation<a name="FNanchor669"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_669">[669]</a>.</p>
+<p>The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly
+4,000,000 bales, and the foreign shipments, without question
+hurried because of the storm-cloud rising at home, had been
+practically completed by April, 1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent
+abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received the larger portion<a name=
+"FNanchor670"></a><a href="#Footnote_670">[670]</a>. There was,
+then, no immediate shortage of supply when war came in America,
+rather an unusual accumulation of raw stocks, even permitting some
+reshipment to the Northern manufacturing centres of America where
+the scarcity then brought high prices. In addition, from December,
+1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been somewhat of a slump
+in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers due to an
+over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had been
+a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial
+crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous
+demand from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running
+again on full time, while many new mills were brought into
+operation. But by May, 1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy
+demands and the rest of the year saw uncertainty of operations and
+brought expressions of fear that the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_8"></a>[V2:pg 8]</span> "plunge" to produce had been
+overdone. Manufactured stocks began to accumulate, and money was
+not easy since 1860 brought also a combination of events--deficient
+grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from England to France
+for investment in French public works, demand of America for gold
+in place of goods, due to political uncertainties there--which
+rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per cent. in
+January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861, the
+Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a
+dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased
+exports of goods<a name="FNanchor671"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_671">[671]</a>. The news of war actually begun in
+America came as a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and
+in the prospect of decreased supply prices rose, saving many
+manufacturers from impending difficulties. A few mills had already
+begun to work on part-time because of trade depression. The
+<i>immediate</i> effect of Lincoln's blockade proclamation was to
+check this movement, but by October it had again begun and this
+time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw cotton as
+compared with the slower advance of the price of goods<a name=
+"FNanchor672"></a><a href="#Footnote_672">[672]</a>.</p>
+<p>In substance the principal effect of the War on the English
+cotton trade for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in
+the manufacturing districts but in the Liverpool speculative and
+importing markets of raw cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a
+shilling a pound in October, 1861. On November 23 there was a near
+panic caused by rumours of British intervention. These were
+denounced as false and in five days the price was back above its
+previous <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_9"></a>[V2:pg
+9]</span> figure. Then on November 27 came the news of the
+<i>Trent</i> and the market was thrown into confusion, not because
+of hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war
+with America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators
+breathed freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative
+British interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and
+could not affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was,
+presumably, a more serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or
+even impossible to obtain, a serious situation would demand
+consideration.</p>
+<p>In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at
+first no great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with
+December, 1861, there was almost complete stoppage of supply from
+America. In the six months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500
+bales were received, less than one per cent. of the amount for the
+same six months of the previous year<a name=
+"FNanchor673"></a><a href="#Footnote_673">[673]</a>. The blockade
+was making itself felt and not merely in shipments from the South
+but in prospects of Southern production, for the news came that the
+negroes were being withdrawn by their masters from the rich sea
+islands along the coast in fear of their capture by the Northern
+blockading squadrons<a name="FNanchor674"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_674">[674]</a>. Such a situation seemed bound in the end
+to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental action
+to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained by
+Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as
+follows:</p>
+<blockquote>"The immediate result of the American war was, at this
+time, to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in
+the raw material and the producers and dealers in manufactures,
+from a serious and impending difficulty. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_10"></a>[V2:pg 10]</span> They had in hand
+a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption of two-thirds of a
+year, therefore a rise in the price of the raw material and the
+partial closing of their establishments, with a curtailment of
+their working expenses, was obviously to their advantage. But to
+make their success complete, this rise in the price of cotton was
+upon the largest stock ever collected in the country at this
+season. To the cotton trade there came in these days an unlooked
+for accession of wealth, such as even it had never known before. In
+place of the hard times which had been anticipated, and perhaps
+deserved, there came a shower of riches<a name=
+"FNanchor675"></a><a href="#Footnote_675">[675]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar
+analysis, no doubt on the explanations offered by his English
+friends, of "the question of cotton supply, which we had supposed
+would speedily have disturbed the level of their neutral policy"
+was made by Mason in March, 1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that
+even in Lancashire and other manufacturing districts no open
+demonstration has been made against the blockade<a name=
+"FNanchor676"></a><a href="#Footnote_676">[676]</a>." Manufactures
+other than cotton were greatly prospering, in particular those of
+woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the cotton lords were
+not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited by it--was
+bruited even during the war. <i>Blackwood's Magazine</i>, October,
+1864, held this view, while the <i>Morning Post</i> of May 16,
+1864, went to the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861,
+relieved just in the nick of time by the War, preventing a
+financial crash, "which must sooner or later have caused great
+suffering in Lancashire."</p>
+<p>Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the
+<i>immediate</i> effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton
+industry from great disaster and that there <i>immediately</i>
+resulted large profits to the manufacturers from the increased
+price of stocks on hand. In fact his description of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_11"></a>[V2:pg 11]</span>
+situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages show, was not
+applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are concerned, until
+the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For though prices
+might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any large
+quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no
+transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies<a name=
+"FNanchor677"></a><a href="#Footnote_677">[677]</a>. Foreign
+purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just been
+abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen
+to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English
+producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking
+an effective market. The importance of this in British foreign
+policy is that at no time, until the accumulated goods were
+disposed of, was there likely to be any trade eagerness for a
+British intervention in America. Their only fear, says Arnold, was
+the sudden opening of Southern ports and a rush of raw
+cotton<a name="FNanchor678"></a><a href="#Footnote_678">[678]</a>,
+a sneer called out by the alleged great losses incurred and
+patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in Parliament the members
+from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with the Government
+policy of neutrality for in the various debates on blockade,
+mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire,
+Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or
+referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to
+any other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the
+war<a name="FNanchor679"></a><a href="#Footnote_679">[679]</a>.</p>
+<p>But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire.
+Whatever the causes of short-time operation in the mills or of
+total cessation of work the situation was such that <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_12"></a>[V2:pg 12]</span> from October,
+1861, more and more operatives were thrown out of employment. As
+their little savings disappeared they were put upon public poor
+relief or upon private charity for subsistence. The governmental
+statistics do not cover, accurately, the relief offered by private
+charity, but those of public aid well indicate the loss of
+wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called "Distressed Districts"
+of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it appears that poor
+relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times, out of a total
+population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November, 1861, it
+was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593; thereafter
+mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of
+113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there
+was a slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief
+resumed an upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862,
+when it reached its highest point of 284,418. In this same first
+week of December private relief, now thoroughly organized in a
+great national effort, was extended to 236,000 people, making a
+grand total at high tide of distress of over 550,000 persons, if
+private relief was not extended to those receiving public funds.
+But of this differentiation there is no surety--indeed there are
+evidences of much duplication of effort in certain districts. In
+general, however, these statistics do exhibit the great lack of
+employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying unusual
+prosperity<a name="FNanchor680"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_680">[680]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_13"></a>[V2:pg 13]</span>
+<p>The manufacturing operative population of the district was
+estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest
+distress some 412,000 of these were receiving either public or
+private aid, though many were working part-time in the mills or
+were engaged on public enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis.
+But there was no starvation and it is absurd to compare the crisis
+to the Irish famine of the 'forties. This was a <i>cotton</i>
+famine in the shortage of that commodity, but it was not a
+<i>human</i> famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was passing
+through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by
+the contributions of the country<a name="FNanchor681"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_681">[681]</a>." Nevertheless a rapid change from a
+condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on
+charity--a change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either
+directly or indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might
+have been expected to arouse popular demonstrations to force
+governmental action directed to securing cotton that trade might
+revive. That no such popular effect was made demands careful
+analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but here the
+<i>fact</i> is alone important, and the fact was that the
+operatives sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the
+Cabinet. Thus at no time during the war was there any attempt from
+Lancashire, whether of manufacturers or operatives, to force a
+change of governmental policy<a name="FNanchor682"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_682">[682]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_14"></a>[V2:pg 14]</span>
+<p>As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public
+discussion and consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was
+little talk of governmental interference and such as did appear was
+promptly met with opposition by the leading trade journals. July
+13, 1861, the <i>Economist</i> viewed the cotton shortage as "a
+<i>temporary</i> and an <i>immediate</i> one.... We have--on our
+hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our supply for
+<i>one</i> year, and that the very <i>next</i> year." Would it
+<i>pay</i>, asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think
+myself it would be cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United
+States<a name="FNanchor683"></a><a href="#Footnote_683">[683]</a>."
+This was also the notion of the London <i>Shipping Gazette</i>
+which, while acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and
+France were about to be greatly embarrassed, continued: "<i>But we
+are not going to add to the difficulty by involving ourselves in a
+naval war with the Northern States</i><a name=
+"FNanchor684"></a><a href="#Footnote_684">[684]</a>...." The
+<i>Times</i> commented in substance in several issues in September,
+1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_15"></a>[V2:pg 15]</span> as a precaution
+against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the glutted
+state of distant markets for manufactured goods<a name=
+"FNanchor685"></a><a href="#Footnote_685">[685]</a>." October 12,
+the <i>Economist</i> acknowledged that the impatience of some
+mill-owners was quite understandable as was talk of a European
+compulsion on America to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel,
+but then entered upon an elaborate discussion of the principles
+involved and demonstrated why England ought not to intervene. In
+November Bright could write: "The notion of getting cotton by
+interfering with the blockade is abandoned apparently by the
+simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted now as a
+fixed policy that we are to take no part in your
+difficulties<a name="FNanchor686"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_686">[686]</a>." Throughout the fall of 1861 the
+<i>Economist</i> was doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging
+that due to the "glut" of manufactured goods short-time must have
+ensued anyway, pointing out that now an advanced price was
+possible, and arguing that here was a situation likely to result in
+the development of other sources of supply with an escape from the
+former dependence on America. In view of the actual conditions of
+the trade, already recounted, these were appealing arguments to the
+larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on short order
+supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less easily
+convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence and
+hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the
+new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and
+manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for
+any <i>immediate</i> change<a name="FNanchor687"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_687">[687]</a>."</p>
+<p>Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of
+the <i>Trent</i> reached England: that of January, 1862, just after
+that controversy had been amicably settled. The <i>Trent</i> had
+both diverted attention from cotton and in <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_16"></a>[V2:pg 16]</span> its immediate
+result created a general determination to preserve neutrality. It
+is evident that even without this threat of war there was no real
+cotton pressure upon the Government. With Northern successes in the
+spring of 1862 hopes were aroused that the war would soon end or
+that at least some cotton districts would be captured to the relief
+of England. Seward held out big promises based on the capture of
+New Orleans, and these for a time calmed governmental
+apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that the inability
+to secure the country back of the city, together with the Southern
+determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into the
+hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the
+Mississippi valley<a name="FNanchor688"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_688">[688]</a>. This was still not a matter of
+<i>immediate</i> concern, for the Government and the manufacturers
+both held the opinion that it was not lack of cotton alone that was
+responsible for the distress and the manufacturers were just
+beginning to unload their stocks<a name="FNanchor689"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_689">[689]</a>. But in considering and judging the
+attitude of the British public on this question of cotton it should
+always be remembered that the great mass of the people sincerely
+believed that America was responsible for the distress in
+Lancashire. The error in understanding was more important than the
+truth.</p>
+<p>In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards
+the causes of distress in England is the more important element.
+The "Cotton Lords" did not choose to reveal it. One must believe
+that they intentionally dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible
+cause. In the first important parliamentary debate on cotton, May
+9, 1862, not a word <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_17"></a>[V2:pg 17]</span> was said of any other element in
+the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word advocating a
+change in British neutral policy<a name="FNanchor690"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_690">[690]</a>. It is to be noted also that this debate
+occurred when for two months past, the numbers on poor relief in
+Lancashire were temporarily decreasing<a name=
+"FNanchor691"></a><a href="#Footnote_691">[691]</a>, and the
+general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was
+serious it was not beyond the power of the local communities to
+meet it. There was not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern
+and Russell expressed governmental conviction when he wrote to
+Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I believe, get thro' the cotton crisis
+as we can, and promote inland works and railroads in India<a name=
+"FNanchor692"></a><a href="#Footnote_692">[692]</a>." Moreover the
+Southern orders to destroy cotton rather than permit its capture
+and export by the North disagreeably affected British
+officials<a name="FNanchor693"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_693">[693]</a>. Up to the end of August, 1862, Russell,
+while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for cotton, did
+not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern policy nor
+in the sense that British distress demanded special official
+consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time
+came wholly from France<a name="FNanchor694"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_694">[694]</a>.</p>
+<p>It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in
+July of the Southern attack on the Government through
+Parliament<a name="FNanchor695"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_695">[695]</a>. June had seen the collapse of Lindsay's
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_18"></a>[V2:pg 18]</span>
+initial move, and Palmerston's answer to Hopwood, June 13, that
+there was no intention, at present, to offer mediation, appeared
+final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat, that produced a
+quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood had
+withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked
+whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the
+country, the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne,
+and the hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the
+Government intend to take any steps whatever, either as parties to
+intervention or otherwise, to endeavour to put an end to the Civil
+War in America?" This was differently worded, yet contained little
+variation from his former question of June 13, and this time
+Palmerston replied briefly that the Government certainly would like
+to mediate if it saw any hope of success but that at present "both
+parties would probably reject it. If a different situation should
+arise the Government would be glad to act<a name=
+"FNanchor696"></a><a href="#Footnote_696">[696]</a>." This
+admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July 11,
+introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of
+offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and
+insisted upon a debate.</p>
+<p>Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours
+of British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams
+was keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20
+presented to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote
+"under the President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours
+were highly injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid
+the South has been encouraged and sustained from the first day of
+secession. Having developed this complaint at some length Seward
+went on to a brief threat, containing the real meat of the
+despatch, that if foreign nations did venture to intervene or
+mediate in favour of the South, the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_19"></a>[V2:pg 19]</span> North would be forced to have
+recourse to a weapon hitherto not used, namely to aid in a rising
+of the slaves against their masters. This was clearly a threat of a
+"servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a war which would
+place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view of her
+anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams'
+discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from
+presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the
+American Minister anxious<a name="FNanchor697"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_697">[697]</a>. No answer was given by Russell for over
+a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy.
+Soon the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope
+of British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that
+Persigny in conversation had assured him "that this Government is
+now more anxious than ever to take prompt and decided action in our
+favour." Slidell asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but
+acknowledged that everything depended on Palmerston: "that august
+body seems to be as afraid of him as the urchins of a village
+school of the birch of their pedagogue<a name=
+"FNanchor698"></a><a href="#Footnote_698">[698]</a>."</p>
+<p>Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private
+instructions now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a
+visit to London. The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement
+anglais s'il ne croit pas le moment venu de reconna&icirc;tre le
+Sud<a name="FNanchor699"></a><a href="#Footnote_699">[699]</a>."
+Palmerston had already answered this question in Parliament and
+Thouvenel was personally very much opposed to the Emperor's
+suggestion. There were press rumours that he was in London
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_20"></a>[V2:pg 20]</span> to
+bring the matter to a head, but his report to Mercier was that
+interference in America was a very dangerous matter and that he
+would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he
+had suggested any change in neutral policy<a name=
+"FNanchor700"></a><a href="#Footnote_700">[700]</a>.</p>
+<p>In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of
+Foreign Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern
+hopes was the knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay
+chose his time well for on July 16 the first thorough report on
+Lancashire was laid before Parliament<a name=
+"FNanchor701"></a><a href="#Footnote_701">[701]</a>, revealing an
+extremity of distress not previously officially authenticated, and
+during this week the papers were full of an impending disaster to
+McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his vacation trip, was
+concerned for the future mainly because of cotton, but did not
+believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with
+America<a name="FNanchor702"></a><a href="#Footnote_702">[702]</a>.
+But the great Southern argument of the moment was the Northern
+military failure, the ability of the South to resist indefinitely
+and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18 all
+London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news
+from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of
+his entire army.</p>
+<p>Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams
+thought the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to
+carry the House of Commons off <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_21"></a>[V2:pg 21]</span> their feet in its debate
+to-night<a name="FNanchor703"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_703">[703]</a>." The debate itself may be regarded as a
+serious attempt to push the Ministry into a position more
+favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced surveyed the
+entire ground of the causes of secession and the inevitability of
+the final separation of North and South. They need but brief
+summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement
+because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no
+element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that
+England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring
+to a conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune
+since mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North,
+and he quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire,
+stating, "We think it high time to give the Southern States the
+recognition they so richly deserve."</p>
+<p>Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress.
+Gregory said: "We should remember what is impending over
+Lancashire--what want, what woe, what humiliation--and that not
+caused by the decree of God, but by the perversity of man. I leave
+the statistics of the pauperism that is, and that is to be, to my
+honourable friends, the representatives of manufacturing England."
+No statistics were forthcoming from this quarter for not a
+representative from Lancashire participated in the debate save
+Hopwood who at the very end upbraided his fellow members from the
+district for their silence and was interrupted by cries of "Divide,
+Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was met by opponents of mediation
+with the assertion that the operatives were well known to be united
+against <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_22"></a>[V2:pg
+22]</span> any action and that they could be sustained "in luxury"
+from the public purse for far less a cost than that of a war with
+America.</p>
+<p>But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate.
+Forster in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a
+consideration of the effect of mediation on <i>England</i>,
+advanced the idea that such a step would not end the war but would
+merely intensify it and so prolong English commercial distress. He
+did state, however, that intervention (as distinct from mediation)
+would bring on a "servile war" in America, thus giving evidence of
+his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of Seward's despatch
+of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were content to be
+silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay. This was
+good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by
+evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive
+result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real
+<i>attack</i> on the Government by his bitter criticisms of
+Russell's "three months" speech<a name="FNanchor704"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_704">[704]</a>.</p>
+<p>At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends,
+their immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to
+adjourn the debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed
+that everyone earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he
+declared that such debates were a great mistake unless something
+definite was to follow since they only served to create irritation
+in America, both North and South. He concluded with a vigorous
+assertion that if the Ministry were to administer the affairs of
+the nation it ought to be trusted in foreign affairs and
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_23"></a>[V2:pg 23]</span> not
+have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions of opinion at
+inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet securely
+established its independence and hence could not be recognized.
+This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and
+thus be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention
+in the future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government
+Palmerston did not insist upon a division and the motion was
+withdrawn<a name="FNanchor705"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_705">[705]</a>.</p>
+<p>On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in
+ignominious failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think
+we know here sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan]
+to be able to come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers
+should do." But the impression left by the debate that there was a
+strong parliamentary opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add:
+"I suppose Mercier will open full cry on the scent, and be all for
+mediation. I am still afraid of any attempt of the kind<a name=
+"FNanchor706"></a><a href="#Footnote_706">[706]</a>." Very much the
+same opinion was held by Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has
+again passed by for the moment and we breathe more freely. But I
+think I wrote to you some time ago that if July found us still in
+Virginia, we could no longer escape interference. I think now that
+it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North on slavery
+would bring "the greatest strength in this running battle<a name=
+"FNanchor707"></a><a href="#Footnote_707">[707]</a>."</p>
+<p>In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed"
+the "pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and
+Mason and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the
+Cabinet, reacting to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the
+Northern defeats, and the distress in Lancashire, was seriously
+considering the possibility of taking some step toward mediation.
+On July 16, two days before the debate in the Commons, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_24"></a>[V2:pg 24]</span> Slidell at last
+had his first personal contact with Napoleon, and came away from
+the interview with the conviction that "if England long persists in
+her inaction he [Napoleon] would be disposed to act without her."
+This was communicated to Mason on July 20<a name=
+"FNanchor708"></a><a href="#Footnote_708">[708]</a>, but Slidell
+did <i>not</i> as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in the
+interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate
+action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special
+commercial treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for
+Mexican affairs," this last without any authority from Benjamin,
+the Confederate Secretary of State. On July 23 Slidell made a
+similar offer to Thouvenel and left with him a full memorandum of
+the Southern proposal<a name="FNanchor709"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_709">[709]</a>. He was cautioned that it was undesirable
+his special offer to France should reach the ears of the British
+Government--a caution which he transmitted to Mason on July 30,
+when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but still without
+revealing the full extent of his own overtures to Napoleon.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image09.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image09.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image09.jpg" width="50%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>JOHN SLIDELL</b><br>
+(<i>From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham Lincoln": The Century
+Co. New York</i>)</p>
+<br>
+<p>In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_25"></a>[V2:pg 25]</span> pull
+off a special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man,
+and in line, also, with a persistent theory that the policy most
+likely to secure results was that of inducing France to act alone.
+But he was repeatedly running against advice that France must
+follow Great Britain, and the burden of his July 20 letter to Mason
+was an urging that a demand for recognition be now made
+simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel, not at all
+enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was at
+least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the
+demand should be made at once<a name="FNanchor710"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_710">[710]</a>. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay,
+Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for
+recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the
+debate of July 18<a name="FNanchor711"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_711">[711]</a>. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell
+referring to their interview of February, 1862, in which he had
+urged the claims of the Confederacy to recognition and again
+presented them, asserting that the subsequent failure of Northern
+campaigns had demonstrated the power of the South to maintain its
+independence. The South, he wrote, asked neither aid nor
+intervention; it merely desired recognition and continuation of
+British neutrality<a name="FNanchor712"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_712">[712]</a>. On the same day Mason also asked for an
+interview<a name="FNanchor713"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_713">[713]</a>, but received no reply until July 31,
+when Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until
+"after a Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem
+necessary<a name="FNanchor714"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_714">[714]</a>.</p>
+<p>This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in
+uncertainty. It is significant that Russell took this moment to
+reply at last to Seward's protestations of May 28<a name=
+"FNanchor715"></a><a href="#Footnote_715">[715]</a>, which had been
+presented to him by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at
+Washington that his delay had <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_26"></a>[V2:pg 26]</span> been due to a "waiting for
+military events," but that these had been indecisive. He gave a
+r&eacute;sum&eacute; of all the sins of the North as a belligerent
+and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins had not
+"induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an
+impartial neutrality<a name="FNanchor716"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_716">[716]</a>." Here was no promise of a continuance of
+neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one
+member of the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote
+privately:</p>
+<blockquote>"It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and
+purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been plain
+enough that the whole question was whether the South was earnest
+and united. That has now for some months been demonstrated; and the
+fact thus established at once places the question beyond the region
+even of the most brilliant military successes<a name=
+"FNanchor717"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_717">[717]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial
+situation. Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a
+change of policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to
+Stuart:</p>
+<blockquote>"...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under
+which I should think the intervention of England in the quarrel
+between the North and South advisable....<br>
+<br>
+"But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is apparent
+from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other ports. And the
+distress in the manufacturing districts threatens to be so great
+that a pressure may be put upon the Government which they will find
+it difficult to resist<a name="FNanchor718"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_718">[718]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the
+expense of the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to
+the fury of Cobden<a name="FNanchor719"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_719">[719]</a>. Of this period Arnold <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_27"></a>[V2:pg 27]</span> later
+sarcastically remarked that, "The representatives of Lancashire in
+the Houses of Parliament did not permit the gaieties of the
+Exhibition season wholly to divert their attention from the
+distress which prevailed in the home county<a name=
+"FNanchor720"></a><a href="#Footnote_720">[720]</a>."</p>
+<p>Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on
+August 1 a long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition,
+using exactly those arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate<a name=
+"FNanchor721"></a><a href="#Footnote_721">[721]</a>. The answer,
+evidently given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had
+been waiting, was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to
+Seward on July 28, called attention to the wholly contradictory
+statements of North and South on the status of the war, which, in
+British opinion, had not yet reached a stage positively indicative
+of the permanence of Southern independence. Great Britain,
+therefore, still "waited," but the time might come when Southern
+firmness in resistance would bring recognition<a name=
+"FNanchor722"></a><a href="#Footnote_722">[722]</a>. The tone was
+more friendly than any expressions hitherto used by Russell to
+Southern representatives. The reply does not reveal the decision
+actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote to Argyll on
+August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the question
+"to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil
+War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident
+the prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both
+parties are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish;
+he would have England approach France and Russia, but if they were
+not ready, wait until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done
+before the hot weather is over to stop these frightful
+horrors<a name="FNanchor723"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_723">[723]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_28"></a>[V2:pg 28]</span>
+<p>All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the
+Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at
+present" and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence.
+Apparently one Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the
+need to splutter. On the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the
+Lords moved for the production of Russell's correspondence with
+Mason, making a very confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were
+convinced the war ought to end in separation. At one time Campbell
+argued that reconquest of the South was impossible; at another that
+England should interfere to prevent such reconquest. Again he urged
+that the North was in a situation where she could not stop the war
+without aid from Europe in extricating her. Probably the motion was
+made merely to draw from Russell an official statement. Production
+of the papers was refused. Russell stated that the Government still
+maintained its policy of strict neutrality, that if any action was
+to be taken it should be by all the maritime powers and that if, in
+the parliamentary recess, any new policy seemed advisable he would
+first communicate with those powers. He also declared very
+positively that as yet no proposal had been received from any
+foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect
+accord" between Great Britain and France<a name=
+"FNanchor724"></a><a href="#Footnote_724">[724]</a>.</p>
+<p>Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying
+and naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that
+France would promptly make this clear<a name=
+"FNanchor725"></a><a href="#Footnote_725">[725]</a>. But France
+gave no sign of lack of "perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel
+even discouraged Slidell from following Mason's example of
+demanding recognition and the formal communication was withheld,
+Mason acquiescing<a name="FNanchor726"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_726">[726]</a>. Slidell thought new disturbances in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_29"></a>[V2:pg 29]</span>
+Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French interest in
+the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration of high
+hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:</p>
+<blockquote>"You will find by my official correspondence that we
+are still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off but
+a strong and continued current of important successes in the
+field.<br>
+<br>
+I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she
+desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the North
+shall be entirely exhausted and broken down.<br>
+<br>
+Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen except
+their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting about their
+disinterested magnaminity and objection of all other considerations
+than those dictated by a high-toned morality, while their entire
+policy is marked by egotism and duplicity. I am getting to be
+heartily tired of Paris<a name="FNanchor727"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_727">[727]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day
+of the session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire
+by authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians.
+Like Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that
+in August there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for
+a change in British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell
+had merely declared that the time for action was "not yet" come,
+but this was regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in
+informed Southern nor Northern circles outside the Cabinet was
+there any suspicion, <i>except by Adams</i>, that in the six months
+elapsed since Lindsay had begun his movement the Ministry had been
+slowly progressing in thoughts of mediation.</p>
+<p>In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had
+been <i>favourable</i> to mediation when "both parties were ready
+for it" and that such readiness would come soon most Members were
+convinced. This was a <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_30"></a>[V2:pg 30]</span> convenient and reasonable ground
+for postponing action but did not imply that if the conviction were
+unrealized no mediation would be attempted. McClellan, driven out
+of the Peninsula, had been removed, and August saw the Northern
+army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now Washington and not
+Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the North must
+soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports early
+in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a
+strong peace party.</p>
+<p>But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of
+enormous new Northern levies of men and of renewed courage<a name=
+"FNanchor728"></a><a href="#Footnote_728">[728]</a>. By mid-August,
+writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any
+quantity of it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the
+peace party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of
+the Administration<a name="FNanchor729"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_729">[729]</a>. As to recognition, Stuart believed:
+"There is nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous
+fresh levies, but to wait and see what the next two months will
+bring forth<a name="FNanchor730"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_730">[730]</a>." The hopes of the British Ministry based
+on a supposed Northern weariness of the war were being shattered.
+Argyll, having received from Sumner a letter describing the
+enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote to Gladstone:</p>
+<blockquote>"It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the
+prospects of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any
+approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of
+mediation<a name="FNanchor731"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_731">[731]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>To this Gladstone replied:</p>
+<blockquote>"I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to
+mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_31"></a>[V2:pg 31]</span> to
+determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I cannot
+subscribe to the opinion of those who think that Europe is to stand
+silent without limit of time and witness these horrors and
+absurdities, which will soon have consumed more men, and done ten
+times more mischief than the Crimean War; but with the difference
+that there the end was uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion
+of the whole world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled
+to point out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled
+by the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any
+interference or warning from third powers, and as far as principle
+goes there never was a case in which warning was so proper and
+becoming, because of the frightful misery which this civil conflict
+has brought upon other countries, and because of the unanimity with
+which it is condemned by the civilized world<a name=
+"FNanchor732"></a><a href="#Footnote_732">[732]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were
+known to Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British
+Ministry. Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady.
+Lindsay's initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect
+diplomacy and not supported by France officially, had received
+prompt rejection accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart
+from strict neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the
+Northern victorious progress in arms and in the face of increasing
+distress in Lancashire, the second answer to Lindsay was less
+dogmatic. As given by Palmerston the Government desired to offer
+mediation, but saw no present hope of doing so successfully.
+Finally the Government asked for a free hand, making no pledges.
+Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when August dawned plans
+were already on foot for a decided change. The secret was well
+kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on events, two
+days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence with
+Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was
+writing to Palmerston:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_32"></a>[V2:pg 32]</span>
+<blockquote>"Mercier's notion that we should make some move in
+October agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England
+before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of course
+the war may flag before that.<br>
+<br>
+"I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice should be
+the first step; but we must be prepared to answer the question on
+what basis are we to negotiate<a name="FNanchor733"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_733">[733]</a>?"</blockquote>
+<p>The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to
+come, not from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the
+South, but from the British Ministry itself.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_654"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor654">[654]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+204.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_655"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor655">[655]</a> <i>De Bow's Review</i>, Dec., 1857, p.
+592.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_656"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor656">[656]</a> Cited in Adams, <i>Trans-Atlantic
+Historical Solidarity</i>, p. 66.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_657"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor657">[657]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 64.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_658"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor658">[658]</a> Cited in Smith, <i>Parties and
+Slavery</i>, 68. A remarkable exposition of the "power of cotton"
+and the righteousness of slavery was published in Augusta, Georgia,
+in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine hundred pages, entitled
+<i>Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments</i>. This reproduced
+seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers analysing
+Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and
+political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology,
+international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united
+publication was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of
+slavery, the prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the
+power of the United States as dependent on its control of the
+cotton supply. The editor was E.N. Elliot, President of Planters'
+College, Mississippi.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_659"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor659">[659]</a> Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell,
+<i>Clarendon</i>, II, p. 237.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_660"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor660">[660]</a> <i>Am. Hist. Rev.</i>, XVIII, p. 785.
+Bunch to Russell. No. 51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here
+printed this letter shows two dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the
+original in the Public Record Office is dated Dec. 5.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_661"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor661">[661]</a> pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of
+Florida.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_662"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor662">[662]</a> Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties,
+learned from Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to
+Yancey. Had he been instructed to negotiate commercial treaties
+with European powers? Mr. Yancey had received no intimation from
+any source that authority to negotiate commercial treaties would
+devolve upon the Commission. 'What then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be
+your instructions?' The President, Mr. Yancey said, seemed to be
+impressed with the importance of the cotton crop. A considerable
+part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a full crop will
+soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton, so far as
+he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy
+expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, <i>Life and Times of
+Yancey</i>, 599).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_663"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor663">[663]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to
+Russell, June 5, 1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the
+South in industries other than its staple products is well
+illustrated by a request from Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the
+Confederacy, to Mason, urging him to secure <i>three</i>
+ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote, "The reduction
+of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason Papers.
+Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_664"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor664">[664]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential.
+Bunch to Russell, March 19, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_665"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor665">[665]</a> p. 130</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_666"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor666">[666]</a> The two principal British works are:
+Arnold, <i>The History of the Cotton Famine</i>, London, 1864; and
+Watts, <i>The Facts of the Cotton Famine</i>, Manchester, 1866. A
+remarkable statistical analysis of the world cotton trade was
+printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner seeking to use his study
+as an argument for British mediation. George McHenry, <i>The Cotton
+Trade</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_667"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor667">[667]</a> Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>,
+pp. 263-4.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_668"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor668">[668]</a> Lack of authentic statistics on indirect
+interests make this a guess by the <i>Times</i>. Other estimates
+run from one-seventh to one-fourth.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_669"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor669">[669]</a> Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the
+Civil War," p. 408 (in <i>Iowa Journal of History and Politics</i>,
+Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent. (Hereafter cited as Schmidt, <i>Wheat and
+Cotton</i>.) Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>, p. 264,
+states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, pp.
+36-39, estimates 83 per cent.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_670"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor670">[670]</a> Great Britain ordinarily ran more than
+twice as many spindles as all the other European nations combined.
+Schmidt, <i>Wheat and Cotton</i>, p. 407, <i>note</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_671"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor671">[671]</a> This Return for April is noteworthy as the
+first differentiating commerce with the North and the
+South.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_672"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor672">[672]</a> These facts are drawn from Board of Trade
+Reports, and from the files of the <i>Economist</i>, London, and
+<i>Hunt's Merchants Magazine</i>, New York. I am also indebted to a
+manuscript thesis by T.P. Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War
+Blockade on the Cotton Trade of the United Kingdom," Stanford
+University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented at Harvard University a
+thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The Influence of Trade (in
+Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations, 1829-1846," but has
+not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil War
+period.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_673"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor673">[673]</a> Adams, <i>Trans-Atlantic Historical
+Solidarity</i>, p. 89.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_674"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor674">[674]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to
+Russell, Jan. 8, 1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were
+being transformed to corn production and that even the cotton on
+hand was deteriorating because of the lack of bagging, shut off by
+the blockade.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_675"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor675">[675]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p.
+81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_676"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor676">[676]</a> Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter,
+March 11, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_677"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor677">[677]</a> Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862.
+<i>Monthly Accounts of Trade and Navigation</i> (in
+<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Commons</i>. Vol. LV, and
+1863, <i>Commons</i>, Vol. LXV).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_678"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor678">[678]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, pp. 174 and
+215.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_679"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor679">[679]</a> In 1861 there were 26 Members from
+Lancashire in the Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties.
+The suffrage was such that only 1 in every 27 of the population had
+the vote. For all England the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV,
+359). <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1867-8, <i>Lords</i>, Vol.
+XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and Counties of
+England."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_680"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor680">[680]</a> The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's
+"Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862.
+<i>Parliamentary Papers, Commons</i>, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863.
+<i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from "Summary of the Number
+of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from November, 1861, to
+December, 1863. <i>Commons</i>, Vol. LII. Farnall's reports are
+less exact than the <i>Summary</i> since at times Liverpool is
+included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do
+not appear in his reports until 1864. The <i>Summary</i>
+consistently includes Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that
+city whenever weather conditions interfered with the ordinary
+business of the port. It is a striking illustration of the narrow
+margin of living wages among the dockers of Liverpool that an
+annotation at the foot of a column of statistics should explain an
+increase in one week of 21,000 persons thrown on poor relief to the
+"prevalence of a strong east wind" which prevented vessels from
+getting up to the docks.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_681"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor681">[681]</a> Trevelyan, <i>Bright</i>, p. 309. To
+Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_682"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor682">[682]</a> The historians who see only economic
+causes have misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton
+famine." Recently, also, there has been advanced an argument that
+"wheat defeated cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England
+itself during the war by pro-Northern friends who pointed to the
+great flow of wheat from the North as essential in a short-crop
+situation in Great Britain. Mr. Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat
+and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations during the Civil War," a
+paper read before the American Historical Association, Dec. 1917,
+and since published in the <i>Iowa Journal of History and
+Politics</i>, July, 1918, presents with much care all the important
+statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions seem to me
+wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence on
+Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping
+the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious
+statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did
+not escape the attention of the English government," since leading
+journals referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted:
+"But it was Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the
+decisive factor, counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in
+keeping the British government from recognizing the Confederacy"
+(p. 437). "That the wheat situation must have exerted a profound
+influence on the government ..." (p. 438). And finally: "In this
+contest wheat won, demonstrating its importance as a world power of
+greater significance than cotton" (p. 439). This interesting thesis
+has been accepted by William Trimble in "Historical Aspects of the
+Surplus Food Production of the United States, 1862-1902" (<i>Am.
+Hist. Assoc. Reports</i>, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think Mr.
+Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition
+of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in
+midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of
+that year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a
+parity, since the former could not be obtained in quantity from
+<i>any</i> source before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the
+United States, could have been obtained from interior Russia, as
+well as from the maritime provinces, in increased supply if Britain
+had been willing to pay the added price of inland transport. There
+was a real "famine" of cotton; there would have been none of wheat,
+merely a higher cost. (This fact, a vital one in determining
+influence, was brought out by George McHenry in the columns of
+<i>The Index</i>, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of all
+Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a
+subject of governmental concern in <i>memoranda</i> and in private
+notes between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one
+single case of the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in
+negation of Mr. Schmidt's thesis.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_683"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor683">[683]</a> Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited
+in <i>Hunt's Merchants Magazine</i>, Vol. 45, pp.
+326-7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_684"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor684">[684]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 442.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_685"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor685">[685]</a> e.g., The <i>Times</i>, Sept. 19,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_686"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor686">[686]</a> To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc.
+<i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 97.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_687"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor687">[687]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p.
+157.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_688"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor688">[688]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to
+Russell, June 25, 1862. He reported a general burning of cotton
+estimating the amount so destroyed as nearly one million
+bales.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_689"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor689">[689]</a> Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression
+that England was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton
+disaster to the War. Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was
+the general public belief but not that of the well informed.
+Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it was not until January, 1863,
+that it was "begun to be understood" that famine was not wholly
+caused by the War, but partly by glut.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_690"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor690">[690]</a> Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520.
+Debate on "The Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The
+principal speakers were Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright.
+Another debate on "The Cotton Supply" took place June 19, 1862,
+with no criticism of America. <i>Ibid.</i>, CLXVII, pp.
+754-93.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_691"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor691">[691]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 12.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_692"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor692">[692]</a> Gladstone Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_693"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor693">[693]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to
+Russell, May 12, 1862. A description of these orders as inclusive
+of "foreign owned" cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had
+been purchased and stored, waiting export, by British citizens.
+Molyneaux at Savannah made a similar report. <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol.
+849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_694"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor694">[694]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp.
+214-18.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_695"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor695">[695]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p. 228,
+quotes a song in the "improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where
+operatives were being given a leisure-time education. One verse
+was:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees
+are<br>
+the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by<br>
+English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war<br>
+is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for<br>
+more."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_696"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor696">[696]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p.
+1213.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_697"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor697">[697]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Further Correspondence relating to the
+Civil War in the United States." No. 1. Reed. June 21,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_698"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor698">[698]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_699"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor699">[699]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>,
+II, 352. The exact length of Thouvenel's stay in London is
+uncertain, but he had arrived by July 10 and was back in Paris by
+July 21. The text of the telegram is in a letter to Flahault of
+July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very averse to any move
+which may lead to war with America, "an adventure more serious than
+that of Mexico" (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 353).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_700"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor700">[700]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See
+also r&eacute;sum&eacute; in Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five
+Years</i>, II, 55.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_701"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor701">[701]</a> Farnall's First Report. <i>Parliamentary
+Papers</i>, 1862, <i>Commons</i>, Vol. XLIX.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_702"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor702">[702]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5,
+1862.<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"Public opinion will not allow the Government to do
+more for<br>
+the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not<br>
+be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from<br>
+the U.S. ..."<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+"However, the real question of the day is cotton...."<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+"The problem is of how to get over <i>this next</i> winter. The<br>
+prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy."<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+"...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton<br>
+for England before the winter, you will have done a greater<br>
+service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century;<br>
+but nobody expects it."</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_703"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor703">[703]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, 166.
+To his son, July 18, 1862. He noted that the news had come by the
+<i>Glasgow</i> which had sailed for England on July 5, whereas the
+papers contained also a telegram from McClellan's head-quarters,
+dated July 7, but "the people here are fully ready to credit
+anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings were
+"Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a
+steamer." <i>Ibid.</i>, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July
+19.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_704"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor704">[704]</a> Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract
+from the <i>Dubuque Sun</i>, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a
+repudiation of all debts to England, and solemnly held this up as
+evidence of the lack of financial morality in America. If he knew
+of this the editor of the small-town American paper must have been
+tickled at the reverberations of his humour.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_705"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor705">[705]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549,
+for the entire debate.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_706"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor706">[706]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_707"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor707">[707]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, I, pp.
+168-9. To Charles Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_708"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor708">[708]</a> Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's
+letter to Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the
+Court of Napoleon III," <i>Am. Hist. Rev.</i>, Jan., 1921, p. 263.
+C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc.
+<i>Proceedings</i>, May, 1914, p. 379, is in error in dating this
+letter April 21, an error for which the present writer is
+responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult
+hand-writing.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_709"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor709">[709]</a> Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to
+Benjamin, July 25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned
+the details of Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of
+July 20, wrote: "There is an important part of our conversation
+that I will give you through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to
+proceed at once to London to enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers
+show that Mann did not go to London, and that Mason was left in the
+dark except in so far as he could guess at what Slidell had done by
+reading Benjamin's instructions, sent to him by Slidell, on July
+30. These did <i>not</i> include anything on Mexico, but made clear
+the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to France. In C.F.
+Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is stated that
+Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of Mercier's
+visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result of
+Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's
+instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14,
+while it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To
+some it will no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not
+have informed Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But
+here, as in Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive
+assurances to Lyons at their face value. Lyons certainly so
+accepted them and there is nothing in French documents yet
+published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour, while the chronology
+of the Confederate documents supports it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_710"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor710">[710]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_711"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor711">[711]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, July 18
+and 19.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_712"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor712">[712]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting
+Blockade and Recognition." No. 7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_713"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor713">[713]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_714"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor714">[714]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_715"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor715">[715]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 18.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_716"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor716">[716]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1862,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXV. "Further Correspondence relating to the
+Civil War in the United States." No. 2. Russell to Stuart, July 28,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_717"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor717">[717]</a> Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July
+26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_718"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor718">[718]</a> Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_719"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor719">[719]</a> Malmesbury, <i>Memoirs of an
+Ex-Minister</i>, II, p. 276. July 31, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_720"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor720">[720]</a> Arnold, <i>Cotton Famine</i>, p.
+175.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_721"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor721">[721]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting
+Blockade and Recognition." No. 10.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_722"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor722">[722]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 11.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_723"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor723">[723]</a> Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll,
+<i>Autobiography</i>, II, p. 191.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_724"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor724">[724]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177
+<i>seq</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_725"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor725">[725]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_726"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor726">[726]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley
+to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20,
+1862. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 21.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_727"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor727">[727]</a> Richardson, II, p. 315.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_728"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor728">[728]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_729"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor729">[729]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell, Aug. 18,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_730"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor730">[730]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing
+to be done" refers, not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July
+that the time was ripe for recognition. He was wholly at variance
+with Lyons on British policy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_731"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor731">[731]</a> Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_732"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor732">[732]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 29, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_733"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor733">[733]</a> Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_33"></a>[V2:pg 33]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2>
+<h3>RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of
+governmental inclination to act in the American Civil War was
+accepted by most of the British public as evidence that the
+Ministry had no intentions in that direction. But keen observers
+were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, was keeping close touch
+with the situation in England through private correspondence. In
+March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have made their
+minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning
+McClellan's advance on Richmond<a name="FNanchor734"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_734">[734]</a>. With the failure of that campaign he
+wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his
+[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last
+long<a name="FNanchor735"></a><a href="#Footnote_735">[735]</a>."
+Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, <i>The
+Index</i>, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom
+and necessity of British action to end the war<a name=
+"FNanchor736"></a><a href="#Footnote_736">[736]</a>. France was
+declared rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the
+expense of England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on
+grounds of close sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation,
+at first objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for
+recognition, was in the end the chief object of <i>The Index</i>,
+after mid-July, when simple recognition seemed impossible of
+attainment<a name="FNanchor737"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_737">[737]</a>. Especially British <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_34"></a>[V2:pg 34]</span> humiliation
+because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any
+public manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great
+detail<a name="FNanchor738"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_738">[738]</a>.</p>
+<p>The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of <i>The
+Index</i> are, however, no indication that either Northern fears or
+Southern hopes were based on authoritative information as to
+governmental purpose. The plan now in the minds of Palmerston and
+Russell and their steps in furthering it have been the subject of
+much historical study and writing. It is here proposed to review
+them in the light of all available important materials, both old
+and new, using a chronological order and with more citation than is
+customary, in the belief that such citations best tell the story of
+this, the most critical period in the entire course of British
+attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great Britain
+voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the
+American conflict<a name="FNanchor739"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_739">[739]</a>.</p>
+<p>Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion,
+July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did <i>not</i> indicate
+safety for the North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of
+Palmerston's speech he wrote the next day in his diary: "It was
+cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from it to show
+that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted by the
+favour of Divine Providence or <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_35"></a>[V2:pg 35]</span> our own efforts. The anxiety
+attending my responsibility is only postponed<a name=
+"FNanchor740"></a><a href="#Footnote_740">[740]</a>." At this very
+moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure
+governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for
+the South--the famous <i>Alabama</i>--which was soon completed and
+put to sea but ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in
+enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter,
+reinforcing the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him
+to explain his alarm to Seward. On August 16 Adams received an
+instruction, written August 2, outlining the exact steps to be
+taken in case the feared change in British policy should occur. As
+printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to Congress
+this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discursive
+essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the
+possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom
+of such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests.
+It does not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had
+given serious consideration to the supposed danger<a name=
+"FNanchor741"></a><a href="#Footnote_741">[741]</a>. But this
+conveys a very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the
+despatch very specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs
+Adams that if approached by the British Government with
+propositions implying a purpose:</p>
+<blockquote>"To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to
+solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to
+debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or transmit, any
+communication of the kind.... If you are asked an opinion what
+reception the President would give to such a proposition, if made
+here, you will reply that you are not instructed, but you have no
+reason for supposing that it would be entertained."</blockquote>
+<p>This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in
+conjunction with other Powers. Further, if the South <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_36"></a>[V2:pg 36]</span> should be
+"acknowledged" Adams was immediately to suspend his functions. "You
+will perceive," wrote Seward, "that we have approached the
+contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great
+reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have
+perceived that the crisis has not appalled us<a name=
+"FNanchor742"></a><a href="#Footnote_742">[742]</a>."</p>
+<p>This serious and definite determination by the North to resent
+any intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln
+were fully committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling.
+Briefly, if the need arose, the North would go to war with Europe.
+Adams at least now knew where he stood and could but await the
+result. The instruction he held in reserve, nor was it ever
+officially communicated to Russell. He did, however, state its
+tenor to Forster who had contacts with the Cabinet through
+Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that the American
+determination was communicated to the Ministry, the presumption is
+that this occurred<a name="FNanchor743"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_743">[743]</a>. Such communication could not have taken
+place before the end of August and possibly was not then made owing
+to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation and
+that, apparently, the plan to move <i>soon</i> in the American War
+was as yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.</p>
+<p>Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of
+their determination<a name="FNanchor744"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_744">[744]</a>. Meanwhile they were depending much upon
+advices from Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was
+suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected<a name=
+"FNanchor745"></a><a href="#Footnote_745">[745]</a>, and continued
+his urgings even though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to
+him from London strong personal objections to any European
+intervention whatever and especially any by Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor746"></a><a href="#Footnote_746">[746]</a>. Lyons
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_37"></a>[V2:pg 37]</span>
+explained his objections to Russell as well, but Stuart, having
+gone to the extent of consulting also with Stoeckl, the Russian
+Minister at Washington, was now in favour of straight-out
+recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, thought
+Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an
+attempt at mediation<a name="FNanchor747"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_747">[747]</a>. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a
+full month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an
+emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence
+of Seward<a name="FNanchor748"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_748">[748]</a>, but he attached no importance to this,
+regarding it as at best a measure of pretence intended to frighten
+the South and to influence foreign governments<a name=
+"FNanchor749"></a><a href="#Footnote_749">[749]</a>. Russell was
+not impressed with Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I
+think," he wrote, "we must allow the President to spend his second
+batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy
+will listen to reason<a name="FNanchor750"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_750">[750]</a>." But this did not imply that Russell was
+wavering in the idea that October would be a "ripe time." Soon he
+was journeying to the Continent in attendance on the Queen and
+using his leisure to perfect his great plan<a name=
+"FNanchor751"></a><a href="#Footnote_751">[751]</a>.</p>
+<p>Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13.
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_38"></a>[V2:pg 38]</span> On
+that date he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound
+Thouvenel, <i>privately</i><a name="FNanchor752"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_752">[752]</a>, and the day following he wrote to
+Palmerston commenting on the news just received of the exploits of
+Stonewall Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end
+the war. In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet<a name=
+"FNanchor753"></a><a href="#Footnote_753">[753]</a>." Similar
+reactions were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for
+the same reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:</p>
+<blockquote>"The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
+Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
+Confederates."<br>
+<br>
+<p>"If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider
+whether in such a state of things England and France might not
+address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon
+the basis of separation<a name="FNanchor754"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_754">[754]</a>?"</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Russell replied:</p>
+<blockquote>"... I agree with you that the time is come for
+offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to
+the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree
+further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize
+the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of
+taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting, of the
+Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting<a name=
+"FNanchor755"></a><a href="#Footnote_755">[755]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result
+of the unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest.
+This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously
+made by Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that
+he had held a long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the
+subject of mediation as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and
+found a disposition "to wait to see the result <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_39"></a>[V2:pg 39]</span> of the
+elections" in the North. Mercier apparently had been writing that
+Southern successes would strengthen the Northern peace party.
+Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party gains the ascendant,"
+Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far committed to listen
+to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set aside." He also
+emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France might
+expect if they recognized the South.</p>
+<blockquote>"I said that we might propose an armistice without
+mediation, and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so,
+and let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
+recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
+recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."<br>
+<br>
+Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.<br>
+<br>
+"...the French Government had some time back sounded that of Russia
+as to her joining France and England in an offer of mediation and
+had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."<br>
+<br>
+"It appears also that there is less public pressure here for the
+recognition of the South than there is in England<a name=
+"FNanchor756"></a><a href="#Footnote_756">[756]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to
+Russell had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less
+weight than formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French
+Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known
+difference on American policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III
+and the well-grounded conviction that the Emperor was at any moment
+ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal.
+The second circumstance was still more important. It was already
+known through the French press that a sharp conflict had arisen in
+the Government as to Italian policy and all signs pointed to a
+reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude Thouvenel. Under
+these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_40"></a>[V2:pg
+40]</span> circumstances Russell could well afford to discount
+Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to go--much
+beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently in
+Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.</p>
+<blockquote>"I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon
+enough for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
+Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the interval
+between this time and the middle of next month. These views had the
+offer of mediation to both parties in the first place, and in the
+case of refusal by the North, to recognition of the South.
+Mediation on the basis of separation and recognition accompanied by
+a declaration of neutrality<a name="FNanchor757"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_757">[757]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a
+communication to Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a
+memorandum, proposed to be sent to Cowley, but again
+<i>privately</i><a name="FNanchor758"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_758">[758]</a>, addressed to France alone. Russell here
+also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. "She only
+wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said that
+should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed
+was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just
+returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not
+taken of the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's
+mind, Europe would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of
+the North<a name="FNanchor759"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_759">[759]</a>. Russell was now at home again and the
+next day Palmerston approved the plans as "excellent"; but he asked
+whether it would not be well to include Russia in the invitation as
+a compliment, even though "she might probably decline." As to the
+other European powers the matter could wait for an "after
+communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_41"></a>[V2:pg 41]</span> slowly is shown
+by a comment on the military situation in America:</p>
+<blockquote>"It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to
+the north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great
+effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great
+defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron
+should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they
+should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may
+follow<a name="FNanchor760"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_760">[760]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to
+France in Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to
+Cowley had not been sent off immediately--as the letter to
+Gladstone of September 26 indicates. But the plan was regarded as
+so far determined upon that on September 24 Russell requested Lyons
+not to fix, as yet, upon a date for his departure for America,
+writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for an opportunity to
+offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out in his
+reckoning<a name="FNanchor761"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_761">[761]</a>." Curiously Mercier had again changed his
+mind and now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move,
+being "particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the
+word <i>separation</i>," but of this Russell had, as yet, no
+inkling<a name="FNanchor762"></a><a href="#Footnote_762">[762]</a>.
+With full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to
+Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete
+agreement that an offer of mediation should be made by the three
+maritime powers, but that "no actual step would be taken without
+the sanction of the Cabinet<a name="FNanchor763"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_763">[763]</a>." Two days later Russell explained to
+Gladstone the exact nature of the proposal<a name=
+"FNanchor764"></a><a href="#Footnote_764">[764]</a>, but that there
+was even now no thoroughly worked out agreement on the sequence of
+steps necessary is shown by <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_42"></a>[V2:pg 42]</span> Palmerston's letter to Gladstone
+of the twenty-fourth, in which is outlined a preliminary proposal
+of an armistice, cessation of blockade, and negotiation on the
+basis of separation<a name="FNanchor765"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_765">[765]</a>.</p>
+<p>Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the
+proposed overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that
+there would be opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in
+attendance upon the Queen at Gotha. He now addressed a long and
+careful argument to Russell opposing the adventure, as he thought
+it, summing up his opinion in this wise:</p>
+<blockquote>"...I doubt, if the war continues long after our
+recognition of the South, whether it will be possible for us to
+avoid drifting into it."<br>
+<br>
+"...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to depart
+from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord
+Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the
+North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish
+to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parliament,
+the press, and the public<a name="FNanchor766"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_766">[766]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few
+days later he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it
+decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to do so!
+Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it; and probably
+Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It appears to me a great
+mistake<a name="FNanchor767"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_767">[767]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_43"></a>[V2:pg 43]</span>
+there now arrived confused accounts from America of the battles
+about Washington and of a check to the Southern advance. On
+September 17 there had been fought the battle of Antietam and two
+days later Lee, giving up his Maryland campaign, began a retreat
+through the Shenandoah valley toward the old defensive Southern
+lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for McClellan, again
+briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for an advance.
+Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and was
+now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European
+overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:</p>
+<blockquote>"MY DEAR RUSSELL,<br>
+<br>
+"I return you Granville's letter which contains much deserving of
+serious consideration. There is no doubt that the offer of
+Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be accepted by the
+South. Why should it not be accepted? It would give the South in
+principle the points for which they are fighting. The refusal, if
+refusal there was, would come from the North, who would be
+unwilling to give up the principle for which they have been
+fighting so long as they had a reasonable expectation that by going
+on fighting they could carry their point. The condition of things
+therefore which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would
+be great success of the South against the North. That state of
+things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has been
+lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course of recent
+events, and still less can we foresee what is about to follow. Ten
+days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future
+prospects.<br>
+<br>
+"As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
+following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the South,
+it is quite true that we should have less to care about that
+resentment in the spring when communication with Canada was open,
+and when our naval force could more easily operate upon the
+American coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and
+the American coast is not so safe.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_44"></a>[V2:pg 44]</span> "But
+if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time by
+England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would probably
+not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like one against a
+European Confederation. Such a quarrel would render certain and
+permanent that Southern Independence the acknowledgment of which
+would have caused it.<br>
+<br>
+"The first communication to be made by England and France to the
+contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of mediation but
+a friendly suggestion whether the time was not come when it might
+be well for the two parties to consider whether the war, however
+long continued, could lead to any other result than separation; and
+whether it might not therefore be best to avoid the great evils
+which must necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by
+at once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of
+separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of the
+contest, however long it may last.<br>
+<br>
+"The best thing would be that the two parties should settle details
+by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps with the
+rancorous hatred now existing between them this might be difficult.
+But their quarrels in negotiation would do us no harm if they did
+not lead to a renewal of war. An armistice, if not accompanied by a
+cessation of blockades, would be all in favour of the North,
+especially if New Orleans remained in the hands of the North.<br>
+<br>
+"The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be cleared up
+by some more decided events between the contending armies...."<br>
+<br>
+PALMERSTON<a name="FNanchor768"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_768">[768]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in
+favour of cautious delay. American military events more than
+Granville's arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there
+appeared a much more vigorous and determined opponent within the
+Cabinet. Cornewall Lewis was prompt to express objections. October
+2, Russell transmitted to Palmerston a letter of disapproval
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_45"></a>[V2:pg 45]</span> from
+Lewis. Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"This American question must be well sifted. I send you
+a letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."<br>
+<br>
+"My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia holds
+back. Her separation from our move would ensure the rejection of
+our proposals. But we shall know more by the 16th. I have desired a
+cabinet to be summoned for that day, but the summons will not go
+out till Saturday. So if you wish to stop it, write to
+Hammond<a name="FNanchor769"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_769">[769]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>From this it would appear that Russia had been
+approached<a name="FNanchor770"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_770">[770]</a> but that Russell's chief concern was the
+attitude of France, that his proposed private communication to
+Cowley had been despatched and that he was waiting an answer which
+might be expected before the sixteenth. If so his expectations were
+negatived by that crisis now on in the French Ministry over the
+Italian question prohibiting consideration of any other matter. On
+October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal retirement from
+office did not take place until October 24. Several Ministers
+abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into
+retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in
+confusion<a name="FNanchor771"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_771">[771]</a>. The Emperor was away <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_46"></a>[V2:pg 46]</span> from Paris and
+all that Cowley reported was that the last time he had seen
+Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as soon as the
+Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a serious
+consideration of the whole question<a name=
+"FNanchor772"></a><a href="#Footnote_772">[772]</a>...." Cowley
+himself was more concerned that it was now becoming clear France,
+in spite of previous protestations, was planning "colonizing"
+Mexico<a name="FNanchor773"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_773">[773]</a>.</p>
+<p>Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government,
+while wholly confident that France would agree in any effort
+whatsoever that England might wish to make, had no recent
+assurances, either official or private, to this effect. This did
+not disturb Russell, who took for granted French approval, and soon
+he cast aside the hesitation caused by the doubts of Granville, the
+opposition of Lewis, and the caution of Palmerston. Public opinion
+was certainly turning toward a demand for Ministerial
+action<a name="FNanchor774"></a><a href="#Footnote_774">[774]</a>.
+Two days of further consideration caused him to return to the
+attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:</p>
+<blockquote>"I think unless some miracle takes place this will be
+the very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest, proposing
+to North and South to come to terms.<br>
+<br>
+"Two things however must be made clear:<br>
+<br>
+(i) That we propose separation,<br>
+<br>
+(ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
+ourselves<a name="FNanchor775"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_775">[775]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not
+made clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was
+preparing a memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a
+mediation on lines of separation, but his uncertainty, even
+confusion, of mind became evident <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_47"></a>[V2:pg 47]</span> but another two days later on
+receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he
+and Mercier were now all for a suggestion of armistice, with no
+mention of separation<a name="FNanchor776"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_776">[776]</a>. Russell now thought:</p>
+<blockquote>"If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion
+might be adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
+North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
+course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition if the
+proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over on the
+25th<a name="FNanchor777"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_777">[777]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the
+Foreign Secretary, having started out on a course portending
+positive and vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of
+veering far to one side, if not turning completely about. But the
+day after Russell seemed to be considering such an attenuation of
+the earlier plan as to be content with a mere suggestion of
+armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already troubled waters
+further and violently disturbing them. This was Gladstone's speech
+at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was devoted to the
+Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis had made an
+army, was making a navy, and had created something still greater--a
+nation<a name="FNanchor778"></a><a href="#Footnote_778">[778]</a>.
+The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at first glance,
+indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the intention of
+forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line earlier
+adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. His
+declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was
+certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of
+governmental action. If Jefferson Davis <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_48"></a>[V2:pg 48]</span> had in truth
+created a nation then early recognition must be given it. But this
+surmise of intentional pressure is not borne out by any discovered
+evidence. On the contrary, the truth is, seemingly, that Gladstone,
+in the north and out of touch, was in complete ignorance that the
+two weeks elapsed since his letters from Palmerston and Russell had
+produced any alteration of plan or even any hesitation. Himself
+long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention in some form
+Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make the
+good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did
+not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had
+not yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against
+the traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken
+without authorization and "off his own bat."</p>
+<p>The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental
+policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to
+indicate a general belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in
+the war. The price of raw cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm
+Southern friends and cause them to give assurances that even if the
+blockade were broken there would be no immediate outpouring of
+cotton from Southern ports<a name="FNanchor779"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_779">[779]</a>. On the other hand, Bright, staunch
+friend of the North, <i>hoped</i> that Gladstone was merely seeking
+to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and Russell to
+move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your old
+acquaintance and friend<a name="FNanchor780"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_780">[780]</a>." The leading newspapers while at first
+accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and
+generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there
+was still uncertainty of policy and became silent <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_49"></a>[V2:pg 49]</span> until it should
+be made clear just what was in the wind<a name=
+"FNanchor781"></a><a href="#Footnote_781">[781]</a>. Within the
+Cabinet it is to be supposed that Gladstone had caused no small
+stir, both by reason of his unusual procedure and by his
+sentiments. On Russell, however much disliked was the incursion
+into his own province, the effect was reinvigoration of a desire to
+carry through at least some portion of the plan and he determined
+to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six days after
+Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a memorandum on
+America<a name="FNanchor782"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_782">[782]</a>.</p>
+<p>This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively,
+its power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that
+the notion of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been
+shown to be wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation,
+promising a freeing of the slaves in the sections still in
+rebellion on January 1, 1863, was no humanitarian or idealistic
+measure (since it left slavery in the loyal or recognized
+districts) and was but an incitement to servile war--a most
+"terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the Great
+Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty to
+propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly
+the advantages of peace<a name="FNanchor783"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_783">[783]</a>." This was a far cry from mediation and
+recognition, nor did Russell <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_50"></a>[V2:pg 50]</span> indicate either the proposed terms
+of an armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in
+bringing it about and making it of value. But the memorandum of
+October 13 does clearly negative what has been the accepted British
+political tradition which is to the effect that Palmerston, angered
+at Gladstone's presumption and now determined against action, had
+"put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in a public speech, thereby
+permitting public information that no Cabinet decision had as yet
+been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on October 14.
+Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that it is
+impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying
+Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office
+memorandum of the thirteenth<a name="FNanchor784"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_784">[784]</a>. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously
+maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to
+<i>any</i> plan of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of
+neutrality and his speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active
+opposition.</p>
+<p>Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather
+he treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in
+the Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole
+ground of British interests. This was the line best suited to
+sustain his arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought,
+that his Cabinet acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern
+complete victory, was his private conviction<a name=
+"FNanchor785"></a><a href="#Footnote_785">[785]</a>. At Hereford
+Lewis argued that everyone must acknowledge a great war was in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_51"></a>[V2:pg 51]</span>
+progress and must admit it "to be undecided. Under such
+circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when it could be
+asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of
+international law that the independence of the Southern States had
+been established<a name="FNanchor786"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_786">[786]</a>." In effect Lewis gave public notice that
+no Cabinet decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to
+Cabinet traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally
+unauthorized, but excusable in the view that the first offence
+against tradition had forced a rejoinder<a name=
+"FNanchor787"></a><a href="#Footnote_787">[787]</a>. For the public
+Lewis accomplished his purpose and the press refrained from
+comment, awaiting results<a name="FNanchor788"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_788">[788]</a>. Meanwhile Palmerston, who must finally
+determine policy, was remaining in uncertainty and in this
+situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader
+of the opposition in Parliament. This was done through Clarendon,
+who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby was averse to
+action.</p>
+<blockquote>"He said that he had been constantly urged to <i>go in
+for</i> recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
+ground that recognition would merely irritate the North without
+advancing the cause of the South or procuring a single bale of
+cotton, and that mediation in the present temper of the
+Belligerents <i>must</i> be rejected even if the mediating Powers
+themselves knew what to propose as a fair basis of compromise; for
+as each party insisted upon having that which the other declared
+was vitally essential to its existence, it was clear that the war
+had not yet marked <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_52"></a>[V2:pg 52]</span> out the stipulations of a treaty
+of peace.... The recognition of the South could be of no benefit to
+England unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which would be
+an act of hostility towards the North<a name=
+"FNanchor789"></a><a href="#Footnote_789">[789]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to
+guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis
+was Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed
+of his male friends<a name="FNanchor790"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_790">[790]</a>." They were in constant communication as
+the Cabinet crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken
+immediately after Palmerston's consultation of Derby through
+Clarendon. October 17, Lewis circulated a memorandum in reply to
+that of Russell's of October 13. He agreed with Russell's statement
+of the facts of the situation in America, but added with
+sarcasm:</p>
+<blockquote>"A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur
+in the historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
+should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between the
+contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any proposal
+of the English Government will be made, not by dispassionate
+bystanders, but by heated and violent partisans; and we have to
+consider, not how the proposal indicated in the Memorandum ought to
+be received, or how it would be received by a conclave of
+philosophers, but how it is likely to be received by the persons to
+whom it would be addressed."</blockquote>
+<p>Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably
+was intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an
+argument against, not for, British action, since it revealed an
+intensity of bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of
+issues by the belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in
+an armistice the only peaceful solution would be an independent
+slave-holding South for the establishment of which Great Britain
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_53"></a>[V2:pg 53]</span>
+would have become intermediary and sponsor. Any policy except that
+of the continuance of strict neutrality was full of dangers, some
+evident, some but dimly visible as yet. Statesmanship required
+great caution; "... looking to the probable consequences," Lewis
+concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether
+the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good,
+and whether it is not--</p>
+<blockquote>'Better to endure the ills we have<br>
+Than fly to others which we know not of<a name=
+"FNanchor791"></a><a href="#Footnote_791">[791]</a>.'"</blockquote>
+<p>At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing
+them on the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there
+were received at the Foreign Office and read with interest the
+reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a
+tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three
+points:</p>
+<p>(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of
+ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;</p>
+<p>(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of
+securing cotton for a long time to come;</p>
+<p>(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in
+favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men
+was being met with enthusiasm<a name="FNanchor792"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_792">[792]</a>.</p>
+<p>This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England
+or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting
+on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice,
+still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could
+do no harm and might open <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_54"></a>[V2:pg 54]</span> the way for a later move, but he
+agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at
+present<a name="FNanchor793"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_793">[793]</a>." Russell himself now heard from
+Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to
+press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on
+the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the
+Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we
+should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer<a name=
+"FNanchor794"></a><a href="#Footnote_794">[794]</a>." A long
+conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell
+committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not
+to move <i>at present</i> without Russia<a name=
+"FNanchor795"></a><a href="#Footnote_795">[795]</a>...." Finally,
+October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate
+present, writing to Russell:</p>
+<blockquote>"Your description of the state of things between the
+two parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much
+inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no step
+nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any
+advantage."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"All that we could possibly do without injury to our position would
+be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree to an
+armistice but whether they might not turn their thoughts towards an
+arrangement between themselves. But the answer of each might be
+written by us beforehand. The Northerners would say that the only
+condition of arrangement would be the restoration of the Union; the
+South would say their only condition would be an acknowledgment by
+the North of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced
+and should only have pledged each party more strongly to the object
+for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined to change the
+opinion on which I wrote to you when the Confederates seemed to be
+carrying all before them, and I am very much come back to our
+original view of the matter, that we must <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_55"></a>[V2:pg 55]</span> continue merely
+to be lookers-on till the war shall have taken a more decided
+turn<a name="FNanchor796"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_796">[796]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a
+Cabinet to consider the American question but Russell now postponed
+it, though a few members appeared and held an informal discussion
+in which Russell still justified his "armistice" policy and was
+opposed by Lewis and the majority of those present. Palmerston did
+not attend, no action was possible and technically no Cabinet was
+held<a name="FNanchor797"></a><a href="#Footnote_797">[797]</a>. It
+soon appeared that Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken,
+was reluctant in yielding and did not regard the question as
+finally settled. Yet on the afternoon of this same day Adams, much
+disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the speeches of Gladstone
+and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and was informed that
+the Government was not inclined at present to change its policy but
+could make no promises for the future<a name=
+"FNanchor798"></a><a href="#Footnote_798">[798]</a>. This appeared
+to Adams to be an assurance against <i>any</i> effort by Great
+Britain and has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part.
+Certainly Adams' confidence was restored by the interview. But
+Russell was apparently unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of
+armistice would necessarily lead to the evil consequences
+prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require any departure from a
+policy of strict neutrality. On the one side Russell was being
+berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an outworn policy
+and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe and of
+America<a name="FNanchor799"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_799">[799]</a>;" on the other he was regarded, for the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_56"></a>[V2:pg 56]</span>
+moment, as insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly
+dangerous to the preservation of peace with the North. October 23
+Palmerston wrote his approval of the Cabinet postponement, but
+declared Lewis' doctrine of "no recognition of Southern
+independence until the North had admitted it" was unsound<a name=
+"FNanchor800"></a><a href="#Footnote_800">[800]</a>. The next day
+he again wrote: "... to talk to the belligerents about peace at
+present would be as useless as asking the winds during the last
+week to let the waters remain calm<a name=
+"FNanchor801"></a><a href="#Footnote_801">[801]</a>."</p>
+<p>This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question
+apparently had come to a conclusion was the result of the
+unexpected persistence of Russell and Gladstone. Replying to
+Palmerston's letter of the twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good
+could come of a Cabinet, I put it off. But tho' I am quite ready to
+agree to your conclusions for the present, I cannot do so for G.
+Lewis' reasons...."</p>
+<blockquote>"G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I
+never thought of making. He says I propose that England and France
+and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to
+suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.<br>
+<br>
+"I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and England
+agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would not do. I
+thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any specific
+proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G. Lewis'
+invention.<br>
+<br>
+"I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is much
+pleased<a name="FNanchor802"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_802">[802]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been
+made by England and France; then Russia was <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_57"></a>[V2:pg 57]</span> necessary; now
+"less than five powers would not do." But whatever the number
+required he still desired a proposal of armistice. On October 23,
+presumably subsequent to the informal meeting of Cabinet members,
+he drew up a brief memorandum in answer to that of Lewis on October
+17, denying that Lewis had correctly interpreted his plan, and
+declaring that he had always had "in contemplation" a step by the
+five great powers of Europe. The advisability of trying to secure
+such joint action, Russell asserted, was all he had had in mind.
+<i>If</i> the Cabinet had approved this advisability, and the
+powers were acquiescent, <i>then</i> (in answer to Lewis'
+accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite
+plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South<a name=
+"FNanchor803"></a><a href="#Footnote_803">[803]</a>. Thus by letter
+to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave
+notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also
+circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by
+England, France and Russia<a name="FNanchor804"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_804">[804]</a>.</p>
+<p>Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by
+his Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell
+merely putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though
+not a member of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the
+situation and on October 24 wrote to Lewis:</p>
+<blockquote>"Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American
+question, which I have read with great satisfaction. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_58"></a>[V2:pg 58]</span> Johnny [Russell]
+always loves to do something when to do nothing is prudent, and I
+have no doubt that he hoped to get support in his meddling
+proclivities when he called a Cabinet for yesterday; but its
+postponement <i>sine die</i> is probably due to your memorandum.
+You have made so clear the idiotic position we should occupy,
+either in having presented our face gratuitously to the Yankee slap
+we should receive, or in being asked what practical solution we had
+to propose after an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion,
+that no discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the
+Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to draw
+in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street<a name=
+"FNanchor805"></a><a href="#Footnote_805">[805]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's
+newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:</p>
+<blockquote>"The Foreign Secretary's <i>blatt</i> exhibits
+considerable soreness, for which you are specially bound to make
+allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He had
+thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out of Vanity,
+and you have shown his backers that the animal was not fit to start
+and would not run a yard if he did. He is therefore taken back to
+the country, where he must have a deal more training before he can
+appear in public again."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as effective
+in checking the alarm and speculation caused by Gladstone's speech,
+as your memorandum was in smashing the Foreign Secretary's proposed
+intervention, and that you did so without in the smallest degree
+committing either the Government or yourself with respect to the
+future<a name="FNanchor806"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_806">[806]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to
+Russell's complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been
+secured, but there was still one element of strength for Russell
+and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening
+of the whole question. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_59"></a>[V2:pg 59]</span> This was the desire of France,
+still unexpressed in spite of indirect overtures, a silence in part
+responsible for the expression of an opinion by Palmerston that
+Napoleon's words could not be depended upon as an indication of
+what he intended to do<a name="FNanchor807"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_807">[807]</a>. On the day this was written the French
+ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's silence--came to
+an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the succession of
+Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion of the
+folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition"
+was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it
+should not take place till May Or June next year, when
+circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was
+right<a name="FNanchor808"></a><a href="#Footnote_808">[808]</a>."
+But this yielding to the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn
+when, at last, Napoleon and his new Minister could turn their
+attention to the American question.</p>
+<p>On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in
+which American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England,
+France and Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley
+replied that he had no instructions and Napoleon then modified his
+ideas by suggesting a proposal of armistice for six months "in
+order to give time for the present excitement to calm down<a name=
+"FNanchor809"></a><a href="#Footnote_809">[809]</a>...." The next
+day Cowley reported that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be
+very anxious to "put an end to the War," but that he was himself
+doubtful whether it would not be better to "wait a little longer,"
+and in any case if overtures to America were rejected Russia
+probably would not join Great Britain and France in going on to a
+recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor810"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_810">[810]</a>. All this was exactly in line with that
+plan to which <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_60"></a>[V2:pg
+60]</span> Russell had finally come and if officially notified to
+the British Government would require a renewed consideration by the
+Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been going on in London
+and he now hastened to give the needed French push. October 28,
+Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the Emperor's
+purpose, acting with England, to bring about an armistice<a name=
+"FNanchor811"></a><a href="#Footnote_811">[811]</a>. Three days
+later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had now been officially
+informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's orders" that a
+despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in England
+and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three
+powers in suggesting an armistice of six months <i>including a
+suspension of the blockade</i>, thus throwing open Southern ports
+to European commerce<a name="FNanchor812"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_812">[812]</a>.</p>
+<p>Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and
+was not regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:</p>
+<blockquote>"As to the French scheme of proposals to the United
+States, we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets,
+which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as would
+be most convenient to you and our colleagues. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_61"></a>[V2:pg 61]</span> But is it likely
+that the Federals would consent to an armistice to be accompanied
+by a cessation of Blockades, and which would give the Confederates
+means of getting all the supplies they may want?"<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of
+runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal which
+the Southerns would agree to, and people of England would approve
+of. The French Government are more free from the shackles of
+principle and of right and wrong on these matters, as on all others
+than we are. At all events it would be wiser to wait till the
+elections in North America are over before any proposal is made. As
+the Emperor is so anxious to put a stop to bloodshed he might try
+his hand as a beginning by putting down the stream of ruffians
+which rolls out from that never-failing fountain at Rome<a name=
+"FNanchor813"></a><a href="#Footnote_813">[813]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some
+sort of proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:</p>
+<blockquote>"My notion is that as there is little chance of our
+good offices being accepted in America we should make them such as
+would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to answer the
+French proposal therefore by saying,<br>
+<br>
+"That in offering our good offices we ought to require both parties
+to consent to examine, first, whether there are any terms upon
+which North and South would consent to restore the Union; and
+secondly, failing any such terms, whether there are any terms upon
+which both would consent to separate.<br>
+<br>
+"We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it would be
+essential in our view, that after what has taken place all the
+slaves should be emancipated, compensation being granted by
+Congress at the rate at which Great Britain emancipated her slaves
+in 1833.<br>
+<br>
+"If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
+slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_62"></a>[V2:pg 62]</span>
+"This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the Cabinet.<br>
+<br>
+"It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
+probably the South will refuse it<a name="FNanchor814"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_814">[814]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North
+and South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed
+them certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was
+eager to present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a
+reversal of the previous decision. Whether from pique or from
+conviction of the wisdom of a change in British policy, he proposed
+to press for acceptance of the French plan, with modifications. The
+news of Napoleon's offer and of Russell's attitude, with some
+uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into
+action and on November 7 he circulated another memorandum, this
+time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. This was in
+the main an historical r&eacute;sum&eacute; of past British policy
+in relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of
+such cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never
+recognized a revolted people so long as a <i>bona fide</i> struggle
+was still going on. Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If
+England could, by legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing
+or imperilling her own interests, accelerate this consummation, she
+would, in my opinion, earn the just gratitude of the civilized
+world." But the question, as he had previously asserted, was full
+of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a concert of Powers was
+itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the five great Powers is
+an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to set in motion. A
+single intervening Power may possibly contrive to satisfy both the
+adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first to satisfy
+one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on the
+question <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_63"></a>[V2:pg
+63]</span> of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might
+find her ideals or her vital interests compromised<a name=
+"FNanchor815"></a><a href="#Footnote_815">[815]</a>?</p>
+<p>Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective
+for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in
+international law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was
+circulated, there appeared a communication in the <i>Times</i> by
+"Historicus," on "The International Doctrine of Recognition,"
+outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments
+presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of
+strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt,
+husband of Lewis' stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon.
+Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell<a name=
+"FNanchor816"></a><a href="#Footnote_816">[816]</a>. "Historicus"
+drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a
+"hostile act" and ought to be resented by the "Sovereign State" as
+a "breach of neutrality and friendship<a name=
+"FNanchor817"></a><a href="#Footnote_817">[817]</a>."</p>
+<p>Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet
+crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The
+French offer was not actually presented until November 10<a name=
+"FNanchor818"></a><a href="#Footnote_818">[818]</a>. On the next
+two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the
+Cabinet. Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account
+by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St.
+Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would
+support English-French proposals through her Minister at
+Washington, "provided it would not cause irritation<a name=
+"FNanchor819"></a><a href="#Footnote_819">[819]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_64"></a>[V2:pg 64]</span>
+<blockquote>"Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to
+explain his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the
+recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable
+opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen their
+hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, Russia
+would reconsider her decision, act directly with France, and thus
+accomplish her favourite purpose of separating France and England.
+He therefore advised that the proposal of France should be
+accepted. Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did
+not say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for
+showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any
+chance of mitigating it [<i>sic</i>].<br>
+<br>
+"The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded to
+pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater
+or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the
+Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The
+principal objection was that the proposed armistice of six months
+by sea and land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade,
+was so grossly unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that
+there was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time,
+Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against
+being a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not
+think his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty ...
+I ought to add that, after the Cabinet had come to a decision and
+the outline of a draft had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a
+few oracular sentences on the danger of refusing the French
+invitation, and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support
+came rather late ... I proposed that we should <i>tater le
+terrain</i> at Washington and ascertain whether there was any
+chance of the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He
+admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from
+Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of displeasing
+France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to seem
+to support him. There is a useful <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_65"></a>[V2:pg 65]</span> article in to-day's <i>Times</i>
+throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that
+Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet<a name=
+"FNanchor820"></a><a href="#Footnote_820">[820]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief
+account:</p>
+<blockquote>"Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again
+to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the
+business of America. But I will send you definite intelligence.
+Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are <i>right.</i> Nov. 12. The
+United States affair has ended and not well. Lord Russell rather
+turned tail. He gave way without resolutely fighting out his
+battle. However, though we decline for the moment, the answer is
+put upon grounds and in terms which leave the matter very open for
+the future. Nov. 13. I think the French will make our answer about
+America public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may
+not take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may
+themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur with
+them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to Russell's
+proposal a feeble and half-hearted support<a name=
+"FNanchor821"></a><a href="#Footnote_821">[821]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in
+France and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's
+"benevolent views and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps
+proposed were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be
+extremely desirable" but remarked that as yet Great Britain had not
+been informed that Russia wished to co-operate, and concluded that
+since there was no ground to hope the North was ready for the
+proposal it seemed best to postpone any overture until there was a
+"greater prospect than now exists of its being accepted
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_66"></a>[V2:pg 66]</span> by
+the two contending parties<a name="FNanchor822"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_822">[822]</a>." The argument of Russell in the Cabinet
+had been for acceptance without Russia though earlier he had
+stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to the
+knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St.
+Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse<a name=
+"FNanchor823"></a><a href="#Footnote_823">[823]</a>. But in the
+answer to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an
+important reason for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis
+for harmonious decision within the British Cabinet. This is not to
+say that had Russia acceded England also would have done so, for
+the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston,
+was against Russell and the result reached was that which the
+Premier wished. More important in his view than any other matter
+was the preservation of a united Ministry and at the conclusion of
+the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to the state of
+matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it
+smoother<a name="FNanchor824"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_824">[824]</a>."</p>
+<p>Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the
+Cabinet decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this
+country against interference<a name="FNanchor825"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_825">[825]</a>," an estimate justified if the more
+important journals are taken into <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_67"></a>[V2:pg 67]</span> account but not true of all. The
+<i>Times</i> of November 13 declared:</p>
+<blockquote>"We are convinced that the present is not the moment
+for these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that
+by means of their own internal action the Americans may themselves
+settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe could settle them
+for them. We have waited so long that it would be unpardonable in
+us to lose the merit of our self-denial at such a moment as
+this.... We quite agree with Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to
+keep all Lancashire on turtle and venison than to plunge into a
+desperate war with the Northern States of America, even with all
+Europe at our back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon
+us in defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are
+as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty or
+our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as this. We
+very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia belonged to France
+as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor of the French would be so
+active in beating up for recruits in this American mediation
+league."</blockquote>
+<p>This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no
+English statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of
+mediation made in such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the
+United States<a name="FNanchor826"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_826">[826]</a>. On the other hand the <i>Herald</i>,
+always intense in its pro-Southern utterances, and strongly
+anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself unable to credit the
+rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively informed that
+our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to them,"
+the <i>Herald</i> declared, "we must hope against hope that they
+are innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of
+Lancashire (depicted in lurid colours):</p>
+<blockquote>"A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed
+upon them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and
+delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_68"></a>[V2:pg 68]</span> with the task
+before them and the power to perform it in their hands--can it be
+that they have shrunk back in craven cowardice, deserted their
+ally, betrayed their country, dishonoured their own names to all
+eternity, that they might do the bidding of John Bright, and
+sustain for a while the infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and
+a Lincoln<a name="FNanchor827"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_827">[827]</a>?"</blockquote>
+<p>In the non-political <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i> the returned
+editor, W.H. Russell, but lately the <i>Times</i> correspondent in
+America, jeered at the American uproar that might now be expected
+against France instead of England: "Let the Emperor beware. The
+scarred veteran of the New York Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his
+sinister or dexter eye upon him, and threatens him with the loss of
+his throne," but the British public must expect no lasting change
+of Northern attitude toward England and must be ready for a war if
+the North were victorious<a name="FNanchor828"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_828">[828]</a>. <i>Blackwood's</i> for November, 1862,
+strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. The
+<i>Edinburgh</i> for January, 1863, as strongly supported the
+Ministry and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain
+to keep out of the war. <i>The Index</i> naturally frothed in angry
+disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a
+reversal of Ministerial decision, even into the next year. "Has it
+come to this? Is England, or the English Cabinet, afraid of the
+Northern States? Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his
+excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her
+ally<a name="FNanchor829"></a><a href="#Footnote_829">[829]</a>."
+An editorial from the <i>Richmond</i> (Virginia) <i>Whig</i> was
+quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as "two
+old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in
+America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_69"></a>[V2:pg 69]</span> and
+expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both
+North and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor830"></a><a href="#Footnote_830">[830]</a>. The
+explanation, said <i>The Index</i>, of British supineness was
+simply the pusillanimous fear of war--and of a war that would not
+take place in spite of the bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on<a name=
+"FNanchor831"></a><a href="#Footnote_831">[831]</a>." Even as late
+as May of the year following, this explanation was still harped
+upon and Russell "a statesman" who belonged "rather to the past
+than to the present" was primarily responsible for British
+inaction. "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands
+of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or
+determination, except where the display of these qualities was
+singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless<a name=
+"FNanchor832"></a><a href="#Footnote_832">[832]</a>."</p>
+<p><i>The Index</i> never wavered from its assumption that in the
+Cabinet Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better
+informed, wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would
+have been the only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in
+favour of accepting the Emperor's proposition<a name=
+"FNanchor833"></a><a href="#Footnote_833">[833]</a>?" He had
+information that Napoleon had been led to expect his proposal would
+be accepted and was much irritated--so much so that France would
+now probably act alone<a name="FNanchor834"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_834">[834]</a>. Gladstone's attitude was a sorrow to
+many of his friends. Bright believed he was at last weaned from
+desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer to
+France<a name="FNanchor835"></a><a href="#Footnote_835">[835]</a>,
+but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on American
+affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was of
+offering <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_70"></a>[V2:pg
+70]</span> Canada to the North if she would let the South
+go<a name="FNanchor836"></a><a href="#Footnote_836">[836]</a>--a
+plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good
+judgment, save to his correspondent.</p>
+<p>In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with
+the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure
+of new policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly
+reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his
+arrival in America. Reaching New York on November 8 he found that
+even the "Conservatives" were much opposed to an offer of mediation
+at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a
+change of Government in Washington--an event still remote. Lyons
+himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed
+by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise
+of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought
+the British Cabinet not prepared<a name="FNanchor837"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_837">[837]</a>. Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's
+reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly
+manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his
+subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern arguments. Again on
+November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern
+paper that did not repudiate <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_71"></a>[V2:pg 71]</span> foreign intervention<a name=
+"FNanchor838"></a><a href="#Footnote_838">[838]</a>. In the South,
+when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had
+refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British
+feeling<a name="FNanchor839"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_839">[839]</a>.</p>
+<p>The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in
+rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling
+the war. It expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy
+rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be
+personally responsible. Since there had been no European offer made
+there was no cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams
+specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had
+been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis
+once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over
+and permanently. He wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be
+disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe. They have had their
+day. We propose to forget them<a name="FNanchor840"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_840">[840]</a>." This was a wise and statesmanlike
+attitude and was shared by Adams in London. Whatever either man
+knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November
+13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of
+Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain
+intended no change of policy<a name="FNanchor841"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_841">[841]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_72"></a>[V2:pg 72]</span>
+<p>So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that
+ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now
+up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally
+toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed
+when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a
+Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of
+State. This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities
+of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward's
+conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the tact and
+authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation,
+secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused both and
+in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control
+which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this
+controversy "I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr.
+Seward. We are much more likely to have a man less disposed to keep
+the peace than a man more disposed to do so. I should hardly have
+said this two years ago<a name="FNanchor842"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_842">[842]</a>." After the event of Seward's retention
+of office Russell wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of
+it<a name="FNanchor843"></a><a href="#Footnote_843">[843]</a>."
+This is a remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better
+understanding of Seward had come, somewhat slowly, to British
+diplomats, but since his action in the <i>Trent</i> affair former
+suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone" being regarded as for
+home consumption, until now there was both belief in Seward's basic
+friendliness and respect for his abilities.</p>
+<p>Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally
+dwindled to a polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere
+suggestion of armistice left no open sores in the British relations
+with America. The projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final
+to Seward and was indeed destined to prove so. But of this there
+was no clear <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_73"></a>[V2:pg
+73]</span> conception in the British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet
+believed that reconquest of the South was even a remote possibility
+and this foretold that the day must some time come when European
+recognition would have to be given the Confederacy. It is this
+unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of the war in America
+that should always be kept in mind in judging the attitude of
+British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their sympathies
+were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence
+during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the
+expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European
+nations <i>now</i> act in such a way as to bring to an early end a
+war whose result in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that
+such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon
+his policy even though personally his sympathies were
+unquestionably with the North. It was, in the end, the conviction
+that <i>now</i> was not a favourable time which determined
+Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his
+support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover
+both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war
+and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers
+were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's
+true policy was to await a return of sanity in the
+contestants<a name="FNanchor844"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_844">[844]</a>.</p>
+<p>For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most
+dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had
+that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is
+little question that Lewis' forebodings <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_74"></a>[V2:pg 74]</span> would have been
+realized and war would have ensued between England and the North.
+But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of
+the South would have been established. Slavery, hated of Great
+Britain, would have received a new lease of life--and by British
+action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln's
+emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and
+it played no part in the final decision. Soon that proclamation was
+to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future
+efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there
+serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American
+Civil War<a name="FNanchor845"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_845">[845]</a>.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_734"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor734">[734]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, 71. To
+his mother, March 16, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_735"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor735">[735]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 81. Aug. 18,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_736"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor736">[736]</a> <i>The Index</i> first appeared on May 1,
+1862. Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as
+the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_737"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor737">[737]</a> <i>The Index</i>, May 15, 29, June 19 and
+July 31, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_738"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor738">[738]</a> e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862,
+contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by
+Palmerston and Roebuck. In his speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided
+America will be a benefit to England." He appealed to Palmerston to
+consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South. "The
+North will never be our friends. (Cheers.) Of the South you can
+make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse
+of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't say that; don't say
+that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying. They
+are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_739"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor739">[739]</a> All American histories treat this incident
+at much length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it
+is C.F. Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to
+light. See his <i>Life of C.F. Adams</i>, Ch. XV; <i>Studies,
+Military and Diplomatic</i>, pp. 400-412; <i>Trans-Atlantic
+Historical Solidarity</i>, pp. 97-106; <i>A Crisis in Downing
+Street</i>, Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, May, 1914, pp.
+372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's
+motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering
+Ministerial policy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_740"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor740">[740]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>,
+p. 388.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_741"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor741">[741]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_742"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor742">[742]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>,
+p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in
+1899.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_743"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor743">[743]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 390.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_744"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor744">[744]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 32.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_745"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor745">[745]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July
+21, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_746"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor746">[746]</a> Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_747"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor747">[747]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8,
+1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that
+the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on
+consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would
+only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the
+next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O.,
+Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more
+emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless
+backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been
+Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him
+"we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to
+war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if
+France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially
+Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this
+Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (<i>Ibid.</i>,
+Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_748"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor748">[748]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was
+Stuart's informant.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_749"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor749">[749]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued
+on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold,
+vindictive and entirely political."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_750"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor750">[750]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug.
+24, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_751"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor751">[751]</a> The ignorance of other Cabinet members is
+shown by a letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862,
+stating as if an accepted conclusion, that there should be no
+interference and that the war should be allowed to reach its
+"natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_752"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor752">[752]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept.
+18, 1862, fixes the date of Russell's letter.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_753"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor753">[753]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_754"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor754">[754]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p.
+360.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_755"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor755">[755]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 361. Sept. 17,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_756"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor756">[756]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept.
+18, 1862. This is the first reference by Cowley in over three
+months to mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him
+by surprise.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_757"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor757">[757]</a> Gladstone Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_758"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor758">[758]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston,
+Sept. 22, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_759"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor759">[759]</a> Russell Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_760"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor760">[760]</a> Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p. 362. Sept.
+23, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_761"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor761">[761]</a> Lyons Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_762"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor762">[762]</a> Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_763"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor763">[763]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, p.
+76.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_764"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor764">[764]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 40.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_765"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor765">[765]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Dooming Street</i>,
+p. 393, giving the exact text paraphrased by Morley.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_766"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor766">[766]</a> Fitzmaurice, <i>Granville</i>, I, pp.
+442-44, gives the entire letter. Sept. 27, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_767"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor767">[767]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862.
+Fitzmaurice attributes much influence to Granville in the final
+decision and presumes that the Queen, also, was opposed to the
+plan. There is no evidence to show that she otherwise expressed
+herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to Russell. As for
+Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have counted for
+little.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_768"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor768">[768]</a> Russell Papers. A brief extract from this
+letter is printed in Walpole, <i>Russell</i>, II, p.
+362.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_769"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor769">[769]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_770"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor770">[770]</a> Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1,
+as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with
+England in offering good services to the United States looking
+towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of
+Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a
+possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5)
+recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that
+this could be done without giving the United States a just ground
+of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the
+action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might
+delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the
+political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament
+reassembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862
+(N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to
+Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1,
+1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object
+of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic
+which would serve to accentuate the differences that were
+understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very
+far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl
+was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme
+friendship to the United States (<i>Ibid.</i>, F.O. to Stoeckl,
+Oct. 3, 1862 (O.S.).)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_771"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor771">[771]</a> Thouvenel, <i>Le Secret de l'Empereur</i>,
+II, pp. 438-9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_772"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor772">[772]</a> Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept.
+30, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_773"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor773">[773]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_774"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor774">[774]</a> Even the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> for
+October, 1862, discussed recognition of the South as possibly near,
+though on the whole against such action.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_775"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor775">[775]</a> Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston
+responsible for the original plan and Russell acquiescent and
+readily agreeing to postpone. This study reverses the
+roles.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_776"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor776">[776]</a> Russell Papers. Also see <i>ante</i> p.
+41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same
+tenor.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_777"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor777">[777]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct.
+6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to
+October 25.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_778"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor778">[778]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, p. 79.
+Morley calls this utterance a great error which was long to
+embarrass Gladstone, who himself later so characterized
+it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_779"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor779">[779]</a> Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>,
+p. 402.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_780"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor780">[780]</a> Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass.
+Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in
+the dark as to a Ministerial project. Much of this letter is
+devoted to the emancipation proclamation which did not at first
+greatly appeal to Bright as a wise measure.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_781"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor781">[781]</a> The <i>Times</i>, October 9 and 10, while
+surprised that Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman,
+accepted the speech as equivalent to a governmental pronouncement.
+Then the <i>Times</i> makes no further comment of moment until
+November 13. The <i>Morning Post</i> (regarded as Palmerston's
+organ) reported the speech in full on October 9, but did not
+comment editorially until October 13, and then with much laudation
+of Gladstone's northern tour but <i>with no mention whatever</i> of
+his utterances on America.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_782"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor782">[782]</a> Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17,
+explaining that he had intended no "official utterance," and
+pleaded that Spence, whom he had seen in Liverpool, did not put
+that construction on his words (Gladstone Papers). Russell replied,
+October 20. "... Still you must allow me to say that I think you
+went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed when
+you said that Jeff Davis had made a nation. Negotiations would seem
+to follow, and for that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared.
+However we shall soon meet to discuss this very topic"
+<i>(Ibid.)</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_783"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor783">[783]</a> Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum
+were the texts of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular
+letter of September 22, and an extract from the <i>National
+Intelligencer</i> of September 26, giving Lincoln's answer to
+Chicago abolitionists.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_784"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor784">[784]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 80, narrates
+the "tradition." Walpole, <i>Twenty-five Years</i>, II, 57, states
+it as a fact. Also <i>Education of Henry Adams</i>, pp. 136, 140.
+Over forty years later an anonymous writer in the <i>Daily
+Telegraph</i>, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact details of the
+"instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in Adams, <i>A
+Crisis in Downing Street</i>, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams,
+<i>Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity</i>, Ch. III, repeats the
+tradition, but in <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i> he completely
+refutes his earlier opinion and the entire tradition. The further
+narrative in this chapter, especially the letters of Clarendon to
+Lewis, show that Lewis acted solely on his own
+initiative.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_785"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor785">[785]</a> Anonymously, in the <i>Edinburgh</i>, for
+April, 1861, Lewis had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern
+sense, and appears never to have accepted fully the theory that it
+was impossible to reconquer the South.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_786"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor786">[786]</a> Cited in Adams, <i>A Crisis in Downing
+Street</i>, p. 407.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_787"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor787">[787]</a> Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had
+characterized Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition
+and best practice. Palmerston agreed, but added that the same
+objection could be made to Lewis' speech. Maxwell,
+<i>Clarendon</i>, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862.
+Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think this called
+for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of the
+falsity of Palmerston's initiative. <i>Ibid.</i>, p.
+267.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_788"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor788">[788]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Oct. 16, 1862, warned
+against acceptance of Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as
+indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English
+opinion was with him, but ignorantly interpreted Cabinet hesitation
+to the "favour of the North and bitter enmity to the South, which
+has animated the diplomatic career of Lord Russell...." Throughout
+the war, Russell, to <i>The Index</i>, was the evil genius of the
+Government.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_789"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor789">[789]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_790"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor790">[790]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II,
+279.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_791"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor791">[791]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_792"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor792">[792]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863.
+<i>Commons</i>, Vol. I XII. "Correspondence relating to the Civil
+War in the United States of North America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two
+reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. Anderson's mission was to
+report on the alleged drafting of British subjects into the
+Northern Army.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_793"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor793">[793]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct.
+18, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_794"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor794">[794]</a> Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct.
+19, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_795"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor795">[795]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct.
+20, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_796"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor796">[796]</a> Russell Papers. It is significant that
+Palmerston's organ, the <i>Morning Post</i>, after a long silence
+came out on Oct. 21 with a sharp attack on Gladstone for his
+presumption. Lewis was also reflected upon, but less
+severely.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_797"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor797">[797]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II,
+265.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_798"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor798">[798]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C.F. Adams
+in <i>A Crisis in Downing Street</i>, p. 417, makes Russell state
+that the Government's intention was "to adhere to the rule of
+perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive assurance, and so
+understood by the American Minister.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_799"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor799">[799]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Oct. 23, 1862. "...
+while our people are starving, our commerce interrupted, our
+industry paralysed, our Ministry have no plan, no idea, no
+intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict
+neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait, like
+Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_800"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor800">[800]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_801"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor801">[801]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Russell, Oct. 24,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_802"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor802">[802]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct.
+24, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_803"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor803">[803]</a> Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24,
+1862."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_804"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor804">[804]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 84. Morley
+was the first to make clear that no final decision was reached on
+October 23, a date hitherto accepted as the end of the Cabinet
+crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a r&eacute;sum&eacute; of talk
+and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October 23 as the
+date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally agreed
+upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also "complete"
+(p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends in some
+degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important
+interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but
+this was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's <i>France and the
+Confederate Navy</i>, p. 126, and so came to be written into
+narratives of mediation proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the
+correct date. Rhodes' supposition that Seward's instructions of
+August 2 became known to Russell and were the determining factor in
+altering his intentions is evidently erroneous.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_805"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor805">[805]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II,
+265.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_806"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor806">[806]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 266.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_807"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor807">[807]</a> Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell,
+Oct. 24, 1862. Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American
+affairs.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_808"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor808">[808]</a> Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_809"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor809">[809]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_810"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor810">[810]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to
+Russell, Oct. 28, 1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He
+approved Drouyn de Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian
+archives that France approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at
+Paris, was instructed that while Russia had always been anxious to
+forward peace in America, she stood in peculiarly friendly
+relations with the United States, and was against any appearance of
+pressure. It would have the contrary effect from that hoped for. If
+England and France should offer mediation Russia, "being too far
+away," would not join, but might give her moral support. (Russian
+Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No. 320.) On the
+same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and was
+instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but
+to limit his efforts to approval of any <i>agreement</i> by the
+North and South to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of
+action if (as Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly
+come when both North and South were ready for peace, and it needed
+but the influence of some friendly hand to soothe raging passions
+and to lead the contending parties themselves to begin direct
+negotiations (<i>Ibid.</i>, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862
+(O.S.).)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_811"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor811">[811]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29,
+1862. Slidell's full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II,
+345.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_812"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor812">[812]</a> F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley
+thought neither party would consent unless it saw some military
+advantage. (Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.)
+Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II, 84-5, speaks of the French offer as
+"renewed proposals of mediation." There was no renewal for this was
+the <i>first</i> proposal, and it was not one of mediation though
+that was an implied result.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_813"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor813">[813]</a> Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday,
+November 1862, was the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston
+wrote.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_814"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor814">[814]</a> Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_815"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor815">[815]</a> Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here
+preserved has the additional interest of frequent marginal comments
+by Gladstone.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_816"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor816">[816]</a> The letters of "Historicus" early
+attracted, in the case of the <i>Trent</i>, favourable attention
+and respect. As early as 1863 they were put out in book form to
+satisfy a public demand: <i>Letters by Historicus on some questions
+of International Law</i>, London, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_817"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor817">[817]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter
+was dated Nov. 4.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_818"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor818">[818]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863, Lords,
+Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America."
+Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_819"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor819">[819]</a> For substance of the Russian answer to
+France see <i>ante</i>, p. 59, <i>note</i> 4. D'Oubril reported
+Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that the time was inopportune but as
+stating he had not expected Russia to join. The French Minister of
+Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article on his overtures that
+had appeared in the <i>Journal de Petersbourg</i>, and thought
+himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian
+Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and
+1912.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_820"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor820">[820]</a> Maxwell, <i>Clarendon</i>, II, 268. The
+letter, as printed, is dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of
+"yesterday." This appears to be an error. Gladstone's account is of
+a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11 and 12, with the decision reached
+and draft of reply to France outlined on the latter date. The
+article in the <i>Times</i>, referred to by Lewis, appeared on Nov.
+13.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_821"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor821">[821]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II,
+85.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_822"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor822">[822]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Lords</i>, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in
+North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_823"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor823">[823]</a> F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to
+Russell. The same day Napier wrote giving an account of an
+interview between the French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in
+which the latter stated Russia would take no chances of offending
+the North. <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 408.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_824"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor824">[824]</a> Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>, II ,85. To his
+wife, Nov. 13, 1862. Even after the answer to France there was some
+agitation in the Ministry due to the receipt from Stuart of a
+letter dated Oct. 31, in which it was urged that this was the most
+opportune moment for mediation because of Democratic successes in
+the elections. He enclosed also an account of a "horrible military
+reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that <i>ten</i>
+Southerners had been executed because of <i>one</i> Northerner
+seized by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers
+contain a series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all
+dated Nov. 14. "W." (Westbury?) refers to the "horrible
+atrocities," and urges that, if Russia will join, the French offer
+should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, "I had supposed the question
+to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This is horrible; but does
+not change my opinion of the course to be pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P.
+Villiers) wrote against accepting the French proposal, and
+commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of the
+South.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_825"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor825">[825]</a> Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_826"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor826">[826]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 15,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_827"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor827">[827]</a> The <i>Herald</i>, Nov. 14, 1862. This
+paper was listed by Hotze of <i>The Index</i>, as on his "pay
+roll." Someone evidently was trying to earn his
+salary.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_828"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor828">[828]</a> Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to
+reconcile Russell's editorials either with his later protestations
+of early conviction that the North would win or with the belief
+expressed by Americans that he was <i>constantly</i> pro-Northern
+in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in <i>A Cycle of Adams'
+Letters</i>, I, 14l.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_829"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor829">[829]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 20, 1862, p.
+56.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_830"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor830">[830]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 15, 1863, p.
+191.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_831"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor831">[831]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Jan. 22, 1863, p.
+201.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_832"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor832">[832]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, May 28, 1863, p.
+72.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_833"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor833">[833]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_834"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor834">[834]</a> Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov.
+29, 1862. This despatch is not in Richardson, <i>Messages and
+Papers of the Confederacy</i>, and illustrates the gaps in that
+publication.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_835"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor835">[835]</a> Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_836"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor836">[836]</a> Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904,
+in a speech at a banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's
+letter outlining it. <i>The Ottawa Sun</i>, Nov. 16,
+1904.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_837"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor837">[837]</a> Almost immediately after Lyons' return to
+Washington, Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that
+England and France planned to offer mediation and that if this were
+refused the South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the
+Foreign Office: "What good will this do?" It would not procure
+cotton unless the ports were forced open and a clear rupture made
+with the North. He thought England understood this, and still
+hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge that if all European Powers
+joined England and France they would be merely tails to the kite
+and that Russia would be one of the tails. This would weaken the
+Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her special
+relationship with the United States. He was against any
+<i>joint</i> European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O.,
+Nov. 5-17, 1862, No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this
+despatch: "Je trouve son opinion tr&egrave;s sage." If Stoeckl
+understood Lyons correctly then the latter had left England still
+believing that his arguments with Russell had been of no effect.
+When the news reached Washington of England's refusal of the French
+offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised (<i>Ibid.</i>, to
+F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_838"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor838">[838]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1832,
+<i>Commons</i>, Vol. LXXII, "Correspondence relating to the Civil
+War in the United States of North America." Nos. 47 and 50.
+Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had been Stuart's
+informant about political conditions in New York, felt that he had
+been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38.
+Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_839"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor839">[839]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore
+(Richmond) to Lyons, Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No.
+135. Bunch (Charleston) to Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of
+the "Constitutional hatred and jealousy of England, which are as
+strongly developed here as at the North. Indeed, our known
+antipathy to Slavery adds another element to Southern
+dislike."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_840"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor840">[840]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 579,
+Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most
+active of the Northern confidential agents abroad. A journalist
+himself, he had close contacts with the foreign press. It is
+interesting that he reported the Continental press as largely
+dependent for its American news and judgments upon the British
+press which specialized in that field, so that Continental tone was
+but a reflection of the British tone. <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 443. Bigelow
+to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_841"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor841">[841]</a> Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams'
+abilities. He wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense
+than any of the American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To
+Russell, Dec. 12, 1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_842"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor842">[842]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22.
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_843"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor843">[843]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_844"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor844">[844]</a> December 1, Brunow related an interview in
+which Russell expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia
+were in agreement that the moment was not opportune for a joint
+offer to the United States. Russell also stated that it was
+unfortunate France had pressed her proposal without a preliminary
+confidential sounding and understanding between the Powers; the
+British Government saw no reason for changing its attitude.
+(Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, 1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.)
+There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow knew of Russell's
+preliminary "soundings" of France.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_845"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor845">[845]</a> Various writers have treated Roebuck's
+motion in 1863 as the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the
+error of this will be shown.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_75"></a>[V2:pg 75]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2>
+<h3>THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862,
+relative to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted
+at the moment though time was to prove its permanence. The British
+press was full of suggestions that the first trial might more
+gracefully come from France since that country was presumed to be
+on more friendly terms with the United States<a name=
+"FNanchor846"></a><a href="#Footnote_846">[846]</a>. Others,
+notably Slidell at Paris, held the same view, and on January 8,
+1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon III, asking
+separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon dictated
+an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in courteous
+terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended
+recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor847"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_847">[847]</a>. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached
+Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the
+<i>New York Tribune</i>, to make an isolated French offer, but that
+he felt this would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto
+maintained in French-British relations. But Mercier added that if
+Lyons was disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to
+advise his Government to give him authority to act alone<a name=
+"FNanchor848"></a><a href="#Footnote_848">[848]</a>. Lyons made no
+comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that
+the Settlement of the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_76"></a>[V2:pg 76]</span> Contest should be made without the
+intervention of England."</p>
+<p>A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons
+desiring to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia
+should act alone, or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a
+proposal to the North<a name="FNanchor849"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_849">[849]</a>. This was based on the supposition that
+the North, weary of war, might ask the good offices of Russia.
+Lyons replied that he did not think that contingency near and
+otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions; but he was somewhat
+suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite forget that
+Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to
+Richmond together last Spring<a name="FNanchor850"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_850">[850]</a>." The day after this despatch was written
+Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on
+February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet
+polite language, but positively declining the proposal<a name=
+"FNanchor851"></a><a href="#Footnote_851">[851]</a>. Evidently
+Lyons was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London,
+Napoleon's overture to America was officially stated to be
+unobjectionable, as indeed was required by the implications of the
+reply of November 13, to France. Russell, on February 14, answered
+Lyons' communications in a letter marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston
+and the Queen":</p>
+<blockquote>"Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at
+present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer good
+offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would feel no
+jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part of France
+alone<a name="FNanchor852"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_852">[852]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_77"></a>[V2:pg 77]</span>
+<p>The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France
+had already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate
+any governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations
+with France on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the
+case and became increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's
+despatch to Lyons of February 14 appears rather to be evidence of
+the effect of the debates in Parliament when its sessions were
+resumed on February 5, for in both Lords and Commons there was
+given a hearty and nearly unanimous support of the Government's
+decision to make no overture for a cessation of the conflict in
+America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions of
+mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had
+practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action
+by neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be
+fully prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and
+strict neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved
+strict neutrality but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle
+speech and sharply attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable
+policy--merely a party speech. Russell upheld the Government's
+decision but went out of his way to assert that the entire
+subjugation of the South would be a calamity to the United States
+itself, since it would require an unending use of force to hold the
+South in submission<a name="FNanchor853"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_853">[853]</a>. Later, when news of the French offer at
+Washington had been received, the Government was attacked in the
+Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord Campbell, on the
+ground of a British divergence from close relations with France.
+Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that the time
+had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show the
+possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis
+that recognition of the South <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_78"></a>[V2:pg 78]</span> could justly be regarded by the
+North as an "unfriendly act<a name="FNanchor854"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_854">[854]</a>."</p>
+<p>Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in
+America, basing this attitude on neutral duty and national
+interests, and with barely a reference to the new policy of the
+North toward slavery, declared in the emancipation proclamations of
+September 22, 1862, and January 1, 1863, Had these great documents
+then no favourable influence on British opinion and action? Was the
+Northern determination to root out the institution of slavery, now
+clearly announced, of no effect in winning the favour of a people
+and Government long committed to a world policy against that
+institution? It is here necessary to review early British opinion,
+the facts preceding the first emancipation proclamation, and to
+examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln.</p>
+<p>Before the opening of actual military operations, while there
+was still hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been
+with the North on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as
+against a slave-owning society. But war once begun the disturbance
+to British trade interests and Lincoln's repeated declarations that
+the North had no intention of destroying slavery combined to offer
+an excuse and a reason for an almost complete shift of British
+opinion. The abolitionists of the North and the extreme
+anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in number in both
+countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause of the
+war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by
+thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct
+bearing on the position of Great Britain when the war was
+concluded. In May, 1861, Palmerston declared that it would be a
+happy day when "we could succeed in putting an end to this
+unnatural war between the two sections of our North American
+cousins," but <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_79"></a>[V2:pg
+79]</span> added that the difficulty for England was that
+"<i>We</i> could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment
+of slavery<a name="FNanchor855"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_855">[855]</a>...."</p>
+<p>Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused,
+indeed, a perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to
+the final outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken
+for granted. Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon
+largely disappeared from British discussion and in its place there
+cropped out, here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as
+to whether the war could long continue without a "servile
+insurrection," with all its attendant horrors.</p>
+<p>On July 6, 1861, the <i>Economist</i>, reviewing the progress of
+the war preparations to date, asserted that it was universally
+agreed no restoration of the Union was possible and answered
+British fears by declaring it was impossible to believe that even
+the American madness could contemplate a servile insurrection. The
+friendly <i>Spectator</i> also discussed the matter and repeatedly.
+It was a mistaken idea, said this journal, that there could be no
+enfranchisement without a slave rising, but should this occur, "the
+right of the slave to regain his freedom, even if the effort
+involve slaughter, is as clear as any other application of the
+right of self-defence<a name="FNanchor856"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_856">[856]</a>." Yet English abolitionists should not
+urge the slave to act for himself, since "as war goes on and all
+compromise fails the American mind will harden under the white heat
+and determine that the <i>cause</i> of all conflict must cease."
+That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern
+denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet
+Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to
+her as clear as anything in reason<a name=
+"FNanchor857"></a><a href="#Footnote_857">[857]</a>. She had no
+patience with English <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_80"></a>[V2:pg 80]</span> anti-slavery people who believed
+Northern protestations, and she did not express concern over the
+horrors of a possible servile insurrection. Nevertheless this
+spectre was constantly appearing. Again the <i>Spectator</i> sought
+to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed that even such a
+contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of the
+slave-power in the South<a name="FNanchor858"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_858">[858]</a>.</p>
+<p>Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument
+which pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the
+bulk of the British press was constant in holding up this bogie to
+its readers, even going to the point of weakening its argument of
+the impossibility of a Northern conquest of the South by appealing
+to history to show that England in her two wars with America had
+had a comparatively easy time in the South, thus postulating the
+real danger of some "negro Garibaldi calling his countrymen to
+arms<a name="FNanchor859"></a><a href="#Footnote_859">[859]</a>."
+Nor was this fear merely a pretended one. It affected all classes
+and partisans of both sides. Even official England shared in it;
+January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The question is rapidly tending
+towards the issue either of peace and a recognition of the
+separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the raising of a
+servile insurrection<a name="FNanchor860"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_860">[860]</a>." At nearly the same time Russell,
+returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden, expressed
+his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation,
+meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been
+since the revival of letters<a name="FNanchor861"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_861">[861]</a>." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic
+which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able
+examination of the underlying causes and probable results of the
+American conflict, excused the Northern leaders for early denial of
+a purpose to attack slavery, but expressed complete confidence that
+even these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_81"></a>[V2:pg
+81]</span> leaders by now understood the "almost certain results of
+success in the present conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and
+prophesied that "if the writers who so severely criticize the
+present moderation of the Free-soilers are desirous to see the war
+become an abolition war, it is probable that if the war lasts long
+enough they will be gratified<a name="FNanchor862"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_862">[862]</a>." John Bright, reaching a wider public,
+in speech after speech, expressed faith that the people of the
+North were "marching on, as I believe, to its [slavery's] entire
+abolition<a name="FNanchor863"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_863">[863]</a>."</p>
+<p>Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition
+war," and believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons,
+feared the same development; friends of the North pushed aside the
+thought of a "negro terror," yet even while hoping and declaring
+that the war would destroy slavery, could not escape from
+apprehensions of an event that appeared inevitable. Everywhere, to
+the British mind, it seemed that emancipation was necessarily a
+provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief largely
+affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact
+almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing.</p>
+<p>Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation
+weaken this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great
+advocate of abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake
+was Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
+Relations. He early took the ground that a proclamation everywhere
+emancipating the slaves would give to the Northern cause a moral
+support hitherto denied it in Europe and would at the same time
+strike a blow at Southern resistance. This idea was presented in a
+public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts, in October, 1861, but
+even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him mistaken and his
+expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he found at
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_82"></a>[V2:pg 82]</span>
+Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date
+Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with
+Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal
+activities for their realization were well known to English
+friends, as in his letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English
+public in general through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long
+been a well-known figure in the British press<a name=
+"FNanchor864"></a><a href="#Footnote_864">[864]</a>.</p>
+<p>Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous
+utterance in the 'fifties that the United States could not
+indefinitely continue to exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in
+1861, disapproved and recalled the orders of some of the military
+leaders, like Fremont, who without authority had sought to extend
+emancipation to slaves within the lines of their command. But as
+early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual emergence of
+emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that wise
+"border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the
+slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union
+and to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the
+time was ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the
+gradual approach through legislation and administrative act. In
+February, 1862, a Bill was under discussion in Congress, called the
+"Confiscation Bill," which, among other clauses, provided that all
+slaves of persons engaged in rebellion against the United States,
+who should by escape, or capture, come into the possession of the
+military forces of the United States, should be for ever free; but
+that this provision should not be operative until the expiration of
+sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity to cease their
+rebellion and retain their slaves<a name="FNanchor865"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_865">[865]</a>. This measure did not at first have
+Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the loyalists of the
+border states. Nevertheless he <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_83"></a>[V2:pg 83]</span> realized the growing strength of
+anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with it
+where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object
+of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred
+in a measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16,
+freeing the slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where
+there was no question of the constitutional power of the national
+Government.</p>
+<p>From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation
+proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict
+between Congress and President as to methods and extent of
+emancipation. Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln,
+looking steadily toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength
+of anti-slavery in the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and
+compensated emancipation. Neither party spoke the word "servile
+insurrection," yet both realized its possibility, and Seward, in
+foreign affairs, was quick to see and use it as a threat. A brief
+summary of measures will indicate the contest. March 6, Lincoln
+sent a message to Congress recommending that a joint resolution be
+passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national Government to any
+state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed purpose being
+to secure early action by the loyal border states in the hope that
+this might influence the Southern states<a name=
+"FNanchor866"></a><a href="#Footnote_866">[866]</a>. Neither the
+House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to
+this resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in
+debate, but it passed by substantial majorities in both branches
+and was approved by Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme
+radical element in Congress had yielded, momentarily, to the
+President's insistence on an olive-branch offering of compensated
+emancipation. Both as regards the border states and looking to the
+restoration of the Union, Lincoln was determined to <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_84"></a>[V2:pg 84]</span> give this line
+of policy a trial. The prevailing sentiment of Congress, however,
+preferred the punitive Confiscation Bill.</p>
+<p>At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department
+of the South," which theoretically included also the States of
+South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the
+slaves in these states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln
+immediately countermanded Hunter's order, stating that such action
+"under my responsibility, I reserve to myself<a name=
+"FNanchor867"></a><a href="#Footnote_867">[867]</a>." He renewed,
+in this same proclamation, earnest appeals to the border states, to
+embrace the opportunity offered by the Congressional resolution of
+April 10. In truth, border state attitude was the test of the
+feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary emancipation, but
+these states were unwilling to accept the plan. Meanwhile pressure
+was being exerted for action on the Confiscation Bill; it was
+pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his signature
+or veto. He signed it on July 12, <i>but did not notify that fact
+to Congress until July 17.</i> On this same day of signature, July
+12, Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary
+aid in voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the
+congressional representatives of the border states seeking their
+definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority
+were emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not
+affect the border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did
+not desire to free the slaves even if compensated<a name=
+"FNanchor868"></a><a href="#Footnote_868">[868]</a>.</p>
+<p>Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was
+forced toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the
+Confiscation Bill. On the day following his failure to win the
+border state representatives he told Seward and Welles who were
+driving with him, that he had <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_85"></a>[V2:pg 85]</span> come to the conclusion that the
+time was near for the issue of a proclamation of emancipation as a
+military measure fully within the competence of the President. This
+was on July 13<a name="FNanchor869"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_869">[869]</a>. Seward offered a few objections but
+apparently neither Cabinet official did more than listen to
+Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned on
+July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of
+an emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of
+which referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would
+be rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their
+allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of
+a gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the
+warning that for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a
+general emancipation of slaves would be proclaimed<a name=
+"FNanchor870"></a><a href="#Footnote_870">[870]</a>. All of the
+Cabinet approved except Blair who expressed fears of the effect on
+the approaching November elections, and Seward who, while
+professing sympathy with the indicated purpose, argued that the
+time was badly chosen in view of recent military disasters and the
+approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The measure, Seward said,
+might "be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a
+cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to
+Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the
+government. It will be considered our last <i>shriek</i> on the
+retreat." He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern
+victory. This appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the
+proclamation aside, waiting for victory<a name=
+"FNanchor871"></a><a href="#Footnote_871">[871]</a>."</p>
+<p>Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at
+Antietam, and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond.
+Five days later, September 22, Lincoln <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_86"></a>[V2:pg 86]</span> issued the
+proclamation, expanded and altered in text from the draft of July
+22, but in substance the same<a name="FNanchor872"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_872">[872]</a>. The loyal border states were not to be
+affected, but the proclamation renewed the promise of steps to be
+taken to persuade them to voluntary action. On January 1, 1863, a
+second proclamation, referring to that of September 22, was issued
+by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested as
+commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in
+time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government
+of the United States...." The states affected were designated by
+name and all persons held as slaves within them "are, and
+henceforward shall be, free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people
+so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in
+necessary self-defence...." "And upon this act, sincerely believed
+to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon
+military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind,
+and the gracious favour of Almighty God<a name=
+"FNanchor873"></a><a href="#Footnote_873">[873]</a>."</p>
+<p>Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical
+Sumner began his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when
+Lincoln's pledge of emancipation was made. Did these steps
+indicate, as British opinion unquestionably held, an intention to
+rouse a servile insurrection? Was the Confiscation Bill passed with
+that purpose in view and had Lincoln decided to carry it into
+effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is, indeed, the great
+marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in England only,
+but in America also. It was the expectation of the North and the
+constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the
+<i>purpose</i> of the emancipation proclamation?</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_87"></a>[V2:pg 87]</span>
+<p>This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American
+historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to
+motives at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are
+made to cover nearly the entire argument for emancipation in
+September, 1862, but in just what manner the military prowess of
+the North was to be increased was not at first indicated. In 1864,
+Lincoln declared that after the failure of successive efforts to
+persuade the border states to accept compensated emancipation he
+had believed there had arrived the "indispensable necessity for
+military emancipation and arming the blacks<a name=
+"FNanchor874"></a><a href="#Footnote_874">[874]</a>." Repeatedly in
+later defence of the proclamation he urged the benefits that had
+come from his act and asserted that commanders in the field
+"believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured troops
+constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion<a name=
+"FNanchor875"></a><a href="#Footnote_875">[875]</a>." He added:
+"negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do
+anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake
+their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive,
+even the promise of freedom."</p>
+<p>There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor
+did Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his
+mind, though the thought of such possible result must have been
+present--was, indeed, present to most minds even without a
+proclamation of emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply
+to draw away slaves, wherever possible, from their rebellious
+masters, thus reducing the economic powers of resistance of the
+South, and then to make these ex-slaves directly useful in winning
+the war. But after the war, even here and there during it, a theory
+was advanced that an impelling motive with the President had been
+the hope of influencing favourably <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_88"></a>[V2:pg 88]</span> foreign governments and peoples by
+stamping the Northern cause with a high moral purpose. In popular
+opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a far-visioned statesman in
+anticipating that which ultimately came to pass. This has important
+bearing on the relations of the United States and Great
+Britain.</p>
+<p>There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had
+believed in 1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize
+strongly with the North. The event did not prove this to be the
+case, nor could the North justly complain in the face of
+administration denials of an anti-slavery purpose. The English
+Government therefore was widely upheld by British opinion in
+regarding the struggle from the point of view of British interests.
+Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of slavery
+compelled British governmental consideration. As early as December,
+1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported a
+conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that
+the South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade<a name=
+"FNanchor876"></a><a href="#Footnote_876">[876]</a>. This was
+limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which
+in substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition
+that Southern agents in England found it hard to explain<a name=
+"FNanchor877"></a><a href="#Footnote_877">[877]</a>. As already
+noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even
+after Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the
+American rupture<a name="FNanchor878"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_878">[878]</a>. By September, 1861, John Bright was
+writing to his friend Sumner that, all indications to the contrary,
+England would warmly support the North <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_89"></a>[V2:pg 89]</span> if only it could
+be shown that emancipation was an object<a name=
+"FNanchor879"></a><a href="#Footnote_879">[879]</a>. Again and
+again he urged, it is interesting to note, just those ideals of
+gradual and compensated emancipation which were so strongly held by
+Lincoln. In this same month the <i>Spectator</i> thought it was
+"idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all
+disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause
+rather than at the effect<a name="FNanchor880"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_880">[880]</a>." Three weeks later the <i>Spectator</i>,
+reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as
+follows:</p>
+<blockquote>"If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think
+you madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of
+Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in
+holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud your
+worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set forth
+continually that you have forfeited all claim to the <i>popular</i>
+sympathy of England."</blockquote>
+<p>This, said the <i>Spectator</i>, had been stated in the most
+objectionable style by the <i>Times</i> in particular, which,
+editorially, had alleged that "the North has now lost the chance of
+establishing a high moral superiority by a declaration against
+slavery." To all this the <i>Spectator</i> declared that the North
+must adopt the bold course and make clear that restoration of the
+Union was not intended with the old canker at its roots<a name=
+"FNanchor881"></a><a href="#Footnote_881">[881]</a>.</p>
+<p>Official England held a different view. Russell believed that
+the separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction
+of slavery since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great
+and prosperous free North, with a population united in ideals,
+would be forced, ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He
+professed that he could not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the
+war <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_90"></a>[V2:pg 90]</span>
+and thought she and Sumner "animated by a spirit of
+vengeance<a name="FNanchor882"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_882">[882]</a>." If the South did yield and the Union
+were restored <i>with</i> slavery, Russell thought that "Slavery
+would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish for
+separation<a name="FNanchor883"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_883">[883]</a>." These views were repeated frequently by
+Russell. He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation,
+but was careful to state, "I give you these views merely as
+speculations," and it is worthy of note that after midsummer of
+1862 he rarely indulged in them. Against such speculations, whether
+by Russell or by others, Mill protested in his famous article in
+<i>Fraser's</i>, February, 1862<a name="FNanchor884"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_884">[884]</a>.</p>
+<p>On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did
+so. Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search
+off the African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression
+of the African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by
+Great Britain but persistently refused by the United States. It
+could not well be declined now by the British Government and was
+signed by Seward, April 8, 1862<a name="FNanchor885"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_885">[885]</a>, but if he expected any change in British
+attitude as a result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South
+of that trade might be a barrier to British goodwill, but the
+action of the North was viewed as but a weak attempt to secure
+British sympathy, and to mark the limits of Northern anti-slavery
+efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager for the treaty on
+other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any interest in
+the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have done ...
+they have done grudgingly and imperfectly<a name=
+"FNanchor886"></a><a href="#Footnote_886">[886]</a>."</p>
+<p>This was written at the exact period when Palmerston
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_91"></a>[V2:pg 91]</span> and
+Russell were initiating those steps which were to result in the
+Cabinet crisis on mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly
+the Slave Trade treaty with America had not influenced governmental
+attitude. At this juncture there was founded, November, 1862, the
+London Emancipation Society, with the avowed object of stirring
+anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against "favouring the South."
+But George Thompson, its organizer, had been engaged in the
+preliminary work of organization for some months and the Society is
+therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group who
+were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause
+and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's
+proclamation<a name="FNanchor887"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_887">[887]</a>. Thus for England as a whole and for
+official England the declarations of these few voices were regarded
+as expressive of a wish rather than as consistent with the facts.
+The moral uplift of an anti-slavery object was denied to the
+North.</p>
+<p>This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by
+the emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for
+so believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times,
+though rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz,
+American Minister at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September
+14, 1861, strongly urging the declaration of an anti-slavery
+purpose in the war and asserting that public opinion in Europe
+would then be such in favour of the North that no government would
+"dare to place itself, by declaration or act, upon the side of a
+universally condemned institution<a name="FNanchor888"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_888">[888]</a>." There is no evidence that Seward showed
+this despatch to Lincoln, but in January, 1862, Schurz returned to
+America and in <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_92"></a>[V2:pg
+92]</span> conversation with the President urged the "moral issue"
+to prevent foreign intervention. The President replied: "You may be
+right. Probably you are. I have been thinking so myself. I cannot
+imagine that any European power would dare to recognize and aid the
+Southern Confederacy if it became clear that the Confederacy stands
+for slavery and the Union for freedom<a name=
+"FNanchor889"></a><a href="#Footnote_889">[889]</a>." No doubt
+others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign
+friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the
+North<a name="FNanchor890"></a><a href="#Footnote_890">[890]</a>,
+and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work in the
+spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue."
+The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant
+proclamation of Northern <i>intention</i> to free the
+slaves<a name="FNanchor891"></a><a href="#Footnote_891">[891]</a>.
+Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner
+pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition
+arguments which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign
+effect. On the general question of emancipation Lincoln listened,
+even telling Sumner that he "was ahead of himself only a month or
+six weeks<a name="FNanchor892"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_892">[892]</a>."</p>
+<p>Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July,
+1862, when strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the
+President to issue a general proclamation of emancipation, he
+reasserted in the famous reply to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one
+single purpose to restore the Union "with or without slavery."</p>
+<blockquote>"If there be those who would not save the Union unless
+they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with
+them.<br>
+<br>
+"If there be those who would not save the Union unless <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_93"></a>[V2:pg 93]</span> they could at
+the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them.<br>
+<br>
+"<i>My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to
+save or to destroy slavery</i><a name="FNanchor893"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_893">[893]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet
+unknown to the public at the moment there had already been drafted
+and discussed in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had
+presented abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A
+month later, September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came
+to Washington, had an audience with Lincoln, presented similar
+arguments, but also laid stress on the necessity of securing the
+sympathy of Europe. This was but nine days before the first
+proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied much as to Greeley,
+though he stated, "I will also concede that Emancipation would help
+us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something
+more than ambition<a name="FNanchor894"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_894">[894]</a>." Immediately after the event, September
+24, making a short speech to a serenading party, Lincoln said, "I
+can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is now for the
+country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon
+it<a name="FNanchor895"></a><a href="#Footnote_895">[895]</a>."
+Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual message to
+Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign countries as
+resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt mainly on
+the beneficial effects at home<a name="FNanchor896"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_896">[896]</a>.</p>
+<p>Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have
+been convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the
+proclamation. On the contrary, if he <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_94"></a>[V2:pg 94]</span> trusted Seward's judgment he may
+have <i>feared</i> the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's
+prophecy. Here may have lain the true meaning of Lincoln's speech
+of September 24--that it was now for "the world to pass judgment
+and, maybe, take action upon it." After all foreign policy, though
+its main lines were subject to the President's control, was in the
+hands of Seward and throughout this entire period of six months
+since the introduction of the Confiscation Bill up to Lincoln's
+presentation of his draft proclamation to the Cabinet in July,
+Seward had been using the threat of a servile insurrection as a
+deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At times Seward
+connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at times not.</p>
+<p>Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal
+to Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he
+could not state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had
+been met with what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as
+unjustifiable declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the
+conflict Lyons and Mercier had been constant in representing the
+hardships inflicted by the American war upon the economic interests
+of their respective countries. Both men bore down upon the
+interruption of the cotton trade and Seward kept repeating that
+Northern victories would soon release the raw cotton. He expected
+and promised much from the capture of New Orleans, but the results
+were disappointing. As time went on Seward became convinced that
+material interests alone would determine the attitude and action of
+Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand in
+the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when
+the war was over <i>provided</i> the war did not take on an
+uncivilized and sanguinary character through a rising of the
+slaves. If that occurred cotton would be burned and destroyed and
+cotton supply to Europe would <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_95"></a>[V2:pg 95]</span> be not merely a matter of
+temporary interruption, but one of long-continued dearth with no
+certainty of early resumption. Fearing the growth in England,
+especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward threatened a
+Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not so much
+in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the
+material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign
+attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the
+winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of
+servile insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for
+fear it would cause that very intervention which it was his object
+to prevent.</p>
+<p>His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In
+February, 1862, the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in
+Congress. In April, Mercier's trip to Richmond<a name=
+"FNanchor897"></a><a href="#Footnote_897">[897]</a> had caused much
+speculation and started many rumours in London of plans of
+mediation<a name="FNanchor898"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_898">[898]</a>. On May 28, Seward wrote to Adams at
+great length and especially emphasized two points: first that while
+diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from discussing
+slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to state
+that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression of
+slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign
+nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a
+war, Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all
+European interests<a name="FNanchor899"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_899">[899]</a>...." A copy of this instruction Adams
+gave to Russell on June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in
+reply to a query about mediation that it would result in a servile
+war<a name="FNanchor900"></a><a href="#Footnote_900">[900]</a>.
+Evidently Adams perfectly understood Seward's policy.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_96"></a>[V2:pg 96]</span>
+<p>On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned
+emancipation proclamation and that this was his first mention of it
+to anyone. Seward commented favourably but wished to consider the
+proposal in all its bearings before committing himself<a name=
+"FNanchor901"></a><a href="#Footnote_901">[901]</a>. The day
+following he transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that
+day introduced into Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual
+and compensated emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was
+unusual. Seward sent the Bill without material comment<a name=
+"FNanchor902"></a><a href="#Footnote_902">[902]</a>, but it is
+apparent that this method and measure of emancipation would much
+better fit in with his theory of the slavery question in relation
+to foreign powers, than would an outright proclamation of
+emancipation.</p>
+<p>Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in
+British neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that
+he had learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet
+might soon "take new ground<a name="FNanchor903"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_903">[903]</a>." This despatch if it reached Seward
+previous to the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to
+his conviction of the inadvisability of now issuing the
+proclamation. In that Cabinet, Seward in fact went much beyond the
+customary historical statement that he advised postponement of the
+proclamation until the occurrence of a Northern victory; he argued,
+according to Secretary of War Stanton's notes of the meeting, "That
+foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery
+for the sake of cotton.... We break up our relations with foreign
+nations and the production of cotton for sixty years<a name=
+"FNanchor904"></a><a href="#Footnote_904">[904]</a>." These views
+did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed action. Ten days later
+Seward sent that long instruction to Adams covering the whole
+ground of feared European intervention, which, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_97"></a>[V2:pg 97]</span> fortunately,
+Adams was never called upon to carry out<a name=
+"FNanchor905"></a><a href="#Footnote_905">[905]</a>. In it there
+was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid
+the South, and again it is the materialistic view that is
+emphasized. Seward was clinging to his theory of correct
+policy.</p>
+<p>Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in
+governmental circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the
+day before Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet,
+Stuart in reviewing military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means
+relied upon for weakening the South is included a servile
+war<a name="FNanchor906"></a><a href="#Footnote_906">[906]</a>." To
+this Russell replied: "... I have to observe that the prospect of a
+servile war will only make other nations more desirous to see an
+end of this desolating and destructive conflict<a name=
+"FNanchor907"></a><a href="#Footnote_907">[907]</a>." This was but
+brief reiteration of a more exact statement by Russell made in
+comment on Seward's first hint of servile war in his despatch to
+Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been given to Russell on June
+20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's arguments, commented on
+the fast increasing bitterness of the American conflict, disturbing
+and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon
+by Mr. Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another
+element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of
+property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a country so
+lately prosperous and tranquil<a name="FNanchor908"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_908">[908]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the
+Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart
+presented a copy of the despatch to Seward <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_98"></a>[V2:pg 98]</span> on August
+16<a name="FNanchor909"></a><a href="#Footnote_909">[909]</a>. On
+August 22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as
+purely a manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign
+governments<a name="FNanchor910"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_910">[910]</a>. Where did Stuart get the news if not
+from Seward, since he also reported the latter's success in
+postponing the proclamation?</p>
+<p>In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in
+the light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both
+believed such an event would add to the argument for foreign
+intervention. The <i>threat</i> Seward had regarded as useful; the
+<i>event</i> would be highly dangerous to the North. Not so,
+however, did emancipation appear in prospect to American diplomats
+abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in attempting to carry out the
+ideas and plans of his chief, but as early as February, 1862, he
+had urged a Northern declaration in regard to slavery in order to
+meet in England Southern private representations that, independence
+won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual emancipation to
+be applied "to all persons born after some specific date<a name=
+"FNanchor911"></a><a href="#Footnote_911">[911]</a>." Motley, at
+Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in private letters to his
+friends in America, urged some forward step on slavery<a name=
+"FNanchor912"></a><a href="#Footnote_912">[912]</a>, but no such
+advice in despatches found its way into the selected correspondence
+annually sent to print by Seward. Far more important was the
+determination taken by Adams, less than a month after he had
+presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward, to
+give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention
+would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object
+in the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_99"></a>[V2:pg
+99]</span> war and that the North should be prepared to meet an
+European offer of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish
+slavery such mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would
+probably put an end to the mediation itself, but it would also
+greatly strengthen the Northern position abroad<a name=
+"FNanchor913"></a><a href="#Footnote_913">[913]</a>.</p>
+<p>This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it
+was assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on
+July 24, Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of
+emancipation, wrote to Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that
+European powers would not be encouraged in interference, because of
+material interests, by a Northern attempt to free the
+slaves<a name="FNanchor914"></a><a href="#Footnote_914">[914]</a>.
+Motley's answer began, "A thousand times No," and Adams repeated
+his plea for a moral issue<a name="FNanchor915"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_915">[915]</a>. September 25, Adams met Seward's
+"material interests" argument by declaring that for Great Britain
+the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not scarcity, but
+uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but know what
+to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the
+Government<a name="FNanchor916"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_916">[916]</a>. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not
+agree with Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet
+received when the day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln
+issued the proclamation. On that day in sending the text to Adams
+the comment of Seward was brief. The proclamation, he said, put
+into effect a policy the approach of which he had "heretofore
+indicated to our representatives abroad," and he laid emphasis on
+the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation was to convince
+the South that its true interests were in the preservation of the
+Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was the return of
+the South <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_100"></a>[V2:pg
+100]</span> <i>with its slaves</i><a name=
+"FNanchor917"></a><a href="#Footnote_917">[917]</a>. Certainly this
+was far from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident.
+Seward's first thought was that having held up the threat of
+servile insurrection he must now remove that bogie. Four days later
+his judgment was improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained
+with vigour, the "high moral purpose" argument as evinced in the
+emancipation proclamation. "The interests of humanity," he wrote to
+Adams, "have now become identified with the cause of our
+country<a name="FNanchor918"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_918">[918]</a>...."</p>
+<p>That the material interests of Great Britain were still in
+Seward's thought is shown by the celerity with which under
+Lincoln's orders he grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to
+liberated slaves. Stuart wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker,
+secretary of the colony of British Guiana, was coming from Demerara
+to Washington to secure additional labour for the British colony by
+offering to carry away ex-slaves<a name="FNanchor919"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_919">[919]</a>. This scheme was no secret and five days
+after the issue of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a
+convention by which the British Government would be permitted to
+transport to the West Indies, or to any of its colonies, the
+negroes about to be emancipated. On September 30, Adams was
+instructed to take up the matter at London<a name=
+"FNanchor920"></a><a href="#Footnote_920">[920]</a>. Russell was at
+first disinclined to consider such a convention and discussion
+dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed, this
+time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_101"></a>[V2:pg 101]</span>
+influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the
+attitude of the British Government<a name=
+"FNanchor921"></a><a href="#Footnote_921">[921]</a>.</p>
+<p>To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a
+matter for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not
+at once convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North.
+But if it be remembered that in the North itself the proclamation
+was greeted, save by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt
+extending even to bitter opposition and that British governmental
+and public opinion had long dreaded a servile insurrection--even of
+late taking its cue from Seward's own prophecies--the cool
+reception given by the Government, the vehement and vituperative
+explosions of the press do not seem so surprising. "This
+Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September 23, "seems a
+brutum fulmen<a name="FNanchor922"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_922">[922]</a>." One of the President's motives, he
+thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no
+pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a
+Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct
+encouragement to servile insurrections<a name=
+"FNanchor923"></a><a href="#Footnote_923">[923]</a>." Received in
+England during the Cabinet struggle over mediation the proclamation
+appears not to have affected that controversy, though Russell
+sought to use it as an argument for British action. In his
+memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove to show that the
+purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both on the
+horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:</p>
+<blockquote>"What will be the practical effect of declaring
+emancipation, not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed
+by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_102"></a>[V2:pg 102]</span>
+the Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and
+retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile community, it
+is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms of the United States
+penetrate, a premium will be given to acts of plunder, of
+incendiarism, and of revenge. The military and naval authorities of
+the United States will be bound by their orders to maintain and
+protect the perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the
+Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be
+disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors of
+land alike reduced to beggary<a name="FNanchor924"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_924">[924]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating
+the proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one
+situation in the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation.
+Citations setting forth such comment have frequently been gathered
+together illustrative of the extent of press condemnation and of
+its unity in vicious editorials<a name="FNanchor925"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_925">[925]</a>. There is no need to repeat many of them
+here, but a few will indicate their tone. The <i>Times</i> greeted
+the news with an assertion that this was a final desperate play by
+Lincoln, as hope of victory waned. It was his "last card<a name=
+"FNanchor926"></a><a href="#Footnote_926">[926]</a>," a phrase that
+caught the fancy of lesser papers and was repeated by them. October
+21, appeared the "strongest" of the <i>Times</i> editorials:</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image10.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image10.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image10.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR.</b><br>
+<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"... We have here the history of the beginning of the
+end, but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet
+to be filled before the inevitable separation is accomplished? Are
+scenes like those which we a short time since described from
+Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the reign of the last PRESIDENT to
+go out amid horrible massacres of <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_103"></a>[V2:pg 103]</span> white women and children, to be
+followed by the extermination of the black race in the South? Is
+LINCOLN yet a name not known to us as it will be known to
+posterity, and is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue
+of monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their
+kind?<br>
+<br>
+"... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to what the
+consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be, except that it
+certainly will not have the effect of restoring the Union. It will
+not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the distinctive affix which he will
+share with many, for the most part foolish and incompetent, Kings
+and Emperors, Caliphs and Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the
+Last.'"</blockquote>
+<p>The <i>Times</i> led the way; other papers followed on. The
+<i>Liverpool Post</i> thought a slave rising inevitable<a name=
+"FNanchor927"></a><a href="#Footnote_927">[927]</a>, as did also
+nearly every paper acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or
+professedly neutral, while even pro-Northern journals at first
+feared the same results<a name="FNanchor928"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_928">[928]</a>. Another striking phrase, "Brutum
+Fulmen," ran through many editorials. The <i>Edinburgh Review</i>
+talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair<a name=
+"FNanchor929"></a><a href="#Footnote_929">[929]</a>," which was
+little different from Seward's feared "last shriek."
+<i>Blackwood's</i> thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless,
+devilish." It "justifies the South in raising the black flag, and
+proclaiming a war without quarter<a name="FNanchor930"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_930">[930]</a>." But there is no need to expand the
+citation of the well-nigh universal British press pouring out of
+the wrath of heaven upon Lincoln, and his emancipation
+proclamation<a name="FNanchor931"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_931">[931]</a>.</p>
+<p>Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at
+first expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is
+apparent that here and there a part of this British wrath was due
+to a fear that, in spite of denials of such influence, the
+proclamation was intended to arouse public opinion against projects
+of intervention and <i>might so arouse it</i>. The New York
+correspondent of the <i>Times</i> wrote that it was "promulgated
+evidently as a sop to keep <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_104"></a>[V2:pg 104]</span> England and France quiet<a name=
+"FNanchor932"></a><a href="#Footnote_932">[932]</a>," and on
+October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very important
+object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition
+cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro
+or the South, but at Europe." <i>Bell's Weekly Messenger</i>
+believed that it was now "the imperative duty of England and France
+to do what they can in order to prevent the possible occurrence of
+a crime which, if carried out, would surpass in atrocity any
+similar horror the world has ever seen<a name=
+"FNanchor933"></a><a href="#Footnote_933">[933]</a>." "Historicus,"
+on the other hand, asked: "What is that solution of the negro
+question to which an English Government is prepared to affix the
+seal of English approbation<a name="FNanchor934"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_934">[934]</a>?" Mason, the Confederate Agent in London,
+wrote home that it was generally believed the proclamation was
+issued "as the means of warding off recognition.... It was seen
+through at once and condemned accordingly<a name=
+"FNanchor935"></a><a href="#Footnote_935">[935]</a>."</p>
+<p>This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives
+the dictum that the proclamation exercised little influence on
+immediate British governmental policy, but does offer some ground
+for the belief that strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw
+the need of combating an argument dangerous to the carrying out of
+projects of mediation. Yet the new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did
+not immediately appeal even to his friends. The <i>Spectator</i>
+deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_105"></a>[V2:pg 105]</span> favour of the
+principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is not that a
+human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him
+unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality
+whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon
+its merits as a political measure<a name="FNanchor936"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_936">[936]</a>." Two weeks later, reporting a public
+speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which
+Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the
+<i>Spectator</i>, while taking issue with the speaker's statements,
+commented that it was not to be understood as fully defending a
+system of government which chose its executive "from the ranks of
+half-educated mechanics<a name="FNanchor937"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_937">[937]</a>."</p>
+<p>Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though
+loudly applauded by the abolitionists, was received with
+misgivings. Lincoln was disappointed at the public reaction and
+became very despondent, though this was due, in part, to the
+failure of McClellan to follow up the victory of Antietam. The
+elections of October and November went heavily against the
+administration and largely on the alleged ground of the President's
+surrender to the radicals<a name="FNanchor938"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_938">[938]</a>. The army as a whole was not favourably
+stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as but a
+useless bit of "waste paper<a name="FNanchor939"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_939">[939]</a>." In England, John Bright, the most
+ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud
+heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and
+even then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public
+interest was much aroused and that attention was now fixed on
+January 1, the date set by Lincoln for actual enforcement of
+emancipation<a name="FNanchor940"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_940">[940]</a>. In a speech at Birmingham, December 18,
+Bright had little to <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_106"></a>[V2:pg 106]</span> say of emancipation; rather he
+continued to use previous arguments against the South for
+admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery
+was the very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and
+society<a name="FNanchor941"></a><a href="#Footnote_941">[941]</a>.
+A few public meetings at points where favour to the North had been
+shown were tried in October and November with some success but with
+no great show of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that
+the wind of public opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising
+had been created by the proclamation began to veer in favour of the
+emancipation edict<a name="FNanchor942"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_942">[942]</a>. By the end of the year it appeared that
+the Press, in holding up horrified hands and prophesying a servile
+war had "overshot the mark<a name="FNanchor943"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_943">[943]</a>."</p>
+<p>Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the
+cause of emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by
+Jefferson Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he
+declared that Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a
+servile insurrection," and that therefore it was now ordered "all
+negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the
+executive authorities of the respective States to which they
+belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said State." This
+by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for his freedom,
+even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave a good
+handle for accusations of Southern ferocity<a name=
+"FNanchor944"></a><a href="#Footnote_944">[944]</a>.</p>
+<p>Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in
+December that the promised January proclamation might still mean
+servile war. He hoped that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor
+Davis' threat of retaliation would be <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_107"></a>[V2:pg 107]</span> carried into
+effect<a name="FNanchor945"></a><a href="#Footnote_945">[945]</a>.
+Russell regarded the January 1 proclamation as "a measure of war of
+a very questionable kind<a name="FNanchor946"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_946">[946]</a>."</p>
+<p>But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its
+fears of an "abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with
+the last week of December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each
+succeeding month, there took place meeting after meeting at which
+strong resolutions were passed enthusiastically endorsing the issue
+of the emancipation proclamation and pledging sympathy to the cause
+of the North. The <i>Liberator</i> from week to week, listed and
+commented on these public meetings, noting fifty-six held between
+December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The American Minister
+reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved resolutions
+or presented them in person through selected delegations. The
+resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield,
+January 10:</p>
+<blockquote>"<i>Resolved</i>: that this meeting being convinced
+that slavery is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on
+in the American States, and that the object of the leaders of the
+rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman system
+of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion may be
+crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the Federal
+Government may be strengthened to pursue its emancipation policy
+till not a slave be left on the American soil<a name=
+"FNanchor947"></a><a href="#Footnote_947">[947]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_108"></a>[V2:pg 108]</span>
+<p>Adams quoted the <i>Times</i> as referring to these meetings as
+made up of "nobodies." Adams commented:</p>
+<blockquote>"They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class,
+but they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most
+exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave Trade
+by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol, and who at
+a later period overcame all their resistance to the complete
+emancipation of the negro slaves in the British dependencies. If
+they become once fully aroused to a sense of the importance of this
+struggle as a purely moral question, I feel safe in saying there
+will be an end of all effective sympathy in Great Britain with the
+rebellion<a name="FNanchor948"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_948">[948]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine
+expression of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the
+working classes," and was confident the Government would be much
+influenced by them<a name="FNanchor949"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_949">[949]</a>. The newspapers, though still editorially
+unfavourable to the emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed
+communications with increasing frequency in which were expressed
+the same ideas as in the public meetings. This was even more
+noticeable in the provincial press. Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant
+of Birmingham, was a prolific letter writer to the <i>Birmingham
+Post</i>, consistently upholding the Northern cause and he now
+reiterated the phrase, "Mr. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_109"></a>[V2:pg 109]</span> Lincoln's cause is just and
+holy<a name="FNanchor950"></a><a href="#Footnote_950">[950]</a>."
+In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the proclamation to
+touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear the fact
+that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict to
+states not in rebellion<a name="FNanchor951"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_951">[951]</a>. On the public platform no one equalled
+the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of
+meetings attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had
+spoken twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in
+evidence. Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged
+anti-slavery feeling, now strongly for the North<a name=
+"FNanchor952"></a><a href="#Footnote_952">[952]</a>.</p>
+<p>Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had
+united in an address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet
+Beecher Stowe now replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of
+her English sisters. A largely signed "round robin" letter assured
+her that English women were still the foes of slavery and were
+indignantly united against suggestions of British recognition of
+the South<a name="FNanchor953"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_953">[953]</a>. Working class Britain was making its
+voice heard in support of the North. To those of Manchester,
+Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of thanks
+for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships
+resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I
+cannot" he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the
+question [of human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian
+heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any
+country<a name="FNanchor954"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_954">[954]</a>." Nonconformist England now came
+vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London, made
+his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_110"></a>[V2:pg 110]</span>
+the North; give victory to their arms<a name=
+"FNanchor955"></a><a href="#Footnote_955">[955]</a>." Further and
+more general expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a
+result of a letter received February 12, 1863, from a number of
+French pastors and laymen, urging all the Evangelical churches to
+unite in an address to Lincoln. The London and Manchester
+Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up a document for
+signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption at a
+meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An
+Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations
+throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition"
+but the address was carried by a large majority and two
+representatives, Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the
+message in person to the brethren across the ocean<a name=
+"FNanchor956"></a><a href="#Footnote_956">[956]</a>. Discussion
+arose over the Biblical sanction of slavery. In the <i>Times</i>
+appeared an editorial pleading this sanction and arguing the
+<i>duty</i> of slaves to refuse liberty<a name=
+"FNanchor957"></a><a href="#Footnote_957">[957]</a>. Goldwin Smith,
+Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in a
+pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery<a name=
+"FNanchor958"></a><a href="#Footnote_958">[958]</a>?" His position
+and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to the
+North.</p>
+<p>Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive,
+became aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863,
+proclamation made good his pledge of the previous September: other
+elements of opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like
+measure, and everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile
+insurrection largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England
+went to such <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_111"></a>[V2:pg
+111]</span> lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound
+and alarm the <i>Saturday Review</i>, which called these
+demonstrations a "carnival of cant<a name=
+"FNanchor959"></a><a href="#Footnote_959">[959]</a>." More neutral
+minds were perplexed over the practical difficulties and might well
+agree with Schleiden who wrote in January, 1863, quoting
+Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men slaves, or
+slaves free<a name="FNanchor960"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_960">[960]</a>?" But by the end of January the popular
+approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the
+twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great
+mass meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The
+meeting had been advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the
+hour arrived the hall was jammed and the corridors filled. A second
+meeting was promptly organized for the lower hall, but even so the
+people seeking admission crowded Exeter Street and seriously
+impeded traffic in the Strand. Outdoor meetings listened to reports
+of what was going on in the Hall and cheered the speakers. The main
+address was made by the Rev. Newman Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few
+Southern sympathizers who attempted to heckle the speakers were
+quickly shouted down<a name="FNanchor961"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_961">[961]</a>.</p>
+<p>The "carnival of cant," as the <i>Saturday Review</i> termed it,
+was truly a popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders,
+but supported by the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its
+first effect was to restore courage and confidence to Northern
+supporters in the upper classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation,
+yet with some misgivings. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_112"></a>[V2:pg 112]</span> He now joined in the movement
+and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on "Slavery and
+Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.</p>
+<p>In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's <i>American
+Union</i>, which had been greeted with great interest in England
+and had influenced largely upper-class attitude in favour of the
+South, Cairnes had published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was
+a reasoned analysis of the basis of slavery and a direct challenge
+to the thesis of Spence<a name="FNanchor962"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_962">[962]</a>. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a
+slave power, Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet
+began to be read with more conviction by that class which until now
+had been coldly neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in
+the Northern cause than that stirred by the emotional reception
+given the emancipation proclamation. Yet at bottom it was
+emancipation that brought this reasoning public to seek in such
+works as that of Cairnes a logical basis for a change of heart.
+Even in official circles, utterances previously made in private
+correspondence, or in governmental conversations only, were now
+ventured in public by friends of the North. On April 1, 1863, at a
+banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the Duke of Argyll
+ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a speech of
+the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of
+Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to
+object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one,"
+Argyll said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient
+combination of the Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to
+pray and hope that the contest, whenever it may be brought to an
+end, shall bring with it that great blessing to the white race
+which shall consist in the final freedom of the black<a name=
+"FNanchor963"></a><a href="#Footnote_963">[963]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_113"></a>[V2:pg 113]</span>
+<p>The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America
+that governmental England would show some evidence of a more
+friendly attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying
+the ideas he thought it would be wise for the public meetings to
+adopt. It read:</p>
+<blockquote>"Whereas, while <i>heretofore</i> States, and Nations,
+have tolerated slavery, <i>recently</i>, for the first time in the
+world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the
+basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain,
+enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore,<br>
+<br>
+<i>Resolved</i>: that no such embryo State should ever be
+recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and
+civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men
+everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such
+recognition or admission<a name="FNanchor964"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_964">[964]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to
+Washington, in November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation
+proclamation as a political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful
+one. The administration he thought was losing ground and the people
+tired of the war. This was the burden of his private letters to
+Russell up to March, 1863, but does not appear in his official
+despatches in which there was nothing to give offence to Northern
+statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the correctness of
+these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm leading to
+the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship
+measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound
+by the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at
+first not the slightest conception of the force or effect of
+emancipation upon the public in middle-class England. He feared an
+American reaction against England when it was understood
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_114"></a>[V2:pg 114]</span>
+that popular meetings would have no influence on the British
+Government.</p>
+<blockquote>"Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on
+the effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to
+fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely round
+to the North that the Government will be obliged to favour the
+North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do so. This notion
+is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it, unreasonable and
+presumptuous in dealing with us<a name="FNanchor965"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_965">[965]</a>."</blockquote>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<p>Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had
+little relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude
+toward emancipation was that the <i>threat</i> of it and of a
+possible servile war might be useful in deterring foreign nations,
+especially Great Britain, from intervening. But he objected to the
+carrying of emancipation into effect because he feared it would
+<i>induce</i> intervention. Servile war, in part by Seward's own
+efforts, in part because of earlier British newspaper speculations,
+was strongly associated with emancipation, in the English view.
+Hence the Government received the September, 1862, proclamation
+with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public with
+apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war
+ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide
+emancipation and the North stood committed to a high moral object.
+A great wave of relief and exultation <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_115"></a>[V2:pg 115]</span> swept over
+anti-slavery England, but did not so quickly extend to governmental
+circles. It was largely that England which was as yet without
+direct influence on Parliament which so exulted and now upheld the
+North. Could this England of the people affect governmental policy
+and influence its action toward America? Lyons correctly
+interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press the
+British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the
+same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a
+head a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both
+during the war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious
+and distinctly unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was
+the building in British ports of Confederate naval vessels of
+war.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_846"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor846">[846]</a> <i>Punch</i>, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon
+picturing Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon
+III.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_847"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor847">[847]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 348.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_848"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor848">[848]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential.
+Lyons to Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted
+Mercier to be already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though
+he gave no hint of it in the interview with Lyons.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_849"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor849">[849]</a> Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on
+a joint offer of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had
+asked instructions and those received made clear that Russia did
+not wish to be compelled to face such a question. She did not wish
+to offend France, and an offer without England had no chance of
+acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863
+(O.S.)).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_850"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor850">[850]</a> F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential.
+Lyons to Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_851"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor851">[851]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 348.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_852"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor852">[852]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_853"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor853">[853]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and
+69-152.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_854"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor854">[854]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1714-41. March 23,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_855"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor855">[855]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, 208-9. To
+Ellice, May 5, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_856"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor856">[856]</a> July 13, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_857"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor857">[857]</a> Harriet Martineau, <i>Autobiography</i>,
+p. 508, To Mrs. Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_858"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor858">[858]</a> Sept. 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_859"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor859">[859]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, Nov. 17,
+1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_860"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor860">[860]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_861"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor861">[861]</a> Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone,
+Jan. 26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_862"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor862">[862]</a> Article in <i>Fraser's Magazine</i>, Feb.
+1862, "The Contest in America."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_863"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor863">[863]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_864"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor864">[864]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, pp. 41-48, and
+63-69.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_865"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor865">[865]</a> Raymond, <i>Life, Public Services and
+State Papers of Abraham Lincoln</i>, p. 243.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_866"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor866">[866]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 229-32.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_867"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor867">[867]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 233, May 19,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_868"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor868">[868]</a> A Bill was in fact introduced July 16,
+1862, on the lines of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July
+12, but no action was taken on it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_869"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor869">[869]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, pp.
+70-71.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_870"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor870">[870]</a> Abraham Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>,
+II, p. 213.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_871"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor871">[871]</a> Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_872"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor872">[872]</a> As issued September 22, the first
+paragraph refers to his plan of securing legislation to aid
+compensated voluntary emancipation, the next sets the date January
+1, 1863, for completed emancipation of slaves in states still in
+rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern the carrying out of
+the confiscation law. Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>, II, pp.
+237-8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_873"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor873">[873]</a> Raymond, <i>State Papers of Lincoln</i>,
+260-61.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_874"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor874">[874]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 214.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_875"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor875">[875]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 410. In letter, August
+26, 1863, addressed to a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional
+Union men."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_876"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor876">[876]</a> American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7.
+Bunch to Russell, Dec. 5, 1860.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_877"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor877">[877]</a> Southern Commissioners abroad early
+reported that recognition of independence and commercial treaties
+could not be secured unless the South would agree to "mutual right
+of search" treaties for the suppression of the African Slave Trade.
+Davis' answer was that the Confederate constitution gave him no
+authority to negotiate such a treaty; indeed, denied him that
+authority since the constitution itself prohibited the importation
+of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's instructions see Bigelow,
+<i>Retrospections</i>, I, pp. 591-96.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_878"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor878">[878]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, May 4,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_879"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor879">[879]</a> Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc.
+<i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLVI, p. 95.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_880"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor880">[880]</a> Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_881"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor881">[881]</a> October 5, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_882"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor882">[882]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_883"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor883">[883]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The
+same ideas are officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7,
+1861, and May 1, 1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and
+<i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 819, No. 197, Draft.).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_884"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor884">[884]</a> See ante, p. 81.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_885"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor885">[885]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_886"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor886">[886]</a> Ashley, <i>Palmerston</i>, II, p. 227.
+Palmerston to Russell, Aug. 13, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_887"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor887">[887]</a> Garrison, <i>Garrison</i>, IV, p. 66. Many
+distinguished names were on the roster of the Society--Mill,
+Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton, Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin
+Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes, Cairns, Herbert Spencer,
+Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and others. Frederick W.
+Chesson was secretary, and very active in the work.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_888"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor888">[888]</a> Schurz, <i>Speeches and
+Correspondence</i>, I, 190.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_889"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor889">[889]</a> Schurz, <i>Reminiscences</i>, II,
+309.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_890"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor890">[890]</a> Gasparin, <i>The Uprising of a Great
+People</i>, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_891"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor891">[891]</a> Gasparin, <i>America before Europe</i>,
+Pt. V, Ch. III. The preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work
+went through three American editions in 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_892"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor892">[892]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, p. 63. No exact
+date, but Spring of 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_893"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor893">[893]</a> Raymond, <i>State Papers of Lincoln</i>,
+p. 253.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_894"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor894">[894]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 256.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_895"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor895">[895]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 162.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_896"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor896">[896]</a> Lincoln's <i>Complete Works</i>, II, p.
+454. But the <i>after-comment</i> by Lincoln as to purpose was
+nearly always in line with an unfinished draft of a letter to
+Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864, when the specific object was
+said to be "inducing the coloured people to come bodily over from
+the rebel side to ours." <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 564.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_897"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor897">[897]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. IX.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_898"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor898">[898]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 83. Adams to Seward, May 8,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_899"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor899">[899]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 101-105.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_900"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor900">[900]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 122. Adams to Seward,
+July 3, 1862. In his despatch Adams states the conversation to have
+occurred "last Saturday," and with an "unofficial person," who was
+sounding him on mediation. This was Cobden.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_901"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor901">[901]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, p.
+70.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_902"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor902">[902]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 135.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_903"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor903">[903]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 133. To Seward. His
+informant was Baring.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_904"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor904">[904]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+333.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_905"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor905">[905]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 35.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_906"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor906">[906]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords</i>,
+Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United
+States of North America." No. 8. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_907"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor907">[907]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 10. Russell to Stuart,
+Aug. 7, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_908"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor908">[908]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 1863, <i>Lords</i>, Vol.
+XXV. "Further correspondence relating to the Civil War in the
+United States of North America." No. 2. To Stuart.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_909"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor909">[909]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 1863, <i>Lords</i>, Vol.
+XXIX. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United
+States of North America," No. 20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_910"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor910">[910]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 37.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_911"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor911">[911]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 78, No. 119.
+Adams to Seward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar
+representation made on Jan. 17, 1862. (<i>U.S. Messages and
+Documents, 1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 16.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_912"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor912">[912]</a> e.g., Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II,
+pp. 64-5. To O.W. Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_913"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor913">[913]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 140. Adams to Seward, July 17,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_914"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor914">[914]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+336.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_915"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor915">[915]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 191. Adams to Seward, Sept. 12,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_916"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor916">[916]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 199.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_917"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor917">[917]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 195.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_918"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor918">[918]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 202. Seward to Adams,
+Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons, on his return to Washington, wrote that he
+found Seward's influence much lessened, and that he had fallen in
+public estimation by his "signing the Abolition Proclamation, which
+was imposed upon him, in opposition to all his own views, by the
+Radical Party in the Cabinet." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell,
+Nov. 14, 1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_919"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor919">[919]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept.
+19, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_920"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor920">[920]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1862-3</i>, Pt. I, p. 202. The instruction went into great detail
+as to conditions and means. A similar instruction was sent to
+Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_921"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor921">[921]</a> There was much talk and correspondence on
+this project from Sept., 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was
+suspicious of some "trap." Russell at one time thought the United
+States was secretly planning to colonize ex-slaves in Central
+America. Some of the Colonies were in favour of the plan. (Russell
+Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862. F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No.
+177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_922"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor922">[922]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_923"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor923">[923]</a> Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept.
+26, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_924"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor924">[924]</a> Gladstone Papers. British agents still
+residing in the South believed the proclamation would have little
+practical effect, but added that if actually carried out the
+cultivation of cotton "would be as completely arrested as if an
+edict were pronounced against its future growth," and pictured the
+unfortunate results for the world at large. (F.O., Am., Vol. 846,
+No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_925"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor925">[925]</a> See Rhodes, IV, 344,
+<i>notes</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_926"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor926">[926]</a> October 6, 1862. The <i>Times</i> had used
+the "last card" phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations
+on the effect of Sumner's agitation for emancipation.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_927"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor927">[927]</a> Oct. 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_928"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor928">[928]</a> e.g., <i>Dublin Nation</i>, Oct. 11, 1862.
+<i>Manchester Guardian</i>, Oct. 7. <i>London Morning
+Advertiser</i>, Oct. 9. <i>North British Review</i>, Oct., 1862.
+<i>London Press</i>, Oct. 11. <i>London Globe</i>, Oct. 6.
+<i>London Examiner</i>, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag," and
+Oct. 18: "The Instigation to Servile War." <i>Bell's Weekly
+Messenger</i>, Oct. 11.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_929"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor929">[929]</a> October, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_930"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor930">[930]</a> November, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_931"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor931">[931]</a> It is worthy of note that the French offer
+of joint mediation made to Britain in October specified the danger
+of servile war resulting from the proclamation as a reason for
+European action. (France, <i>Documents Diplomatiques, 1862</i>, p.
+142.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_932"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor932">[932]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Oct. 7,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_933"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor933">[933]</a> Oct. 18, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_934"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor934">[934]</a> Communication in the <i>Times</i>, Nov. 7,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_935"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor935">[935]</a> Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin,
+Nov. 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_936"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor936">[936]</a> <i>Spectator</i>, Oct. 11,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_937"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor937">[937]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Oct. 25, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_938"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor938">[938]</a> Rhodes, IV, 162-64.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_939"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor939">[939]</a> Perry, <i>Henry Lee Higginson</i>, p.
+175.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_940"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor940">[940]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 349, <i>note</i>. Bright to
+Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_941"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor941">[941]</a> Rogers, <i>Speeches by John Bright</i>, I,
+pp. 216 ff.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_942"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor942">[942]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a
+meeting at Leigh, Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At
+Sheffield, Dec. 31, 1862, an amended resolution calling for
+recognition of the South was voted down and the original
+pro-Northern resolutions passed. There were speakers on both sides.
+<i>Liberator</i>, Jan. 23, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_943"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor943">[943]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p. 113.
+J.S. Mill to Motley, Jan. 26, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_944"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor944">[944]</a> Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order
+applied also to all Northern white officers commanding negro
+troops. It proved an idle threat.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_945"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor945">[945]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30,
+1862. And again, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a
+servile insurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move
+for its authors." Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed
+regret that the emancipation proclamation had been issued, since it
+set up a further barrier to the reconciliation of North and
+South--always the hope of Russia. Seward replied that in executing
+the proclamation, there would be, no doubt, many modifications.
+Stoeckl answered that then the proclamation must be regarded as but
+a futile menace. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec.
+1, 1862, No. 2171.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_946"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor946">[946]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 357.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_947"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor947">[947]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence,
+1863</i>, Pt. I, p. 55. Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863,
+transmitting this and other resolutions presented to him. Adams by
+March 20 had reported meetings which sent resolutions to him, from
+Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills, Salford, Cobham,
+Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool,
+South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh,
+Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle,
+Bury, Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne,
+Huddersfield, Ashford, Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton,
+Newark, and York. See also Rhodes, IV, 348-58, for
+r&eacute;sum&eacute; of meetings and opinions
+expressed.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_948"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor948">[948]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 300.
+Adams to Seward, Jan. 22, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_949"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor949">[949]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence,
+1863</i>, Pt. I, p. 100. Adams to Seward, Feb. 5,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_950"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor950">[950]</a> Goddard, <i>Letters on the American
+Rebellion</i>, p. 287. Goddard contributed seventy letters before
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_951"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor951">[951]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 307. Letter to <i>Daily
+Gazette</i>, May 2, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_952"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor952">[952]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Feb. 27, 1863. At
+Bristol the opposition element introduced a resolution expressing
+abhorrence of slavery and the hope that the war in America might
+end in total emancipation, but adding that "at the same time [this
+meeting] cannot but regard the policy of President Lincoln in
+relation to slavery, as partial, insincere, inhuman, revengeful and
+altogether opposed to those high and noble principles of State
+policy which alone should guide the counsels of a great people."
+The resolution was voted down, and one passed applauding Lincoln.
+The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologize for
+slurring remarks on Thompson.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_953"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor953">[953]</a> <i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, XI, p.
+525.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_954"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor954">[954]</a> Lincoln, <i>Complete Works</i>, II, p.
+302.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_955"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor955">[955]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>, p. 306.
+Also Rhodes, IV, p. 351.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_956"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor956">[956]</a> Massie, <i>America: the Origin of Her
+Present Conflict</i>, London, 1864. This action and the tour of the
+two delegates in America did much to soothe wounded feelings which
+had been excited by a correspondence in 1862-3 between English,
+French and American branches of similar church organizations. See
+<i>New Englander</i>, April, 1863, p. 288.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_957"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor957">[957]</a> Jan. 6, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_958"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor958">[958]</a> Published Oxford and London,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_959"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor959">[959]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 355.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_960"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor960">[960]</a> Lutz, <i>Notes</i>. Schleiden's despatch,
+No. 1, 1863. German opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal
+Germany sympathized strongly with the North; while the aristocratic
+and the landowning class stood for the South. The historian Karl
+Friedrich Neumann wrote a three-volume history of the United States
+wholly lacking in historical impartiality and strongly condemnatory
+of the South. (Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin,
+1863-66.) This work had much influence on German public opinion.
+(Lutz, <i>Notes</i>.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_961"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor961">[961]</a> <i>Liberator</i>, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of
+J.P. Jewett to W.L. Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in
+England who may still sympathize with slavery and the Southern
+rebels, will be rendered absolutely powerless by these grand and
+powerful uprisings of THE PEOPLE."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_962"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor962">[962]</a> Duffus, <i>English Opinion</i>, p.
+51.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_963"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor963">[963]</a> Argyll, <i>Autobiography</i>, II, pp.
+196-7.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_964"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor964">[964]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>. Facsimile,
+opp. p. 303. Copy sent by Sunmer to Bright, April,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_965"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor965">[965]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March
+10, 1863. Lyons was slow to favour the emancipation proclamation.
+The first favourable mention I have found was on July 26, 1864.
+(Russell Papers. To Russell.) In this view his diplomatic
+colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December, 1863, wrote that
+slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and that even in
+the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian
+Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But
+immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl
+could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made
+of universal application it would have been a "great triumph for
+the principle of individual liberty," but as issued they could only
+mean "the hope of stirring a servile war in the South."
+<i>(Ibid.</i>, Dec. 24, 1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_116"></a>[V2:pg 116]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIII"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2>
+<h3>THE LAIRD RAMS</h3>
+<br>
+<p>The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like
+the <i>Alabama</i> and the subsequent controversy and arbitration
+in relation thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed
+from every aspect of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations,
+and principles of international law. There is no need and no
+purpose here to review in detail these matters. The purpose is,
+rather, to consider the development and effect at the time of their
+occurrence of the principal incidents related to Southern
+ship-building in British yards. The <i>intention</i> of the British
+Government is of greater importance in this study than the
+correctness of its action.</p>
+<p>Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a
+belligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in the
+ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite
+application in international law. There were general principles
+already established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its
+subjects to do, anything directly in aid of belligerents. The
+British Foreign Enlistment Act, notification of which had been
+given in May, 1861, forbade subjects to "be concerned in the
+equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or
+vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be
+employed in the service ..." of a belligerent, and provided for
+punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this
+prohibition were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_117"></a>[V2:pg 117]</span>
+punishment, or seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence.
+Here was the weak point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were
+maintained by offenders the proof was available only after the
+offence had been committed and one of the belligerents injured by
+the violation of the law. Over twenty years earlier the American
+Government, seeking to prevent its subjects from committing
+unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion of 1837,
+had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then
+stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and
+therefore limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a
+more perfect law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral
+duty, had given federal officials power to act and seize <i>on
+suspicion</i>, leaving the proof of guilt or innocence to be
+determined later. But the British interpretation of her own
+neutrality laws was that proof was required in advance of
+seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic principle
+that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that
+preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so
+promptly asserted at the beginning of the Civil War<a name=
+"FNanchor966"></a><a href="#Footnote_966">[966]</a>.</p>
+<p>The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one,
+early conceived the idea of using neutral ports for <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_118"></a>[V2:pg 118]</span> the
+construction of war vessels. Advice secured from able British
+lawyers was to the effect that if care were taken to observe the
+strict letter of the Foreign Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike
+equipment, a ship, even though her construction were such as to
+indicate that she was destined to become a ship of war, might be
+built by private parties in British yards. The three main points
+requiring careful observance by the South were concealment of
+government ownership and destination, no war equipment and no
+enlistment of crew in British waters.</p>
+<p>The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these
+lines was Captain J.D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive
+of his work that he never violated British neutrality law and that
+prevailing legal opinion in England supported him in this
+view<a name="FNanchor967"></a><a href="#Footnote_967">[967]</a>. In
+March, 1862, the steamer <i>Oreto</i> cleared from Liverpool with a
+declared destination of "Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica."
+She was not heard of until three months later when she was reported
+to be at Nassau completing her equipment as a Southern war vessel.
+In June, Adams notified Russell "that a new and still more powerful
+war-steamer was nearly ready for departure from the port of
+Liverpool on the same errand<a name="FNanchor968"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_968">[968]</a>." He protested that such ships violated
+the neutrality of Great Britain and demanded their stoppage and
+seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this second ship, "No. 290"
+(later christened the <i>Alabama</i>) left Liverpool, Adams and the
+United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in securing
+evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each
+protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been
+referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26,
+when there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_119"></a>[V2:pg 119]</span>
+Counsel, Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive
+against the "290," that Russell appears to have been seriously
+concerned. On July 28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for
+an immediate opinion, and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent
+to Liverpool and to other ports to stop and further examine the
+vessel. But the "290" was well away and outside of British
+waters<a name="FNanchor969"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_969">[969]</a>.</p>
+<p>The <i>Alabama</i>, having received guns and munitions by a
+ship, the <i>Bahama</i>, sent out from England to that end, and
+having enlisted in the Confederate Navy most of the British crews
+of the two vessels, now entered upon a career of destruction of
+Northern commerce. She was not a privateer, as she was commonly
+called at the time, but a Government vessel of war specially
+intended to capture and destroy merchant ships. In short her true
+character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of a "commerce
+destroyer." Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she traversed
+all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal and
+stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she
+evaded battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear
+that an almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to
+British or other foreign register took place, in the mercantile
+marine. The career of the <i>Alabama</i> was followed with
+increasing anger and chagrin by the North; this, said the public,
+was a British ship, manned by a British crew, using British guns
+and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been winked at by
+the British Government. What further evidence was necessary of bad
+faith in a professed strict neutrality?</p>
+<p>Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion
+and anger. At the last moment it had appeared <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_120"></a>[V2:pg 120]</span> as if the
+Government were inclined to stop the "290." Was the hurried
+departure of the vessel due to a warning received from official
+sources? On November 21, Adams reported that Russell complained in
+an interview of remarks made privately by Bright, to the effect
+that warning had come from Russell himself, and "seemed to me a
+little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright had heard this from
+me<a name="FNanchor970"></a><a href="#Footnote_970">[970]</a>."
+Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such imputation, but at the
+same time expressed to Russell his conviction that there must have
+been from some source a "leak" of the Government's
+intention<a name="FNanchor971"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_971">[971]</a>. The question of advance warning to
+Bullock, or to the Lairds who built the <i>Alabama</i>, was not one
+which was likely to be officially put forward in any case; the real
+issue was whether an offence to British neutrality law had been
+committed, whether it would be acknowledged as such, and still more
+important, whether repetitions of the offence would be permitted.
+The <i>Alabama</i>, even though she might, as the American
+assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us a sick
+turn<a name="FNanchor972"></a><a href="#Footnote_972">[972]</a>,"
+could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the war; but many
+<i>Alabamas</i> would be a serious matter. The belated governmental
+order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the future since in
+reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective
+claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop
+had been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and
+that <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_121"></a>[V2:pg
+121]</span> in strict law there had been no neglect of governmental
+duty<a name="FNanchor973"></a><a href="#Footnote_973">[973]</a>. If
+this were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit
+official interference in the issue from British ports of a whole
+fleet of Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a
+real offence to the North had taken place. He might write, "I
+confess the proceedings of that vessel [the <i>Alabama</i>] are
+enough to <i>rile</i> a more temperate nation, and I owe a grudge
+to the Liverpool people on that account<a name=
+"FNanchor974"></a><a href="#Footnote_974">[974]</a>," but this was
+of no value to the North if the governmental decision was against
+interference without complete and absolute proof.</p>
+<p>It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of
+bringing home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence
+in American eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such
+offences were to be continued. An immediate downright threat of war
+would have been impolitic and would have stirred British pride to
+the point of resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it
+was required of Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet
+make no such threat as would involve the two nations in war--a
+result that would have marked the success of Southern secession.
+That Seward was able to find the way in which to do this is
+evidence of that fertility of imagination and gift in expedient
+which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the Civil
+War<a name="FNanchor975"></a><a href="#Footnote_975">[975]</a>.</p>
+<p>In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the
+"290," June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the
+contracts made with the Laird <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_122"></a>[V2:pg 122]</span> Brothers at Liverpool, for the
+building of two vessels far more dangerous than the <i>Alabama</i>
+to the Northern cause. These were the so-called Laird Rams. They
+were to be two hundred and thirty feet long, have a beam of forty
+feet, be armoured with four and one-half inch iron plate and be
+provided with a "piercer" at the prow, about seven feet long and of
+great strength. This "piercer" caused the ships to be spoken of as
+rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped it was expected the
+"piercer" would be three feet under the surface of the water. This
+was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was unusual
+construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at
+sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close
+blockade at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper
+comment in England that the vessels were "new <i>Alabamas</i>," and
+in America that they were "floating fortresses," suitable for
+attack upon defenceless Northern cities, their primary purpose was
+to break up the blockading squadrons<a name=
+"FNanchor976"></a><a href="#Footnote_976">[976]</a>.</p>
+<p>Shortly before the escape of the <i>Alabama</i> and at a time
+when there was but little hope the British Government would seize
+her and shortly after the news was received in Washington that
+still other vessels were planned for building in the Lairds' yards,
+a Bill was introduced in Congress authorizing the President to
+issue letters of marque and privateering. This was in July, 1862,
+and on the twelfth, Seward wrote to Adams of the proposed measure
+specifying that the purpose was to permit privateers to seek for
+and capture or destroy the <i>Alabama</i> or other vessels of a
+like type. He characterized this as a plan "to organize the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_123"></a>[V2:pg 123]</span>
+militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and
+reprisal<a name="FNanchor977"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_977">[977]</a>." Neither here nor at any time did Seward
+or Adams allege in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than
+the pursuit of <i>Alabamas</i>, nor is it presumable that in July,
+1862, the construction plans of the Rams were sufficiently well
+known to the North to warrant a conclusion that the later purpose
+of the proposed privateering fleet was <i>at first</i> quite other
+than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill introduced in July,
+1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the <i>Oreto</i>
+(or <i>Florida</i>) and to the failure of early protests in the
+case of the <i>Alabama</i>. Moreover there had been an earlier
+newspaper agitation for an increase of naval power by the creation
+of a "militia of the seas," though with no clear conception of
+definite objects to be attained. This agitation was now renewed and
+reinforced and many public speeches made by a General Hiram
+Wallbridge, who had long advocated an organization of the
+mercantile marine as an asset in times of war<a name=
+"FNanchor978"></a><a href="#Footnote_978">[978]</a>. But though
+introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" was not
+seriously taken up until February, 1863.</p>
+<p>In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of
+introduction, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object
+was to encourage privateers to pursue British ships when, as was
+expected, they should "turn Confederate." Sumner objected that the
+true business of privateers was to destroy enemy commerce and that
+the South had no such <i>bona fide</i> commerce. Grimes agreed that
+this was his opinion also, but explained that the administration
+wanted <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_124"></a>[V2:pg
+124]</span> the measure passed so that it might have in its hands a
+power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion of the
+Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but
+without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up
+again<a name="FNanchor979"></a><a href="#Footnote_979">[979]</a>.
+Six months later the progress of construction and the purpose of
+the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7, 1863,
+the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred to
+the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17
+was passed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March
+2 it was given a third reading and passed without debate<a name=
+"FNanchor980"></a><a href="#Footnote_980">[980]</a>. In the Senate,
+Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the
+Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels
+designed to break our blockade of their coast," and that the
+privateers were to "assist in maintaining blockades." There was no
+thorough debate but a few perfunctory objections were raised to
+placing so great a power in the hands of the President, while
+Sumner alone appears as a consistent opponent arguing that the
+issue of privateers would be dangerous to the North since it might
+lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral commerce. No
+speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were to be
+used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an
+"administration measure."</p>
+<p>Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of
+Russell at the escape of the <i>Alabama</i> had somewhat lost its
+edge. At first he had been impressed with the necessity of amending
+the Foreign Enlistment Act so as to prevent similar offences and
+had gained the approval of the law officers of the Crown. Russell
+had even offered to take up with America an agreement by which both
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_125"></a>[V2:pg 125]</span>
+countries were to amend their neutrality laws at the same moment.
+This was in December, 1862, but now on February 14, 1863, he wrote
+to Lyons that the project of amendment had been abandoned as the
+Cabinet saw no way of improving the law<a name=
+"FNanchor981"></a><a href="#Footnote_981">[981]</a>. While this
+letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from Seward was
+<i>en route</i>, explaining to Adams the meaning of the
+privateering bill.</p>
+<p>"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President
+of the United States the power to grant letters of marque and
+reprisal in any war in which the country may at any time be
+engaged, and it is expected that the Bill will become a law. Lord
+Lyons suggests that the transaction may possibly be misapprehended
+abroad, if it come upon foreign powers suddenly and without any
+explanations. You will be at liberty to say that, as the Bill
+stands, the executive Government will be set at liberty to put the
+law in force in its discretion, and that thus far the proper policy
+in regard to the exercise of that discretion has not engaged the
+President's attention. I have had little hesitation in saying to
+Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there will be
+entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating to
+him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part
+of friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be
+feared would be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall
+be found expedient to put the Act in force against the insurgents
+of the United States<a name="FNanchor982"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_982">[982]</a>."</p>
+<p>Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object
+might be asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents,"
+the hint was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be
+"incidentally and indirectly affected." And so both Lyons and
+Seward understood the matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a
+long conversation with Seward in which after pointing out the
+probable "bad effect" on Europe, Lyons received the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_126"></a>[V2:pg 126]</span> reply that
+some remedy must be found for the fact that "the law did not appear
+to enable the British Government to prevent" the issue of
+Confederate "privateers<a name="FNanchor983"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_983">[983]</a>." On March 8, Seward followed this up by
+sending to Lyons an autograph letter:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am receiving daily such representations from our
+sea-ports concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by
+the vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I do
+most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into the unhappy
+condition of affairs, which, with all the best dispositions of your
+Government and my own, cannot long be controlled to the
+preservation of peace.<br>
+<br>
+<p>"If you think well of it, I should like that you should
+confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more armed
+vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English ports is a thing
+to be deprecated above all things."</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and
+it appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward
+stated that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about
+the <i>Alabama</i>, declaring:</p>
+<blockquote>"That no American merchant vessels would get
+freights--that even war with England was preferable to this--that
+in that case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least
+find a profitable employment in cruising against British
+trade."</blockquote>
+<p>Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and
+Lyons protested vigorously and implied that war must result.</p>
+<blockquote>"Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the
+inconvenience not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque:
+that he should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the
+necessity altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came
+from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure would be
+unavoidable<a name="FNanchor984"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_984">[984]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_127"></a>[V2:pg 127]</span>
+<p>Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North
+must not be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers
+were dwelling on the notion that under British interpretation of
+her duty as a neutral Mexico, if she had money, could build ships
+in British ports to cruise in destruction of French commerce,
+adding that "one might almost suppose" some rich American would
+give the funds to Mexico for the purpose and so seek to involve
+England in trouble with France<a name="FNanchor985"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_985">[985]</a>. Lyons had also been told by Seward in
+their conversation of March 9, that on that day an instruction had
+been sent to Adams to present to Russell the delicacy of the
+situation and to ask for some assurance that no further Southern
+vessels of war should escape from British ports. This instruction
+presented the situation in more diplomatic language but in no
+uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering
+bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national
+navigating interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ...
+the enforcement of the neutrality law of Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor986"></a><a href="#Footnote_986">[986]</a>...."</p>
+<p>Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was
+read to him. Russell had already commented to Adams that American
+privateers would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if
+they interfered with neutral commerce the United States Government
+would be put in an awkward position. To this Adams replied that the
+privateers would seek and capture, if possible, vessels like the
+<i>Alabama</i>, but Russell asked Lyons to find out "whether in any
+case they [privateers] will be authorized to interfere with neutral
+commerce, and if in any case in what case, and to what
+extent<a name="FNanchor987"></a><a href="#Footnote_987">[987]</a>."
+Three days later, on March 26, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_128"></a>[V2:pg 128]</span> Adams presented his instructions
+and these Russell regarded as "not unfriendly in tone," but in the
+long conversation that ensued the old result was reached that Adams
+declared Great Britain negligent in performance of neutral duty,
+while Russell professed eagerness to stop Southern shipbuilding if
+full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams concluded that "he had
+worked to the best of his power for peace, but it had become a most
+difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, "Mr. Adams
+fully deserves the character of having always laboured for peace
+between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and those of
+the two Governments fail of success<a name=
+"FNanchor988"></a><a href="#Footnote_988">[988]</a>."</p>
+<p>In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing
+to a head both in America and England. At Washington, from March
+seventh to the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of
+marque and reprisal had been prominently before the Cabinet and
+even Welles who had opposed them was affected by unfavourable
+reports received from Adams as to the intentions of Great Britain.
+The final decision was to wait later news from England<a name=
+"FNanchor989"></a><a href="#Footnote_989">[989]</a>. This was
+Seward's idea as he had not as yet received reports of the British
+reaction to his communications through Lyons and Adams. March 27
+was the critical day of decision in London, as it was also the day
+upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most vigorously
+debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Preceding this
+other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the first
+days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official
+assurances that if the South wished to build ships in French yards
+"we should be permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to
+sea<a name="FNanchor990"></a><a href="#Footnote_990">[990]</a>."
+This suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the
+intention, no <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_129"></a>[V2:pg
+129]</span> doubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In
+the winter of 1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic
+fleet to cruise in western waters and there was first a suspicion
+in America, later a conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was
+distinctly friendly to the North--that the orders might even extend
+to actual naval aid in case war should arise with England and
+France. In March, 1863, this was but vague rumour, by midsummer it
+was a confident hope, by September-October, when Russian fleets had
+entered the harbours of New York and San Francisco, the rumour had
+become a conviction and the silence of Russian naval officers when
+banqueted and toasted was regarded as discreet confirmation. There
+was no truth in the rumour, but already in March curious surmises
+were being made even in England, as to Russian intentions, though
+there is no evidence that the Government was at all concerned. The
+truth was that the Russian fleet had been ordered to sea as a
+precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, in case the
+difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead to war
+with France and England<a name="FNanchor991"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_991">[991]</a>.</p>
+<p>In England, among the people rather than in governmental
+England, a feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the
+Ministry had been lax in regard to the <i>Alabama</i>, and as news
+of her successes was received this feeling was given voice.
+Liverpool, at first almost wholly on the side of the Lairds and of
+Southern ship-building, became doubtful <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_130"></a>[V2:pg 130]</span> by the very
+ease with which the <i>Alabama</i> destroyed Northern ships.
+Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests
+might, after all, be directly opposed to those of the
+ship-builders. Meetings were held and the matter discussed. In
+February, 1863, such a meeting at Plaistow, attended by the gentry
+of the neighbourhood, but chiefly by working men, especially by
+dock labourers and by men from the ship-building yards at
+Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman be requested to write to the
+Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestly entreating him to put in
+force, with utmost vigilance, the law of England against such ships
+as the <i>Alabama</i><a name="FNanchor992"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_992">[992]</a>." Such expressions were not as yet
+widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulge in
+much discussion, but British <i>doubt</i> was developing<a name=
+"FNanchor993"></a><a href="#Footnote_993">[993]</a>.</p>
+<p>Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt
+as to Britain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in
+Parliament which Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all
+the speeches he has made <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_131"></a>[V2:pg 131]</span> since I have been at this
+post<a name="FNanchor994"></a><a href="#Footnote_994">[994]</a>."
+On March 26, came the presentation by Adams of Seward's instruction
+of which Russell wrote to Lyons as made in no unfriendly tone and
+as a result of which Adams wrote: "The conclusion which I draw ...
+is, that the Government is really better disposed to exertion, and
+feels itself better sustained for action by the popular sentiment
+than ever before<a name="FNanchor995"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_995">[995]</a>." Russell told Adams that he had received
+a note from Palmerston "expressing his approbation of every word"
+of his speech three days before. In a portion of the despatch to
+Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, Adams advised
+against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the present
+favourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to
+run the risk of changing the current in Great Britain by the
+presentation of a new issue which might rally all national pride
+against us as was done in the <i>Trent</i> case<a name=
+"FNanchor996"></a><a href="#Footnote_996">[996]</a>." That Russell
+was indeed thinking of definite action is foreshadowed by the
+advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27, as to the latter's
+language in the debate scheduled for that day on the Foreign
+Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interview with
+Adams:</p>
+<blockquote>"The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked
+him what he had to propose in reference to the <i>Alabama</i> was
+that the Government should declare their disapproval of the fitting
+out of such ships of war to prey on American commerce.<br>
+<br>
+"Now, as the fitting out and escape of the <i>Alabama</i> and
+<i>Oreto</i> was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can
+have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the Government
+disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law with a view to
+assist one of the belligerents<a name="FNanchor997"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_997">[997]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_132"></a>[V2:pg 132]</span>
+<p>But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the
+hopeful view of the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to
+Sumner, "badly managed and told against us<a name=
+"FNanchor998"></a><a href="#Footnote_998">[998]</a>," and Bright
+himself participated in this "bad management." For over a year he
+had been advocating the cause of the North in public speeches and
+everywhere pointing out to unenfranchised England that the victory
+of the North was essential to democracy in all Europe. Always an
+orator of power he used freely vigorous language and nowhere more
+so than in a great public meeting of the Trades Unions of London in
+St. James' Hall, on March 26, the evening before the parliamentary
+debate. The purpose of this meeting was to bring public pressure on
+the Government in favour of the North, and the pith of Bright's
+speech was to contrast the democratic instincts of working men with
+the aristocratic inclinations of the Government<a name=
+"FNanchor999"></a><a href="#Footnote_999">[999]</a>. Reviewing
+"aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said:</p>
+<blockquote>"Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this
+contest, and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your
+streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has beheld an
+afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has beheld thirty
+millions of men, happy and prosperous, without emperor, without
+king, without the surroundings of a court, without nobles, except
+such as are made by eminence in intellect and virtue, without State
+bishops and State priests.<br>
+<br>
+"'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation,' without great
+armies and great navies, without great debt and without great
+taxes.<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for
+yourselves.... Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the worst
+foes of freedom that the world has ever seen.... You will not do
+this. I have faith in you. Impartial history <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_133"></a>[V2:pg 133]</span> will tell
+that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many
+of your rich men were corrupt, when your press--which ought to have
+instructed and defended--was mainly written to betray, the fate of
+a Continent and of its vast population being in peril, you clung to
+freedom with an unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will
+yet make it the heritage of all His children<a name=
+"FNanchor1000"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1000">[1000]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in
+support of the North held throughout the whole course of the war,
+and it was also the most notable one as indicating the rising tide
+of popular demand for more democratic institutions. That it
+irritated the Government and gave a handle to Southern sympathizers
+in the parliamentary debate of March 27 is unquestioned. In
+addition, if that debate was intended to secure from the Government
+an intimation of future policy against Southern shipbuilding it was
+conducted on wrong lines for <i>immediate</i> effect--though
+friends of the North may have thought the method used was wise for
+<i>future</i> effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster,
+leading in the debate<a name="FNanchor1001"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1001">[1001]</a>, called on Ministers to explain the
+"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer
+some pledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should
+have been active on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead
+of waiting to be urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a
+certain degree of complicity in the escape of the <i>Alabama</i>.
+The Solicitor-General answered in a legal defence of the
+Government, complained of the offence of America in arousing its
+citizens against Great Britain upon unjustifiable grounds, but did
+not make so vigorous a reply as might, perhaps, have been expected.
+Still he stood firmly on the ground that the Government could not
+act without evidence to convict--in itself a statement that might
+well preclude <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_134"></a>[V2:pg
+134]</span> interference with the Rams. Bright accused the
+Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality," and referred at
+length to the public meeting of the previous evening:</p>
+<blockquote>"If you had last night looked in the faces of three
+thousand of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London,
+as I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for that
+country for which you appear to care so little, you would imagine
+that the more forbearing, the more generous, and the more just the
+conduct of the Government to the United States, the more it would
+recommend itself to the magnanimous feelings of the people of this
+country."</blockquote>
+<p>This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the
+people was not likely to win or to convince men, whether
+pro-Southern or not, who were opponents of the speaker's
+long-avowed advocacy of more democratic institutions in England. It
+is no wonder then that Laird, who had been castigated in the
+speeches of the evening, rising in defence of the conduct of his
+firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I would rather be handed
+down to posterity as the builder of a dozen <i>Alabamas</i> than as
+a man who applies himself deliberately to set class against class,
+and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when they
+come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the
+very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." This utterance was
+greeted with great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the
+<i>Alabama</i> as in approval of the speaker's defiance of
+Bright.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image11.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image11.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image11.jpg" width="45%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)</b></p>
+<br>
+<p>In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some
+immediate pledge by the Government, had gone the wrong way about to
+secure it. Vigour in attack was no way to secure a favourable
+response from Palmerston. Always a fighting politician in public it
+was inevitable that he should now fight back. Far from making the
+statement recommended to him by Russell, he concluded the debate by
+reasserting the correctness of governmental procedure in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_135"></a>[V2:pg 135]</span>
+the case of the <i>Alabama</i>, and himself with vigour accused
+Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as to increase rather
+than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading of the
+speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows
+that while vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they
+were avoiding <i>any</i> pledge of whatever nature, for the
+future.</p>
+<p>Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of
+the debate was "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of
+Lord Russell's speech than to confirm it<a name=
+"FNanchor1002"></a><a href="#Footnote_1002">[1002]</a>." He and his
+English advisers were very uneasy, not knowing whether to trust to
+Russell's intimations of more active governmental efforts, or to
+accept the conclusion that his advice had been rejected by
+Palmerston<a name="FNanchor1003"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1003">[1003]</a>. Possibly if less anxious and alarmed
+they would have read more clearly between the lines of
+parliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to
+hurry the Government into public announcement of a new policy was
+no proof that old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the
+result in Parliament, they forgot that the real pressure on
+Government was coming from an American declaration of an intention
+to issue privateers unless something were done to satisfy that
+country. Certainly Russell was unmoved by the debate for on April 3
+he wrote to Palmerston:</p>
+<blockquote>"The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for
+the ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have
+thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The
+Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the measure, as
+one of policy, though not of strict law.<br>
+<br>
+"We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we have
+satisfied the opinion which prevails here <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_136"></a>[V2:pg 136]</span> as well as in
+America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed
+to go on without some attempt to stop it<a name=
+"FNanchor1004"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1004">[1004]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Two days later, on April 5, the <i>Alexandra</i>, a vessel being
+equipped to join the <i>Alabama</i> as a commerce destroyer, was
+seized on the ground that she was about to violate the Enlistment
+Act and a new policy, at least to make a test case in law, was
+thereby made public. In fact, on March 30, but three days after the
+debate of March 27, the case of the <i>Alexandra</i> had been taken
+up by Russell, referred to the law officers on March 31, and
+approved by them for seizure on April 4<a name=
+"FNanchor1005"></a><a href="#Footnote_1005">[1005]</a>. Public
+meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's
+action, as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people
+applauded the seizure of the <i>Alexandra</i>, demanded vigorous
+prosecution of the Lairds and others, and urged governmental
+activity to prevent any further ship-building for the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1006"></a><a href="#Footnote_1006">[1006]</a>.</p>
+<p>On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons:</p>
+<blockquote>"The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can
+be procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate
+service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which
+have been raised in Northern America by the escape from justice of
+the <i>Oreto</i> and <i>Alabama</i><a name=
+"FNanchor1007"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1007">[1007]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on
+<i>evidence</i> to be sure, but on evidence of the vessels being
+"<i>apparently</i> intended" for the South. This was far from being
+the same thing as the previous assertion that conclusive evidence
+was required. What, then, was the basic consideration in Russell's
+mind leading to such a <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_137"></a>[V2:pg 137]</span> face-about on declared policy?
+Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing neutrality law to
+operate, recognition that there was just cause for the rising
+ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful
+than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and
+intent in application of the American "privateering" Bill. How did
+Russell, and Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did
+they foresee and fear?</p>
+<p>As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had
+been introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason
+passed without serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by
+Welles, Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the
+feeling that "something must be done" because vessels were building
+in England intended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under
+construction were clearly understood to have that purpose. If
+privateers were to offset the action of the Rams there must be some
+definite plan for their use. Seward and Adams repeatedly complained
+of British inaction yet in the same breath asserted that the
+privateers were intended to chase and destroy <i>Alabamas</i>--a
+plan so foolish, so it seemed to British diplomats, as to be
+impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of Seward. How, in
+short, <i>could</i> privateers make good an injury to blockade
+about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockading squadrons
+on station off the Southern ports they would but become so much
+more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of
+<i>Alabamas</i> the chances were that they would be the vanquished
+rather than the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile
+marine for them to attack and privateering against "enemy's
+commerce" was thus out of the question since there was no such
+commerce.</p>
+<p>There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended
+use of privateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the
+close blockade the only recourse of the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_138"></a>[V2:pg 138]</span> North would be
+to establish a "cruising squadron" blockade remote from the shores
+of the enemy. If conducted by government war-ships such a blockade
+was not in contravention to British interpretation of international
+law<a name="FNanchor1008"></a><a href="#Footnote_1008">[1008]</a>.
+But the Northern navy, conducting a cruising squadron blockade was
+far too small to interfere seriously with neutral vessels bringing
+supplies to the Confederacy or carrying cotton from Southern ports.
+A "flood of privateers," scouring the ocean from pole to pole
+might, conceivably, still render effective that closing in of the
+South which was so important a weapon in the Northern war
+programme.</p>
+<p>This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he
+saw in it a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable
+ultimate clash leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's
+desire should be Russell's reaction, though never specifically
+explaining the exact purpose of the privateers. Moreover,
+nine-tenths of the actual blockade-running still going on was by
+British ships, and this being so it was to be presumed that
+"privateers" searching for possible blockade runners would commit
+all sorts of indignities and interferences with British merchant
+ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in ordinary
+trade between non-belligerent ports.</p>
+<p>Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering
+bill, Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to
+raise objections though not formally making official protest, and
+had asked for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed
+activities of such vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be
+issued by the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_139"></a>[V2:pg
+139]</span> Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty
+of preventing unwarranted interference with legitimate British
+commerce by privateers<a name="FNanchor1009"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1009">[1009]</a>. The alteration of governmental policy
+as indicated in the arrest of the <i>Alexandra</i>, it might be
+hoped, would at least cause a suspension of the American plan, but
+assurances were strongly desired. Presumably Russell knew that
+Adams as a result of their conversations, had recommended such
+suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet uninformed of the
+<i>Alexandra</i> action, was still much alarmed. On April 13 he
+reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative
+to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last
+effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had
+made imminent<a name="FNanchor1010"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1010">[1010]</a>." Lyons had argued with Seward the
+inadvisability of sending such a despatch, since it was now known
+that Russell had "spoken in a satisfactory manner" about
+Confederate vessels, but Seward was insistent. Lyons believed there
+was real cause for anxiety, writing:</p>
+<blockquote>"A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident
+design of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate
+England, but still there can be little doubt that the exasperation
+has reached such a point as to constitute a serious danger. It is
+fully shared by many important members of the Cabinet--nor are the
+men in high office exempt from the overweening idea of the naval
+power of the United States, which reconciles the people to the
+notion of a war with England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned
+the flame in order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I
+believe, seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong
+measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the
+Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance to
+them. If no military success be obtained within a short time, it
+may become a Party necessity to resort to some means of producing
+an excitement <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_140"></a>[V2:pg
+140]</span> in the country sufficient to enable the Government to
+enforce the Conscription Act, and to exercise the extra-legal
+powers conferred by the late Congress, To produce such an
+excitement the more ardent of the party would not hesitate to go,
+to the verge of a war with England. Nay there are not a few who
+already declare that if the South must be lost, the best mode to
+conceal the discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be
+to go to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to
+English interference<a name="FNanchor1011"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1011">[1011]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On the same day Lyons wrote, privately:</p>
+<blockquote>"I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon
+some better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted
+out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my
+opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without leading the
+people here to think that they had gained their point by
+threats<a name="FNanchor1012"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1012">[1012]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, he
+cipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing<a name=
+"FNanchor1013"></a><a href="#Footnote_1013">[1013]</a>, but soon
+his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could report
+that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for
+communication to Russell<a name="FNanchor1014"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1014">[1014]</a>, and on the twenty-fourth when
+presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the
+privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that
+the "latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of
+the <i>Alexandra</i>, had caused Seward to become very
+conciliatory. Lyons was assured that the plan "was for the present
+at rest<a name="FNanchor1015"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1015">[1015]</a>." Apparently Seward now felt more
+security than did Lyons as to future British action for three days
+later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne that an
+American issue of letters of marque would surely come if
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_141"></a>[V2:pg 141]</span>
+England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a
+way as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps <i>must</i>
+be taken to prevent their escape<a name="FNanchor1016"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1016">[1016]</a>.</p>
+<p>The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show
+that he regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern
+ship-building in British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863.
+Seward became unusually friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in
+August he virtually forced Lyons to go on tour with him through the
+State of New York, thus making public demonstration of the good
+relations of the two Governments. This sweet harmony and mutual
+confidence is wholly contrary to the usual historical treatment of
+the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the threat of the
+privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily increasing
+in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by Adams to
+Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September.
+Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only
+American sources and have been at a loss to understand the
+privateering plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague
+generalization of its object in official utterances. It is the
+British reaction to that plan which reveals the real "threat" made
+and the actual crisis of the incident.</p>
+<p>It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires
+less extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The
+correct understanding of this later story is the recognition that
+Great Britain had in April given, a pledge and performed an act
+which satisfied Seward and Adams that the Rams would not be
+permitted to escape. It was their duty nevertheless to be on guard
+against a British relaxation <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_142"></a>[V2:pg 142]</span> of the promise made, and the
+delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing the Rams, caused
+American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of the sincerity of
+British actions.</p>
+<p>Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against
+Southern ship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the
+Foreign Office by a group of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting
+an alteration in the Foreign Enlistment Act if this were needed to
+prevent the issue of Southern ships, and pointing out that the
+"present policy" of the Government would entail a serious danger to
+British commerce in the future if, when England herself became a
+belligerent, neutral ports could be used by the enemy to build
+commerce destroyers<a name="FNanchor1017"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1017">[1017]</a>. The memorial concluded that in any
+case it was a disgrace that British law should be so publicly
+infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gave the old answer
+that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtained of any
+act done with the intent to violate it<a name=
+"FNanchor1018"></a><a href="#Footnote_1018">[1018]</a>." Evidently
+ship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutely
+alarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the
+<i>Alexandra</i>, and on June 22, a decision was rendered against
+the Government, but was promptly appealed.</p>
+<p>This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and
+the latter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams.
+Rumours were spread that the vessels were in fact intended for
+France, and when this was disproved that they were being built for
+the Viceroy of Egypt. This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was
+declared that the real owners were certain French merchants whose
+purpose in contracting for such clearly warlike vessels was left in
+mystery, but with the intimation that Egypt was to be <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_143"></a>[V2:pg 143]</span> the ultimate
+purchaser. Captain Bullock had indeed made such a contract of sale
+to French merchants but with the proviso of resale to him, after
+delivery. On his part, Russell was seeking <i>proof</i> fully
+adequate to seizure, but this was difficult to obtain and such as
+was submitted was regarded by the law officers as inadequate. They
+reported that there was "no evidence capable of being presented to
+a court of justice." He informed Adams of this legal opinion at the
+moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearing completion,
+and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlier
+determination, began that series of diplomatic protests which very
+nearly approached a threat of war.</p>
+<p>At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's
+decision in the <i>Alexandra</i> case, and shortly after the great
+Northern victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a
+despatch to Adams, July 11, which has been interpreted as a
+definite threat of war. In substance Seward wrote that he still
+felt confident the Government of Great Britain would find a way to
+nullify the <i>Alexandra</i> decision, but renewed, in case this
+did not prove true, his assertion of Northern intention to issue
+letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to "pursue"
+Southern vessels even into neutral ports<a name=
+"FNanchor1019"></a><a href="#Footnote_1019">[1019]</a>. But there
+are two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely
+negative the belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not
+read or communicate it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything
+serious was in mind; and he did not instruct Adams to communicate
+it to Russell. The latter never heard of it until the publication,
+in 1864, of the United States diplomatic correspondence<a name=
+"FNanchor1020"></a><a href="#Footnote_1020">[1020]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_144"></a>[V2:pg 144]</span>
+<p>In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell
+evidence secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the
+Rams and to urge their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed
+his duty and was in fact acting in accordance with Russell's own
+request<a name="FNanchor1021"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1021">[1021]</a>. On July 16 he reported to Seward that
+the Roebuck motion for recognition of the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1022"></a><a href="#Footnote_1022">[1022]</a> had died
+ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety because of the
+slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape, Adams wrote
+to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a participant
+in the war<a name="FNanchor1023"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1023">[1023]</a>. Further affidavits were sent to
+Russell on August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell
+that the Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in
+any way with these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and
+expressed his regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently
+emphasized the grave nature of the crisis pending between the
+United States and Great Britain. To this Russell replied that the
+matter was "under serious and anxious consideration," to which, on
+September 5, in a long communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams
+escaped: "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your
+Lordship that this is war."</p>
+<p>The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat
+of war on the explanation that Great Britain would herself be
+participating in the war. There is no question that at the moment
+Adams thought Russell's "change of policy" of April was now thrown
+overboard, but the fact was that on September 1, Russell had
+already <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_145"></a>[V2:pg
+145]</span> given directions to take steps for the detention of the
+Rams and that on September 3, positive instructions were given to
+that effect<a name="FNanchor1024"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1024">[1024]</a>, though not carried out until some days
+later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy" of April;
+the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to secure
+evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for acting
+in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to be
+the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the
+<i>Alabama</i>. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain
+Bullock that complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was
+forced, finally, to act without it<a name=
+"FNanchor1025"></a><a href="#Footnote_1025">[1025]</a>.</p>
+<p>It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston,
+on September 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no
+Cabinet approval for this step had yet formally been given, since
+Russell notified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if
+he disapproved, to call a Cabinet at once<a name=
+"FNanchor1026"></a><a href="#Footnote_1026">[1026]</a>. The
+<i>plan</i> to stop the Rams must have long been understood for
+Palmerston called no Cabinet. Moreover it is to be presumed that he
+was preparing the public for the seizure, for on this same
+September 3, the <i>Times</i>, in a long editorial, argued that the
+law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmony with true
+neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to British commerce, as
+had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the <i>Times</i> was at
+this period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at least
+inferential that the editorial was an advance notice of
+governmental intention to apply a policy known in intimate circles
+to have been for some time matured. Four days <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_146"></a>[V2:pg 146]</span> later, while
+governmental action was still unknown to the public another
+editorial advocated seizure of the Rams<a name=
+"FNanchor1027"></a><a href="#Footnote_1027">[1027]</a>. Russell had
+acted under the fear that one of the Rams might slip away as had
+the <i>Alabama</i>; he had sent orders to stop and investigate, but
+he delayed final seizure in the hope that better evidence might yet
+be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letters with Lairds (the
+builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It was only on
+September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send the
+vessels on a "trial trip," and it was not until September 16 that
+public announcement was made of the Government's action<a name=
+"FNanchor1028"></a><a href="#Footnote_1028">[1028]</a>.</p>
+<p>Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it
+was not until September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him
+the Rams would be seized, even though three days before, on
+September 5, this information had been sent to Washington. The
+explanation is Russell's eager search for evidence to
+<i>convict</i>, and his correspondence with Lairds which did not
+come to a head until the eighth, when the builders refused to give
+information. To the builders Russell was writing as if a
+governmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no
+chance of a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed,
+Adams was well satisfied though his immediate reaction was to
+criticize, not Russell, but the general "timidity and vacillation"
+of the law officers of the Crown<a name="FNanchor1029"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1029">[1029]</a>. Two days later, having learned from
+Russell himself just what was taking place, Adams described the
+"firm stand" taken by the Foreign Secretary, noted the general
+approval by the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_147"></a>[V2:pg 147]</span> public press and expressed the
+opinion that there was now a better prospect of being able to
+preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since his
+arrival in London<a name="FNanchor1030"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1030">[1030]</a>. Across the water British officials
+were delighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada
+expressed his approval<a name="FNanchor1031"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1031">[1031]</a>. Lyons reported a "great improvement"
+in the feeling toward England and that Seward especially was highly
+pleased with Russell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem
+for Seward together with the hope that he would remain in
+office<a name="FNanchor1032"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1032">[1032]</a>.</p>
+<p>The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur until
+mid-October, though they had been placed under official
+surveillance on September 9. Both sides were jockeying for position
+in the expected legal battle when the case should be taken up by
+the courts<a name="FNanchor1033"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1033">[1033]</a>. At first Russell even thought of
+making official protest to Mason in London and a draft of such
+protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officers and subsequently
+revised by Palmerston, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_148"></a>[V2:pg 148]</span> but finally was not sent<a name=
+"FNanchor1034"></a><a href="#Footnote_1034">[1034]</a>. Possibly it
+was thought that such a communication to Mason approached too
+nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for
+in December the protest ultimately directed to be made through
+Consul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond
+and after stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing
+the Confederacy to present the following:</p>
+<blockquote>"It appears from various correspondence the
+authenticity of which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate
+Government having no good ports free from the blockade of the
+Federals have conceived the design of using the ports of the United
+Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be equipped
+and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce of the United
+States of America, a State with which Her Majesty is at
+peace...."<br>
+<br>
+"These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity which
+ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a Neutral Power.<br>
+<br>
+"Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly to
+observe it.<br>
+<br>
+"You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his Government
+to forbear from all acts tending to affect injuriously Her
+Majesty's position<a name="FNanchor1035"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1035">[1035]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>To carry out this instruction there was required permission for
+Crawford to pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when
+Lyons made the request<a name="FNanchor1036"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1036">[1036]</a>.</p>
+<p>Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's
+course in seizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very
+generally against the act. Adams now pressed either for an
+alteration of the British law or for a convention <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_149"></a>[V2:pg 149]</span> with America
+establishing mutual similar interpretation of neutral duty. Russell
+replied that "until the trials of the <i>Alexandra</i> and the
+steam rams had taken place, we could hardly be said to know what
+our law was, and therefore not tell whether it required alteration.
+I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Seward that the wish and
+intention of Government were to make our neutrality an honest and
+bona-fide one<a name="FNanchor1037"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1037">[1037]</a>." But save from extreme and avowed
+Southern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less
+to the stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political
+character, attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign
+Minister and his humiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to
+American threats." Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling
+of Parliament, a party attack was made on Russell and the
+Government by Derby in the House of Lords. Derby approved the
+stopping of the Rams but sought to prove that the Government had
+dishonoured England by failing to act of its own volition until
+threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of July II with
+much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printed
+American diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was
+not an instruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell
+flat for Russell simply replied that Adams had never presented such
+an instruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on
+February 15 he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the
+dates of various documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a
+threat of war and Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was
+brief and to the effect that orders to stop the Rams had been given
+before the communications from Adams were received. Finally, on
+February 23, a motion in the Commons called for all correspondence
+with Adams and with Lairds, The <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_150"></a>[V2:pg 150]</span> Government consented to the
+first but refused that with Lairds and was supported by a vote of
+187 to 153<a name="FNanchor1038"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1038">[1038]</a>.</p>
+<p>Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of
+Russell the Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was
+virtually a vote of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud
+as was the Government in praise of Adams and in approval of the
+seizure of the Rams. Naturally their cause was weakened, and the
+Ministry, referring to expressions made and intentions indicated as
+far back as March, 1863, thus hinting without directly so stating
+that the real decision had then been made, was easily the victor in
+the vote<a href="#Footnote_1038">[1038]</a>. Derby had committed an
+error as a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April,
+1864, he attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on
+dates of documents. Russell's reply ignored that point
+altogether<a name="FNanchor1039"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1039">[1039]</a>. It did not suit his purpose to
+declare, flatly, the fact that in April assurances had been given
+both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward, that measures would be
+taken to prevent the departure of Southern vessels from British
+ports. To have made this disclosure would have required an
+explanation <i>why</i> such assurance had been given and this would
+have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern
+plan to create a <i>cruising squadron blockade by privateers</i>.
+<i>There</i> was the real threat. The later delays and seeming
+uncertainties of British action made Adams anxious but there is no
+evidence that Russell ever changed his purpose. He sought stronger
+evidence before acting and he hoped for stronger support
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_151"></a>[V2:pg 151]</span>
+from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on the Rams and when they
+had reached the stage where there was danger of escape, he seized
+them even though the desired evidence was still lacking<a name=
+"FNanchor1040"></a><a href="#Footnote_1040">[1040]</a>. Seward's
+"privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon in a moment of
+desperation and with no clear statement from him of its exact
+application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats became
+pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the
+interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the
+cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America
+complained.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_966"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor966">[966]</a> In other respects, also, this question of
+belligerent ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in
+practice, vaguely defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing
+Texan war of independence against Mexico, the British Foreign
+Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at sea. Mexico made a contract
+for two ships of war with the English firm of Lizardi &amp;
+Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the ships were
+to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the guns
+were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British
+Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary
+authority to purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed
+to think strict neutrality was secured if the same privileges were
+offered that country. Later he prohibited naval officers to go in
+command. One Mexican vessel, the <i>Guadaloupe</i>, left England
+with full equipment as originally planned; the other, the
+<i>Montezuma</i>, was forced to strip her equipment. But both
+vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were
+permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated.
+In all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid
+Mexico, but it is also clear that British governmental opinion was
+much in confusion as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See
+my book, <i>British Interests and Activities in Texas</i>, Ch.
+IV.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_967"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor967">[967]</a> Bullock, <i>Secret Service under the
+Confederacy</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_968"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor968">[968]</a> Bernard, <i>Neutrality of Great Britain
+during the American Civil War</i>, p. 338-9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_969"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor969">[969]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'"
+Also <i>ibid.</i>, "Correspondence between Commissioner of Customs
+and Custom House Authorities at Liverpool relating to the
+'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to the illness of a Crown
+adviser.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_970"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor970">[970]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264.
+Adams to Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_971"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor971">[971]</a> Selborne, in his <i>Memorials: Family and
+Personal</i>, II, p. 430, declared that in frequent official
+communication with all members of the Cabinet at the time, "I never
+heard a word fall from any one of them expressive of anything but
+regret that the orders for the detention of the <i>Alabama</i> were
+sent too late." Of quite different opinion is Brooks Adams, in his
+"The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (<i>Proceedings</i>, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, the American
+Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what purported
+to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse, Southern
+agent in England, warning him of danger to his "proteg&eacute;."
+"This Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office."
+(<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 260, <i>note</i>.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_972"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor972">[972]</a> Fox, <i>Confidential Correspondence</i>,
+I, p. 165. Fox to Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_973"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor973">[973]</a> It is interesting that the opinion of many
+Continental writers on international law was immediately expressed
+in favour of the American and against the British contention. This
+was especially true of German opinion. (Lutz,
+<i>Notes</i>.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_974"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor974">[974]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_975"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor975">[975]</a> I am aware that Seward's use of the
+"Privateering Bill," now to be recounted is largely a new
+interpretation of the play of diplomacy in regard to the question
+of Southern ship-building in England. Its significance became
+evident only when British correspondence was available; but that
+correspondence and a careful comparison of dates permits, and, as I
+think, requires a revised statement of the incident of the Laird
+Rams.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_976"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor976">[976]</a> Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers
+and laying Northern cities under contribution. According to a
+statement made in 1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the
+rams, no instructions as to their use had been given him by the
+Confederate Government, but his plans were solely to break the
+blockade with no thought of attacking Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV.
+385, <i>note</i>.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_977"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor977">[977]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1862, p. 134.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_978"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor978">[978]</a> Wallbridge, <i>Addresses and
+Resolutions</i>. Pamphlet. New York, n.d. He began his agitation in
+1856, and now received much popular applause. His pamphlet quotes
+in support many newspapers from June, 1862, to September, 1863.
+Wallbridge apparently thought himself better qualified than Welles
+to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his agitation as
+instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet. Welles
+professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress
+unknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a
+statement difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon
+it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_979"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor979">[979]</a> Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session,
+Pt. IV, pp. 3271, 3325 and 3336.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_980"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor980">[980]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220,
+393, and Part II, pp. 960, 1028, 1489.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_981"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor981">[981]</a> Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird
+Rams." (Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLV, pp.
+265-6.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_982"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor982">[982]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 116, Feb. 19, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_983"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor983">[983]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_984"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor984">[984]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to
+Russell, March 10, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_985"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor985">[985]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 235. Lyons to Russell,
+March 13, 1863. Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger.
+(Russell Papers. To Russell, March 24, 1863.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_986"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor986">[986]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 141. Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_987"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor987">[987]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to
+Lyons, March 24, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_988"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor988">[988]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell
+to Lyons, March 27, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_989"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor989">[989]</a> Welles, <i>Diary</i>, I, pp.
+245-50.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_990"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor990">[990]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 634,
+Slidell to Benjamin, March 4, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_991"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor991">[991]</a> For example of American contemporary
+belief and later "historical tradition," see Balch, <i>The Alabama
+Arbitration</i>, pp. 24-38. Also for a curious story that a large
+part of the price paid for Alaska was in reality a repayment of
+expenses incurred by Russia in sending her fleet to America, see
+<i>Letters of Franklin K. Lane</i>, p. 260. The facts as stated
+above are given by F.A. Golder, <i>The Russian Fleet and the Civil
+War</i> (<i>Am. Hist. Rev</i>., July, 1915, pp. 801 <i>seq</i>.).
+The plan was to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of
+aid to the North was "born on American soil," and Russian officers
+naturally did nothing to contradict its spread. In one case,
+however, a Russian commander was ready to help the North.
+Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the harbour of San Francisco
+was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours of the approach of
+the <i>Alabama</i> and gave orders to protect the city. He acted
+without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his
+superiors at home.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_992"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor992">[992]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, March 6,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_993"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor993">[993]</a> American opinion knew little of this
+change. An interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan
+to thwart Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by
+the United States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams
+outright by the offer of such a price as, it was thought, would be
+so tempting to the Lairds as to make refusal unlikely. Two men,
+Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to England with funds and much
+embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetly refrained from stating
+details, but yet permitted him to guess their object. The plan of
+buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic protests on
+England's duty in international law and the agents themselves soon
+saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, wrote to
+Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in England, I
+think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.) Thurlow
+Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of
+Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, 632.)
+Forbes reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on
+with the plan. "We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we
+have put new fire into Mr. Dudley by furnishing <i>fuel</i>, and he
+is hard at it getting evidence.... My opinion <i>to-day</i> is that
+we can and shall stop by legal process and by the British
+Government the sailing of ironclads and other war-ships." (Forbes
+MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department plan and was
+disliked by State Department representatives is shown by Dudley's
+complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately
+discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding
+citations, in his <i>Studies Military and Diplomatic</i>, Ch. IX.
+"An Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by
+Chittenden written in 1890, in which bad memory and
+misunderstanding played sad havoc with historical
+truth.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_994"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor994">[994]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To Seward, March 24, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_995"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor995">[995]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 160. To Seward, March 27,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_996"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor996">[996]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356.
+Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_997"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor997">[997]</a> Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston,
+March 27, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_998"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor998">[998]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 369, <i>notes</i>, April 4,
+1863. Bright was made very anxious as to Government intentions by
+this debate.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_999"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor999">[999]</a> This topic will be treated at length in
+Chapter XVIII. It is here cited merely in relation to its effect on
+the Government at the moment.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1000"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1000">[1000]</a> Trevelyan, <i>John Bright</i>,
+307-8.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1001"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1001">[1001]</a> Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for
+entire debate.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1002"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1002">[1002]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 164. Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1003"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1003">[1003]</a> Rhodes, IV, 369-72.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1004"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1004">[1004]</a> Palmerston MS.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1005"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1005">[1005]</a> Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in
+June, and the seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government
+this decision was upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It
+was again appealed, and the Government defeated in the House of
+Lords in April, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1006"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1006">[1006]</a> <i>Manchester Examiner and Times</i>,
+April 7, 1863. Goldwin Smith was one of the principal speakers.
+Letters were read from Bright, Forster, R.A. Taylor, and
+others.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1007"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1007">[1007]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No.
+183.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1008"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1008">[1008]</a> "Historicus," in articles in the
+<i>Times</i>, was at this very moment, from December, 1862, on,
+discussing international law problems, and in one such article
+specifically defended the belligerent right to conduct a cruising
+squadron blockade. See <i>Historicus on International Law</i>, pp.
+99-118. He stated the established principle to be that search and
+seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels actually intercepted
+in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which
+shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been
+destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the
+blockade." (<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 108.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1009"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1009">[1009]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to
+Lyons, March 28, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1010"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1010">[1010]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To
+Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1011"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1011">[1011]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 310. To Russell, April
+13, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1012"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1012">[1012]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1013"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1013">[1013]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy
+enclosed in Lyons to Russell, April 17, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1014"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1014">[1014]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1015"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1015">[1015]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to
+Russell, April 24, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1016"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1016">[1016]</a> Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons
+wrote: "The stories in the newspapers about an ultimatum having
+been sent to England are untrue. But it is true that it had been
+determined (or very nearly determined) to issue letters of marque,
+if the answers to the despatches sent were not satisfactory. It is
+very easy to see that if U.S. privateers were allowed to capture
+British merchant vessels on charges of breach of blockade or
+carrying contraband of war, the vexations would have soon become
+intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must have
+ensued."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1017"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1017">[1017]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on
+Foreign Enlistment Act."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1018"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1018">[1018]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1019"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1019">[1019]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, pp. 308-10.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1020"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1020">[1020]</a> The despatch taken in its entirety save
+for a few vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's
+phrase-making, is not at all warlike. Bancroft, II, 385
+<i>seq</i>., makes Seward increasingly anxious from March to
+September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to Adams,
+September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivings reported
+in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my
+interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made
+in April would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to
+Russell a communication from Seward denying that his July 11
+despatch was intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to
+Great Britain. (F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons,
+April 3, 1864.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1021"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1021">[1021]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864,
+<i>Commons</i>, LXII. "Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels
+building at Birkenhead."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1022"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1022">[1022]</a> See next chapter.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1023"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1023">[1023]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No.
+452, and No. 453 with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1024"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1024">[1024]</a> Rhodes, IV, 381.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1025"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1025">[1025]</a> Many of these details were unknown at
+the time so that on the face of the documents then available, and
+for long afterwards, there appeared ground for believing that
+Adams' final protests of September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to
+yield. Dudley, as late as 1893, thought that "at the crisis" in
+September, Palmerston, in the absence of Russell, had given the
+orders to stop the rams. (In <i>Penn. Magazine of History</i>, Vol.
+17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England during the Late
+War.")</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1026"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1026">[1026]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 382.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1027"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1027">[1027]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Sept. 7,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1028"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1028">[1028]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863.
+The Governmental correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a
+motion in Parliament, Feb. 23, 1864, but the Government was
+supported in refusing it. A printed copy of this correspondence,
+issued privately, was placed in Adams' hands by persons unnamed and
+sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Seward thereupon had this printed
+in the <i>Diplomatic Correspondence</i>, 1864-5, Pt. I, No.
+633.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1029"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1029">[1029]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No.
+492. Adams to Seward, Sept. 8, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1030"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1030">[1030]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 370. To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at
+the whole matter of the Rams and the alleged "threat of war" of
+Sept. 5, from the point of view of his own anxiety at the time, was
+naturally inclined to magnify the effects of his own efforts and to
+regard the <i>crisis</i> as occurring in September. His notes to
+Russell and his diary records were early the main basis of
+historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved the
+accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLV, p. 293, <i>seq.</i>)
+ignores Rhodes, harks back to the old argument and amplifies it
+with much new and interesting citation, but not to conviction. My
+interpretation is that the real crisis of Governmental decision to
+act came in April, and that events in September were but final
+applications of that decision.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1031"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1031">[1031]</a> Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept.
+26, 1863. Copy in Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1032"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1032">[1032]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1033"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1033">[1033]</a> Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You
+will learn by the papers that we have at last seized the Iron
+Clads. Whether we shall be able to bring home to them legally that
+they were Confederate property is another matter. I think we can,
+but at all events no moral doubt can be entertained of the fact,
+and, therefore, we are under no anxiety whether as to the public or
+Parliamentary view of our proceeding. They would have played the
+devil with the American ships, for they are most formidable ships.
+I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably in consequence."
+(Lyons Papers.) The Foreign Office thought that it had thwarted
+plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea. (F.O.,
+Am., Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine to Hammond,
+Oct. 26, 1863.).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1034"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1034">[1034]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 929. Marked "September,
+1863." The draft summarized the activities of Confederate
+ship-building and threatened Southern agents in England with "the
+penalities of the law...."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1035"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1035">[1035]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 932, No. 1. F.O. to
+Consul-General Crawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7,
+1863, had already "expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to
+protest against this also. (<i>Ibid.</i>, No. 4.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1036"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1036">[1036]</a> Bonham. <i>British Consuls in the
+South</i>, p. 254. (Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1037"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1037">[1037]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5,
+1863. Bullock, <i>Secret Service</i>, declares the British
+Government to have been neutral but with strong leaning toward the
+North.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1038"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1038">[1038]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIII, pp. 430-41,
+544-50, 955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by
+Brooks Adams, <i>The Seizure of the Laird Rams</i>, pp.
+312-324.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1039"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1039">[1039]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXIV, pp.
+1862-1913. <i>The Index</i>, naturally vicious in comment on the
+question of the Rams, summed up its approval of Derby's
+contentions: "Europe and America alike will inevitably believe that
+it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothing else, which induced the
+Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the 1st September, and
+they will draw the necessary conclusion that the way to extort
+concessions from England is by bluster and menace." (Feb. 18, 1864,
+p. 106.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1040"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1040">[1040]</a> Lairds brought suit for damages, but the
+case never reached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by
+the Government. This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the
+Government that it had no case. In my view the failure to push the
+case to a conclusion was due to the desire not to commit Great
+Britain on legal questions, in view of the claim for damages
+certain to be set up by the United States on account of the
+depredations of the <i>Alabama</i>.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_152"></a>[V2:pg 152]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XIV"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2>
+<h3>ROEBUCK'S MOTION</h3>
+<br>
+<p>In the mid-period during which the British Government was
+seeking to fulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards
+ship-building and while the public was unaware that such a promise
+had been given, certain extreme friends of the South thought the
+time had come for renewed pressure upon the Government, looking
+toward recognition of the Confederacy. The <i>Alexandra</i> had
+been seized in April, but the first trial, though appealed, had
+gone against the Government in June, and there was no knowledge
+that the Ministry was determined in its stand. From January to the
+end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations in approval of the
+emancipation proclamation had somewhat checked expressions of
+Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friends had
+recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came
+forward in the person of Roebuck.</p>
+<p>Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends
+had not ceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less
+vigorous tone. For four months after the British refusal of
+Napoleon's overtures on mediation, in November, 1862, the friends
+of the South were against "acting now," but this did not imply that
+they thought the cause lost or in any sense hopeless. Publicists
+either neutral in attitude or even professedly sympathetic with the
+North could see no outcome of the Civil War save separation of
+North and South. Thus the historian Freeman in the preface to the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_153"></a>[V2:pg 153]</span>
+first volume of his uncompleted <i>History of Federal
+Government</i>, published in 1863, carefully explained that his
+book did not have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued
+that the breaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent
+weakness in a federal system, but took it for granted that American
+reunion was impossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a
+long tour of the North, beginning in September, 1861, published
+late in 1862 a two-volume work, <i>North America</i>, descriptive
+of a nation engaged in the business of war and wholly sympathetic
+with the Northern cause. Yet he, also, could see no hope of forcing
+the South back into the Union. "The North and South are virtually
+separated, and the day will come in which the West also will
+secede<a name="FNanchor1041"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1041">[1041]</a>."</p>
+<p>Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual;
+they were, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in
+November, 1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to
+prove it to be so for never again was there so near an approach to
+British intervention. Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think
+that true Southern policy was now to make an appeal to the Tories
+against the Government. In January, 1863, he was planning a new
+move:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time
+for a thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a
+vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body and if
+so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I have seen Mr.
+Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself in communication
+with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for action for this seems
+to me now our best card<a name="FNanchor1042"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1042">[1042]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the
+attitude of the <i>Index</i> which all through the months from
+November, 1862, to the middle of January, 1863, had <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_154"></a>[V2:pg 154]</span> continued to
+harp on the subject of mediation as if still believing that
+something yet might be done by the existing Ministry, but which
+then apparently gave up hope of the Palmerstonian
+administration:</p>
+<blockquote>"But what the Government means is evident enough. It
+does not mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if
+it can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States,
+unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over which
+they have no control,' which leave weak men and weak ministers no
+choice. They will not, if they are not forced to it, quarrel with
+Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will let Lancashire starve;
+they will let British merchantmen be plundered off Nassau and burnt
+off Cuba; they will submit to a blockade of Bermuda or of
+Liverpool; but they will do nothing which may tend to bring a
+supply of cotton from the South, or to cut off the supply of eggs
+and bacon from the North<a name="FNanchor1043"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1043">[1043]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant
+encouragement and was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by
+the debate in Parliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby
+gave explicit approval of the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_155"></a>[V2:pg 155]</span> Government's refusal to listen
+to Napoleon<a name="FNanchor1044"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1044">[1044]</a>. By February, Russell, having recovered
+from the smart of defeat within the Cabinet, declared himself weary
+of the perpetual talk about mediation and wrote to Lyons, "... till
+both parties are heartily tired and sick of the business, I see no
+use in talking of good offices. When that time comes Mercier will
+probably have a hint; let him have all the honour and glory of
+being the first<a name="FNanchor1045"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1045">[1045]</a>." For the time being Spence's idea was
+laid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from
+Mason:</p>
+<blockquote>"The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at
+present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be useless
+to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North. Any motion on
+the subject will be received with disfavour, consequently the way
+in which it will be treated will only make the North more elated,
+and will irritate the South against us. If I saw the slightest
+chance of a motion being received with any favour I would not let
+it go into other hands, but I find the most influential men of all
+Parties opposed to it<a name="FNanchor1046"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1046">[1046]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in
+France, reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the
+Foreign Office" that "It is believed that every possible thing has
+been done here in your behalf--we must now await the action of
+England, and it is through that you must aim all your efforts in
+that direction<a name="FNanchor1047"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1047">[1047]</a>."</p>
+<p>With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to
+move the British Government or to stir Parliament, energies were
+now directed toward using financial methods of winning support for
+the Southern cause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken
+with the double <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_156"></a>[V2:pg 156]</span> object of providing funds for
+Southern agents in Europe and of creating an interested support of
+the South, which might, it was hoped, ultimately influence the
+British Government.</p>
+<p>By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the
+blockade, for the Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its
+agents abroad. Bullock, especially, required large amounts in
+furtherance of his ship-building contracts and was embarrassed by
+the lack of business methods and the delays of the Government at
+home. The incompetence of the Confederacy in finance was a weakness
+that characterized all of its many operations whether at home or
+abroad<a name="FNanchor1048"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1048">[1048]</a> and was made evident in England by the
+confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. At first the
+Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with drafts upon
+the house of Fraser, Trenholm &amp; Company, of Liverpool, a branch
+of the firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina,
+purchasing its bills of exchange with its own "home made" money.
+But as Confederate currency rapidly depreciated this method of
+transmitting funds became increasingly difficult and costly. The
+next step was to send to Spence, nominated by Mason as financial
+adviser in England, Confederate money bonds for sale on the British
+market, with authority to dispose of them as low as fifty cents on
+the dollar, but these found no takers<a name=
+"FNanchor1049"></a><a href="#Footnote_1049">[1049]</a>. By
+September, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted
+and some new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was
+found in adopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made
+the basis for an advance of &pound;60,000, a form of cotton bond
+being devised which fixed the price of cotton at eightpence the
+pound. These bonds were not put on the market but were privately
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_157"></a>[V2:pg 157]</span>
+placed by Lindsay &amp; Company with a few buyers for the entire
+sum, the transaction remaining secret<a name=
+"FNanchor1050"></a><a href="#Footnote_1050">[1050]</a>.</p>
+<p>In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to the
+authorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton
+should be purchased by the Government, stored, and certificates
+issued to be sold abroad, the purchaser being assured of "all
+facilities of shipment." Spence was to be the authorized agent for
+the sale of these "cotton certificates," but before any reached him
+various special agents of the Confederacy had arrived in England by
+December, 1862, with such certificates in their possession and had
+disposed of some of them, calling them "cotton warrants." The
+difficulties which might arise from separate action in the market
+were at once perceived and following a conference with Mason all
+cotton obligations were turned to Fraser, Trenholm &amp; Company.
+Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but no further
+attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants"
+were considered a better means of raising funds.</p>
+<p>It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved a
+governmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants"
+partook of the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point
+the Richmond authorities, after the first failure to sell "money
+bonds" abroad were not keen to attempt anything that could be
+stamped as a foreign "government loan." Their idea was rather that
+a certain part of the produce of the South was being set aside as
+the property of those who in England should extend credit to the
+South. The sole purpose of these earlier operations was to provide
+funds for Southern agents. By July, 1862, Bullock had exhausted his
+earlier credit of a million dollars. The &pound;60,000 loan secured
+through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demand and this had
+been followed by a development on similar lines of the "cotton
+certificates" <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_158"></a>[V2:pg
+158]</span> and "warrants" which by December, 1862, had secured,
+through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars or
+thereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of
+this method and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however,
+there was broached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for
+the definite floating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan."</p>
+<p>This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by the
+well-established firm of Erlanger &amp; Company. First approached
+by this company in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but
+found the latter strongly committed to his own plans with
+Spence<a name="FNanchor1051"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1051">[1051]</a>. But Slidell persisted and Mason gave
+way<a name="FNanchor1052"></a><a href="#Footnote_1052">[1052]</a>.
+Representatives of Erlanger proceeded to Richmond and proposed a
+loan of twenty-five million dollars; they were surprised to find
+the Confederate Government disinclined to the idea of a foreign
+loan, and the final agreement, cut to fifteen millions, was largely
+made because of the argument advanced that as a result powerful
+influences would thus be brought to the support of the
+South<a name="FNanchor1053"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1053">[1053]</a>. The contract was signed at Richmond,
+January 28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the
+day following<a name="FNanchor1054"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1054">[1054]</a>. But there was no Southern enthusiasm
+for the project. Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy
+disclaimed the "desire or intention on our part to effect a loan in
+Europe ... during the war we want only such very moderate sums as
+are required abroad for the purchase of warlike supplies and for
+vessels, and even that is not required because of our want of
+funds, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_159"></a>[V2:pg
+159]</span> but because of the difficulties of remittance"; as for
+the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would have declined it
+altogether but for the political considerations indicated by Mr.
+Slidell<a name="FNanchor1055"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1055">[1055]</a>...."</p>
+<p>From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from
+Slidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the
+purpose of establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to
+suspend the operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's
+offer was learned, but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing
+agent of the Confederacy, caused a further sale of "cotton
+warrants<a name="FNanchor1056"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1056">[1056]</a>." Spence, fearing he was about to be
+shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while Slidell
+regarded Spence<a name="FNanchor1057"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1057">[1057]</a> as a weak and meddlesome agent<a name=
+"FNanchor1058"></a><a href="#Footnote_1058">[1058]</a>. But on
+February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and
+uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and
+agreed to co-operate in floating the loan<a name=
+"FNanchor1059"></a><a href="#Footnote_1059">[1059]</a>. Then
+followed a remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so
+much as regards the financial returns to the South, for these were
+negligible, as in relation to the declared object of Slidell and
+the Richmond Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would
+accompany the successful flotation of a loan.</p>
+<p>Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to
+receive promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress
+authorizing the loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this
+contract Erlanger &amp; Company, sole managers of the loan, had
+guaranteed flotation of the entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77,
+the profit of the Company to be five per cent., plus the difference
+between 77 and the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_160"></a>[V2:pg 160]</span> actual price received, but the
+first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the disposal of
+the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19, in
+London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically
+all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was
+entitled "<i>Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States
+of America for</i> 3 <i>Millions Sterling at</i> 90 <i>per
+Cent</i>." The bonds were to bear interest at seven per cent. and
+were to be exchangeable for cotton at the option of the holder at
+the price of sixpence "for each pound of cotton, at any time not
+later than six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace
+between the present belligerents." There were provisions for the
+gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who did not
+desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on application.
+10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the days, the
+first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the first of
+August, September and October.</p>
+<p>Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound
+it was thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at
+least a good chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds.
+True "the loan was looked upon as a wild cotton speculation<a name=
+"FNanchor1060"></a><a href="#Footnote_1060">[1060]</a>," but odds
+were so large as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed
+hardly conceivable that cotton could for some years go below
+sevenpence per pound, and even that figure would have meant profit,
+<i>if</i> the Confederacy were established. Moreover, even though
+the loan was not given official recognition by the London stock
+exchange, the financial columns of the <i>Times</i> and the
+<i>Economist</i> favoured it and the subscriptions were so prompt
+and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as
+over-subscribed three times in London alone<a name=
+"FNanchor1061"></a><a href="#Footnote_1061">[1061]</a>. With the
+closing of the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2.
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_161"></a>[V2:pg 161]</span>
+Slidell wrote: "It is a financial recognition of our independence,
+emanating from a class proverbially cautious, and little given to
+be influenced by sentiment or sympathy<a name=
+"FNanchor1062"></a><a href="#Footnote_1062">[1062]</a>." On Friday,
+March 27, the allotment took place and three days later Mason
+wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on the
+triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows,
+<i>malgr&eacute;</i> all detraction and calumny, that cotton is
+king at last<a name="FNanchor1063"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1063">[1063]</a>."</p>
+<p>"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble
+and it took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep
+him in state<a name="FNanchor1064"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1064">[1064]</a>." On April 1, the flurry of speculation
+had begun to falter and the loan was below par; on the second it
+dropped to 3-1/2 discount, and by the third the promoters and the
+Southern diplomats were very anxious. They agreed that someone must
+be "bearing" the bonds and suspected Adams of supplying Northern
+funds for that purpose<a name="FNanchor1065"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1065">[1065]</a>. Spence wrote from Liverpool in great
+alarm and coincidently Erlanger &amp; Company urged that Mason
+should authorize the use of the receipts already secured to hold up
+the price of the bonds. Mason was very reluctant to do this<a name=
+"FNanchor1066"></a><a href="#Footnote_1066">[1066]</a>, but finally
+yielded when informed of the result of an interview between Spence,
+Erlanger, and the latter's chief London agent, Schroeder. Spence
+had proposed a withdrawal of a part of the loan from the market as
+likely to have a stabilizing effect, and opposed the Erlanger plan
+of using the funds already in hand. But <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_162"></a>[V2:pg 162]</span> Schroeder
+coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative refused
+to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market, then
+Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their
+contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued
+it, they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up
+their instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent
+sacrificed is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government
+at all, but the profits of Messrs. Erlanger &amp; Co., actually in
+their hands, and they cannot be expected to take a worse position.
+At any rate they will not do so, and unless the compact can be made
+on the basis we name, matters must take their course<a name=
+"FNanchor1067"></a><a href="#Footnote_1067">[1067]</a>."</p>
+<p>In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he
+"could not hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous
+politically, as well as financially, as the public break-down of
+the Loan<a name="FNanchor1068"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1068">[1068]</a>." Mason gave the required authorization
+and this was later approved from Richmond. For a time the "bulling"
+of the loan was successful, but again and again required the use of
+funds received from actual sales of bonds and in the end the loan
+netted very little to the Confederacy. Some $6,000,000 was
+squandered in supporting the market and from the entire operation
+it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the
+Confederacy, although, as stated by the <i>Economist</i>, over
+$12,000,000 of the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands
+of British investors at the end of the war<a name=
+"FNanchor1069"></a><a href="#Footnote_1069">[1069]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_163"></a>[V2:pg 163]</span>
+<p>The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by
+Slidell, a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere
+barometer of Southern fortunes<a name="FNanchor1070"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1070">[1070]</a>. From first to last the Confederate
+Cotton Loan bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture
+and lacked the regard attached to sound investment. This fact in
+itself denied to the loan any such favourable influence, or
+"financial recognition of the Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell,
+in the first flush of success, attributed to it. The rapid
+fluctuations in price further discredited it and tended to
+emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus "confidence in
+the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of increased by this
+turning from political to financial methods of bringing pressure
+upon the Government<a name="FNanchor1071"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1071">[1071]</a>.</p>
+<p>Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been
+reserved from January to June, 1863. Public attention was
+distracted from the war in America by the Polish question, which
+for a time, particularly during the months of March and April,
+1863, disturbed the good relations existing between England and
+France since the Emperor seemed bent on going beyond British
+"meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily might lead to war
+with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America, and Napoleon
+himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish question
+than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was
+still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary
+"push" and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_164"></a>[V2:pg 164]</span>
+Lancashire little attention was given it, though ordinarily it
+would have been seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern
+demonstration. This was a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the
+Commons, on April 27, directed against the cotton manufacturers as
+lukewarm over employees' sufferings. Potter, a leading cotton
+manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and his brother were
+already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet no effort
+was made to use the debate to the advantage of the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1072"></a><a href="#Footnote_1072">[1072]</a>.</p>
+<p>In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to
+make advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton
+loan, though fairly strong again because of Confederate
+governmental aid, was in fact a failure in its expected result of
+public support for the South; something must be done to offset that
+failure. In Polish affairs France had drawn back; presumably
+Napoleon was again eager for some active effort. Best of all, the
+military situation in America was thought to indicate Southern
+success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt with the
+stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at
+Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly
+defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a
+definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance
+north did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in
+a select circle in England and much was expected of it. The time
+seemed ripe, therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck
+of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the
+real purpose of which was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories'
+which had been advocated by Spence in January, but postponed on the
+advice of Gregory<a name="FNanchor1073"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1073">[1073]</a>. <i>The Index</i> clearly indicated
+where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now asks what will be
+the policy of Great <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_165"></a>[V2:pg 165]</span> Britain towards America; but
+everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will
+do."</p>
+<blockquote>"... England to-day pays one of the inevitable
+penalties of free government and of material prosperity, that of
+having at times at the head of national affairs statesmen who
+belong rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and
+merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details,
+acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient
+comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies....<br>
+<br>
+"The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a
+diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or
+determination, except where the display of these qualities was
+singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From Great
+Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet at
+Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States nothing
+to expect<a name="FNanchor1074"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1074">[1074]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The
+<i>Times</i> minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as
+required for political effect to hold the north-western states
+loyal to the Union, and while indulging in no prophecies as to the
+fate of Vicksburg, expressing the opinion that, if forced to
+surrender it, the South could easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at
+some other point<a name="FNanchor1075"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1075">[1075]</a>. Naturally <i>The Index</i> was pleased
+with and supported this view<a name="FNanchor1076"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1076">[1076]</a>. Such ignorance of the geographic
+importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful misleading of the
+public; but professed British military experts were equally
+ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at
+Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American
+campaigns, centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and
+Virginia and reaching the conclusion that the South could resist,
+indefinitely, any Northern attack<a name=
+"FNanchor1077"></a><a href="#Footnote_1077">[1077]</a>. He
+dismissed <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_166"></a>[V2:pg
+166]</span> the western campaigns as of no real significance. W.H.
+Russell, now editor of the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, better
+understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed
+Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the
+Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the
+success of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to
+Roebuck's motion for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it.</p>
+<blockquote>"If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking
+the North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and
+trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it
+to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can
+breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union
+again, is the delusion of some people in England who imagine that
+by recognition we would give life to the South, divide the nations
+on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this
+war to the end. There is probably not one of these clamourers for
+recognition who could define the limits of the State to be
+recognized.... And, over and above all, recognition, unless it
+meant 'war,' would be an aggravation of the horrors of the contest;
+it would not aid the South one whit, and it would add immensely to
+the unity and the fury of the North<a name=
+"FNanchor1078"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1078">[1078]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at
+Roebuck's motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has
+given notice of a motion to recognize the South. But I think it
+certain that neither Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I
+should think no great number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from
+all parties will compose the minority<a name=
+"FNanchor1079"></a><a href="#Footnote_1079">[1079]</a>." Russell
+was correct in this view but not so did it appear to Southern
+agents who now became active at the request of Roebuck and Lindsay
+in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of willingness to
+act, and promptly, if England would but give the word. There was no
+real hope that Russell would change his policy, but <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_167"></a>[V2:pg 167]</span> there seemed
+at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one.
+The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30.
+On June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from
+Roebuck asking for an interview with Napoleon<a name=
+"FNanchor1080"></a><a href="#Footnote_1080">[1080]</a>, and on June
+16, Mason wrote that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the
+greatest importance that he, Mason, should be at once informed of
+the results and how far he might communicate them to "our friends
+in the House<a name="FNanchor1081"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1081">[1081]</a>." Slidell saw the Emperor on June 18,
+talked of the possibility of "forcing the English Cabinet to act or
+to give way to a new ministry," asked that an interview be given
+Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, a warm friend
+of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in a Tory
+cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid in
+upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested
+interview and declared he would go to the length of officially
+informing the British Ministry that France was very ready to
+discuss the advisability of recognizing the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1082"></a><a href="#Footnote_1082">[1082]</a>.</p>
+<p>This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from
+Mocquard stating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London,
+had been instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and
+Lindsay had hurried to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the
+twenty-fifth, Slidell reported that they were authorized to state
+in the House of Commons that France was "not only willing but
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_168"></a>[V2:pg 168]</span>
+anxious to recognize the Confederate States with the co-operation
+of England<a name="FNanchor1083"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1083">[1083]</a>." Slidell added, however, that Napoleon
+had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal proposal to
+Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received by Slidell
+from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance be known
+to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on
+June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and
+asked for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being
+permitted to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed
+instruction<a name="FNanchor1084"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1084">[1084]</a>, he received a reply indicating
+confusion somewhere:</p>
+<blockquote>"I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires
+Etrangeres on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just
+left me. M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to
+Baron Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he
+directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading Members of
+Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the subject of American
+affairs were unchanged. That he was disposed with the co-operation
+of England immediately to recognize the Confederate States; this
+was in the form of a draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he
+officially instructed the Baron to sound <i>Palmerston</i> on the
+subject and to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This
+was done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the
+Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait bien
+d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis d&eacute;cid&eacute;
+&agrave; reconna&icirc;tre le Sud.' This is by far the most
+significant thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the
+others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England may do
+or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press his motion and
+make his statement of the Emperor's declaration. Lord Palmerston
+will not dare to dispute it and the responsibility of the
+continuance of the war will rest entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de
+Lhuys has not heard from Baron Gros the result of his interview
+with <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_169"></a>[V2:pg
+169]</span> Palmerston. I see that the latter has been unwell and
+it is probable that the former had not been able to see him. There
+can be no impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will
+doubtless give him information which he will use to advantage. I
+write in great haste; will you do me the favour to let Lord
+Campbell know the substance of this note, omitting that portion of
+it which relates to the Emperor's inclination to act alone. Pray
+excuse me to Lord Campbell for not writing to him, time not
+permitting me to do so<a name="FNanchor1085"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1085">[1085]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth,
+"Can I put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by
+Corcoran<a name="FNanchor1086"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1086">[1086]</a>." To which Slidell replied by
+letter:</p>
+<blockquote>"For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write
+to say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be
+<i>used in any way</i>. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay
+when they were here and have no objection that they should again
+see it confidentially<a name="FNanchor1087"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1087">[1087]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the
+information that no formal communication had been made to Russell.
+The next day in an effort in some way to secure an admission of
+what Mason and his friends believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell
+asked Russell in the House of Lords if he had received either a
+document or a verbal communication outlining Napoleon's desires.
+Russell replied that Baron Gros had told him "an hour ago" that he
+had not even received any instruction to deliver such a
+communication<a name="FNanchor1088"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1088">[1088]</a>. This was in the hours preceding the
+debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had
+been an error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck
+and Lindsay, or else there was a question of veracity between
+Russell, Baron Gros and Napoleon.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_170"></a>[V2:pg 170]</span>
+<p>Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the
+Queen to enter into negotiations with foreign powers for
+co-operation in recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that
+the South had in fact established its independence and that this
+was greatly to England's advantage since it put an end to the
+"threatening great power" in the West. He repeated old arguments
+based on suffering in Lancashire--a point his opponents brushed
+aside as no longer of dangerous concern--attacked British
+anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and minimized the dangers
+of a war with the North, prophesying an easy victory for Great
+Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the Government Roebuck
+related at length his interview with Napoleon, claiming to have
+been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to action and
+asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply again
+to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was
+concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however,
+he added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application
+could be renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to
+Seward, through Lyons, the contents of a former application.</p>
+<p>Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat
+perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot
+with all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance<a name=
+"FNanchor1089"></a><a href="#Footnote_1089">[1089]</a>. Here was
+direct attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the
+debate. Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of
+the South, was sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into
+the field of diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming
+involved in the war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued
+British neutrality. Palmerston was absent, being ill, but
+Gladstone, for the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_171"></a>[V2:pg 171]</span> Government, while carefully
+avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or South, yet
+going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster to
+political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was
+positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either
+Roebuck's motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not
+<i>commit</i> herself to any line of policy, especially as military
+events were "now occurring" which might greatly alter the whole
+situation, though "the main result of the contest was not
+doubtful." Here spoke that element of the Ministry still convinced
+of ultimate Southern success.</p>
+<p>If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his
+friends might well have thought they were about to secure a
+ministerial change of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone
+spoke more for himself than for the Government. Roebuck had made a
+direct accusation and in meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign
+Office, entered a positive and emphatical denial, in which he was
+supported by Sir George Grey, Home Secretary, who added sharp
+criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself to be made the channel
+of a French complaint against England. It early became evident to
+the friends of the South that an error in tactics had been
+committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new
+French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof
+of it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt
+to unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to
+a support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting
+Roebuck "feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party
+strongly supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so
+clearly a mere party one that it served to increase the strength of
+ministerial resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated
+the situation and in strong speeches supported the neutrality
+policy of the Government. Forster laid stress upon the danger of
+war and the strength <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_172"></a>[V2:pg 172]</span> of British emancipation
+sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most powerful
+of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In
+particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of
+Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his
+"friend" Lindsay for his version<a name="FNanchor1090"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1090">[1090]</a> of the affair, and concluded by
+recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been
+fond of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright
+dilated upon the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to
+represent the Emperor of France on the floor of the House of
+Commons. The Emperor, he asserted, was in great danger of being too
+much represented in Parliament<a name="FNanchor1091"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1091">[1091]</a>.</p>
+<p>The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was
+disconcerting to Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a
+vote, for which they were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting
+was Slidell's refusal to permit the citation of Mocquard's note in
+proof of Roebuck's assertions. Mason wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the
+papers of to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was
+present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell said in
+reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair remains in a 'muss,'
+unless the Emperor will show his hand <i>on paper</i>, we shall
+never know what he really means, or derive any benefit from his
+private and individual revelations. As things now stand before the
+public, there can be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one
+language in private communications, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_173"></a>[V2:pg 173]</span> though 'with liberty to
+divulge,' and another to his ambassador here. The debate is
+adjourned to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his
+explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no confidence
+in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from him so far can
+invite only distrust<a name="FNanchor1092"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1092">[1092]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition
+of the Confederacy received little support. The <i>Times</i>, while
+sympathetic with the purpose was against Roebuck's motion,
+considering it of no value unless backed up by force; to this the
+<i>Times</i> was decidedly opposed<a name=
+"FNanchor1093"></a><a href="#Footnote_1093">[1093]</a>. Of like
+opinion was the <i>Economist</i>, declaring that premature
+recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war by
+the North<a name="FNanchor1094"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1094">[1094]</a>. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate
+was to be renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's
+recovery and return to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate
+decision. Layard reaffirmed very positively that no communication
+had been received from France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged
+complaint of a British revelation to Seward of French overtures was
+a myth, since the document in question had been printed in the
+<i>Moniteur</i>, thus attracting Seward's attention<a name=
+"FNanchor1095"></a><a href="#Footnote_1095">[1095]</a>. Thus
+Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence wrote strongly
+urging the withdrawal of the motion:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have a letter from an eminent member of the House
+and great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr.
+Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated by a
+great majority and the effect of this will encourage the North and
+distress our friends. It will also strengthen the minority of the
+Cabinet in favour of the North....<br>
+<br>
+"The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on the part
+of France, has failed us--and taken shape which tells injuriously
+instead of being the great support....<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_174"></a>[V2:pg 174]</span>
+"If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to support the
+motion it would alter the question entirely. In the absence of this
+I fear the vote would be humiliating and would convey an impression
+wholly delusive, for the members are 10 to 1 in favour of the South
+and yet on this point the vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern
+interests<a name="FNanchor1096"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1096">[1096]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured
+an agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next<a name=
+"FNanchor1097"></a><a href="#Footnote_1097">[1097]</a>." Meantime
+many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the matter
+and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy and
+actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a
+feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a
+pro-Southern policy<a name="FNanchor1098"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1098">[1098]</a>. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further
+discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate,
+wrote in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July
+9:</p>
+<blockquote>"Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon
+you, and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping
+altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further mention
+or discussion of what passed between you and Mr. Lindsay on the one
+hand, and the Emperor of the French on the other. In truth the
+whole proceeding on this subject the other day seems to me to have
+been very irregular. The British Parliament receives messages and
+communications from their own sovereign, but not from the
+sovereigns of other countries...."<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_175"></a>[V2:pg 175]</span>
+"No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from
+fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of
+things he has to think of he may be excused for making. I am very
+anxious that neither you nor Mr. Lindsay should mention those
+matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair
+the good relations between the French and English Governments.
+Might I ask you to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow
+traveller<a name="FNanchor1099"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1099">[1099]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to
+Roebuck to withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because
+of the uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated
+if pressed to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged
+that if the debate be continued speakers should refrain from all
+further mention of the personal questions that had been raised,
+since these were not proper matters for discussion in the House and
+were embarrassing to the French Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in
+management was unavailing in this case and the "muss" (as Mason
+called it) was continued when Lindsay entered upon a long account
+of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the accusations of
+Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not to
+withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The
+<i>Scotia</i>, he said was due and any moment news from America
+might change the governmental policy. Again the fat was in the
+fire. Palmerston sharply disavowed that news would change policy.
+Kinglake thought Roebuck's actions should be thoroughly
+investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for continuation of the
+debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's "diplomacy," and
+of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and those of the
+South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the motion
+should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord Robert
+Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_176"></a>[V2:pg 176]</span> to wait "until Monday" and this
+was finally done<a name="FNanchor1100"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1100">[1100]</a>.</p>
+<p>All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America.
+Lee's advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no
+reports were yet at hand of the battle which must determine this
+first great offensive campaign by the South. July 9, the
+<i>Times</i> predicted, editorially, that Lee was about to capture
+Washington and that this event would be met by a great cry of joy
+and relief in the North, now weary of the war and eager to escape
+from the despotism of Lincoln's administration<a name=
+"FNanchor1101"></a><a href="#Footnote_1101">[1101]</a>.
+Nevertheless the <i>Times</i>, while still confident of Lee's
+victorious advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in
+the North, came out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to
+withdraw his motion, arguing that even if he were successful Great
+Britain ought to make no hurried change of policy<a name=
+"FNanchor1102"></a><a href="#Footnote_1102">[1102]</a>. On this
+day, the thirteenth, Roebuck moved the discharge <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_177"></a>[V2:pg 177]</span> of his motion
+in a speech so mild as to leave the impression that "Tear 'em" had
+his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, his feelings evidently
+injured by the aspersions cast upon his own "amateur diplomacy,"
+spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon and tried to
+show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, "employed"
+by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in reply.
+Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this would
+be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his
+duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may
+have passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign
+country<a name="FNanchor1103"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1103">[1103]</a>."</p>
+<p>The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the
+cause of the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete
+misunderstanding of the position of Tory leaders, begun with a
+vehemence that led its mover into tactical error, it rapidly
+dwindled to a mere question of personal veracity and concluded in
+sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt the very success (so it
+seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon which Roebuck counted
+to support his motion was, in actual effect, a deterrent, since
+many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might now keep
+hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no
+evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any
+consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even
+to the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of
+the Government in relation to Southern ship-building.</p>
+<p>Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent
+Southern victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it
+would be overwhelmingly defeated. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_178"></a>[V2:pg 178]</span> The debate was the last one of
+importance on the topics of mediation or recognition<a name=
+"FNanchor1104"></a><a href="#Footnote_1104">[1104]</a>. News of
+Lee's check at Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was
+described by the <i>Times</i> two days later as virtually a
+Southern victory since the Northern army had been compelled to act
+wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it was stated of
+Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope there can be
+of reducing the city<a name="FNanchor1105"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1105">[1105]</a>." But on July 20, full news of the
+events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat
+from Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged,
+though efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed
+that neither side could conquer the other<a name=
+"FNanchor1106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1106">[1106]</a>. In
+contradiction of previous assertions that "another Vicksburg" might
+easily be set up to oppose Northern advance in the west there was
+now acknowledgment that the capture of this one remaining barrier
+on the Mississippi was a great disaster to the South. <i>The
+Index</i>, forgetful that it was supposedly a British publication,
+declared: "The saddest news which has reached <i>us</i> since the
+fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of Vicksburg.
+The <i>very day</i> on which the capitulation took place renders
+the blow heavier<a name="FNanchor1107"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1107">[1107]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_179"></a>[V2:pg 179]</span>
+<p>"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the
+week, never yet being able to drive it off my mind<a name=
+"FNanchor1108"></a><a href="#Footnote_1108">[1108]</a>." Adams
+reported that the news had caused a panic among the holders of the
+Cotton Loan bonds and that the press and upper classes were
+exceedingly glad they had refused support of Roebuck's
+motion<a name="FNanchor1109"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1109">[1109]</a>.</p>
+<p>If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of
+Southern effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed
+to failure from the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back
+by the ill-fortune of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real
+crisis of governmental attitude had long since passed. Naturally
+this was not acknowledged by the staunch friends of the South any
+more than at Richmond it was acknowledged (or understood) that
+Gettysburg marked the crisis of the Confederacy. But that the end
+of Southern hope for British intervention had come at Richmond, was
+made clear by the action of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of
+State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing that the recent
+debates in Parliament showed the Government determined not to
+receive him:</p>
+<blockquote>"Under these circumstances, your continued residence in
+London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent with
+the dignity of this Government, and the President therefore
+requests that you consider your mission at an end, and that you
+withdraw, with your secretary, from London<a name=
+"FNanchor1110"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1110">[1110]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason
+to remain if there were any "marked change" in governmental
+attitude, but since the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird
+Rams had been made public at nearly the same moment when this
+instruction was received, September <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_180"></a>[V2:pg 180]</span> 15, Mason could hardly fail to
+retire promptly. Indeed, the very fact of that seizure gave
+opportunity for a dramatic exit though there was no connection
+between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping of Confederate
+ship-building in England. The real connection was with the failure
+of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of
+Roebuck's motion. Even the <i>Times</i> was now expanding upon the
+"serious reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood
+that England "has not had and will not have the slightest
+inclination to intervention or mediation, or to take any position
+except that of strict neutrality<a name="FNanchor1111"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1111">[1111]</a>."</p>
+<p>Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall
+instruction and secured the latter's approval of the communication
+he proposed making to Russell<a name="FNanchor1112"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1112">[1112]</a>. A general consultation of Southern
+agents took place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how
+small was the regard for his abilities as a diplomat<a name=
+"FNanchor1113"></a><a href="#Footnote_1113">[1113]</a>. <i>The
+Index</i> hastened to join in a note already struck at Richmond of
+warm welcome to France in her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on
+September 17, an editorial from the <i>Richmond Enquirer</i> in
+which it was declared, "France is the only Power in the world that
+has manifested any friendly feeling towards the Confederacy in its
+terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all hope was now
+centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt distasteful to
+Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_181"></a>[V2:pg 181]</span>
+<p>On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very
+nearly in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once
+made public, calling out from the <i>Times</i> a hectoring
+editorial on the folly of the South in demanding recognition before
+it had won it<a name="FNanchor1114"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1114">[1114]</a>. In general, however, the press took a
+tone apparently intended to "let Mason down easily," acknowledging
+that his act indicated a universal understanding that Great Britain
+would not alter her policy of strict neutrality, but expressing
+admiration for the courage and confidence of the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1115"></a><a href="#Footnote_1115">[1115]</a>. September
+25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy but also with seeming
+finality:</p>
+<blockquote>"I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons
+which have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the
+overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto
+prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the accredited
+Minister of an established State.<br>
+<br>
+"These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to
+repeat them.<br>
+<br>
+"I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating your
+personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of affairs, I
+should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction<a name=
+"FNanchor1116"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1116">[1116]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in
+England were still to be his, but the chief r&ocirc;le there was
+now assigned to others and the principal scenes transferred to
+France. That Mason did not fully concur in this as final, easily as
+it was accepted by Slidell, is evident from his later
+correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He regarded the question of
+British recognition of the South as mainly an English political
+question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of Palmerston's
+Ministry. This he <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_182"></a>[V2:pg 182]</span> believed to depend on the life
+of the Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of
+Palmerston were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a
+desired course of action and Mason after consulting Slidell and,
+naturally, securing his acquiescence, determined to remain in
+Europe waiting events.</p>
+<p>If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was
+correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was
+officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported<a name=
+"FNanchor1117"></a><a href="#Footnote_1117">[1117]</a>. In this
+same private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest
+against a notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of
+joint action by England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent
+rights <i>to the North</i>, unless the United States formally
+"concede to their enemy the status of a Belligerent for all
+<i>international</i> purposes." Why or how this idea came to be
+taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result of
+irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the
+war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory
+clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the
+American Secretary of State throughout the entire war and
+constantly causing difficulties in relations with neutral
+countries. At any rate Lyons was quick to see the danger. He
+wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of
+wrath from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be
+denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be founded
+would be incontrovertible, and that in the end firmness answers
+better with the Americans than coaxing. But then England, France
+and Spain must be really firm, and not allow their Declaration to
+be a <i>brutum fulmen</i>. If on its being met, as it very probably
+would be, by a decided refusal on the part of the United States,
+they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all events to
+resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high
+seas, the United <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_183"></a>[V2:pg 183]</span> States Government and people
+would become more difficult to deal with than ever. I find,
+however, that I am going beyond my own province, and I will
+therefore add only an excuse for doing so<a name=
+"FNanchor1118"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1118">[1118]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of
+America's readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different
+from that of 1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing
+for such a contingency not with any desire for it but that she
+might not be caught napping<a name="FNanchor1119"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1119">[1119]</a>. This was written as if merely an
+interesting general speculation and was accompanied by the
+assurance, "I don't think the Government here at all desires to
+pick a quarrel with us or with any European Power--but the better
+prepared it is, the less manageable it will be<a name=
+"FNanchor1120"></a><a href="#Footnote_1120">[1120]</a>."
+Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of withdrawing
+belligerent rights to the North was great, and his representations
+presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the matter. Russell
+relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:</p>
+<blockquote>"I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I
+think this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship
+which might turn sour like beer if there should be a
+thunder-storm.<br>
+<br>
+"But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_184"></a>[V2:pg 184]</span> Powers with
+whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom our
+relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United
+States<a name="FNanchor1121"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1121">[1121]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and
+cordial," there was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to
+English friends of the South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality
+is agreed upon by all, and I hope a more fair and friendly
+neutrality than we have seen during the past two years<a name=
+"FNanchor1122"></a><a href="#Footnote_1122">[1122]</a>." George
+Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry Ward Beecher for his speech
+there, commented on the many crowded open public meetings in favour
+of the North as compared with the two pro-Southern ones in London,
+slimly and privately attended<a name="FNanchor1123"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1123">[1123]</a>. Jefferson Davis, in addressing the
+Confederate Congress, December 7, was bitter upon the "unfair and
+deceptive conduct" of England<a name="FNanchor1124"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1124">[1124]</a>. Adams, by mid-December, 1863, was sure
+that previous British confidence in the ultimate success of the
+South was rapidly declining<a name="FNanchor1125"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1125">[1125]</a>.</p>
+<p>Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the
+cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of
+activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the
+military situation in America and to the realization that the
+heretofore largely negative support given to the Southern cause
+must be replaced by organized and persistent effort. Grant's
+victorious progress in the West had been checked by the disaster to
+Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September 18, and Grant's army forced to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_185"></a>[V2:pg 185]</span>
+retrace its steps to recover Chattanooga. It was not until November
+24 that the South was compelled to release its grip upon that city.
+Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen back to his old lines before
+Richmond, presented a still impregnable front to Northern advance.
+No sudden collapse, such as had been expected, followed the
+Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Again the contest
+presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small wonder then that
+McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now declare that at
+last cotton was to become in truth King<a name=
+"FNanchor1126"></a><a href="#Footnote_1126">[1126]</a>, and count
+much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently
+published book<a name="FNanchor1127"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1127">[1127]</a>. Small wonder that Southern friends
+should hurry the organization of the "Southern Independence
+Association." Seeking a specific point of attack and again hoping
+for Tory support they first fixed their attention on the new trial
+of the <i>Alexandra</i>, on appeal from the decision by the Chief
+Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On December 4, Lindsay wrote to
+Mason that he had daily been "journeying to town" with the "old
+Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would again be
+defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the
+seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his
+caution to Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in
+Government policy or on any expectation that the Tories would
+replace Palmerston<a name="FNanchor1128"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1128">[1128]</a>.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1041"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1041">[1041]</a> Trollope, <i>North America</i>, I, p.
+124.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1042"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1042">[1042]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3,
+1863. Liverpool.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1043"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1043">[1043]</a> The <i>Index</i>, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217.
+The active agent in control of the <i>Index</i> was Henry Hotze,
+who, in addition to managing this journal, used secret service
+funds of the Confederacy to secure the support of writers in the
+London press. He was in close touch with all the Southern agents
+sent to Europe at various times, but appears never to have been
+fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made notes
+from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in
+the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were
+(1) a letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency,
+London"; (2) a copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31,
+1864; (3) a copy letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May
+28, 1864, to June 16, 1865. All these materials were secured by Mr.
+Adams from Professor J.F. Jameson, who had received them from Henry
+Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams' death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze
+materials has been found. My references, then, to "Hotze Papers,"
+must rest on my notes, and transcripts of many letters, taken in
+1912-13. Describing his activities to Benjamin, Hotze stated that
+in addition to maintaining the <i>Index</i>, he furnished news
+items and <i>editorials</i> to various London papers, had seven
+paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant distributor
+of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American whiskey and
+other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the question
+to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to
+Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his
+regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of
+the Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid
+writer" on the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1044"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1044">[1044]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. XI.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1045"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1045">[1045]</a> Lyons Papers, Feb. 14,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1046"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1046">[1046]</a> Mason Papers, March 18,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1047"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1047">[1047]</a> Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No.
+34, May 3, 1863. This despatch is omitted by
+Richardson.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1048"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1048">[1048]</a> Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of
+America</i> gives the best analysis and history of Southern
+financing.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1049"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1049">[1049]</a> It is possible that a few were disposed
+of to contractors in payment for materials.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1050"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1050">[1050]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept.
+27, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1051"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1051">[1051]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1052"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1052">[1052]</a> Slidell's daughter was engaged to be
+married to Erlanger's son.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1053"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1053">[1053]</a> Slidell himself wrote: "I should not
+have gone so far in recommending these propositions ... had I not
+the best reason to believe that even in anticipation of its
+acceptance the very strongest influence will be enlisted in our
+favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, Oct. 28,
+1862.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1054"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1054">[1054]</a> Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of
+America</i>, pp. 30-31. Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger
+himself went to Richmond, since it appears from Slidell's letters
+that he was in constant contact with Erlanger in Paris during the
+time the "agents" were in Richmond.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1055"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1055">[1055]</a> Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1056"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1056">[1056]</a> <i>Ibid</i>, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin,
+Feb. 5, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1057"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1057">[1057]</a> Mason Papers, Jan. 23,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1058"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1058">[1058]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1059"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1059">[1059]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23,
+1863, and Mason to Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1060"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1060">[1060]</a> Schwab, p. 33.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1061"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1061">[1061]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 33. In France
+permission to advertise the loan was at first refused, but this was
+changed by the intervention of the Emperor.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1062"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1062">[1062]</a> Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin,
+March 21, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1063"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1063">[1063]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p. 401. To
+Benjamin, March 30, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1064"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1064">[1064]</a> MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A.
+degree at Stanford University: <i>James M. Mason--Confederate
+Diplomat</i> (1915). I am much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V:
+"Mason and Confederate Finance."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1065"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1065">[1065]</a> No evidence has been found to support
+this. Is not the real reason for the change to be found in British
+Governmental intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of
+the Parliamentary debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while
+March 31, on the other hand, the <i>Alexandra</i> case was referred
+to the Law Officers, and April 4 they recommend her seizure, which
+was done on April 5. It is to be presumed that rumours of this
+seeming face-about by the Government had not failed to reach the
+bond market.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1066"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1066">[1066]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1067"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1067">[1067]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, May 9,
+1863. This letter was written a month after the event at Mason's
+request for an exact statement of what had occurred.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1068"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1068">[1068]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1069"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1069">[1069]</a> Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that
+Erlanger &amp; Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion
+of having themselves been large holders of the bonds in question,
+especially in view of the presumably large amount of lapsed
+subscriptions, and of having quietly unloaded them on the
+unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market showed signs of
+collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to Spence's report
+which gives further ground for this suspicion.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1070"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1070">[1070]</a> A newspaper item that Northern ships had
+run by Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania
+caused a recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as
+thirty per cent. discount.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1071"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1071">[1071]</a> After the war was over Bigelow secured
+possession of and published an alleged list of important
+subscribers to the loan in which appeared the name of Gladstone. He
+repeated this accusation--a serious one if true, since Gladstone
+was a Cabinet member--in his <i>Retrospections</i> (I, p. 620), and
+the story has found place in many writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam,
+<i>Memoirs</i>, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic denial, calling the
+story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley, <i>Gladstone</i>,
+II, p. 83.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1072"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1072">[1072]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp.
+776-838.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1073"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1073">[1073]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 155.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1074"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1074">[1074]</a> The <i>Index</i>, May 28, 1863, pp.
+72-3.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1075"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1075">[1075]</a> The <i>Times</i>, June 1,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1076"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1076">[1076]</a> The <i>Index</i>, June 4,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1077"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1077">[1077]</a> Chesney, <i>Military View of Recent
+Campaigns in Maryland and Virginia</i>, London, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1078"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1078">[1078]</a> <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, June 6,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1079"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1079">[1079]</a> Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1080"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1080">[1080]</a> Callahan, <i>Diplomatic History of the
+Southern Confederacy</i>, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The
+Crisis in England" is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole
+plan of "bringing in the Tories" never had a chance of succeeding,
+as, indeed, Callahan himself notes. His detailed examination of the
+incident has unfortunately misled some historians who have derived
+from his work the idea that the critical period of British policy
+towards America was Midsummer, 1863, whereas it occurred, in fact,
+in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton during
+the Civil War," pp. 413 <i>seq</i>. Schmidt's thesis is largely
+dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1081"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1081">[1081]</a> Mason Papers. To Slidell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1082"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1082">[1082]</a> Callahan, pp. 184-5.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1083"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1083">[1083]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 186. To
+Benjamin.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1084"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1084">[1084]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27,
+1863. Mason wrote: "The question of veracity is
+raised."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1085"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1085">[1085]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, June 29,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1086"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1086">[1086]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Slidell.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1087"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1087">[1087]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Mason. "Monday eve."
+(June 29, 1863.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1088"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1088">[1088]</a> Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser.,
+CLXXI, p. 1719.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1089"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1089">[1089]</a> Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was
+of a terrier labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his
+enemies.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1090"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1090">[1090]</a> Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long
+been warm friends. They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did
+not destroy their friendship.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1091"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1091">[1091]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp.
+1771-1842, for debate of June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later
+related by Lamar, then in London on his way to Russia as
+representative of the South. A few days before the debate Lamar met
+Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he expected
+Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck
+sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old
+story--the story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr.
+Bright will not cross swords with me again." Lamar attended the
+debate and saw Roebuck given by Bright the "most deliberate and
+tremendous pounding I ever witnessed." (<i>Education of Henry
+Adams</i>, pp. 161-2.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1092"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1092">[1092]</a> Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1093"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1093">[1093]</a> July 1, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1094"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1094">[1094]</a> July 4, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1095"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1095">[1095]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp.
+67-73.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1096"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1096">[1096]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In
+fact Disraeli, throughout the Civil War, favoured strict
+neutrality, not agreeing with many of his Tory colleagues. He at
+times expressed himself privately as believing the Union would not
+be restored but was wise enough to refrain from such comment
+publicly. (Monypenny, <i>Disraeli</i>, IV, p. 328.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1097"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1097">[1097]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p.
+252.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1098"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1098">[1098]</a> <i>The Index</i> felt it necessary to
+combat this, and on July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating
+such criticisms to be negligible as emanating wholly from minority
+and opposition papers. "All the sympathies of the French Government
+have, from the outset, been with the South, and this, quite
+independently of other reasons, dictated the line which the
+opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist
+<i>Debats</i>, Republican <i>Si&egrave;cle</i>, The Palais Royal
+<i>Opinion</i>, all join in the halloo against the
+South."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1099"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1099">[1099]</a> Palmerston MS. July 9,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1100"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1100">[1100]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554
+<i>seq</i>., July 10, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1101"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1101">[1101]</a> In the same issue appeared a letter from
+the New York correspondent of the <i>Times</i>, containing a
+similar prediction but in much stronger terms. For the last half of
+the war the <i>Times</i> was badly served by this correspondent who
+invariably reported the situation from an extreme anti-Northern
+point of view. This was Charles Mackay who served the <i>Times</i>
+in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865. (Mackay, <i>Forty
+Years' Recollections</i>, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had strict
+instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to
+Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported
+that Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if
+Washington should fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for
+himself inadvisable, since it would irritate Seward and in case the
+unexpected happened he could no doubt get passage on Mercier's
+ship. When news came of the Southern defeat at Gettysburg and of
+Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought the complete collapse
+of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie Stephen is a
+witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this time. He
+visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met Seward,
+being received with much cordiality as a <i>verbal</i> champion in
+England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles
+on the war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke
+of the friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on
+political economy. (Maitland, <i>Leslie Stephen</i>, p.
+120.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1102"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1102">[1102]</a> In this issue a letter from the New York
+correspondent, dated July 1, declared that all of the North except
+New England, would welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson
+Davis might ride in triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a
+more enthusiastic multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of
+America." The New York city which soon after indulged in the "draft
+riots" might give some ground for such writing, but it was far
+fetched, nevertheless--and New York was not the North.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1103"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1103">[1103]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661
+<i>seq</i>. Ever afterwards Roebuck was insistent in expressions of
+dislike and fear of America. At a banquet to him in Sheffield in
+1869 he delivered his "political testament": "Beware of Trades
+Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of America." (Leader,
+<i>Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck</i>, p. 330.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1104"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1104">[1104]</a> May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to
+introduce another recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he
+had had no chance to make it, and asked Palmerston if the
+Government was not going to act. The reply was a brief
+negative.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1105"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1105">[1105]</a> The <i>Times</i>, July 18,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1106"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1106">[1106]</a> The power of the <i>Times</i> in
+influencing public opinion through its news columns was very great.
+At the time it stood far in the lead in its foreign correspondence
+and the information printed necessarily was that absorbed by the
+great majority of the British public. Writing on January 23, 1863,
+of the mis-information spread about America by the <i>Times</i>,
+Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so much as in this
+matter the enormous power which the <i>Times</i> has, not from the
+quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but
+from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to
+a vast number of minds. The <i>ignorance</i> in which it has been
+able to keep a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S.
+Beesly. Haultain, <i>Correspondence of Goldwin Smith</i>, p.
+11.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1107"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1107">[1107]</a> <i>The Index</i>, July 23, 1863, p. 200.
+The italics are mine. The implication is that a day customarily
+celebrated as one of rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No
+<i>Englishman</i> would be likely to regard July 4 as a day of
+rejoicing.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1108"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1108">[1108]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1109"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1109">[1109]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 329. Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1110"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1110">[1110]</a> Mason, <i>Mason</i>, p.
+449.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1111"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1111">[1111]</a> Sept. 4, 1863. The <i>Times</i> was now
+printing American correspondence sharply in contrast to that which
+preceded Gettysburg when the exhaustion and financial difficulties
+of the North were dilated upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated
+August 30, declared that, to the writer's astonishment, the West
+gave every evidence that the war had fostered rather than checked,
+prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1112"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1112">[1112]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14
+and 15, 1863. Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1113"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1113">[1113]</a> McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17,
+1863, that in his opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern
+agents of value diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He
+thought all others would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even
+in his letter to Mason, had the questionable taste of drawing a
+rosy picture of his own and his family's intimate social
+intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1114"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1114">[1114]</a> Sept. 23, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1115"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1115">[1115]</a> e.g., <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, Sept.
+23, 1863, quoted in <i>The Index</i>, Sept. 24, p.
+343.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1116"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1116">[1116]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p.
+456.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1117"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1117">[1117]</a> Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1118"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1118">[1118]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons wrote after
+receiving a copy of a despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France,
+dated October 10, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1119"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1119">[1119]</a> F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential.
+Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain
+that at the commencement of a war with Great Britain, the relative
+positions of the United States and its adversary would be very
+nearly the reverse of what they would have been if a war had broken
+out three or even two years ago. Of the two Powers, the United
+States would now be the better prepared for the struggle--the
+coasts of the United States would present few points open to
+attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the
+neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the
+Bahamas, would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great
+Britain might at the commencement of a war have thrown a larger
+number of trained troops into the British Provinces on the
+continent than could have been immediately sent by the United
+States to invade those provinces. It seems no exaggeration to say
+that the United States could now without difficulty send an Army
+exceeding in number, by five to one, any force which Great Britain
+would be likely to place there."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1120"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1120">[1120]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Private. Lyons to Russell,
+Nov. 3, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1121"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1121">[1121]</a> Lyons Papers. To Lyons.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1122"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1122">[1122]</a> Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1123"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1123">[1123]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 27, 1863. I
+have not dwelt upon Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863,
+because its influence in "winning England" seems to me absurdly
+over-estimated. He was a gifted public orator and knew how to
+"handle" his audiences, but the majority in each audience was
+friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of opinion" in 1863
+as has frequently been stated in order to exalt Beecher's
+services.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1124"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1124">[1124]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p. 319.
+The words are Dodd's.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1125"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1125">[1125]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No.
+557. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1126"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1126">[1126]</a> Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze,
+Dec. 1, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1127"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1127">[1127]</a> McHenry, <i>The Cotton Trade</i>,
+London, 1863. The preface in the form of a long letter to W.H.
+Gregory is dated August 31, 1863. For a comprehensive note on
+McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>,
+March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 <i>seq</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1128"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1128">[1128]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_186"></a>[V2:pg 186]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XV"></a>CHAPTER XV</h2>
+<h3>THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION</h3>
+<br>
+<p>Northern friends in England were early active in organizing
+public meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of
+January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern
+friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and
+equally confident that they had with them the great bulk of
+upper-class opinion in England, at first thought it unnecessary to
+be active in public expressions aside from such as were made
+through the newspapers. Up to November, 1862, <i>The Index</i>
+records no Southern public meeting. But by the summer of 1863, the
+indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion that something must
+be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in
+the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern sympathy had
+been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his initiative
+a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that others
+were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In Manchester
+the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist meeting in
+the Free Trade Hall":</p>
+<blockquote>"These parties are not the rich spinners but young men
+of energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It appears
+to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint money in aiding
+this effort to expose cant and diffuse the truth. Manchester is
+naturally the centre of such a move and you will see there are here
+the germs of important work--but they need to be tended and
+fostered. I have supplied <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_187"></a>[V2:pg 187]</span> a good deal of money
+individually but I see room for the use of &pound;30 or &pound;40 a
+month or more<a name="FNanchor1129"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1129">[1129]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance
+the required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the
+Confederate secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with
+the contributions willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of
+energy with a taste for agitation but little money" reveals a
+source of support somewhat dubious in persistent zeal and requiring
+more than a heavy list of patrons' names to keep up a public
+interest. Nevertheless, Spence succeeded, for a short time, in
+arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann
+that measures were "in progress and in course of execution" to hold
+public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form an association
+for the promotion of Southern independence "under the auspices of
+such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord
+Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay,
+Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and
+others<a name="FNanchor1130"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1130">[1130]</a>...." A fortnight later, Spence reported
+his efforts and postulated that in them, leading to European
+intervention, lay the principal, if not the only hope, of Southern
+independence--a view never <i>publicly</i> acknowledged by any
+devoted friend of the South:</p>
+<blockquote>"The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how
+the war is to be worked out to success without the action of
+Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a power that
+will move the latter, if it can only be stirred up, and that, of
+course, is public opinion. I had a most agreeable and successful
+visit to Glasgow upon a requisition signed by the citizens. The
+enemy placarded the walls and brought all their forces to the
+meeting, in which out of 4,000 I think they were fully 1,000
+strong, but we beat them completely, carrying a resolution which
+embraced a memorial <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_188"></a>[V2:pg 188]</span> to Lord Palmerston. We have now
+carried six public meetings, Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston,
+Ashton, Glasgow. We have three to come off now ready, Burnley,
+Bury, Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work
+up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the
+latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon the
+assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I think we
+shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert latent into active
+sympathy. There is ample power on our side to move the
+Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse that power. At any
+rate the object is worth the effort<a name=
+"FNanchor1131"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1131">[1131]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In the month of November, <i>The Index</i> began to report these
+meetings. In nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted
+to heckle the speakers, and usually presented amendments to the
+address which were voted down. Spence was given great credit for
+his energy, being called "indefatigable":</p>
+<blockquote>"The commencement of the session will see Parliament
+flooded with petitions from every town and from every mill
+throughout the North. A loud protest will arise against the
+<i>faineant</i> policy which declines to interfere while men of
+English blood are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and
+while England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It
+remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have any
+effect upon the policy of the Government<a name=
+"FNanchor1132"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1132">[1132]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an
+explanation was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London
+because it was really a "congeries of cities," with no such
+solidarity of interests as characterized "the North<a name=
+"FNanchor1133"></a><a href="#Footnote_1133">[1133]</a>." Without
+London, however, the movement <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_189"></a>[V2:pg 189]</span> lacked driving force and it was
+determined to create there an association which should become the
+main-spring of further activities. Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord
+Eustace Cecil were made a committee to draft a plan and preliminary
+address. Funds were now forthcoming from the big blockade-running
+firms</p>
+<blockquote>"Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a
+terrific sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause
+in proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was
+near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote a
+percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the blockade, to
+the good of the cause. He has given me at once &pound;500 on
+account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and have sent on to
+Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you see, we are fairly
+afloat there<a name="FNanchor1134"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1134">[1134]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was
+too late:</p>
+<blockquote>"Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil
+tidings make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite
+veered round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The
+<i>Times</i> correspondent's letters do great harm--more especially
+Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. I have, however,
+taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, so he will soon be out
+again and he is dead for our side<a name=
+"FNanchor1135"></a><a href="#Footnote_1135">[1135]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European
+intervention:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_190"></a>[V2:pg 190]</span>
+Europe to move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the
+North--the end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore,
+impossible that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our
+Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 'Oh,
+what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought back to life
+two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the efforts at first seemed
+hopeless, but in case of life or death what effort should be
+spared<a name="FNanchor1136"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1136">[1136]</a>?"</blockquote>
+<p>The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those
+organized by Spence and was the centre for operations in the
+manufacturing districts. On December 15, a great gathering (as
+described by <i>The Index</i>) took place there with delegates from
+many of the near-by towns<a name="FNanchor1137"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1137">[1137]</a>. Forster referred to this and other
+meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts being made by
+Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American
+affairs<a name="FNanchor1138"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1138">[1138]</a>," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was
+unquestioned and plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the
+Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more
+especially the members of Parliament as a body. These petitions
+were "in process of being signed in every town and almost in every
+cotton-mill throughout the district<a name=
+"FNanchor1139"></a><a href="#Footnote_1139">[1139]</a>." It was
+high time for London, if it was desired that she should lead and
+<i>control</i> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_191"></a>[V2:pg
+191]</span> these activities, to perfect her own Club. "Next week,"
+wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be formally launched
+under the name of "The Southern Independence Association<a name=
+"FNanchor1140"></a><a href="#Footnote_1140">[1140]</a>," and would
+be in working order before the reassembling of Parliament.</p>
+<p>The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the
+Southern Independence Association were attempts to do for the South
+what Bright and others had done earlier and so successfully for the
+North. Tardily the realization had come that public opinion, even
+though but slightly represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful
+weapon with which to influence the Government. Unenfranchised
+England now received from Southern friends a degree of attention
+hitherto withheld from it by those gentry who had been confident
+that the goodwill of the bulk of their own class was sufficient
+support to the Southern cause. Early in the war one little Southern
+society had indeed been organized, but on so diffident a basis as
+almost to escape notice. This was the <i>London Confederate States
+Aid Association</i> which came to the attention of Adams and his
+friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early
+meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who
+reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held
+at 3 Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty
+persons and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently
+an unwelcome guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected
+by a policeman and got revenge by arranging a demonstration against
+Mason (who was present), confronting him, on leaving the house,
+with a placard showing a negro in chains<a name=
+"FNanchor1141"></a><a href="#Footnote_1141">[1141]</a>. There was
+no "public effort" contemplated in such a meeting, although funds
+were to be <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_192"></a>[V2:pg
+192]</span> solicited to aid the South. Adams reported the
+Association as a sort of Club planning to hold regular Wednesday
+evening meetings of its members, the dues being a shilling a week
+and the rules providing for loss of membership for
+non-attendance<a name="FNanchor1142"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1142">[1142]</a>.</p>
+<p>Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862.
+Possibly its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not
+intended to appeal to the public<a name="FNanchor1143"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1143">[1143]</a>. But the launching of the Southern
+Independence Association betokened the new policy of constructive
+effort in London to match and guide that already started in the
+provinces. A long and carefully worded constitution and address
+depicted the heroic struggles of the Confederates and the "general
+sympathy" of England for their cause; dwelt upon the "governmental
+tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war,
+untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity toward Great
+Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of America
+and of the world would be best served by the independence of the
+South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of
+Lincoln's emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt
+by the framers of this constitution to meet that issue. This
+required delicate handling and was destined to cause some
+heart-burnings. The concluding section of the constitution
+read:</p>
+<blockquote>"The Association will also devote itself to the
+cultivation of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain
+and of the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily
+but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition by
+Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_193"></a>[V2:pg 193]</span> of
+servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, in
+accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine the gradual
+extinction of slavery with the preservation of property, the
+maintenance of the civil polity, and the true civilization of the
+negro race<a name="FNanchor1144"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1144">[1144]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns
+of heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership
+fee (one guinea annually) was large enough to attract the
+&eacute;lite, but it remained to be seen whether all this equipment
+would be sent into action. As yet the vigour of the movement was
+centred at Manchester and even there a curious situation soon
+arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring that the "Petition
+to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 at Ashton, he
+said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on January 30,
+1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade Hall at
+Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to a halt.
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_194"></a>[V2:pg 194]</span>
+"The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall in
+the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the
+rent of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their
+resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass
+against them<a name="FNanchor1145"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1145">[1145]</a>." There must have been truth in the
+taunt for while <i>The Index</i> in nearly every issue throughout
+the middle of 1864 reports great activity there, it does not give
+any account of a public meeting. The reports were of many
+applications for membership "from all quarters, from persons of
+rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective counties<a name=
+"FNanchor1146"></a><a href="#Footnote_1146">[1146]</a>."</p>
+<p>Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence
+Association programme. It <i>did</i> appeal to "persons of rank and
+gentlemen of standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it
+of these classes it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class
+England--already largely committed to the cause of the North.
+Goldwin Smith, in his "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern
+Independence Association," made the point very clear<a name=
+"FNanchor1147"></a><a href="#Footnote_1147">[1147]</a>. In this
+pamphlet, probably the strongest presentation of the Northern side
+and the most severe castigation of Southern sympathizers that
+appeared throughout the whole war, Smith appealed to old Whig ideas
+of political liberty, attacked the aristocracy and the Church of
+England, and attempted to make the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_195"></a>[V2:pg 195]</span> Radicals of England feel that
+the Northern cause was their cause. Printing the constitution and
+address of the Association, with the list of signers, he
+characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title and
+family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for
+its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the
+North<a name="FNanchor1148"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1148">[1148]</a>.</p>
+<p>It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern
+Independence Association at Manchester, that <i>The Index</i>, from
+the end of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single
+Southern public meeting. The London Association, having completed
+its top-heavy organization, was content with that act and showed no
+life. The first move by the Association was planned to be made in
+connection with the <i>Alexandra</i> case when, as was expected,
+the Exchequer Court should render a decision against the
+Government's right to detain her. On January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote
+to Mason that he had arranged for the public launching of the
+Association "next week," that he had again seen the Chief Baron who
+assured him the Court would decide "that the Government is entirely
+wrong":</p>
+<blockquote>"I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the
+Government persisted in proceeding further, that our Association
+(which he was pleased to learn had been formed) would take up the
+matter in Parliament and out of it, for if we had no right to seize
+these ships, it was most unjust that we should detain them by
+raising legal quibbles for the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_196"></a>[V2:pg 196]</span> purpose of keeping them here
+till the time arrived when the South might not require them. I
+think public opinion will go with us on this point, for John
+Bull--with all his failings--loves fair play<a name=
+"FNanchor1149"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1149">[1149]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was
+thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the
+<i>Alexandra</i><a name="FNanchor1150"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1150">[1150]</a>, and hoped much from an attack on the
+Government's policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was
+to be made to bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of
+Parliament. In an <i>Index</i> editorial, Adams was pictured as
+having driven Russell into a corner by "threats which would not
+have been endured for an hour by a Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign
+Secretary as invariably yielding to the "acknowledged mastery of
+the Yankee Minister":</p>
+<blockquote>"Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is
+blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. We can
+trace his influence in the detention of the <i>Alexandra</i> and
+the protracted judicial proceedings which have arisen out of it; in
+the sudden raid upon the rams at Birkenhead; in the announced
+intention of the Government to alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of
+this country in accordance with the views of the United States
+Cabinet. When one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined
+to marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one reflects
+that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl
+Russell<a name="FNanchor1151"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1151">[1151]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams
+occurred<a name="FNanchor1152"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1152">[1152]</a>, the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay
+and others depended to drive home the meaning of the
+<i>Alexandra</i> decision, carefully avoided urging the Government
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_197"></a>[V2:pg 197]</span> to
+change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very
+much in line with that initiated by <i>The Index</i>, to belittle
+Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by the
+Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries
+out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained
+quiescent. Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli,
+had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of
+Southern ship-building. Russell's reply to his accusers was but a
+curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he
+had no fear of a party attack on the <i>policy</i> of stopping the
+ships. He was disgusted with the result of the <i>Alexandra</i>
+trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the
+uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration
+of justice<a name="FNanchor1153"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1153">[1153]</a>."</p>
+<p>As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by
+the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance
+of the other were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious
+and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less
+belligerent in language. Seward now radiated supreme confidence in
+the ultimate victory of the North. He had heard rumours of a
+movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the
+war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of
+Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate debts.
+Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern
+answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush
+rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any "interposition";
+(2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject
+of any bargain; (3) "As to the Confederate debt the United States,
+Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it<a name=
+"FNanchor1154"></a><a href="#Footnote_1154">[1154]</a>." That there
+was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_198"></a>[V2:pg 198]</span> did not deny
+and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity
+treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid no attention to
+this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political
+manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure<a name=
+"FNanchor1155"></a><a href="#Footnote_1155">[1155]</a>. Some alarm
+was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating
+back to the very beginning of the war of establishing ships off the
+Southern ports which should collect duties on imports. He told
+Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the
+proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain.
+Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be
+refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British
+withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a
+bold Northern defiance to France if she objected<a name=
+"FNanchor1156"></a><a href="#Footnote_1156">[1156]</a>. Adams did
+discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone
+consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced<a name=
+"FNanchor1157"></a><a href="#Footnote_1157">[1157]</a>. Apparently
+this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound
+British attitude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie
+previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward
+America was still strong. Certainly at this same time Seward was
+making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current
+Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican
+policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of
+helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico<a name=
+"FNanchor1158"></a><a href="#Footnote_1158">[1158]</a>.</p>
+<p>For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had
+held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that
+ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern
+independence. Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory
+that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful
+obedience to the Federal Government. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_199"></a>[V2:pg 199]</span> As a reasoning and reasonable
+statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.</p>
+<blockquote>"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals
+think it worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience
+they are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or
+lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. If
+they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New Orleans,
+they might as well leave to the Confederates Charleston and
+Savannah<a name="FNanchor1159"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1159">[1159]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it
+upon the United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held
+as to the warlike <i>power</i> of the North. Similarly the
+<i>Quarterly Review</i>, long confident of Southern success and
+still prophesying it, was acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern]
+dream of universal empire" must first have passed<a name=
+"FNanchor1160"></a><a href="#Footnote_1160">[1160]</a>. Throughout
+these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now
+thoroughly developed readiness of the United States for a foreign
+war and urged the sending of a military expert to report on
+American preparations<a name="FNanchor1161"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1161">[1161]</a>. He was disturbed by the arrogance
+manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially by
+Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote,
+often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic
+bearing of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was
+Lyons to avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much
+listened to as he ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy
+Departments<a name="FNanchor1162"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1162">[1162]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_200"></a>[V2:pg 200]</span>
+<p>Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and
+disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter
+already attracting the attention of the British public and causing
+some anxiety to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of
+enlistments for the Northern forces. The war in America had taken
+from the ranks of industry in the North great numbers of men and at
+the same time had created an increased demand for labour. But the
+war had also abruptly checked, in large part, that emigration from
+Europe which, since the middle 'forties, had been counted upon as a
+regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady
+growth of productive enterprise. A few Northern emissaries of the
+Government early sent abroad to revive immigration were soon
+reinforced by private labour agents and by the efforts of steamship
+companies<a name="FNanchor1163"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1163">[1163]</a>. This resulted in a rapid resumption of
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_201"></a>[V2:pg 201]</span>
+emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of Irishmen signed
+contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental agents) that on
+arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into the army.
+The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered
+under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each
+recruit. Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal
+from a few of these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the
+best he could to secure redress, though the process was usually a
+long one owing to red-tape and also to the resistance of army
+officers.</p>
+<p>As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered
+prompt steps were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of
+State. But the few cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged
+and encouraged agents of <i>bona fide</i> labour emigration from
+Ireland, gave ground for accusations in Parliament that Ireland was
+being used against the law as a place of enlistments. Russell had
+early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed,
+and on it appearing that no authorized Northern agent was engaged
+in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been dropped<a name=
+"FNanchor1164"></a><a href="#Footnote_1164">[1164]</a>. There could
+be and was no objection to encourage labour emigration, and this
+was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden increase of the
+numbers going to America<a name="FNanchor1165"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1165">[1165]</a>. But diplomatic and public quiescence
+was disturbed when the United States war vessel <i>Kearsarge</i>,
+while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board fifteen
+Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received
+indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these
+men had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at
+Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well
+under <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_202"></a>[V2:pg
+202]</span> way the <i>Kearsarge</i> sailed into Queenstown again
+and landed the men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt
+Adams was quick to give orders for her return. Adams was soon able
+to disprove the accusation against the consul but it still remained
+a question whether the commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold
+defiance of British neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on
+trial at Cork, pleaded guilty to violation of the Foreign
+Enlistment Act, but the question of the commander's responsibility
+was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further
+investigation<a name="FNanchor1166"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1166">[1166]</a>.</p>
+<p>The <i>Kearsarge</i> case occurred as Parliament was drawing to
+a close in 1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low
+ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a
+gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in
+evading British laws and in carrying off to America a group of
+Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the
+Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject of a
+Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply
+made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British
+law and British honour<a name="FNanchor1167"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1167">[1167]</a>, but these were rather individual
+accusations than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making
+an issue with the Government<a name="FNanchor1168"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1168">[1168]</a>. Whenever opportunity arose some
+inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the
+alleged timidity of Russell's policy towards the North--a method
+then also being employed on many other matters with the evident
+intention <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_203"></a>[V2:pg
+203]</span> of weakening the Ministry for the great Tory attack now
+being organized on the question of Danish policy.</p>
+<p>In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to
+one side in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening
+Danish question which had long been brewing but which did not come
+into sharp prominence until March. A year earlier it had become
+known that Frederick VII of Denmark, in anticipation of a change
+which, under the operations of the Salic law, would come at his
+death in the constitutional relations of Denmark to
+Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional act" to
+secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The law
+was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days
+later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention
+to hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate
+from Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German
+Confederation. The Federal Diet of the Confederation had early
+protested the purpose of Denmark and Russell had at first upheld
+the German arguments but had given no pledges of support to
+anyone<a name="FNanchor1169"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1169">[1169]</a>. But Palmerston on various occasions
+had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour for the
+Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point of
+virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions<a name=
+"FNanchor1170"></a><a href="#Footnote_1170">[1170]</a>. A distinct
+crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when Prussia,
+under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust
+the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed
+command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from
+Denmark.</p>
+<p>This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's
+utterances, made against the wish of the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_204"></a>[V2:pg 204]</span> majority of
+his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far
+aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely
+voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and
+Austria worked their will on Denmark. There was excellent ground
+for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a
+humiliating "Danish policy," at one time threatening vigorous
+British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic
+manoeuvres. For three months the Government laboured to bring about
+through a European council some solution that should both save
+something for Denmark and save its own prestige. Repeatedly
+Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke
+loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which
+could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once
+it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in
+arms to the defence of the Danish King.</p>
+<p>From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its
+earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have
+any essential bearing on the American question, though they were
+soon to believe that in it lay a great hope. Having set the
+Southern Independence Association on its feet in London and hoping
+much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was
+momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon.
+Being undeceived<a name="FNanchor1171"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1171">[1171]</a> he gave a ready ear to other rumours,
+received privately through Delane of the <i>Times</i>, that an
+important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming<a name=
+"FNanchor1172"></a><a href="#Footnote_1172">[1172]</a>.
+Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"Our political prospects here are still very uncertain.
+The Conference on the Danish question will either make or
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_205"></a>[V2:pg 205]</span>
+mar the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain
+in office. If they fail, out they go<a name=
+"FNanchor1173"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1173">[1173]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme
+Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet
+made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation
+to affect the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the
+principal confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on
+ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles
+or measures. He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London
+Independence Association and threatened to resign membership if
+this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended
+activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the
+recognition of the South<a name="FNanchor1174"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1174">[1174]</a>. He had already let it be known that
+another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and
+recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once
+declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties.
+Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a
+break up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a
+meeting of the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary
+resolution would be considered. The Manchester Association was much
+more alert and ready to support him. "The question is quite ripe
+<i>for fresh agitation</i> and from experience I find that that
+agitation <i>must</i> be started by a debate in Parliament. No
+notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the provinces<a name=
+"FNanchor1175"></a><a href="#Footnote_1175">[1175]</a>."</p>
+<p>Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers
+began anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer
+mediation in America. They met with little favourable response. The
+<i>Times</i>, at the very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its
+indifference, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_206"></a>[V2:pg
+206]</span> and recited the situation of October-November, 1862,
+stating that the question had then been decided once for all. It
+declared that Great Britain had "no moral right to interfere" and
+added that to attempt to do so would result in filling "the North
+with the same spirit of patriotism and defiance as animated the
+invaded Confederates<a name="FNanchor1176"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1176">[1176]</a>." Thus support to Lindsay was lacking
+in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with Association
+members had brought a plan of modified action the essential feature
+of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a
+<i>party</i> one and that the only hope of the South lay in the
+existing Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though
+it was clearly understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay
+in ministerial desire for and need of support in its Danish policy.
+Lindsay expected to find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly
+as regards American policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to
+Mason on May 27:</p>
+<blockquote>"I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a
+matter of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in
+regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am
+therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On this
+subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on Monday last
+and on the same subject we are to have another meeting next Monday;
+but differences of opinion exist there as well as elsewhere, as to
+the advisability of moving at present. Some say 'move'--others,
+'postpone'--but the news by the <i>Scotia</i> to-morrow will
+regulate to a considerable extent our course of action. One thing
+is now clear to me that the motion must <i>not</i> be a party one,
+and that the main point will be to get the Government to go with
+<i>whoever</i> brings forward the motion, for as you are aware I
+would rather see the motion in other hands than mine, as my views
+on the American question are so well known. As no competent member
+however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the
+responsibility, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_207"></a>[V2:pg 207]</span> I sent to inquire if it would be
+agreeable to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on
+the subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He sent
+word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, therefore, a
+long meeting with him alone last night, the result of which was
+that if I brought forward a motion somewhat as follows, on the
+third of June, he would likely be prepared <i>to accept it</i>,
+though he asked if I would see him again after the <i>Scotia</i>
+arrived. The motion we talked about was to this
+<i>effect</i>--'That the House of Commons deeply regretting the
+great loss of life and the sufferings of the people of the United
+States and the Confederate States of North America by the
+continuance of the war which has been so long waged between them,
+trust that Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the
+earliest opportunity of mediating in conjunction with the other
+powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of
+hostilities.'"</blockquote>
+<p>Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for
+Mason to return to England and have a conference with the Premier.
+To this Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no
+invitation. Lindsay strongly urged Mason to come over:</p>
+<blockquote><i>I think much good will follow your meeting Lord
+Palmerston. It will lead to other meetings</i>; and besides in
+other matters I think if you came here, you might <i>at present</i>
+prove of much service to the South<a name=
+"FNanchor1177"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1177">[1177]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence
+Association permitted the coming forward of a minor London
+organization called <i>The Society for Promoting the Cessation of
+Hostilities in America</i>. A letter was addressed by it to Members
+of Parliament urging that the time had come for action:</p>
+<blockquote>"215 <i>Regent Street,<br>
+London, W.<br>
+May 28th</i>, 1864.<br>
+<br>
+"SIR,</blockquote>
+<blockquote>"The Society which has the honour to present to you
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_208"></a>[V2:pg 208]</span>
+the accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in
+Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken by the
+Government of this country in concert with other Powers, to bring
+about peace on a durable basis between the belligerents in North
+America.<br>
+<br>
+"I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you will,
+before the Session closes, support a motion in Parliament to this
+effect; and should you desire to see evidence of the feeling of a
+large portion of the country in this matter, I shall be most happy
+to lay it before you<a name="FNanchor1178"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1178">[1178]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had
+stirred the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this
+letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston,
+is suggestive. The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not
+at first successful. Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived
+at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected
+from Palmerston or Russell and that the only hope rested in their
+overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay had now taken definite ground.
+Moreover, Mason had been instructed to shake the dust of England
+from off his shoes with no official authority to return. Carefully
+explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined to hold an
+interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at
+least suggestion:</p>
+<blockquote>"Had the suggestion you make of an interview and
+conversation with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I
+might not have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at
+once acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to a
+proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.<br>
+<br>
+"Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special
+Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full powers,
+and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me as
+his own act (of course unofficially, and even without any reason
+assigned for the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_209"></a>[V2:pg 209]</span> interview) I should have had
+great pleasure in complying with his request<a name=
+"FNanchor1179"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1179">[1179]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the
+last paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again.
+Lindsay renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated
+over the seeming success of his overtures to the Government. He had
+again seen Palmerston and had now pushed his proposal beyond the
+timid suggestion of overtures when the opportune moment should
+arrive to a definite suggestion of recognition of the
+Confederacy:</p>
+<blockquote>"I reasoned on the <i>moral</i> effect of recognition,
+considering that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly
+hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., etc.
+This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable effect, for he
+appears now to be very open to conviction. He again said that in
+his opinion the subjugation of the South could not be effected by
+the North, and he added that he thought the people of the North
+were becoming more and more alive to the fact every
+day."</blockquote>
+<p>Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with
+Russell and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be
+plain sailing:</p>
+<blockquote>"Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by
+stern facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that
+all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, <i>is at an
+end</i>. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. He
+used to pay some little attention to any opinions I ventured to
+express to him, and I am <i>not</i> without hope. I may add that I
+was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has been pleased to be with
+me, and I told him at parting to-day, that my present intention was
+not to proceed with the Motion at least for 10 days or a fortnight,
+unless he was prepared to support me. He highly commended this
+course, and seemed much gratified with what I said. The fact is,
+<i>sub rosa</i>, it is clear to me that <i>no</i> motion will be
+carried unless <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_210"></a>[V2:pg
+210]</span> it is supported by the Government for it is clear that
+Lord Derby is resolved to leave the responsibility with the
+Executive, and therefore, <i>in the present state of matters</i>,
+it would seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward
+any motion which would not be carried."</blockquote>
+<p>Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.</p>
+<blockquote>"Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston,
+I must earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much
+wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can do no
+harm, and <i>may, at the present moment, be of great service to
+your country</i><a name="FNanchor1180"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1180">[1180]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would
+have amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on
+America, his "gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the
+parliamentary motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had
+but recently rebuked for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be
+interpreted in no other light than an evidence of a desire to
+prevent Southern friends from joining in the attack, daily becoming
+more dangerous, on the Government's Danish policy. How much of this
+Lindsay understood is not clear; on the face of his letters to
+Mason he would seem to have been hoodwinked, but the more
+reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much was hoped from the
+governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. The Danish
+situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In addition
+the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over Southern
+prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in this
+the <i>Times</i> was again leading<a name=
+"FNanchor1181"></a><a href="#Footnote_1181">[1181]</a>. The Society
+for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly
+issued another circular letter inviting Members of Parliament to
+join in a deputation to call on Palmerston to urge action
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_211"></a>[V2:pg 211]</span> on
+the lines of Lindsay's first overture. Such a deputation would
+represent "more than 5,000 members and the feeling of probably more
+than twenty millions of people." It should not be a deputation "of
+parties" but representative of all groups in Parliament:</p>
+<blockquote>"The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is
+disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here contemplated and
+that the weight of an influential deputation would strengthen his
+hands<a name="FNanchor1182"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1182">[1182]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's
+later objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to
+be unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary
+Secretary of the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the <i>Southern
+Independence Association</i>, finally stirred by Lindsay's
+insistence, had agreed to join the Society in a representation to
+Palmerston but had favoured some specific statement on recognition.
+Palmerston had sent word that he favoured the Society's resolution
+but not that of the Association, and as a result the joint letter
+of the two organizations would be on the mild lines of Lindsay's
+original motion:</p>
+<blockquote>"Although this quite expresses the object of our
+Society, still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought
+to have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have
+consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to bring
+before Parliament--that of the Independence of the Confederacy--and
+more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be
+submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed. You know the
+resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words
+'That Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest
+opportunity of mediating, etc.'<br>
+<br>
+"This is just leaving the Government where they have been all
+along. They have always professed to take 'the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_212"></a>[V2:pg 212]</span> earliest
+opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges<a name=
+"FNanchor1183"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1183">[1183]</a>!"</blockquote>
+<p>Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement
+among the leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in
+judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day
+that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of
+favourable news upon which to spring it. Even such news, Adams
+believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict
+the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern forces<a name=
+"FNanchor1184"></a><a href="#Footnote_1184">[1184]</a>. The day
+following the <i>Times</i> reported Grant to be meeting fearful
+reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy advance
+toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the
+West<a name="FNanchor1185"></a><a href="#Footnote_1185">[1185]</a>.
+But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England
+was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason understood
+this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and had come
+to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the interview
+(now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:</p>
+<blockquote>"Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in
+substance that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well
+disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that the war
+on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither
+could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke.... In
+regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell said, that he could not
+<i>accept</i> it, but if brought up for discussion his side would
+<i>speak</i> favourably of it. That is to say they would commend it
+if they could not vote for it."</blockquote>
+<p>This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the
+"earliest opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_213"></a>[V2:pg 213]</span> reception
+given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided
+benefit for the South. It must now have been fairly apparent to
+Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance
+by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain
+or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories. The two
+old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for
+every doubtful vote. Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for
+governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the
+best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him
+unexpectedly in agreement:</p>
+<blockquote>"I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter,
+editor of the <i>Herald</i>, had written to Hotze about his
+connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter
+took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would
+carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most
+cheerfully and eagerly yield him the <i>pas</i>. Disraeli's
+accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in
+Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement
+could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before
+his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be
+for the present that he should be silent and to await
+events<a name="FNanchor1186"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1186">[1186]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it
+might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell:</p>
+<blockquote>"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very
+doubtful, Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being
+brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he can be
+beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it
+appeared to be carried with his qualified assent<a name=
+"FNanchor1187"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1187">[1187]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_214"></a>[V2:pg 214]</span> change in
+British policy toward America must rest (and even then but
+doubtfully) on a change of Government. By June 29 his personal
+belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be
+defeated and that this would "of course postpone Lindsay's
+projected motion<a name="FNanchor1188"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1188">[1188]</a>." On June 25, the Danish Conference had
+ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed. There was a
+general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster followed by a
+meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of censure, July
+8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy
+as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the Lords
+by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial
+majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of
+Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote
+was needed<a name="FNanchor1189"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1189">[1189]</a>.</p>
+<p>Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview
+with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been
+deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on
+July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by
+Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was
+nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's
+defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this.
+Palmerston appears to have said little.</p>
+<blockquote>"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his
+remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I
+felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the
+obligation would be increased if I could take with me any
+expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to
+unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the
+war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as I was of
+opinion that the crisis was at hand, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_215"></a>[V2:pg 215]</span> it might be better to wait until
+it had arrived. I told him that my opinion was that the crisis had
+passed, at least so far as that the war of invasion would end with
+the campaign<a name="FNanchor1190"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1190">[1190]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language,
+Mason wrote:</p>
+<blockquote>"My own impressions derived from the whole interview
+are, that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the
+separation of the States is final and the independence of the South
+an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under the menaces
+of the North<a name="FNanchor1191"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1191">[1191]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Slidell's comment was bitter:</p>
+<blockquote>"I am very much obliged for your account of your
+interview with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had
+anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said even
+less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has now
+arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what
+Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague, I say, on
+both your Houses<a name="FNanchor1192"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1192">[1192]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South
+had nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should
+acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, <i>The
+Index</i> expressed much the same view and was equally bitter. It
+quoted an item in the <i>Morning Herald</i> of July 16, to the
+effect that Mason had secured an interview with Palmerston and that
+"the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":</p>
+<blockquote>"The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is
+said, the result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort
+of implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; that
+is to say, when Grant and Sherman have <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_216"></a>[V2:pg 216]</span> been defeated,
+and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."</blockquote>
+<p>In the same issue <i>The Index</i> described a deputation of
+clergymen, noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished
+and influential gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge
+mediation toward a cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at
+last the joint project of the Southern Independence Association and
+of the Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in
+America had been put in execution <i>after</i> the political storm
+had passed and not before--when the deputation might have had some
+influence. But the fact was that no deputation, unless a purely
+party one, could have been collected before the conclusion of the
+Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no party complexion,"
+and the smiling readiness with which it received Palmerston's
+jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was to keep
+strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation itself
+though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this
+demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so
+<i>The Index</i> which sneered at the childishness of
+Palmerston:</p>
+<blockquote>"... He proved incontestably to his visitors that,
+though he has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime,
+he can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by telling
+them that<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>They who in quarrels interpose<br>
+Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--</blockquote>
+<br>
+a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the
+British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as not
+altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself<a name=
+"FNanchor1193"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1193">[1193]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come
+into personal contact with Palmerston, "even <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_217"></a>[V2:pg 217]</span> now at his
+great age a charming contrast to that piece of small human
+pipe-clay, Lord Russell<a name="FNanchor1194"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1194">[1194]</a>." But the whole incident of Lindsay's
+excited efforts, Mason's journey to London and interview with
+Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad taste in the mouth of
+the more determined friends of the South--of those who were
+Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had been
+deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London
+was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the
+argument for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much
+stress on the break-down of the North. All that was wanted was
+recognition which was due the South from the mere facts of the
+existing situation, and recognition, if accorded, would have at
+once ended the war without intervention in any form<a name=
+"FNanchor1195"></a><a href="#Footnote_1195">[1195]</a>. Similarly
+<i>The Index</i> stated that mediation was an English notion, not a
+Southern one. The South merely desired justice, that is,
+recognition<a name="FNanchor1196"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1196">[1196]</a>. This was a bold front yet one not
+unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as
+reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta
+had but just started and little was known of the strength of his
+army or of the powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was
+therefore regarded as of minor importance. It was on Grant's
+advance toward Richmond that British attention was fixed; Lee's
+stiff resistance, the great losses of the North in battle after
+battle and finally the settling down by Grant to besiege the
+Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed to
+indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"
+was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of
+each of the three preceding years.</p>
+<p>Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_218"></a>[V2:pg 218]</span>
+practically ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of
+June, 1864, but British confidence in Southern ability to defend
+herself indefinitely, a confidence somewhat shattered at the
+beginning of 1864--had renewed its strength by July. For the next
+six months this was to be the note harped upon in society, by
+organizations, and in the friendly press.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1129"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1129">[1129]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1130"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1130">[1130]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1131"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1131">[1131]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1132"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1132">[1132]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Dec. 10, 1863, p.
+518.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1133"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1133">[1133]</a> The success of pro-Northern meetings in
+London was ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My
+recollection is that while many public meetings were held all over
+Great Britain by those who favoured the cause which promised the
+extinction of Slavery, no open (i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever
+expressed itself on behalf of the South, much as its splendid
+courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in Mass. Hist. Soc.
+<i>Proceedings</i>, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of these
+pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is
+clear from the reports in <i>The Index</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1134"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1134">[1134]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1135"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1135">[1135]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, The <i>weight</i> of the
+<i>Times</i> is here evident even though Goldwin Smith's statement,
+made in a speech at Providence, R.I., in 1864, be true that the
+London <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, a paper not committed to either side
+in America, had three times the circulation of the <i>Times</i>.
+(<i>The Liberator</i>, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made on
+the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown
+University.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1136"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1136">[1136]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, That Mason did contribute
+Confederate funds to Spence's meetings comes out in later
+correspondence, but the amount is uncertain.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1137"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1137">[1137]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532.
+"The attendance of representatives was numerous, and the greatest
+interest was manifested throughout the proceedings. Manchester was
+represented by Mr. W.R. Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central
+Committee), and by Messrs. Pooley, J.H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev.
+Geo. Huntington, Rev. W. Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter,
+Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse, Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc.
+Mr. Mortimer Collins, the Secretary of the Association, was also
+present. The districts were severally represented by the following
+gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs. Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr.
+Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J. Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and
+Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield; Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker,
+Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and Saddleworth--Mr. Lees,
+J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge; Heywood--Mr.
+Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley (Chorley)---Mr.
+J. Beesley, etc., etc."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1138"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1138">[1138]</a> So reported by <i>The Index</i>, Jan.
+14, 1864, p. 20, in comment on speeches being made by Forster and
+Massie throughout Lancashire.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1139"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1139">[1139]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 14, 1864, p.
+22.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1140"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1140">[1140]</a> Mason Papers. To Mason.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1141"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1141">[1141]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Dec. 26, 1862,
+giving an extract from the London <i>Morning Star</i> of Dec. 4,
+and a letter from George Thompson.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1142"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1142">[1142]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. 1, p. 18. Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a
+pamphlet issued by the Association.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1143"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1143">[1143]</a> Its appeal for funds was addressed in
+part to women. "Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated
+innocence, insulted virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in
+woman's majesty and omnipotence and give strength to a cause that
+has for its object the highest human aims--the amelioration and
+exaltation of humanity."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1144"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1144">[1144]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23.
+The committee of organization was as follows:--<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian,<br>
+The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath,<br>
+The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,<br>
+The Lord Eustace Cecil,<br>
+The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe.<br>
+The Right Honourable Lord Campbell,<br>
+The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P.,<br>
+The Honourable Robt. Bourke,<br>
+Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax,<br>
+Colonel Greville, M.P.,<br>
+W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P.,<br>
+T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P.,<br>
+A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.,<br>
+W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P.,<br>
+G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.,<br>
+Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.,<br>
+James Spence, Esq., Liverpool,<br>
+William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.<br>
+Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil.</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1145"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1145">[1145]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Feb. 26,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1146"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1146">[1146]</a> <i>The Index</i>, March 17, 1864, p.
+174. An amusing reply from an "historian" inclined to dodge is
+printed as of importance. One would like to know his identity, and
+what his "judicial situation" was. "An eminent Conservative
+historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to become a member of your
+Association from a doubt whether I should take that open step to
+which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to the
+neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and
+responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto
+invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of
+opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by
+my former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from
+the reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of
+the Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more
+effectually in my literary character. And the printing of a new
+edition of my 'History' (which is now going on) will afford me
+several opportunities of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly
+to avail myself.'"</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1147"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1147">[1147]</a> Printed, London, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1148"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1148">[1148]</a> At the time a recently-printed work by a
+clergyman had much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years'
+Experience in the Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne.
+London, 1863. Ozanne wrote: "Southern society has most of the
+virtues of an aristocracy, increased in zest by the democratic form
+of government, and the freedom of discussion on all topics fostered
+by it. It is picturesque, patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed
+gentry, it founds families, it favours leisure and field sports; it
+develops a special class of thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and
+protecting minds; it tends to elevation of sentiment and refinement
+of manners" (p. 61). Especially he insisted the South was intensely
+religious and he finally dismissed slavery with the phrase: "The
+Gospel of the Son of God has higher objects to attain than the mere
+removal of one social evil" (p. 175).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1149"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1149">[1149]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1150"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1150">[1150]</a> The <i>Alexandra</i>, as a result of the
+Court's decision, was again appealed, but on an adverse decision
+was released, proceeded to Nassau, where she was again libelled in
+the Vice-Admiralty Court of the Bahamas, and again released. She
+remained at Nassau until the close of the war, thus rendering no
+service to the South. (Bernard, pp. 354-5.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1151"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1151">[1151]</a> Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1152"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1152">[1152]</a> See Ch. XIII.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1153"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1153">[1153]</a> State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward,
+April 7, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1154"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1154">[1154]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to
+Russell, Feb. 1, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1155"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1155">[1155]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb.
+9, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1156"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1156">[1156]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to
+Russell, Feb. 12, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1157"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1157">[1157]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons
+to Russell, March 22, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1158"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1158">[1158]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons
+to Russell, Feb. 23, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1159"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1159">[1159]</a> Lyons Papers, April 23,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1160"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1160">[1160]</a> April, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1161"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1161">[1161]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April
+19, 1864, and F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April
+25, 1864. A Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully
+confirmed Lyons' reports.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1162"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1162">[1162]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9,
+1864. The tone of the <i>New York Herald</i> might well have given
+cause for anxiety. "In six months at the furthest, this unhappy
+rebellion will be brought to a close. We shall then have an account
+to settle with the Governments that have either outraged us by a
+recognition of what they call 'the belligerent rights' of the
+rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid which they have afforded
+them. Let France and England beware how they swell up this
+catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have unemployed
+a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops in the
+world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the
+French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our
+powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in
+European affairs." (Quoted by <i>The Index</i>, July 23, 1863, p.
+203.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1163"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1163">[1163]</a> Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p.
+563, states that great efforts were made by the Government to
+stimulate immigration both to secure a labour supply and to fill up
+the armies. Throughout and even since the war the charge has been
+made by the South that the foreign element, after 1862,
+preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way of determining
+the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were kept. A
+Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15,
+1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the
+several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at
+which time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown
+preponderance), the figures of nativity stood: United States,
+341,569; Germany, 54,944; Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645;
+England, 16,196; and various other countries no one of which
+reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics really mean little as
+regards war-time immigration since they do not show <i>when</i> the
+foreign-born came to America; further, from the very first days of
+the war there had been a large element of American citizens of
+German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the
+British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the
+figures given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but
+38,000 subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in
+1862, 48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000,
+and this figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly
+two-thirds were from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in
+1863, considering the number of Irish-American citizens already in
+the army, it is evident that the bulk must have gone into labour
+supply.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1164"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1164">[1164]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1863,
+<i>Commons</i>, LXXII. "Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting
+enlistment of British subjects."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1165"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1165">[1165]</a> The <i>Times</i>, Nov. 21, 1863. Also
+March 31, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1166"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1166">[1166]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864,
+<i>Commons</i>, LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of
+British seamen at Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence,"
+etc.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1167"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1167">[1167]</a> For facts and much correspondence on the
+Phinney case see <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1864, <i>Commons</i>,
+LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British subjects
+in the United States Army." Also "Further Correspondence,"
+etc.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1168"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1168">[1168]</a> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and
+CLXXV, p. 353, and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates,
+July 28, 1864, papers were asked for on "Emigration to America,"
+and readily granted by the Government.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1169"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1169">[1169]</a> Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five
+Years</i>, Vol. I, Ch. VI.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1170"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1170">[1170]</a> In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some
+extent Russell) was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter
+of whom just at this time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong
+pro-German influence of the Queen. (Fitzmaurice, <i>Granville</i>,
+I, Ch. XVI.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1171"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1171">[1171]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March
+13, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1172"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1172">[1172]</a> This came through a letter from
+Donoughmore to Mason, April 4, 1864, stating that it was private
+information received by Delane from Mackay, the <i>Times</i> New
+York correspondent. The expected Southern victory was to come "in
+about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1173"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1173">[1173]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1174"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1174">[1174]</a> Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope,
+April 8, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1175"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1175">[1175]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, May 10,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1176"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1176">[1176]</a> July 18, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1177"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1177">[1177]</a> Mason Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1178"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1178">[1178]</a> Sample letter in Mason
+Papers.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1179"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1179">[1179]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1180"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1180">[1180]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lindsay to Mason, May 30,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1181"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1181">[1181]</a> Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864,
+painted a dark picture for Northern armies.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1182"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1182">[1182]</a> Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I,
+1864. Signed by F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1183"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1183">[1183]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Tremlett to Mason, June 2,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1184"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1184">[1184]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No.
+705. Adams to Seward, June 2, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1185"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1185">[1185]</a> June 3, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1186"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1186">[1186]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8,
+1864. Mason wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his
+friends and followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward
+some such motion as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's
+<i>Mason</i>, p. 500. To Benjamin, June 9, 1864.) Evidently the
+friend was Hunter.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1187"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1187">[1187]</a> Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1188"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1188">[1188]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, June 29,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1189"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1189">[1189]</a> Walpole, <i>History of Twenty-five
+Years</i>, Vol. I, Ch. VI.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1190"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1190">[1190]</a> Mason's <i>Mason</i>, p. 507. Mason to
+Benjamin, July 14, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1191"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1191">[1191]</a> Mason Papers, July 16,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1192"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1192">[1192]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, To Mason, July 17,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1193"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1193">[1193]</a> <i>The Index</i>, July 21, 1864, p.
+457.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1194"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1194">[1194]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1195"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1195">[1195]</a> Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to
+Mason, Sept. 20, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1196"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1196">[1196]</a> July 21, 1864.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_219"></a>[V2:pg 219]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVI"></a>CHAPTER XVI</h2>
+<h3>BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH</h3>
+<br>
+<p>After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South
+and of Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance,
+but later involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European
+eyes, had reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the
+other. To the European neutral the situation was much as in the
+Great War it appeared to the American neutral in December, 1916, at
+the end of two years of fighting. In both wars the neutral had
+expected and had prophesied a short conflict. In both, this had
+proved to be false prophecy and with each additional month of the
+Civil War there was witnessed an increase of the forces employed
+and a psychological change in the people whereby war seemed to have
+become a normal state of society. The American Civil War, as
+regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources
+employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War,"
+to date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all
+foreign observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after
+an apparent check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that
+all America had become engaged in a struggle from which there was
+scant hope of emergence by a decisive military victory. There was
+little knowledge of the steady decline of the resources of the
+South even though Jefferson Davis in a message to the Confederate
+Congress in February, 1864, had spoken bitterly of Southern
+disorganization<a name="FNanchor1197"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1197">[1197]</a>. Yet this belief in stalemate
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_220"></a>[V2:pg 220]</span> in
+essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for the
+function of the Confederacy was, after all, to <i>resist</i> until
+its independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in
+England both felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the
+general attitude of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the
+powers of indefinite Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by
+Southern champions.</p>
+<p>There was now one element in the situation, however, that
+hampered these Southern champions. The North was at last fully
+identified with the cause of emancipation; the South with the
+perpetuation of slavery. By 1864, it was felt to be impossible to
+remain silent on this subject and even in the original constitution
+and address of the Southern Independence Association a clause was
+adopted expressing a hope for the gradual extinction of
+slavery<a name="FNanchor1198"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1198">[1198]</a>. This brought Mason some heartburnings
+and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply being that he
+also agreed that the South ought not to be offered gratuitous
+advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that the
+topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand,
+at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also,
+there arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar
+expressions. "In Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and
+the strongest man on the board, brought forward a motion for an
+address on this subject. I went up to Manchester purposely to quash
+it and I did so effectually<a name="FNanchor1199"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1199">[1199]</a>."</p>
+<p>Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in
+Southern armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot,"
+and by mere iteration gave such currency to it that even in
+Southern meetings it was repeated. <i>The Index</i>, as early as
+February, 1864, felt compelled to meet the phrase and in an
+editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_221"></a>[V2:pg 221]</span> argued the error of Southern
+friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in
+characterization of Southern slavery, <i>The Index</i> felt that
+there could be no effective British push for Southern independence
+and it asserted that slavery, in the sense in which England
+understood it, did not exist in the Confederacy.</p>
+<blockquote>"... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the
+condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and otherwise
+dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending such practices to
+say that the South does none of these things, but that on the
+contrary, both in theory and in practice, she treats the negro as a
+fellow-creature, with a soul to be saved, with feelings to be
+respected, though in the social order in a subordinate place, and
+of an intellectual organization which requires guardianship with
+mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery,
+because it developed itself out of an older and very different one
+of that name, but for this the South is not to blame.<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so long
+as they make no determined effort to relieve the Southern character
+from this false drapery, they will never gain for it that respect,
+that confidence in the rectitude of Southern motives, that active
+sympathy, which can alone evoke effective assistance.... The best
+assurance you can give that the destinies of the negro race are
+safe in Southern hands is, not that the South will repent and
+reform, but that she has consistently and conscientiously been the
+friend and benefactor of that race.<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such expressions
+as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from the lips of earnest
+promoters of Confederate Independence. As a concession they are
+useless; as a confession they are untrue.... Thus the Southerner
+may retort as we have seen that an Englishman would retort for his
+country. He might say the South is proud, and of nothing more proud
+than this--not that she has slaves, but that she has treated them
+as slaves never were treated before, that she has used power
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_222"></a>[V2:pg 222]</span> as
+no nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she
+has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem which
+has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he might use the
+unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at hearing much said of
+'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark and damnable blot that
+England left us with, and it required all the efforts of Southern
+Christianity to pale it as it now is<a name=
+"FNanchor1200"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1200">[1200]</a>.'"</blockquote>
+<p>In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, <i>The Index</i> had declared
+that slavery was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the
+"domestic institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying
+forms, was evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's
+emancipation edicts. <i>The Index</i> could not keep away from the
+subject. In March, quotations were given from the <i>Reader</i>,
+with adverse comments, upon a report of a controversy aroused in
+scientific circles by a paper read before the Anthropological
+Society of London. James Hunt was the author and the paper,
+entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the contempt of
+Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and placed
+upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a fine
+controversy among the scientists which could only serve to
+emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the
+American War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a
+newspaper duel with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley
+asserted "the North is justified in any expenditure of blood or
+treasure which shall eradicate a system hopelessly inconsistent
+with the moral elevation, the political freedom, or the economical
+progress of the American people<a name="FNanchor1201"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1201">[1201]</a>...."</p>
+<p>Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility
+to many sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of
+<i>The Index</i>, acted as a check upon the holding of public
+meetings and prevented the carrying out of that <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_223"></a>[V2:pg 223]</span> intensive
+public campaign launched by Spence and intended to be fostered by
+the Southern Independence Association. By the end of June, 1864,
+there was almost a complete cessation of Southern meetings, not
+thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief period in the
+fall just before the Presidential election in America<a name=
+"FNanchor1202"></a><a href="#Footnote_1202">[1202]</a>. Northern
+meetings were continuous throughout the whole period of the war but
+were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were almost entirely
+of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and religious
+bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An analysis of
+those recorded in the files of <i>The Liberator</i>, and in the
+reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following
+classification<a name="FNanchor1203"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1203">[1203]</a>:</p>
+<center>
+<table summary="" border="1">
+<tr>
+<th align="center" rowspan="2">YEAR.</th>
+<th align="center" rowspan="2">NUMBER.</th>
+<th align="center" colspan="2">CHARACTER.</th>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<th align="center">ANTI-SLAVERY<br>
+AND RELIGIOUS</th>
+<th align="center">WORKING-MEN.</th>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1860</td>
+<td align="center">3</td>
+<td align="center">3</td>
+<td align="center">-</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1861</td>
+<td align="center">7</td>
+<td align="center">7</td>
+<td align="center">-</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1862</td>
+<td align="center">16</td>
+<td align="center">11</td>
+<td align="center">5</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1863</td>
+<td align="center">82</td>
+<td align="center">26</td>
+<td align="center">56</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1864</td>
+<td align="center">21</td>
+<td align="center">10</td>
+<td align="center">11</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center">1865</td>
+<td align="center">5</td>
+<td align="center">4</td>
+<td align="center">1</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</center>
+<br>
+<p>Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_224"></a>[V2:pg 224]</span>
+officers or as speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those
+appearing with frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever,
+Rev. Newman Hall, John Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P.,
+Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A. Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas
+Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and Mason Jones. While held in all
+parts of England and Scotland the great majority of meetings were
+held in London and in the manufacturing districts with Manchester
+as a centre. From the first the old anti-slavery orator of the
+'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most active speaker and
+was credited by all with having given new life to the moribund
+emancipation sentiment of Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor1204"></a><a href="#Footnote_1204">[1204]</a>. Thompson
+asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and
+energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or
+city<a name="FNanchor1205"></a><a href="#Footnote_1205">[1205]</a>.
+Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the most
+popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others,
+not named in the preceding list, constantly active and
+effective<a name="FNanchor1206"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1206">[1206]</a>. Forster, in the judgment of many, was
+the most influential friend of the North in Parliament, but Bright,
+also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in
+moulding the opinion of Lancashire and <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_225"></a>[V2:pg 225]</span> became to
+American eyes their great English champion, a view attested by the
+extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the appeal
+of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred
+Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port
+of San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern
+commerce<a name="FNanchor1207"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1207">[1207]</a>.</p>
+<p>This record of the activities of Northern friends and
+organizations, the relative subsidence of their efforts in the
+latter part of 1864, thus indicating their confidence in Northern
+victory, the practical cessation of public Southern meetings, are
+nevertheless no proof that the bulk of English opinion had greatly
+wavered in its faith in Southern powers of resistance. The
+Government, it is true, was better informed and was exceedingly
+anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the more so as
+there was now being voiced by the public in America a sentiment of
+extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in opposition to
+the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and France<a name=
+"FNanchor1208"></a><a href="#Footnote_1208">[1208]</a>. It was a
+period of many minor irritations, arising out of the blockade,
+inflicted by America on British interests, but to these Russell
+paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He wrote to
+Lyons:</p>
+<blockquote>"I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just
+causes of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward
+should see that we are long patient, and do <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_226"></a>[V2:pg 226]</span> nothing to
+distract their attention from the arduous task they have so
+wantonly undertaken<a name="FNanchor1209"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1209">[1209]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he
+thought that the current of political opinion was running against
+the re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were
+full of expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that
+neither the "peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever
+talked of any solution of the war save on the basis of re-union.
+Hence Lyons strongly advised that "the quieter England and France
+were just at this moment the better<a name=
+"FNanchor1210"></a><a href="#Footnote_1210">[1210]</a>." Even the
+suggested armistice was not thought of, he stated, as extending to
+a relaxation of the blockade. Of military probabilities, Lyons
+professed himself to be no judge, but throughout all his letters
+there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of warning as to
+the great power and high determination of the North.</p>
+<p>But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the
+theory of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view
+that the only hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of
+war, the leading British newspapers were still indulging in
+expressions of confidence in the South while at the same time
+putting much faith in the expected defeat of Lincoln at the polls.
+As always at this period, save for the few newspapers avowedly
+friendly to the North and one important daily professing strict
+neutrality--the <i>Telegraph</i>--the bulk of the metropolitan
+press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from the
+columns of the <i>Times</i>. This journal, while early assuming a
+position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in
+the war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York
+correspondent, Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a
+change came over the <i>Times</i>; it was either itself
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_227"></a>[V2:pg 227]</span>
+deceived or was wilfully deceiving its readers, for steadily every
+event for the rest of the year was coloured to create an impression
+of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. Read to-day in the
+light of modern knowledge of the military situation throughout the
+war, the <i>Times</i> gave accurate reports for the earlier years
+but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year
+of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting
+reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in
+the West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward
+Atlanta<a name="FNanchor1211"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1211">[1211]</a>. The same ideas were repeated
+throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to be printed a series
+of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond who wrote in
+contempt of Grant's army.</p>
+<blockquote>"I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone
+in which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of the
+huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured victims (there
+are Indians serving under the Stars and Stripes) who are at times
+goaded up to the Southern lines.... The truth is that for the first
+time in modern warfare we are contemplating an army which is at
+once republican and undisciplined<a name=
+"FNanchor1212"></a><a href="#Footnote_1212">[1212]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's
+leading paper the facts of the situation were that the South was
+unable to prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to
+spare soldiers to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the
+<i>Times</i> was either ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed
+a general British sentiment during the summer of 1864, that the
+North was losing its power and determination in the war<a name=
+"FNanchor1213"></a><a href="#Footnote_1213">[1213]</a>, even though
+it was unquestioned that the earlier "enthusiasm for the
+slave-holders" <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_228"></a>[V2:pg
+228]</span> had passed away<a name="FNanchor1214"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1214">[1214]</a>. One element in the influence of the
+<i>Times</i> was its <i>seeming</i> impartiality accompanied by a
+pretentious assertion of superior information and wisdom that at
+times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as making
+this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a
+<i>Times</i> editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been
+berated for a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, <i>The
+Index</i> declared:</p>
+<blockquote>"Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only
+shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian
+philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command admiration, it
+shouts simultaneously with opposite and contending crowds. It is
+everybody's <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1215"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1215">[1215]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Yet <i>The Index</i> knew, and frequently so stated, that the
+<i>Times</i> was at bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the
+<i>Morning Star</i>, said: "There was something bordering on the
+sublime in the tremendous audacity of the war news supplied by the
+<i>Times</i>. Of course, its prophecies were in a similar style.
+None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your double-meaning
+vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus in<a name=
+"FNanchor1216"></a><a href="#Footnote_1216">[1216]</a>." In short,
+the <i>Times</i> became for the last year of the war the Bible of
+their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its
+preachments<a name="FNanchor1217"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1217">[1217]</a>.</p>
+<p>There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if
+not greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was
+the weekly <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, and its editor, W.H.
+Russell, in 1861 war correspondent in America of the <i>Times</i>,
+but recalled shortly after his famous letter on the battle of Bull
+Run, consistently maintained after the war had ended that he had
+always asserted <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_229"></a>[V2:pg 229]</span> the ultimate victory of the
+North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was
+the real cause of his recall<a name="FNanchor1218"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1218">[1218]</a>. He even claimed to have believed in
+Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations
+after the event are not borne out by the columns of the
+<i>Gazette</i>, for that journal was not far behind the
+<i>Times</i> in its delineation of incidents unfavourable to the
+North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern disaster. The
+<i>Gazette</i> had no wide circulation except among those in the
+service, but its <i>dicta</i>, owing to the established reputation
+of Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were
+naturally quite readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary
+press. Based on a correct appreciation of man power and resources
+the <i>Gazette</i> did from time to time proclaim its faith in
+Northern victory<a name="FNanchor1219"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1219">[1219]</a>, but always in such terms as to render
+possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with the assertion
+that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most definite
+prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:</p>
+<blockquote>"The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to
+fight by itself, without even a conference or an armistice to
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_230"></a>[V2:pg 230]</span>
+aid it; and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance,
+and resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually
+dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the Northern
+States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the matter. We
+hold that the Union perished long ago, and that its component parts
+can never again be welded into a Confederacy of self-governing
+States, with a common executive, army, fleet, and central
+government. Not only that. The principle of Union itself among the
+non-seceding States is so shocked and shattered by the war which
+has arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and spread,
+and to form eventually great gulfs separating the Northern Union
+itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North be convinced of the
+futility of its efforts to substitute the action of force for that
+of free will, we think it will reduce the Southern States to the
+direst misery<a name="FNanchor1220"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1220">[1220]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at
+the "Confederate partisanship" of the <i>Times</i><a name=
+"FNanchor1221"></a><a href="#Footnote_1221">[1221]</a> served to
+differentiate the <i>Gazette</i> from other journals, but when it
+came to description and estimate of specific campaigns there was
+little to choose between them and consequently little variance in
+the effect upon the public. Thus a fortnight before his "profession
+of faith," Russell could comment editorially on Sherman's campaign
+toward Atlanta:</p>
+<blockquote>"The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the
+North have so long been fixed promises to become a source of
+fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not
+advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously with
+his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has eaten up
+all the supplies of the district.... All the enormous advantages
+possessed by the Federals have been nullified by want of skill, by
+the interference of Washington civilians, and by the absence of an
+animating homogeneous spirit on the part of their soldiery<a name=
+"FNanchor1222"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1222">[1222]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_231"></a>[V2:pg 231]</span>
+<p>Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on
+the Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of
+Lincoln's defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American
+press but the citations made in <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_232"></a>[V2:pg 232]</span> British papers emphasized
+especially Northern weariness of Lincoln's despotism and
+inefficiency. Thus, first printed in <i>The Index</i>, an extract
+from a New York paper, <i>The New Nation</i>, got frequent
+quotation:</p>
+<blockquote>"We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which
+you have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly
+be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years longer.
+Your military governors and their provost-marshals override the
+laws, and the <i>echo of the armed heel rings forth as dearly now
+in America as in France or Austria. You have encroached upon our
+liberty without securing victory, and we must have both</i><a name=
+"FNanchor1223"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1223">[1223]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would
+have an important bearing on the election. The <i>Times</i> while
+expressing admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta
+campaign was confident of his defeat:</p>
+<blockquote>"... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can
+escape a still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his
+predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty miles
+from his base of operations, over a mountainous country; and he has
+no option but to retreat by the same line as he advanced. This is
+the first instance of a Federal general having ventured far from
+water communications. That Sherman has hitherto done so with
+success is a proof of both courage and ability, but he will need
+both these qualities in a far greater degree if he is forced to
+retreat<a name="FNanchor1224"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1224">[1224]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>And W.H. Russell, in the <i>Gazette</i>, included Grant in the
+approaching disaster:</p>
+<blockquote>"The world has never seen anything in war so slow and
+fatuous as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman.
+Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an
+ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank and
+then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking eye of the
+enemy, ready for his spring and bite. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_233"></a>[V2:pg 233]</span> In sheer
+despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to
+shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know that
+they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful artillery as
+their own out of a position.... The Northerners have, indeed, lost
+the day solely owing to the want of average ability in their
+leaders in the field<a name="FNanchor1225"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1225">[1225]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the <i>Gazette</i>
+the city of Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news
+reached England the <i>Times</i> having declared this impossible,
+now asserted that it was unimportant, believed that Sherman could
+not remain in possession and, two days later, turned with vehemence
+to an analysis of the political struggle as of more vital
+influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, would place peace
+"paramount to union" and were sure to win<a name=
+"FNanchor1226"></a><a href="#Footnote_1226">[1226]</a>. Russell, in
+the <i>Gazette</i>, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks
+earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of
+Atlanta:</p>
+<blockquote>"General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as
+an able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he
+won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which
+carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of Georgia<a name=
+"FNanchor1227"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1227">[1227]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would
+acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success.
+Not so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed
+than he would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons,
+who for some time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought
+escape from the summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal.
+He now wrote correctly interpreting a great change in Northern
+attitude and a renewed determination to persevere in the war until
+reunion was secured. Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be
+re-elected:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_234"></a>[V2:pg 234]</span>
+<blockquote>"The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be
+taken as an indication of what the real feelings of the people in
+the Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently desire
+to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments when they
+despair of doing this that they listen to plans for recovering the
+territory by negotiation. The time has not come yet when any
+proposal to relinquish the territory can be publicly made<a name=
+"FNanchor1228"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1228">[1228]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The <i>Times</i>, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have
+influence in the election, and as always clever above its
+contemporaries in the delicate process of face-about to save its
+prestige, arrived in October at the point where it could join in
+prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did so by throwing the
+blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party convention in
+Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an excellent
+chance of success by declaring for union first and peace
+afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late
+analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had
+called for a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a
+convention to restore peace--in substance, for an armistice. But
+the <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1229"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1229">[1229]</a> now assumed temporarily a highly moral
+and disinterested pose and washed its hands of further
+responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:</p>
+<blockquote>For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it
+otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that we are
+aware of against the present Government of America. Allowance being
+made for the difficulties of their position, they are conducting
+the war with a fair regard to the rights of neutral nations. The
+war has swept American commerce from the sea, and placed it, in
+great measure, in our hands; we have supplied the loss of the
+cotton which was suddenly withdrawn from us; the returns of our
+revenue and our trade are thoroughly satisfactory, and we
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_235"></a>[V2:pg 235]</span>
+have received an equivalent for the markets closed to us in America
+in the vast impulse that has been given towards the development of
+the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not been
+in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of our ruin,
+apparently resolved to execute, without pause and without remorse,
+the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon itself. We see the
+frantic patient tearing the bandages from his wounds and thrusting
+aside the hand that would assuage his miseries, and every day that
+the war goes on we see less and less probability that the great
+fabric of the Union will ever be reconstructed in its original
+form, and more and more likelihood that the process of
+disintegration will extend far beyond the present division between
+North and South.... Were we really animated by the spirit of
+hostility which is always assumed to prevail among us towards
+America, we should view the terrible spectacle with exultation and
+delight, we should rejoice that the American people, untaught by
+past misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, and
+hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln as the
+event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady continuance
+in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that the people of
+this country view the prospect of another four years of war in
+America with very different feelings. They are not able to divest
+themselves of sympathy for a people of their own blood and language
+thus wilfully rushing down the path that leadeth to
+destruction<a name="FNanchor1230"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1230">[1230]</a>.</blockquote>
+<p>Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that
+Lincoln would again be chosen President, but the <i>Times</i> was
+more slow to acknowledge its military importance, first hinting and
+then positively asserting that Sherman had fallen into a trap from
+which he would have difficulty in escaping<a name=
+"FNanchor1231"></a><a href="#Footnote_1231">[1231]</a>. The
+<i>Gazette</i> called this "blind partisanship<a name=
+"FNanchor1232"></a><a href="#Footnote_1232">[1232]</a>," but itself
+indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and results
+of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that election
+day would see the use of "force, <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_236"></a>[V2:pg 236]</span> fraud and every mechanism known
+to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it
+continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as
+it dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation
+for justice and honour throughout the world<a name=
+"FNanchor1233"></a><a href="#Footnote_1233">[1233]</a>." Again
+official England was striking a note far different from that of the
+press<a name="FNanchor1234"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1234">[1234]</a>. Adams paid little attention to
+newspaper <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_237"></a>[V2:pg
+237]</span> utterances, but kept his chief informed of opinions
+expressed by those responsible for, and active in determining,
+governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by Members of
+Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident
+unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was
+inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential
+election in America came nearer, attention was diverted from
+military events. Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings
+urging their friends in America to vote for Lincoln<a name=
+"FNanchor1235"></a><a href="#Footnote_1235">[1235]</a>. Writing
+from Washington, Lyons, as always anxious to forestall frictions on
+immaterial matters, wrote to Russell, "We must be prepared for
+demonstrations of a '<i>spirited foreign policy</i>' by Mr. Seward,
+during the next fortnight, for electioneering purposes<a name=
+"FNanchor1236"></a><a href="#Footnote_1236">[1236]</a>." Possibly
+his illness made him unduly nervous, for four days later he was
+relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as possible all
+business with him until after the election<a name=
+"FNanchor1237"></a><a href="#Footnote_1237">[1237]</a>." By
+November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and
+in replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he
+was entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious
+difficulties with Great Britain.</p>
+<blockquote>"... I do not think the U.S. Government have any
+ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing
+themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their
+existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and buncome
+may be at times, I think they will subside when the popular clamour
+is over<a name="FNanchor1238"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1238">[1238]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_238"></a>[V2:pg 238]</span>
+<p>In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving
+212 electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such
+as the <i>Gazette</i> had gloomily foretold attended the event, and
+the tremendous majority gained by the President somewhat stunned
+the press. Having prophesied disorders, the <i>Gazette</i> now
+patted America on the back for her behaviour, but took occasion to
+renew old "professions of faith" against reunion:</p>
+<blockquote>"Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham
+Lincoln I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and
+so far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the
+measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most creditable to
+the law-abiding habits of the people that the elections ... passed
+off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln has four long years of strife
+before him; and as he seems little inclined to change his advisers,
+his course of action, or his generals, we do not believe that the
+termination of his second period of government will find him
+President of the United States<a name="FNanchor1239"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1239">[1239]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The <i>Times</i> was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was
+cautious in comment:</p>
+<blockquote>"Ever since he found himself firmly established in his
+office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had begun
+to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of the conduct
+of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been less exacting,
+his language has been less offensive and, due allowance being made
+for the immense difficulties of his situation, we could have parted
+with Mr. Lincoln, had such been the pleasure of the American
+people, without any vestige of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done
+as regards this country what the necessities of his situation
+demanded from him, and he has done no more<a name=
+"FNanchor1240"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1240">[1240]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_239"></a>[V2:pg 239]</span>
+<p>This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the
+real reaction of the press was indicated by <i>Punch's</i> cartoon
+of a phoenix, bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising
+from the ashes where lay the embers of all that of old time had
+gone to make up the <i>liberties</i> of America<a name=
+"FNanchor1241"></a><a href="#Footnote_1241">[1241]</a>.</p>
+<p>During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election
+English friends of the South had largely remained inactive.
+Constantly twitted that at the chief stronghold of the <i>Southern
+Independence Association</i>, Manchester, they did not dare to hold
+a meeting in the great Free Trade Hall<a name=
+"FNanchor1242"></a><a href="#Footnote_1242">[1242]</a>, they tried
+ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there met with
+opposition from those who attended. At three other places, Oldham,
+Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the
+manufacturing districts met with little success<a name=
+"FNanchor1243"></a><a href="#Footnote_1243">[1243]</a>, and even,
+as reported in the <i>Index</i>, were attended mainly by
+"magistrates, clergy, leading local gentry, manufacturers,
+tradesmen, and cotton operatives," the last named being also,
+evidently, the last considered, and presumably the least
+represented<a name="FNanchor1244"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1244">[1244]</a>. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted "follow
+up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an
+appearance<a name="FNanchor1245"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1245">[1245]</a>. At one town only, Oldham, described by
+<i>The Index</i> as "the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a
+meeting held at all comparable with the great demonstrations easily
+staged by pro-Northern friends. Set for October 31, great efforts
+were made to picture this meeting as an outburst of indignation
+from the unemployed. Summoned by <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_240"></a>[V2:pg 240]</span> handbills headed "<i>The Crisis!
+The Crisis! The Crisis!</i>" there gathered, according to <i>The
+Index</i> correspondent, a meeting "of between 5,000 and 6,000
+wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children in their
+arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment, had
+met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to
+be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost
+threatening violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become
+so hackneyed as to seem ridiculous after a description intended to
+portray the misery and the revolutionary character of the
+meeting:</p>
+<blockquote>"That in consequence of the widespread distress that
+now prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the war
+in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's Government
+should use their influence, together with France and other European
+powers, to bring both belligerents together in order to put a stop
+to the vast destruction of life and property that is now going on
+in that unhappy country<a name="FNanchor1246"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1246">[1246]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but
+in truth it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the
+distress in Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew
+it, while elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative
+feeling was with the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being
+circulated for signature among the working men, appealing to
+Irishmen in America to stand by the administration of Lincoln and
+to enlist in the Northern armies on the ground of
+emancipation<a name="FNanchor1247"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1247">[1247]</a>. Here, indeed, was the insuperable
+barrier, in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny
+as he might the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society,
+Hotze, of <i>The Index</i>, could not counteract that phrase. When
+the Confederate Congress at Richmond began, in <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_241"></a>[V2:pg 241]</span> the autumn of
+1864, seriously to discuss a plan of transforming slaves into
+soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and thus replenishing the
+waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was hard put to it to
+explain to his English readers that this was in fact no evidence of
+lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the part of
+the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms in
+defence of his country<a name="FNanchor1248"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1248">[1248]</a>.</p>
+<p>This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon
+the absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates,
+however, permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of
+November 10, and indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though
+this, early in the spring of 1865, was actually provided for by
+law. On November 11, Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the
+Powers of Europe a communication accompanying a Confederate
+"Manifesto," of which the blockade had long delayed transmissal.
+This "Manifesto" set forth the objects of the Southern States and
+flatly demanded recognition:</p>
+<blockquote>"'All they ask is immunity from interference with their
+internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the undisturbed
+enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life, liberty and the
+pursuit of happiness which their common ancestry declared to be the
+equal heritage of all parties to the Social compact<a name=
+"FNanchor1249"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1249">[1249]</a>.'"</blockquote>
+<p>Russell replied, November 25:</p>
+<blockquote>"Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the
+exception of a short period, connected by friendly relations with
+both the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement
+of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's Government
+have continued to entertain sentiments of friendship equally for
+the North and for the <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_242"></a>[V2:pg 242]</span> South; of the causes of the
+rupture Her Majesty's Government have never presumed to judge; they
+deplored the commencement of this sanguinary struggle, and
+anxiously look forward to the period of its termination. In the
+meantime they are convinced that they best consult the interests of
+peace, and respect the rights of all parties by observing a strict
+and impartial Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has
+faithfully maintained and will continue to maintain<a name=
+"FNanchor1250"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1250">[1250]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>If <i>The Index</i> did indeed hope for results from the
+"Manifesto," and had sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a
+Southern plan to "let the slaves win their freedom," the answer of
+Russell was disappointing. Yet at the moment, in spite of the
+effect of Lincoln's re-election, the current of alleged expert
+military opinion was again swinging in favour of the South. The
+<i>Times</i> scored Russell's answer, portraying him as attempting
+to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":</p>
+<blockquote>"The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the
+representatives of the Confederate States without appearing rude to
+the United States; and, on the other hand, to acknowledge the
+authority of the United States without affronting the dignity of
+the Confederates. Between these two pitfalls Lord Russell
+oscillates in his letter, and now puts his foot a little bit in the
+hole on one side, and then, in recovering himself gets a little way
+into the hole on the other side. In this way he sways to and fro
+for a minute or two, but rights himself at last, and declares he
+has hitherto stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will
+continue to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of
+forgetting that <i>neuter</i> does not mean <i>both</i>, but
+<i>neither</i>, and that if, therefore, he would maintain even in
+words a strict neutrality it is necessary to avoid any
+demonstrations of friendship to either belligerent<a name=
+"FNanchor1251"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1251">[1251]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was harsh criticism, evincing a <i>Times</i> partisanship
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_243"></a>[V2:pg 243]</span>
+justifying the allegations of the <i>Gazette</i>, but wholly in
+line with the opinion to which the <i>Times</i> was now desperately
+clinging that Grant had failed and that Sherman, adventuring on his
+spectacular "march to the sea" from Atlanta, was courting
+annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were appalled at Sherman's
+boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The son of the
+American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron wall in
+Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a step
+after all<a name="FNanchor1252"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1252">[1252]</a>."</p>
+<p>The <i>Times</i> was at least consistent in prophecies until the
+event falsified them; the <i>Gazette</i> less so. Some six weeks
+after having acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of
+Atlanta<a name="FNanchor1253"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1253">[1253]</a>, the <i>Gazette's</i> summary of the
+military situation was that:</p>
+<blockquote>"... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg,
+and Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the South
+may be nearer its dawning day of independence than could have been
+expected a few weeks ago, even though Wilmington be captured and
+Charleston be ground away piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The
+position of the Democrats would urge them to desperate measures,
+and the wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body
+which now represents the Federal States of North America<a name=
+"FNanchor1254"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1254">[1254]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and
+foretold with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so
+the <i>Times</i>, privately very anxious as to what Sherman's
+campaign portended, while publicly belittling it. December 2, it
+was noted that Sherman had not been heard from for weeks, having
+left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December 5, his objective was stated
+to be Savannah, and while the difficulties to be encountered were
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_244"></a>[V2:pg 244]</span>
+enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on December 22,
+Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his
+inability to retreat <i>northward</i> from Atlanta:</p>
+<blockquote>"If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that
+the great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into Georgia.
+We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will succeed in escaping
+the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that his apparent rashness is
+excused by the fact that Sherman was unable to return on the way by
+which he came; so that the most remarkable feature of the war,
+according to the President, is the wild and desperate effort of an
+out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position which,
+whatever effect it may have had on the election, should never, on
+mere military grounds, have been occupied at all<a name=
+"FNanchor1255"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1255">[1255]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was followed up four days later by a long and careful
+review of Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the
+dictum that his sole object now was to escape to some undefended
+point on the coast where he could be rescued by the Northern navy.
+The war had taken a definite turn in favour of the South; it was
+impossible to conceive that Sherman would venture to attack
+Savannah:</p>
+<blockquote>"For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is
+essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring point on
+the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be equivalent to
+ruin, and he will do nothing to create it<a name=
+"FNanchor1256"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1256">[1256]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Rarely, if ever, did the <i>Times</i>, in its now eager and
+avowed championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to
+preserve British confidence in the Southern cause<a name=
+"FNanchor1257"></a><a href="#Footnote_1257">[1257]</a>. Even
+friends of the North were made doubtful <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_245"></a>[V2:pg 245]</span> by the
+positiveness of prediction indulged in by that journal whose
+opinions were supposed to be based on superior information. Their
+recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on the American
+Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern cause<a name=
+"FNanchor1258"></a><a href="#Footnote_1258">[1258]</a>, and their
+relief was great when the news was received that Savannah had
+fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The <i>Times</i> recorded
+the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern
+prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long
+silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial
+wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a
+complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.</p>
+<p>For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the
+fall of Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of
+prestige to the <i>Times</i><a name="FNanchor1259"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1259">[1259]</a>. Courage failed and confidence in the
+South waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed
+before the <i>Times</i> ventured to lift again the banner of hope,
+and even then but half-heartedly.</p>
+<blockquote>"The capture of the city completes the history of
+Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one
+of the most singular military achievements of the war.<br>
+<br>
+"... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the possession
+of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his army 'the change
+of base' is indisputably a change for the better. Assuming that his
+position at Atlanta was as <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_246"></a>[V2:pg 246]</span> desperate as shortness of
+supplies and an interrupted line of retreat could make it, the
+command of a point near the sea-coast and free communication with
+the fleet is obviously an improvement. At the least the army
+secures full means of subsistence, and a point from which further
+operations may be commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as
+the Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact
+that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the capture
+of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage of the war.<br>
+<br>
+"... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would be
+absurd to deny that it has produced an impression unfavourable to
+the <i>prestige</i> of the Confederacy<a name=
+"FNanchor1260"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1260">[1260]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture
+presented, though in sarcasm, by the <i>Times</i> New York
+correspondent, printed in this same issue:</p>
+<blockquote>"No disappointments, however fast they may follow on
+the heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of conceit
+and self-worship that glows in the heart of the Yankee. His country
+is the first in the world, and he is the first man in it. Knock him
+down, and he will get up again, and brush the dirt from his knees,
+not a bit the worse for the fall. If he do not win this time, he is
+bound to win the next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest
+destiny is to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to
+conquer."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1197"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1197">[1197]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p.
+233.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1198"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1198">[1198]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 192.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1199"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1199">[1199]</a> Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1200"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1200">[1200]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Feb. 18, 1864, p.
+105.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1201"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1201">[1201]</a> <i>The Index</i>, March 24, 1864, p.
+189, quoting the <i>Reader</i> for March 19.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1202"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1202">[1202]</a> The first Southern meeting in England I
+have found record of was one reported in the <i>Spectator</i>, Nov.
+16, 1861, to honour Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the
+<i>Fishmongers of London</i>. Yancey was warmly received and
+appealed to his hosts on the ground that the South was the best
+buyer of English goods.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1203"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1203">[1203]</a> The 134 meetings here listed represent
+by no means all held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500
+after the beginning of 1862. (<i>The Civil War in America</i>,
+London, 1866.) The list may be regarded as an analysis of the more
+important, attracting the attention of <i>The Liberator</i> and of
+Adams.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1204"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1204">[1204]</a> At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863
+he was declared by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the
+slaves in the English colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his
+courage "when social obloquy and personal danger had to be incurred
+for the truth's sake," having rendered great services "to the cause
+of Abolition in America."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1205"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1205">[1205]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Jan. 15, 1864.
+Letter to James Buffum, of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1206"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1206">[1206]</a> Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War
+in America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester
+Union and Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays
+especial tribute to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly
+allied yourself with the working-men in forming this association."
+Smith gives a five-page list of other leading members, among whom,
+in addition to some Northern friends already named, are to be noted
+Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, John Stuart Mill. There are eleven
+noted "Professors," among them Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and
+Fawcett. The publicity committee of this society during three years
+had issued and circulated "upwards of four hundred thousand books,
+pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the activities of
+Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis Train,
+correspondent of the <i>New York Herald</i>, made twenty-three
+speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches
+in England.")</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1207"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1207">[1207]</a> For text of Lincoln's pardon see
+Trevelyan, <i>Bright</i>, p. 296. Lincoln gave the pardon
+"especially as a public mark of the esteem held by the United
+States of America for the high character and steady friendship of
+the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of the South
+have been given in Chapter XV.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1208"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1208">[1208]</a> This was a commonplace of American
+writing at the time and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a
+book devoted to the thesis that England and France had united in a
+"policy" of repressing the development of America and Russia
+(<i>English and French Neutrality and the Anglo-French Alliance in
+their relations to the United States and Russia</i>, Cincinnati,
+C.F. Vest &amp; Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You have not come to
+the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you have touched
+that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large and
+strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical
+importance except that it was thought worth publication in
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1209"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1209">[1209]</a> Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864.
+Copy.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1210"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1210">[1210]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug.
+23, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1211"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1211">[1211]</a> June 3, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1212"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1212">[1212]</a> The <i>Times</i>, August 4, 1864.
+Letters dated June 27 and July 5, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1213"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1213">[1213]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p.
+126. Henry Adams to his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead
+against us, and the atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the
+possibility of our success is not admitted."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1214"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1214">[1214]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 136. Henry Adams to his
+brother, June 3, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1215"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1215">[1215]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Feb. 19, 1863, p.
+265.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1216"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1216">[1216]</a> This was written immediately after the
+battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was
+much more marked in 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1217"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1217">[1217]</a> The <i>Times</i> average of editorials
+on the Civil War ran two in every three days until May, 1864, and
+thereafter one in every three days.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1218"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1218">[1218]</a> Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8,
+1865: "You know, perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the
+North must win, I was tabooed from dealing with American questions
+in the <i>Times</i> even after my return to England, but <i>en
+revanche</i> I have had my say in the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>,
+which I have bought, every week, and if one could be weak and
+wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such ruins
+and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I
+maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment"
+(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5,
+1865, Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the <i>Times</i> followed
+my advice, how different our position would be--not only that of
+the leading journal, but of England. If ever I did State service,
+it was in my letters from America." (Atkins, <i>Life of W.H.
+Russell</i>, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also Bigelow,
+<i>Retrospections</i>, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the
+<i>Gazette</i> on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6,
+1860, but left it to go to America. On his return he settled down
+to his editorial task in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout
+the war, the <i>Gazette</i> may be regarded as reflecting his
+views. His entire letters from America to the <i>Times</i>
+constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding the
+outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for
+its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North.
+This dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D.
+White ("A Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in
+his 'Diary North and South'"), published in London in
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1219"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1219">[1219]</a> June 25, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1220"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1220">[1220]</a> The <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, July
+30, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1221"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1221">[1221]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 25,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1222"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1222">[1222]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, July 16, 1864. Similar
+articles and editorials might be quoted from many of the more
+important papers, but the <i>Times</i> and the <i>Gazette</i> will
+suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not examined in detail
+the files of the metropolitan press beyond determining their
+general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional special
+references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to
+warrant the conclusion that the <i>weight</i> of the <i>Times</i>
+in influencing opinion was very great. Collating statistics given
+in:<br>
+<br>
+<blockquote>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(1) Grant's <i>The
+Newspaper Press</i>; (2) in a speech in<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864
+(Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;p. 295); and (3) in <i>Parliamentary
+Papers</i>, 1861, <i>Commons</i>,<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered
+Newspapers in the<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;United Kingdom ... from 30 June,
+1860, to 30 June, 1861," the<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;following facts of circulation are
+derived:<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+(A) <i>Daily Papers</i>:<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(1) <i>The Telegraph</i> (evening), 150,000
+(neutral).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(2) <i>The Standard</i> (morning and evening), 130,000
+(Southern).<br>
+Under the same management was also <i>The Herald</i> (morning), but
+with<br>
+small circulation (Southern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(3) The <i>Times</i> (morning), 70,000 (Southern).
+Grant says: "The<br>
+prestige of the <i>Times</i> was remarkable. The same articles
+appearing<br>
+in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the
+<i>Times</i>."<br>
+Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as
+well-known<br>
+... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our<br>
+European kings.... The <i>Times</i> may, indeed, be called the
+Monarch<br>
+of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(4) <i>The Morning Advertiser</i> (circulation
+uncertain, probably 50,000),<br>
+but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in
+the<br>
+Clubs (neutral).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(5) <i>The Daily News</i> (morning), 6,000
+(Northern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(6) <i>The Morning Star</i>, 5,500 (but with evening
+edition 10,000)<br>
+(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John
+Bright<br>
+was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet
+deficits.<br>
+<i>The Star</i> was regarded as an <i>anti-British paper</i> and
+was very unpopular.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(7) <i>The Morning Post</i>, 4,500 (Southern). It was
+regarded as<br>
+Palmerston's organ.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(8) <i>The Morning Chronicle</i>. Very small
+circulation in the 'sixties<br>
+(neutral).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+(B) <i>Weekly Papers.</i>--No approximate circulation figures are
+available,<br>
+but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of
+subscribers.<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(1) <i>Reynolds' Weekly</i>. Circulation upwards of
+350,000. A penny<br>
+paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the
+manufacturing<br>
+districts (Northern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(2) <i>John Bull</i> (Southern). "The country squire's
+paper."<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(3) <i>The Spectator</i> (Northern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(4) <i>The Saturday Review</i> (Southern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(5) <i>The Economist</i> (Neutral).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+&nbsp;&nbsp;(6) <i>The Press and St. James' Chronicle</i>. Small
+circulation (Southern).<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+<br>
+In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in
+sentiment<br>
+<i>The Liberator</i> names for Great Britain as a whole
+<i>Westminster<br>
+Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post,
+Manchester<br>
+Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast
+Whig</i>, and some<br>
+few others of lesser importance. (<i>Liberator</i>, June 30,
+1863.)<br>
+The attitude of the <i>Manchester Guardian</i> seemed to <i>The
+Liberator</i> to<br>
+be like that of the <i>Times</i>.</blockquote>
+</blockquote>
+<br>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1223"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1223">[1223]</a> <i>The Index</i>, April 14, 1864, p.
+231.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1224"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1224">[1224]</a> August 8, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1225"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1225">[1225]</a> Sept. 3, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1226"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1226">[1226]</a> Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1227"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1227">[1227]</a> Sept. 24, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1228"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1228">[1228]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept.
+16, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1229"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1229">[1229]</a> General McClellan, the nominee of the
+convention, modified this in his letter of acceptance.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1230"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1230">[1230]</a> Oct. 10, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1231"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1231">[1231]</a> Nov. 10, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1232"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1232">[1232]</a> Nov. 12, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1233"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1233">[1233]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1234"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1234">[1234]</a> According to <i>The Index</i>, the
+French press was more divided than was the London press in
+portrayal of military events in America. The <i>Si&egrave;cle</i>
+and the <i>Opinion Nationale</i> pictured Sherman as about to
+capture Atlanta. Readers of the <i>Constitutionel, Patrie,
+Moniteur</i>, and <i>La France</i> "know quite well that Sherman
+has neither occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed,
+any part of the defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely
+defeated by General Hood on July 22." (<i>Index</i>, Aug. 18, 1864,
+p. 522.) The Paris correspondent wrote, October 19, after the news
+was received of Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley:<br>
+<br>
+"The <i>Si&egrave;cle</i> is triumphant. According to this
+humanitarian journal, whose sole policy consists in the expression
+of a double hatred, part of which it bestows on the priests, and
+part on the slave-dealers, the American contest has assumed its
+last phase, the Confederates are running in breathless haste to
+demand pardon, and true patriotism is at last to meet with its
+reward. This great and noble result will be due to the Northern
+generals, <i>who have carried military glory to so high a pitch
+without at the same time compromising American Democracy!</i><br>
+<br>
+"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above
+lines undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing;
+but what will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus
+expresses himself relative to the issues of the coming
+election?<br>
+<br>
+'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The
+South will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced
+to barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive
+by the labour of the freeman; the Confederates, <i>who know only
+how to fight, and who are supported by the sweat of others</i>,
+will purify and regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own
+brains and of their own hands....'<br>
+<br>
+"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the
+robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers
+for the welfare of the American brethren.<br>
+<br>
+"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very
+masterpiece of delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one
+of the most eminent writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the
+celebrated historian of France. (<i>Index</i>, Oct. 20, 1864, p.
+667.)<br>
+<br>
+A week later <i>The Index</i> was vicious in comment upon the "men
+and money" pouring out of <i>Germany</i> in aid of the North.
+German financiers, under the guise of aiding emigration, were
+engaged in the prosperous business of "selling white-skinned
+Germans to cut Southern throats for the benefit, as they say, of
+the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This bitter tone was
+indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin
+wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully
+deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he
+stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor
+of the French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are
+engrossed in the defence of their homes against an atrocious
+warfare waged by greatly superior numbers, has thought the occasion
+opportune for promoting his own purposes, at no greater cost than a
+violation of his faith and duty toward us." (Richardson, II, p.
+577.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1235"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1235">[1235]</a> e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and
+Emancipation Society, Oct. 11, 1864. (<i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4,
+1864.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1236"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1236">[1236]</a> Russell Papers, Oct. 24,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1237"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1237">[1237]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1238"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1238">[1238]</a> Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19,
+1864. Lyons reached London December 27, and never returned to his
+post in America. Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the
+United States and Great Britain were of the greatest. He upheld
+British dignity yet never gave offence to that of America; he
+guarded British interests but with a wise and generous recognition
+of the difficulties of the Northern Government. No doubt he was at
+heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, even though at
+first sharing in the view that there was small possibility of
+reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to Seward and to
+Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the relations with
+Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the Government
+at home.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1239"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1239">[1239]</a> Nov. 26, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1240"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1240">[1240]</a> Nov. 22, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1241"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1241">[1241]</a> The gradual change in <i>Punch's</i>
+representation of a silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp
+of despotic ferocity is an interesting index of British opinion
+during the war. By 1864 those who watched his career had come to
+respect Lincoln's ability and power though as yet wholly
+unappreciative of his still greater qualities.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1242"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1242">[1242]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Sept. 23, 1864.
+Letter from T.H. Barker to Garrison, August 27, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1243"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1243">[1243]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Nov. 4, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1244"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1244">[1244]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Sept. 29, 1864, p.
+618, describing the meeting at Ashton.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1245"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1245">[1245]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1246"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1246">[1246]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 3, 1864, p.
+699.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1247"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1247">[1247]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, Nov. 4,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1248"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1248">[1248]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 10, 1864, p.
+713.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1249"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1249">[1249]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and
+Mann to Russell, Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from
+England, France, Sweden and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason
+to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1250"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1250">[1250]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to
+the "Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25,
+1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1251"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1251">[1251]</a> Dec. 1, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1252"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1252">[1252]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p.
+207. Henry Adams to his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1253"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1253">[1253]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 233.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1254"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1254">[1254]</a> Nov. 12, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1255"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1255">[1255]</a> Dec. 22, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1256"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1256">[1256]</a> Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a
+mere "keeping up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p.
+300.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1257"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1257">[1257]</a> That this was very effective
+championship is shown by Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec.
+16, 1864. (<i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p. 232.) "Popular
+opinion here declares louder than ever that Sherman is lost. People
+are quite angry at his presumption in attempting such a wild
+project. The interest felt in his march is enormous, however, and
+if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the sea, you may rely
+upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on Europe will
+be greater than that of any other event of the war."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1258"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1258">[1258]</a> State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward,
+Dec. 16, 1864. Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety
+of his receiving such deputations and making replies to them.
+<i>The Index</i> (Dec. 22, 1864, p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams
+should presume to "hector and threaten" England through his
+replies. But Adams continued to receive deputations.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1259"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1259">[1259]</a> Delane's position on the Civil War and
+the reasons for the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are
+described in Ch. XVIII.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1260"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1260">[1260]</a> Jan. 9, 1865.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_247"></a>[V2:pg 247]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVII"></a>CHAPTER XVII</h2>
+<h3>THE END OF THE WAR</h3>
+<br>
+<blockquote>"I think you need not trouble yourself about England.
+At this moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change,
+and our people and indeed our Government is more moderately
+disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from a
+member of the Government that it is believed that the feeling
+between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has been steadily
+improving<a name="FNanchor1261"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1261">[1261]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865.
+Three weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American
+rumours that Europe was still planning some form of intervention to
+save the South: "<i>All parties and classes</i> here are resolved
+on a strict neutrality<a name="FNanchor1262"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1262">[1262]</a>...." This was a correct estimate. In
+spite of a temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and
+of renewed assertions from the South that she "would never submit,"
+British opinion was now very nearly unanimous that the end was
+near. This verdict was soon justified by events. In January, 1865,
+Wilmington, North Carolina, was at last captured by a combined sea
+and land attack. Grant, though since midsummer, 1864, held in check
+by Lee before Petersburg, was yet known to be constantly increasing
+the strength of his army, while his ability to strike when the time
+came was made evident by the freedom with which his cavalry scoured
+the country about the Confederate <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_248"></a>[V2:pg 248]</span> capital, Richmond--in one raid
+even completely encircling that city. Steadily Lee's army lost
+strength by the attrition of the siege, by illness and, what was
+worse, by desertion since no forces could be spared from the
+fighting front to recover and punish the deserters. Grant waited
+for the approach of spring, when, with the advance northwards of
+the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee, to end,
+it was hoped, in writing <i>finis</i> to the war.</p>
+<p>From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in
+Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter
+date he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance
+and easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South
+Carolina, was burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not
+until March, in North Carolina, that any real opposition to the
+northward progress was encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the
+nineteenth, Johnston, in command of the weak Southern forces in
+North Carolina, made a desperate effort to stop Sherman, but
+without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was at Goldsboro, one
+hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to cut off the
+retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an energetic
+offensive.</p>
+<p>In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to
+Richmond, thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the
+Southern capital, to come out of his lines at Petersburg and
+present an unfortified front. The result was the evacuation of
+Petersburg and the abandonment of Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his
+Government fleeing from the city on the night of April 2.
+Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of joining
+Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at
+Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston
+surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of
+the war and of the Confederacy.</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image12.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image12.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image12.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET!</b><br>
+<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p>
+<br>
+<p>The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_249"></a>[V2:pg 249]</span> crumbled in
+1865 when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled
+foreign observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had
+been foreseen from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah.
+The desperate courage of the South was admired, but regarded as
+futile. Equally desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort
+of the Confederate agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to
+abolish slavery in return for recognition. The plan originated with
+Benjamin, Southern Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by
+Davis<a name="FNanchor1263"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1263">[1263]</a>, and was committed to Mason for
+negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his withdrawal from
+London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any point to
+which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of
+Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other
+representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than
+a beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at
+Richmond not only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by
+personal messenger also of the urgency of presenting the offer of
+abolition promptly and with full assurance of carrying it into
+effect. The instruction was therefore entrusted to Duncan F.
+Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in Paris early in March, 1865,
+overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such an offer to England,
+and accompanied the latter to London.</p>
+<p>The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason
+reached London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and
+the evacuation of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach
+Palmerston, but was pressed by Kenner who urged action on the
+theory that Great Britain did not wish to see a reconstruction of
+the Union<a name="FNanchor1264"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1264">[1264]</a>. Slidell, in Paris, on receiving
+Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been
+consulted, was granted an interview <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_250"></a>[V2:pg 250]</span> and reported Napoleon III as
+ready as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising
+delay until more favourable news was received from America<a name=
+"FNanchor1265"></a><a href="#Footnote_1265">[1265]</a>. But Mason's
+instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or
+resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March
+13, therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private
+interview and was promptly granted one for the day following.</p>
+<p>Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and
+judgment that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in
+expressing himself to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was
+stultifying his country in condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout
+language, "with such form of allusion to the <i>concession</i> we
+held in reserve, as would make him necessarily comprehend
+it<a name="FNanchor1266"></a><a href="#Footnote_1266">[1266]</a>,"
+and turning again and again to a supposed "latent, undisclosed
+obstacle<a name="FNanchor1267"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1267">[1267]</a>" to British recognition, Mason yet made
+clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not mentioned
+by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the South
+had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British
+objections to recognition were those which had long since been
+stated, and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason
+called on the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with
+whom he had long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought
+Palmerston's Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of
+slavery to recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time
+had gone by now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition"
+were spoken boldly<a name="FNanchor1268"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1268">[1268]</a>, and Donoughmore was positive that if,
+in the midsummer of 1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the
+South had made its present overture, nothing could have prevented
+British recognition. <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_251"></a>[V2:pg 251]</span> The opinion clashed with Mason's
+own conviction, but in any case no more was to be hoped, now, from
+his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could help the
+South.</p>
+<p>There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card"
+Southern effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours
+that some such move was on foot, but with a primary motive of
+restoring Southern fighting power by putting the negroes in arms.
+British public attention was fixed rather upon a possible
+last-moment reconciliation of North and South and a restored Union
+which should forget its domestic troubles in a foreign war.
+Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society and gloomy
+were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen enemy
+of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The
+Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had
+learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson
+Davis by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border
+state of Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by
+Lincoln of armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a
+war would be popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his
+mind<a name="FNanchor1269"></a><a href="#Footnote_1269">[1269]</a>
+to-morrow." In London the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i> declared
+that Davis could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not
+offer any other terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched
+up on the basis of a common aggression against supposed foreign
+enemies<a name="FNanchor1270"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1270">[1270]</a>. Adams pictured all British society as
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_252"></a>[V2:pg 252]</span>
+now convinced that the end of the war was near, and bitter against
+the previous tone and policy of such leaders of public opinion as
+the <i>Times</i>, adding that it was being "whispered about that if
+the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army
+left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility
+to this country<a name="FNanchor1271"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1271">[1271]</a>."</p>
+<p>The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the
+mediator. He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln
+instructed Seward to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners"
+appointed by Davis. But Lincoln made positive in his instructions
+three points:</p>
+<blockquote>(1) Complete restoration of the Union.<br>
+<br>
+(2) No receding on emancipation.<br>
+<br>
+(3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war, and
+the disbanding of all forces hostile to the
+Government."</blockquote>
+<p>A few days later the President decided that his own presence was
+desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads
+Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the
+Confederates did indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war
+for a "traditional American object," using the argument that
+<i>after</i> such a war restoration of the Union would be easily
+accomplished. The enemy proposed was not Great Britain but France,
+and the place of operations Mexico. There was much discussion of
+this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading Southern
+Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for
+comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would
+be entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The
+Southerners urged that there was precedent for an agreement in
+advance of cessation of hostilities in the negotiations between
+Charles I and the Roundheads. Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not
+profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I turn
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_253"></a>[V2:pg 253]</span>
+you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of
+Charles I is that he lost his head in the end<a name=
+"FNanchor1272"></a><a href="#Footnote_1272">[1272]</a>."</p>
+<p>When news of the holding of this conference reached England
+there occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty
+created by the prospect of an immediate end of the American War.
+"The consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary<a name=
+"FNanchor1273"></a><a href="#Footnote_1273">[1273]</a>." What did
+the United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general
+that peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with
+this country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and
+indefinite apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to
+Seward; and he advised that it might be well for the United States
+"to consider the question how far its policy may be adapted to
+quiet this disturbance"; due allowance should be made for the
+mortification of those leaders who had been so confident of
+Southern victory and for expressions that might now fall from their
+lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the United States
+might aid in the coming elections in retaining the Government in
+power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be desired<a name=
+"FNanchor1274"></a><a href="#Footnote_1274">[1274]</a>.</p>
+<p>Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition
+of that given earlier and with more emphasis<a name=
+"FNanchor1275"></a><a href="#Footnote_1275">[1275]</a>. Apparently
+Seward was then in no mood to act on it, for his reply was
+distinctly belligerent in tone, recapitulating British and Canadian
+offences in permitting the enemy to use their shores, and asserting
+that the measures now proposed of abrogating the reciprocity treaty
+of 1854 with Canada and the agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments
+on the Great Lakes, were but defensive measures required to protect
+American soil<a name="FNanchor1276"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1276">[1276]</a>. These matters Adams had been
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_254"></a>[V2:pg 254]</span>
+instructed to take up with Russell, but with discretion as to time
+and he had ventured to postpone them as inopportune. Professing
+entire agreement with the justice of Seward's complaints he
+nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment would be only
+playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and disarming our
+own friends<a name="FNanchor1277"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1277">[1277]</a>." The day before this was written home
+Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to
+the agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the
+United States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the
+Great Lakes<a name="FNanchor1278"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1278">[1278]</a>.</p>
+<p>Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British
+excitement over a prospective war with America, even though no such
+intention was seriously entertained by the North. The British
+Government did not share this fear, but Delane, of the
+<i>Times</i>, kept it alive in the public mind, and indeed was
+sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger. "I do not
+know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to his
+American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is
+about to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us
+scarcely less horrible<a name="FNanchor1279"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1279">[1279]</a>." Governmental circles, however,
+belittled the agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England
+at Washington, was assured by Seward, and so reported, that all
+these rumours of a foreign war were of Southern origin, had in fact
+been actually elaborated at the Hampton Roads Conference, but were
+perfectly understood by the North as but part of the Southern game,
+and that the Southern offer had been flatly refused<a name=
+"FNanchor1280"></a><a href="#Footnote_1280">[1280]</a>. In a
+parliamentary debate in the Commons on March 13, arising out of
+governmental estimates for military expenditures in Canada,
+opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_255"></a>[V2:pg 255]</span>
+America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the
+general tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance
+of peaceful relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech,
+threw right and left criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and
+individuals, not sparing members of the Government, but expressed
+the utmost confidence in the pacific policy of Lincoln. As one
+known to be in close touch with America his words carried
+weight<a name="FNanchor1281"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1281">[1281]</a>. Palmerston gave assurances that the
+present relations between the two Governments were perfectly
+friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported
+Adams, was to quiet the panic<a name="FNanchor1282"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1282">[1282]</a>, yet at the same time England was now
+awake to and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development
+of physical power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended
+"prudence and moderation in tone<a name="FNanchor1283"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1283">[1283]</a>."</p>
+<p>Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the
+possible effect of this event on foreign relations had been for
+some time anticipated and estimated in Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor1284"></a><a href="#Footnote_1284">[1284]</a>. The news of
+Lee's surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the
+<i>Times</i> and other papers had been preparing the public for
+it<a name="FNanchor1285"></a><a href="#Footnote_1285">[1285]</a>.
+Newspaper comment on the event followed closely that of the
+<i>Times</i>, rendering honour to <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_256"></a>[V2:pg 256]</span> the militant qualities of the
+South and to Lee, but writing <i>finis</i> to the war:</p>
+<blockquote>"Such is the end of the great army which, organized by
+the extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other
+commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this war.
+Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count a series of
+more brilliant victories than the force which, raised chiefly from
+the high-spirited population of Virginia, has defeated so many
+invasions of the State, and crushed the hopes of so many Northern
+generals. Chief and soldiers have now failed for the first and last
+time. They were victorious until victory was no longer to be
+achieved by human valour, and then they fell with honour<a name=
+"FNanchor1286"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1286">[1286]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The people of the North, also, were complimented for their
+slowly developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a
+patience, a fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank
+among the very first of military nations<a name=
+"FNanchor1287"></a><a href="#Footnote_1287">[1287]</a>." No one
+remained to uphold the Southern banner in Europe save the
+Confederate agents, and, privately, even they were hopeless. Mason,
+it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own courage, that "this
+morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming disaster; it could not
+be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace on the basis of
+separation; finally, "5th. <i>I know</i> that no terms of peace
+would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the
+conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:</p>
+<blockquote>"I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I
+assume, that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived
+from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace would be
+entertained that did not rest on <i>independence</i><a name=
+"FNanchor1288"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1288">[1288]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:</p>
+<blockquote>"I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_257"></a>[V2:pg 257]</span>
+beginning of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst.
+With Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular
+organized armies and I can see no possible good to result from a
+protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must submit to the
+yoke. Our children must bide their time for vengeance, but you and
+I will never revisit our homes under our glorious flag. For myself
+I shall never put my foot on a soil from which flaunts the hated
+Stars and Stripes.... I am sick, sick at heart<a name=
+"FNanchor1289"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1289">[1289]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that
+of a serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its
+editorial on the end of the war the <i>Times</i> took occasion to
+pay a tribute to the statesman whom it had been accustomed to
+berate.</p>
+<blockquote>"There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a
+desire to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance
+of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in the
+Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we trust, be
+spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by gentle measures
+restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his term of office
+expires, calm in some degree the animosities which have been raised
+by these years of war<a name="FNanchor1290"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1290">[1290]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of
+British statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public,
+come to be regarded in an aspect far different from that with which
+he was generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the
+reports of Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there
+was received also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of
+the brutal attack on Seward, all England united in expressions of
+sympathy and horror. "Few events of the present century," wrote
+Adams, "have created such general consternation and
+indignation<a name="FNanchor1291"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1291">[1291]</a>."</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_258"></a>[V2:pg 258]</span>
+<p>In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot
+by Booth, a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the
+box where the President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next
+morning. On the same evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man
+was admitted to Seward's house on the plea that he had a message
+from the physician, passed upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's
+son at the door of the sick room. Beating the son into
+semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had missed fire, the
+stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as he lay in
+bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward rolled
+off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides,
+his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved,
+probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw
+fractured in the runaway accident nine days before<a name=
+"FNanchor1292"></a><a href="#Footnote_1292">[1292]</a>. The
+assailant fought his way out of the house and escaped. For some
+days Seward's life was despaired of, whether from his injuries or
+from shock.</p>
+<p>These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit
+in the hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense
+represented the feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however,
+that abroad so horrible a crime should react both to the detriment
+of the Confederacy and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with
+the North took the form of a sudden exaltation of the personality
+of Lincoln, bringing out characterizations of the man far different
+from those which had been his earlier in the war. The presence of a
+"rural attorney" in the Presidential office had seemed like the
+irony of fate in the great crisis of 1861. Even so acute an
+observer as Lyons could then write, "Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto
+given proof of his possessing any natural talents to compensate for
+his ignorance of everything but Illinois village politics. He seems
+to be well meaning <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_259"></a>[V2:pg 259]</span> and conscientious, in the
+measure of his understanding, but not much more<a name=
+"FNanchor1293"></a><a href="#Footnote_1293">[1293]</a>." But Lyons
+was no more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all
+characterizations, whether American or foreign, were of like
+nature.</p>
+<p>But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a
+different estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for
+the growth of his personal authority and for his steadiness of
+purpose, with criticism of his alleged despotism. Now, with his
+death, following so closely the collapse of the Confederacy, there
+poured out from British press and public a great stream of
+laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a national recantation.
+In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as a few
+dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, <i>Punch</i> led
+the way in a poem by Tom Taylor:</p>
+<blockquote>"<i>You</i> lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's
+bier,<br>
+<i>You</i>, who with mocking pencil wont to trace,<br>
+Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,<br>
+His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+"Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,<br>
+To lame my pencil and confute my pen--<br>
+To make me own this hind of princes peer,<br>
+This rail-splitter a true-born king of men<a name=
+"FNanchor1294"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1294">[1294]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of
+Lincoln, stood the <i>Times</i>. Severely reprobating the act of
+Booth and prophesying a disastrous effect in the treatment of the
+conquered South, it proceeded:</p>
+<blockquote>"Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest
+eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a make-shift,
+simply because Mr. Seward and their other prominent <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_260"></a>[V2:pg 260]</span> leaders were
+obnoxious to different sections of the party, it was natural that
+his career should be watched with jealous suspicion. The office
+cast upon him was great, its duties most onerous, and the obscurity
+of his past career afforded no guarantee of his ability to
+discharge them. His shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The
+education of a man whose early years had been spent in earning
+bread by manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults
+of manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the outset.
+In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won for himself the
+respect and confidence of all. His perfect honesty speedily became
+apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more to his credit, amid the many
+unstudied speeches which he was called upon from time to time to
+deliver, imbued though they were with the rough humour of his early
+associates, he was in none of them betrayed into any intemperance
+of language towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His
+utterances were apparently careless, but his tongue was always
+under command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which
+served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy of
+bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way gradually
+to his conclusions, and those who will compare the different stages
+of his career one with another will find that his mind was growing
+throughout the course of it."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"The gradual change of his language and of his policy was most
+remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who showed the best
+characteristics of their race in his respect for what is good in
+the past, acting in unison with a recognition of what was made
+necessary by the events of passing history<a name=
+"FNanchor1295"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1295">[1295]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far
+warmer expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all
+England, there appeared another and longer editorial:</p>
+<blockquote>"If anything could mitigate the distress of the
+American people in their present affliction, it might surely be the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_261"></a>[V2:pg 261]</span>
+sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We are
+not using the language of hyperbole in describing the manifestation
+of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has been witnessed in our
+generation.... But President Lincoln was only the chief of a
+foreign State, and of a State with which we were not infrequently
+in diplomatic or political collision. He might have been regarded
+as not much more to us than the head of any friendly Government,
+and yet his end has already stirred the feelings of the public to
+their uttermost depths."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to fill the
+country with grief and indignation, but to evoke almost
+unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted bodies. It
+was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the murder reached
+us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and Commons, the
+Corporation of the City of London, and the people of our chief
+manufacturing towns in public meeting assembled had recorded their
+sentiments or expressed their views. In the House of Lords the
+absence of precedent for such a manifestation was actually made the
+subject of remark.<br>
+<br>
+"That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the tragical
+character of the event and the horror with which the crime is
+regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble the the fact that
+the loss which the Americans have sustained is also thought our own
+loss in so far as one valuable guarantee for the amity of the two
+nations may have been thus removed. But, upon the whole, it is
+neither the possible embarrassment of international relations nor
+the infamous wickedness of the act itself which has determined
+public feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine
+sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck down by
+an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the trouble which at a
+crisis of their destinies such a catastrophe must bring. Abraham
+Lincoln was as little of a tyrant as any man who ever lived. He
+could have been a tyrant had he pleased, but he never uttered so
+much as an ill-natured speech.... In all America there was,
+perhaps, not one man who less deserved to be the victim of this
+revolution than he who has just fallen<a name=
+"FNanchor1296"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1296">[1296]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_262"></a>[V2:pg 262]</span>
+<p>The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on
+receipt of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and
+Commons for an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next,"
+expressing "sorrow and indignation" at the assassination of
+Lincoln<a name="FNanchor1297"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1297">[1297]</a>. April 28, Russell instructed Bruce to
+express at Washington that "the Government, the Parliament, and the
+Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of abhorrence of the
+criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious crimes, and
+sympathy for the Government and People of the United States<a name=
+"FNanchor1298"></a><a href="#Footnote_1298">[1298]</a>...." Russell
+wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The Queen wrote a personal
+letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce had written from
+Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the South in his
+party<a name="FNanchor1299"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1299">[1299]</a>," and he was extremely anxious that
+Seward's recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of
+Sumner's assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss
+terribly the comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward<a name=
+"FNanchor1300"></a><a href="#Footnote_1300">[1300]</a>."</p>
+<br>
+<a name="image13.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image13.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image13.jpg" width="100%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA.</b><br>
+<i>Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"</i></p>
+<br>
+<p>The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which
+the public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in
+this country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes
+of society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and
+resolutions<a name="FNanchor1301"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1301">[1301]</a>...." Indeed all the old sources of
+"addresses" to Adams on emancipation and many organizations having
+no professed interest in that subject now sent to him
+resolutions--the emancipation societies, of horror, indignation,
+and even accusation against the South; the others of sympathy,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_263"></a>[V2:pg 263]</span>
+more moderate in tone, yet all evincing an appreciation of the
+great qualities of Lincoln and of the justice of the cause of the
+North, now victorious. Within two weeks Adams reported over four
+hundred such addresses from Emancipation Societies, Chambers of
+Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities, boroughs, churches, indeed
+from every known type of British organizations<a name=
+"FNanchor1302"></a><a href="#Footnote_1302">[1302]</a>.</p>
+<p>On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for
+debate. In the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving
+qualities of Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost
+by his death. Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of
+the world at Booth's act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the
+United States, but repeated the old phrase about the "North
+fighting for empire, the South for independence," and hinted that
+the unusual step now being taken by Parliament had in it a
+"political object," meaning that the motion had been introduced in
+the hope of easing American irritation with Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor1303"></a><a href="#Footnote_1303">[1303]</a>. It was not
+a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in the Commons, Disraeli,
+saved his party from criticism by what was distinctly the most
+thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day. Palmerston was
+ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who incautiously began
+by asserting that the majority of the people of Great Britain had
+always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of "No,
+no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:</p>
+<blockquote>"There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation
+approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking, are
+supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form the happy
+privilege of private life; and this is one. Under all circumstances
+we should have bewailed the catastrophe at Washington; under all
+circumstances we should have <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_264"></a>[V2:pg 264]</span> shuddered at the means by which
+it was accomplished. But in the character of the victim, and even
+in the accessories of his last moments there is something so homely
+and so innocent that it takes as it were the subject out of all the
+pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the
+heart of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of
+mankind.<br>
+<br>
+"Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this House, and
+in the country generally on the policy of the late President of the
+United States, on this, I think, all must agree, that in one of the
+severest trials which ever tested the moral qualities of man, he
+fulfilled his duty with simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible
+for the people of England, at such a moment, to forget that he
+sprang from the same fatherland, and spoke the same mother
+tongue.<br>
+<br>
+"When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to fall
+into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of the causes
+and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one of our duties to
+reassure the country under unreasoning panic or despondency.
+Assassination has never changed the history of the world....<br>
+<br>
+"In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the
+citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their elected
+Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of depression,
+but rather let us express a fervent hope that from out the awful
+trials of the last four years, of which not the least is this
+violent demise, the various populations of North America may issue
+elevated and chastened; rich in that accumulated wisdom, and strong
+in that disciplined energy which a young nation can only acquire in
+a protracted and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not
+merely to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will
+renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind. It is
+with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to the
+Crown<a name="FNanchor1304"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1304">[1304]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British
+popular sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and
+the North victorious. But officially the Government had not yet
+recognized this. Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had
+returned to the old proposal <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_265"></a>[V2:pg 265]</span> that the nations of Europe
+should withdraw their recognition of Southern belligerent
+rights<a name="FNanchor1305"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1305">[1305]</a>, and in March he had asked Stoeckl, the
+Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion
+of this measure to England and France<a name=
+"FNanchor1306"></a><a href="#Footnote_1306">[1306]</a>. Meanwhile
+Sherman's army was rapidly advancing northward and reports were
+arriving of its pillagings and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in
+the Commons whether the Government was taking any steps to prevent
+the destruction of British property and received from Layard an
+evasive reply. Merely a "confident hope" had been expressed to the
+United States that "every facility will be given" to British
+subjects to prove ownership of property<a name=
+"FNanchor1307"></a><a href="#Footnote_1307">[1307]</a>. Evidently
+the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at a
+moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events
+of the war.</p>
+<p>Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination
+of Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from
+active duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on
+England--a fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great
+Britain in that it gave time for a clearer appreciation of the
+rapidity and completeness of the collapse of the South. May 15,
+Lord Houghton asked whether the Government did not intend, in view
+of recent events in America, "to withdraw the admission of
+belligerent rights conceded to the so-called Confederate States."
+Russell promptly objected to the form of the question: England had
+not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had merely issued a
+proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared the existence
+of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no other
+recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade,
+and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_266"></a>[V2:pg 266]</span> of
+the neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official
+announcement from the United States that the war was at an end.
+Texas was still in arms and Galveston still blockaded, and for this
+section the United States would no doubt continue to exercise on
+neutral vessels a belligerent right of search. It followed that if
+Great Britain did prematurely withdraw her proclamation of
+neutrality and the United States searched a British vessel, it
+would be the exercise of a right of search in time of peace--an act
+against which Great Britain would be bound to make vigorous
+protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming the
+end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at
+the prospect of peace<a name="FNanchor1308"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1308">[1308]</a>.</p>
+<p>But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course.
+Seward, though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was
+eager to resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was
+held at his house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some
+anxiety that America was about to <i>demand</i> the withdrawal by
+Great Britain of belligerent rights to the South, that if Great
+Britain would but act before such a demand was made it would serve
+to continue the existing good feeling in America created by the
+sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially, that there was a
+decided danger to good relations in the fact that Confederate
+cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be sent
+to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and
+supplies<a name="FNanchor1309"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1309">[1309]</a>. Three days later Bruce repeated his
+warning<a name="FNanchor1310"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1310">[1310]</a>. This was, apparently, a complication
+unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any case Russell at once made
+a complete face-about from the policy he had outlined in reply to
+Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in Paris to notify
+France <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_267"></a>[V2:pg
+267]</span> that England thought the time had arrived for
+recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the
+question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper
+treatment in British ports<a name="FNanchor1311"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1311">[1311]</a>. Thus having given to France notice of
+his intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell,
+on June 2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was
+ended and stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were
+to be treated<a name="FNanchor1312"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1312">[1312]</a>. Here was prompt, even hurried, action
+though the only additional event of war in America which Russell
+could at the moment cite to warrant his change of policy was the
+capture of Jefferson Davis. On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce
+stating what had been done and recognizing the "re-establishment of
+peace within the whole territory of which the United States, before
+the commencement of the civil war, were in undisturbed
+possession<a name="FNanchor1313"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1313">[1313]</a>."</p>
+<p>This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's
+caustic criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's
+previous inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government
+had not stuck to its earlier position and calling attention to the
+fact that the United States, while now proclaiming certain ports
+open to trade, yet specified others as still closed and threatened
+with punishment as pirates, any vessel attempting to enter them.
+Derby desired information as to what the Government had done about
+this remarkable American proclamation. Russell, "who was very
+imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it was embarrassing
+that no "regular communication" had been received from America
+giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two Confederate
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_268"></a>[V2:pg 268]</span>
+cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to various
+Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had
+consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the
+United States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The
+"piracy proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby
+pushed for an answer as to whether the Government intended to let
+it go by unnoticed. Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce
+showed that "notice" had been taken of it. Derby asked whether the
+papers would be presented to Parliament; Russell "was understood to
+reply in the affirmative<a name="FNanchor1314"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1314">[1314]</a>." Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a
+hectoring of Russell for his quick shift from the position taken a
+month earlier. But the very indifference of Russell to this attack,
+his carelessness and evasion in reply, indicate confidence that
+Parliament was as eager as the Government to satisfy the North and
+to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken by Bruce at
+Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to report it
+to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and probably a
+mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners<a name=
+"FNanchor1315"></a><a href="#Footnote_1315">[1315]</a>. Russell
+instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had
+been captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there
+was presumably no port left where it could be applied<a name=
+"FNanchor1316"></a><a href="#Footnote_1316">[1316]</a>.</p>
+<p>In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had
+outrun diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces
+still in the field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while
+at Washington all was temporarily in confusion upon the death of
+Lincoln and the illness of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and
+the prompt action of Russell fortunate. Seward at once accepted
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_269"></a>[V2:pg 269]</span>
+Russell's notification of June 2 as ending British neutrality.
+While again insisting upon the essential injustice of the original
+concession of belligerent rights to the South, and objecting to
+some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he yet admitted
+that normal relations were again established and acknowledged that
+the United States could no longer exercise a right of
+search<a name="FNanchor1317"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1317">[1317]</a>. July 4, Russell presented this paper
+to Parliament, reading that portion in which Seward expressed his
+pleasure that the United States could now enter again upon normal
+relations with Great Britain<a name="FNanchor1318"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1318">[1318]</a>. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce
+that he had not expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of
+England's neutrality position, pointed out that his Admiralty
+instructions were misunderstood and were less objectionable than
+appeared and concluded by the expression of a hope for the
+"establishment of a lasting and intimate friendship between the two
+nations<a name="FNanchor1319"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1319">[1319]</a>."</p>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<p>Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in
+January, 1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of
+fortune" which occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in
+the approaching dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of
+all the nations of the world, would benefit by it in the expansion
+of her power, hitherto blocked by the might of the United States.
+Broken into two or more hostile pieces America would be at the
+mercy of England, to become her plaything. "The Cabinet of London
+is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and
+awaits the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in
+disguising." Great Britain would soon, <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_270"></a>[V2:pg 270]</span> in return for
+cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed
+support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the
+slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for
+all nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between
+England and the United States "has been the best guarantee against
+the ambitious projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon
+race<a name="FNanchor1320"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1320">[1320]</a>."</p>
+<p>This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was
+repeated frequently as the crisis in America approached and during
+the first two years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such
+opinion. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and
+the French Emperor puzzled himself in vain to discover why Great
+Britain, in furtherance of her own interests, did not eagerly
+accept his overtures for a vigorous joint action in support of the
+South<a name="FNanchor1321"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1321">[1321]</a>.</p>
+<p>The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how
+unfounded was such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing
+nothing, apparently, of that positive change in British policy in
+the late 'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease
+opposition to the expansion of American power. Such opposition was
+then acknowledged to have been an error and in its place there
+sprang into being a conviction that the might of America would tend
+toward the greatness of England itself<a name=
+"FNanchor1322"></a><a href="#Footnote_1322">[1322]</a>. In the
+months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all British
+governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the
+quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there
+were those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_271"></a>[V2:pg 271]</span> rupture
+between North and South, but they were not in office and had no
+control of British policy.</p>
+<p>The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it,
+was prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for
+fear of maritime complications with that one of the belligerents,
+the North, which alone possessed a naval force. But the British
+Ministry, like that of every other European state, believed that a
+revolution for independence when undertaken by a people so numerous
+and powerful as that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence
+as the war dragged on, the Ministry, pressed from various angles at
+home, ventured, with much uncertainty, upon a movement looking
+toward mediation. Its desire was first of all for the restoration
+of world peace, nor can any other motive be discovered in Russell's
+manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately for America and, it may be
+believed, for the world, was blocked by cool heads within the
+Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved, permanent
+readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle in the
+American crisis.</p>
+<p>This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both
+North and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British
+sympathy and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold
+neutrality" is evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of
+race and sentiment, could have understood the mistaken view-point
+of diplomats like Stoeckl, who dwelt in realms of "reasons of
+state," unaffected by popular emotions. Aside from race, which
+could be claimed also by the South, the one great argument of the
+North in appeal to England lay in the cry of anti-slavery. But the
+leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself unsympathetic
+with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the British
+Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of
+strict neutrality.</p>
+<p>In all this the Government but pursued that line which
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_272"></a>[V2:pg 272]</span> is
+the business of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and
+power of the state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and
+the British recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there
+came, as is evident from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone
+and acts, a growing belief that the North might after all succeed
+in its purpose, at least of subjugating the South. This would mean
+the possibility of continuing that policy of friendship for a
+united America which had been determined upon in the 'fifties. Here
+was no special sympathy, but merely a cool calculation of benefits
+to Great Britain, but there can be no question that the general
+attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was distinctly
+favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began to
+replace a "cold neutrality."</p>
+<p>But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard
+national interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own
+authority and seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation,
+never greatly stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised
+an increasing pressure by the force of public approval. It made
+impossible any attempt to overthrow the Ministry on the score of
+non-interference in America, or of favouritism toward the North. It
+gave to an enthusiastic and vociferous section of the British
+public just ground for strong support of Lincoln and his cause, and
+in some degree it affected governmental attitude.</p>
+<p>There was, however, another question, much more vital than
+emancipation in its relation to British home politics, that ran
+like a constant thread through the whole pattern of British public
+attitude toward America. It had always been so since the days of
+the American revolution and now was accentuated by the American
+war. This was the question of the future of democracy. Was its fate
+bound up with the result of that war? And if so where lay British
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_273"></a>[V2:pg 273]</span>
+interest? Always present in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen,
+appearing again and again through each changing phase of the war,
+this question was so much a constant that to have attempted
+discussion of it while other topics were being treated, would have
+resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made the
+subject of a separate and concluding chapter.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1261"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1261">[1261]</a> Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. <i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 132).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1262"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1262">[1262]</a> To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (<i>Ibid.</i>,
+p. 133).</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1263"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1263">[1263]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p.
+343</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1264"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1264">[1264]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1265"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1265">[1265]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, March 5
+and 6, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1266"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1266">[1266]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Mason to Slidell, March
+15, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1267"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1267">[1267]</a> Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865.
+(Richardson, II, pp. 709-17.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1268"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1268">[1268]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 717.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1269"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1269">[1269]</a> Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan.
+24, 1865. No. 187. It is interesting that just at this time
+Gortchakoff should have sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by
+one, C. Catacazy, employ&eacute; of the Foreign Office and
+long-time resident in the United States, in which was outlined a
+plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum specified that
+such an offer should be based on the idea that the time had come
+for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both North
+and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's
+interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain.
+Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to
+Stoeckl's judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian
+Archives. F.O. to Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1270"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1270">[1270]</a> Feb. 4, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1271"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1271">[1271]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II,
+254. To his son, Feb. 10, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1272"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1272">[1272]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, pp.
+410-14.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1273"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1273">[1273]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II,
+256. To his son, Feb. 17, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1274"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1274">[1274]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182. Adams to Seward, Feb. 23,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1275"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1275">[1275]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 112. Adams to Seward,
+Feb. 2, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1276"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1276">[1276]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 180. Seward to Adams,
+Feb. 21, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1277"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1277">[1277]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 199. Adams to Seward,
+March 9, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1278"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1278">[1278]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 197. Seward to Adams,
+March 8, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1279"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1279">[1279]</a> March 8, 1865. (Bigelow,
+<i>Retrospections</i>, II, p. 361.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1280"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1280">[1280]</a> Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb.
+23 and March 13, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1281"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1281">[1281]</a> "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally
+admitted to have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his
+peculiar style of oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome
+to both sides of the House, it was yet received after the fashion
+of an unpleasant medicine, which has the aid of a strong and
+savoury medium to overwhelm the nauseous taste." (<i>U.S. Messages
+and Documents</i>, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246. Adams to Seward, March
+16, 1865.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1282"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1282">[1282]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1283"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1283">[1283]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 262. Adams to Seward,
+March 24, 1865. Adams wrote of his own situation that it "seems at
+last to be getting easy and comfortable, so far as freedom from
+anxiety is concerned." (<i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II, p.
+258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1284"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1284">[1284]</a> Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at
+Washington, reached New York on April 7. His first letter to
+Russell from Washington, dated April 14, stated that America was
+certainly preparing to oust Maximilian in Mexico, and that even the
+Southern prisoners were eager to join the United States troops in
+an expedition for this purpose. (Russell Papers.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1285"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1285">[1285]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1865-66, Part II, p. 323. Adams to Seward, April 20,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1286"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1286">[1286]</a> April 24, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1287"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1287">[1287]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1288"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1288">[1288]</a> Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April
+23, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1289"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1289">[1289]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Slidell to Mason, April
+26, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1290"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1290">[1290]</a> April 24, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1291"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1291">[1291]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331. Adams to Seward, April 28,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1292"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1292">[1292]</a> Bancroft, <i>Seward</i>, II, p.
+417.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1293"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1293">[1293]</a> Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April
+9, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1294"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1294">[1294]</a> May 6, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1295"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1295">[1295]</a> April 27, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1296"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1296">[1296]</a> April 29, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1297"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1297">[1297]</a> Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073
+and 1081.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1298"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1298">[1298]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865,
+Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting the
+Assassination of the late President of the United
+States."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1299"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1299">[1299]</a> Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April
+18, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1300"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1300">[1300]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, April 24,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1301"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1301">[1301]</a> <i>A Cycle of Adams' Letters</i>, II,
+267. Charles Francis Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1302"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1302">[1302]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1865-66</i>, Pt. I, pp. 344, 361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May
+11, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1303"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1303">[1303]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p.
+1219.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1304"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1304">[1304]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 1242-46.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1305"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1305">[1305]</a> Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan.
+16, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1306"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1306">[1306]</a> Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March
+1-13, 1865. No. 523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1307"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1307">[1307]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p.
+1922.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1308"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1308">[1308]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, CLXXIX, p.
+286.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1309"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1309">[1309]</a> F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to
+Russell, May 16, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1310"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1310">[1310]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 303. Bruce to Russell,
+May 19, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1311"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1311">[1311]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865,
+Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 10.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1312"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1312">[1312]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Correspondence respecting
+the Cessation of Civil War in North America."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1313"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1313">[1313]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Further Correspondence
+respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North America." No.
+9.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1314"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1314">[1314]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp.
+1-6.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1315"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1315">[1315]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers, 1865,
+Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting President's
+Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865." Bruce to Russell, May 26,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1316"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1316">[1316]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, June 16,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1317"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1317">[1317]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, "Further Correspondence
+respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9.
+Seward to Bruce, June 19, 1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1318"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1318">[1318]</a> Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p.
+1143.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1319"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1319">[1319]</a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1865,
+<i>Commons</i>, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 10.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1320"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1320">[1320]</a> Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec.
+23, 1859/Jan. 4, 1860. No. 146.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1321"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1321">[1321]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan.
+17-29, 1861. No. 267. He reports that he has seen a confidential
+letter from Thouvenel to Mercier outlining exactly his own ideas as
+to England being the sole gainer by the dissolution of the
+Union.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1322"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1322">[1322]</a> For an analysis of this change see
+<i>The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy</i>, Vol II, p.
+277, which also quotes a remarkable speech by
+Disraeli.</blockquote>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_274"></a>[V2:pg 274]</span>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XVIII"></a>CHAPTER XVIII</h2>
+<h3>THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE</h3>
+<br>
+<p>On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's
+surrender to Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the
+Commons the first serious debate in thirty-three years on a
+proposed expansion of the electoral franchise. It was a dramatic
+coincidence and no mere fortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful
+Englishmen who had seen in the Civil War a struggle as fateful in
+British domestic policy as in that of America herself. Throughout
+all British political agitation from the time of the American
+revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of the American
+"example" as argument to some for imitation, to others for warning.
+Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing his
+impressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental and
+political institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of
+what was desirable in his own country<a name=
+"FNanchor1323"></a><a href="#Footnote_1323">[1323]</a>. In the ten
+years immediately preceding the Civil War most travellers were
+laudatory of American democracy, and one, the best in acute
+analysis up to the time of Lord Bryce's great work, had much
+influence on that class in England which was discontented with
+existing political institutions at home. This was Mackay's
+<i>Western World</i> which, first published in 1849, had gone
+through four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was
+frequently reprinted<a name="FNanchor1324"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1324">[1324]</a>. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_275"></a>[V2:pg 275]</span>
+longer an experiment; its success and permanence were evident in
+the mighty power of the United States; Canada would soon follow the
+American example; the "injustice" of British aristocrats to the
+United States was intentional, seeking to discredit democracy:</p>
+<blockquote>"... Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with
+their judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the
+interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever it is
+found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the people have
+too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided them in their
+object. They recognize America as the stronghold of republicanism.
+If they can bring it into disrepute here, they know that they
+inflict upon it the deadliest blow in Europe<a name=
+"FNanchor1325"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1325">[1325]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued the
+inapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain<a name=
+"FNanchor1326"></a><a href="#Footnote_1326">[1326]</a>. The
+theoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects
+admirable but in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of
+the mob and had debased the nation in the estimation of the world;
+bribery in elections, the low order of men in politics and in
+Congress, were proofs of the evils of democracy; those in England
+who clamoured for a "numerical" rather than a class representation
+should take warning from the American experiment. Occasionally,
+though rarely, there appeared the impressions of some British
+traveller who had no political axe to grind<a name=
+"FNanchor1327"></a><a href="#Footnote_1327">[1327]</a>, but from
+1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing on
+America was coloured by the author's attitude on <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_276"></a>[V2:pg 276]</span> political
+institutions at home. The "example" of America was constantly on
+the horizon in British politics.</p>
+<p>In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb
+since the high tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to
+have made a private agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory
+parties would oppose any movement toward an expansion of the
+franchise<a name="FNanchor1328"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1328">[1328]</a>. Lord John Russell, in his youth an
+eager supporter of the Reform Bill of 1832, had now gained the name
+of "Finality John" by his assertion that that Reform was final in
+British institutions. Political reaction was in full swing much to
+the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden and their
+supporters. When the storm broke in America the personal
+characteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and
+Davis, took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme
+importance as if representative of the political philosophies of
+the two sections. Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis'
+"culture" was aristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had
+"aristocratic" views on government<a name=
+"FNanchor1329"></a><a href="#Footnote_1329">[1329]</a>. But that
+this issue had any vital bearing on the quarrel between the
+American sections was never generally voiced in England. Rather,
+British comment was directed to the lesson, taught to the world by
+the American crisis, of the failure of democratic institutions in
+<i>national power.</i> Bright had long preached to the
+unenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and
+these had long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a
+result of democratic institutions. At first the denial was now
+repeated, the <i>Saturday Review</i>, February 23, 1861, protesting
+that there was no essential connection between the "shipwreck" of
+American institutions and the movement in England for an expanded
+franchise. Even, the article <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_277"></a>[V2:pg 277]</span> continued, if an attempt were
+made to show such a connection it would convince nobody since "Mr.
+Bright has succeeded in persuading a great number of influential
+persons that the admission of working-men into the constituencies
+is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground that it has
+succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panacea
+against the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of old
+Governments in Europe." Yet that the denial was not sincere is
+shown by the further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of
+Birmingham and other kindred platforms must bear the blame of the
+inference, drawn nearly universally at the present moment, that, if
+the United States become involved in hopeless difficulties, it
+would be madness to lower the qualification for the suffrage in
+England."</p>
+<p>This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the
+American struggle and British institutions was not long persisted
+in. A month later the <i>Saturday Review</i> was strong in
+contemptuous criticism of the "promiscuous democracy" of the
+North<a name="FNanchor1330"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1330">[1330]</a>. Less political journals followed suit.
+The <i>Economist</i> thought the people of England would now be
+convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who had
+advocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm,
+gratitude and shame<a name="FNanchor1331"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1331">[1331]</a>." Soon W.H. Russell could write, while
+still at Washington "... the world will only see in it all, the
+failure of republican institutions in time of pressure as
+demonstrated by all history--that history which America vainly
+thought she was going to set right and re-establish on new grounds
+and principles<a name="FNanchor1332"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1332">[1332]</a>." "The English worshippers of American
+institutions," said the <i>Saturday Review</i>, "are in danger of
+losing their last pretext for preferring <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_278"></a>[V2:pg 278]</span> the Republic
+to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England.... It now
+appears that the peaceable completion of the secession has become
+impossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground of
+superiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be
+advantageously contrasted with Queen Victoria<a name=
+"FNanchor1333"></a><a href="#Footnote_1333">[1333]</a>."</p>
+<p>These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of
+the war and may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers
+rather than as attempts to read a lesson to the public. No such
+expressions are to be found in the letters of leading officials
+though minor ones occasionally indulged in them<a name=
+"FNanchor1334"></a><a href="#Footnote_1334">[1334]</a>. As late as
+June, 1861, Adams declared that while some in England welcomed
+American disunion as a warning to their countrymen it was evident
+that but a small number as yet saw the cause of the North as
+identical with the world progress of free institutions<a name=
+"FNanchor1335"></a><a href="#Footnote_1335">[1335]</a>. Evidently
+he was disappointed that the followers of Bright were not
+exhibiting more courage and demanding public support of the North
+as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangely
+silent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. It
+required time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the American
+question and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic
+Britain was first to declare a definite lesson to be learned,
+thereby bringing out the fighting qualities of British democracy.
+Throughout 1861, the comment was relatively mild. In July,
+<i>Blackwood's</i> declared:</p>
+<blockquote>"It is precisely because we do not share the admiration
+of America for her own institutions and political tendencies that
+we do not now see in the impending change an event <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_279"></a>[V2:pg 279]</span> altogether to
+be deplored. In those institutions and tendencies we saw what our
+own might be if the most dangerous elements of our Constitution
+should become dominant. We saw democracy rampant, with no
+restriction upon its caprices. We saw a policy which received its
+impulses always from below ... nor need we affect particularly to
+lament the exhibition of the weak point of a Constitution ... the
+disruption of which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages
+which America owes to England, and which have contributed so
+powerfully to her prosperity...."<br>
+<br>
+"With a rival Government on the frontier ... with great principles
+to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we should probably
+see the natural aristocracy rise from the dead level of the
+Republic, raising the national character with its own
+elevation<a name="FNanchor1336"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1336">[1336]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>In the same month the <i>Quarterly</i>, always more calm,
+logical and convincing than <i>Blackwood's</i>, published
+"Democracy on its Trial<a name="FNanchor1337"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1337">[1337]</a>." "The example of America kept alive,
+as it had created, the party of progress"; now "it has sunk from
+the decrepitude of premature old age." If England, after such an
+example, permits herself to be led into democracy she "will have
+perished by that wilful infatuation which no warning can
+dispel."</p>
+<p>Adams had complained that few British friends of progress
+identified the cause of the North with their own, but this was true
+of Americans also. The <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for July 1861,
+discussed British attitude wholly in terms of cotton supply. But
+soon there appeared in the British press so many preachments on the
+"lesson" of America that the aristocratic effort to gain an
+advantage at home became apparent to all<a name=
+"FNanchor1338"></a><a href="#Footnote_1338">[1338]</a>. The
+<i>Economist</i> moralized on the "untried" <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_280"></a>[V2:pg 280]</span> character of
+American institutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant
+as the "masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual
+still more worthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral
+degradation" to the level of their constituents<a name=
+"FNanchor1339"></a><a href="#Footnote_1339">[1339]</a>. "The upper
+and ruling class" wrote Bright to Sumner, were observing with
+satisfaction, "that democracy may get into trouble, and war, and
+debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has done for this country<a name=
+"FNanchor1340"></a><a href="#Footnote_1340">[1340]</a>." Thus
+Bright could not deny the blow to democracy; nor could the
+<i>Spectator</i>, upbraiding its countrymen for lack of sympathy
+with the North: "New England will be justified in saying that Old
+England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimental
+pretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with
+cotton against the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her
+gentle regret over the new impulse given to slavery by her lively
+gratification over the paralyzing shock suffered by
+Democracy<a name="FNanchor1341"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1341">[1341]</a>." This was no taking up of cudgels for
+the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for. Vigour rested
+with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a short war
+vanished. The <i>Saturday Review</i> asserted:</p>
+<blockquote>"In that reconstruction of political philosophy which
+the American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of the
+popular element will be reduced to its due proportions.... The true
+guarantee of freedom will be looked for more in the equilibrium of
+classes than in the equality of individuals.... We may hope, at
+last, that the delusive confusion between freedom and democracy is
+finally banished from the minds of Englishmen<a name=
+"FNanchor1342"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1342">[1342]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>"The real secret," wrote Motley, "of the exultation which
+manifests itself in the <i>Times</i> and other organs over our
+troubles and disasters, is their hatred, not to America,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_281"></a>[V2:pg 281]</span> so
+much as to democracy in England<a name="FNanchor1343"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1343">[1343]</a>." It was scarcely a secret in the
+columns of the journals already quoted. But no similar
+interpretation had as yet appeared in the <i>Times</i> and Motley's
+implication was justified for it and other leading daily
+newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leading
+the attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright
+and his followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis.
+The <i>Edinburgh</i> at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the
+American dispute<a name="FNanchor1344"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1344">[1344]</a>, then attributed it to the inevitable
+failure in power of a federal system of government, not mentioning
+democracy as in question<a name="FNanchor1345"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1345">[1345]</a>. <i>Blackwood's</i> repeatedly pushed
+home its argument:</p>
+<blockquote>"Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that
+the end of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than
+terrible.... But for our own benefit and the instruction of the
+world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so fatal, of their
+political system exposed, in the most effective way.... And the
+venerable Lincoln, the respectable Seward, the raving editors, the
+gibbering mob, and the swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no
+malicious tricks of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are
+all of them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic ...
+dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the spoiled
+child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before high heaven,
+and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises, dies as sheerly from
+lack of vitality as the oldest of worn-out despotisms.... In the
+hope that this contest may end in the extinction of mob rule, we
+become reconciled to the much slighter amount of suffering that war
+inflicts on America<a name="FNanchor1346"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1346">[1346]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the
+cause of the South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished
+audience" used language insulting to the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_282"></a>[V2:pg 282]</span> North, fawning
+upon the South and picturing the latter as wholly admirable for its
+aristocratic tendencies. For this he was sharply taken to task by
+the <i>Spectator</i><a name="FNanchor1347"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1347">[1347]</a>. More sedately the Earl of Shrewsbury
+proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracy and its
+failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union is inevitable,
+and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracy
+established in America<a name="FNanchor1348"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1348">[1348]</a>." In all countries and at all times
+there are men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but
+in such utterances as these there is manifest not merely the
+customary desire to stand in the limelight of assured knowledge and
+wisdom, but also the happy conviction that events in America were
+working to the undoing of the Radicals of Great Britain. If they
+would not be supine the Radicals must strike back. On December 4,
+at Rochdale where, as the <i>Times</i> asserted, he was sure of an
+audience sympathetic on purely personal grounds, Bright renewed his
+profession of faith in the American Republic and sang his
+accustomed praises of its great accomplishments<a name=
+"FNanchor1349"></a><a href="#Footnote_1349">[1349]</a>. The battle,
+for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challenge
+issued by aristocratic England, accepted.</p>
+<p>But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there
+stood a group holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the
+historical significance of the American collapse. To this group
+belonged Gladstone, as yet uncertain of his political philosophy,
+and regretful, though vainly, it would appear, of the blow to
+democracy. He wrote his thought to Brougham, no doubt hoping to
+influence the view-point of the <i>Edinburgh</i>.</p>
+<blockquote>"This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor
+'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier discount
+since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of the <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_283"></a>[V2:pg 283]</span> American
+constitution in the main fact of the rupture. On the contrary it
+was a great achievement to strike off by the will and wit of man a
+constitution for two millions of men scattered along a seaboard,
+which has lasted until they have become more than thirty millions
+and have covered a whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and
+follies, not to say worse, with which the rupture has been met in
+the Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not exposition
+but) exposure have really given as I have said the old lady in
+question such a heavy blow and great discouragement that I hope you
+will in the first vigour of your action be a little merciful and
+human lest you murder her outright<a name=
+"FNanchor1350"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1350">[1350]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions
+the American Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not
+believing in 1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade
+advantage would lead Great Britain from just rules of conduct. Even
+in the crisis of the <i>Trent</i> affair he was firm in this
+opinion:</p>
+<blockquote>"Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may
+be disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils, and
+much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make democracy
+responsible for them, the inexorable logic of events is
+contradicting each and every assertion based on these notions, and
+proving that the American struggle is, after all, the
+ever-recurring one in human affairs between right and wrong,
+between labour and capital, between liberty and absolutism. When
+such an issue comes to be presented to the people of Great Britain,
+stripped of all the disguises which have been thrown over it, it is
+not difficult to predict at least which side it will <i>not</i>
+consent to take<a name="FNanchor1351"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1351">[1351]</a>.</blockquote>
+<p>April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on
+American democracy and December its acceptance by Bright.
+Throughout 1862 he practically deserted his seat in Parliament and
+devoted himself to <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_284"></a>[V2:pg 284]</span> stirring up labour and radical
+sentiment in favour of the North. In January, 1862, a mass meeting
+at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced the daily press and was
+thought of sufficient moment to be reported by Adams. A motion was
+carried:</p>
+<blockquote>"That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the
+ill-disguised efforts of the <i>Times</i> and other misleading
+journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American
+questions ... to decry democratic institutions under the trials to
+which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of the working-men
+especially as unrepresented in the National Senate to express their
+sympathy with the United States in their gigantic struggle for the
+preservation of the Union<a name="FNanchor1352"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1352">[1352]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in the
+controversy. The <i>Morning Post</i>, stating with conviction its
+belief that there could be no re-union in America, added:</p>
+<blockquote>"... if the Government of the United States should
+succeed in reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still
+extensive dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest
+triumph since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the
+ample satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is
+even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate not
+only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can ride
+safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf every other
+craft laden with human destinies; that it can descend to the
+darkest depths of adversity, and rise from them all the stronger
+for the descent.... And who can doubt that Democracy will be more
+arrogant, more aggressive, more levelling and vulgarizing, if that
+be possible, than it ever had been before<a name=
+"FNanchor1353"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1353">[1353]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that
+the political controversy in England had an important bearing on
+the attitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of
+<i>Fraser's Magazine</i> seemed turning <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_285"></a>[V2:pg 285]</span> to one-sided
+presentation of the "lesson" of America. Mill's defence of the
+North, appearing in the February number, was soon followed in July
+by the first of a series of articles, "Universal Suffrage in the
+United States and Its Consequences," depicting the war as the
+result of mob rule and predicting a military despotism as its
+inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losing strength, wrote
+Adams:</p>
+<blockquote>"That the American difficulties have materially
+contributed to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of
+the leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United States
+is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The
+predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate
+subdivision of America into many separate States which will
+neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative
+class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of liberal opinions
+and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them<a name=
+"FNanchor1354"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1354">[1354]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully
+aloof at least in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell
+commented to Palmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson
+by De Witt, which is both interesting and instructive. It shows how
+the Great Republic of Washington degenerated into the Democracy of
+Jefferson. They are now reaping the fruit<a name=
+"FNanchor1355"></a><a href="#Footnote_1355">[1355]</a>." Was it
+mere coincidence or was there significance in an editorial in
+Palmerston's alleged "organ," the <i>Morning Post</i>:</p>
+<blockquote>"That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure
+to the calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_286"></a>[V2:pg 286]</span>
+false. But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful
+Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United States
+during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a democratic
+tyranny compared with which the most corrupt despotisms of the Old
+World appear realms of idyllic happiness and peace, have gratefully
+recognized the finger of Providence in the strife by which they
+have been so frightfully rent asunder<a name=
+"FNanchor1356"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1356">[1356]</a>...."</blockquote>
+<p>In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again
+brought into action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than
+heretofore. "For a great number of years," said the
+<i>Quarterly</i>, "a certain party among us, great admirers of
+America ... have chosen to fight their English battles upon
+American soil." Now the American Government "has disgracefully and
+ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evident that "political
+equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera<a name=
+"FNanchor1357"></a><a href="#Footnote_1357">[1357]</a>." At last,
+in November, the <i>Times</i> openly took the position which its
+accusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial
+utterances almost from the beginning of the Civil War.</p>
+<blockquote>"These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form
+of government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city
+attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if such a
+terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in England we should
+at the earliest moment possible have sent the incapables about
+their business, and put ourselves in the hands of better
+men...."<br>
+<br>
+"This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model for
+imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how it works
+now, when for the first time it has some work to do. We believe
+that if the English system of Parliamentary action had existed in
+America, the war could not have occurred, but we are quite sure
+that such Ministers would have long since been changed<a name=
+"FNanchor1358"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1358">[1358]</a>."</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_287"></a>[V2:pg 287]</span>
+<p>In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the
+failure of democracy, the open friends of the South dilated also
+upon the "gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and
+society. This was the frequent burden of articles in <i>The
+Index</i> in the early weeks of its publication. To this was soon
+added a picture of Northern democracy as composed of and controlled
+by the "immigrant element" which was the source of "the enormous
+increase of population in the last thirty years" from revolutionary
+areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carried with them more
+than their strong arms, they imported also their theories of
+equality.... The revolutionary party which represents them is at
+this moment master in the States of the North, where it is
+indulging in all its customary licence<a name=
+"FNanchor1359"></a><a href="#Footnote_1359">[1359]</a>." This fact,
+complained <i>The Index</i>, was not sufficiently brought out in
+the English press. Very different was the picture painted by
+Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states:</p>
+<blockquote>"... this man has his romance, his high poetic feeling,
+and above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him
+without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers and old
+flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws the signs of
+ague and sickness; but he will stand upright before you and speak
+to you with all the ease of a lettered gentleman in his own
+library. All the odious incivility of the republican servant has
+been banished. He is his own master, standing on his own threshold,
+and finds no need to assert his equality by rudeness. He is
+delighted to see you, and bids you sit down on his battered bench,
+without dreaming of any such apology as an English cotter offers to
+a Lady Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his
+independence, and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He
+tells you of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will
+always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some token of
+advance in education. When he questions you about the old country
+he astonishes you by the extent of his knowledge. <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_288"></a>[V2:pg 288]</span> I defy you not
+to feel that he is superior to the race from whence he has sprung
+in England or in Ireland."<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 25%;">
+<br>
+"It is always the same story. With us there is no level of society.
+Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd congregates near the
+bottom, and the lower steps are very broad. In America men stand
+upon a common platform, but the platform is raised above the
+ground, though it does not approach in height the top of our
+staircase. If we take the average altitude in the two countries, we
+shall find that the American heads are the more elevated of the
+two<a name="FNanchor1360"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1360">[1360]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative
+and aristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy
+and its lesson to England was most marked and most open at the
+moment when the Government was seriously considering an offer of
+mediation in the war. Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of
+September, 1862, had appeared. It did not immediately affect
+governmental attitude, save adversely to the North, and it gave a
+handle for pro-Southern outcry on the score of a "servile war."
+Indeed, the radicals were at first depressed by it; but when months
+passed with no appearance of a servile war and when the second
+emancipation proclamation of January, 1863, further certified the
+moral purpose of the North, a great element of strength was added
+to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous "addresses" to
+Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for the cause of
+anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation of
+American political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter
+Hall, January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an
+American paper as largely deriving its strength from the universal
+dissatisfaction <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_289"></a>[V2:pg 289]</span> of the lower orders of the
+English people with their existing conditions under the Crown:</p>
+<blockquote>"The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing
+under the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the
+contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the soil, the
+grievous effects of the laws of entail and primogeniture, whereby
+they are kept poor and rendered liable to starvation and
+pauperism--these have looked to America as the model democracy
+which proves the poor man's capacity for self-government." The
+meeting was called for seven o'clock but at half after five the
+hall was filled, and at six crowded. A second hall was filled and
+outdoor meetings of two thousand people organized in Exeter Street.
+"All working-class England was up in arms, not so much against
+slavery as against British oligarchy<a name=
+"FNanchor1361"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1361">[1361]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had
+caused anxious consideration to the managers of the <i>Times</i>,
+and the decision to step more warily. No doubt this was
+exaggeration of the political character and effect of the meeting,
+but certain it is that the political element was present joining
+hands with anti-slavery enthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the
+last confident and vigorous expression of the "failure" of
+democracy, from sources professedly neutral, appeared immediately
+after the St. James' Hall meeting, but was necessarily written
+before that meeting took place. <i>Blackwood's</i>, in its issue of
+February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man in this
+country now acknowledges ... that we have already gone as far
+toward democracy as is safe to go.... This is the great moral
+benefit which we have derived from the events in America." John
+Blackwood was an intimate friend of Delane, editor of the
+<i>Times</i>, holding similar views on political questions; but the
+<i>Times</i> was suddenly grown cautious in reading English
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_290"></a>[V2:pg 290]</span>
+political lessons from America. In truth, attack now rested with
+the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand<a name=
+"FNanchor1362"></a><a href="#Footnote_1362">[1362]</a>. He now
+advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North to
+the offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merely
+because it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it
+desired to make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was
+the negro<a name="FNanchor1363"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1363">[1363]</a>. It was now Radical purpose to keep the
+battle raging and they were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the
+United States might well recognize its opportunity in this
+controversy and give aid to its friends:</p>
+<blockquote>"After all, this struggle of ours both at home and
+abroad is but a struggle between the principle of popular
+government and government by a privileged class. The people
+therefore all the world over are in a species of solidarity which
+it is our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost<a name=
+"FNanchor1364"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1364">[1364]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the
+democratic movement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise,
+developed, he yet feared that the extremes to which Bright and
+others were going in support of the North might create unfortunate
+reactions in the Government. Especially he was anxious that the
+United States should not offer opportunity for accusation of
+interference in a British political quarrel. It is noteworthy that
+while many addresses to Lincoln were forwarded by him and many were
+printed in the annual publication of diplomatic correspondence,
+those that thus appeared dealt almost exclusively with <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_291"></a>[V2:pg 291]</span> emancipation.
+Yet Adams was also forwarding addresses and speeches harping on
+American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh, February 19, found
+place, in its emancipation aspect in the United States
+documents<a name="FNanchor1365"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1365">[1365]</a>, but the burden of that meeting,
+democracy, did not. It was there proclaimed that the British press
+misrepresented conditions in America, "because the future of free
+political institutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of
+Independence and in the State Constitutions of the Northern States,
+would be a standing argument against the expansion of the franchise
+and the enjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a
+convenient argument in favour of the continued domination of our
+aristocratic parties<a name="FNanchor1366"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1366">[1366]</a>." The tide of democratic feeling was
+rising rapidly in England. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a
+recent debate in Parliament that that body was much more judicious
+in expressions on America than it had been before 1862. "It will
+not escape your observation that the question is now felt to be
+taking a shape which was scarcely anticipated by the managers [of
+the <i>Times</i>] when they first undertook to guide the British
+mind to the overthrow of free institutions in America<a name=
+"FNanchor1367"></a><a href="#Footnote_1367">[1367]</a>."</p>
+<p>On the evening of the day on which this was written there
+occurred the greatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the
+aristocracy, of the meetings held to support the cause of the
+North. This was the spectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of
+London at St. James' Hall, on March 26, usually regarded as the
+culminating effort in Bright's tour of England for the cause of
+democracy, but whose origin is somewhat shrouded in mystery.
+Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceived the idea
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_292"></a>[V2:pg 292]</span> of
+the meeting and was responsible for its organization<a name=
+"FNanchor1368"></a><a href="#Footnote_1368">[1368]</a>. The press
+generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting." Adams wrote to Seward
+of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the University
+of London, to send a representative from the American Ministry,
+Beesly expanding upon the importance and high standing of the
+Trades Unions. To this Adams demurred but finally sent his son to
+sit in the audience and report the proceedings.</p>
+<p>Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the most
+important of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the
+Civil War, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle of
+democracy." Save for some distinguished speakers those in
+attendance consisted almost wholly of three thousand picked
+representatives of the Trades Unions of London. Adams transmitted
+to Seward his son's report of the meeting, its character,
+composition, names of speakers and their emphatic expressions of
+friendship for the North<a name="FNanchor1369"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1369">[1369]</a>, but it is again noteworthy that Henry
+Adams' clear analysis of the real significance of the meeting was
+not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence. Giving due
+praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commenting on
+press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were only
+brought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright," Henry
+Adams continued: "That this was not the case <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_293"></a>[V2:pg 293]</span> must have been
+evident to every person present. In fact, it was only after he
+closed that the real business of the evening began." Then followed
+speeches and the introduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a
+bricklayer ... Mr. Odgers, a shoemaker ... Mr. Mantz, a compositor
+... Mr. Cremer, a joiner, who was bitter against Lord Palmerston
+... Mr. Conolly, a mason...." and other labouring men, all
+asserting "that the success of free institutions in America was a
+political question of deep consequence in England and that they
+would not tolerate any interference unfavourable to the North." No
+one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what was intended."</p>
+<blockquote>"The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength
+and no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a
+direct political bearing on internal politics in England it needed
+little of doing so. There was not even a profession of faith in the
+government of England as at present constituted. Every hostile
+allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the opinions of the
+'privileged classes,' was received with warm cheers. Every allusion
+to the republican institutions of America, the right of suffrage,
+the right of self-taxation, the 'sunlight' of republican influence,
+was caught up by the audience with vehement applause. It may
+therefore be considered as fairly and authoritatively announced
+that the class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of
+the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an act
+almost without precedent in their history, the principle that they
+make common cause with the Americans who are struggling for the
+restoration of the Union and that all their power and influence
+shall be used on behalf of the North<a name=
+"FNanchor1370"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1370">[1370]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege," and
+his appeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America
+have been given in a previous <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_294"></a>[V2:pg 294]</span> chapter<a name=
+"FNanchor1371"></a><a href="#Footnote_1371">[1371]</a>. Evidently
+that appeal, though enthusiastically received for its oratorical
+brilliance, was unneeded. His was but an eloquent expression of
+that which was in the minds of his audience. Upon the American
+Minister the effect was to cause him to renew warnings against
+showing too keen an appreciation of the support of political
+radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at once stirred
+anxiety in Parliament and verged:</p>
+<blockquote>"... much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic
+politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or sympathize
+with by Foreign Governments.... Hence it seems to me of the
+greatest consequence that the treatment of all present questions
+between the two nations should be regulated by a provident forecast
+of what may follow it [the political struggle in England]
+hereafter. I am not sure that some parties here would not now be
+willing even to take the risk of a war in order the more
+effectually to turn the scale against us, and thus, as they think,
+to crush the rising spirit of their own population. That this is
+only a feeling at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a
+policy may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon
+the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if
+possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such
+hopes.... We owe this duty not less to the great body of those who
+in this kingdom are friends to us and our institutions, than to
+ourselves<a name="FNanchor1372"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1372">[1372]</a>."</blockquote>
+<br>
+<a name="image14.jpg"></a>
+<p class="ctr"><a href="images/image14.jpg"><img src=
+"images/image14.jpg" width="55%" alt=""></a><br>
+<b>JOHN BRIGHT</b><br>
+(<i>From a photograph taken of him in the attitude in which he
+usually spoke</i>)<br>
+(<i>From Trevelyan's "Life of John Bright</i>")</p>
+<br>
+<p>Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect to
+democratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received a
+deputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutions
+passed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed
+fears that a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain
+and America, and that this would have a disastrous influence on the
+aspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms
+of appreciation for the sympathies expressed <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_295"></a>[V2:pg 295]</span> by the meeting
+but carefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose.
+"He was too prudent," said the <i>Times</i> in reporting the
+deputation, "to appraise the importance of the particular
+demonstration to which his notice was invited ..." and his reply
+was given favourable comment<a name="FNanchor1373"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1373">[1373]</a>. This reply, wrote Adams, "appears to
+have had a sedative effect<a name="FNanchor1374"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1374">[1374]</a>." Meanwhile, Bright continued his
+preachment to the English people though modifying his tone of
+fierce accusation against "privilege," and confining himself to
+declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in the American
+conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Society of
+London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people
+in this country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I
+say that these have an interest, almost as great and direct as
+though they were living in Massachusetts or New York, in the
+tremendous struggle for freedom which is now shaking the whole
+North American Continent<a name="FNanchor1375"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1375">[1375]</a>." Like utterances were repeated at
+further public meetings and so insistent were they as to require
+reply by the conservative faction, even if, as was supposed, the
+effect of the Trades' Union attitude had been to give a halt to the
+vehemence of those who had been sounding the "lesson" of American
+failure in democracy. Bright became the centre of attack. The
+<i>Times</i> led.</p>
+<blockquote>"His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the
+Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant
+Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it must
+go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives up all his
+most cherished notions and all his less absorbing
+principles...."<br>
+<br>
+"Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_296"></a>[V2:pg 296]</span>
+and his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master
+passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He worshipped
+it while rising to its culminating point, and he is obliged to turn
+right round to worship it while setting. He did not himself know,
+until tested by this great trial, how entirely his opinions as to
+war and peace, and slavery and freedom, and lust of conquest and
+hatred of oppression, were all the mere accidents which hung
+loosely upon him, and were capable of being detached at once in the
+interest of the ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant
+Democracy. Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been
+a failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright up to
+this time has been but a foolish dream<a name=
+"FNanchor1376"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1376">[1376]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness;
+but an "if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American
+democracy, caused less by the progress of the war than by the
+rising excitement of democratic England. The <i>Times</i> editorial
+just quoted appeared when the faith was generally professed that
+Lee was about to end the war through the invasion of Pennsylvania.
+In the reaction created by the arrival of the news of Gettysburg
+and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned his Government against
+either a belligerent or interfering attitude toward Great Britain,
+but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supreme importance
+in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is to show, by
+our example to the people of England in particular, and to all
+nations in general, the value of republican institutions." There
+was still a general belief in the incompetency of those
+institutions. "The greatest triumph of all would be to prove these
+calculations vain. In comparison with this, what would be the gain
+to be derived from any collision with the powers of Europe<a name=
+"FNanchor1377"></a><a href="#Footnote_1377">[1377]</a>?"</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_297"></a>[V2:pg 297]</span>
+<p>It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of
+English opinion on American democracy few in America itself
+appreciated the significance of the British controversy. J.M.
+Forbes, who had been on a special mission to England, wrote to
+Lincoln, on his return<a name="FNanchor1378"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1378">[1378]</a>:</p>
+<blockquote>"Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his
+glorious band of English Republicans see that we are fighting for
+Democracy or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal
+institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world are
+as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have on this
+side.<br>
+<br>
+Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and the
+Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of the People
+against an Aristocracy<a name="FNanchor1379"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1379">[1379]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly
+always came from men who had been abroad and had thus come into
+direct contact with British political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's
+retreat from Pennsylvania had produced a like retreat in the
+opinions on the failure of democracy earlier confidently held by
+the professedly neutral press. In September, having arrived at the
+point by the usual process of gradually facing about, the
+<i>Times</i> was bold enough to deny that England had any personal
+feeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had
+anything to do with English attitude on the war<a name=
+"FNanchor1380"></a><a href="#Footnote_1380">[1380]</a>. Thenceforth
+neither the <i>Times</i> nor any of the leading papers saw fit to
+revive with vigour the cry of "democracy's failure," no matter how
+persistent in proclaiming ultimate victory for the South.
+Aristocratic exultation had given place to alarm and it seemed
+wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue<a name=
+"FNanchor1381"></a><a href="#Footnote_1381">[1381]</a>. Not so the
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_298"></a>[V2:pg 298]</span>
+Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in the
+minds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence
+but increased firmness debated the question in every public meeting
+favourable to the North<a name="FNanchor1382"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1382">[1382]</a>. Many Conservatives, Adams reported,
+were now anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a
+difficult one because of their irritation at Bright's
+taunts<a name="FNanchor1383"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1383">[1383]</a>. Bright's star was rising. "The very
+moment the war comes to an end," wrote Adams, "and a restoration of
+the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reaction that will
+make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man in
+England<a name="FNanchor1384"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1384">[1384]</a>."</p>
+<p>The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly
+one-sided. In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent
+upon the more eager and professed friends of the South to take up
+the cudgels. Hence, in part, came the organization of the Southern
+Independence Association and the attempt to hold public meetings
+favourable to the South, in the early months of 1864. Much talk had
+been spent on the "British issue" involved in the war; there was
+now to be vigorous work to secure it<a name=
+"FNanchor1385"></a><a href="#Footnote_1385">[1385]</a>. <i>The
+Index</i> plunged into vigorous denunciation of "The Manchester
+School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better for the
+future call the American School." Even the Government was attacked
+for its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining
+as a member Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that
+he shared Bright's views on democracy:</p>
+<blockquote>"That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter
+the Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament
+despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and vituperation,
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_299"></a>[V2:pg 299]</span>
+his vulgarity, and his incurable want of veracity, had made him so
+hateful to the educated classes that it would have required no
+common courage to give him office; his insolent sneers at royalty
+would have made his appointment little less than a personal insult
+to the Queen; and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable
+colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a
+faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other existence
+but what it borrowed from him, while its previous life and
+education had accustomed it to the society of statesmen and of
+gentlemen<a name="FNanchor1386"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1386">[1386]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they
+were too evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical
+and pro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the
+Southern Independence Association, analysed with clarity the
+situation. Answering criticisms of the passionate mob spirit of
+Northern press and people, he accused the <i>Times</i> of
+having</p>
+<blockquote>"... pandered to the hatred of America among the upper
+classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at least
+had been taught by what we have lately seen not to shrink from an
+extension of the suffrage, if the only bad consequence of that
+measure of justice would be a change in government from the
+passions of the privileged class to the passions of the people....
+History will not mistake the meaning of the loud cry of triumph
+which burst from the hearts of all who openly or secretly hated
+liberty and progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the
+Great Republic." British working men "are for the most part as well
+aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right of
+labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can be that
+the other cause in his<a name="FNanchor1387"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1387">[1387]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as an
+institution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the
+front in politics. This was very largely a result of the American
+Civil War. Roebuck, after the failure of his <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_300"></a>[V2:pg 300]</span> effort for
+mediation in 1863, was obsessed with a fear of the tendency in
+England. "I have great faith in my countrymen," he wrote, "but the
+experience of America frightens me. I am not ashamed to use the
+word <i>frightened</i>. During my whole life I have looked to that
+country as about to solve the great problem of self-government, and
+now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth and manhood are
+destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my political philosophy,
+and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point<a name=
+"FNanchor1388"></a><a href="#Footnote_1388">[1388]</a>." More
+philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule of
+aristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the
+discovery of some middle ground or method--some "influence [which]
+may help us to prevent the English people from becoming, with the
+growth of democracy, <i>Americanized</i><a name=
+"FNanchor1389"></a><a href="#Footnote_1389">[1389]</a>." "There is
+no longer any sort of disguise maintained," wrote Adams, "as to the
+wishes of the privileged classes. Very little genuine sympathy is
+entertained for the rebels. The true motive is apparent enough. It
+is the fear of the spread of democratic feeling at home in the
+event of our success<a name="FNanchor1390"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1390">[1390]</a>."</p>
+<p>The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser
+Conservative elements in proclaming the "lesson" of American
+democracy--a retreat caused by alarm at the vigour with which
+Radicals had taken up the challenge. Conservative hopes were still
+fixed upon Southern success and Conservative confidence loudly
+voiced. Even the pride of the <i>Times</i> in the accuracy of its
+news and in its military forecasts was subordinated to the purpose
+of keeping up the courage of the faction it represented<a name=
+"FNanchor1391"></a><a href="#Footnote_1391">[1391]</a>. Small
+wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving the news of Sherman's
+arrival before Savannah, should be made physically ill and write to
+Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow <span class=
+"pagenum"><a name="Page2_301"></a>[V2:pg 301]</span> to us as well
+as to the South." The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed
+about Sherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the
+mischief<a name="FNanchor1392"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1392">[1392]</a>." "Attenuation" of Northern progress in
+arms was, indeed, attempted, but the facts of the military
+situation were too strong for continued concealment. From January,
+1865, only the most stubborn of Southern friends could remain blind
+to the approaching Northern victory. Lord Acton, a hero-worshipper
+of the great Confederate military leader, "broke his heart over the
+surrender of Lee," but was moved also by keen insight as to the
+political meaning of that surrender<a name=
+"FNanchor1393"></a><a href="#Footnote_1393">[1393]</a>.</p>
+<p>So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War
+in America was closing in Northern victory that the final event was
+discounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for
+an English political struggle on the great issue heralded as
+involved in the American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a
+motion in Parliament for expansion of the franchise the
+ultra-Conservatives attempted to read a "lesson" from America. The
+<i>Quarterly</i> for April, 1865, asserted that even yet "the mass
+of educated men in England retain the sympathy for the South which
+they have nourished ever since the conflict assumed a decided
+shape." America was plainly headed in the direction of a military
+despotism. Her example should warn England from a move in the same
+direction. "The classes which govern this country are in a
+minority," and should beware of majority rule. But events
+discredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination
+of Lincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring of
+expressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exalt
+Lincoln's leadership in democracy<a name=
+"FNanchor1394"></a><a href="#Footnote_1394">[1394]</a>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_302"></a>[V2:pg 302]</span>
+<p>In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new
+Parliament. Not a single member who had supported the cause of the
+North failed of re-election, several additional Northern "friends"
+were chosen, and some outspoken members for the South were
+defeated. Adams thought this a matter deserving special notice in
+America, and prophesied a new era approaching in England:</p>
+<blockquote>"As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period
+marks an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure
+old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the
+confidence of the country that it will not appear in that guise any
+more. Unless some new and foreign element should interpose, I look
+for decided progress in enlarging the popular features of the
+constitution, and diminishing the influence of the aristocracy....
+It is impossible not to perceive traces of the influence of our
+institutions upon all these changes.... The progress of the liberal
+cause, not in England alone, but all over the world, is, in a
+measure, in our hands<a name="FNanchor1395"></a><a href=
+"#Footnote_1395">[1395]</a>."</blockquote>
+<p>The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams
+anticipated. Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October
+18, 1865. Russell succeeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost
+immediately declared himself in favour of Parliamentary reform even
+though a majority in both Houses was still opposed to such a
+measure. Russell's desertion of his earlier attitude of "finality"
+on franchise expansion correctly represented the acceptance, though
+unwillingly, by both political parties of the necessity of reform.
+The battle, long waged, but reaching its decisive moment during the
+American Civil War, had finally gone <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_303"></a>[V2:pg 303]</span> against Conservatism when Lee
+surrendered at Appomatox. Russell's Reform Bill of 1866 was
+defeated by Tory opposition in combination with a small Whig
+faction which refused to desert the "principle" of aristocratic
+government--the "government by the wise," but the Tories who came
+into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voiced
+even to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill.
+Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises,"
+which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to
+British working-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic
+criticism that all the planned advantages to Conservatism were soon
+thrown overboard, and a Bill presented so Radical as to permit a
+transfer of political power to the working classes<a name=
+"FNanchor1396"></a><a href="#Footnote_1396">[1396]</a>. The Reform
+Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain from a government by aristocracy
+to one by democracy. A new nation came into being. The friends of
+the North had triumphed.</p>
+<p>Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the
+incidental frictions, the effect on trade relations, the
+applications of British neutrality, and the general policy of the
+Government, there existed for Great Britain a great issue in the
+outcome of the Civil War--the issue of the adoption of democratic
+institutions. It affected at every turn British public attitude,
+creating an intensity and bitterness of tone, on both sides,
+unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. In America this
+was little understood, and American writers both during the war and
+long afterwards, gave little attention to it<a name=
+"FNanchor1397"></a><a href="#Footnote_1397">[1397]</a>. Immediately
+upon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during
+the conflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_304"></a>[V2:pg 304]</span>
+"the territorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of the
+Established Church" would have been excusable "if they could only
+have said frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions
+opposed to their own, instead of talking about their sympathy for
+the weak, and their respect for national independence, and their
+anxiety for the triumph of Free Trade<a name=
+"FNanchor1398"></a><a href="#Footnote_1398">[1398]</a>." This was
+stated before the democratic hope in England had been realized.
+Three years later the same staunch friend of the North, now removed
+to America and occupying a chair of history at Cornell University,
+wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of their attitude: "I
+fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, that their
+defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But I daresay
+we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been born
+members of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under
+the blessed influence of equality and justice<a name=
+"FNanchor1399"></a><a href="#Footnote_1399">[1399]</a>."</p>
+<p>Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian as
+well-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one
+fought first of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue
+of democracy in England seemed of little moment and little to
+excuse either the "cold neutrality" of the Government or the tone
+of the press. To Americans Great Britain appeared friendly to the
+dissolution of the Union and the destruction of a rival power.
+Nationality was the issue for the North; that democracy was an
+issue in America was denied, nor could it, in the intensity of the
+conflict, be conceived as the vital question determining British
+attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a new British nation into
+existence, the nation decrying American institutions was dead and a
+"sister democracy" holding <span class="pagenum"><a name=
+"Page2_305"></a>[V2:pg 305]</span> out hands to the United States
+had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for the
+North long remained blind. Not during the generation when
+Americans, immersed in a life and death struggle for national
+existence, felt that "he who is not for me is against me," could
+the generally correct neutrality of the British Government and the
+whole-hearted support of Radical England be accepted at their true
+value to the North. For nearly half a century after the American
+Civil War the natural sentiments of friendship, based upon ties of
+blood and a common heritage of literature and history and law, were
+distorted by bitter and exaggerated memories.</p>
+<br>
+<blockquote>FOOTNOTES:</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1323"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1323">[1323]</a> See my article, "The Point of View of
+the British Traveller in America," <i>Pol. Sci. Quarterly</i>,
+June, 1914.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1324"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1324">[1324]</a> Alexander Mackay, <i>The Western World;
+or Travels in the United States in</i> 1846-47.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1325"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1325">[1325]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Fourth Edition, London,
+1850, Vol. III, p. 24.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1326"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1326">[1326]</a> Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, <i>The
+Constitution of the United States compared with Our Own</i>,
+London, 1854.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1327"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1327">[1327]</a> e.g., William Kelly, <i>Across the Rocky
+Mountains from New York to California</i>, London, 1852. He made
+one acute observation on American democracy. "The division of
+parties is just the reverse in America to what it is in England. In
+England the stronghold of democracy is in the large towns, and
+aristocracy has its strongest supporters in the country. In America
+the ultra-democrat and leveller is the western farmer, and the
+aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst the manufacturers and
+merchants of the eastern cities." (p. 181.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1328"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1328">[1328]</a> Monypenny, <i>Disraeli</i>, IV, pp.
+293-4, states a Tory offer to support Palmerston on these
+lines.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1329"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1329">[1329]</a> Dodd, <i>Jefferson Davis</i>, p.
+217.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1330"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1330">[1330]</a> March, 30, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1331"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1331">[1331]</a> March 16, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1332"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1332">[1332]</a> To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861.
+(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 347.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1333"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1333">[1333]</a> April 27, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1334"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1334">[1334]</a> Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861,
+that the war in America was the "natural result of the much vaunted
+system of government of the United States"; it had "crumbled to
+pieces," and this result had long been evident to the public mind
+of Europe. (F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 58.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1335"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1335">[1335]</a> State Department, Eng., Vol. 77, No. 9.
+Adams to Seward, June 21, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1336"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1336">[1336]</a> I have made an effort to identify
+writers in <i>Blackwood's</i>, but am informed by the editors that
+it is impossible to do this for the period before 1870, old
+correspondence having been destroyed.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1337"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1337">[1337]</a> July, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1338"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1338">[1338]</a> The <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> for
+November, 1861, takes up the question, denying that democracy is in
+any sense "on trial" in America, so far as the permanence of
+American institutions is concerned. It still does not see clearly
+the real nature of the controversy in England.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1339"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1339">[1339]</a> Aug. 17, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1340"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1340">[1340]</a> Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc.
+<i>Proceedings</i>, XLVI, p. 94.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1341"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1341">[1341]</a> Sept. 7, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1342"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1342">[1342]</a> Sept. 14, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1343"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1343">[1343]</a> Motley, <i>Correspondence</i>, II, p.
+35. To his mother, Sept. 22, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1344"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1344">[1344]</a> April, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1345"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1345">[1345]</a> Oct., 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1346"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1346">[1346]</a> Oct., 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching
+by Example."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1347"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1347">[1347]</a> Nov. 23, 1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1348"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1348">[1348]</a> Cited by Harris, <i>The Trent
+Affair</i>, p. 28.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1349"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1349">[1349]</a> Robertson, <i>Speeches of John
+Bright</i>, I, pp. 177 <i>seq.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1350"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1350">[1350]</a> Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27,
+1861.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1351"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1351">[1351]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78, No. 95.
+Adams to Seward, Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in <i>U.S. Messages and
+Documents, 1862-63</i>, Pt. I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word
+"<i>not</i>" is unindicated, by the failure to use
+italics.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1352"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1352">[1352]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams
+to Seward, Jan. 31, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1353"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1353">[1353]</a> Feb. 22, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1354"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1354">[1354]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 80, No. 206.
+Adams to Seward, Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV,
+78) writes that "the most significant and touching feature of the
+situation was that the cotton operative population was frankly on
+the side of the North." Lutz, <i>Die Beziehungen zwischen
+Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten w&auml;hrend des
+Sezessionskrieges</i>, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysis of
+the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude by
+factional political idealisms in Germany.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1355"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1355">[1355]</a> Palmerston MS., Aug. 24,
+1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1356"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1356">[1356]</a> Aug. 30, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1357"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1357">[1357]</a> October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle
+and Recognition."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1358"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1358">[1358]</a> Nov. 4, 1862.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1359"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1359">[1359]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63.
+(Communication.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1360"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1360">[1360]</a> Anthony Trollope, <i>North America</i>,
+London, 1862, Vol. I, p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862,
+and was in its third edition by the end of the year. It was also
+published in New York in 1862 and in Philadelphia in
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1361"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1361">[1361]</a> <i>The Liberator</i>, March 13, 1863,
+quoting a report in the <i>New York Sunday
+Mercury</i>.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1362"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1362">[1362]</a> Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince,
+<i>John Bright</i>, p. 204, as stating that Bright "was the
+greatest master of English oratory that this generation--I may say
+several generations--has seen. I have met men who have heard Pitt
+and Fox, and in whose judgment their eloquence at its best was
+inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright. At a time when much
+speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated, eloquence, he
+maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style in which he
+gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts he
+desired to utter."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1363"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1363">[1363]</a> Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863.
+(Robertson, <i>Speeches of John Bright</i>, I, pp. 234
+<i>seq.</i>)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1364"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1364">[1364]</a> Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863.
+(Bigelow, <i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 600.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1365"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1365">[1365]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 123.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1366"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1366">[1366]</a> State Dept., Eng., Adams to Seward. No.
+334. Feb. 26, 1863. enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as
+printed in <i>The Weekly Herald, Mercury and News</i>, Feb. 21,
+1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1367"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1367">[1367]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 157.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1368"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1368">[1368]</a> Spargo, <i>Karl Marx,</i> pp. 224-5.
+Spargo claims that Marx bent every effort to stir working men to a
+sense of class interest in the cause of the North and even went so
+far as to secure the presence of Bright at the meeting, as the most
+stirring orator of the day, though personally he regarded Bright
+"with an almost unspeakable loathing." On reading this statement I
+wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence and received the reply that
+he believed the tradition unquestionably well founded, though
+"almost the only testimony available consists of a reference or two
+in one of his [Marx's] letters and the ample corroborative
+testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others." This is
+scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talk
+with Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary,
+and who attended and reported the meeting, the information was
+given that Henry Adams himself had then understood and always since
+believed Marx's to have been the guiding hand in organizing the
+meeting.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1369"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1369">[1369]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 162. (Adams to Seward, March 27,
+1863.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1370"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1370">[1370]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 358.
+Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams.
+There was also enclosed the printed report, giving speeches at
+length, as printed by <i>The Bee Hive</i>, the organ of the London
+Trades Unions.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1371"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1371">[1371]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 132.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1372"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1372">[1372]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 360.
+Adams to Seward, April 2, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1373"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1373">[1373]</a> May 5, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1374"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1374">[1374]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence</i>,
+1863, Pt. I, p. 243. Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1375"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1375">[1375]</a> Robertson, <i>Speeches of John
+Bright</i>, I, p. 264. In a letter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863,
+Bright estimated that there were seven millions of men of
+twenty-one years of age and upward in the United Kingdom, of whom
+slightly over one million had the vote. (Bigelow,
+<i>Retrospections</i>, I, p. 610.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1376"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1376">[1376]</a> July 2, 1863. The editorial was written
+in connection with Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise
+interesting for an attempt to characterize each of the speakers in
+the Commons.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1377"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1377">[1377]</a> <i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence,
+1863</i>, Part I, p. 319. To Seward, July 23, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1378"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1378">[1378]</a> See <i>ante</i>, p. 130, <i>note</i>
+2.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1379"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1379">[1379]</a> MS. letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession
+of C.F. Adams, Jr.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1380"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1380">[1380]</a> Sept. 24, 1863.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1381"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1381">[1381]</a> Even the friendly Russian Minister in
+Washington was at this time writing of the "rule of the mob" in
+America and trusting that the war, "the result of democracy," would
+serve as a warning to Europe. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O.,
+Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1382"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1382">[1382]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and
+559. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to
+"keep out of it."</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1383"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1383">[1383]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to
+Seward, Jan. 29, 1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was
+partly the aristocratic antipathy to Bright that had
+<i>produced</i> the ill-will to the United States.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1384"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1384">[1384]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1385"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1385">[1385]</a> See Ch. XV.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1386"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1386">[1386]</a> <i>The Index</i>, Jan. 28, 1864, p.
+58.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1387"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1387">[1387]</a> Goldwin Smith, <i>A Letter to a Whig
+Member of the Southern Independence Association</i>, London, 1864,
+pp. 14, 68, and 71.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1388"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1388">[1388]</a> Leader, <i>Roebuck</i>, p. 299. To
+William Ibbitt, April 26, 1864.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1389"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1389">[1389]</a> Arnold, <i>Mixed Essays</i>, p. 17.
+N.Y., Macmillan, 1883.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1390"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1390">[1390]</a> State Dept., Eng., Vol. 86, No. 709.
+Adams to Seward, June 9, 1864</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1391"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1391">[1391]</a> See <i>ante</i>, Ch. XVI.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1392"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1392">[1392]</a> Dasent, <i>Delane</i>, II, pp. 135-6.
+Delane to Dasent, Dec. 25 and 26, 1864. The <i>Times</i> on
+December 26 pictured Sherman as having <i>escaped</i> to the sea,
+but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1393"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1393">[1393]</a> <i>Lord Acton's Letters to Mary
+Gladstone</i>, p. 183.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1394"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1394">[1394]</a> These were not confined to Great
+Britain. The American Legation in Berlin received addresses of
+sympathy from many organizations, especially labour unions. One
+such, drawn by W. Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in
+part: "Members of the working-class, we need not affirm to you the
+sincerity of these our sympathies; for with pride we can point to
+the fact, that, while the aristocracy of the Old World took openly
+the part of the southern slaveholder, and while the middle class
+was divided in its opinions, the working-men in all countries of
+Europe have unanimously and firmly stood on the side of the Union."
+(<i>U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865</i>, Pt. IV, p.
+500.)</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1395"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1395">[1395]</a> <i>U.S. Messages and Documents,
+1865</i>, Pt. I, p. 417. Adams to Hunter, July 13,
+1865.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1396"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1396">[1396]</a> Disraeli was less disturbed by this than
+were other Tory leaders. He had long before, in his historical
+novels, advocated an aristocratic leadership of democracy, as
+against the middle class. Derby called the Bill "a leap in the
+dark," but assented to it.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1397"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1397">[1397]</a> Pierce, <i>Sumner</i>, IV, pp. 151-153,
+summarizes the factors determining British attitude and places
+first the fear of the privileged classes of the example of America,
+but his treatment really minimizes this element.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1398"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1398">[1398]</a> Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in
+America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester
+Union and Emancipation Society." (Jan. 26, 1866.) London, 1866, pp.
+71-75.</blockquote>
+<blockquote><a name="Footnote_1399"></a><a href=
+"#FNanchor1399">[1399]</a> Goldwin Smith, <i>America and England in
+their present relations</i>, London, 1869, p. 30.</blockquote>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_306"></a>[V2:pg
+306]</span><br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_307"></a>[V2:pg 307]</span>
+<h2><a name="INDEX"></a>INDEX</h2>
+<br>
+<div class="indx">
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Aberdeen, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_13'>13</a>, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>
+[<a href="#Footnote_966">1</a>]</p>
+<p>Acton, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a></p>
+<p>Adams, Brooks, <i>The Seizure of the Laird Rams</i>, cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_125'>125</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Adams, Charles Francis, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page_63'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page_81'>1</a>; attitude in the early
+days of the American crisis, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a> <i>and
+note</i>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>;
+appointed American Minister in London, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>,
+<a href='#Page_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page_81'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_96'>96</a>; impressions of English opinion on the crisis,
+<a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>; alarm at Seward's
+Despatch No. 10, i. <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>; attitude of, to
+the Palmerston-Russell ministry, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>;
+controversy on General Butler's order, <a href=
+'#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_305'>5</a>; reports to Seward on
+British public meetings on Emancipation Proclamation, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_223'>223</a>; view of the popular manifestations on
+Emancipation, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a>; view as to decline of
+British confidence in the South, <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>; and
+the London Confederate States Aid Association, <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>; receives
+deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall of
+Savannah, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; quoted
+on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>-<a href='#Page2_252'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_253'>253</a>; on effect in England of the Hampton Roads
+Conference, <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>; advice of, to Seward on
+attitude to be observed to Britain, <a href=
+'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>; attitude to
+Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences, <a href=
+'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a>; comments of, on
+parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of confidence in Lincoln,
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on feeling in
+Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt on Seward,
+<a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_263'>3</a>; receives addresses of sympathy from British
+organizations, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_263'>3</a>; and formal declaration of the end of the war,
+<a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>; faith of, in ultimate British opinion
+on the issues in the Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>;
+views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing
+attitude to America <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_285'>285</a>; advice to Seward on the political position in
+relation to democracy, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_298'>298</a> <i>note</i>[1]; quoted on the rising of
+democratic feeling in Britain, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>;
+disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, <a href=
+'#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_280'>280</a>; report of, on London mass meeting in favour
+of the North, <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>; and the Trades Unions
+of London meeting, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_294'>294</a>-<a href='#Page_295'>5</a>; quoted on John
+Bright, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>; on the attitude of the
+privileged classes to democracy, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>; on the influence of
+American institutions on the political movement in Great Britain,
+<a href='#Page2_302'>302</a> <i>Diplomatic action and views of, in
+regard to:</i> <i>Alabama case</i>: ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a> British Foreign
+Enlistment Act, i. <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_148'>148</a>-<a href='#Page_149'>9</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a> Bunch controversy,
+i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>,
+<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_195'>195</a> Confederate Commissioners: representations on
+intercourse with, i. <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_106'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> Confederate Cotton
+Loan: reported connection with, ii. <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>
+<i>and note</i>[4]; views on, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>
+Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+and U.S. Navy Department plan to stop, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; Laird Rams incident, <a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> Cotton: report on
+British position, ii. <a href='#Page2_99'>99</a> Declaration of
+Paris negotiation: action on proposed convention, i. <a href=
+'#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href='#Page_169'>69</a> <i>passim</i>; view
+of American intention, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_169'>169</a>; failure of his negotiation, <a href=
+'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_171'>71</a> Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_55'>55</a> Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a> Lindsay's efforts
+for mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_35'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a> Mediation: presents
+the "servile war" threat against, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>; view of England's reply to French proposals on,
+<a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>; advantages of an anti-slavery avowal,
+<a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href='#Page2_99'>9</a> Neutrality
+Law, <i>See</i> British Foreign Enlistment Act <i>supra</i>
+Privateering Bill, ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_127'>127</a>; advises against issue of privateers, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a> Proclamation of Neutrality, The:
+representations on, i. <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page_301'>1</a>;
+despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, <a href=
+'#Page_134'>134</a>; protests against British recognition of
+belligerency, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>; advice to Seward on,
+<a href='#Page_275'>275</a> Roebuck's motion: report on, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a> "Servile War" threat, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a> <i>and note</i>[4] Slavery: urges Northern
+declaration on, ii. <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_99'>9</a>; comments on <i>Times</i> criticism of
+anti-slavery meetings, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a> Southern Ports:
+plan of collecting duties at, ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>
+<i>Trent</i> Affair, the: interviewed by Palmerston, i. <a href=
+'#Page_208'>208</a>-<a href='#Page_209'>9</a>; statement on the
+<i>James Adger</i>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_210'>10</a>; suspicion of British policy in, <a href=
+'#Page_218'>218</a>; views on public opinion in, <a href=
+'#Page_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page_223'>3</a>; officially states
+Wilkes acted without authorization, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>;
+report on English hope of peaceful settlement, <a href=
+'#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; on British
+opinion after settlement of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_240'>240</a>; on effect of, in Great Britain, <a href=
+'#Page_243'>243</a>; view of popular attitude in Britain in the
+crisis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a> Appreciation and
+criticisms on: Characterized in <i>The Index</i>, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_196'>196</a> Lord Lyons', report on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page_63'>3</a>; opinion on, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[4] Lord Russell's view of
+his diplomacy, ii. <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a> Tory approval of,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_100'>100</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_308"></a>[V2:pg 308]</span>
+<p>Adams, C.F., Jun., view of British attitude and the Proclamation
+of Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a>; view of the delay in his father's journey to
+England, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a> <i>note</i>; view on Seward's
+attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, <a href=
+'#Page_138'>138</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_156'>6</a>; examination of British action in the
+negotiation, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>-<a href='#Page_155'>5</a>;
+review of the <i>Trent</i> affair, cited, <a href=
+'#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note, et seq. passim</i>; on American
+feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, <a href=
+'#Page_218'>218</a>; and the Hotze materials, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Adams, E.D.: <i>British Interests and Activities in Mexico</i>,
+cited ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1] "The Point of
+View of the British Traveller in America," cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_23'>23</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Adams, Henry, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]; view of, on W.E. Forster, i.
+<a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on British Proclamation
+of Neutrality, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>; on American exultation
+in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>; on British
+attitude in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>; view
+of Gregory's speech on the blockade, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>;
+on British view of prospects in the War, <a href=
+'#Page_297'>297</a>; on possibility of intervention, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_23'>23</a>; on advantage of a Northern declaration on
+slavery, <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>; on the Trades Unions of London
+meeting, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>and note</i>[1] <a href=
+'#Page2_293'>293</a> "Declaration, The, of Paris," 1861 ...
+reviewed, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_153'>153</a>; view of Russell's policy in, <a href=
+'#Page2_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_159'>159</a>; view of Lyons, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a> <i>Education of Henry Adams</i>
+quoted, i. <a href='#Page_149'>149</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[2]; cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Adams, John (Second President of the U.S.), i. <a href=
+'#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a></p>
+<p>Adams, John Quincy, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_81'>81</a></p>
+<p>African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href='#Page_86'>6</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_88'>88</a>; suppression of, international efforts for, i.
+<a href='#Page_8'>8</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; punishment to
+slave traders in American law, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>; American
+attitude to right of search, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>; British
+anti-slavery policy, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_32'>2</a>; wane of British interest in, <a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>; Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. <a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_91'>91</a></p>
+<p>Agassiz, L., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>.</p>
+<p>Akroyd, Edward, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>
+<i>note</i>.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_309"></a>[V2:pg 309]</span>
+<p><i>Alabama</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page2_119'>119</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_120'>120</a>; departure of, from Liverpool, <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>; British order to stop departure, <a href=
+'#Page2_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>; Russell's private
+feelings as to, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>; public opinion in Great Britain on, <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>; Palmerston's
+defence of Government action on, <a href=
+'#Page2_134'>134</a>-<a href='#Page2_135'>5</a>; American anger
+over, <a href='#Page2_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>;
+measures against, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>; New York Chamber
+of Commerce protest on, <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>; claim for
+damages on account of, <a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a></p>
+<p><i>Alexandra</i>, case, The: Seizure of the vessel, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_161'>161</a> <i>note</i>[4]; public approval, <a href=
+'#Page2_136'>136</a>; law actions on, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_149'>149</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>; American
+anxiety at Court decision, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; final
+result, <a href='#Page2_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>America, Central: British-American disputes in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a></p>
+<p>American: Civil War: i. <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_87'>87</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>;
+British public and official views at the commencement of, <a href=
+'#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; origins of; American
+and British views, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_48'>8</a>; efforts at compromise, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>;
+British official attitude on outbreak of, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>; European opinion of, after duration of three
+years, ii. <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; compared with the Great
+War in Europe, <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; British attitude to
+democracy as determining attitude to the War, i. <a href=
+'#Page_77'>77</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_305'>5</a>; bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain,
+<a href='#Page2_299'>299</a> Union, The: British views of, i.
+<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; prognostications of its dissolution,
+<a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> War of
+Independence, i. <a href='#Page_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page_3'>3</a>,
+<a href='#Page_17'>17</a>; adjustments after the Treaty of Peace,
+<a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; as fostering militant patriotism, <a href=
+'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>; commercial
+relations after, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_18'>18</a> "War of 1812" i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>,
+<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>; causes leading
+to, <a href='#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>; New England
+opposition to, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>;
+effect of, on American National unity, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>
+<i>See also under</i> United States</p>
+<p>Anderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a></p>
+<p>Anderson's Mission, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; reports, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. <a href=
+'#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href='#Page_220'>20</a></p>
+<p>Anthropological Society of London, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_222'>222</a></p>
+<p>Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_105'>105</a>; effect of, on Lord Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page2_43'>43</a></p>
+<p>Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. <a href=
+'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a></p>
+<p>Argyll, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>; anti-slavery attitude of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_112'>112</a>; views of, in <i>Trent</i> crisis, i. <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>; on calamity of
+war with America, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_238'>238</a>; on Northern determination, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_30'>30</a></p>
+<p>Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a> <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>; attitude in the
+conflict, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>-<a href='#Page2_230'>30</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>; on the Presidential election,
+<a href='#Page2_235'>235</a>-<a href='#Page2_236'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_238'>238</a>; summary of military situation after Atlanta,
+<a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>; on "foreign war" rumours, <a href=
+'#Page2_251'>251</a>; cited or quoted, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>. (<i>See also
+under</i> Russell, W.H.)</p>
+<p>Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. <a href=
+'#Page_47'>47</a>; on British "superiority," <a href=
+'#Page_258'>258</a>; on the rule of aristocracy and growth of
+democracy, ii. <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a></p>
+<p>Arnold, <i>The History of the Cotton Famine</i>, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_6'>6</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_11'>11</a>; quoted: first effects of the war on the
+cotton trade, <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>-<a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>;
+cotton operatives' song, <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[6];
+on the members for Lancashire, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_27'>7</a></p>
+<p>Ashburton, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; Ashburton
+Mission, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a></p>
+<p>Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_233'>233</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>; effect of, on
+Northern attitude, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_234'>4</a>; effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, <a href=
+'#Page2_235'>235</a></p>
+<i>Atlantic Monthly</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; <a href='#Page_279'>279</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Bagley, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Balch, <i>The Alabama Arbitration</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Baligny. <i>See</i> Belligny</p>
+<p>Bancroft, Frederic, cited, i. <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>
+<i>note</i>; analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris
+negotiation, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>;
+view on Russell's aims in, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2] <i>Life of Seward</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href=
+'#Page_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>
+<i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[3]; <a href=
+'#Page_132'>132</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>,
+<a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_186'>186</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>
+<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>and note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_281'>281</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_99'>99</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_258'>258</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_310"></a>[V2:pg 310]</span>
+<p>Banks, Governor, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Baring, ii. <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Bath, Marquis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Beals, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a></p>
+<p>Bedford, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]</p>
+<p><i>Bee Hive, The,</i> cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_293'>293</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Beesly, Professor, speech of, at Trades Unions of London
+Meeting, ii. <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a></p>
+<p><i>Belfast Whig</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Belligny, French Consul at Charleston, i. <a href=
+'#Page_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>,
+<a href='#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and note</i>[4]</p>
+<p><i>Bell's Weekly Messenger</i>, quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_104'>104</a></p>
+<p>Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_5'>5</a>; Mercier's interview with, i. <a href=
+'#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>; report of, to
+Slidell on Mercier's visit, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; instructions of, to Slidell offering commercial
+advantages for French intervention, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2]; on idea of Confederate loan, <a href=
+'#Page2_158'>158</a>-<a href='#Page2_159'>9</a>; recalls Mason,
+<a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>; and recognition of the Confederacy,
+<a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; on the attitude of France to the
+Confederacy, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; plan of
+offering abolition of slavery in return for recognition, <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_292'>292</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Bentinck, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_269'>269</a></p>
+<p>Bernard, Montague: <i>Neutrality, The, of Great Britain during
+the American Civil War</i>, quoted, i., <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>
+<i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_138'>8</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>; cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>notes</i>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the American
+representations on the British Proclamation of Neutrality, i.
+<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>; on Declaration of Paris negotiations,
+<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page_138'>8</a>; on the
+Blockade, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>and notes</i> "Two
+Lectures on the Present American War": on recognition, cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_183'>183</a></p>
+<p>Bigelow, John, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[3]:
+<i>France and the Confederate Navy</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>Retrospections of an Active
+Life</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a> <i>note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_128'>128</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; Gladstone and the Cotton Loan, <a href=
+'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]; U.S. stimulation of
+immigration, <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1]; cited,
+<a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; Quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_254'>254</a>; advice of, on the political position in
+Britain; quoted, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>; cited, <a href=
+'#Page2_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Billault, M., i. <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_289'>289</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Birkbeck, Morris, <i>Letters from Illinois</i>, quoted, i.
+<a href='#Page_25'>25</a></p>
+<p><i>Birmingham Post</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>;
+letters of S.A. Goddard in support of emancipation in, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_108'>108</a>-<a href='#Page2_109'>9</a></p>
+<p>Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Bismarck, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a></p>
+<p>Black, Judge, American Secretary of State, i. <a href=
+'#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a></p>
+<p>Blackwood, John, political views of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_289'>289</a></p>
+<p><i>Blackwood's Magazine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; on cotton and the blockade, <a href=
+'#Page2_10'>10</a>; on French mediation proposals, <a href=
+'#Page2_68'>68</a>; on the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href=
+'#Page2_103'>103</a>; on democracy as cause of the war, <a href=
+'#Page2_278'>278</a>-<a href='#Page2_279'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_281'>281</a>, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a></p>
+<p>Blair, member of the United States Cabinet, i, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_252'>252</a></p>
+<p>Blockade of Southern Ports, the: Lincoln's declaration on, i.
+<a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a>; commencement of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a>; method of warning at the port, <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; as involving
+hardship to British merchants, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_246'>6</a>; effectiveness of, <a href=
+'#Page_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page_271'>71</a> <i>passim</i>;
+effect on British Trade, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>; effect on Cotton
+Trade, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_8'>8</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>; statistics as to effectiveness, i.
+<a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>note</i>[3] Southern Ports Bill, i.
+<a href='#Page_246'>246</a> <i>et seq.</i> Stone Boat Fleet
+Blockade, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_269'>269</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a> British attitude
+to, i. <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>,
+<a href='#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_263'>263</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; Parliamentary
+debate on, i. <a href='#Page_267'>267</a> <i>et seq.</i>; Gregory's
+motion <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>et seq.</i>; press attitude,
+<a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; Bright's view, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a> Confederate
+representations on, i. <a href='#Page_265'>265</a> Napoleon's view
+of, i. <a href='#Page_290'>290</a></p>
+<p>Booth, assassinator of Lincoln, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_258'>258</a>, <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_263'>263</a></p>
+<p>Border States, The: efforts at compromise, i. <a href=
+'#Page_49'>49</a>; sympathies in, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>; the
+"Border State policy" of Lincoln, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>,
+<a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>; and Confiscation
+Bill, Lincoln's fears, <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>; attitude of, to
+emancipation, ii. <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_87'>87</a>; not affected in
+Proclamation of Emancipation, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_311"></a>[V2:pg 311]</span>
+<p>Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a></p>
+<p>Boynton, Rev. C.B., <i>English and French Neutrality, etc.</i>,
+cited and quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Bright, John, i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; quoted on <i>Times</i> attitude towards
+the United States, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[3]; view
+of the Northern attempt at reconquest, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>;
+views of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality, <a href=
+'#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>; speech on
+<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_222'>2</a>; letter to Sumner on <i>Trent</i> affair,
+influence on Lincoln, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>; speech on
+Britain's attitude on conclusion of <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_241'>241</a>-<a href='#Page_242'>2</a>; view on the war as
+for abolition, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; on distress in
+Lancashire, ii. <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_14'>14</a>; view of the blockade, <a href=
+'#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; on the cotton
+shortage, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; and Gladstone's Newcastle
+speech, <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a>; view of Emancipation
+Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_105'>105</a>-<a href='#Page2_106'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_111'>111</a>-<a href='#Page2_112'>12</a>; on England's
+support if emancipation an object in the war, <a href=
+'#Page2_88'>88</a>-<a href='#Page2_89'>9</a>; the escape of the
+<i>Alabama</i>, <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a>; at Trades Unions of
+London meeting, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href='#Page2_293'>3</a>; support of the
+North, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_283'>283</a>-<a href='#Page2_284'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_295'>295</a>; on the interests of the unenfranchised in the
+American conflict, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_295'>295</a>; on the unfriendly neutrality of the
+Government, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>; rebuked by Palmerston,
+<a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; trouncing of Roebuck, <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; on Britain's neutrality
+(Nov., 1863), <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>; championship of
+democratic institutions, i. <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_222'>2</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_277'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_283'>283</a>; popularity of, as advocate of Northern cause,
+<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>;
+influence of, for the North, i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>; Lincoln's pardon
+of Alfred Rubery in honour of, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; quoted on feeling of the British Government and people
+towards United States in Jan., 1865, etc., <a href=
+'#Page2_247'>247</a>; confidence of, in pacific policy of Lincoln,
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; quoted on the
+ruling class and democracy, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>; attack on
+Southern aristocracy by, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a>; heads
+deputation to Adams, <a href='#Page2_294'>294</a>; eulogy of George
+Thompson by, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[1] Adams'
+opinion on, ii. <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>; view of, in <i>The
+Index</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_299'>9</a>; Laird's view of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_134'>134</a>; Karl Marx's view of, <a href=
+'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted on the
+oratory of, <a href='#Page2_290'>290</a> <i>note</i>[1], the
+<i>Times</i> attack on, <a href='#Page2_295'>295</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_296'>6</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_289'>289</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_281'>281</a>. (See also under <i>Morning Star</i>)</p>
+<p>British, <i>See also under</i> Great Britain</p>
+<p>British emigration to America, i. <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>
+<i>et seq</i>, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>; effect of American
+political ideals on, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_26'>26</a></p>
+<p>British Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_116'>116</a>-<a href='#Page_117'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>; application of, in American crisis, question
+in Commons, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>; Russell's idea of
+amending, ii. <a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_196'>196</a>; Russell's advice to Palmerston on, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a>; debate in Parliament on, <a href=
+'#Page2_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_134'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; Forster and the
+violation of, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>; Government reply to
+Liverpool shipowners on, <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>;
+<i>Kearsarge</i> incident, <a href='#Page2_202'>202</a></p>
+<p>British Press. <i>See under names of Papers and under subject
+headings</i></p>
+<p><i>British Standard</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>British travellers' views on America, i. <a href=
+'#Page_23'>23</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>,
+<a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a></p>
+<p>Brooks, i. <a href='#Page_80'>80</a></p>
+<p>Brougham, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_282'>282</a></p>
+<p>Brougham, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_19'>19</a></p>
+<p>Brown, John, raid of, i. <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Browning, Robert, pro-Northern sentiment of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_70'>70</a>; on stone-boat blockade, <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a>; on Slavery a factor in the struggle, <a href=
+'#Page_238'>238</a>-<a href='#Page_239'>9</a>; on British dismay at
+prospect of war in <i>Trent</i> crisis, <a href=
+'#Page_240'>240</a>; mentioned, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>
+<i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Bruce,--, British Ambassador in Washington, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[4]; report of American intentions
+against France in Mexico, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>
+<i>note</i>[4]; comment of, on Lincoln, Seward and Sumner, <a href=
+'#Page2_262'>262</a>; warns Russell of probable American demands at
+end of war, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_268'>268</a>; attitude to "piracy" proclamation, <a href=
+'#Page2_268'>268</a>. Otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>.</p>
+<p>Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador: on British policy, i.
+<a href='#Page_50'>50</a>-<a href='#Page_51'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_74'>74</a>; interpretation of Russell's "three months"
+statement, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a> <i>note</i>[1]; report of,
+on Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; interview of, with Russell on joint mediation
+offer, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_312"></a>[V2:pg 312]</span>
+<p>Bryce, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_188'>188</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_274'>274</a></p>
+<p>Buchanan, President, i. <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_278'>278</a></p>
+<p>Buckingham, James Silk, <i>America, Historical, Statistic and
+Descriptive</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Buckley, Victor, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>,
+<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a>; as affecting Seward's policy, considered,
+<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_156'>6</a>; effect of, in Great Britain: press views,
+<a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_178'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; official views,
+<a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; public opinion, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a></p>
+<p>Bullock, Captain J.D., Confederate Agent in Britain, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>; on the proposed use of the Laird
+rams, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_143'>143</a>; shipbuilding contracts of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>; <i>Secret
+Service under the Confederacy</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Bunch,--, British Consul at Charleston, description of Jockey
+Club dinner, i. <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>; on Southern anti-British
+sentiment, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>[2], ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[2]; instructions to, on the
+secession, i. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a> <i>note</i>[1]; appeal of,
+to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, <a href=
+'#Page2_52'>52</a>; characterizations of Southern leaders, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a>; view of President Davis, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a>; views on the South and secession, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>; characterizations
+of Southern Commissioners, <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>; negotiations
+of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris, <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page2_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page2_186'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>; attitude of, to
+the South, <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>and note</i>[4],
+<a href='#Page2_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; American complaints of, <a href=
+'#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>; recall of
+exequatur of, <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_187'>187</a> <i>et seq</i>., <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>-<a href='#Page2_195'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>; defence of his action in the Mure case,
+<a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page2_188'>188</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>;
+subsequent history of, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+view of, as scapegoat, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+on attitude to the Blockade, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>; on Southern intentions, <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; view of Southern
+determination, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on
+Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, <a href=
+'#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>; on effect
+of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, <a href=
+'#Page2_9'>9</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on burning of Mississippi cotton,
+<a href='#Page2_16'>16</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[4]; on the American system of
+government as the cause of the Civil War, <a href=
+'#Page2_278'>278</a> <i>note</i>[2] British attitude to the
+controversy over, i. <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_189'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>; French attitude,
+i. <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a> <i>note</i> Lyons' views on Bunch controversy,
+i. <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>,
+<a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Russell's views, i.
+<a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[4]
+Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_88'>88</a></p>
+<p>Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with
+America, ii. <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p>
+<p>Butler, General, order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i.
+<a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href='#Page_304'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; Palmerston and
+Adams controversy on, i. <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_305'>5</a>; Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Cairnes, Professor, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; pamphlet by, on "Slave Power," <a href=
+'#Page2_112'>112</a></p>
+<p><i>Caledonian Mercury</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>California, acquisition of, by U.S., i. <a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p>
+<p>Callahan,--, <i>Diplomatic History of the Southern
+Confederacy</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_167'>167</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a>
+<i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Campbell, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_292'>292</a>; ii, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a></p>
+<p>Canada: Rebellion of 1837 in, i.
+<a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_117'>117</a>; British fear of American attack on, i.
+<a href='#Page_4'>4</a>; sentiment in, as affected by the American
+Wars against England, <a href='#Page_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>;
+suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U.S., <a href=
+'#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href='#Page_55'>5</a>; "compensation" in, idea
+in British press, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_55'>5</a>; and in views of American political leaders,
+<a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_69'>69</a>-<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>; military defence of,
+in <i>Trent</i> crisis, i. <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_241'>241</a>-<a href='#Page_242'>2</a>; views in, on
+<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; on
+British policy and defence, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>
+<i>note</i>; view of the <i>Times</i> in, <a href=
+'#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i> Free Trade policy and, a Southern
+premonition as to, i. <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> Reciprocity Treaty
+of, with U.S., ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a> Otherwise
+mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_254'>254</a>, <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a></p>
+<p>Canning, i. II, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_20'>20</a></p>
+<p>Cardwell, ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a></p>
+<p>Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_313"></a>[V2:pg 313]</span>
+<p>Carolina, South, secession of, i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>,
+<a href='#Page_43'>43</a>-<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_4'>4</a>; seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. <a href=
+'#Page_52'>52</a>; requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter,
+<a href='#Page_117'>117</a></p>
+<p>"Caroline" affair, The, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a></p>
+<p>Case, Walter M., <i>James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat</i>,
+cited and quoted, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_161'>161</a> <i>and note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Catacazy, C., and mediation by Russia, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_251'>251</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a></p>
+<p>Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i.
+<a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; supports Roebuck's motion, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_176'>6</a>; on Committee of Southern Independence
+Association, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a></p>
+<p>Charleston, S.C.: Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>; seizure
+of customs house at, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>; British appeal on
+question of port dues at, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_244'>244</a>; "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, <a href=
+'#Page_253'>253</a>; evacuation of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a></p>
+<p>Charleston <i>Mercury</i>, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_5'>5</a></p>
+<p>Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>,
+<a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>; quarrel with Seward, <a href=
+'#Page2_72'>72</a></p>
+<p>Chase, W.H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>Chattanooga, ii. <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a></p>
+<p>Cheever, Rev. Dr., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Chenery, ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a></p>
+<p>Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a></p>
+<p>Chesson, F.W., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Chicago Convention, the, i. <a href='#Page_175'>175</a></p>
+<p>Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_184'>184</a></p>
+<p>Chittenden, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a></p>
+<p>Clanricarde, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a></p>
+<p>Clarendon, Earl of, i. <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_58'>8</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Russell's mediation
+project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, <a href=
+'#Page2_57'>57</a>-<a href='#Page2_58'>8</a></p>
+<p>Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation
+of, i. <a href='#Page_113'>113</a></p>
+<p>Cobden, i. <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; quoted, on the
+<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; opinion of
+Seward, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; and Sumner,
+<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; on Palmerston's action in
+<i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, <a href=
+'#Page_232'>232</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_289'>289</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a></p>
+<p>Collie, ii. <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a></p>
+<p>Collier, legal advice of, on <i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>-<a href='#Page2_119'>9</a></p>
+<p>Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_83'>83</a></p>
+<p>Columbia, S.C., burning of, ii. <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a></p>
+<p>Combe, George, <i>Notes on the United States, etc.</i>, cited,
+i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the: Bunch's
+characterization of, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>; unofficial
+interview with Russell, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_86'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_158'>158</a>; protest against closing of British ports,
+<a href='#Page_170'>170</a> <i>note</i>[2]; replaced by "Special
+Commissioners," <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>; attempt to make use of
+the <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>; British
+attitude to, not modified by <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_235'>235</a>; policy of, with regard to recognition and the
+blockade, i. <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>5</a>,
+<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_300'>300</a>; acquire a "confidential" document, <a href=
+'#Page_265'>265</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; hopes of, from Parliament,
+<a href='#Page_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a>; instructions of the first Commissioners, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; failure of the first
+Commission, <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>-<a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>;
+suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; slavery abolition offer, <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a> Confederate Agents' correspondence,
+collections of, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>[1]
+<i>See also under personal names</i></p>
+<p>Confederates, <i>See under</i> Southern States</p>
+<p>Confiscation Bill, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>; Lincoln's attitude to, <a href=
+'#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_84'>84</a>; Lord Russell's
+comment on, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a></p>
+<p><i>Constitutionel</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Continental Press and American News, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Corcoran, ii. <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_314"></a>[V2:pg 314]</span>
+<p>Cotton supplies and slavery, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>; in
+British-American commercial relations, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>,
+<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; British manufacturers' dependence on,
+<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; effect of the Civil War on, <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_53'>53</a>; the crop of 1860 ... ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_7'>7</a> Blockade, The, and, i. <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_9'>9</a>; effect of, on price, i. <a href=
+'#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>; Napoleon's views
+on, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> England, need of, for, i. <a href=
+'#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_197'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>,
+<a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_99'>99</a>; cotton famine in, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_11'>11</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>-<a href='#Page2_7'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_8'>8</a>; first effects of the war on, <a href=
+'#Page2_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_10'>10</a>. <i>See also under</i> Lancashire. France,
+necessity of, for cotton, i. <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_300'>300</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_17'>17</a>; Mercier's plan
+to relieve, i. <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a> Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on
+price of, ii. <a href='#Page2_48'>48</a>; "King Cotton" theory, i.
+<a href='#Page_63'>63</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a> <i>et
+seq.</i>; belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy,
+<a href='#Page2_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> Southern orders for
+destruction of, ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_17'>17</a> <i>note</i>[4]; effect of, on British officials,
+<a href='#Page2_17'>17</a></p>
+<p>Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. <a href=
+'#Page_88'>88</a>; reports French agreement with British policy on
+Southern belligerent rights, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>; in the
+Declaration of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>,
+<a href='#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>; conversations
+with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>;
+disturbed at French evasion of direct support, <a href=
+'#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a> <i>note</i>[1]; in <i>Trent</i> affair fears
+war with America, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>; communications on
+Southern Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill,
+<a href='#Page_247'>247</a>; on French policy in Mexico, <a href=
+'#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; quoted, on Thouvenel's view on
+mediation in Feb., 1862 ... i. <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href=
+'#Page_288'>288</a>; statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with
+Napoleon, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>; on the possibility of
+reunion, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>; on the blockade, <a href=
+'#Page_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page_291'>1</a>; denial of Napoleon's
+"offer" to England, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_291'>291</a>; reports of, on Lindsay's mission, <a href=
+'#Page_291'>291</a>-<a href='#Page_292'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, <a href=
+'#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_294'>4</a>; Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted,
+<a href='#Page_295'>295</a> <i>note</i>[2]; interview with
+Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a> <i>and note</i>,
+<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; on Napoleon's suggestion of joint
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; instructed to notify France
+of England's view of the war as ended and of attitude to
+Confederate cruisers, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_267'>7</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_218'>218</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_148'>148</a></p>
+<p>Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce,
+i. <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></p>
+<p>Crittenden, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>Daily Gazette</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p><i>Daily News</i>, attitude of, during the American Civil War,
+i. <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>-<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and
+note</i> <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>,
+<a href='#Page_181'>181</a>-<a href='#Page_182'>2</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3], on Lincoln's message to
+Congress, i. <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>; letters of W.W. Story in,
+<a href='#Page_228'>228</a></p>
+<p><i>Daily Telegraph</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], attitude and circulation of, <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. <a href=
+'#Page_62'>62</a>; lack of instructions on American intentions,
+<a href='#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_112'>112</a>; communications with Lord Russell, <a href=
+'#Page_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_74'>74</a>; despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions,
+<a href='#Page_66'>66</a>-<a href='#Page_67'>7</a>; Russell's
+pledge of delay to, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>; report on
+proposed British joint action with France, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>-<a href='#Page_85'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_86'>86</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Dana, R.H., cited, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>; <i>The Trent
+Affair</i>, cited, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_205'>205</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_237'>237</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Danish question, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_205'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a></p>
+<p>Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_180'>180</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Davis, Bancroft, <i>Times</i> correspondent in New York, i.
+<a href='#Page_56'>56</a></p>
+<p>Davis, Jefferson, personal characteristics of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_82'>82</a>: ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; attitude of,
+in the opening of the crisis, i. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; elected
+President of the Southern Government, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>,
+<a href='#Page_81'>81</a>; foreign policy of, <a href=
+'#Page_81'>81</a>-<a href='#Page_82'>2</a>; aristocratic views of,
+on government, ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; proclamation of,
+on marque and privateering, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>; defensive
+measures of, in the South, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>; on Bunch's
+negotiations on Declaration of Paris, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>;
+replaces Confederate agents to Europe, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>;
+and the African Slave Trade, ii. <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's
+Emancipation Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4]; on England's conduct towards the South, <a href=
+'#Page2_184'>184</a>; on Southern disorganization, <a href=
+'#Page2_219'>219</a>; flight of, from Richmond, <a href=
+'#Page2_248'>248</a>; approves plan of offering abolition of
+slavery in return for recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>;
+capture of, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a> British views on, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> Bunch's characterization of, i.
+<a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>
+<i>note</i>[4] Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_47'>47</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>
+<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_283'>283</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_315"></a>[V2:pg 315]</span>
+<p>Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. <a href=
+'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_143'>143</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_167'>167</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>,
+<a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_300'>300</a></p>
+<p>de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. <i>See under</i> Brunow</p>
+<p>de Flahault, French Ambassador. <i>See under</i> Flahault</p>
+<p><i>Debats</i>: French press views on military situation, cited,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p><i>De Bow's Review</i>, eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_2'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_4'>4</a>; on cotton and slavery, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a>;
+view of England's action on blockade, <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>Declaration of Paris, The, i. <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>,
+<a href='#Page_139'>139</a>-<a href='#Page_140'>40</a>; attitude of
+United States to, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_141'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>; American offer of
+adherence during the Civil War, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>,
+<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_142'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_151'>151</a></p>
+<p>Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. <a href=
+'#Page_137'>137</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>,
+<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>; British suggestion to France in, i.
+<a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_147'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_157'>157</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; American offer of
+adherence, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_142'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_151'>151</a>; convention agreed between Britain, France, and
+America, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>-<a href='#Page_143'>3</a>;
+addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed
+by Lord Russell, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a>; American rejection of convention, <a href=
+'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a> American argument at Geneva on effect of
+British diplomacy in, i. <a href='#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[2]
+Confederates: approach of, in the negotiation, i. <a href=
+'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page_186'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_193'>193</a>; Confederate Congress resolution of approval
+in, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> Convention, the, proposed by U.S.
+Cowley's opinion on, i. <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]; Thouvenel's opinion on, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>;
+Palmerston's suggestion on, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4] Seward's motives in, <i>See under</i> Seward</p>
+<p>Delane, editor of the <i>Times:</i> Palmerston's letters to, on
+American rights in interception of Confederate Commissioners, i.
+<a href='#Page_207'>207</a>-<a href='#Page_208'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_209'>209</a>; close relations of, with Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_145'>145</a>; anticipations of Southern victory, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; on prospective war
+with America, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>; effect of Sherman's
+arrival at Savannah on, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_301'>1</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_65'>65</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_289'>289</a></p>
+<p>de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_63'>63</a> <i>note</i>[5], <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a></p>
+<p>Democratic element in British Society: lack of press
+representation, i. <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_41'>41</a></p>
+<p>Democracy: British views on American institutions, i. <a href=
+'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_30'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a>; view of the
+American struggle as a failure of, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>
+<i>et seq. passim;</i> Press comments on the lesson from failure of
+American democratic institutions, <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>; bearing of the Civil War on, <a href=
+'#Page2_299'>299</a>; aristocratic and conservative attitude to,
+<a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>; rise of
+democratic feeling in Great Britain, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>;
+effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a></p>
+<p>Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. <a href=
+'#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; attitude
+to recognition and mediation, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_77'>77</a>; attacks governmental policy in relation to
+Laird Rams and Southern shipbuilding, <a href=
+'#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>50</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a>; approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation
+proposals, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>-<a href='#Page2_155'>5</a>;
+speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's
+assassination, <a href='#Page2_263'>263</a>; attacks Government on
+American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war, <a href=
+'#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href='#Page2_268'>8</a>; attitude to
+expansion of the franchise, i. <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>,
+<a href='#Page_295'>295</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a></p>
+<p><i>Dial</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. <a href=
+'#Page_79'>79</a>; on <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_241'>241</a>; connection with Lindsay's motion, <a href=
+'#Page_292'>292</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; approval of neutrality,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_77'>77</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; in Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>;
+attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a>; speech, of, on the motion for the Address to
+the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, <a href=
+'#Page2_263'>263</a>-<a href='#Page2_264'>4</a>; Reform Bill of
+(1867) ... <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>and note</i>[1]
+Mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_316"></a>[V2:pg 316]</span>
+<p>Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; reply to Mason, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_251'>1</a></p>
+<p>D'Oubril, ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4],
+<a href='#Page2_62'>62</a> <i>note</i>[5]</p>
+<p>Doyle, Percy, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>Dublin News</i>, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>,
+<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>Dubuque Sun</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Dudley, U.S. Consul at Liverpool, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Dufferin, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></p>
+<p>Duffus, R.L., "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the
+American Civil War," i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+quoted, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>;
+cited, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_112'>112</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Dumfermline, Lady, i. <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Dumping of British goods: effect on American feeling, i.
+<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>Economist</i>, The: attitude in the struggle, i. <a href=
+'#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_174'>4</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>;
+cited or quoted: on Lincoln's election, i. <a href=
+'#Page_39'>39</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on impossibility of Northern
+reconquest, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; on secession an accomplished
+fact, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>;
+on Bull Run, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; on cotton shortage, i.
+<a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_15'>15</a>; on servile insurrection, <a href=
+'#Page2_79'>79</a>; on Cotton Loan, <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_162'>162</a>; on Roebuck's motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_173'>173</a>; on extension of the franchise, <a href=
+'#Page2_277'>277</a>; on American institutions and statesmen,
+<a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>-<a href='#Page2_280'>80</a></p>
+<p><i>Edinburgh Review</i>, The: attitude to slavery, i. <a href=
+'#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_281'>281</a>; attitude in the conflict, i. <a href=
+'#Page_42'>42</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; on recognition, <a href=
+'#Page2_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on the Emancipation
+Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a>; on the causes of the
+war, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a></p>
+<p>Elliot, charg&eacute;, i. <a href='#Page_14'>14</a></p>
+<p>Elliott, E.N., editor of <i>Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery
+Arguments</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. <a href='#Page2_74'>74</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_86'>86</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>;
+idea of military necessity for, <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_87'>87</a>; Lincoln's alleged purpose in, <a href=
+'#Page2_87'>87</a>; purpose of, according to Seward, <a href=
+'#Page2_99'>99</a>-<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>; viewed as an
+incitement to servile insurrection, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[6]
+American reception of, ii. <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_105'>105</a> British attitude to, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_101'>101</a> <i>et seq.</i>; Press denunciation of,
+<a href='#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_106'>106</a>; public meetings in favour of, <a href=
+'#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a>; English women's
+support of, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>; Nonconformist support,
+<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>;
+Emancipation societies support of, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>
+Confiscation Bill, <i>See that heading</i> <i>See also</i> Border
+States <i>and sub-heading under</i> Lincoln</p>
+<p>Emigration, British, to America, i. <a href=
+'#Page_23'>23</a>-<a href='#Page_24'>4</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_200'>200</a>-<a href='#Page2_201'>1</a>; <i>Kearsarge</i>
+incident, <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_201'>1</a></p>
+<p>England: cotton famine. <i>See under</i> Cotton. <i>See</i>
+Great Britain</p>
+<p>Erlanger &amp; Co. and Confederate Cotton Loan, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_158'>158</a>-<a href='#Page_160'>60</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page2_162'>162</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a></p>
+<p>Eustis, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Evans, William, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of
+Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i.
+<a href='#Page_90'>90</a></p>
+<p>Expatriation, American and British views on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_16'>16</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Fairfax, Lieut., of the <i>San Jacinto</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_205'>205</a></p>
+<p>Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts,"
+ii. <a href='#Page2_12'>12</a> <i>note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a></p>
+<p>Fawcett, Prof., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Featherstonaugh, G.W., <i>Excursion through the Slave
+States</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Federals. <i>See under</i> Northern</p>
+<p>Ferguson, Sir James, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a></p>
+<p>Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p>
+<p><i>Fishmongers of London</i>: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a></p>
+<p>Fitzwilliam, Hon. C., ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a></p>
+<p>Flahault, M. de, French Ambassador, i. <a href=
+'#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_260'>260</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>,
+<a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_45'>45</a></p>
+<p>Forbes, J.M., and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_297'>297</a></p>
+<p>Forbes, J.M., quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for
+Democracy, ii. <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_317"></a>[V2:pg 317]</span>
+<p>Forster, William E., i. <a href='#Page_58'>58</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; a friend of the North, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>; quoted, on
+Harriet Martineau, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+question in Commons on privateering, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>,
+<a href='#Page_157'>157</a>; speech against Gregory's motion on
+blockade, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>;
+speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a>; close touch with Adams, <a href=
+'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>; attacks Government
+in debate on Southern shipbuilding, <a href='#Page2_133'>133</a>;
+rebuked by Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; in Roebuck's
+motion, <a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>-<a href='#Page2_172'>2</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>; comment on Southern meetings,
+<a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_274'>274</a></p>
+<p>Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note[1]</i>,
+<a href='#Page_274'>274</a></p>
+<p>Fox, G.V.: <i>Confidential Correspondence</i>, cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_257'>257</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page_268'>268</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[3]; quoted, on Confederate
+ironclads in England, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. <a href=
+'#Page_6'>6</a>; and American contentions on neutral rights,
+<a href='#Page_18'>18</a>; Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a> <i>note</i>[2] Cotton: lack of, i.
+<a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href='#Page_294'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_17'>17</a> Mediation and armistice, attitude to British
+unofficial overture on, ii. <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_39'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_46'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_60'>60</a> Ministerial crisis, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a> Neutrality of, i. <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>;
+Northern sentiment on, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2] Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great
+Britain, i. <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>,
+<a href='#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page_250'>50</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; break in,
+<a href='#Page2_77'>77</a> Press of, and the events in U.S., ii.
+<a href='#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>See also under</i> Mercier,
+Napoleon, Thouvenel, <i>and under subject-headings</i></p>
+<p><i>Fraser's Magazine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>; J.S.
+Mill's articles in, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a></p>
+<p>Fraser, Trenholm &amp; Company: Confederate financial agents in
+Liverpool, ii. <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_157'>157</a></p>
+<p>Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_203'>203</a></p>
+<p>Free Trade, i. <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_304'>304</a></p>
+<p>Freeman, E.A., <i>History of Federal Government</i>, cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page2_153'>3</a></p>
+<p>Fremont, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Gallenga,----, <i>Times</i> correspondent in New York, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a></p>
+<p>Gait, Sir J.T., i. <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Galveston, Tex. i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+ii. <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page2_268'>268</a></p>
+<p>Garrison, W.L., American abolitionist, editor of the
+<i>Liberator</i>, i. <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Garrison, <i>Garrison</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>
+<i>notes</i></p>
+<p>Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British
+Neutrality, in, i. <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>; American argument
+before, on Declaration of Paris, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>German opinion on the Civil War, i. <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+press attitude, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Germany: the <i>Index</i> quoted on "aid given by, to the
+North," ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a></p>
+<p>Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the <i>Times</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> <i>The Englishman in
+Kansas</i>, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Gladstone, W.E., i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_78'>78</a>; fear of war with America in <i>Trent</i> affair,
+<a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; influence of the commercial situation
+on, ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>; attitude to intervention,
+<a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page2_27'>27</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_30'>30</a>-<a href='#Page2_31'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a>; Newcastle speech,
+<a href='#Page2_47'>47</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>
+<i>and notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_58'>58</a>; memorandum in reply to Lewis, <a href=
+'#Page2_57'>57</a>; supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and
+blockade, ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_69'>69</a>; account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's
+suggestion, <a href='#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; idea of
+offering Canada to the North, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; and the Confederate Cotton
+Loan, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]; reply of, in
+Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_171'>1</a>; quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to
+democracy, <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a>-<a href='#Page2_283'>3</a>
+Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>,
+<a href='#Page_266'>266</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page2_77'>77</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_80'>80</a></p>
+<p>Goddard, S.A., ii. <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a> <i>Letters on
+the American Rebellion</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_108'>108</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Godkin, E.L., <i>Daily News</i> correspondent, i. <a href=
+'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Golder, Dr. F.A., cited, i. <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]. "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_318"></a>[V2:pg 318]</span>
+<p>Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for
+foreign war, ii. <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Gorgas, Col., ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Gortchakoff, comment of, on Russell's mediation plan, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]; and idea of Russian
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a> <i>note</i>[1]; mentioned,
+i. <a href='#Page_164'>164</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Grant, General, capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i.
+<a href='#Page_273'>273</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_274'>274</a>; victory at Shiloh, <a href=
+'#Page_278'>278</a>; captures New Orleans, <a href=
+'#Page_279'>279</a>; Western campaign of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_184'>184</a>-<a href='#Page2_185'>5</a>; capture of
+Vicksburg by, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>; advance to Richmond, <a href=
+'#Page2_217'>217</a>, <a href='#Page2_219'>219</a>; siege of
+Southern lines at Petersburg, <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; capture
+of Petersburg and Richmond by, <a href=
+'#Page2_247'>247</a>-<a href='#Page2_248'>8</a>; <i>Times</i>
+report of reverses to, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>; condition of
+his army, Southern account in <i>Times</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_227'>227</a>; W.H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign,
+<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>; Henry
+Adams, quoted, on, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a> Otherwise
+mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a></p>
+<p>Grant's <i>The Newspaper Press</i>, cited and quoted, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Granville, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, quoted, <a href=
+'#Page_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on difficulties in Washington
+and attitude of neutrality, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; opposition
+of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. <a href='#Page2_42'>42</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; mentioned, i.
+<a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Grattan, Thomas Colley, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>;
+<i>Civilized America</i>, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Great Britain: Citizenship, theory of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_6'>6</a> Colonial system: trade
+basis of, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>,
+<a href='#Page_21'>21</a> Commercial relations with America after
+independence, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> <i>et seq</i>., <a href=
+'#Page_22'>22</a> Franchise, expansion of the, in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_274'>274</a>, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_277'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_302'>302</a>, <a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_304'>304</a>; effect of the American example on political
+agitation in, <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a>; connection of the
+American struggle with the franchise movement in, <a href=
+'#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>; Radical
+acceptance of the challenge on democracy, <a href=
+'#Page2_282'>282</a>, <a href='#Page2_283'>283</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_290'>290</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_300'>300</a>; aristocratic and conservative attitude to
+democracy, <a href='#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> Policy toward
+America: conditions affecting, i. <a href='#Page_2'>2</a> <i>et
+seq</i>. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_270'>270</a>; the right of search controversy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_6'>6</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>; territorial expansion
+<a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_16'>16</a>; extension of slavery, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>,
+<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>; Mexican War, <a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>-<a href='#Page_16'>16</a>; commercial interests,
+<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>-<a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; in the Civil
+War, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>-<a href='#Page_54'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_199'>199</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_272'>2</a>; influence of democracy in determining, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page_305'>5</a>; policy of
+joint action with France. <i>see under</i> France. <i>See also
+under</i> Lyons, Russell, <i>and subject-headings.</i> Public
+opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America, i.
+<a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_28'>28</a>, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a> Public opinion and
+official views in, at the opening of the Civil War, i. <a href=
+'#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; doubts of Northern
+cause, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>;
+attitude to recognition of the South, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], on secession, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a> Trade: exclusive basis
+in, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>,
+<a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; effect of American retaliatory system
+on, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>; free trade theory, <a href=
+'#Page_21'>21</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a>; hopes from
+cotton interests, i. <a href='#Page_22'>22</a> Working classes in:
+Northern sympathies of, ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1] <i>See also
+subject-headings</i></p>
+<p>Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p>
+<p>Greeley, Horace, editor of <i>New York Times</i>, attack on
+Seward by, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and
+Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>;
+Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, <a href=
+'#Page2_92'>92</a>-<a href='#Page_93'>3</a></p>
+<p>Gregg, Percy, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South), i. <a href=
+'#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; motion of, for recognition of the
+South, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>,
+<a href='#Page_108'>108</a>; advice to Mason on blockade question,
+<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; motion to urge the blockade
+ineffective, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_272'>72</a>; speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a> <i>and
+note</i>; quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and
+recognition, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; view of Roebuck's
+motion, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>; question of, on the
+destruction of British property in America, <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a>; mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_319"></a>[V2:pg 319]</span>
+<p>Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a></p>
+<p>Greville. Colonel, ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Grey, Sir George, i. <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_207'>207</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_263'>263</a></p>
+<p>Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page_124'>4</a></p>
+<p>Gros, Baron, ii. <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_170'>170</a></p>
+<p>Grote, George, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_1'>1</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Haliburton, T.C., ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Hall, Capt. Basil, <i>Travels in North America</i>, cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_26'>26</a>-<a href='#Page_27'>7</a></p>
+<p>Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Hamilton, R.C., "The English Press and the Civil War," i.
+<a href='#Page_38'>38</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, <i>Men and Manners in America</i>,
+quoted, i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></p>
+<p>Hammond, E., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. <a href=
+'#Page_189'>189</a>; enquiry as to possible action of American Navy
+to intercept Southern Commissioners, <a href=
+'#Page_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page_207'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_142'>142</a>; letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird
+Rams, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[4]; quoted, on
+public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, <a href=
+'#Page2_66'>66</a>; mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a></p>
+<p>Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_2'>2</a>-<a href='#Page2_3'>3</a></p>
+<p>"Hampton Roads Conference," The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page_253'>3</a></p>
+<p>Harcourt, Sir William, quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship
+during the American Civil War, i. <a href='#Page_1'>1</a>; letters
+of, in the <i>Times</i> on questions of International Law, i.
+<a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_63'>63</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; <i>and see under</i>
+"Historicus"</p>
+<p>Hardwicke, Earl, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Harris, T.L., <i>The Trent Affair</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_203'>203</a> <i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_282'>282</a> <i>note</i>[2]; citations of anti-Americanism
+in <i>Times</i>, i. <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a></p>
+<p>Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. <a href=
+'#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe by Treaty</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_94'>94</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>"Historicus," Letters of, to the <i>Times</i>, cited and quoted,
+i. <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page2_104'>104</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_138'>138</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Holmes, O.W., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Hood, General, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Hope, A.J. Beresford, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>-<a href='#Page2_282'>2</a></p>
+<p>Hopwood, i. <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_21'>21</a></p>
+<p>Horsfall, Mr., ii. <a href='#Page2_153'>153</a></p>
+<p>Horton, Wilmot, i. <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>; Committee on
+Emigration to America, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_24'>24</a></p>
+<p>Hotze, H., Confederate agent, quoted on effect of <i>Trent</i>
+affair, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; descriptive account of his
+activities, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and
+the "foul blot" phrase, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a>; and the
+Southern arming of negroes, <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a>;
+mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>
+Hotze Papers, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Houghton, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a></p>
+<p>Hughes, Thomas, i. <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Hunt, James, <i>The Negro's Place in Nature</i>, cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_222'>222</a></p>
+<p>Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. <a href='#Page2_8'>8</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_14'>14</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. <a href=
+'#Page_264'>264</a></p>
+<p>Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_84'>84</a></p>
+<p>Hunter, Mr., editor of the <i>Herald,</i> ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_213'>213</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Huse, Caleb, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_159'>159</a></p>
+<p>Huskisson, cited, i. <a href='#Page_20'>20</a></p>
+<p>Huxley's criticism of Hunt's <i>The Negro's Place in Nature</i>,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_222'>222</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i.
+<a href='#Page_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_8'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p>
+<p><i>Index, The</i>, ii., <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]; agitation of, for recognition of the South and
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>-<a href='#Page_34'>4</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>-<a href='#Page_154'>4</a>; on
+Gladstone's Newcastle speech, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, <a href=
+'#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>
+<i>and note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>; on reply to
+French joint mediation offer, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_69'>9</a>; on Laird Rams, <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents,
+<a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_165'>5</a>; connection with Hotze, <a href=
+'#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and the fall of Vicksburg,
+<a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; on French press and policy of France, <a href=
+'#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a>;
+reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, <a href=
+'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and
+notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a>; comments on the
+Palmerston-Mason interview, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_216'>6</a>; criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; view of mediation,
+<a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>; defence of slavery in the South,
+<a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>-<a href='#Page_222'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_240'>240</a>-<a href='#Page_241'>1</a>; criticism of the
+<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; quotations from the
+French press on the war, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; and the Presidential election, <a href=
+'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Germany's aid to the North,
+<a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on reception of
+Northern deputations by Adams, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; on characteristics of Southern leaders and society,
+<a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>; view of Northern democracy, <a href=
+'#Page2_287'>287</a>; denunciation of the Manchester School
+<a href='#Page2_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_181'>181</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_186'>186</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[3],
+<a href='#Page2_199'>199</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_242'>242</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_320"></a>[V2:pg 320]</span>
+<p>Ionian Islands, control of, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a></p>
+<p>Ireland: Irish emigration to America, i. <a href=
+'#Page_29'>29</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_200'>200</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>; enlistments in, for Northern forces, <a href=
+'#Page2_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a>; the
+<i>Kearsarge</i> incident, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_202'>2</a>; petitions circulated in, in support of the
+North, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a></p>
+<p>Italy, disturbances in, ii. <a href='#Page2_29'>29</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia: effect of, on
+Russell and Palmerston, ii. <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a></p>
+<p>Jackson, W.A., ii. <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a></p>
+<p>James, <i>William Wetmore Story and his Friends</i>, quoted, i.
+<a href='#Page_228'>228</a> <i>and note</i>[4]; cited, <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p><i>James Adger</i>, The, American war-ship, i. <a href=
+'#Page_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Jameson, Professor J.F., ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Japan: Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against, i.
+<a href='#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Jefferson, President, i. <a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a></p>
+<p>Jewett, J.P., quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p><i>John Bull</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>;
+quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>;
+Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_179'>179</a>-<a href='#Page_180'>80</a></p>
+<p>Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a></p>
+<p>Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>. <a href=
+'#Page2_195'>195</a>. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a></p>
+<p>"Justicia," letters of, in the <i>Times</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_217'>217</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Kansas border struggles, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a></p>
+<p><i>Kearsarge</i> incident, The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a></p>
+<p>Kelly, William, <i>Across the Rocky Mountains, etc.</i>, cited
+and quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Kennedy, William, <i>Texas, etc.</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Kenner, Duncan F., Confederate Commissioner, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page2_250'>50</a></p>
+<p>Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_173'>173</a></p>
+<p>Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_175'>175</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>La France</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Laird Brothers: builders of the <i>Alabama</i> and <i>Laird
+Rams</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_120'>120</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page2_122'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a>; prosecution of, demanded, <a href=
+'#Page2_136'>136</a>; officially ordered not to send Rams on trial
+trip, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a>;
+Government's correspondence with, <a href='#Page2_146'>146</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_150'>50</a></p>
+<p>Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a></p>
+<p>Laird Rams, the, ii. <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_122'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_140'>140</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_196'>196</a>;
+description and purpose of, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>and</i>
+<i>note</i>[1]; British Government position, <a href=
+'#Page2_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>; rumours
+regarding, <a href='#Page2_142'>142</a>-<a href='#Page_143'>3</a>;
+seizure of, <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_150'>50</a>, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_180'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>; suit for damages,
+<a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1]; British Government
+purchase of, <a href='#Page2_151'>151</a> <i>note</i>[1]; U.S. Navy
+plan to purchase, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+usual historical treatment of the incident, <a href=
+'#Page2_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Lamar, Confederate representative: account of Roebuck and
+Bright, ii. <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Lancashire: Cotton trade, distress in, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_6'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_11'>11</a> <i>et seq.</i>,
+<a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_29'>29</a>, <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_240'>240</a>; attitude in, to Government policy, <a href=
+'#Page2_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page2_11'>11</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>; attitude of the
+"Cotton Lords" to, <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_16'>16</a>; Farnall report on, <a href='#Page2_12'>12</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>; Northern sympathies of cotton
+operatives, <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_285'>285</a> <i>note</i>[1] Cotton factories, statistics,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a> Cotton manufacturers, attack on in
+Commons, ii. <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_164'>4</a></p>
+<p><i>Lane, Franklin K., Letters of</i>, cited ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Layard, reply of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>; on destruction
+of British property in America, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a></p>
+<p><i>Le Si&egrave;cle</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_321"></a>[V2:pg 321]</span>
+<p>Lee, General, turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>; defeated at Antietam, <a href=
+'#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>; retreat of, through
+Shenandoah valley, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>; advance in
+Pennsylvania, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>; defeats Hooker
+at Chancellorsville, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>; retreat from
+Gettysburg, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_297'>297</a>; defence of Richmond, <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>; surrender,
+<a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>-<a href='#Page2_257'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_303'>303</a> <i>Times</i>, quoted or cited, on his
+campaign, ii. <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_256'>256</a>, <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a></p>
+<p>Lees, Mr., ii, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a></p>
+<p>Lempriere, Dr., i. <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a></p>
+<p>Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>,
+<a href='#Page_78'>78</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_94'>94</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>; views of, on the
+Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>; article on "The Election of President
+Lincoln and its Consequences," i. <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>
+<i>note</i>; fears war with America in <i>Trent</i> affair,
+<a href='#Page_215'>215</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>;
+objections of, to mediation, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_44'>44</a>-<a href='#Page2_46'>6</a>; Hereford speech of,
+in reply to Gladstone, <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page2_58'>58</a>; view of the
+Emancipation Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>; action of,
+on Russell's proposed intervention, <a href='#Page2_52'>52</a>
+<i>et seq</i>., <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_74'>4</a>; memorandum of, on British policy in opposition
+to Russell, <a href='#Page2_62'>62</a>-<a href='#Page2_63'>3</a>;
+account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion,
+<a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>-<a href='#Page2_65'>5</a>; Hereford
+speech, effect on Adams, ii. <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>;
+Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, <a href=
+'#Page2_56'>56</a>; Russell's reply to Lewis, <a href=
+'#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a></p>
+<p><i>Liberator, The</i>, Garrison's abolition organ, i. <a href=
+'#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a> <i>and note</i>[3];
+<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_47'>47</a>; cited or quoted, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; III <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_184'>184</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_237'>237</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_240'>240</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_289'>289</a></p>
+<p>Liebknecht, W., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Lincoln, President, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>
+Characteristics of, i. <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_127'>127</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>8</a>; influence of, in
+Britain, ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> Election and
+inauguration, i. <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_48'>48</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; inaugural
+address, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>,
+<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; personal
+view of terms of election, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; popular views
+on <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_115'>115</a> Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_119'>119</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>; and defend
+Federal forts, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>; attitude to Seward's
+foreign war policy, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_120'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>; reply to Seward's
+"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," <a href=
+'#Page_119'>119</a>-<a href='#Page_120'>20</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_124'>124</a>; modifies Despatch No. <a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_127'>7</a>; attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, <a href=
+'#Page_121'>121</a> 122; emergency measures of, <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a> <i>Policy and
+views of, on:</i>-- Blockade proclamation, i. <a href=
+'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>. <i>See
+heading</i> Blockade Border State policy of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>
+Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_84'>84</a> Emancipation Proclamation of, <i>See
+that heading</i> Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href='#Page2_253'>3</a> Intervention, on,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a> Piracy proclamation, i. <a href=
+'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_160'>160</a> Servile insurrection, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_83'>83</a> Slavery: inaugural address on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_38'>38</a>. <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>; view of the terms
+of his election regarding, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>; denial of
+emancipation as an issue, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_88'>88</a>; reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[3]; declarations on, <a href=
+'#Page2_78'>78</a>; conversations with Sumner on, <a href=
+'#Page2_82'>82</a>; attitude to emancipation, <a href=
+'#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_84'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>; and anti-slavery
+sentiment, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>; denial of, as a cause of the
+war, <a href='#Page2_88'>88</a>; reply to Schurz on emancipation,
+<a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; reply to Greeley, <a href=
+'#Page2_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page2_94'>94</a>; orders of, as to
+liberated slaves, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a> <i>Trent</i> affair;
+attitude to release of envoys, i. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], British view of, in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_230'>230</a> Union, the: efforts to preserve, i. <a href=
+'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>; efforts to restore,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>-<a href='#Page2_95'>5</a>; reply to
+Greeley on, <a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>-<a href='#Page2_93'>3</a>
+Attitude of, to England, i. <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; curtails
+authority of General Butler, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; settles
+quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>;
+letter to Manchester supporters of the North, <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a>; drafts resolution for use in British public
+meetings on slavery, <a href='#Page2_113'>113</a>; British
+addresses to, <a href='#Page2_288'>288</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page2_191'>1</a> Re-election, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page2_238'>238</a>;
+expectations of his defeat, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a>; British Press views on, <a href=
+'#Page2_234'>234</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_238'>238</a>; <i>Punch</i> cartoon, <a href=
+'#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; complaints of his
+despotism and inefficiency in press, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>; his terms to
+the South, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a> Assassination of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_257'>257</a>-<a href='#Page2_258'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a>; political effect of, in Britain, <a href=
+'#Page2_301'>301</a>, and in Germany, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; British sympathy, <a href=
+'#Page2_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page2_264'>64</a> Appreciations of,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_258'>258</a>-<a href='#Page2_261'>61</a>
+British opinion of, during the War, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>note</i>[1] Bright's confidence in, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Lyons' view on, i.
+<a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_258'>258</a>-<a href='#Page2_259'>9</a> Press views, i.
+<a href='#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a> <i>passim</i>
+Schleiden's view of, i. <a href='#Page_116'>116</a> Influence of
+Bright's letters on, i. <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>; pardons Rubery
+in honour of Bright, ii. <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>,
+<a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_223'>223</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page2_281'>281</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_297'>297</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_322"></a>[V2:pg 322]</span>
+<p>Lindsay, William Schaw: descriptive account of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>; on the blockade
+and French attitude to intervention, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>;
+project of mediation of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>; account of
+interview with Napoleon III, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_290'>90</a>; interview with Cowley, <a href=
+'#Page_290'>290</a>-<a href='#Page_291'>1</a>; second interview
+with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>; effect of interviews on
+Confederate Commissioners, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; refused an
+interview by Russell and Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a>-<a href='#Page_295'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_296'>296</a>; third interview with Napoleon, <a href=
+'#Page_295'>295</a>; interview with Disraeli, <a href=
+'#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; proposed motion
+in Parliament, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_302'>2</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_306'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>; account of a letter
+to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion, <a href=
+'#Page_305'>305</a> <i>and note</i>[5]; introduces motion in
+Parliament on mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_23'>23</a>; withdrawal of, <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>; with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on
+recognition, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_175'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; suggestion by, on
+Confederate finance, <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>; proposes a
+further recognition motion, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; connection with Southern Independence Association,
+<a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page2_211'>211</a>; hopes
+of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern vessels,
+<a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_196'>196</a>; hopes from Napoleon and from Southern
+victory, <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a>; fresh agitation for
+mediation and recognition, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_206'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_210'>210</a>; interviews Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page2_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page2_207'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_209'>209</a>; urges Mason to interview Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_209'>209</a>; interview with Lord Russell <a href=
+'#Page2_209'>209</a>-<a href='#Page2_210'>10</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page2_213'>13</a>; use of the Danish
+question, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_210'>210</a>; hopes from Disraeli, <a href=
+'#Page2_213'>213</a>; postponement of his motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_214'>214</a>, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_218'>218</a> Friendship with John Bright, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a> <i>note</i>[1]; otherwise mentioned, i.
+<a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a></p>
+<p>Lindsay &amp; Co., ii. <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a></p>
+<p>Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the <i>Alabama</i>, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>-<a href='#Page2_130'>30</a></p>
+<p><i>Liverpool Post</i>, The, cited on the Emancipation
+Proclamation, ii. <a href='#Page2_103'>103</a></p>
+<p>Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing
+of Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats," i. <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a></p>
+<p><i>London Chronicle</i>, The, quoted, i. <a href=
+'#Page_46'>46</a></p>
+<p>London Confederate States Aid Association, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href='#Page2_192'>192</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a></p>
+<p>London Emancipation Society, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>; distinguished members of, <a href=
+'#Page2_91'>91</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>London Gazette</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_94'>94</a></p>
+<p><i>London Press</i>, The, quoted i. <a href=
+'#Page_54'>54</a>-<a href='#Page_55'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_68'>68</a></p>
+<p><i>London Review</i>, The, cited, i. <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>
+<i>and note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Longfellow, H.W., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Lothian, Marquis of, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Lousada, letter to Lyons on <i>Trent</i> affair, quoted, i.
+<a href='#Page_220'>220</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Lowell, J.R., i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_236'>236</a></p>
+<p>Lushington, Dr., i. <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></p>
+<p>Lutz, Dr. Ralph H., cited, i. <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>
+<i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+<a href='#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[1] <i>Die Beziehungen
+zwischen Deutschland</i>, etc., cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_323"></a>[V2:pg 323]</span>
+<p>Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. <a href=
+'#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_114'>114</a>; attitude in the American dispute, <a href=
+'#Page_51'>51</a>, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_88'>88</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_93'>93</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4]; on Southern clamour at
+Lincoln's election, i. <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>; views on the
+personnel of the Northern Government, i. <a href=
+'#Page_59'>59</a>-<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; view of Seward,
+<a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_129'>129</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; fears from
+Seward's foreign war policy, i. <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>-<a href='#Page_136'>36</a>
+<i>passim</i>; efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the
+South, i. <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>,
+<a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>; views on the
+American controversy, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>; advises joint action with France, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>; receives instructions on British policy,
+<a href='#Page_87'>87</a>; and course of action if disavowed by
+America, i. <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>; suspicion of French
+policy, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a> <i>and note</i>; survey of the
+situation after Shiloh, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>; farewell
+interview with Lincoln, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; opinion of
+Adams, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>note</i>[4]; views on
+Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, <a href='#Page2_106'>106</a>;
+friendliness of Seward to, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2];
+report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, <a href=
+'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>; report on
+"scare" at Lee's advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; view after Gettysburg, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; protests against Russell's motion to withdraw
+belligerent rights to the North, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_183'>183</a>; attitude to American public animosity
+towards Great Britain, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_198'>198</a>; on Seward's plan to collect import duties at
+Southern ports, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; description of
+American readiness for foreign war, <a href='#Page2_183'>183</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; on arrogance of
+American ministers, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; advises quiet
+attitude towards the North, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; view of
+Northern determination <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_233'>233</a>; view of Lincoln's chances of re-election,
+<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>; on
+effect of the fall of Atlanta, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>; advice
+on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, <a href=
+'#Page2_237'>237</a>; illness of, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_237'>237</a>; return to London, <a href=
+'#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4]; appreciation of diplomatic
+service of, <a href='#Page2_237'>237</a> <i>note</i>[4]
+<i>Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to</i>: Belligerent
+rights to the South, i. <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>; attitude to
+request for withdrawal, i. <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_275'>5</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a> Blockade, i.
+<a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_245'>5</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; and
+legislative closing of Southern ports, i. <a href=
+'#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; communications
+with Seward on, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>; opinion on,
+<a href='#Page_254'>254</a> Southern Ports Bill, i. <a href=
+'#Page_246'>246</a>-<a href='#Page_250'>50</a> <i>passim</i> Bunch
+controversy, i. <a href='#Page_184'>184</a> <i>et seq.</i>; view on
+Bunch's conduct, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>; conferences with
+Seward in, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>-<a href='#Page_192'>2</a>,
+<a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; comment on Bunch's explanation, <a href=
+'#Page_192'>192</a>-<a href='#Page_193'>3</a>; attitude to American
+decision in, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_194'>194</a> Cotton, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_197'>7</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a> <i>and note</i>[3] Declaration of Paris
+negotiations: alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. <a href=
+'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>; view
+of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, <a href=
+'#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; communications with
+Confederates in, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>,
+<a href='#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>,
+<a href='#Page_188'>188</a>; view on the American proposal,
+<a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_164'>164</a> Emancipation, as an issue, i. <a href=
+'#Page_223'>223</a> Emancipation proclamation, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page2_113'>113</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_114'>114</a> <i>and note</i> Intervention, i. <a href=
+'#Page_197'>197</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_36'>36</a>; fears commercial influence on policy, <a href=
+'#Page2_26'>26</a>; <i>See also</i> Mediation <i>infra</i> Irish
+emigrants: enlistment of, ii. <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a>
+Mediation, i. <a href='#Page_284'>284</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>; summary of Mercier's plan of, i.
+<a href='#Page_298'>298</a>-<a href='#Page_299'>9</a>; report on
+French isolated offer of, ii. <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_76'>6</a>; on Russian suggestion of, <a href=
+'#Page2_76'>76</a> Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href=
+'#Page_281'>281</a> <i>et seq. passim</i>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>note</i>[2]; comment on the result of, i.
+<a href='#Page_286'>286</a>; effect of, on, <a href=
+'#Page_287'>287</a>; comment on newspaper report of, <a href=
+'#Page_287'>287</a> Privateering Bill, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_127'>127</a> Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of,
+to Seward, i. <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3],
+<a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>
+Recognition of the South, i. <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_70'>70</a> Seward's foreign war policy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_129'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_136'>136</a>; advice to Russell on, <a href=
+'#Page_128'>128</a>-<a href='#Page_129'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_131'>131</a>; anxiety as to Canada, <a href=
+'#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_131'>131</a> Slave Trade Treaty, i. <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a> Slavery, i. <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a> <i>and note</i>[3];
+account of changes in Northern feeling on, <a href=
+'#Page_223'>223</a> Southern Commissioners, i. <a href=
+'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a> Southern shipbuilding,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_139'>139</a>-<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; on American War
+feeling over, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_140'>40</a> <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href=
+'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_221'>221</a>; instructions in, <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page_214'>4</a>; anxiety for Canada
+in, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page2_170'>170</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_324"></a>[V2:pg 324]</span>
+<p>Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_182'>182</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>McClellan, General: advance of, on Richmond, i. <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_301'>301</a>; ii. i, <a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>; defeat of,
+by Lee, <a href='#Page2_1'>1</a>, <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_33'>33</a>; rumoured capture of, <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a> <i>note</i>; Adams'
+opinion on rumours, <a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_21'>21</a> <i>note</i>; British newspaper reports of
+capture of, <a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_21'>21</a>
+<i>note</i>; removal of, <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a>; defeats Lee at
+Antietam, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>, <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>;
+fails to follow up his victory, <a href='#Page2_43'>43</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_105'>105</a>; as candidate in Presidential
+election, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_238'>238</a></p>
+<p>McFarland, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>McHenry, George, <i>The Cotton Trade</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_6'>6</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Mackay, Alexander, <i>The Western World,</i> cited and quoted,
+i. <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_274'>274</a>-<a href='#Page2_275'>5</a></p>
+<p>Mackay, Charles, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>and note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[4]; as <i>Times</i>
+correspondent in New York, ii. <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>
+<i>notes</i>; <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_226'>226</a> <i>Forty Years' Recollections</i>, cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2] "John and Jonathan"
+poem, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i> <i>Life and
+Liberty in America</i>, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Mackay, Dr., editor of the <i>London Review</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_46'>46</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837),
+i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>McLaren, Duncan, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Madison, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p>
+<p>"Madison's War," i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_9'>9</a></p>
+<p>Malmesbury, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a></p>
+<p>Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. no, <a href=
+'#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p><i>Manchester Examiner and Times</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a>
+<i>note</i>; cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p><i>Manchester Guardian</i>, The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; cited, <a href=
+'#Page2_181'>181</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of
+delegates, ii. <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society," The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_110'>110</a>; leading members and activities of, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. <a href=
+'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_85'>85</a> <i>notes</i>; <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>,
+<a href='#Page_265'>265</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>See also under
+heading</i> Confederate Commissioners</p>
+<p>Marchand, Captain, of the American ship, <i>James Adger</i>, i.
+<a href='#Page_208'>208</a>; instructions of, to intercept the
+<i>Nashville</i>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i.
+<a href='#Page_140'>140</a>-<a href='#Page_141'>1</a></p>
+<p>Marryat, Captain Frederick: <i>A Diary in America</i>, etc.,
+cited and quoted, i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a></p>
+<p>Martin, M. Henri, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Martin, T.P., theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_8'>8</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Martineau, Harriet: faith of, in democracy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_27'>27</a>; ardent advocate of the North, <a href=
+'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; view of slavery as cause of
+the Civil War, ii. <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_80'>80</a></p>
+<p>Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i.
+<a href='#Page_173'>173</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_325"></a>[V2:pg 325]</span>
+<p>Mason, James M., Special Commissioner of the Confederates to
+Britain, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_203'>203</a>; relations with Spence, <a href=
+'#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; captured in the <i>Trent</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_204'>204</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2]; reception of, in England, <a href=
+'#Page_264'>264</a>; interview with Russell, <a href=
+'#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_266'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>; statistics of, on
+the blockade, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a> <i>and note</i>[2];
+effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>; hope in a change
+of Government, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>; views of, on capture of
+New Orleans, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; comment of, on mediation
+after the Northern successes, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, and
+Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_306'>306</a>-<a href='#Page_307'>7</a>; on the state of the
+cotton trade in England, ii. <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>; request to
+Lord Russell for recognition of the South, <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; and Slidell's offer
+to France, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; refused
+an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, <a href=
+'#Page2_27'>27</a>; view of the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href=
+'#Page2_104'>104</a>; nominates Spence as financial adviser in
+England, <a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>; and Confederate cotton
+obligations, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page2_159'>159</a>; and Confederate
+Cotton Loan, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_162'>162</a>; in Roebuck's motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_173'>3</a>; opinion of Napoleon, <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page2_173'>3</a>; recall of,
+<a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_182'>2</a>; determines to remain in Europe, <a href=
+'#Page2_182'>182</a>; hope from a change of Government, <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_214'>4</a>; demonstration against, after a Southern
+meeting, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>; representations on
+<i>Kearsarge</i> enlistment of Irishmen, <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>; interview with Palmerston suggested to,
+<a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_209'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_214'>214</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_215'>5</a>; returns to London, <a href=
+'#Page2_212'>212</a>; opinion of Palmerston and Russell's attitude
+in interview with Lindsay, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>; suggests
+Disraeli to handle Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>;
+protests against clause in Southern Independence Association
+address, <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; attitude of, to slavery,
+<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>;
+interview of, with Palmerston, on Confederate offer to abolish
+slavery, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>; interview with Earl of
+Donoughmore, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_251'>1</a>; quoted on Lee's surrender, <a href=
+'#Page2_256'>256</a> Correspondence of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_255'>255</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a> <i>note</i>[3],
+<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_186'>186</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_241'>241</a></p>
+<p>Mason Papers, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]: ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <i>et
+passim</i></p>
+<p>Massie, Rev., ii. no, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a></p>
+<p>Maximilian, Archduke, i. <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Melish, John, <i>Travels</i>, quoted, i. <a href=
+'#Page_25'>25</a></p>
+<p>Mercier, French Minister in Washington: with Lyons attempts
+official presentation to Seward of Proclamations of Neutrality, i.
+<a href='#Page_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>; in Declaration of
+Paris negotiations <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>;
+negotiations with Confederates, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>
+<i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[4];
+plan for recognition of Southern independence, <a href=
+'#Page_192'>192</a>; plan to relieve French need for cotton,
+<a href='#Page_196'>196</a>-<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>; supports
+British demands in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_230'>230</a>; on withdrawal of belligerent rights to South,
+<a href='#Page_275'>275</a>; efforts for mediation, <a href=
+'#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_300'>300</a>; ii, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>,
+<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>
+<i>note</i>[1] <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; idea of an armistice, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>,
+<a href='#Page_47'>47</a> Richmond visit, i. <a href=
+'#Page_280'>280</a> <i>ct seq.</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>; Seward's acquiescence
+in, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>,
+<a href='#Page_282'>282</a>; consultation with Lyons on, <a href=
+'#Page_281'>281</a>-<a href='#Page_282'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_283'>283</a>; result of, <a href=
+'#Page_284'>284</a>-<a href='#Page_285'>5</a>; report to Thouvenel
+on, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>; effect of, on Lyons and Russell,
+<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>; <i>New York Times</i> report of,
+<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>; effect of, in Paris and London,
+<a href='#Page_287'>287</a>-<a href='#Page_288'>8</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>; effect of, on Confederate agents, i. <a href=
+'#Page_288'>288</a> Southern Ports Bill, attitude to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_247'>247</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>
+<i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>; views of, on
+recognition, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>-<a href='#Page_286'>6</a>;
+belief of, in ultimate Southern success, <a href=
+'#Page_298'>298</a>; and isolated French offer of mediation, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>; proposes Russo-French mediation,
+<a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>note</i>[1]; precautions of, during
+Lee's northern advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2]
+Bancroft quoted on, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> Otherwise
+mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[1] <a href=
+'#Page_191'>191</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p><i>Merrimac</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_277'>277</a></p>
+<p>Mexican War of 1846, i. <a href=
+'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_206'>206</a></p>
+<p>Mexico, British influence in, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>;
+revolt of Texas from, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+contract of, for ships and equipment in Britain, <a href=
+'#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1]; British policy towards, after
+revolt of Texas, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_14'>14</a>; war with United States, 1846 ... <a href=
+'#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_206'>206</a>; expectation in, of British aid, <a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>; loss of California by, <a href=
+'#Page_15'>15</a>; joint action of France, Great Britain and Spain
+against, for recovery of debts, <a href=
+'#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_260'>60</a>; designs of France
+in, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>;
+American idea to oust France from, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>, <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Mill, J.S., ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+article in defence of the North contributed to <i>Fraser's
+Magazine</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>,
+<a href='#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page2_81'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>; on <i>Trent</i>
+affair, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>; on slavery, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>-<a href='#Page2_81'>1</a></p>
+<p>Milne, Admiral, i. <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>; Lyons' letter
+to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American letters of
+marque, ii. <a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_141'>141</a> <i>and note</i></p>
+<p>Milner-Gibson, i. <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_36'>36</a>; attack on, by <i>The Index</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_298'>298</a></p>
+<p>Milnes, Monckton, i. <a href='#Page_268'>268</a></p>
+<p>Missouri, State of, and the Union: effect of the "border state"
+policy, i. <a href='#Page_173'>173</a></p>
+<p>Mobile, Ala., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's proposal on recognition in
+Roebuck's motion, ii. <a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page2_169'>169</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a></p>
+<p>Monck, Viscount, ii. <a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>; approves
+seizure of Laird Rams, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a></p>
+<p><i>Monitor</i>, The: duel of with the <i>Merrimac</i>, i.
+<a href='#Page_276'>276</a>; effect of, in Great Britain, <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_326"></a>[V2:pg 326]</span>
+<p>Monroe Doctrine, The, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_12'>12</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>; as a medium for
+American territorial expansion, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a></p>
+<p>Monroe, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p>
+<p>Monson, cited, i. <a href='#Page_93'>93</a></p>
+<p>Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>;
+amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_171'>171</a></p>
+<p>Montgomery, Ala., i. <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_82'>82</a></p>
+<p>Moore, <i>Digest of International Law</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky: speech of, at Liverpool,
+accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. <a href='#Page2_105'>105</a></p>
+<p><i>Morning Herald</i>, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_67'>67</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; quoted, <a href=
+'#Page2_67'>67</a>-<a href='#Page_68'>8</a>; cited, <a href=
+'#Page2_215'>215</a></p>
+<p><i>Morning Post</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; in <i>Trent</i> crisis,
+i. <a href='#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page_229'>229</a>; views on the conflict and democratic tyranny,
+<a href='#Page_229'>229</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_284'>284</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>-<a href='#Page2_286'>6</a>; on the war
+and the cotton industry, ii. <a href='#Page2_10'>10</a>; on
+Gladstone's Newcastle speech, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>Morning Star</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>; criticism of <i>Times</i> war
+news in, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a></p>
+<p>Motley, J.L., United States Minister at Vienna: letter of,
+analysing nature of the American constitution, i. <a href=
+'#Page_174'>174</a>-<a href='#Page_176'>6</a>; urges forward step
+on slavery, ii. <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; reply to Seward on
+effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, <a href=
+'#Page2_99'>99</a>; quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in
+the British Press, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_281'>1</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>
+<i>Causes, The, of the American Civil War</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_174'>174</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>
+<i>Correspondence</i>, i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a> <i>note</i>[4],
+<a href='#Page2_106'>106</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page2_281'>1</a></p>
+<p>Motley, Mrs., i. <a href='#Page_179'>179</a></p>
+<p>Mure, Robert: arrest of, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_188'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_193'>193</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>;
+Lyons' views on, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_188'>8</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Napier, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_66'>66</a></p>
+<p>Napoleon I., Emperor, i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_8'>8</a>; and American contentions on neutral rights, i.
+<a href='#Page_18'>18</a> Napoleonic Wars, i. <a href=
+'#Page_4'>4</a>-<a href='#Page_7'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_23'>23</a></p>
+<p>Napoleon III., Emperor: American policy of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_39'>39</a>; differences with Thouvenel on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>
+Blockade, view of, on the, i. <a href='#Page_290'>290</a> British
+policy: vexation at, i. <a href='#Page_295'>295</a> Confederate
+Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>
+<i>note</i>[2] Mediation: hopes for, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; suggests an
+armistice for six months, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_60'>60</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>;
+request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on,
+<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>; British views on, <a href=
+'#Page2_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page2_65'>65</a>; British reply,
+<a href='#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and</i> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_155'>155</a>; Russian attitude to, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>
+<i>and</i> [3], <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_66'>66</a>; offers friendly mediation, <a href=
+'#Page2_75'>75</a>-<a href='#Page2_76'>6</a> Interview with Lindsay
+on, i. <a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>et seq.</i>; reported offer
+on, to England, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_291'>291</a> Interviews with Slidell on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a> Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of
+with, i. <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>;
+displeasure at, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a> Mexican policy of, i.
+<a href='#Page_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page_261'>61</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a> Polish
+question, ii. <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_164'>164</a> Recognition: private desires for, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a>; endeavours to secure British concurrence,
+<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>-<a href='#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_38'>38</a>; reported action and proposals in Roebuck's
+motion, <a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>-<a href='#Page2_177'>77</a>
+<i>passim</i>; interview with Slidell on abolition in return for
+recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_250'>50</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_32'>32</a>, <a href='#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_270'>270</a> Benjamin's view
+of, ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[1] Mason's opinion
+of, ii. <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page2_173'>3</a>
+Palmerston's views of, ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a></p>
+<p><i>National Intelligencer</i>, The, i. <a href=
+'#Page_297'>297</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Neumann, Karl Friedrich: History of the United States by, cited,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Neutrality, Proclamations of: British i. <a href=
+'#Page_93'>93</a>, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_96'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; statements on
+British position, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; British Press views on, i.
+<a href='#Page_136'>136</a> <i>note</i> French, i. <a href=
+'#Page_96'>96</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>
+American attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>,
+<a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; British-French
+joint action, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_132'>132</a> <i>and</i> <i>note</i>[2]; Seward's refusal to
+receive officially, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_103'>103</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; view of, as hasty
+and premature, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_108'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>; Seward's view of,
+<a href='#Page_134'>134</a>-<a href='#Page_135'>5</a>; modern
+American judgment on, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_327"></a>[V2:pg 327]</span>
+<p>New England States, The, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_18'>18</a>; opposition of, to war of 1812 ... i. <a href=
+'#Page_7'>7</a></p>
+<p><i>New Nation</i>, The (New York), quoted on Lincoln's
+despotism, ii. <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a></p>
+<p>New Orleans, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+capture of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_296'>296</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>; effect of, on
+Confederates, i. <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>; Seward's promises
+based on, ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_26'>26</a></p>
+<p>New York, rumour of Russian fleet in harbour of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a></p>
+<p>New York Chamber of Commerce, The, protest by, on the
+<i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a></p>
+<p>New York City: anti-British attitude of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_29'>29</a>; idea of separate secession, <a href=
+'#Page_83'>83</a></p>
+<p><i>New York Herald,</i> The, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>,
+<a href='#Page_255'>255</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>
+<i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p><i>New York Times,</i> The, attack on W.H. Russell in, i.
+<a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2]; quoted on <i>Trent</i>
+affair, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a> <i>note</i>[1]; report of
+Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a></p>
+<p>Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></p>
+<p><i>Newcastle Chronicle</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Newfoundland fisheries controversy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>Newman, Professor, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a></p>
+<p>Newton, Dr., in <i>Cambridge History of British Foreign
+Policy</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Nicaragua, i. <a href='#Page_16'>16</a></p>
+<p>Nicolay and Hay, <i>Lincoln</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>,
+<a href='#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p><i>Nonconformist</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Nonconformist sympathy with emancipation proclamations, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>-<a href='#Page2_110'>10</a></p>
+<p>Norfolk, Va., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1] "No
+<a href='#Page_290'>290</a>," Confederate War Vessel. See
+<i>Alabama</i></p>
+<p>Northern States: Army, foreign element in, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_200'>200</a> <i>note</i>[1] Emancipation: identified with,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a> Immigration and recruiting in, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_200'>200</a> "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War,
+i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_103'>103</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a> Intervention:
+determination to resist, ii. <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_36'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> "Piracy" declaration,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href='#Page2_268'>8</a> Public
+and Press views in, at the outbreak of the struggle, i. <a href=
+'#Page_42'>42</a> Union, the: determination to preserve, i.
+<a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_226'>226</a> Western and Eastern States attitude to the
+War, compared, ii. <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>Opinion Nationale</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_174'>174</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Oregon territory controversy, i. <a href='#Page_15'>15</a></p>
+<p><i>Oreto</i>, The, Confederate steamer, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a>, <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a></p>
+<p><i>Ottawa Sun</i>, The, cited, ii, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Ozanne Rev. T.D., <i>The South as</i> <i>it is, etc.</i>,
+quoted, ii. <a href='#Page2_195'>195</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Page, Captain, instructions to, on the use of the Laird Rams,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Pakenham, British Minister to Mexico, i. <a href=
+'#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href='#Page_14'>14</a></p>
+<p>Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General, i. <a href=
+'#Page_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a></p>
+<p>Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government of, in 1859 ... i.
+<a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_78'>78</a>; on Seward's attitude, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a>; on reinforcement of Canada, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a>-<a href='#Page_131'>1</a>; statement of reasons
+for participation in Declaration of Paris, <a href=
+'#Page_139'>139</a>; suggests method of approach in Declaration of
+Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on
+the object of the belligerents, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>; on
+British policy and the cotton shortage, <a href=
+'#Page_199'>199</a>-<a href='#Page_200'>200</a>; on possible
+interception of Mason and Slidell, <a href=
+'#Page_207'>207</a>-<a href='#Page_208'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_209'>209</a>; action of, in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>,
+<a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; statement of, on British neutrality,
+<a href='#Page_241'>241</a>; interview with Spence, <a href=
+'#Page_266'>266</a>; refusal to interview Lindsay, <a href=
+'#Page_295'>295</a>-<a href='#Page_296'>6</a>; letters to Adams on
+General Butler's order, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_305'>5</a>; reply to Hopwood on mediation, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>; definition of British policy in debate on
+Lindsay's motion, <a href='#Page2_22'>22</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_23'>3</a>; sneers at the silent cotton manufacturers,
+<a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>; views of, on mediation, <a href=
+'#Page2_31'>31</a>; participates in Russell's mediation plan,
+<a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_46'>46</a>, <a href='#Page2_51'>51</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_73'>73</a>; traditional connection with Lewis' Hereford
+speech, <a href='#Page2_50'>50</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; <a href=
+'#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the folly of appealing to the
+belligerents, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>; opinion of
+Napoleon, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; views on French proposals for
+armistice, <a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page2_61'>1</a>; on
+British position in regard to slavery, <a href='#Page2_61'>61</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>-<a href='#Page2_79'>9</a>; approves
+Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a>; defends Government procedure in
+<i>Alabama</i> case, <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_135'>5</a>; accusation of, against Forster and Bright,
+<a href='#Page2_135'>135</a>; attitude to seizure of Laird Rams,
+<a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>; on the use of Napoleon's name in
+Roebuck's motion, <a href='#Page2_174'>174</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_175'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; the crisis over
+Danish policy of, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_204'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_214'>214</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; interviews with
+Lindsay, <a href='#Page2_206'>206</a>-<a href='#Page2_208'>8</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>; consents to interview Mason, <a href=
+'#Page2_207'>207</a>; opinion of, on the ultimate result of the
+Civil War, <a href='#Page2_209'>209</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_215'>215</a>; attitude to resolution of Southern Societies,
+<a href='#Page2_211'>211</a>; interview with Mason, <a href=
+'#Page2_214'>214</a>-<a href='#Page2_215'>5</a>; reply to joint
+deputation of Southern Societies, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>;
+reply to Mason's offer on abolition, <a href='#Page2_250'>250</a>;
+assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads
+Conference, <a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>; attitude to expansion of
+the franchise, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a> <i>and note</i>[1];
+death of, <a href='#Page2_302'>302</a> Characteristics of, as
+politician, ii. <a href='#Page2_134'>134</a> Cobden quoted on, i.
+<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a> <i>note</i>[2] Delane, close relations
+with, i. <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2] <i>Index</i>:
+criticism of, in the, ii. <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a> Press organ
+of, i, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_194'>194</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page2_112'>112</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_263'>263</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_285'>285</a>, <a href='#Page2_293'>293</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_328"></a>[V2:pg 328]</span>
+<p>Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 ... i. <a href=
+'#Page_4'>4</a></p>
+<p>Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Paris, Congress of (1856), i. <a href='#Page_139'>139</a></p>
+<p>Peabody, George, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_227'>227</a></p>
+<p>Peacocke, G.M.W. ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Persigny, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>; conversation with
+Slidell on intervention, ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a></p>
+<p>Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a></p>
+<p>Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern
+army, ii. <a href='#Page2_202'>202</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina, i. <a href=
+'#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_186'>186</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Pickett Papers quoted, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>
+<i>note</i>; ii. <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a> <i>note</i>[5]</p>
+<p>Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page2_163'>163</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a></p>
+<p>Pollard, <i>The Lost Cause</i>, quoted on attitude of England on
+the cotton question, ii. <a href='#Page2_5'>5</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_6'>6</a></p>
+<p>Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>, <i>and note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Prescott, i. <a href='#Page_37'>37</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Press, British, the attitude of, in the American Civil War.
+<i>See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc.</i></p>
+<p>Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i.
+<a href='#Page_259'>259</a></p>
+<p>Prince Consort, The, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_225'>5</a>; influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy,
+<a href='#Page_224'>224</a>; policy of conciliation to United
+States, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>; Adams, C.F., quoted on,
+<a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a></p>
+<p>Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a> <i>et seq</i>.,
+<a href='#Page_153'>153</a> <i>et seq. passim</i> Russian
+convention with U.S. on, i. <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>
+<i>note</i>[1] Southern Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>,
+<a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.
+Proclamation on, <i>see under</i> Davis. British attitude to, i.
+<a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_166'>166</a>; Parliamentary discussion on, <a href=
+'#Page_94'>94</a>, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_157'>157</a>; closing of British ports to, <a href=
+'#Page_170'>170</a> <i>and note</i>[2] French attitude to, i.
+<a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a> Northern attitude
+to, i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>,
+<a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>; Seward's motive
+against in Declaration of Paris negotiation, <a href=
+'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_169'>169</a>; Northern accusations against Britain on,
+<a href='#Page_91'>91</a> United States policy on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>. <i>See</i>
+Privateering Bill, <i>infra</i> <i>See also under</i> Declaration
+of Paris negotiation</p>
+<p>Privateering Bill, The, ii. <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a> <i>et
+seq</i>.; purpose of, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_137'>137</a>; discussion in Senate on, <a href=
+'#Page2_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page2_124'>4</a>; passed as an
+administrative measure, <a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_137'>137</a>; influence of, on Russell's policy, <a href=
+'#Page2_137'>137</a>; British view of American intentions, <a href=
+'#Page2_137'>137</a>-<a href='#Page2_138'>8</a>; historical view,
+<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; Seward's use of, <a href=
+'#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href='#Page2_204'>4</a></p>
+<p><i>Punch</i>, cartoons of, cited: on <i>Trent</i> affair, i.
+<a href='#Page_217'>217</a>-<a href='#Page_218'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_237'>237</a>; on Stone Boat Blockade, <a href=
+'#Page_255'>255</a>; suggesting intervention by France, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_75'>75</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Roebuck, <a href=
+'#Page2_170'>170</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Lincoln's re-election,
+<a href='#Page2_239'>239</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Poem in, on the
+death of Lincoln, ii. <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_329"></a>[V2:pg 329]</span>
+<p>Putnam, G.H., <i>Memories of My Youth</i>, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Putnam, G.P., <i>Memoirs</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_163'>163</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>Quarterly Review</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>;
+views on the Southern secession, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; on the
+lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, <a href=
+'#Page_47'>47</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_286'>286</a>, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>; attitude in the
+conflict, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_301'>301</a>; on British sympathy for the South, <a href=
+'#Page2_301'>301</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p><i>Reader</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_222'>222</a>,
+<i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Reform Bill of 1832 ... i. <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_28'>28</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>; of 1867 ...
+<a href='#Page2_303'>303</a>, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a></p>
+<p>Republican Party, The, i. <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_115'>115</a></p>
+<p>Rhett, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>and note</i>[3],
+<a href='#Page2_88'>88</a></p>
+<p>Rhodes, <i>United States</i>, cited or quoted, i. <a href=
+'#Page_110'>110</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>,
+<a href='#Page_217'>217</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_16'>16</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_147'>147</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>
+<i>note</i>[1] <i>et passim</i>.</p>
+<p>Richardson, <i>Messages and Papers of the Confederacy</i>, cited
+or quoted, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a> <i>note</i>[5], <a href=
+'#Page2_155'>155</a> <i>note</i>[6], <i>et passim</i>.</p>
+<p>Richmond, Va., Southern Government head-quarters at, i. <a href=
+'#Page_81'>81</a>; capture of, by Grant, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_248'>248</a></p>
+<p><i>Richmond Enquirer</i>, The, quoted on attitude of France to
+the Confederacy, ii. <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a></p>
+<p><i>Richmond Whig</i>, The, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_68'>68</a></p>
+<p>Right of Search controversy, i. <a href='#Page_6'>6</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a> <i>passim</i>, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>;
+recrudescence of, in <i>Trent</i> affair, <a href=
+'#Page_218'>218</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a></p>
+<p>Robinson, Chas. D., Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_93'>93</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_34'>34</a> <i>note</i>[1]; motion of, for recognition of
+the Confederacy, <a href='#Page2_74'>74</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_144'>144</a>, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a> <i>et seq.</i>; <a href=
+'#Page2_296'>296</a> <i>note</i>[1]; W.H. Russell's views on,
+<a href='#Page2_166'>166</a>; Lord Russell's opinion on, <a href=
+'#Page2_166'>166</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, <a href=
+'#Page2_167'>167</a>; Parliamentary debate on, <a href=
+'#Page2_170'>170</a>-<a href='#Page2_172'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a>-<a href='#Page2_178'>8</a>; withdrawal of
+motion, <a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a>-<a href='#Page2_177'>7</a>; subsequent
+attitude of, to America, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_300'>300</a>; opinion on the failure of democracy in
+America, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>-<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>;
+<i>Punch</i> cartoon on, <a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_306'>306</a></p>
+<p>Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_184'>184</a></p>
+<p>Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. <a href=
+'#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_264'>264</a></p>
+<p>Rouher, M., French Minister of Commerce, i. <a href=
+'#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a></p>
+<p>Roylance, ii. <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a></p>
+<p>Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_225'>225</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Russell, Lord John, i. <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_78'>78</a>-<a href='#Page_79'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_81'>81</a>; attitude of, in the early days of the American
+struggle, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_51'>51</a>,
+<a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_74'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>; views on the secession, <a href=
+'#Page_52'>52</a>-<a href='#Page_53'>3</a>; views and action in
+anticipation of war, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_58'>8</a>; instruction on possible jingo policy toward
+England, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>-<a href='#Page_61'>1</a>;
+recommends conciliation, i. <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_74'>74</a>; refusal to make a pledge as to British policy,
+<a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_125'>125</a>; promise of delay to Dallas, <a href=
+'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_108'>108</a>; plan of joint action with France, <a href=
+'#Page_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>; advises Parliament to
+keep out of the Civil War, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]; uncertainty as to American intention, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page_202'>2</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_237'>237</a>; interview with Spence, i. <a href=
+'#Page_266'>266</a>; "three months" statement, <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_22'>22</a>; effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>; effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech
+on, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>; idea of withdrawal of belligerent
+rights to the North, <a href='#Page2_182'>182</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_183'>183</a>; on relations with United States and Seward,
+<a href='#Page2_183'>183</a>-<a href='#Page2_184'>4</a>; attitude
+to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports,
+<a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; views on the conflict: belief in
+ultimate Southern independence, <a href=
+'#Page2_198'>198</a>-<a href='#Page2_199'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page2_271'>271</a>; and the Danish
+question, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>; action in withdrawing
+neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights, <a href=
+'#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href='#Page2_267'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_268'>268</a>, <a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>; attitude to
+piracy proclamation, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_268'>8</a>, and the Reform Bill, <a href=
+'#Page2_276'>276</a>, <a href='#Page2_302'>302</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_303'>303</a>; quoted on the degeneration of the American
+Republic, <a href='#Page2_285'>285</a>; succeeds to Premiership,
+<a href='#Page2_302'>302</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i2"><i>Diplomatic action and views of, in regard
+to</i>:</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_330"></a>[V2:pg 330]</span>
+<p class="i3"><i>Alabama</i>, the, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>; interview with Adams on, <a href=
+'#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>; private
+feelings on <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>, <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Belligerent rights to the South, i. <a href=
+'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <i>and note</i>[3];
+reply to Houghton on, ii. <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_267'>267</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Blockade, the: views on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_253'>3</a>; instructions to Lyons on, <a href=
+'#Page_58'>58</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_272'>272</a>; instructions to Bunch, <a href=
+'#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[2]; view on notification at the
+port method, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>; on British Trade under,
+<a href='#Page_252'>252</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>; aim in
+presenting Parliamentary Papers on, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>,
+<a href='#Page_267'>267</a>; on irritation caused by, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page2_226'>6</a> Southern Ports
+Bill, protests against, i. <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_251'>51</a>; instructions to Lyons on, <a href=
+'#Page_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a> Stone Boat Fleet,
+i. <a href='#Page_254'>254</a>-<a href='#Page_255'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Bunch controversy, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>,
+<a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_195'>5</a>; letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture,
+<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>; anxiety in, <a href=
+'#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Butler's, General, order to troops: advice to
+Palmerston on, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_304'>4</a>; reply to Adams, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Confederate Commissioners: attitude to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>; interviews with, i.
+<a href='#Page_85'>85</a>-<a href='#Page_86'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_158'>158</a>; declines official communication with, <a href=
+'#Page_214'>214</a> <i>and note</i>[4], <a href=
+'#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page_266'>6</a>; reception of Mason,
+<a href='#Page_235'>235</a>, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_266'>6</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_268'>268</a>; suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of
+Slidell, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>; reply to Mason's notification
+of his recall, ii. <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>; reply to
+Confederate "Manifesto," <a href='#Page2_241'>241</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_242'>2</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Confederate Shipbuilding: reply to Adams' protests,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_118'>118</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_120'>120</a>-<a href='#Page2_121'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_127'>127</a>; advice to Palmerston on, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a>; orders detention of contractors, <a href=
+'#Page2_135'>135</a>; seizure of <i>Alexandra</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_136'>136</a>; stoppage of, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>;
+result of <i>Alexandra</i> trial, <a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>.
+<i>See also sub-headings</i> Alabama, Laird Rams</p>
+<p class="i3">Confederates: negotiations with, i. <a href=
+'#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a> <i>note</i>[4],
+<a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; attitude
+to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, <a href=
+'#Page_189'>189</a>; explanation to Adams of British attitude to,
+<a href='#Page_190'>190</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Cotton supply: attitude to French proposals on, i.
+<a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Declaration of Paris negotiation: request to France
+in, i. <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page_147'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]; instructions to Lyons on, <a href=
+'#Page_146'>146</a>-<a href='#Page_162'>62</a> <i>passim</i>,
+<a href='#Page_184'>184</a>; interviews with Adams, <a href=
+'#Page_141'>141</a>-<a href='#Page_148'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_158'>158</a>; proposals to the United States, <a href=
+'#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_170'>170</a>; instructions to Cowley, <a href=
+'#Page_156'>156</a>-<a href='#Page_159'>9</a> <i>passim</i>;
+suggested declaration in proposed convention, <a href=
+'#Page_143'>143</a>-<a href='#Page_146'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>,
+<a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_201'>201</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Emancipation Proclamation: views on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_101'>101</a>-<a href='#Page2_102'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Foreign Enlistment Act: idea of amending, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_124'>124</a>; offer to United States on, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>-<a href='#Page2_125'>5</a>; reply to Adams'
+pressure for alteration of, <a href='#Page2_149'>149</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Gregory's motion, i. <a href='#Page_108'>108</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Irishmen: recruiting of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a>-<a href='#Page2_202'>2</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Laird Rams: conversations with Adams on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_144'>144</a>; orders detention of, <a href=
+'#Page2_144'>144</a>-<a href='#Page2_145'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_151'>151</a>; correspondence with the Lairds, <a href=
+'#Page2_146'>146</a>; drafts protest to Mason, <a href=
+'#Page2_147'>147</a>, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; reply to attack on Government policy on, <a href=
+'#Page2_149'>149</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>50</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Lindsay: approval of Cowley's statement to, i.
+<a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>; reply to
+request of, for an interview, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_295'>5</a>; interview with, on motion for mediation and
+recognition, ii. <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_213'>13</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Mediation: advice to Palmerston on reported French
+offer, i. <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; reply to Seward's protest,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_26'>6</a>, <a href='#Page2_27'>27</a>; project of, with
+Palmerston, ii. <a href='#Page2_31'>31</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_32'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_34'>34</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_36'>36</a> <i>et seq.</i>, <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_271'>271</a>; instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel,
+<a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>; letters to Gladstone on, <a href=
+'#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_41'>41</a>; points of, <a href=
+'#Page2_46'>46</a>; responsibility for, <a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>
+<i>note</i>[4]; Russia approached, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>;
+memorandum on America, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>and
+note</i>[3]; proposal of an armistice, <a href=
+'#Page2_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page2_32'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page2_53'>53</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_55'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_56'>56</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_57'>7</a>; comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion,
+<a href='#Page2_61'>61</a>-<a href='#Page2_62'>2</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_64'>64</a>; wish for acceptance, <a href=
+'#Page2_62'>62</a>, <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a>; declaration of no
+change in British policy, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>; end of the
+project, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>;
+motive in, <a href='#Page2_73'>73</a>; viewed as a crisis, <a href=
+'#Page2_73'>73</a>; comments of, to Brunow on joint mediation offer
+<a href='#Page2_73'>73</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p class="i3">Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href=
+'#Page_287'>287</a>, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a></p>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_331"></a>[V2:pg 331]</span>
+<p class="i3">Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_91'>91</a>, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_163'>63</a> <i>passim</i>; possible interference of, with
+neutrals, ii. <a href='#Page2_127'>127</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_138'>138</a>-<a href='#Page2_150'>150</a>; opinion of, on
+intended use of privateers, <a href='#Page2_138'>138</a>
+Proclamation of Neutrality. British position in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a>-<a href='#Page2_266'>6</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Recognition of the Confederacy: attitude to, i.
+<a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_77'>77</a>-<a href='#Page2_78'>8</a>; influence of
+<i>Trent</i> affair on, i. <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>; reply to
+Mason's requests for, ii. <a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_27'>27</a>; opinion of Roebuck's motion on, <a href=
+'#Page2_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page2_177'>177</a>; denies receipt
+of proposal from France on <a href='#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href='#Page2_172'>172</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3">Servile War, ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Slavery, ii. <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>; view of Seward's proposal for transport of
+emancipated slaves, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p>
+<br>
+<p class="i3"><i>Trent</i> affair, view of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>; letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America
+over, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>; on possible ways of settlement
+of, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>; instructions to Lyons on learning
+officially that Wilkes acted without authorization, <a href=
+'#Page_226'>226</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Policy of, in the American Civil War: i. <a href=
+'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_243'>243</a>, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_271'>271</a>-<a href='#Page2_272'>2</a>; declaration to
+Adams on, <a href='#Page2_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>
+Attitude to Adams, i. <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>; view of, i.
+<a href='#Page_131'>131</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_128'>128</a> View
+of Lincoln, i. <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_263'>263</a> View of Seward, i. <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>,
+<a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_235'>235</a>-<a href='#Page_236'>6</a>; improved relations
+with, ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Criticism and view of, in <i>The Index</i>, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_51'>51</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_196'>196</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>,
+<a href='#Page_101'>101</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_277'>277</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_208'>208</a>, <a href='#Page2_254'>254</a></p>
+<p>Russell, Lady, quoted on <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href=
+'#Page_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Russell, W.H., <i>Times</i> correspondent, i. <a href=
+'#Page_44'>44</a>, <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; letters of, to the
+<i>Times</i>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_177'>177</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; on the secession, i. <a href='#Page_56'>56</a>,
+<a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; impression of Lincoln, <a href=
+'#Page_61'>61</a> <i>note</i>[2]; description of Bull Run, <a href=
+'#Page_177'>177</a>-<a href='#Page_178'>8</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; abhorrence of slavery, i.
+<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>; American
+newspaper attacks on <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; recall of, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on Napoleon's mediation offer,
+<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>; on recognition, <a href=
+'#Page2_166'>166</a>; editor of <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; belief of, in ultimate
+Northern victory, i. <a href='#Page_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_68'>68</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; view of the ending of the
+War, <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>-<a href='#Page2_230'>30</a>; on
+campaigns of Grant and Sherman, <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_243'>243</a>; quoted on Delane, <a href=
+'#Page2_254'>254</a>; on prospective war with America, <a href=
+'#Page2_254'>254</a>; on failure of republican institutions,
+<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a> <i>My Diary North and South</i>, i.
+<a href='#Page_177'>177</a> <i>notes</i>; quoted <a href=
+'#Page_44'>44</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>,
+<a href='#Page_71'>71</a>; cited, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>,
+<a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_229'>229</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Russia: attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i.
+<a href='#Page_164'>164</a> <i>note</i>[1]; convention with United
+States on privateering, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+attitude to recognition of the South, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; and mediation, i.
+<a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]; British approach to, on
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page2_45'>45</a>,
+<i>and note</i>[2]; attitude to joint mediation, <a href=
+'#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_63'>63</a>
+<i>and note</i>[5], <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on joint mediation
+without Britain, <a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>and note</i>[1];
+plan of separate mediation, <a href='#Page2_251'>251</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern
+belligerent rights, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2]; policy of friendship to United States, <a href=
+'#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>
+<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2]; United
+States friendship for, <a href='#Page2_225'>225</a> Polish
+question, ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_163'>163</a> Fleets of, in Western waters: story of, in
+<i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href='#Page_227'>227</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+ii. <a href='#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>and note</i> <i>See also
+under</i> Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl</p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston, i. <a href=
+'#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_191'>191</a> <i>note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_290'>290</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Salt, price of, in Charleston: effect of the blockade, i.
+<a href='#Page_270'>270</a></p>
+<p>San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention
+to guarantee independence of, i. <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_332"></a>[V2:pg 332]</span>
+<p>San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_129'>129</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>San Jacinto</i>, the, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>,
+<a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a></p>
+<p><i>Saturday Review</i>, The: views of, on Lincoln's election, i.
+<a href='#Page_39'>39</a>; judgment of Seward, <a href=
+'#Page_39'>39</a>; views at outbreak of war, <a href=
+'#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>; on Southern right of
+secession, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>; on Proclamation of
+Neutrality, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>-<a href='#Page_101'>1</a>;
+on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, <a href=
+'#Page_146'>146</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on slavery as an issue: attack
+on Mrs. H.B. Stowe, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_181'>1</a>; on blockade and recognition, <a href=
+'#Page_183'>183</a>; on duration of war and cotton supply, <a href=
+'#Page_246'>246</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on servile insurrection, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>; and the relation between the American
+struggle and British institutions, <a href='#Page2_276'>276</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>-<a href='#Page2_278'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_280'>280</a>; on the promiscuous democracy of the North,
+<a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>; on the Republic and the British
+Monarchy, <a href='#Page2_277'>277</a>-<a href='#Page2_278'>8</a>;
+cited, <a href='#Page2_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Savannah, Ga., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+captured by Sherman, ii. <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_301'>1</a></p>
+<p>Scherer, <i>Cotton as a World Power</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_6'>6</a></p>
+<p>Schilling, C., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen, i. <a href=
+'#Page_115'>115</a>, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_130'>130</a>; views of, on Seward and Lincoln,
+<a href='#Page_115'>115</a>-<a href='#Page_116'>6</a>; offers
+services as mediator: plan of an armistice, <a href=
+'#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>; visit of, to
+Richmond, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page_123'>3</a>;
+failure of his mediation, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_123'>3</a>; report of Russian attitude to privateers,
+<a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on <i>Trent</i> affair,
+<a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>; on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of
+envoys, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on attitude of
+Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, <a href=
+'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>note</i>[3]; quoted, on slavery, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_111'>111</a> <i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Schleswig-Holstein question, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>-<a href='#Page2_204'>4</a></p>
+<p>Schmidt, <i>Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War</i>, cited,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_7'>7</a> <i>notes</i>; <a href=
+'#Page2_167'>167</a> <i>note</i>[1]; arguments in, examined,
+<a href='#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Scholefield, Wm., ii. <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Schouler,----, on diplomatic controversies between England and
+America, cited, i. <a href='#Page_35'>35</a></p>
+<p>Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate
+Cotton Loan, ii. <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_162'>2</a></p>
+<p>Schurz, Carl, papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i.
+<a href='#Page_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>; advocates declaration of
+an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_92'>92</a>; cited i. <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Schwab, <i>The Confederate States of America</i>, cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_156'>156</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_158'>158</a> <i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>
+<i>notes</i>, <a href='#Page2_162'>162</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in
+<i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href='#Page_218'>218</a></p>
+<p>Sears, <i>A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon
+III</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>,
+<a href='#Page_289'>289</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_24'>24</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Secession States, ports of, i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Semmes, captain of the <i>Alabama</i>, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_119'>119</a></p>
+<p>Senior, Nassau W., article on "American Slavery," i. <a href=
+'#Page_33'>33</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_34'>34</a></p>
+<p>Servile insurrection, i. <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page2_87'>87</a>; British
+apprehension of, i. <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page2_79'>79</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>; emancipation
+viewed as provocative of, <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_114'>114</a>; as an argument for intervention, <a href=
+'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[6]; use of as a threat, <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page2_94'>94</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_114'>114</a></p>
+<p>Seward, W.H., American Secretary of State, i. <a href=
+'#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_64'>64</a>, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; British view of,
+<a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, view of, as
+unfriendly to Great Britain, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_113'>113</a>-<a href='#Page_114'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_125'>125</a> <i>et seq.</i> <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>;
+reputation as a politician, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>; efforts of, to
+secure European support for the North, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>,
+<a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>; view of
+his relation to Lincoln, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_115'>115</a>-<a href='#Page_116'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_127'>127</a>-<a href='#Page_128'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a>; document "Some Thoughts for the President's
+Consideration," <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_119'>9</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_124'>124</a>; advice on Fort Sumter, <a href=
+'#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>; his "Despatch No.
+<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>", <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_130'>30</a>, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_155'>155</a>; reversal of his policy, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>; action on
+Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, <a href=
+'#Page_164'>164</a>; instructions to American diplomats on slavery
+as issue, i. <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>; offers facilities for transport of British
+troops, i. <a href='#Page_213'>213</a> <i>note</i>[4]; change of
+attitude to England, ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; quarrel with
+Chase, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>; influence of, lessened by
+signing Abolition Proclamation, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; friendliness to Lyons, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>; appreciation of Russell's expression
+of esteem, <a href='#Page2_147'>147</a>; attitude to Russell,
+<a href='#Page2_197'>197</a>; policy in regard to reunion, <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a>; plan of collecting import duties at Southern
+ports, <a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; tests British-French harmony,
+<a href='#Page2_198'>198</a>; anxiety to avoid irritating
+incidents, <a href='#Page2_199'>199</a>; considers abrogation of
+treaties with Canada, <a href='#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_254'>4</a>; denies rumours of prospective foreign war,
+<a href='#Page2_254'>254</a>; accepts notification of ending of
+British neutrality, <a href='#Page2_268'>268</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_269'>9</a>; meets with an accident, <a href=
+'#Page2_257'>257</a>; attempted murder of, <a href=
+'#Page2_257'>257</a>-<a href='#Page2_258'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_265'>265</a></p>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_333"></a>[V2:pg 333]</span>
+<p class="i2"><i>Diplomatic action and views of, with regard
+to:</i></p>
+<p class="i3">Belligerent rights to South denial of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_182'>182</a>; remonstrance on concession of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>, proposes
+withdrawal of, ii. <a href='#Page2_264'>264</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_265'>5</a>, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>; <i>See also
+under</i> Declaration of Paris <i>and</i> Neutrality
+<i>infra</i>.</p>
+<p class="i3">Blockade, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>; interviews with
+Lyons on, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>,
+<a href='#Page_246'>246</a>, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a>, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>; suggested
+alleviation of, i. <a href='#Page_274'>274</a> Southern Ports Bill:
+reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_249'>249</a>; attitude to issue of, <a href=
+'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>,
+<a href='#Page_251'>251</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>; on
+closing of ports by proclamation, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>,
+<a href='#Page_252'>252</a> Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement
+on, i. <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>-<a href='#Page_257'>7</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Bunch affair, i. <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>,
+<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a> <i>and
+note</i>[4], <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]</p>
+<p class="i3">Confederate debts: statement on, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i.
+<a href='#Page_105'>105</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_121'>121</a>, <a href='#Page2_139'>139</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_140'>140</a>; effect of seizure of the <i>Alexandra</i> on,
+<a href='#Page2_140'>140</a>; despatch on <i>Alexandra</i> case
+decision, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; refuses
+to allow British Consul through the blockade, <a href=
+'#Page2_148'>148</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Cotton: on proposed French intervention to secure, i.
+<a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>; promises
+of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_16'>16</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. <a href=
+'#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_150'>150</a> <i>et seq.</i>; statement in refusing
+convention as modified by Russell, <a href='#Page_145'>145</a>;
+motives in, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_152'>2</a>,
+<a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; hope to
+influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent rights, <a href=
+'#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_151'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; as part of
+foreign war policy: considered, <a href=
+'#Page_153'>153</a>-<a href='#Page_154'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_155'>155</a>-<a href='#Page_156'>6</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Emancipation Proclamation: urges postponement of, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_37'>37</a>. <a href='#Page2_85'>85</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page2_114'>114</a>; informed as to
+effect of, on intervention, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_99'>99</a> comments on purpose of, <a href=
+'#Page2_99'>99</a>-<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a> the "high moral
+purpose" argument, ii. <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>; proposes
+convention for transport of emancipated slaves, <a href=
+'#Page2_100'>100</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Hampton Roads Conference, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a>; attitude to Britain after, <a href=
+'#Page2_253'>253</a>-<a href='#Page2_254'>4</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Intervention: attitude to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_145'>145</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_200'>200</a>; threat of servile war and, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>; instructions to
+Adams on, <a href='#Page2_35'>35</a>-<a href='#Page2_36'>6</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_96'>96</a>-<a href='#Page2_97'>7</a>; view of the
+effect of emancipation, on, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_114'>114</a>. <i>See also</i> Mediation <i>infra</i>.</p>
+<p class="i3">Irish Emigrants: enlistment of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_201'>201</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Mediation: attitude to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_18'>18</a>, <a href='#Page2_57'>57</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]; by France, i. <a href='#Page_283'>283</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; by Russia, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; view of England's refusal to act with France in,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a>, <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>;
+declines French offer of, <a href='#Page2_76'>76</a> <i>See
+also</i> Intervention <i>supra</i>.</p>
+<p class="i3">Mercier's Richmond visit, i. <a href=
+'#Page_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page_284'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_286'>286</a>; statement to Lyons: view of Confederate
+position, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>; newspaper statement on,
+<a href='#Page_287'>287</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Napoleon's Mexican policy: attitude to, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_198'>198</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Neutrality Proclamations: representations on, i.
+<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>; despatch
+on American view of, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_103'>103</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>;
+refusal to receive officially, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_103'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>; efforts to secure recall
+of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>-<a href='#Page_153'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_169'>169</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_275'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_301'>301</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Privateering, i. <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>;
+convention with Russia, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>.
+<i>See also</i> Southern Privateering <i>infra</i>.</p>
+<p class="i3">"Privateering Bill:" use of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_141'>141</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_151'>151</a>; on the purpose and use of the
+privateers, <a href='#Page2_122'>122</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_123'>3</a>, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_137'>137</a>, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; conversations
+with Lyons on, <a href='#Page2_125'>125</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_126'>126</a>; on necessity for issuing letters of marque,
+<a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>, <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>; advised
+by Adams against issue of privateers, <a href='#Page2_131'>131</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_139'>139</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Recognition of Southern Independence, i. <a href=
+'#Page_65'>65</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_198'>198</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Servile War threat, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_22'>22</a>, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. <a href=
+'#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_276'>276</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_90'>90</a></p>
+<p class="i3">Southern privateering: view of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_104'>104</a>, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>; efforts to
+influence European attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>,
+<a href='#Page_150'>150</a>-<a href='#Page_151'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>; attitude on issue
+of privateers from British ports, ii. <a href='#Page2_126'>126</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_127'>127</a></p>
+<p class="i3"><i>Trent</i> affair: reception of British demands in,
+i. <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>; on Wilkes' action, <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a>; attitude to release of envoys, <a href=
+'#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_233'>233</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a>; British opinion
+on Seward in, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a></p>
+<br>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_334"></a>[V2:pg 334]</span>
+<p class="i2">Foreign Policy: high tone, i. <a href=
+'#Page_236'>236</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>; restoration of the Union
+as basis of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>; influences affecting, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p>
+<p class="i2">Foreign war panacea, i. <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>,
+<a href='#Page_113'>113</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_123'>123</a>-<a href='#Page_124'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_125'>125</a>, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_132'>132</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_135'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_154'>154</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_214'>214</a>; appreciation of, <a href=
+'#Page_136'>136</a>.</p>
+<p class="i2">Southern conciliation policy of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_49'>49</a>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a>, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_120'>120</a>-<a href='#Page_121'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_123'>123</a>, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>; expectations from
+Union sentiment in the South, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_117'>117</a>; aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, <a href=
+'#Page_121'>121</a>-<a href='#Page_123'>3</a>; communications with
+Confederate Commissioners, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_118'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a></p>
+<p class="i2">Appreciation and criticism of: by British statesmen
+and press in 1865.... ii. <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>;
+<i>Times</i> tribute to, <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a>; Horace
+Greeley's attack on, i. <a href='#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+Gregory's attack on, i. <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>; Lyons' view
+of, i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>; Adams'
+admiration for i. <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_127'>127</a></p>
+<p class="i2">British suspicion of, i. <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>,
+<a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_236'>6</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+the Newcastle story, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_227'>227</a>; Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, <a href=
+'#Page2_227'>227</a>; Adams' view, <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a></p>
+<p class="i2">Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>,
+<a href='#Page_163'>163</a> <i>notes</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_188'>188</a>, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_217'>217</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_175'>175</a>, <a href='#Page2_223'>223</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_225'>225</a>, <a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>
+<i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_281'>281</a></p>
+<p>Shelburne, Earl of, i. <a href='#Page_240'>240</a></p>
+<p>Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Sherman, General: Atlanta campaign of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_217'>217</a>; captures Atlanta, <a href=
+'#Page2_233'>233</a>; march to the sea, <a href=
+'#Page2_243'>243</a>-<a href='#Page2_245'>5</a>; captures Savannah,
+<a href='#Page2_245'>245</a>, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page2_301'>1</a>; campaign
+against Johnston, <a href='#Page2_248'>248</a>; reports of
+pillaging and burning by his army, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>;
+mentioned, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a> Russell, W.H., views of, on
+Sherman's campaigns, ii. <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_232'>232</a>-<a href='#Page2_233'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_243'>243</a> <i>Times</i> view of his campaigns, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href='#Page2_227'>227</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page2_243'>243</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_246'>6</a></p>
+<p>Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. <a href=
+'#Page_278'>278</a></p>
+<p>Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_116'>116</a>, <a href='#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_128'>128</a>; Continental opinion of international
+law on, <a href='#Page2_121'>121</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>Shipping Gazette</i>, quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_14'>14</a></p>
+<p>Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its
+failure, ii. <a href='#Page2_282'>282</a></p>
+<p>Slavery: cotton supplies and, i. <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>;
+controversy in America on, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_36'>36</a>; English opinion on, <a href=
+'#Page_31'>31</a>-<a href='#Page_35'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_37'>37</a>-<a href='#Page_38'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_40'>40</a>; as an issue in the Civil War, <a href=
+'#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_88'>88</a>-<a href='#Page2_93'>93</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_222'>222</a>; Confederates identified with, i. <a href=
+'#Page_71'>71</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; Southern
+arguments for, <a href='#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>and note</i>[2];
+attitude of the North to, <a href='#Page2_78'>78</a>; growth of
+anti-slavery sentiment, <a href='#Page2_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_84'>84</a>; failure of the slaves to rise, <a href=
+'#Page2_86'>86</a>; Northern declaration on, urged, <a href=
+'#Page2_98'>98</a>-<a href='#Page2_99'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_107'>107</a>; British public meetings on, <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>note</i>[2]; Southern declaration on,
+<a href='#Page2_106'>106</a>. <i>See also</i> African Slave Trade,
+Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc.</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_335"></a>[V2:pg 335]</span>
+<p>Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to
+France, i. <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>; captured on the
+<i>Trent</i>, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_205'>5</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>and note</i>[2];
+connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, <a href=
+'#Page_261'>261</a> <i>note</i>[1]; plan of action of, <a href=
+'#Page_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page_265'>5</a>; received by
+Thouvenel, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; view on
+Continental and British interests in the blockade, <a href=
+'#Page_267'>267</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>;
+view of Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>; on
+Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>;
+views of, on the capture of New Orleans, <a href=
+'#Page_296'>296</a>; idea to demand recognition from France,
+<a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; hopes of
+mediation by France, ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, <a href=
+'#Page2_23'>23</a>, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>; makes offers to
+Napoleon and to Thouvenel, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>; letter to Benjamin on failure to secure
+intervention, <a href='#Page2_29'>29</a>; interview with Napoleon
+on Armistice, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_60'>60</a>; memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking
+for separate recognition, <a href='#Page2_75'>75</a>; on
+shipbuilding for Confederates in France, <a href=
+'#Page2_128'>128</a>; quoted on position of France in relation to
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>; and Confederate Cotton
+Loan, <a href='#Page2_158'>158</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_163'>163</a>; interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition,
+<a href='#Page2_167'>167</a>; and Napoleon's instruction on
+recognition in Roebuck's motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_168'>168</a>-<a href='#Page2_169'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_172'>172</a>; and Mason's recall, <a href=
+'#Page2_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_182'>182</a>; opinion of Russell, <a href=
+'#Page2_213'>213</a>; suggestion on Lindsay's motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_213'>213</a>; disappointment at result of Mason's interview
+with Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>; opinion on European
+attitude to the South, <a href='#Page2_215'>215</a>; interview with
+Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for recognition,
+<a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href='#Page2_250'>50</a>; quoted on
+Lee's surrender <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_257'>7</a>; appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; correspondence of, i. <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>
+<i>note</i>; otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]. <i>See also under heading</i> Confederate
+Commissioners</p>
+<p>Smith, Goldwin, ii. <a href='#Page2_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on Gladstone and
+Canada, <a href='#Page2_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; quoted on the influence of the <i>Times</i>,
+<a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; on the <i>Daily Telegraph</i>,
+<a href='#Page2_189'>189</a> <i>note</i>[2]; tribute of, to T.B.
+Potter, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3]; view of the
+<i>Times</i> attitude to democracy, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a>;
+criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, <a href=
+'#Page2_303'>303</a>-<a href='#Page2_304'>4</a> <i>America and
+England in their present relations</i>, quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_304'>304</a>, <i>and note</i>[2] <i>Civil War, The, in
+America</i>, cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_223'>223</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+quoted, <a href='#Page2_304'>304</a> <i>note</i>[1] Does the Bible
+sanction American Slavery?" ii. <a href='#Page2_110'>110</a>
+<i>Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence
+Association</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_194'>194</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_195'>5</a>; quoted, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a></p>
+<p>Smith, T.C., <i>Parties and Slavery</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_3'>3</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>; letters of, to Members of
+Parliament, <a href='#Page2_207'>207</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_208'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_211'>11</a>; deputation of, to Palmerston, <a href=
+'#Page2_216'>216</a></p>
+<p>Somerset, Duke of, i. <a href='#Page_207'>207</a></p>
+<p>South Carolina, secession of, i. <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>,
+<a href='#Page_44'>44</a>; <i>Times</i> view on, <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>; and restoration of Colonial relations: some
+British misconceptions on, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_44'>44</a> <i>and note</i></p>
+<p>Southern Independence Association, The, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a>-<a href='#Page2_195'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_204'>204</a>, <a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_298'>298</a>; cessation of meetings of, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href='#Page2_194'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page2_223'>3</a>; apathy and
+dissension in, <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_207'>207</a>, <a href='#Page2_208'>208</a>; resolution and
+deputation to Palmerston, <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_212'>2</a>, <a href='#Page2_216'>216</a>; ticket meetings,
+<a href='#Page2_239'>239</a>; Oldham meeting, <a href=
+'#Page2_239'>239</a>, <a href='#Page2_240'>240</a></p>
+<p>Southern Ports Bill. <i>See</i> Blockade</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_336"></a>[V2:pg 336]</span>
+<p>Southern States: attitude of, to protection policy, i. <a href=
+'#Page_21'>21</a>, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; and reciprocity
+treaty with British-American provinces, <a href=
+'#Page_21'>21</a>-<a href='#Page_22'>2</a>; influences directing
+British trade to, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>; British press attitude
+to, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>-<a href='#Page_48'>48</a>
+<i>passim</i>; characterization of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>;
+right of secession, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>; tariff as a cause
+for secession, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>; question of recognition
+considered, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>; secession, <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a>-<a href='#Page_173'>3</a>; preparations for
+war, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>; recognized as belligerents,
+<a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a>; expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_148'>148</a> <i>note</i>[2]; activities of British friends
+of, <a href='#Page2_152'>152</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_187'>187</a>-<a href='#Page2_188'>8</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_194'>4</a>, <a href='#Page2_239'>239</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_298'>298</a>; Conservative hopes for success of, <a href=
+'#Page2_300'>300</a>; views on French attitude, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_236'>236</a> <i>note</i>[2]; effect of the fall of Savannah
+on, <a href='#Page2_246'>246</a>; end of the Confederacy, <a href=
+'#Page2_248'>248</a>, <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_268'>268</a>; hope of, from "foreign war," <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a>; effect on, of Lincoln's assassination
+<a href='#Page2_258'>258</a>; withdrawal of belligerent rights to,
+<a href='#Page2_264'>264</a>-<a href='#Page2_266'>6</a>; end of the
+war; naval policy towards, <a href='#Page2_266'>266</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_267'>7</a> Belligerent rights, recognition of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_87'>87</a>, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_95'>95</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_166'>166</a> <i>note</i>[3]. <i>See</i> Neutrality
+Proclamations. Commissioners of, <i>See under</i> Confederate
+Commissioners Cotton, obsession as to, i. <a href=
+'#Page_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_5'>5</a> Cotton Loan, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_155'>155</a> <i>et seq.</i> <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>;
+reception of, in England, <a href='#Page2_160'>160</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_161'>1</a>; amounts realized by, <a href=
+'#Page2_162'>162</a> Declaration of Paris negotiation: attitude to,
+i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a> Finance, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_156'>156</a> <i>et seq.</i> Hampton Roads Conference:
+suggestions in, ii. <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_253'>3</a> Leaders of: British information on, i. <a href=
+'#Page_58'>58</a>-<a href='#Page_59'>9</a> Manifesto to Europe, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_241'>241</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_242'>242</a> Mediation: feeling in, on England's refusal
+of, ii. <a href='#Page2_71'>71</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; hope of
+change in British policy on, <a href='#Page2_213'>213</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_214'>4</a> Military resources: decline of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_219'>219</a>; desertions from the Army, <a href=
+'#Page2_222'>222</a> Negroes, arming of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_240'>240</a>-<a href='#Page2_241'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_251'>251</a> Privateering. <i>See that heading.</i>
+Recognition of independence: anger at failure to secure, i.
+<a href='#Page_252'>252</a> <i>note</i>[2]; desire for, without
+mediation, ii. <a href='#Page2_217'>217</a> Secret service funds,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1] Shipbuilding in
+British ports for, ii. <a href='#Page2_115'>115</a> <i>et seq.</i>;
+British protest to, on, <a href='#Page2_148'>148</a>. <i>See also
+under</i> Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc. Slavery attitude, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_88'>88</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; intention of gradual
+emancipation, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; British views on,
+<a href='#Page2_220'>220</a>; offer of abolition in return for
+recognition, <a href='#Page2_249'>249</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_251'>51</a></p>
+<p>Spain, and Mexican debts, i. <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>,
+<a href='#Page_260'>260</a></p>
+<p>Spargo, <i>Karl Marx</i>, cited, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_292'>292</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p><i>Spectator</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href='#Page2_231'>231</a> <i>note</i>;
+constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>;
+on Lincoln's election, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>; views on the
+Civil War, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>,
+<a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; on
+secession, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>; on Proclamation of
+Neutrality, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_136'>136</a> <i>note</i>[1]; attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech
+on dissolution of the Union, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>; on
+servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>; on British Press
+attitude to emancipation, <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>; on
+declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, <a href=
+'#Page2_89'>89</a>; on the Emancipation Proclamation, <a href=
+'#Page2_104'>104</a>-<a href='#Page2_105'>5</a>; on British lack of
+sympathy with the North, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a>; on
+anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, <a href=
+'#Page2_280'>280</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_180'>180</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_105'>105</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_282'>282</a></p>
+<p>Spence, James, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; conferences of, in
+London, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>,
+<a href='#Page_272'>272</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_273'>273</a>; prevents demonstration by cotton operatives,
+<a href='#Page_300'>300</a>; plan to appeal to the Tories, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_155'>155</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>; as Confederate financial adviser,
+<a href='#Page2_156'>156</a>, <a href='#Page2_157'>157</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_158'>158</a>; and Confederate Cotton Loan, <a href=
+'#Page2_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page2_161'>161</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_162'>2</a>; urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, <a href=
+'#Page2_173'>173</a>-<a href='#Page2_174'>4</a>; effect of the fall
+of Vicksburg on, <a href='#Page2_179'>179</a>; organization of
+Southern Clubs by, <a href='#Page2_186'>186</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_187'>7</a>, <a href='#Page2_188'>188</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>; hopes for
+intervention, <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_188'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_190'>90</a>; organization of Southern Independence
+Association by, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>; organization of
+meetings by, <a href='#Page2_191'>191</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_222'>222</a>-<a href='#Page2_223'>3</a>; organizes
+petitions to Parliament, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a>; comments of,
+on the Palmerston-Mason interview, <a href=
+'#Page2_216'>216</a>-<a href='#Page2_217'>7</a>; on slavery clause
+in Southern Independence Association's address, <a href=
+'#Page2_220'>220</a> Slidell's opinion of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_159'>159</a>; Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_302'>302</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>The
+American Union</i>, i. <a href='#Page_183'>183</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[3]; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_112'>112</a></p>
+<p>Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></p>
+<p>Spurgeon, C.H., prayer of, for victory of the North, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>-<a href='#Page2_110'>110</a></p>
+<p>Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_42'>42</a></p>
+<p>Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of Southern Government,
+i. <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_121'>121</a>; interview of, with Schleiden, <a href=
+'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>; discussion of,
+with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_252'>252</a></p>
+<p>Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to
+Palmerston, quoted, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_110'>10</a></p>
+<p>Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington: view of the secession,
+i. <a href='#Page_53'>53</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on Russian policy in
+Declaration of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; on privateers in Northern Pacific, <a href=
+'#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1]; and recognition of the South,
+<a href='#Page_196'>196</a> <i>note</i>[3], and Mercier's Richmond
+visit, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>and note</i>[1]; on
+mediation, <a href='#Page_283'>283</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_37'>37</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>
+<i>note</i>[4], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_76'>76</a>; comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation,
+<a href='#Page2_107'>107</a> <i>note</i>[1]; on the reconciliation
+of North and South followed by a foreign war, <a href=
+'#Page2_251'>251</a>; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of
+Southern belligerent rights, <a href='#Page2_265'>265</a>; views on
+probable policy of Britain at the beginning of the Civil War,
+<a href='#Page2_269'>269</a>-<a href='#Page_270'>70</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_271'>271</a>; on the Civil War as a warning against
+democracy, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a> <i>note</i>[4]; Otherwise
+mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_54'>54</a> <i>note</i>[1]; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_45'>45</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_337"></a>[V2:pg 337]</span>
+<p>Stone Boat Fleet. <i>See</i> Blockade.</p>
+<p>Story, William Wetmore, i. <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_256'>256</a>; letters of, in <i>Daily News</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_228'>228</a> <i>and note</i>[4]</p>
+<p>Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the <i>Saturday Review</i>, i.
+<a href='#Page_181'>181</a>; mentioned, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_89'>89</a>-<a href='#Page2_90'>90</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a> <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i>, i. <a href=
+'#Page_33'>33</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Stowell, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_208'>208</a></p>
+<p>Stuart--, British Minister at Washington: report of new Northern
+levies of men, ii. <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a>; on recognition,
+<a href='#Page2_30'>30</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; views on British
+policy, <a href='#Page2_30'>30</a> <i>note</i>[3]; attitude to
+intervention and recognition, <a href='#Page2_36'>36</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, <a href=
+'#Page2_37'>37</a>, <a href='#Page2_98'>98</a>; suggestion of
+armistice, <a href='#Page2_47'>47</a>; account of Federal
+"reprisals," <a href='#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3]; on servile
+insurrection, <a href='#Page2_97'>97</a>; describes Emancipation
+proclamation as a <i>brutum fulmen</i>, <a href=
+'#Page2_101'>101</a> Otherwise mentioned, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page2_26'>26</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_66'>66</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_70'>70</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page2_101'>101</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Sturge, Joseph, <i>A Visit to the United States in</i> 1841,
+cited, i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Sumner, Charles, i. <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_80'>80</a>; Brooks' attack on, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>,
+<a href='#Page_80'>80</a>; hope of, for appointment as Minister to
+England, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>and note</i>[2]; views on
+annexation of Canada, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>; in <i>Trent</i>
+affair, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>,
+<a href='#Page_234'>234</a> <i>note</i>[3]; attitude to Southern
+Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a> <i>and note</i>[3];
+advocacy of abolition, ii. <a href='#Page2_81'>81</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_90'>90</a>; conversations with Lincoln on abolition,
+<a href='#Page2_82'>82</a>, <a href='#Page2_86'>86</a>; attitude to
+Privateering Bill, <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_124'>124</a>; otherwise mentioned, i. <a href=
+'#Page_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_130'>130</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>;
+ii. <a href='#Page2_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page2_132'>132</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href='#Page2_247'>247</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page2_280'>280</a></p>
+<p>Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_73'>73</a>, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>; Seward's policy
+on reinforcement of, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a></p>
+<p>Sutherland, Rev. Dr., prayer of in American Senate, i. <a href=
+'#Page_233'>233</a> <i>note</i></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Tariff Bill (U.S.) of 1816, i. <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>; of
+1828, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a></p>
+<p>Taylor, P.A., abolitionist, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>;
+eulogy of George Thompson, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Taylor, Tom, poem by, in <i>Punch</i>, on the death of Lincoln,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_259'>259</a></p>
+<p>Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. <a href=
+'#Page_173'>173</a></p>
+<p>Texas, State of: revolts from Mexico, i. <a href=
+'#Page_12'>12</a>; Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular
+agents to, <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>; independence of, as affecting
+British policy, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_16'>16</a>; enters the American Union, <a href=
+'#Page_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_16'>16</a>; in War of Independence against Mexico protests
+against shipbuilding for Mexico in Britain, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_117'>117</a> <i>note</i>[1]; mentioned, <a href=
+'#Page2_266'>266</a></p>
+<p>Thompson and Wainwright, <i>Confidential Correspondence of G.V.
+Fox, etc.</i>, cited, i. <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_91'>91</a>; work of, for emancipation, <a href=
+'#Page2_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>and
+note</i>[1]; mentioned, <a href='#Page2_109'>109</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_184'>184</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_191'>191</a></p>
+<p>Thouvenel, M., French Foreign Minister, i. <a href=
+'#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>; in the Declaration
+of Paris negotiations, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_159'>159</a>, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_162'>162</a>, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>; initiates
+negotiations with Confederates, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>,
+<a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; policy of, for relief of French need
+for cotton, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>; attitude of, in
+Charleston consuls case, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>; and Southern
+Ports Bill, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_248'>248</a> <i>and notes</i>, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>
+<i>and note</i>[4]; interview with Slidell, <a href=
+'#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1]; attitude of, to mediation,
+<a href='#Page_266'>266</a> <i>note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_279'>279</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_19'>19</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_28'>28</a>; on difficulties due
+to lack of cotton, i. <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_293'>293</a>-<a href='#Page_294'>4</a>; conversations on
+Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>,
+<a href='#Page_293'>293</a>; and Mercier's Richmond visit, <a href=
+'#Page_280'>280</a>, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_282'>282</a>, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>; conversation with
+Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of the South, <a href=
+'#Page_294'>294</a>; on French neutrality, <a href=
+'#Page_299'>299</a>; opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_19'>19</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page2_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page2_39'>39</a>; Slidell's offer to,
+on mediation, <a href='#Page2_24'>24</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_25'>25</a>; reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of
+mediation, <a href='#Page2_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page2_39'>9</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_46'>46</a>; retirement of, <a href=
+'#Page2_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page2_59'>59</a>; view of England's
+advantage from dissolution of the Union, <a href=
+'#Page2_270'>270</a> <i>note</i>[2]; otherwise mentioned, i.
+<a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_338"></a>[V2:pg 338]</span>
+<p><i>Times</i>, The: characteristics of, as newspaper, i. <a href=
+'#Page_42'>42</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii.
+<a href='#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href='#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>; influence on public opinion, <a href=
+'#Page2_178'>178</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_189'>189</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; influence on
+public press, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_230'>230</a> <i>note</i>[3]; accuracy of reports in,
+<a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>; pro-Southern attitude in last year of
+the conflict, <a href='#Page2_226'>226</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_228'>8</a>, <a href='#Page2_242'>242</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_244'>244</a> <i>and note</i>[3]; attitude to Hotze,
+<a href='#Page2_154'>154</a> <i>note</i>[1]; relations of, with
+W.H. Russell, i. <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_178'>178</a>, ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>and note</i>[1] Criticisms of: John
+Bright's view of, i. <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>note</i>[3];
+citations of anti-Americanism in, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]; Cobden, on, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>
+<i>note</i>; Canadian opinion on, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>
+<i>note</i>; in <i>Index</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; in
+<i>Morning Star</i>, <a href='#Page2_228'>228</a>; Goldwin Smith's
+attack on, <a href='#Page2_299'>299</a> "Historicus," articles by,
+in. <i>See under</i> "Historicus." <i>Views expressed in, on:</i>
+Civil War: non-idealistic, i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_97'>97</a>; prints Motley's letter on causes of, <a href=
+'#Page_174'>174</a>-<a href='#Page_175'>5</a> Confederate
+Manifesto, ii. <a href='#Page2_242'>242</a> Cotton, i. <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_7'>7</a> <i>and note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_14'>14</a>, <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a> Democracy:
+attitude to, i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_280'>280</a>-<a href='#Page2_281'>1</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_284'>284</a>, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_297'>297</a>, <a href='#Page2_300'>300</a>; change of view
+on, <a href='#Page2_289'>289</a>-<a href='#Page2_290'>90</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>;
+comparison of British and United States Governments, <a href=
+'#Page2_286'>286</a>; attack on John Bright, <a href=
+'#Page2_295'>295</a>-<a href='#Page2_296'>6</a> Foreign war plans
+of America on, ii. <a href='#Page2_252'>252</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_254'>254</a> Gladstone's speech, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_49'>49</a> <i>note</i>[1] Laird Rams, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_146'>146</a> Lincoln: on Slavery speech of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_38'>38</a>; on re-election of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_234'>234</a>-<a href='#Page2_235'>5</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_238'>238</a>; appreciations of, after his death, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_259'>259</a>-<a href='#Page2_261'>61</a> Lindsay's
+proposed motion: ii. <a href='#Page2_205'>205</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_206'>6</a> Mediation, i. <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>,
+<a href='#Page_305'>305</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_67'>67</a>
+Military situation, ii. <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_176'>176</a> <i>and note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page2_297'>297</a>; after
+Gettysburg, ii. <a href='#Page2_180'>180</a> <i>and note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page2_228'>228</a> <i>note</i>[3]; Lee's Northern
+advance, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>; on Grant's reverses and
+Sherman's march on Atlanta, <a href='#Page2_212'>212</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_227'>227</a>, <a href='#Page2_232'>232</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_243'>243</a>; capture of Atlanta, <a href=
+'#Page2_233'>233</a>, <a href='#Page2_234'>234</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_235'>235</a>; fall of Savannah, <a href=
+'#Page2_245'>245</a>-<a href='#Page2_246'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_300'>300</a>-<a href='#Page2_301'>1</a>; Lee's surrender,
+<a href='#Page2_255'>255</a>-<a href='#Page2_256'>6</a>;
+appreciation of Lee's campaign, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>;
+Northern ability in war, <a href='#Page2_256'>256</a>; Sherman's
+campaign, <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> <i>note</i>[1] Neutrality in
+non-idealistic war i. <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_97'>97</a> Northern ability in war, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_256'>256</a> Privateers, i. <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>
+Proclamation of Neutrality, i. <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_104'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a> Roebuck's motion,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_296'>296</a> <i>note</i>[2] Secession, i. <a href=
+'#Page_45'>45</a>, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a> Seward, i. <a href=
+'#Page_216'>216</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_257'>257</a> Slavery:
+attitude to controversy on, i. <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_55'>55</a>; condemnation of, <a href=
+'#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_40'>40</a>, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>; on Northern attitude
+to, ii. <a href='#Page2_89'>89</a>; Emancipation Proclamation,
+<a href='#Page2_102'>102</a>-<a href='#Page2_103'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_104'>104</a>; criticism of anti-slavery meetings, <a href=
+'#Page2_108'>108</a>; on Biblical sanction of, <a href=
+'#Page2_110'>110</a> South, The: condemnation of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_38'>38</a>-<a href='#Page_39'>9</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_40'>40</a>; lawless element in, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>,
+<a href='#Page_41'>41</a>; changing views on, at opening of the
+war, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a> <i>and note</i>[3], <a href=
+'#Page_56'>56</a>-<a href='#Page_57'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_68'>68</a>-<a href='#Page_69'>9</a>; demand of, for
+recognition, ii. <a href='#Page2_181'>181</a>; renewed confidence
+in, ii. <a href='#Page2_210'>210</a> <i>and note</i>[2] Southern
+shipbuilding, ii. <a href='#Page2_145'>145</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_146'>146</a> <i>Trent</i> affair, i. <a href=
+'#Page_216'>216</a>-<a href='#Page_217'>7</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_225'>225</a>-<a href='#Page_226'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_237'>237</a> War of 1812 ... i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>
+"Yankee," The, ii. <a href='#Page2_246'>246</a> Otherwise
+mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_65'>65</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page2_160'>160</a>, <a href='#Page2_201'>201</a> <i>and
+note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_204'>204</a> <i>and note</i>[2],
+<a href='#Page2_295'>295</a></p>
+<p>Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. <a href=
+'#Page_129'>129</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]</p>
+<p>Toronto <i>Globe</i>, the, cited, i. <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_132'>132</a>-<a href='#Page2_133'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_134'>134</a>, <a href='#Page2_291'>291</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_293'>3</a></p>
+<p>Train, George Francis, of the <i>New York Herald</i>, speeches
+of, in England, ii. <a href='#Page2_224'>224</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Treaty of Washington (1842) i. <a href='#Page_4'>4</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_9'>9</a></p>
+<p>Tremenheere, H.S., <i>The Constitution of the United States</i>,
+etc., cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_275'>275</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Tremlett, F.W., quoted, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_211'>211</a>-<a href='#Page2_212'>12</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_339"></a>[V2:pg 339]</span>
+<p><i>Trent</i> affair. The, i. <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>,
+<a href='#Page_203'>203</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_204'>204</a> <i>et seq.</i> British demands in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_212'>212</a>-<a href='#Page_213'>3</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, points of the
+complaint, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a> <i>note</i>[1]; American
+reply, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>
+British views on, i. <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_218'>8</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_224'>4</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_226'>226</a>-<a href='#Page_227'>7</a>; American exultation
+in, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>-<a href='#Page_206'>6</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_218'>218</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>; effect of in
+Canada, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a> <i>note</i>; Cabinet members'
+sentiments on, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>; change in American
+views, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_230'>230</a>-<a href='#Page_231'>1</a>; British speculation
+on probable war, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_229'>229</a>; European support of Britain in, <a href=
+'#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>; French views on,
+<a href='#Page_230'>230</a>, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_235'>5</a>; release of envoys, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>;
+American feeling after settlement of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>
+<i>and note</i>[3], <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>; Parliamentary
+debate on conclusion of, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_241'>1</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_265'>265</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>; influence of, on
+British policy in relation to the Civil War, <a href=
+'#Page_242'>242</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_15'>15</a>-<a href=
+'#Page2_16'>16</a>; Southerners' action in, i. <a href=
+'#Page_211'>211</a> <i>note</i>[1]; effect of, on British cotton
+trade, ii. <a href='#Page2_9'>9</a><br>
+Otherwise mentioned, i. <a href='#Page_171'>171</a> <i>note</i>[1],
+<a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_244'>244</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_254'>254</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_72'>72</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_131'>131</a></p>
+<p>Trescott, William Henry, i. <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>,
+<a href='#Page_188'>188</a></p>
+<p><i>Tribune</i>, The New York, cited, i. <a href=
+'#Page_280'>280</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Trimble, W., "Surplus Food Production of the United States,"
+cited, ii. <a href='#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Trollope, Anthony, i. <a href='#Page_239'>239</a> <i>and
+note</i>[5], <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_153'>153</a>; description of the United States citizen by,
+ii. <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>-<a href='#Page2_288'>8</a>
+<i>North America</i>, i. <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>; ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page2_287'>287</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_288'>288</a> <i>and note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Trollope, Mrs., i. <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_48'>48</a></p>
+<p>Tyler, President, i. <a href='#Page_10'>10</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Union and Emancipation Society of London, The: Bright's speech
+to, ii. <a href='#Page2_295'>295</a></p>
+<p>United Empire Loyalists, i. <a href='#Page_8'>8</a>
+<i>note</i></p>
+<p>United States: Citizenship: theory of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_6'>6</a> <i>and note</i> Commercial
+relations with Great Britain, i. <a href='#Page_17'>17</a> <i>et
+seq.</i> Democracy in, <i>See under</i> Democracy. International
+law, influence of U.S. on, belligerent and neutral rights in, i.
+<a href='#Page_5'>5</a>-<a href='#Page_10'>10</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_140'>140</a> Naval power: agitation for increase of, i.
+<a href='#Page_123'>123</a> Policy in the Civil War, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_197'>197</a> <i>See under</i> Adams, Lincoln, Seward,
+<i>and subject-headings</i> Political principles of: British
+sympathy for, i. <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>
+Political institutions in: views of travellers and writers, i.
+<a href='#Page_30'>30</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_274'>274</a> <i>et
+seq.</i> Population, growth of, i. <a href='#Page_12'>12</a>
+Protection policy: beginnings of, i. <a href=
+'#Page_18'>18</a>-<a href='#Page_19'>19</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_20'>20</a>-<a href='#Page_21'>1</a>; reaction against in the
+South, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a> Territorial expansion, i. <a href=
+'#Page_12'>12</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+<i>See also under subject-headings.</i></p>
+United States Supreme Court: decision on Lincoln's blockade
+proclamations, i. <a href='#Page_110'>110</a> <i>note</i>[3]</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Van Buren, President, i. <a href='#Page_109'>109</a></p>
+<p>Vansittart, William, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Vicksburg, capture of, ii. <a href='#Page2_143'>143</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_176'>176</a>
+<i>note</i>[2], <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_228'>228</a> <i>note</i>[3], <a href='#Page2_296'>296</a>;
+Southern defence of, <a href='#Page2_164'>164</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_165'>165</a>, <a href='#Page2_178'>178</a>; importance of,
+in the military situation, <a href='#Page2_165'>165</a></p>
+<p>Victoria, Queen, i. <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_96'>96</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_190'>190</a> <i>note</i>[2]; ii. <a href='#Page2_40'>40</a>,
+<a href='#Page2_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page2_262'>262</a>;
+pro-German influence of, <a href='#Page2_203'>203</a>
+<i>note</i>[3]; writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln,
+<a href='#Page2_262'>262</a></p>
+<p>Vignaud, Henry, ii. <a href='#Page2_154'>154</a>
+<i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Virginia, State of, i. <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_122'>122</a>, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_245'>245</a></p>
+<p>Vogt, A., ii. <a href='#Page2_301'>301</a> <i>note</i>[3]</p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, ... i.
+<a href='#Page_80'>80</a></p>
+<p>Walker, Mr., and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_100'>100</a></p>
+<p>Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a>
+<i>and note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Warburton, George <i>Hochelaga</i>: i. <a href=
+'#Page_29'>29</a></p>
+<p>Washington, President, i. <a href='#Page_11'>11</a></p>
+<p>Watts, <i>Cotton, Famine</i>, ii. <a href='#Page2_6'>6</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Weed, Thurlow, i. <a href='#Page_114'>114</a> <i>and notes</i>,
+<a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_231'>231</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_130'>130</a>
+<i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_199'>199</a>; in <i>Trent</i> affair, congratulates Wilkes,
+i. <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>; attitude to the "Privateering
+Bill," ii. <a href='#Page2_123'>123</a> <i>note</i>[2], <a href=
+'#Page2_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page2_137'>137</a>; mentioned,
+<a href='#Page2_84'>84</a>, <a href='#Page2_96'>96</a></p>
+<p>West Indian Colonies, i. <a href='#Page_3'>3</a>; American trade
+with, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>,
+<a href='#Page_20'>20</a>, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>; slavery in,
+<a href='#Page_31'>31</a></p>
+<p>Westbury, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_263'>3</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_64'>64</a></p>
+<p><i>Westminster Review</i>, The, i. <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>,
+<a href='#Page_70'>70</a> <i>and note</i>[1], <a href=
+'#Page_71'>71</a></p>
+<p>Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. <a href='#Page2_187'>187</a>, <a href=
+'#Page2_193'>193</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. <a href=
+'#Page2_13'>13</a> <i>note</i>[2]</p>
+<p>Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. <a href=
+'#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a></p>
+<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page2_340"></a>[V2:pg 340]</span>
+<p>White, Andrew D., "A Letter to W.H. Russell," etc. cited, ii.
+<a href='#Page2_229'>229</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Whittier, J.G., i. <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_47'>47</a></p>
+<p>Wilberforce, Samuel, i. <a href='#Page_31'>31</a></p>
+<p>Williams, Commander, R.N., i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a></p>
+<p>Wilkes, Captain, of the <i>San Jacinto</i>, intercepts the
+<i>Trent</i>, i. <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href=
+'#Page_220'>20</a>; American national approbation of, <a href=
+'#Page_219'>219</a>-<a href='#Page_220'>20</a>; Seward on, <a href=
+'#Page_233'>233</a>; his action officially stated to be
+unauthorized, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_254'>254</a></p>
+<p>Wilmington, N.C., i. <a href='#Page_253'>253</a> <i>note</i>[1];
+ii. <a href='#Page2_247'>247</a></p>
+<p>Wilson, President, i. <a href='#Page_90'>90</a> <i>note</i></p>
+<p>Wodehouse, Lord, i. <a href='#Page_84'>84</a></p>
+</div>
+<div class="letter">
+<p>Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>,
+<a href='#Page_82'>82</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href=
+'#Page_85'>85</a>, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>, <a href=
+'#Page_264'>264</a>; ii. <a href='#Page2_4'>4</a> <i>note</i>[3],
+<a href='#Page2_223'>223</a> <i>note</i>[1]</p>
+<p>Yeomans, cited, i. <a href='#Page_38'>38</a></p>
+</div>
+</div>
+<br>
+<br>
+<hr style="width: 35%;">
+<br>
+<br>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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@@ -0,0 +1,26378 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil War
+by Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Great Britain and the American Civil War
+
+Author: Ephraim Douglass Adams
+
+Release Date: October 18, 2004 [EBook #13789]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN CIVIL WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Charlie Kirschner and the PG Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: LORD JOHN RUSSELL
+(_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy_")]
+
+_EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS_
+
+GREAT BRITAIN
+AND
+THE AMERICAN
+CIVIL WAR
+
+TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the British Museum
+many newspapers and journals for the years 1860-1865, and then planned a
+survey of English public opinion on the American Civil War. In the
+succeeding years as a teacher at Stanford University, California, the
+published diplomatic correspondence of Great Britain and of the United
+States were studied in connection with instruction given in the field of
+British-American relations. Several of my students prepared excellent
+theses on special topics and these have been acknowledged where used in
+this work. Many distractions and other writing prevented the completion
+of my original plan; and fortunately, for when in 1913 I had at last
+begun this work and had prepared three chapters, a letter was received
+from the late Charles Francis Adams inviting me to collaborate with him
+in preparing a "Life" of his father, the Charles Francis Adams who was
+American Minister to Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams had
+recently returned from England where he had given at Oxford University a
+series of lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as to
+obtain copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. Worthington
+C. Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office files
+in the Public Record Office and from the private papers in the
+possession of various families.
+
+The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at Washington
+and at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life." Two volumes were
+completed, the first by Mr. Adams carrying the story to 1848, the
+second by myself for the period 1848 to 1860. For the third volume I
+analysed and organized the new materials obtained in England and we were
+about to begin actual collaboration on the most vital period of the
+"Life" when Mr. Adams died, and the work was indefinitely suspended,
+probably wisely, since any completion of the "Life" by me would have
+lacked that individual charm in historical writing so markedly
+characteristic of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr.
+Adams was an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory.
+
+The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I returned
+to the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the American Civil
+War" in the hope that the English materials obtained by Mr. Adams might
+be made available to me. When copies were secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 a
+restriction had been imposed by the Foreign Office to the effect that
+while studied for information, citations and quotations were not
+permissible since the general diplomatic archives were not yet open to
+students beyond the year 1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, the
+whole matter was again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exact
+statement that the new request was in no way related to the proposed
+"Life" of Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of the
+materials. Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved the
+request but with the usual condition that my manuscript be submitted
+before publication to the Foreign Office. This has now been done, and no
+single citation censored. Before this work will have appeared the
+limitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic correspondence will have been
+removed, and the date for open research have been advanced beyond 1865,
+the end of the Civil War.
+
+Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made through
+my friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the owners of various private papers,
+and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came to England for further study
+of some of these private papers. The Russell Papers, transmitted to the
+Public Record Office in 1914 and there preserved, were used through the
+courtesy of the Executors of the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with the
+hearty goodwill of Lady Agatha Russell, daughter of the late Earl
+Russell, the only living representative of her father, Mr. Rollo
+Russell, his son, having died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved in
+the Muniment Room at Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesy
+of the Duchess of Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor.
+The Gladstone Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used through
+the courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from the
+Palmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved by
+Lieut.-Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M.P.
+
+The opportunity to study these private papers has been invaluable for my
+work. Shortly after returning from England in 1913 Mr. Worthington Ford
+well said: "The inside history of diplomatic relations between the
+United States and Great Britain may be surmised from the official
+archives; the tinting and shading needed to complete the picture must be
+sought elsewhere." (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 478.) Mr.
+C.F. Adams declared (_ibid._, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers
+"... the character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865) cannot
+be understood.... It would appear that the commonly entertained
+impressions as to certain phases of international relations, and the
+proceedings and utterances of English public men during the progress of
+the War of Secession, must be to some extent revised."
+
+In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate in the
+generosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor Frank A.
+Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St. Petersburg in
+1914, of all Russian diplomatic correspondence on the Civil War. Many
+friends have aided, by suggestion or by permitting the use of notes and
+manuscripts, in the preparation of this work. I have sought to make due
+acknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to those
+already named, I should here particularly note the courtesy of the late
+Mr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State Department at
+Washington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, for the
+transcript of the Correspondence of Mason and Slidell, Confederate
+Commissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles Moore, Chief of Manuscripts
+Division, Library of Congress, for the use of the Schurz Papers
+containing copies of the despatches of Schleiden, Minister of the
+Republic of Bremen at Washington during the Civil War. Especially thanks
+are due to my friend, Mr. Herbert Hoover, for his early interest in this
+work and for his generous aid in the making of transcripts which would
+otherwise have been beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to the
+skill and care of my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press,
+and whose criticisms were invaluable.
+
+It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my hope
+that with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence," now for the
+first time available to the historian, a fairly true estimate may be
+made of what the American Civil War meant to Great Britain; how she
+regarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief, my work is primarily a
+study in British history in the belief that the American drama had a
+world significance, and peculiarly a British one.
+
+EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS.
+
+_November 25, 1924_
+
+
+
+CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE
+
+CHAPTER                                                       PAGE
+
+   I. BACKGROUNDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1
+  II. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61   .  .  .  35
+ III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861  .  .  .  .  .  .  76
+  IV. BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 113
+   V. THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION .  .  .  .  .  .  . 137
+  VI. BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND MERCIER   .  .  .  . 172
+ VII. THE "TRENT"  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 203
+VIII. THE BLOCKADE .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 244
+  IX. ENTER MR. LINDSAY  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 274
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+PART ONE
+
+LORD JOHN RUSSELL   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . _Frontispiece_
+_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of
+Italy_"
+
+LORD LYONS (1860)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   _facing p_. 42
+_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons" (Edward
+Arnold & Co_.)
+
+SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G.  .  .  .  .  .       "     90
+_From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory,
+K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography"_ (_John Murray_)
+
+WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    114
+_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons"_ (_Edward
+Arnold & Co._)
+
+C.F. ADAMS   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    138
+_From a photograph in the United States Embassy,
+London_
+
+JAMES M. MASON  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    206
+_From a photograph by L.C. Handy, Washington_
+
+"KING COTTON BOUND"   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       "    262
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch"_
+
+GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+BACKGROUNDS
+
+In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in London, the
+American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of depression and
+bitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That Great Britain did,
+in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a
+monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and
+at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only
+foreign nation steadily contributing in every indirect way possible to
+verify its judgment, will probably be the verdict made against her by
+posterity, on calm comparison of the evidence[1]." Very different were
+the views of Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "The
+perfect neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to
+me almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance has
+been shown during the political history of the last two centuries. It is
+the single case in which the English Government and public--generally so
+meddlesome--have displayed most prudent and commendable forbearance in
+spite of great temptations to the contrary[2]." And Sir William
+Harcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord Russell's many
+titles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner in which he has
+steered the vessel of State through the Scylla and Charybdis of the
+American War will, I think, always stand conspicuous[3]."
+
+Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason somewhat
+to modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of Great Britain was
+long prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was also among the historians
+and writers of Continental Europe--notably those of France and Russia.
+To what extent was this dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite of
+her long years of championship of personal freedom and of leadership in
+the cause of anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in the
+disruption of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms,
+react only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national
+power? In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted by
+historians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in both
+foreign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of her
+statesmen, or the inspirations of her people?
+
+It was to answer this question that the present work was originally
+undertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became progressively more
+clear that the great crisis in America was almost equally a crisis in
+the domestic history of Great Britain itself and that unless this were
+fully appreciated no just estimate was possible of British policy toward
+America. Still more it became evident that the American Civil War, as
+seen through British spectacles, could not be understood if regarded as
+an isolated and unique situation, but that the conditions preceding that
+situation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the two
+nations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when the
+crisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions is
+here possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this first
+chapter is devoted.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it is
+unnecessary to dilate, though it should always be remembered that both
+during the war and afterwards there existed a minority in Great Britain
+strongly sympathetic with the political ideals proclaimed in
+America--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something to be striven for
+in Britain itself and the conflict with America as, in a measure, a
+conflict in home politics. But independence once acknowledged by the
+Treaty of Peace of 1783, the relations between the Mother Country and
+the newly-created United States of America rapidly tended to adjust
+themselves to lines of contact customary between Great Britain and any
+other Sovereign State. Such contacts, fixing national attitude and
+policy, ordinarily occur on three main lines: governmental, determined
+by officials in authority in either State whose duty it is to secure the
+greatest advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial,
+resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the business
+opportunities of either nation in the other's territory, or from their
+rivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of comparative
+development especially in those ideals of political structure which
+determine the nature of the State and the form of its government. The
+more obvious of these contacts is the governmental, since the attitude
+of a people is judged by the formal action of its Government, and,
+indeed, in all three lines of contact the government of a State is
+directly concerned and frequently active. But it may be of service to a
+clearer appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if the
+intermingling of elements required by a strict chronological account of
+relations is here replaced by a separate review of each of the three
+main lines of contact.
+
+Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, the
+interest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs American.
+True, there still remained the valued establishments in the West Indies,
+and the less considered British possessions on the continent to the
+north of the United States. Meanwhile, there were occasional frictions
+with America arising from uncertain claims drawn from the former
+colonial privileges of the new state, or from boundary contentions not
+settled in the treaty of peace. Thus the use of the Newfoundland
+fisheries furnished ground for an acrimonious controversy lasting even
+into the twentieth century, and occasionally rising to the danger point.
+Boundary disputes dragged along through official argument, survey
+commissions, arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of the
+northern limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty of
+Washington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any time in
+the forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an agreement
+creditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both countries, was
+reached establishing small and equal naval armaments on the Great Lakes.
+The British fear of an American attack on Canada proved groundless as
+time went on and was definitely set at rest by the strict curb placed by
+the American Government upon the restless activities of such of its
+citizens as sympathized with the followers of McKenzie and Papineau in
+the Canadian rebellion of 1837[4].
+
+None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British policy
+toward America. But the "War of 1812," as it is termed in the United
+States, "Mr. Madison's War," as it was derisively named by Tory
+contemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious policies in which
+the respective governments were in definite opposition. Briefly, this
+was a clash between belligerent and neutral interests. Britain, fighting
+at first for the preservation of Europe against the spread of French
+revolutionary influence, later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire,
+held the seas in her grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomed
+rights of a naval belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view,
+and as always in the case of the dominant naval belligerent, she
+stretched principles of international law to their utmost interpretation
+to secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral of
+importance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested point by
+point the issue of exceeded belligerent right as established in
+international law. America did more; she advanced new rules and theories
+of belligerent and neutral right respectively, and demanded that the
+belligerents accede to them. Dispute arose over blockades, contraband,
+the British "rule of 1756" which would have forbidden American trade
+with French colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited by
+France herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching the
+personal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the British
+exercise of a right of search and seizure to recover British sailors.
+
+Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely opposed
+theories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a man once born a
+British subject could never cease to be a subject--could never "alienate
+his duty." It was her practice to fill up her navy, in part at least, by
+the "impressment" of her sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, and
+wherever found--in her own coast towns, or from the decks of her own
+mercantile marine. But many British sailors sought security from such
+impressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to desert to
+American merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in the
+rapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became by
+naturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty of
+America to defend them as such in their lives and business. America
+ultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was accomplished
+from Great Britain when American citizenship was conferred. On shore
+they were safe, for Britain did not attempt to reclaim her subjects
+from the soil of another nation. But she denied that the American flag
+on merchant vessels at sea gave like security and she asserted a naval
+right to search such vessels in time of peace, professing her complete
+acquiescence in a like right to the American navy over British merchant
+vessels--a concession refused by America, and of no practical value
+since no American citizen sought service in the British merchant marine.
+
+This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic points of
+opposition between the two governments. First America contested the
+British theory of "once a citizen always a citizen[5]"; second, America
+denied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel in _time of peace_
+to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying the American flag. The
+_right of search in time of war_, that is, a belligerent right of
+search, America never denied, but there was both then and later much
+public confusion in both countries as to the question at issue since,
+once at war, Great Britain frequently exercised a legal belligerent
+right of search and followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged to
+be British subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially careful
+to make sure that no American-born sailors were included in their
+impressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after victim,
+the American irritation steadily increased. True, France was also an
+offender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was lost sight of in
+view of the, literally, thousands of _bona fide_ Americans seized by
+Great Britain. Here, then, was a third cause of irritation connected
+with impressment, though not a point of governmental dispute as to
+right, for Great Britain professed her earnest desire to restore
+promptly any American-born sailors whom her naval officers had seized
+through error. In fact many such sailors were soon liberated, but a
+large number either continued to serve on British ships or to languish
+in British prisons until the end of the Napoleonic Wars[6].
+
+There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812, most of
+them arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief maritime
+neutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific presidential
+administration of Jefferson sought by trade restrictions, using embargo
+and non-intercourse acts, to bring pressure on both England and France,
+hoping to force a better treatment of neutrals. The United States,
+divided in sympathy between the belligerents, came near to disorder and
+disruption at home, over the question of foreign policy. But through all
+American factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to Great
+Britain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by America in
+1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one section, New
+England, that war later came to be regarded as of great national value
+as one of the factors which welded the discordant states into a national
+unity. Naturally also, the war once ended, its commercial causes were
+quickly forgotten, whereas the individual, personal offence involved in
+impressment and right of search, with its insult to national pride,
+became a patriotic theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, in
+fact, a British "right of search" became a national point of honour,
+upon which no American statesman would have dared to yield to British
+overtures.
+
+In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war of
+Independence" and also as of international importance in contesting an
+unjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to be
+remembered that no other war of importance was fought by America until
+the Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus centred on the
+two wars fought against Great Britain. The contemporary British view
+was that of a nation involved in a life and death struggle with a great
+European enemy, irritated by what seemed captious claims, developed to
+war, by a minor power[7]. To be sure there were a few obstinate Tories
+in Britain who saw in the war the opportunity of smashing at one blow
+Napoleon's dream of empire, and the American "democratic system." The
+London _Times_ urged the government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and
+then deal with Mr. Madison and democracy," arguing that it should be
+England's object to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian
+school." But this was not the purpose of the British Government, nor
+would such a purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whig
+minority in Parliament.
+
+The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of the war,
+quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict. Impressment was
+not mentioned, but it was never again resorted to by Great Britain upon
+American ships. But the principle of right of search in time of peace,
+though for another object than impressment, was soon again asserted by
+Great Britain and for forty years was a cause of constant irritation and
+a source of danger in the relations of the two countries. Stirred by
+philanthropic emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for the
+suppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principle
+repudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various maritime
+powers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels of each upon
+the others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade was in fact
+outlawed for the flags of all nations. But America, smarting under the
+memory of impressment injuries, and maintaining in any case the doctrine
+that in time of peace the national flag protected a vessel from
+interference or search by the naval vessels of any other power, refused
+to sign mutual right of search treaties and denied, absolutely, such a
+right for any cause whatever to Great Britain or to any other nation.
+Being refused a treaty, Britain merely renewed her assertion of the
+right and continued to exercise it.
+
+Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not ended with
+the war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national relations, for
+Britain alone used her navy with energy to suppress the slave trade, and
+the slave traders of all nations sought refuge, when approached by a
+British naval vessel, under the protection of the American flag. If
+Britain respected the flag, and sheered off from search, how could she
+stop the trade? If she ignored the flag and on boarding found an
+innocent American vessel engaged in legal trade, there resulted claims
+for damages by detention of voyage, and demands by the American
+Government for apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seized
+under the American flag, never protested to the United States, nor
+claimed American citizenship, for his punishment in American law for
+engaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any other
+nation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his vessel.
+
+Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British contention was
+that here was a great international humanitarian object frustrated by an
+absurd American sensitiveness on a point of honour about the flag. After
+fifteen years of dispute Great Britain offered to abandon any claim to a
+right of _search_, contenting herself with a right of _visit_, merely to
+verify a vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted this
+to be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whose
+legality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine boundary
+controversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape. Joint
+cruising squadrons were provided for the coast of Africa, the British
+to search all suspected vessels except those flying the American flag,
+and these to be searched by the American squadron. At once President
+Tyler notified Congress that Great Britain had renounced the right of
+search. Immediately in Parliament a clamour was raised against the
+Government for the "sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and Lord
+Aberdeen promptly made official disclaimer of such surrender.
+
+Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of peace was a
+steady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty of Great Britain,
+appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, but suspicious of an
+ulterior "will to rule the seas." After 1830 no American political
+leader would have dared to yield the right of search. Great Britain for
+her part, viewing the expansion of domestic slavery in the United
+States, came gradually to attribute the American contention, not to
+patriotic pride, but to the selfish business interests of the
+slave-holding states. In the end, in 1858, with a waning British
+enthusiasm for the cause of slave trade suppression, and with
+recognition that America had become a great world power, Britain yielded
+her claim to right of search or visit, save when established by Treaty.
+Four years later, in 1862, it may well have seemed to British statesmen
+that American slavery had indeed been the basic cause of America's
+attitude, for in that year a treaty was signed by the two nations giving
+mutual right of search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade.
+In fact, however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of State
+for the North, to influence British and European opinion against the
+seceding slave states of the South.
+
+The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when American power
+reached a point where the British Government must take it seriously into
+account as a factor in general world policy. That power had been
+steadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From almost the first moment
+of established independence American statesmen visualized the
+separation of the interests of the western continent from those of
+Europe, and planned for American leadership in this new world.
+Washington, the first President, emphasized in his farewell address the
+danger of entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations of
+Europe, immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in this
+new world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward,
+but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France,
+commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened in
+Spain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about to
+intervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted colonies,
+there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly about to draw
+America and England into closer co-operation. Canning, for Britain,
+proposed to America a joint declaration against French intervention in
+the Americas. His argument was against the principle of intervention;
+his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial expansion; but his
+ultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influence
+and position in the new world.
+
+Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The
+ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, but
+the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, favouring
+rather a separate declaration by the United States, and of this opinion
+was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe Doctrine announcing
+American opposition to the principle of "intervention," and declaring
+that the American continents were no longer to be regarded as open to
+further colonization by European nations. The British emergency
+situation with France, though already quieted, caused Monroe's Message
+to be greeted in England with high approval. But Canning did not so
+approve it for he saw clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challenge
+not merely to continental Europe, but to England as well and he set
+himself to thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policy
+been followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted a
+serious clash with the United States[8].
+
+In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying policy of
+non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the United States
+the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own expansion in territory
+and in influence. But for a time there was no need of additional
+territory for that already hers stretched from the Atlantic to the Rocky
+Mountains, two-thirds of the way from ocean to ocean. Her population was
+growing fast. But four millions at the time of the Revolution, there
+were thirteen millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were already
+across the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards new
+lands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first definite
+notice given to Europe of America's preconceived "destiny," but the
+earlier realization of that destiny took place on lines of expansion
+within her own boundaries. To this there could be no governmental
+objection, whether by Great Britain or any other nation.
+
+But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the view of
+British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering upon a policy
+of further territorial expansion, forsaking her peaceful progress and
+turning toward war, there was a quick determination on a line of British
+policy as regards the American advance. The first intimation of the new
+American policy came in relation to the State of Texas which had
+revolted from Mexico in 1836, and whose independence had been generally
+recognized by 1842. To this new state Britain sent diplomatic and
+consular agents and these reported two factions among the people--one
+seeking admission to the American Union, one desiring the maintenance
+of independence.
+
+In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with instructions to
+secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in dispute. Here was a
+genuine British effort to escape from national irritations. But before
+the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the earlier stages
+of negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm, quite new
+questions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious relation
+with the United States the desire for which had led to the Ashburton
+mission. This new development was the appearance of an American fever
+for territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but soon voiced
+as a "manifest destiny" which should carry American power and
+institutions to the Pacific and even into Central America. Among these
+institutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of Great
+Britain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration since the
+great cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies of
+raw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself a
+cotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon slave-grown
+cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once acquired, what was there
+to prevent further American exploitation, followed by slave expansion,
+into Mexico, where for long British influence had been dominant?
+
+On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole British
+policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, urged a
+British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering Texas, and
+strong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining her
+independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer Anglo-Saxon
+state, prohibiting American advance to the south-west, releasing Britain
+from dependence on American cotton, and ultimately, he hoped, leading
+Texas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be ineradicable. This
+policy was approved by the British Government, Pakenham was sent to
+Washington to watch events, a _charge_, Elliot, was despatched to Texas,
+and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and to
+force the acquiescence of Mexico.
+
+In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it is
+unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, for such
+it became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both sides. The basic
+fact was that America was bent upon territorial expansion, and that
+Great Britain set herself to thwart this ambition. But not to the point
+of war. Aberdeen was so incautious at one moment as to propose to France
+and Mexico a triple guarantee of the independence of Texas, if that
+state would acquiesce, but when Pakenham notified him that in this case,
+Britain must clearly understand that war with America was not merely
+possible, but probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan of
+guarantee, fortunately not yet approved by Mexico[9].
+
+The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. Did she
+wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer independence?
+Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas would choose
+independence and British favour. But the people of the new state were
+largely emigrants from the United States, and a majority of them wished
+to re-enter the Union, a step finally accomplished in 1846, after ten
+years of separate existence as a Republic. The part played by the
+British Government in this whole episode was not a fortunate one. It is
+the duty of Governments to watch over the interests of their subjects,
+and to guard the prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a
+perfect _right_ to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to
+Texas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a
+policy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. The
+Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a policy
+of preventing the development of the power of the United States. Then,
+fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic British public
+feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, of never again being
+drawn into war with America, not because of fear, but because of
+important trade relations and also because of essential liking and
+admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, was not appreciated in
+America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in governmental circles,
+pleaded that the support of Texan independence was in reality perfectly
+in harmony with the best interests of the United States, since it would
+have tended toward the limitation of American slavery. And in the matter
+of national power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that the
+American Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two,
+perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South, free
+nations in North and West.
+
+The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all
+opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted
+northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness. Mexico,
+relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy between the
+United States and Great Britain over the Oregon territory, expected
+British aid in her war of 1846 against America. But she was sharply
+warned that such aid would not be given, and the Oregon dispute was
+settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of vigorous legal argument, followed
+by a fair compromise. The Mexican war resulted in the acquisition of
+California by the United States. British agents in this province of
+Mexico, and British admirals on the Pacific were cautioned to take no
+active steps in opposition.
+
+Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier to
+American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the extension
+of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was not realized.
+The United States was soon plunged, as British statesmen had prophesied,
+into internal conflict over the question whether the newly-acquired
+territories should be slave or free.
+
+The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick transit
+between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned across Central
+America. Here Britain and America acted together, at first in amity,
+though the convention signed in 1850 later developed discord as to the
+British claim of a protectorate over the Atlantic end of the proposed
+canal at San Juan del Nicaragua. But Britain was again at war in Europe
+in the middle 'fifties, and America was deep in quarrel over slavery at
+home. On both sides in spite of much diplomatic intrigue and of
+manifestations of national pride there was governmental desire to avoid
+difficulties. At the end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to
+Nicaragua her protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of
+friction, so reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, were
+happily removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition to
+the growth of American power.
+
+In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were seemingly all
+at an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The differing theories
+of the two Governments on British expatriation still remained, but
+Britain attempted no practical application of her view. The right of
+search in time of peace controversy, first eased by the plan of joint
+cruising, had been definitely settled by the British renunciation of
+1858. Opposition to American territorial advance but briefly manifested
+by Britain, had ended with the annexation of Texas, and the fever of
+expansion had waned in America. Minor disputes in Central America,
+related to the proposed canal, were amicably adjusted.
+
+But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples,
+frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions in
+governmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to react
+to such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the commercial
+relations of the two nations--later to examine their political ideals.
+
+In 1783 America won her independence in government from a colonial
+status. But commercially she remained a British colony--yet with a
+difference. She had formed a part of the British colonial system. All
+her normal trade was with the mother country or with other British
+colonies. Now her privileges in such trade were at an end, and she must
+seek as a favour that which had formerly been hers as a member of the
+British Empire. The direct trade between England and America was easily
+and quickly resumed, for the commercial classes of both nations desired
+it and profited by it. But the British colonial system prohibited trade
+between a foreign state and British colonies and there was one channel
+of trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable to
+both sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by American
+independence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and farm products
+desired by the West Indian planters, and these in turn offered needed
+sugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired to restore the trade, and
+in spite of the legal restrictions of the colonial system, the trade was
+in fact resumed in part and either permitted or winked at by the British
+Government, but never to the advantageous exchange of former times.
+
+The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not reached
+until some thirty years after American Independence, but the uncertainty
+of such trade during a long period in which a portion of it consisted
+in unauthorized and unregulated exchange was a constant irritant to all
+parties concerned. Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with its
+preliminary check upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and its
+final total prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800
+the bulk of American importation of manufactures still came from Great
+Britain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jefferson
+attempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially on
+England, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation Act,
+1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were so
+unpopular in the commercial states of New England that they were
+withdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked the
+United States into believing that France had yielded to American
+contentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse was
+proclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America finally
+declared war and trade stopped save in a few New England ports where
+rebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a blockading British
+naval squadron.
+
+For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had steadily
+decreased, finally almost to extinction during the war. But America
+required certain articles customarily imported and necessity now forced
+her to develop her own manufactures. New England had been the centre of
+American foreign commerce, but now there began a trend toward
+manufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814, however, at the end of the war,
+it was still thought in the United States that under normal conditions
+manufactured goods would again be imported and the general cry of
+"protection for home industries" was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, a
+group of infant industries had in fact been started and clamoured for
+defence now that peace was restored. This situation was not unnoticed in
+Great Britain where merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peace
+on the continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discovered
+that the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking with
+apprehension toward the new industries of America, British merchants,
+following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary speech, dumped
+great quantities of their surplus goods on the American market, selling
+them far below cost, or even on extravagant credit terms. One object was
+to smash the budding American manufactures.
+
+This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry patriotic
+emotions in the circles where American business suffered and a demand
+began to be heard for protection. But the Government of the United
+States was still representative of agriculture, in the main, and while a
+Tariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was regarded as a temporary
+measure required by the necessity of paying the costs of the recent war.
+Just at this juncture, however, British policy, now looking again toward
+a great colonial empire, sought advantages for the hitherto neglected
+maritime provinces of British North America, and thought that it had
+found them by encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies.
+The legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now enforced
+and for a time intercourse was practically suspended.
+
+This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection in
+America. It not only worked against a return by New England from
+manufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks of
+protectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had been
+accustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters seeking
+cheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist element was
+as yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home markets" for
+agriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning to be felt, and
+by 1820 the question of West Indian trade became one of constant
+agitation and demanded political action. That action was taken on lines
+of retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law excluding from American
+ports any British vessel coming from a port access to which was denied
+to an American vessel, and placing under bond in American ports British
+vessels with prohibition of their proceeding to a British port to which
+American vessels could not go. This act affected not merely direct trade
+with the West Indies, but stopped the general custom of British ships of
+taking part cargoes to Jamaica while _en route_ to and from the United
+States. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson's
+administration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment by
+Britain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial system.
+
+The "retaliatory system" which J.Q. Adams regarded as "a new declaration
+of independence," was, in fact, quickly taken up by other non-colonial
+nations, and these, with America, compelled Great Britain to take stock
+of her interests. Huskisson, rightly foreseeing British prosperity as
+dependent upon her manufactures and upon the carrying trade, stated in
+Parliament that American "retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom of
+trade in British ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nations
+that would open their ports within one year on terms of equality to
+British ships. J.Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayed
+acceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and was
+rebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade did
+not take place until 1830, after the close of Adams' administration.
+That trade never recovered its former prosperity.
+
+Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, had
+resulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not a
+sufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice of, the
+theory of protection to attribute this alone to British checks placed
+upon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless the progress of America
+toward an established system, reaching its highest mark for years in the
+Tariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly related to the events just narrated.
+After American independence, the partially illegal status of West Indian
+trade hampered commercial progress and slightly encouraged American
+manufactures by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutral
+troubles of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increased
+the transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection to
+infant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirred
+patriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial system
+restrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave time
+for the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the United
+States. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for the world
+the common advantage and the justice of a great theory of free trade.
+America was apparently now committed to an opposing economic theory, the
+first great nation definitely to establish it, and thus there resulted a
+clear-cut opposition of principle and a clash of interests. From 1846,
+when free trade ideas triumphed in England, the devoted British free
+trader regarded America as the chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptance
+of his theory.
+
+The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free trader,
+was in the Southern States, where cotton interests, desiring no
+advantage from protection, since their market was in Europe, attacked
+American protection and sought to escape from it. Also slave supplies,
+without protection, could have been purchased more cheaply from England
+than from the manufacturing North. In 1833 indeed the South had forced a
+reaction against protection, but it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it was
+Southern opinion that carried through Congress the reciprocity treaty
+with the British American Provinces, partly brought about, no doubt, by
+a Southern fear that Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantages
+in British markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join the
+United States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union.
+Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial tie
+with the United States, and the one great hope, to the British minds, of
+a break in the false American system of protection. Thus both in
+economic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of slavery, the
+export trading interests of Great Britain became more and more directed
+toward the Southern States of America. Adding powerfully to this was the
+dependence of British cotton manufactures upon the American supply. The
+British trade attitude, arising largely outside of direct governmental
+contacts, was bound to have, nevertheless, a constant and important
+influence on governmental action.
+
+Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade and
+industrial interests, are the favourite themes of those historians who
+regard nations as determined in their relations solely by economic
+causes--by what is called "enlightened self-interest." But governments,
+no matter how arbitrary, and still more if in a measure resting on
+representation, react both consciously and unconsciously to a public
+opinion not obviously based upon either national or commercial rivalry.
+Sometimes, indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter to
+popular attitude in international affairs. In such a case, the
+historical estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmental
+action, is a false one and may do great injustice to the essential
+friendliness of a people.
+
+How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America before
+1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British Government?
+Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and its reaction to,
+American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such public opinion can
+be found in quantity sufficient to base an estimate only in travellers'
+books, in reviews, and in newspapers of the period. When all these are
+brought together it is found that while there was an almost universal
+British criticism of American social customs and habits of life, due to
+that insularity of mental attitude characteristic of every nation,
+making it prefer its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours,
+summed up in the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found that
+British opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as a
+place for emigration and, second, American political ideals and
+institutions[10].
+
+British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured colonization
+process before the American revolution, lost that favour after 1783,
+though not at first definitely opposed. But emigration still continued
+and at no time, save during the war of 1812, was it absolutely stopped.
+Its exact amount is unascertainable, for neither Government kept
+adequate statistics before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic wars
+there came great distress in England from which the man of energy sought
+escape. He turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay at
+least, with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, and
+influenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would find
+people of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier emigration
+to America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825, one energetic
+Member of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the Government to appoint a
+committee to investigate the whole subject, the result was a mass of
+testimony, secured from returned emigrants or from their letters home,
+in which there constantly appeared one main argument influencing the
+labourer type of emigrant; he got good wages, and he was supplied, as a
+farm hand, with good food. Repeatedly he testifies that he had "three
+meat meals a day," whereas in England he had ordinarily received but one
+such meal a week.
+
+Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type of
+emigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this type
+remaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity surrounding
+America. But there was a second testimony brought out by Horton's
+Committee, less general, yet to be picked up here and there as evidence
+of another argument for emigration to America. The labourer did not
+dilate upon political equality, nor boast of a share in government,
+indeed generally had no such share, but he did boast to his fellows at
+home of the social equality, though not thus expressing it, which was
+all about him. He was a common farm hand, yet he "sat down to meals"
+with his employer and family, and worked in the fields side by side with
+his "master." This, too, was an astounding difference to the mind of the
+British labourer. Probably for him it created a clearer, if not
+altogether universal and true picture of the meaning of American
+democracy than would have volumes of writing upon political
+institutions. Gradually there was established in the lower orders of
+British society a visualization of America as a haven of physical
+well-being and personal social happiness.
+
+This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium of
+expression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public opinion
+of America, of much latent influence, but for the moment largely
+negligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A more
+important emigrating class in its influence on opinion at home, though
+not a large class, was composed about equally of small farmers and small
+merchants facing ruin in the agricultural and trading crises that
+followed the end of the European war. The British travellers' books
+from 1810 to 1820 are generally written by men of this class, or by
+agents sent out from co-operative groups planning emigration. Generally
+they were discontented with political conditions at home, commonly
+opposed to a petrified social order, and attracted to the United States
+by its lure of prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, a
+superior type of emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant,
+examining and emphasizing industrial opportunity.
+
+Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior political
+institutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican finds here A
+Republic, and the only Republic on the face of the earth that ever
+deserved the name: where all are under the protection of equal laws; of
+laws made by Themselves[11]." Another, who established an English colony
+in the Western States of Illinois, wrote of England that he objected to
+"being ruled and taxed by people who had no more right to rule and tax
+us than consisted in the power to do it." And of his adopted country he
+concludes: "I love the Government; and thus a novel sensation is
+excited; it is like the development of a new faculty. I am become a
+patriot in my old age[12]." Still another detailed the points of his
+content, "I am here, lord and master of myself and of 100 acres of
+land--an improvable farm, little trouble to me, good society and a good
+market, and, I think, a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry in
+summer; the parson gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and
+poor rates amount to Sec.25.00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I
+leave my door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an
+ounce or a little more[13]."
+
+From the first days of the American colonial movement toward
+independence there had been, indeed, a British interest in American
+political principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these principles for
+reasons of home political controversy. Their sympathy continued after
+American independence and by its insistent expression brought out
+equally insistent opposition from Tory circles. The British home
+movement toward a more representative Government had been temporarily
+checked by the extremes into which French Liberalism plunged in 1791,
+causing reaction in England. By 1820 pressure was again being exerted by
+British Liberals of intelligence, and they found arguments in such
+reports as those just quoted. From that date onward, and especially just
+before the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, the
+example of a prosperous American democracy was an element in British
+home politics, lauded or derided as the man in England desired or not an
+expansion of the British franchise. In the earlier period, however, it
+is to be remembered that applause of American institutions did not mean
+acceptance of democracy to the extent of manhood franchise, for no such
+franchise at first existed in America itself. The debate in England was
+simply whether the step forward in American democracy, was an argument
+for a similar step in Great Britain.
+
+Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political quarrel
+there grew in force, depicted America favourably or otherwise according
+to political sympathies at home. Both before and after the Reform Bill
+of 1832 this type of effort to mould opinion, by citation of America,
+was widespread. Hence there is in such writing, not so much the
+expression of public opinion, as of propaganda to affect that opinion.
+Book upon book, review upon review, might be quoted to illustrate this,
+but a few notable examples will suffice.
+
+The most widely read and reviewed book on the United States before
+1840, except the humorous and flippant characterization of America by
+Mrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil Hall's three-volume work, published in
+1829[14]. Claiming an open mind, he expected for his adverse findings a
+readier credence. For adverse to American political institutions these
+findings are in all their larger applications. In every line Hall
+betrays himself as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief,
+and convinced of the perfection and unalterableness of the British
+Constitution. Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank in
+avowal of a purpose[15]. He states in his preface:
+
+     "... When I found the institutions and experiences of the
+     United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament,
+     as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and
+     learned that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense,
+     instead of encountering merited derision, were listened to
+     with patience and approbation by men as ignorant as
+     themselves, I certainly did feel that another work on America
+     was yet wanted, and at once determined to undertake a task
+     which inferior considerations would probably have induced me
+     to decline."
+
+Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home, found in
+the United States proofs for her faith in democracy[16]. Captain Marryat
+belittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes proved himself less a
+critic of America than an enemy of democracy. Answering a review of his
+earlier volumes, published separately, he wrote in his concluding
+volume: "I candidly acknowledge that the reviewer is right in his
+supposition; my great object has been to do serious injury to the cause
+of democracy[17]."
+
+The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes were
+suffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step toward
+democracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was still
+limited to a small minority of the population. Britain was still ruled
+by her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile, however, just at
+the moment when dominant Whig influence in England carried through that
+step forward toward democratic institutions which Whigs had long lauded
+in America, the latter country had progressed to manhood suffrage, or as
+nearly all leading Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, had
+plunged into the rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening in
+Whig ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before long
+to the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in Great
+Britain that the Reform of 1832 was "final," the last step toward
+democracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange that the
+books and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily stress the
+dangers and crudity of American democracy. They were written for what
+was now a nearly unanimous British reading public, fearful lest Radical
+pressure for still further electoral reform should preach the example of
+the United States.
+
+Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section of the
+British governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by a critical,
+if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid development of the
+power and wealth of the United States, governing-class England, of all
+factions save the Radical, came to view America just as it would have
+viewed any other rising nation, that is, as a problem to be studied for
+its influence on British prosperity and power. Again, expressions in
+print reflect the changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than in
+travellers' books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted,
+not to American political institutions, but to studies, many of them
+very careful ones, of American industry and governmental policy.
+
+Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of such
+description. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this day to the
+American historical student[18]. George Combe, philosopher and
+phrenologist, studied especially social institutions[19]. Joseph Sturge,
+philanthropist and abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of the
+poet Whittier, through the Northern and Eastern States[20].
+Featherstonaugh, a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southern
+slave states, in terms completely at variance with those of Sturge[21].
+Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston, and
+Warburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of Canada,
+an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter professedly
+alarmed, at the evidences of power in America[22]. Amazed at the energy,
+growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the anti-British
+feeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote that "they
+[Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the incendiary torch of
+Republicanism to the nations of Europe[23]." Soon after this was written
+there began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish emigration to America
+which heavily reinforced the anti-British attitude of the City of New
+York, and largely changed its character.
+
+Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect British
+public opinion, or did they create it? It is difficult to estimate such
+matters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these books coincided in
+point of time with a British governmental attitude of opposition, though
+on peaceful lines, to the development of American power, and to the
+adoption to the point of faith, by British commercial classes, of free
+trade as opposed to the American protective system. But governing
+classes were not the British public, and to the great unenfranchised
+mass, finding voice through the writings of a few leaders, the
+prosperity of America made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy was
+again beginning to make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was published
+a study of the United States, more careful and exact than any previous
+to Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions. This
+was Mackay's "Western World," and that there was a public eager for such
+estimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went through four
+British editions in 1850[24]. At the end of the decade, then, there
+appeared once more a vigorous champion of the cause of British
+democracy, comparing the results of "government by the wise" with
+alleged mob rule. Mackay wrote:
+
+     "Society in America started from the point to which society
+     in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to
+     this moment, its corner-stone ... that which develops itself
+     as the sympathy of class, becomes in America the general
+     sentiment of society.... We present an imposing front to the
+     world; but let us tear the picture and look at the canvas.
+     One out of every seven of us is a pauper. Every six
+     Englishmen have, in addition to their other enormous burdens,
+     to support a seventh between them, whose life is spent in
+     consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of their
+     common subsistence."
+
+British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition to the
+advance of American power, found themselves involved again, as before
+1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a prosperous American
+democracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion at home. Also, for all
+Englishmen, of whatever class, in spite of rivalry in power, of opposing
+theories of trade, of divergent political institutions, there existed a
+vague, though influential, pride in the advance of a people of similar
+race, sprung from British loins[25]. And there remained for all
+Englishmen also one puzzling and discreditable American institution,
+slavery--held up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficult
+of excuse among her friends.
+
+Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce, had early
+committed British Government and people to a crusade against the African
+slave trade. This British policy was clearly announced to the world in
+the negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15. But Britain herself still
+supported the institution of slavery in her West Indian colonies and it
+was not until British humanitarian sentiment had forced emancipation
+upon the unwilling sugar planters, in 1833, that the nation was morally
+free to criticize American domestic slavery. Meanwhile great
+emancipation societies, with many branches, all virile and active, had
+grown up in England and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack on
+slavery the world over, and especially on American slavery. The great
+American abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than in
+his own country; his weekly paper, _The Liberator_, is full of messages
+of cheer from British friends and societies, and of quotations from a
+sympathetic, though generally provincial, British press.
+
+From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its height. It
+watched with anxiety the evidence of a developing struggle over slavery
+in the United States, hopeful, as each crisis arose, that the free
+Northern States would impose their will upon the Southern Slave States.
+But as each crisis turned to compromise, seemingly enhancing the power
+of the South, and committing America to a retention of slavery, the
+hopes of British abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to British
+opinion, become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery,
+but after the "great compromise of 1850," where the elder American
+statesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of that
+measure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover,
+after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general humanitarian
+sentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to seem hopeless and
+the earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The British Government still
+maintained its naval squadron for the suppression of the African slave
+trade, but the British official mind no longer keenly interested itself
+either in this effort or in the general question of slavery.
+
+Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still, after
+1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally critical, by
+English writers. Each renewal of the conflict in America, even though
+local, not national in character, drew out a flood of comment. In the
+public press this blot upon American civilization was a steady subject
+for attack, and that attack was naturally directed against the South.
+The London _Times_, in particular, lost no opportunity of presenting the
+matter to its readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansas
+during the height of the border struggles there, and reported his
+observations in letters to the _Times_. The writer was wholly on the
+side of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that the
+Kansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantly
+depicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence of
+the North as compared with the South[26].
+
+Mrs. Stowe's _Uncle Tom's Cabin_ excited greater interest in England
+than in America itself. The first London edition appeared in May, 1852,
+and by the end of the year over one million copies had been sold, as
+opposed to one hundred and fifty thousand in the United States. But if
+one distinguished writer is to be believed, this great British interest
+in the book was due more to English antipathy to America than to
+antipathy to slavery[27]. This writer was Nassau W. Senior, who, in
+1857, published a reprint of his article on "American Slavery" in the
+206th number of the _Edinburgh Review_, reintroducing in his book
+extreme language denunciatory of slavery that had been cut out by the
+editor of the _Review_[28]. Senior had been stirred to write by the
+brutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after his
+speech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident of the
+slavery quarrel in America excited British attention.
+
+Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all anti-slavery,
+the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of British
+understanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the citations of
+the British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison in his
+_Liberator_[29]. Yet for intellectual Britain, at least--that Britain
+which was vocal and whose opinion can be ascertained in spite of this
+constant interest in American slavery, there was generally a fixed
+belief that slavery in the United States was so firmly established that
+it could not be overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditure
+of British sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at the
+conclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed the
+pessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not venture to hope
+that we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see American slavery
+extirpated, or even materially mitigated[30]."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: State Department, Eng., Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Walpole, _Russell_, Vol. II, p. 367.]
+
+[Footnote 3: _Life of Lady John Russell_, p. 197.]
+
+[Footnote 4: There was a revival of this fear at the end of the American
+Civil War. This will be commented on later.]
+
+[Footnote 5: This was the position of President and Congress: yet the
+United States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen to
+expatriate himself.]
+
+[Footnote 6: Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from American
+ships, 102 were retained, 1,042 were discharged, and 805 were held for
+further proof. (Updyke, _The Diplomacy of the War of 1812_, p. 21.)]
+
+[Footnote 7: The people of the British North American Provinces regarded
+the war as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the European
+wars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United Empire
+Loyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the same two
+wars which fostered militant patriotism in America against England had
+the same result in Canadian sentiment against America.]
+
+[Footnote 8: Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in
+_Am. Hist. Rev._, XI, 783. Also _Cambridge History of British Foreign
+Policy_, Vol. II, ch. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 9: Much has recently been published on British policy in
+Texas. See my book, _British Interests and Activities in Texas,
+1838-1846_, Johns Hopkins Press, Balt., 1910. Also Adams, Editor,
+_British Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas_,
+The Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, 1918.]
+
+[Footnote 10: In my studies on British-American relations, I have read
+the leading British reviews and newspapers, and some four hundred
+volumes by British travellers. For a summary of the British travellers
+before 1860 see my article "The Point of View of the British Traveller
+in America," in the _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XXIX, No. 2,
+June, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 11: John Melish, _Travels_, Vol. I, p. 148.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Morris Birkbeck, _Letters from Illinois_, London, 1818, p.
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 13: Letter in Edinburgh _Scotsman_, March, 1823. Cited by
+_Niles Register_, Vol. XXV, p. 39.]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Travels in North America_, 1827-28, London, 1829.]
+
+[Footnote 15: Captain Thomas Hamilton, _Men and Manners in America_,
+Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 16: _Society in America_, London, 1837. 3 vols. _Retrospect of
+Western Travel_, London, 1838. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 17: Captain Frederick Marryat, _A Diary in America, with
+Remarks on Its Institutions_, Vol. VI, p. 293.]
+
+[Footnote 18: James Silk Buckingham, _America, Historical, Statistic and
+Descriptive_, London, 1841-43. 9 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 19: _Notes on the United States of North America during a
+phrenological visit_, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh, 1841. 3 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 20: _A Visit to the United States in 1841_, London, 1842.]
+
+[Footnote 21: George William Featherstonaugh, _Excursion through the
+Slave States_, London, 1844. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 22: William Kennedy, _Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospects
+of the Republic of Texas_, London, 1841. 2 vols. George Warburton,
+_Hochelaga: or, England in the New World_, London, 1845. 2 vols.]
+
+[Footnote 23: Warburton, _Hochelaga_, 5th Edition, Vol. II, pp. 363-4.]
+
+[Footnote 24: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World: or, Travels through
+the United States in 1846-47_, London, 1849.]
+
+[Footnote 25: This is clearly indicated in Parliament itself, in the
+debate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856 of Crampton, the
+British Minister at Washington, for enlistment activities during the
+Crimean War.--_Hansard_, 3rd. Ser., CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203.]
+
+[Footnote 26: Gladstone's letters were later published in book form,
+under the title _The Englishman in Kansas_, London, 1857.]
+
+[Footnote 27: "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom' gratified in England
+were not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but national jealousy and
+national vanity. We have long been smarting under the conceit of
+America--we are tired of hearing her boast that she is the freest and
+the most enlightened country that the world has ever seen. Our clergy
+hate her voluntary system--our Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hate
+her parvenus--our Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, and
+her ambition. All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from the
+enemy." Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 38.]
+
+[Footnote 28: The reprint is without date, but the context shows the
+year to be 1857.]
+
+[Footnote 29: For example the many British expressions quoted in
+reference to John Brown's raid, in _The Liberator_ for February 10,
+1860, and in succeeding issues.]
+
+[Footnote 30: Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 68.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61.
+
+It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, that
+immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomatic
+controversies between England and America had largely been settled, and
+that England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly" yielded under
+American demands. This generalization, as applied to what were, after
+all, minor controversies, is in great measure true. In larger questions
+of policy, as regards spheres of influence or developing power, or
+principles of trade, there was difference, but no longer any essential
+opposition or declared rivalry[31]. In theories of government there was
+sharp divergence, clearly appreciated, however, only in governing-class
+Britain. This sense of divergence, even of a certain threat from America
+to British political institutions, united with an established opinion
+that slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforce
+governmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America. The
+British public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in the
+institution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest was
+waning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to a degree
+not true of any other two world-powers, were of the same race, had
+similar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in close touch at
+many points by the steady flow of British emigration to the
+United States.
+
+When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in November,
+1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered, the situation
+took both British Government and people by surprise. There was not any
+clear understanding either of American political conditions, or of the
+intensity of feeling now aroused over the question of the extension of
+slave territory. The most recent descriptions of America had agreed in
+assertion that at some future time there would take place, in all
+probability, a dissolution of the Union, on lines of diverging economic
+interests, but also stated that there was nothing in the American
+situation to indicate immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, a
+long-time resident in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote:
+
+     "The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will break
+     the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But
+     no man may foretell the period of dissolution.... The many
+     restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation.
+     The Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are
+     invisible; and it seems wondrous that each limb does not act
+     for itself independently of its fellows. A closer examination
+     shows the nature of the network which keeps the members of
+     this association so tightly bound. Any attempt to untangle
+     the ties, more firmly fastens them. When any one State talks
+     of separation, the others become spontaneously knotted
+     together. When a section blusters about its particular
+     rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to all. If
+     a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes
+     in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which
+     there can be danger, there is also found the element of
+     safety." Yet, he added, "All attempts to strengthen this
+     federal government at the expense of the States' governments
+     must be futile.... The federal government exists on
+     sufferance only. Any State may at any time constitutionally
+     withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually dissolve it[32]."
+
+Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one Charles
+Mackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished British poet,"
+who made the usual rapid tour of the principal cities of America in
+1857-58, and as rapidly penned his impressions:
+
+     "Many persons in the United States talk of a dissolution of
+     the Union, but few believe in it.... All this is mere bravado
+     and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to all
+     Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary.... There is
+     no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions
+     to which over-ardent politicians of the North and South
+     sometimes give vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West,'
+     as it is fondly called, is in the position even now to
+     arbitrate between North and South, should the quarrel stretch
+     beyond words, or should anti-slavery or any other question
+     succeed in throwing any difference between them which it
+     would take revolvers and rifles rather than speeches and
+     votes to put an end to[33]."
+
+The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be regarded in
+England as a constant quarrel between North and South, but of no
+immediate danger to the Union. Each outbreak of violent American
+controversy produced a British comment sympathetic with the North. The
+turmoil preceding and following the election of Lincoln in 1860, on the
+platform of "no extension of slavery," was very generally noted by the
+British press and public, as a sign favourable to the cause of
+anti-slavery, but with no understanding that Southern threat would at
+last be realized in definite action. Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May
+15, 1862, to his American friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had the
+means of judging, the feeling here was at first _very decidedly_ on the
+side of the North[34] ..." The British metropolitan press, in nearly
+every issue of which for at least two years after December, 1860, there
+appeared news items and editorial comment on the American crisis, was at
+first nearly unanimous in condemning the South[35]. The _Times_, with
+accustomed vigour, led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated:
+
+     "When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject of
+     Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments
+     it expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation,
+     for the feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we
+     see how entirely he narrows his opposition to the single
+     point of the admission of Slavery into the Territories, we
+     cannot help being forcibly struck by the absurdity of
+     breaking up a vast and glorious confederacy like that of the
+     United States from the dread and anger inspired by the
+     election of such a man to the office of Chief Magistrate....
+     We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it [the
+     election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad
+     to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone
+     which its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom,
+     has been at length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a
+     vast community of our own race has at length given an
+     authoritative expression to sentiments which are entertained
+     by everyone in this country. We trust to see the American
+     Government employed in tasks more worthy of a State founded
+     on the doctrines of liberty and equality than the invention
+     of shifts and devices to perpetuate servitude; and we hear in
+     this great protest of American freedom the tardy echo of
+     those humane doctrines to which England has so long become a
+     convert."
+
+Other leading journals, though with less of patronizing
+self-complacency, struck the same note as the _Times_. The _Economist_
+attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the sympathies of the "lower
+orders" in the electorate who had now deserted their former leaders, the
+slave-owning aristocracy of the South, and allied themselves with the
+refined and wise leaders of the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not an
+extremist in any sense. His plan of action lay within the limits of
+statesmanlike moderation[36]. The _Saturday Review_ was less sure that
+England should rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had suffered
+some hard blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but at
+least England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no more
+discourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The Republican
+party, however, had no policy, except that of its leader, Seward, and
+from him might be expected extreme insolence[37]. This was a very early
+judgment of Seward, and one upon which the _Saturday Review_ preened
+itself later, as wholly justified. The _Spectator_, the only one of the
+four journals thus far considered which ultimately remained constant in
+advocacy of the Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment,
+regarding the 1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as in
+reality a mere contest between parties for political power[38].
+
+Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press issue
+for several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding varying
+notes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said the _Times_,
+it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred thousand slave-owners,
+trembling nightly with visions of murder and pillage, backed by a
+dissolute population of 'poor whites,' are no match for the hardy and
+resolute populations of the Free States[39]," and if the South hoped for
+foreign aid it should be undeceived promptly: "Can any sane man believe
+that England and France will consent, as is now suggested, to stultify
+the policy of half a century for the sake of an extended cotton trade,
+and to purchase the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville by
+recognizing what has been called 'the isothermal law, which impels
+African labour toward the tropics' on the other side of the
+Atlantic[40]?" Moreover all Americans ought to understand clearly that
+British respect for the United States "was not due to the attitude of
+the South with its ruffian demonstrations in Congress.... All that is
+noble and venerable in the United States is associated with its Federal
+Constitution[41]."
+
+Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no direct
+evidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography or letters
+upon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent on the struggle
+in America for the first few months and presumably public opinion, less
+informed even than the press, received its impressions from the journals
+customarily read. Both at this period and all through the war, also, it
+should be remembered, clearly, that most newspapers, all the reviews, in
+fact nearly all vehicles of British expression, were in the early
+'sixties "in the hands of the educated classes, and these educated
+classes corresponded closely with the privileged classes." The more
+democratic element of British Society lacked any adequate press
+representation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by such
+comparatively crude methods as public meetings and demonstrations, but
+it was hampered in literary and political expression[42]." The opinion
+of the press was then, presumably, the opinion of the majority of the
+educated British public.
+
+Thus British comment on America took the form, at first of
+moralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet very
+generally asserting the essential justice of the Northern position. But
+it was early evident that the newspapers, one and all, were quite
+unprepared for the determined front soon put up by South Carolina and
+other Southern States. Surprised by the violence of Southern
+declarations, the only explanation found by the British press was that
+political control had been seized by the uneducated and lawless element.
+The _Times_ characterized this element of the South as in a state of
+deplorable ignorance comparable with that of the Irish peasantry, a
+"poor, proud, lazy, excitable and violent class, ever ready with knife
+and revolver[43]." The fate of the Union, according to the _Saturday
+Review_, was in the hands of the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, and
+most lawless [class] in the world--the poor or mean whites of the Slave
+States[44]." Like judgments were expressed by the _Economist_ and, more
+mildly, by the _Spectator_[45]. Subsequently some of these journals
+found difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle to
+expressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of the
+South; but all, especially the _Times_, were skilled by long practice
+in the journalistic art of facing about while claiming perfect
+consistency. In denial of a Southern right of secession, also, they were
+nearly a unit[46], though the _Saturday Review_ argued the case for the
+South, making a pointed parallel between the present situation and that
+of the American Colonies in seceding from England[47].
+
+The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an initial
+confusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the theory of an
+"enlightened press." The Reviews, by the conditions of publication, came
+into action more slowly and during 1860 there appeared but one article,
+in the _Edinburgh Review_, giving any adequate idea of what was really
+taking place in America[48]. The lesser British papers generally
+followed the tone of the leading journals, but without either great
+interest or much acumen. In truth the depth of British newspaper
+ignorance, considering their positiveness of utterance, appears utterly
+astonishing if regarded from the view-point of modern historical
+knowledge. But is this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there not
+equal confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself,
+certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They also
+had come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were slow to
+understand that the great conflict of ideals and interests was at
+last begun.
+
+The British press both influenced and reflected educated class opinion,
+and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John Russell at the
+Foreign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, were
+exchanging anxious letters, and the latter was sending home reports
+remarkable for their clear analysis of the American controversy. Yet
+even he was slow to appreciate the inevitability of secession.
+
+[Illustration: LORD LYONS (_From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S.A.,
+in 1860) (From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons," by kind permission_)]
+
+Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the United
+States, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to that of the
+press. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a far-fetched view of
+causes, is supplied in a letter of February 2, 1860, from Consul Bunch,
+at Charleston, S.C., to Lord Lyons, the British Minister at
+Washington[49]. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had been given the
+evening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston. Being called upon for
+a speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the Turf at home, and had
+referred especially to the Plates run for the various British colonies.
+Continuing, he said:
+
+     "'... I cannot help calling your attention to the great loss
+     you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial
+     Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had
+     continued to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure
+     in sending you some Plates too.'
+
+     "Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke,
+     calculated to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my
+     amazement, the company chose to take me literally, and
+     applauded for about ten minutes--in fact I could not go on
+     for some time."
+
+Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration. He could
+with difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be re-annexed as a
+colony of Great Britain, and comments upon the episode in a somewhat
+humorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his letter, he solemnly
+assures Lord Lyons that
+
+     "... The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people' of
+     South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents,
+     therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of
+     universal suffrage."
+
+It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in England
+there was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a resumption of
+colonial relations, though W.H. Russell, correspondent of the _Times_,
+reported in the spring, 1861, that he frequently heard the same
+sentiment in the South[50]. For general official England, as for the
+press, the truth is that up to the time of the secession of South
+Carolina no one really believed that a final rupture was about to take
+place between North and South. When, on December 20, 1860, that State in
+solemn convention declared the dissolution "of the Union now existing
+between South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the
+'United States of America,'" and when it was understood that other
+Southern States would soon follow this example, British opinion believed
+and hoped that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until it
+became clear that war would ensue, the South was still damned by the
+press as seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery was
+even more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In the
+number for April, 1861, the _Edinburgh Review_ attributed the whole
+difficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would be with the
+anti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the very dissolution of
+the Union would hasten the ultimate extinction of slavery since economic
+competition with a neighbouring free state, the North, would compel the
+South itself to abandon its beloved "domestic institution[51]."
+
+Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the _Times_, in a long and
+carefully worded editorial, took up one by one the alleged causes of
+secession, dismissed them as inadequate, and concluded, "... we cannot
+disguise from ourselves that, apart from all political complications,
+there is a right and a wrong in this question, and that the right
+belongs, with all its advantages, to the States of the North[52]." Three
+days later it asserted, "The North is for freedom of discussion, the
+South represses freedom of discussion with the tar-brush and the
+pine-fagot." And again, on January 10, "The Southern States expected
+sympathy for their undertaking from the public opinion of this country.
+The tone of the press has already done much to undeceive them...."
+
+In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press expressed
+similar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The _Dublin News_
+published with approval a long communication addressed to Irishmen at
+home and abroad: "... there is no power on earth or in heaven which can
+keep in peace this unholy co-partnership.... I hope ... that the North
+will quietly permit the South to retire from the confederacy and bear
+alone the odium of all mankind[53]...." The _Saturday Review_ thought
+that deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social structure of
+the South which now visioned a re-opening of the African Slave Trade,
+and the occupation by slavery of the whole southern portion of North
+America. "A more ignoble basis for a great Confederacy it is impossible
+to conceive, nor one in the long run more precarious.... Assuredly it
+will be the Northern Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with a
+policy untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, that
+will be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the New
+World[54]." The _London Chronicle_ was vigorous in denunciation. "No
+country on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or a
+treachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the new
+Southern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in itself[55].
+The _London Review_ more moderately stigmatized slavery as the cause,
+but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding the whole
+matter as one of diverging economic systems and in any case as
+inevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some time. The
+inevitable might as well come now as later and would result in benefit
+to both sections as well as to the world fearing the monstrous empire of
+power that had grown up in America[56].
+
+The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in truth,
+definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was particularly true of
+the provincial press. Garrison's _Liberator_, advocating extreme
+abolition action, had long made a practice of presenting excerpts from
+British newspapers, speeches and sermons in support of its cause. In
+1860 there were thirty-nine such citations; in the first months of 1861
+many more, all condemning slavery and the South. For the most part these
+citations represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section,
+both in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnold
+was among the first of men of letters to record his faith that secession
+was final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the North, looking to
+the purity of race and the opportunity for unhampered advance[57]. If
+English writers were in any way influenced by their correspondents in
+the United States they may, indeed, have well been in doubt as to the
+origin and prospects of the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently at
+home again after seven years' consulship in England, was writing that
+abolition was not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittier
+wrote to _his_ English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was the
+basic issue[58]. But literary Britain was slow to express itself save in
+the Reviews. These, representing varying shades of British upper-class
+opinion and presenting articles presumably more profound than the
+newspaper editorials, frequently offered more recondite origins of the
+American crisis. The _Quarterly Review_, organ of extreme Conservatism,
+in its first article, dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions,
+a topic not here treated at length since it will be dealt with in a
+separate chapter as deserving special study. The _Quarterly_ is also the
+first to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated by
+the North, was a real cause for Southern secession[59]; an idea made
+much of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, but not
+hitherto advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, there
+was frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory.
+
+     "At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern planters
+     did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country
+     gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with
+     him on the part of those in England who represented the old
+     traditions of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman'
+     theory, containing as it did an undeniable element of truth,
+     is much harped upon by certain of the reviewers, and one can
+     easily conceive of its popularity in the London Clubs.... The
+     'American,' so familiar to British readers, during the first
+     half of the century, through the eyes of such travellers as
+     Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee,' and is located north
+     of Mason and Dixon's line[60]."
+
+Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of the Tory
+organs alone, and the Radical _Westminster_ took pains to deny the truth
+of the picture, asserting again and again that the vital and sole cause
+of the conflict was slavery. Previous articles are summed up in that of
+October, 1863, as a profession of the _Westminster's_ opinion
+throughout: "... the South are fighting for liberty to found a Slave
+Power. Should it prove successful, truer devil's work, if we may use the
+metaphor, will rarely have been done[61]."
+
+Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British opinion
+generally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had not soon
+found cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from the trend of
+events in America. Lincoln had been elected on a platform opposing the
+further territorial expansion of slavery. On that point the North was
+fairly well united. But the great majority of those who voted for
+Lincoln would have indignantly repudiated any purpose to take active
+steps toward the extinction of slavery where it already existed. Lincoln
+understood this perfectly, and whatever his opinion about the ultimate
+fate of slavery if prohibited expansion, he from the first took the
+ground that the terms of his election constituted a mandate limiting his
+action. As secession developed he rightly centred his thought and effort
+on the preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to the
+Presidency.
+
+Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at still
+another great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing President,
+Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until March 4, 1861,
+there were still some Southern leaders, like Jefferson Davis, seeking
+either a complete surrender to Southern will, or advantages for Southern
+security in case secession was accomplished. Buchanan appealed
+hysterically to the old-time love of the Union and to the spirit of
+compromise. Great congressional committees of both Senate and House of
+Representatives were formed seeking a solution. Crittenden for the
+border states between North and South, where, more than anywhere else,
+there was division of opinion, proposed pledges to be given to the
+South. Seward, long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was active
+in the Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended to
+conciliate by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler,
+in the House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republican
+colleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of slavery as
+then established[62]. A constitutional amendment was drafted to this
+effect and received Lincoln's preliminary approval. Finally Lincoln, in
+his inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared:
+
+     "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with
+     the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I
+     believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
+     inclination to do so."
+
+It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these efforts
+were observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began to replace
+the earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of slavery was at stake
+in America. This offered an easy excuse for a switch-about of sympathy
+as British commercial and other interests began to be developed, and
+even dismayed the ardent friends of the anti-slavery North. Meanwhile
+the Government of Great Britain, from the very first appearance of the
+cloud of civil war, had focused its attention on the point of what the
+events in America portended to British interests and policy. This is the
+business of governments, and their agents would be condemned as
+inefficient did they neglect it. But did British governmental policy go
+beyond this entirely justifiable first thought for immediate British
+interests to the point of positive hope that England would find an
+advantage in the breaking up of the great American Republic? American
+opinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of this
+offence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the Civil
+War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an unfriendly one
+because of his official position, made emphatic declaration to like
+effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, Russian Ambassador at
+London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the English Government, at the
+bottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into two
+republics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one
+the other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both,
+would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them,
+restraining them by their rival ambitions[63]."
+
+If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as to the
+springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of official
+and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no proof for such
+accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, nor
+Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, reveal any animus against
+the United States. Considering his many personal ties with leaders of
+both factions Lyons, from the first, reported events with wonderful
+impartiality, and great clarity. On November 12, 1860, he sent to
+Russell a full description of the clamour raised in the South over the
+election of Lincoln, enumerated the resignation of Federal officials
+(calling these "ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that
+Lincoln was no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without
+damage to the Union[64]. Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct
+Lyons and the British consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather
+than the other," and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless
+asked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should be
+against all violent action as tending toward civil war[65].
+
+This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an eager
+readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the dissolution of the
+Union, but such an interpretation is not borne out by a reading of his
+instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and anxious that British agents
+should not gain the ill-will of either American faction, an ill-will
+that would be alike detrimental in the future, whether the Union
+remained unbroken or was destroyed.
+
+Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore repeated
+frequently[66]. Meanwhile the first concrete problem requiring British
+action came from the seizure by South Carolina of the Federal customs
+house at the port of Charleston, and the attempt of the State
+authorities to collect port dues customarily paid to Federal officials.
+British shipowners appealed to Consul Bunch for instructions, he to
+Lyons, and the latter to the American Secretary of State, Judge Black.
+This was on December 31, 1860, while Buchanan was still President, and
+Black's answer was evasive, though asserting that the United States must
+technically regard the events in South Carolina as acts of violent
+rebellion[67]. Black refused to state what action would be taken if
+Bunch advised British shipowners to pay, but a way out of the
+embarrassment was found by advising such payment to State authorities
+"under protest" as done "under compulsion." To one of his letters to
+Bunch on this topic, Lyons appended an expression indicative of his own
+early attitude. "The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pill
+which it will be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the
+Slave Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish British
+stomach will reject it[68]."
+
+Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon followed by
+other Southern States, made a deep impression on Russell, especially
+when compared with the uncertainty and irresolution manifested in the
+attempted compromise measures of Northern statesmen. In a private letter
+to Lyons, January 10, 1861, he wrote "I do not see how the United States
+can be cobbled together again by any compromise.... I cannot see any
+mode of reconciling such parties as these. The best thing _now_ would
+be that the right to secede should be acknowledged.... I hope sensible
+men will take this view.... But above all I hope no force will be
+used[69]." And again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of the
+Union is now inevitable[70]." To Russell, as to most foreign observers,
+it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous extent
+of territory, and its five and one-half millions of population, were
+determined to leave the Union, no force whatever could compel a return.
+History failed to record any revolution on so large a scale which had
+not succeeded. His desire, therefore, was that the North would yield to
+the inevitable, and would not plunge into a useless civil war disastrous
+alike to the prosperity of America and of foreign nations. Russell's
+first hope was that the South would forgo secession; his second, this
+accomplished, that there would be no war, and in this sense he
+instructed Lyons. The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, and
+more aware of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout his
+entire service at Washington that there was at least a _chance_ that the
+North could subdue the South by might of arms[71], but he also, looking
+to British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, in cautious
+suggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from January to
+March, 1861, British effort and indirect advice were based on the hope
+that British trade interests might escape the tribulations inevitable
+from a civil conflict in America. Beyond that point there was no grasp
+of the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clear
+formulation of British policy[72].
+
+In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and official
+British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determined
+Northern effort to recover the South. Early British attitude was,
+therefore, based on a misconception. As this became clear, public
+opinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentiment
+and to show, in some quarters, quite another face. Even as early as
+January the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States had
+not availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such an
+incubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]." and a month
+later professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit the
+North to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexing
+Canada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it. This, it was
+argued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down military
+expenditures[74]. The _London Press_ indulged in similar speculation,
+though from the angle of a Canadian annexation of the Northern States,
+whose more sober citizens must by now be weary of the sham of American
+democracy, and disgusted with the rowdyism of political elections, which
+"combine the morals of a horse race, the manners of a dog fight, the
+passions of a tap-room, and the emotions of a gambling house[75]."
+Probably such suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at the
+moment, but it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" in
+Canada should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States the
+same thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles Sumner
+held it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the face of the
+growing Northern determination to preserve the Union. It lay at the
+bottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old friend Charles
+Francis Adams, now busy in schemes intended, apparently, to restore the
+Union by compromise, and it led Sumner to hope for appointment as
+Minister to England[76].
+
+The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the _Times_, was one of
+the first to begin the process of "face about," as civil war in America
+seemed imminent[77]. Viewed from the later attitude of the _Times_, the
+earlier expressions of that paper, and in truth of many British
+journals, seem merely the customary platitudinous British holding up of
+horrified hands at American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strong
+editorial still proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting
+"without law, without justice," but displayed a real dismay at the
+possible consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January
+22, the _Times_ reprinted an article from the _Economist_, on a probable
+cessation of cotton supply and editorially professed great alarm, even
+advocating an early recognition of the Southern confederacy if needed to
+maintain that supply. From this time on there is no further note in the
+_Times_ of the righteousness of the Northern cause; but while it is
+still asserted that war would be folly, the strength of the South, its
+superiority as a military nation, are depicted.
+
+A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial comment.
+Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written by Bancroft
+Davis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause, was discontinued.
+W.H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the Crimea, was summoned
+to London and, according to his own story, upon being given papers,
+clippings, and correspondence (largely articles from the _New York
+Herald_) supporting the right of the South to secede, hastily took his
+departure for America to report upon the situation[78]. He sailed from
+Queenstown on March 3, and arrived in New York on March 16. At last on
+March 12, the _Times_ took positive ground in favour of the justice of
+the Southern cause.
+
+     "No treachery has been at work to produce the disruption, and
+     the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies
+     of every free and enlightened people. Such are the widely
+     different auspices under which the two rival Republics start
+     into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these
+     things by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly
+     swayed by their own interest, and the two Republics must be
+     weighed, not by their professions or their previous history,
+     but by the conduct they pursue and the position they maintain
+     among the Powers of the earth. Their internal institutions
+     are their own affair; their financial and political
+     arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil is a slave-holding
+     Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct it has
+     contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy of
+     nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free
+     from this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy
+     of America evinces a determination to act in a narrow,
+     exclusive, and unsocial spirit, while its Southern
+     competitor extends the hand of good fellowship to all
+     mankind, with the exception of its own bondsmen, we must not
+     be surprised to see the North, in spite of the goodness of
+     its cause and the great negative merit of the absence of
+     Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the
+     sympathy and regard of mankind."
+
+This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral tone
+earlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that England
+would not "stultify the policy of half a century for the sake of an
+extended cotton trade[79]."
+
+The _Economist_, with more consistency, still reported the violence and
+recklessness of the South, yet in logical argument proved to its own
+satisfaction the impossibility of Northern reconquest, and urged a
+peaceful separation[80]. The _Spectator_, even though pro-Northern, had
+at first small hope of reunion by force, and offered consolation in the
+thought that there would still remain a United States of America
+"strong, powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the Black
+South[81]." In short from all quarters the public press, whatever its
+sympathy, united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failure
+if undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion,
+however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was indeed
+more slow to make up its mind and more considerate in expressing itself.
+When it became clear that in all probability the North would fight,
+there was still no conception, any more than in the United States
+itself, of the duration and intensity of the conflict. Indeed, Russell
+yet hoped, as late as the end of January, that no protracted war would
+occur. Nevertheless he was compelled to face the situation in its
+relation to British commerce.
+
+On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of possible war
+which would at once call for a determination of British policy. "Above
+all things," he wrote, "endeavour to prevent a blockade of the Southern
+coast. It would produce misery, discord, and enmity incalculable[82]."
+Within a week Forster, a thorough friend of the North throughout the
+whole war, was interrogating the Ministry in the House of Commons in
+regard to the situation at Charleston, and expressing the hope that
+England would not in any way attempt to interfere[83]. This was the
+first reference in Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after the
+long vacation, to the American conflict, but British commercial
+interests were being forced to a keener attention, and already men in
+many circles were asking themselves what should be the proper
+governmental attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy could
+justly claim European recognition; how far and how fast European
+governments ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to be
+the proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, a
+declaration of neutrality ought to be issued.
+
+With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became important
+for British statesmen to know something about the leaders in this new
+Southern movement, the attitude of the people in general, and the
+purposes of the new Government. Here, unfortunately, Lord Lyons could
+be no guide. The consuls in the South, however, were in a position to
+give their impressions. On February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell,
+describing the election of Davis and Stephens[84], to the Presidency and
+Vice-Presidency of the Confederacy, and giving a personal
+characterization of many members of the Government. He was rather
+caustic. Davis, he said, was the only _able_ man, and he, unfortunately,
+was a confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunch
+prophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had acquiesced
+in a Southern State and the fear of the North had passed. Bunch had no
+faith in any future greatness of the South, asserting that it would be a
+State despised among nations for its maintenance of slavery, and that it
+could not hope for any encouragement or sympathy from the humane nations
+of Europe; in fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning to
+the South. Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questioned
+that the South had already actually established its independence. This
+he seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter,
+there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to the
+Civil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity long
+preached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and her
+certainty that a new State was being born.
+
+For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to report,
+but up to the end of January he had not written in any great detail with
+regard to the new administration and its make-up, though on January 7,
+he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State and
+had expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be "a
+dangerous Foreign Minister[85]." Lincoln was still in Illinois and the
+constituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward's voice was
+sure to be a powerful one. Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity to
+talk with him. On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell,
+Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latter
+had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was but
+superficial and that union sentiment in the South would soon
+prevail[86]. In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyons
+asserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretary
+of State. He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to
+protect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in order
+to resist such interference[87]. Again, on February 12, while himself
+expressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties in
+America, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solve
+these difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governments
+refused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formal
+blockade closing the Southern ports[88]. Writing privately, Lyons
+exhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested
+that the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for
+if these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade,
+Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89].
+
+Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction in
+which it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld and
+a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by an
+assertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy toward
+England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of
+strength but that "blustering demonstrations" must not be carried too
+far[90]. Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen the
+possibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect in
+America. Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyons
+that this might be more than mere "bunkum," Russell began to instruct
+Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the same
+time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism.
+Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for a
+time, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see what
+Lincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope of
+compromise, and that in his own view this was still possible. In this
+letter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyons
+is concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to a
+resumption of normal relations between the North and South. He at least
+had no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91].
+
+Before this communication could reach England Russell had thoroughly
+awakened to the seriousness of the American situation in relation to
+British foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to Lyons, he
+stated, "I hope you are getting on well with the new President. If he
+blockades the Southern ports we shall be in a difficulty. But according
+to all American doctrine it must be an actual blockade kept up by an
+efficient force[92]." Thus, before any act had really occurred in
+America, the matter of a blockade was occupying the attention of British
+statesmen. One difficulty at the time was that there was no one in
+England qualified to speak for the new administration at Washington.
+Dallas, the American Minister appointed under the Buchanan
+administration, while, unlike some other diplomatic representatives
+abroad, faithful to the cause of the United States, was nevertheless not
+wholly trusted by Lincoln or by Seward, and was thus handicapped in
+representing to Russell American conditions or intentions. Indeed he had
+very little communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England was
+known to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell,
+"Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister in
+London. I think it a very good appointment[93]." This news was received
+in London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to elapse before Adams
+reached his post. The appointment of Adams, however, seemed to Lyons a
+matter of congratulation in his hope that no vicious anti-British policy
+would be indulged in by Seward. Ten days after his telegram, he wrote at
+length to Russell, making an excellent statement and analysis in regard
+to the character of Adams.
+
+     "Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. of the
+     U.S., and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The
+     grandfather was the first Am. minister in England. The father
+     was one of the Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the
+     Convention of the 3rd July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of
+     the H. of R. for one of the districts of Mass., acted with
+     the less violent section of the 'Republican' Party. During
+     the last session of Congress he made a very remarkable
+     speech on the state of the Union, denying the reasonableness
+     of the complaints of the Southern States, but stating his
+     desire that every concession not inconsistent with honour and
+     principle should be made to them. He is considered to be a
+     man of great independence of character, and has the
+     reputation of being very tenacious of his own opinions. In
+     manner he is quiet and unassuming. He is a man of good
+     fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a considerable family in Mass.,
+     of the name of Brooks. The late wife of Mr. Edward Everett,
+     who, as your L. is aware, has held the offices of Minister in
+     London and Secretary of State, was her sister[94]."
+
+Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the same time
+by Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now being despatched
+to London, but they were not so favourable. Mann, wrote Bunch, was the
+son of a "bankrupt grocer." His personal character was "not good," yet
+he alone of the three Commissioners appointed had had diplomatic
+experience. Yancey, it was stated, was an able lawyer, a stirring
+orator, and a recognized leader of the secession movement, but he was
+also extremely pro-slavery in his views, had expressed himself in favour
+of a renewal of the slave trade, and throughout his career had been a
+"manifest destiny" man. Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusion
+Bunch described the extreme confidence expressed in the South in "King
+Cotton," and in rather bitter criticism stated that the Southern
+Commissioners thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now be
+compelled to bend the knee and recognize the South in order to get
+cotton[95].
+
+The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an astonishingly
+pro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald, consul at New York,
+wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, an exceedingly strong
+statement of his faith in the power of the North and its fixed and
+unalterable determination to force the South back into the Union, his
+confidence in Northern success, and his belief in the justice of the
+Northern cause. He ventured to suggest the proper policy for England to
+pursue, viz., to offer immediately her services in mediation but wholly
+and clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did not
+feel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such a
+consistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for the
+North as would help in shortening the war[96]. The British Consul at
+Boston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far, indeed, did these
+men go in expressing their sympathy with the North, that Lyons, on April
+27, commented to Russell that these consuls had "taken the Northern War
+Fever," and that he had mildly reproved Archibald[97].
+
+With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the installation of
+Seward as Secretary of State, it was possible for Lyons to become more
+active in his efforts to prevent a disruption of British Trade. On March
+20 he told Seward in a confidential conversation:
+
+     "... If the United States determined to stop by force so
+     important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the
+     cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what
+     might happen.
+
+     "... It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to
+     England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were
+     to take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were
+     to be at the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an
+     immense pressure would be put upon Her Majesty's Government
+     to use all the means in their power to open those ports. If
+     Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to do so,
+     they would naturally endeavour to effect their object in a
+     manner as consistent as possible, first with their friendly
+     feelings towards both Sections of this Country, and secondly
+     with the recognized principles of International Law. As
+     regards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared
+     that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to
+     recognize the Southern Confederacy[98]."
+
+This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the South did
+not at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five days later, on
+March 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreign
+Ministers, and there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all
+ships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade,
+made Lyons very anxious. As a host he diverted the conversation lest it
+become too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward
+
+     "... that it was really a matter so very serious that I was
+     unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount
+     in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast
+     comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an
+     enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase
+     the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in
+     the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of
+     submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99]."
+
+Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the Southern
+Commissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treated
+well. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his folly. Still
+Lyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as his
+language seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that "prudent
+counsels" were in the ascendant, that there would be no interference
+with trade "_at present_," and that a quieter tone was everywhere
+perceptible in Washington[100].
+
+From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, the
+danger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain lay
+in this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports. Naturally,
+and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade. At first,
+indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war really
+ensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. Certainly he bore hard
+and constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not only
+officials at Washington but the public press. Thus, in a letter to Bunch
+dated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W.H. Russell, the
+_Times_ correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructed
+Bunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impress
+him with the idea that any interruption of trade might and probably
+would result in a British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, "...
+the _only_ chance, if chance there still be of preventing an
+interruption of the English commerce with the S. is the fear entertained
+here, that it would lead to our recognizing the S.C.[101]" In these
+words is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, the
+fact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade rather
+than that he was convinced such interruption ought to result in a
+British recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen, when the
+blockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause for recognition
+and was most tolerant of its early ineffectiveness.
+
+While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the relations
+between England and America at London were exceedingly meagre. All that
+the American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's intentions is summed up
+in his despatches to Seward of March 22 and April 9, 1861[102]. On the
+former date, he gave an account of an interview with Russell in which
+the latter simply refused to pledge himself against a recognition of
+the Confederacy; in the latter, presenting a long memorial written by
+Seward to all of the larger European Governments arguing in friendly
+spirit the cause of the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russell
+merely a general expression of England's kindly feeling towards the
+United States and her hope that there might still be a peaceful
+solution. Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to English
+policy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be better
+for Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any definite
+action, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though the latter
+later denied that any pledge of delay was given. There is no doubt,
+however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say to Dallas, the
+separation in America was an accomplished fact and the hope of Great
+Britain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful separation.
+
+Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting that no
+definite stand was yet being taken by the American Government. At the
+same time Russell was continuing his instructions to Lyons to recommend
+conciliation "but never to obtrude advice unasked[103]." Yet Russell was
+not wholly undisturbed by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude,
+for in a private letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote to
+Lyons, "I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer us
+through the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr.
+Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the
+Southerners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at a
+proper distance[104]." It is an interesting query, whether this fear
+thus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct benefit to the
+United States at the moment when the Southern Commissioners arrived in
+England. The inference would seem to be clear, that in spite of Lyons'
+advice to treat them well, the effect upon Russell of Seward's attitude
+was to treat them coolly. Russell was indeed distinctly worried by
+Seward's unfriendly attitude.
+
+In the meantime the British press and public, while still uncertain and
+divided as to the merits of the conflict were now substantially a unit
+in accepting separation as final. The _Times_, with judicial ponderosity
+declared: "The new nationality has been brought forth after a very short
+period of gestation.... and the Seceding States have now constituted
+themselves a nation[105] ..." At the other end of the scale in newspaper
+"tone," the _London Press_ jeered at the Northern American eagle as
+having "had his tail pulled out and his wings clipped--yet the meek bird
+now holds out his claws to be pared, with a resignation that would be
+degrading in the most henpecked of domestic fowls[106]." Having now
+veered about to expressions of confidence in the permanency of the
+Southern Confederacy the _Times_ was also compelled to alter its opinion
+of Southern Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the Confederate
+Congress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far superior
+to that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to resist making
+the customary reference to manners traditionally American;
+
+     "With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain from
+     quoting the _naive_ testimony of a visitor in its favour.
+     'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in
+     Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such
+     industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant
+     Congressional action. _Not one member has appeared in his
+     seat under the influence of liquors or wines_, not a harsh
+     word has been uttered in debate, and all exhibit the most
+     unflagging energy and determination[107].'"
+
+The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the _Times_,
+forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the control of
+"ignorant ruffians," and dilated upon the statemanlike directness and
+sagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the stupidity of the
+North, displayed in its tariff policy[108]. A few journals thought that
+the North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle but that such a
+victory would be disastrous to the principles of federalism[109], and,
+in any case, that this civil war was one without "a noble cause to
+sustain either side[110]." By May nearly all the older journals were
+aligned on the right of the South to secede, and on the fact of a
+successful secession, though still differing as to the basic causes and
+essential justice involved. In this same month, however, there emerged a
+few vigorous champions of the Northern cause and prospects. In April the
+_Spectator_ agreed that the Great Republic was at an end[111]; in May it
+urged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance of
+ultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of all
+European nations[112]. A small newspaper of limited circulation, the
+_Morning Star_, organ of John Bright, had from the first championed the
+Northern cause. Now, as the armed conflict broke in America, it was
+joined by a more important paper, the _Daily News_, which set itself the
+task of controverting the _Times_. Moreover the _Daily News_ was all the
+more influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yet
+consistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause and
+principles behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling for a
+low price, twopence-halfpenny, the _Daily News_, like the _Westminster_
+among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and more popular constituency
+than the older publications, especially to a constituency not yet vocal,
+since still unrepresented, in Parliament[113].
+
+The _Daily News_ was fortunate in having, after 1862, the best-informed
+New York correspondent writing to the London press. This was an
+Irishman, E.L. Godkin, who, both at home and in America, was the
+intimate friend of literary men, and himself, later, a great moulder of
+public opinion[114]. Harriet Martineau further aided the _Daily News_ by
+contributing pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radical
+circles[115]. But literary England in general, was slow to express
+itself with conviction, though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, was
+firmly determined in his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he was
+writing in letters of the "good cause[116]." But Browning was a rare
+exception and it was not until the Civil War had been under way for many
+months that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to make
+comment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset was
+negligible[117].
+
+In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike indicative of
+a widespread conviction that Southern independence was assured, there
+still remained both in those circles where anti-slavery sentiment was
+strong, and in others more neutral in sympathy, a distaste for the
+newly-born State as the embodiment of a degrading institution. Lincoln's
+inaugural address denying an intention to interfere with slavery was a
+weapon for the friends of the South, but it could not wholly still that
+issue. Even in the _Times_, through the medium of W.H. Russell's
+descriptive letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his
+"Diary," "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and perfect
+the arrangements for economizing slave labour ... are, the more hateful
+and odious does slavery become[118]," and in his letter of May 8, from
+Montgomery, having witnessed an auction sale of slaves he stated:
+
+     "I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor negro
+     worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill
+     through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar
+     with the fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as
+     absolutely the owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew,
+     flesh and brains as of the horse which stood by my side.
+     There was no sophistry which could persuade me the man was
+     not a man--he was, indeed, by no means my brother, but
+     assuredly he was a fellow creature[119]."
+
+This was hard printing for the _Times_, in its new advocacy of the
+South, and Russell's description was made much of by the _Westminster
+Review_ and other publications that soon began to sound again the
+"issue" of slavery[120]. Yet the _Westminster_ itself in the same
+article decried the folly of the Northern attempt at reconquest. So also
+thought even John Bright at the moment, when expressing himself
+privately to friends in America[121].
+
+Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British public, but of
+what use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world State were in fact
+born? And if a State in power, why not give it prompt recognition? The
+extreme British anti-slavery opponents feared that this was just what
+the Government was inclined to do, and with promptness. Here and there
+meetings were hurriedly called to protest against recognition[122]. This
+fear was unfounded. Neither in London nor at Washington was there any
+official inclination to hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Seward
+the logic of such action, if British trade were illegally interfered
+with. By April 9 Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in the
+Cabinet would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longer
+be attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon to
+follow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in
+Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere to
+protect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassing
+to that trade. He himself was still insisting, but with dwindling
+confidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under any
+circumstances. And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated to
+Russell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners with
+deference. Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase the
+Northern confidence that they may do anything without provoking the
+resistance of England[123].
+
+Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all it
+was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if that
+injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) he
+did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action by
+Great Britain. When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter in
+Charleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyons
+expressed himself with regard to other elements in the struggle
+previously neglected in his correspondence. On April 15 describing to
+Russell the fall of Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun.
+The North he believed to be very much more powerful than the South, the
+South more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint of
+slavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized
+world." It was true that "commercial intercourse with the cotton States
+is of vital importance to manufacturing nations[124]...." but Lyons was
+now facing an actual situation rather than a possible one, and as will
+be seen later, he soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this
+"commercial intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition of
+the South.
+
+With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a civil
+war was actually under way in America, a large number of new and vexing
+problems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them furnishes the
+subject matter of later chapters. For the period previous to April,
+1861, British official attitude may be summed up in the statement that
+the British Minister at Washington hoped against hope that some solution
+might be found for the preservation of the Union, but that at the same
+time, looking to future British interests and possibly believing also
+that his attitude would tend to preserve the Union, he asserted
+vehemently the impossibility of any Northern interference with British
+trade to Southern ports. Across the water, Russell also hoped faintly
+that there might be no separation. Very soon, however, believing that
+separation inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixed
+his hope on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this,
+however, he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone else
+in England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be a
+long and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering the
+arrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new,
+independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the future is
+no proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of British
+governmental pleasure in American disruption was justified[125].
+Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge himself to Dallas, was using
+exactly such caution as a Foreign Secretary was bound to exercise. He
+would have been a rash man who, in view of the uncertainty and
+irresolution of Northern statesmen, would have committed Great Britain
+in March, 1861, to a definite line of policy.
+
+On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommend
+reconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an instruction
+from Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of "traditional friendship"
+against a British recognition of the Confederacy. Russell again refused
+to pledge his Government, but on April 12 he wrote to Lyons that British
+Ministers were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and
+final[126]." In the early morning of that same day the armed conflict in
+America had begun, and on the day following, April 13, the first
+Southern victory had been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. The
+important question which the man at the head of the British Foreign
+Office had now immediately to decide was, what was to be England's
+attitude, under international law, toward the two combatants in
+America. In deciding this question, neither sentiment nor ideals of
+morality, nor humanitarianism need play any part; England's _first_ need
+and duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizens
+the correct position, under International law, which must be assumed in
+the presence of certain definite facts.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 31: Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the 'fifties Great
+Britain made a sharp change of policy. (_Cambridge History of British
+Foreign Policy_, Vol. II, p. 283.)]
+
+[Footnote 32: Thomas Colley Grattan, _Civilized America_, 2 vols. 2nd
+ed., London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The first edition was printed in
+1859 and a third in 1861. In some respects the work is historically
+untrustworthy since internal evidence makes clear that the greater part
+of it was written before 1846, in which year Grattan retired from his
+post in Boston. In general he wrote scathingly of America, and as his
+son succeeded to the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought it
+wiser to postpone publication. I have found no review of the work which
+treats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This fact
+and its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work importance as
+influencing British knowledge and opinions.]
+
+[Footnote 33: Charles Mackay, _Life and Liberty in America: or, Sketches
+of a Tour in the United States and Canada in 1857-8_, one vol., New
+York, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at least of sufficient repute as a
+poet to be thought worthy of a dinner in Boston at which there were
+present, Longfellow, Holmes, Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks,
+and others. He preached "hands across the seas" in his public lectures,
+occasionally reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advance
+copy of Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden." Mackay's concluding
+verse, "John" speaking, was:
+
+     "And I have strength for nobler work
+       Than e'er my hand has done,
+     And realms to rule and truths to plant
+       Beyond the rising sun.
+     Take you the West and I the East;
+       We'll spread ourselves abroad,
+     With trade and spade and wholesome laws,
+       And faith in man and God."
+]
+
+[Footnote 34: Duncan, _Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer_, Vol. I, p.
+140.]
+
+[Footnote 35: R.C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes on "The
+English Press and the Civil War." Mr. Hamilton was at work on this
+subject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford University before
+completing his thesis. His notes have been of considerable value, both
+for suggested citations from the English Press, and for points of
+interpretation.]
+
+[Footnote 36: _Economist_, November 24, 1860. Six months later, however,
+the _Economist_ pictured Lincoln as merely an unknown "sectionalist,"
+with no evidence of statesmanship--_Economist_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 37: _Saturday Review_, November 24, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 38: _Spectator_, November 24, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 39: The _Times_, November 26, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 40: _Ibid._, November 29, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 41: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 42: R.L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the
+American Civil War," p. 2. A thesis presented in fulfilment of the
+requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Stanford University,
+1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a valuable study of the
+Reviews and of the writings of men of letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus
+"English Opinion."]
+
+[Footnote 43: The _Times_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 44: _Saturday Review_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 45: _Economist_, December 8, 1860. _Spectator_, January 19,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 46: _Spectator_, December 1, 1860. _Times_, January 29, 1861.
+_Economist_, May 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 47: _Saturday Review_, January 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 48: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 112, p. 545.]
+
+[Footnote 49: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 50: Russell, _My Diary North and South_, Boston, 1863, p. 134.
+"Then cropped out again the expression of regret for the rebellion of
+1776, and the desire that if it came to the worst, England would receive
+back her erring children, or give them a prince under whom they could
+secure a monarchical form of government. There is no doubt about the
+earnestness with which these things are said." Russell's _Diary_ is
+largely a condensation of his letters to the _Times_. In the letter of
+April 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a column
+on the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of colonial
+relations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported a Charleston
+sentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club in February. He
+wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration of a
+     newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day,' being the
+     _nefastus ille dies_ in which the bloody Britishers left
+     Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for
+     about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos _de_
+     nothing at all."
+
+In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic demonstration.
+Returning to his home one evening, he met a military company, which from
+curiosity he followed, and which
+
+     "drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of my
+     friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium
+     of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto
+     Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very
+     brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life
+     an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded,
+     to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr.
+     Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self.' the
+     amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (_dia
+     stomatos_) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back
+     into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a
+     blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy
+     that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over
+     the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to
+     the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit
+     on the floor."
+
+Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of the
+British consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than the
+clamour of the orator, that offended him? (_Lyons Papers_.)]
+
+[Footnote 51: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 113, p. 555.]
+
+[Footnote 52: The _Times_, January 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 53: Letter to _Dublin News_, dated January 26, 1861. Cited in
+_The Liberator_, March 1, 1861. Garrison, editor of _The Liberator_, was
+then earnest in advocating "letting the South go in peace" as a good
+riddance.]
+
+[Footnote 54: _Saturday Review_, March 2, 1861, p. 216.]
+
+[Footnote 55: _London Chronicle_, March 14, 1861. Cited in _The
+Liberator_, April 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 56: _London Review_, April 20, 1861. Cited in Littel's _Living
+Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the _Review_ was a Dr. Mackay,
+but I have been unable to identify him, as might seem natural from his
+opinions, as the Mackay previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New York
+correspondent of the _Times_.]
+
+[Footnote 57: Matthew Arnold, _Letters_, Vol. I., p. 150. Letter to Mrs.
+Forster, January 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 58: Julian Hawthorne, _Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife_, Vol.
+II, pp. 271-78. _Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier_, Vol. II,
+pp. 439 seq.]
+
+[Footnote 59: _Quarterly Review_, Vol. 110, p. 282. July, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 60: Duffus, "English Opinion," p. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 61: _Westminster_, Vol. LXXX, p. 587.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his former
+intimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of Adams was,
+foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so strongly the
+arrogance and intolerance of the South as to create greater unity of
+Northern sentiment. This was a purpose that could not be declared and
+both at home and abroad his action, and that of other former
+anti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith that the North was
+in earnest on the general issue of slavery.]
+
+[Footnote 63: _Services rendered by Russia to the American People during
+the War of the Rebellion_, Petersburg, 1904, p. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 65: _Ibid._, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, December 26, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 66: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, January 5, 1861, and No.
+17, February 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 67: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Lords_, Vol. XVIII.
+Correspondence with U.S. Government respecting suspension of Federal
+Customs House at the Port of Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3.]
+
+[Footnote 68: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 69: _Ibid._, The same day official instructions were sent
+permitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, but directing him, if asked to
+recognize South Carolina, to refer the matter to England. F.O., Am.,
+Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, January 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 70: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 71: This view was not shared by Lyons' colleagues at
+Washington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early declared the Union
+permanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, yet hoped the North
+would soon accept the inevitable and seek close co-operation with the
+South in commerce and in foreign relations. This view was repeated by
+him many times and most emphatically as late as the first month of 1863.
+(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., January 29-February 10, 1863. No.
+342.) It was not until September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hope
+for a Northern reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A.
+Golder, of Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcripts
+covering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the United
+States, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this material the
+English translation is mine.]
+
+[Footnote 72: Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with Lyons, at which he,
+Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had asserted that if Civil
+War came all foreign commerce with the South would be interrupted. To
+this Lyons protested that England could not get along without cotton and
+that she would secure it in one way or another. Seward made no reply.
+(_Ibid._, March 25-April 9, 1861, No. 810.)]
+
+[Footnote 73: _Economist_, January 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Ibid._, February 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 75: _London Press_, March 23, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living
+Age_, Vol. LXIX, p. 438.]
+
+[Footnote 76: Before Adams' selection as Minister to England was decided
+upon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were urging him for the place.
+Longfellow was active in this interest. _H.W. Longfellow_, by Samuel
+Longfellow, Vol. II, pp. 412-13.]
+
+[Footnote 77: John Bright later declared "his conviction that the
+leading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or friendly
+article toward the States since Lincoln's accession to office." Dasent,
+_Life of Delane_, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is approximately correct, but
+the shift in policy began earlier, when it came to be feared that the
+North would not submit to peaceable secession.]
+
+[Footnote 78: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. I, pp. 344-45.]
+
+[Footnote 79: See _ante_, p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 80: _Economist_, March 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 81: _Spectator_, March 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 82: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 83: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXI, p. 814. February 22, 1861.
+William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early taken part in
+public meetings called to express humanitarian sentiment. From 1850 on
+he was an acceptable public speaker in all matters liberal, as free
+trade, social reform, and anti-slavery. Elected to Parliament in 1859
+and again in 1861 from Bradford, where he was engaged in business as a
+woollen manufacturer, he sought, after the fashion of new Members, a
+cause to represent and found it in championship of the North. Having
+great native ability, as shown by his later distinguished career, it was
+the good fortune of the United States thus to enlist so eager a
+champion. Forster and John Bright were the two leading "friends of the
+North" in Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, but
+was more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with a
+reputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved prestige
+for himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and private
+secretary of the American Minister to England, once told the writer that
+he regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, the most valuable
+rendered by any Englishman to the North.]
+
+[Footnote 84: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 85: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I, p. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 86: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 87: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 88: F.O., Am., Vol. 760, No. 59.]
+
+[Footnote 89: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 90: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 17. Russell to
+Lyons, February 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 91: F.O., Am., Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March 11. It is
+curious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no extended
+characterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with the new
+President were insufficient to justify it. The first record of personal
+impressions was that made by W.H. Russell and later printed in his
+"Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the _Times_. Russell was
+taken to the White House. "Soon afterwards there entered, with a
+shambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, lean
+man, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, long
+pendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which,
+however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet.... The impression
+produced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping and
+wide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness,
+sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face ... eyes dark, full, and
+deeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almost
+amounts to tenderness.... A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the street
+would not take him to be what--according to usages of European
+society--is called a 'gentleman' ... but, at the same time, it would not
+be possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the street
+without notice."--_My Diary_, I, pp. 37-8.]
+
+[Footnote 92: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 93: F.O., Am., Vol. 761.]
+
+[Footnote 94: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, 1861. Received
+April 16.]
+
+[Footnote 95: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. Received
+April 9.]
+
+[Footnote 96: F.O., Am., Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 97: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 98: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, 1861. Printed
+in Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I., p. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 99: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 100: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 101: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 102: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, pp, 80-81.]
+
+[Footnote 103: F.O., Am., Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to Lyons, April 6,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 104: Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 105: The _Times_, February 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 106: _London Press_, March 30, 1861, Cited in Littell's
+_Living Age_, Vol. 69, p. 379.]
+
+[Footnote 107: The _Times_, March 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 108: _Saturday Review_, May 11, 1861, pp. 465-6.]
+
+[Footnote 109: _Economist_, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 110: _Examiner_, January 5 and (as quoted) April 27, 1861.
+Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 68, p. 758 and Vol. 69, p. 570.]
+
+[Footnote 111: _Spectator_, April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 112: _Ibid._, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 113: These four publications, the _Spectator_, the
+_Westminster_, the _Daily News_, and the _Morning Star_, were the
+principal British pro-Northern organs. In addition _The Liberator_ names
+among the lesser and provincial press the following: _Nonconformist,
+British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, Newcastle
+Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury_ and _Belfast Whig_. Duffus, "English
+Opinion," p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 114: Godkin had joined the staff of the _Daily News_ in 1853.
+During the Crimea War he was special war correspondent. He had travelled
+extensively in America in the late 'fifties and was thoroughly well
+informed. From 1862 to 1865 his letters to the _Daily News_ were of
+great value in encouraging the British friends of the North. In 1865
+Godkin became editor of the New York _Nation_.]
+
+[Footnote 115: W.E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet Martineau alone
+who was keeping English opinion about America on the right side through
+the Press." The _Daily News_ Jubilee Edition, p. 46.]
+
+[Footnote 116: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, Vol. II,
+p. 92.]
+
+[Footnote 117: Moncure D. Conway's _Autobiography_ asserts that
+two-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union cause, some of
+them actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, Sir Charles Lyell,
+Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, Cairns, Fawcett, Frederic
+Harrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the Rossettis," Vol. I, p. 406.
+This is probably true of ultimate, though not of initial, interest and
+attitude. But for many writers their published works give no clue to
+their opinions on the Civil War--as for example the works of Dickens,
+Thackeray, William Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion,"
+p. 103.]
+
+[Footnote 118: Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 398.]
+
+[Footnote 119: The _Times_, May 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 120: _Westminster Review_, Vol. 76, pp. 487-509, October,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 121: Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited in Rhodes,
+_United States_, Vol. III, p. 509.]
+
+[Footnote 122: A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, declared that
+anti-slavery England ought never to recognize the South. Reported in
+_Liberator_, May 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 123: F.O., Am., Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and 142.]
+
+[Footnote 124: _Ibid._, No. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 125: See _ante_, pp. 50-51.]
+
+[Footnote 126: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 24, 25 and 26.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861
+
+In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under the
+leadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" Liberal
+Government, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so constituted
+that almost equal influence was attributed to the Foreign Secretary,
+Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held the Premiership, and, as
+they represented different wings of the Whig-Liberal party, it was
+prophesied by political wiseacres that personal friction would soon lead
+to a new disruption. Nor were the possible elements of discord confined
+to these two. Gladstone, formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a time
+uncertain whether to return to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals,
+had yielded to Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters,
+and had joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed to
+him in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadership
+among the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home Secretary
+until July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April, 1863, Secretary
+for War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and conciliator between
+these divergent interests stood Lord Granville, President of Council,
+then a "Conservative-Liberal," especially valuable to the Cabinet for
+the confidence reposed in him by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert.
+
+In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this he had
+built his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism," assertive of
+England's honour and jealous for British advantage. Now, however, as
+head of a Government requiring the most delicate handling to maintain
+itself, he devoted his energies to details of political management in
+which he had great skill. His ambition was, primarily, to retain office,
+and in this purpose he was fortunate because, unknown to his ministerial
+colleagues, he had received an indirect pledge from Lord Derby, the
+Opposition leader, that there would be, for a time at least, no
+determined effort to unseat him so long as his Ministry brought forward
+no Bill for a further expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingness
+to make any further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerston
+was wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so,
+was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John," gained by his
+assertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step toward
+democracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchise
+question. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the
+"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political faith, and
+none were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The outspoken Radicals in
+Parliament, like John Bright, and his friend Cobden, who had refused to
+take office under Palmerston, gave a lukewarm support to the Ministry,
+but would not pledge themselves to steadfast adherence. They had hopes
+of Gladstone, believed that he would ultimately come into their group,
+but meanwhile watched with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeed
+Palmerston desired it, in the details of financial management to the
+exclusion of other questions.
+
+The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward democracy
+as affecting British policy during the American Civil War will be
+considered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had not become a
+clear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as historical evidence can
+determine, affect early governmental policy toward America. The
+outstanding feature of the British Government in 1861 is that it was
+made up of various so-called "Liberal" elements, the representatives of
+each of which carried on the business of his own department much as he
+pleased. Palmerston's was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever he
+cared to express it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern was
+to keep his all-star associates running smoothly together and thus to
+give no occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followed
+that Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreign
+affairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed the
+Government was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell Ministry."
+These two were the leaders of the team; next came Gladstone and
+Cornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation, and each eager to
+lead when their elders should retire from harness. Gladstone's great
+ability was already recognized, but his personal political faith was not
+yet clear. Lewis, lacking his rival's magnetic and emotional qualities,
+cold, scholarly, and accurate in performance, was regarded as a
+statesman of high promise[127]. Other Cabinet members, as is the custom
+of coalitions, were more free in opinion and action than in a strict
+party ministry where one dominating personality imposes his will upon
+his colleagues.
+
+Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the main voice
+of the Government; rather, save in times of extreme crisis, governmental
+foreign policy was Russell's policy. This was even more true as regards
+American than European affairs, for the former were little understood,
+and dependence was necessarily placed upon the man whose business it was
+to be familiar with them. Indeed there was little actual parliamentary
+or governmental interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the American
+question, attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italian
+expansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionian
+islands, and to the developing Danish troubles in Schleswig-Holstein.
+Neither did the opposition party venture to express a policy as regards
+America. Lord Derby, able but indolent, occasionally indulged in caustic
+criticism, but made no attempt to push his attack home. Malmesbury, his
+former Foreign Secretary, was active and alert in French affairs, but
+gave no thought to relations across the Atlantic[128]. Disraeli, Tory
+leader in the Commons, skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on the
+Government's policy, but never on the American question, though
+frequently urged to do so by the friends of the South. In short for the
+first year of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain toward
+America was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friend
+or foe.
+
+This being the case, what did Russell know about the American crisis?
+Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived from the
+reports of British officials in the United States, and from the pages of
+the public press. The salient facts known to Russell were few. Lincoln's
+Cabinet had been named. Lincoln himself was absolutely an unknown
+quantity, but it was unbelievable that a man of his origins and history
+could be more than a mere figurehead--an opinion then held as widely in
+America as in England. But someone must determine American policy, and
+by universal consent, this would be Seward.
+
+The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in England
+than any other American statesman, with the possible exception of
+Charles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had established a
+circle of British friendships. Both men were accepted as champions of
+anti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations and his so-called
+"martyrdom" under the physical violence of the South Carolinan, Brooks;
+and Seward for his clever political anti-Southern leadership in the
+United States Senate. But Seward's reputation in this respect was offset
+by the belief that he was anti-British in his personal sentiments, or at
+least that he was very ready to arouse for political ends the customary
+anti-British sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of New
+York. In 1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of the
+Prince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke of
+Newcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then
+"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat,
+whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious speculation
+in British governmental circles[129]. Moreover Seward's reputation was
+that of a wily, clever politician, rather unscrupulous in methods which
+British politicians professed to disdain--a reputation serving to dim
+somewhat, as indeed it did in America also, the sincere idealisms and
+patriotism of the statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in Great
+Britain as a rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding power
+in the new Republican administration.
+
+This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but not by
+all. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis Adams, himself
+a most stiffly upright politician, both regarded Seward as the only
+possible leader of Republican party policy and rejoiced that this was
+so, having great confidence in his chief's integrity and wisdom. Adams
+himself was well suited to his new post. He was known as having early in
+1849 fought the battle of anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig," and later
+as a leading Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts.
+Principally, however, he was suited to his post by education, family,
+and character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father's
+ministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England. His
+father and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, both
+Presidents of the United States, had both, also, been American Ministers
+at London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide acquaintance through
+training and study with European affairs, especially those of Britain,
+and equipped with high intellectual gifts, Adams was still further
+fitted to his new post by his power of cool judgment and careful
+expression in critical times. His very coolness, sometimes appearing as
+coldness and stiff dignity, rendered him an especially fit agent to deal
+with Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. The two men quickly
+learned to respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose in
+national policies.
+
+But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in London. The
+Southern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama, but soon
+transferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson Davis as
+President and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President. Neither man was well
+known in England, though both had long been prominent in American
+politics. The little British information on Davis, that he had served in
+the United States Senate and as a Cabinet member, seemed to indicate
+that he was better fitted to executive duties than his rival, Lincoln.
+But Davis' foreign policy was wholly a matter for speculation, and his
+Cabinet consisted of men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. In
+truth it was not a Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune of
+the South that everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southern
+gentlemen sought reputation and glory in the army rather than in
+political position. Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp the
+importance to the South of a well-considered and energetic foreign
+policy. At first, indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attention
+to the exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southern
+patriotism, Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessary
+in denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, to
+appoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on both
+slavery and secession[130]. "The single exception to this general
+policy[131]" was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost and
+Mann, all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Of
+these Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic experience.
+Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he at least was
+known abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern orator, demanding for
+ten years past, that Southern action in defence of states rights and
+Southern "interests," which now, at last, the South was attempting[132].
+
+Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached London
+on April 29[133]. Meanwhile in this same month of April, conditions in
+America, so long confused and uncertain, were being rapidly clarified.
+The South, earlier than the North, had come to a determined policy, for
+while during January and February, at the Montgomery convention, there
+had been uncertainty as to actively applying the doctrinaire right of
+secession, by March the party of action had triumphed, and though there
+was still talk of conferences with the North, and commissioners actually
+appointed, no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In the
+North, the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincoln
+was not inaugurated until March 4, and no positive pronouncement was
+earlier possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed.
+European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing to let
+the South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was discussing the
+advisability of a separate secession by that financial centre from
+Nation and State alike--and of setting up as a "free town." Seward, just
+appointed Secretary of State, was repudiating in both official and
+private talk any intention to coerce the South by force of arms[134]. It
+is no wonder that British statesmen were largely at sea over the
+American situation.
+
+But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort Sumter
+in Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal fortress
+under the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That event drove
+away as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and removed the last
+vestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of militant patriotism swept
+over both sections[135]. Hurriedly both North and South prepared for
+war, issuing calls for volunteers and organizing in all accustomed
+warlike preparations. The news of Sumter reached London on April 27, and
+that civil war seemed certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis,
+since the South lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issue
+letters of marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed a
+Northern intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under such
+letters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to be
+instituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British officials and
+public after the long delay and uncertainty of months, events in America
+had precipitated a state of war, though in fact there were still to
+elapse other months in which both North and South laboured to transform
+a peaceful society into one capable of waging effective battle.
+
+The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to alter,
+almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British policy,
+though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting the turn of
+events, had given careful consideration to the steps required of it in
+just such a situation as had now arisen. Certainly both Lyons and
+Russell had been deeply anxious for some time, and had visualized a
+proper British policy. The movement in Great Britain now became rapid.
+On April 29, Malmesbury, in the Lords, spoke of the news of civil war
+which had arrived "this morning," and asked if the Government had tried
+to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with other powers to
+check it. Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the United
+States as an independent State would have resented any suggestions from
+Great Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be extremely
+careful about offering advice unless "asked for by the contending
+parties themselves." Both speakers commented on the "ties of blood"
+rendering Britain especially anxious in this American quarrel, and
+regretted the conflict[136]. Malmesbury's query as to the approach to
+another government, meaning France, was evaded. That some such approach,
+in accordance with the earlier advice of Lyons[137], had already been
+made, is evident from the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallas
+learned from Russell of the plan of joint action with France, though
+what that action would be was not made clear[138]. As Dallas' report was
+soon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be considered, the
+paragraph referring to this matter is important:
+
+     "The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of
+     certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the
+     President induced him to request me to call at his private
+     residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three
+     representatives of the Southern confederacy were here[139];
+     that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so,
+     _unofficially_; that there existed an understanding between
+     this government and that of France which would lead both to
+     take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course
+     might be; and he then referred to the rumour of a meditated
+     blockade of Southern ports and their discontinuance as ports
+     of entry--topics on which I had heard nothing. But as I
+     informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention
+     to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara,' which
+     left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive
+     in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his
+     lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere
+     rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my
+     successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be
+     further postponed, at his lordship's suggestion."
+
+May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two Southern
+commissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As reported by
+them[140], Russell listened with attention to their representation, but
+made no informing comment. They argued the constitutional right of
+secession, depicted the firm determination of the South, were confident
+of early acquiescence by the North, and especially laid stress on the
+Southern desire for free trade. Russell's own report to Lyons on this
+interview and on one held six days later, May 9, is in substantial
+agreement, but much more is made by him than by the Commissioners of a
+question put by Russell as to a Southern plan of reviving the African
+slave-trade[141]. Yancey and Rost denied this and asserted "that they
+had prohibited the slave-trade, and did not mean to revive it." Their
+report to Richmond does not depict this matter as of special
+significance in the interview; Russell's report to Lyons lays stress
+upon it. The general result of the interview was that Russell listened,
+but refused, as to Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But the
+Southern Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and were
+content to wait on British action[142].
+
+On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the Attorney-General a
+memorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing the belligerency of the
+South and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and
+reprisal. The memorandum notes that Southern privateering would be
+dangerous to British commerce with the North, but sees no help for it.
+"The best solution," wrote the Attorney-General, "would be for the
+European nations to determine that the war between the two Confederacies
+shall be carried on on the principles of 'Justum Bellum,' and shall be
+conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize the
+Southern States as a Belligerent on this condition only[143]." The next
+day, referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the law
+officers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in America
+as regular war[144]," but he does _not_ comment on the legal advice to
+press the South to abandon privateering before recognizing her
+belligerent rights, for this is the only meaning that can be attached to
+the last sentence quoted from the Attorney-General's memorandum. This
+advice, however, in view of the opinion that there was "no help for it,"
+was presumably but a suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvre
+with little confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" was
+not the probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readily
+yield its only naval weapon.
+
+In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and announced. The
+letter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to be a "regular war"
+was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction giving Lyons advance
+notice of the determination reached by the Cabinet to recognize the
+belligerent rights of the South. Russell indulged in many expressions of
+regret and sympathy, but Lyons was not to conceal that this British
+action represented the Government's view of the actualities of the
+American situation. Yet while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion he
+was not instructed to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition of
+Southern belligerency[145]. Here was a correct understanding of the
+difficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a permitted
+avoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground[146]. Russell was not then aware
+of the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a theory, not yet
+clearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was a
+rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he does
+appear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to the
+constituted government at Washington[147]. Moreover his instructions
+were in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, a
+recognition of Southern sovereignty.
+
+On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent to
+Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France to
+join, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights. Cowley was
+also instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautions
+by European governments, and it was suggested that France and England
+unite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and third
+articles of the Declaration of Paris[148]. These articles refer to the
+exemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a
+neutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag[149]. This day,
+also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognize
+the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as a
+necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified Russell that
+Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with
+England's policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication,
+Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's suggestion that both powers issue a
+declaration that they "intended to abstain from all interference," and
+that M. de Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been given
+instructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151].
+
+The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May
+1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat by
+surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell's
+parliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date. But on May
+9 the _Times_ set the fashion of general approval in an editorial
+stating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflict
+in a new light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals
+involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were now
+more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to be
+regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business to keep strictly
+out of it and to maintain neutrality[152]. This generalization was no
+doubt satisfactory to the public, but in the Government and in
+Parliament men who were thinking seriously of specific difficulties
+realized that the two main problems immediately confronting a British
+neutral policy were privateering and blockade. The South had declared
+its _intention_ to use privateers. The North had declared its
+_intention_, first to hang those who engaged in privateering, and second
+to establish a blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been put
+into effect.
+
+The first action of the British Government was directed toward
+privateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords Commissioners
+of the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern plan to issue letters
+of marque and reprisal and directing that reinforcements be sent to the
+British fleet in American waters. This was prompt action on unofficial
+information, for Davis' proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons'
+despatch containing copies of it, sent on April 22, was not received by
+Russell until May 10[153]. Ordinary news from the United States required
+ten days to get into print in London[154], but official messages might
+be sent more rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamer
+to Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram to
+Halifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time was
+occasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best the
+exact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincoln
+proclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been received
+only a few days before the order was issued to reinforce the
+British fleet.
+
+[Illustration: _Photo: F. Hollyer_. SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K.C.M.G. (_From
+Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K.C.M.G.: An Autobiography," by
+kind permission_)]
+
+The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers sailing
+under the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with as Pirates,"
+thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at the Davis and
+Lincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a British fleet had
+been sent to protect British interests and took occasion to indicate
+British policy by adding, "we have not been involved in any way in that
+contest by any act or giving any advice in the matter, and, for God's
+sake, let us if possible keep out of it[155]." May 6, Gregory, a friend
+of the South, who had already given notice of a motion for the
+recognition of the Confederacy as an independent State, asked whether
+the United States had been informed that a blockade of Southern ports
+would not be recognized unless effective, and whether there would be
+acquiescence in the belligerent right of the South to issue letters of
+marque and reprisal[156]. Russell replied that Lincoln had _not_ been
+informed that a blockade must be effective to be respected since the
+Washington Government did not need to be told of an international rule
+which it had itself long proclaimed. As to the second point, he now
+announced what heretofore had not been clearly stated, that Southern
+privateers could not be regarded by Great Britain as pirates, for if so
+regarded Britain would herself have to treat them as pirates and would
+thus be unneutral. This was in fact, in spite of Northern bitter
+accusations that Britain was exhibiting governmental sympathy with the
+South by her tolerance of the plan of Southern privateering, an
+inescapable conclusion. Russell added, however, that the matter of
+privateering involved some new questions under the Declaration of Paris
+upon which the Government had not yet decided what stand to take[157].
+It was on this same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley to
+take up with France the question of the Declaration of Paris[158],
+Privateering and blockade, declared in America months before there was
+any possibility of putting them into effect, and months before there
+were any military operations in the field, forced this rapid European
+action, especially the action of Great Britain, which, more than any
+other European nation, feared belligerent interference with her carrying
+and export trade. How was the British Government to know that Davis
+would not bend every energy in sending out privateers, and Lincoln to
+establish a blockade? The respective declarations of Davis and Lincoln
+were the _first_ evidences offered of belligerent status. It was
+reasonable to assume that here would come the first energetic efforts of
+the belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence sufficiently
+informed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled few ships that
+could be fitted out as privateers, or that two-thirds of the Northern
+navy was at the moment widely scattered in foreign seas, making
+impossible a prompt blockade.
+
+To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial interests lay
+in this announced maritime war, and it felt the necessity of defining
+its neutral position with speed. The underlying fact of the fixity of
+Southern determination to maintain secession had in the last few weeks
+become clearly recognized.
+
+Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in America,
+some of it received just before the issue of the Proclamation of
+Neutrality, some just after, was all confirmative of the rapid approach
+of a great war. A letter from Bunch, at Charleston, was received on May
+10, depicting the united Southern will to resist Northern attack, and
+asserting that the South had no purpose save to conduct a strictly
+defensive war. Bunch was no longer caustic; he now felt that a new
+nation was in process of birth[159]. May 4, Monson, writing from
+Washington, and just returned from a trip through the South, in the
+course of which he had visited Montgomery, stated "_no reconstruction_
+of the Union is possible," and added that there was no danger of a
+servile insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb the
+British Government and public[160]. A few days later on, May 12, Lyons
+expressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons of
+anti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from expressions
+of sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern Cabinet in its
+plan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would be frightful in its
+consequences both to America and to England[161].
+
+Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation of
+Neutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action was
+necessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that action had
+been wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series of questions as
+to the application of the British Foreign Enlistment Act in the American
+crisis. What would be the status of British citizens serving on
+Confederate privateers? How would the Government treat citizens who
+aided in equipping such privateers? Did not the Government intend to
+take measures to prevent the infringement of law in British ports? Here
+was pressure by a friend of the North to hasten an official announcement
+of the policy already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis replied
+stating that the Government was about to issue a general proclamation
+warning British subjects not to take any part in the war[162]. Similar
+questions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received a
+similar answer[163]. The few days' delay following Russell's statement
+of May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law Officers to the exact
+form required. The Proclamation as issued was dated May 13, and was
+officially printed in the _London Gazette_ on May 14.
+
+In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not differ
+from customary usage[164]. It spoke of the Confederacy as "states
+styling themselves the Confederate States of America," prohibited to
+Englishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist others, or
+equipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to such ships. War
+vessels being equipped in British ports would be seized and forfeited to
+the British Government. If a belligerent war-ship came into a British
+port, no change or increase of equipment was to be permitted. If a
+subject violated the Proclamation he was both punishable in British
+courts and forfeited any claim to British protection. The Parliamentary
+discussion on May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimity
+of opinion the policy of the Government in application of the
+Proclamation; the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, but
+recognition of independence was for the future to determine; the right
+of the South to send out privateers was regretfully recognized; such
+privateers could not be regarded as pirates and the North would have no
+right to treat them as such, but if the North in defiance of
+international opinion did so treat them, Great Britain had at least
+warned its subjects that they, if engaged in service on a Southern
+privateer, had no claim to British protection; a blockade of the South
+to be respected must be effective at least to the point where a vessel
+attempting to pass through was likely to be captured; the plan of
+blockading the entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles of
+coast line, was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members of
+Parliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of the
+Southern seaboard[165].
+
+The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for one side
+in the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly on legal
+questions and their probable application. On May 15 Russell sent to
+Lyons the official text of the Proclamation, but did not instruct him to
+communicate it officially to Seward, leaving this rather to Lyons'
+discretion. This was discretionary in diplomatic usage since in strict
+fact the Proclamation was addressed to British subjects and need not be
+communicated officially to the belligerents. In the result the
+discretion permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognition
+of Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which the
+Northern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then, or
+later, make official communication to Seward of the Proclamation[166].
+The fact soon appeared that the United States seriously objected to the
+Proclamation of Neutrality, protesting first, its having been issued at
+all, and, in the second place, resenting what was considered its
+"premature" announcement by a friendly nation. This matter developed so
+serious a criticism by both American Government and public, both during
+and after the Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did the
+British Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a
+"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality?
+
+On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on the
+morning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in London[167],
+but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas was
+prevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford[168].
+All that was immediately possible was to make official notification of
+arrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen. This was
+promptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, Palmerston
+attending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams' first report to
+Seward was therefore brief, merely noting that public opinion was "not
+exactly what we would wish." In this he referred to the utterances of
+the press, particularly those of the _Times_, which from day to day and
+with increasing vigour sounded the note of strict neutrality in a
+"non-idealistic" war. On May 30 the _Times_, asserting that both parties
+in America were bidding for English support, summed up public opinion
+as follows:
+
+     "We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, that it
+     does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern leaders
+     that they are half inclined to become British once more. Both
+     sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans
+     over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily.
+
+     "For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of
+     events has induced us to regard the dispute as a more
+     commonplace kind of quarrel than it at first appeared to be.
+     The real motives of the belligerents, as the truth
+     transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as have caused
+     wars in all times and countries. They are essentially selfish
+     motives--that is to say, they are based upon speculations of
+     national power, territorial aggrandizement, political
+     advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim any
+     superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of
+     patriotism....
+
+     "We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to
+     remove the case from the common category of national or
+     monarchical quarrels. The representations of the North might
+     be made word for word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous
+     of 'rectifying' his frontier, consolidating his empire, or
+     retaining a disaffected province in subjection. The
+     manifestos of the South might be put forth by any State
+     desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion or exchanging
+     union for independence....
+
+     "It is just such a question as has been left times out of
+     mind in this Old World to the decision of the sword. The
+     sword will be the arbitrator in the New World too; but the
+     event teaches us plainly enough that Republics and
+     Democracies enjoy no exemption from the passions and follies
+     of humanity."
+
+Under these impressions Adams presented himself on May 18 for his first
+interview with Russell[169]. He stated that he had come with the idea
+that there was
+
+     ".... little to do beyond the duty of preserving the
+     relations actually existing between the two nations from the
+     risk of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate
+     domestic disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was
+     not without pain that I was compelled to admit that from the
+     day of my arrival I had felt in the proceedings of both
+     houses of Parliament, in the language of Her Majesty's
+     ministers, and in the tone of opinion prevailing in private
+     circles, more of uncertainty about this than I had before
+     thought possible,"
+
+Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to Dallas
+refusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South implied a
+British purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the effect to widen,
+if not to make irreparable, a breach [between North and South] which we
+believed yet to be entirely manageable by ourselves."
+
+Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had simply
+meant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not disposed in
+any way to interfere." To this Adams answered that:
+
+     ".... it was deserving of grave consideration whether great
+     caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might,
+     even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage
+     the hopes of the disaffected in America.... It was in this
+     view that I must be permitted to express the great regret I
+     had felt on learning the decision to issue the Queen's
+     proclamation, which at once raised the insurgents to the
+     level of a belligerent State, and still more the language
+     used in regard to it by Her Majesty's ministers in both
+     houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever might be the
+     design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the effect of
+     these events had been to encourage the friends of the
+     disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private
+     opinion indicated it strongly."
+
+Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on recent events
+than they deserved. The Government had taken the advice of the Law
+Officers and as a result had concluded that "as a question merely of
+_fact_, a war existed.... Under such circumstances
+
+     it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this in the
+     technical sense as _justum bellum_, that is, a war of two
+     sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice,
+     as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to
+     bring the management of it within the rules of modern
+     civilized warfare. This was all that was contemplated by the
+     Queen's proclamation. It was designed to show the purport of
+     existing laws, and to explain to British subjects their
+     liabilities in case they should engage in the war."
+
+To this Adams answered "... that under other circumstances
+
+     I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to this
+     view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to
+     remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a
+     little more rapid than was absolutely called for by the
+     occasion.... And furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to
+     be a belligerent State before they had ever shown their
+     capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever, except
+     within one of their own harbours, and under every possible
+     advantage. It considered them a marine power before they had
+     ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean.... The rule
+     was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any
+     organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its
+     power to defend and protect itself against the assaults of
+     enemies, and at the same time to manifest a capacity to
+     maintain binding relations with foreign nations, then a
+     measure of recognition could not be justly objected to on any
+     side. The case was very different when such an interference
+     should take place, prior to the establishment of the proof
+     required, as to bring about a result which would not probably
+     have happened but for that external agency."
+
+This representation by the American Minister, thus early made, contains
+the whole argument advanced against the British Proclamation of
+Neutrality, though there were many similar representations made at
+greater length both by Adams later, and by Seward at Washington. They
+are all well summarized by Bernard as "a rejection ... of the
+proposition that the existence of war is a simple matter of fact, to be
+ascertained as other facts are--and an assertion ... of the dogma that
+there can be no war, so far as foreign nations are concerned, and,
+therefore, no neutrality, so long as there is a sovereignty _de
+jure_[170]." But in this first representation Adams, in the main, laid
+stress upon the _haste_ with which the Proclamation of Neutrality had
+been issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that British
+sympathies were with the South.
+
+One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing exactly
+those opinions advanced by Adams. The _Spectator_ declared that while
+the Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared to be one of strict
+neutrality, it in reality tended "directly to the benefit of the
+South[171]." A fortnight later this paper asserted, "The quarrel, cover
+it with cotton as we may, is between freedom and slavery, right and
+wrong, the dominion of God and the dominion of the Devil, and the duty
+of England, we submit, is clear." She should, even though forced to
+declare her neutrality, refuse for all time to recognize the
+slave-holding Confederacy[172]. But the _Spectator_ stood nearly alone
+in this view. The _Saturday Review_ defended in every respect the issue
+of the Proclamation and added, "In a short time, it will be necessary
+further to recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but the
+United States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall be
+postponed until the failure of the effort which they assert or believe
+that they are about to make has resulted in an experimental proof that
+subjugation is impossible[173]." A few provincial papers supported the
+view of the _Spectator_, but they were of minor importance, and
+generally the press heartily approved the Proclamation.
+
+At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has just
+received an instruction from Seward written under the impression aroused
+by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April 8 to make any pledge as
+to British policy on the recognition of Southern independence. Seward
+was very much disturbed by what Russell had said to Dallas. In this
+instruction, dated April 27[174], he wrote:
+
+     "When you shall have read the instructions at large which
+     have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that
+     these last remarks of his lordship are by no means
+     satisfactory to this government. Her Britannic Majesty's
+     government is at liberty to choose whether it will retain the
+     friendship of this government by refusing all aid and comfort
+     to its enemies, now in flagrant rebellion against it, as we
+     think the treaties existing between the two countries
+     require, or whether the government of Her Majesty will take
+     the precarious benefits of a different course.
+
+     "You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic
+     Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of
+     his lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this
+     government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights
+     and derogating from its dignity."
+
+Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood them,
+Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and especially
+in the Government, stating that this improvement was due, in part, to
+the vigour now being shown by the Northern Government, in part "to a
+sense that the preceding action of Her Majesty's ministers has been
+construed to mean more than they intended by it[175]." But at
+Washington the American irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was
+reporting Seward and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the
+Proclamation of Neutrality[176]. On June 14, Lyons had a long
+conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that the
+South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the conference
+feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and England on this
+point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious because France was so long
+delaying her own Proclamation[177]. To meet the situation, he and
+Mercier, the French Minister, went the next day, June 15, on an official
+visit to Seward with the intention of formally presenting the British
+Proclamation and Thouvenel's instructions to Mercier to support it[178].
+But Seward "said at once that he could not receive from us a
+communication founded on the assumption that
+
+     the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as Belligerents; that
+     this was a determination to which the Cabinet had come
+     deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events had
+     in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers
+     and the Southern States; that he would not discuss the
+     question with us, but that he should give instructions to the
+     United States Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be
+     enabled to state the reasons for the course taken by their
+     Government to Your Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you
+     should be desirous to hear them.... He should not take
+     Official cognizance of the recognition of the Belligerent
+     Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and France, unless
+     he should be forced to do so by an Official communication
+     addressed to the Government of the United States itself."
+
+In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward "for
+his own use only." They did not regard the moment well chosen "to be
+punctilious." Lyons reported that Seward's language and demeanour
+throughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good humoured," but
+the fact remained that the United States had not been officially
+notified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and that the American
+Government, sensitive to popular excitement in the matter and committed
+to the theory of a rebellion of peoples, was thus left free to continue
+argument in London without any necessity of making formal protest and of
+taking active steps to support such protest[179]. The official relation
+was eased by the conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger of
+America, expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and,
+temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs. The
+_Times_ told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that the utmost care
+and circumspection must be used by every man or party in England to
+avoid giving offence to either of the two incensed belligerents[180]."
+In answer to the Northern outcry at the lack of British sympathy, it
+declared "Neutrality--strict neutrality--is all that the United States
+Government can claim[181]."
+
+While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward the
+British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two other
+matters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of the
+British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing given by
+Russell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward, on May 21,
+wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent
+service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We
+treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by
+our own citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great
+Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents and give
+them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the law of nations affords
+an adequate and proper remedy[182]." This was threatening language, but
+was for Adams' own eye, and in the next sentence of his letter Seward
+stated that avoidance of friction on this point was easy, since in 1856
+Great Britain had invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration
+of Paris everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United
+States was now ready to accede.
+
+What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made clear for
+the question of privateering did not constitute the main point of his
+belligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed treatment of
+privateers as pirates might have resulted in very serious complications,
+for though the Proclamation of Neutrality had warned British subjects
+that they would forfeit any claim to protection if they engaged in the
+conflict, it is obvious that the hanging as a pirate of a British seaman
+would have aroused a national outcry almost certain to have forced the
+Government into protest and action against America. Fortunately the
+cooler judgment of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of
+the plan of treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of
+giving "shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from
+Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such
+shelter would be available in British ports[183].
+
+In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that the
+Southern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially,"
+instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that: "You
+will, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as
+well as official, with the British Government, so long as it shall
+continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this
+country." Here was a positive instruction as to the American Minister's
+conduct in a given situation, and a very serious instruction, nearly
+equivalent to "taking leave" after a rupture of diplomatic relations,
+but the method to be used in avoiding if possible the necessity of the
+serious step was left to Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment,
+when reporting the outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion of
+my task[184]." Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as to
+British intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, but
+added that he had not been able to convince himself of the existence of
+an unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised that the fact of
+the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in this city, and still
+more the knowledge that they had been admitted to more or less
+interviews with his lordship, was calculated to excite uneasiness.
+Indeed, it had already given great dissatisfaction to my Government. I
+added, as moderately as I could, that in all frankness any further
+protraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as
+hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action
+accordingly." Russell replied that both France and England had long been
+accustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the case of
+"Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc.," to hear what they had to say. "But
+this did not imply recognition in their case any more than in ours. He
+added that he had seen the gentlemen once some time ago, and once more
+some time since; he had no expectation of seeing them any more[185]."
+
+For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions might
+have brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of Adams and
+the acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been given; Russell
+merely stated that he had "no expectation" of further interviews with
+the Southern commissioners; he was still ready to hear from them in
+writing. This caused a division of opinion between the commissioners;
+Yancey argued that Russell's concession to Adams was itself a violation
+of the neutrality the British Government had announced, and that it
+should be met by a formal protest. But the other members insisted on a
+reference to Richmond for instructions[186]. On the same day that Adams
+reported the result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston:
+
+     "My position here thus far has not been difficult or painful.
+     If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in the
+     diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high
+     road to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to
+     me to be expedient so to play into the hands of our
+     opponents. Although there has been and is more or less of
+     sympathy with the slave-holders in certain circles, they are
+     not so powerful as to overbear the general sentiment of the
+     people. The ministry has been placed in rather delicate
+     circumstances, when a small loss of power on either extreme
+     would have thrown them out[187]."
+
+In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly, at
+least, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he therefore
+considered it best not to press too harshly upon the Government.
+
+But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant: "I wait
+with patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to engage a house
+for more than a month at a time...." He might himself be inclined to
+view more leniently the Proclamation of Neutrality and be able to find
+excuses for the alleged haste with which it had been issued, but his
+instructions required strong representations, especially on the latter
+point. Adams' report to Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interview
+with Russell of June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southern
+commissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of delay
+given by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that pledge in a
+hasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on the line already
+taken on May 18[188]. From this time on, throughout and after the war,
+this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing bitterness.
+British friends of the North joined in the American outcry. By mere
+reiteration it became in the popular mind on both sides of the Atlantic
+an accepted and well-founded evidence of British governmental
+unfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion of the Civil War, John
+Bright in Parliament, commenting on the causes of American ill-will,
+declared that the Government of 1861, knowing that Adams was on his way,
+should in mere courtesy, have waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, the
+Proclamation, entirely justifiable in itself, might have been issued
+without offence and without embittering the United States[189].
+
+Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was the
+Proclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had given any
+such pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the interview of May 1
+would seem to support that denial[190]. On that day Russell for the
+second time told Dallas that England would not commit herself, as yet,
+as regards Southern recognition, clearly meaning a recognition of
+_sovereignty_, not of belligerency, and immediately asked Dallas what
+the rumours of a blockade meant. Dallas replied that he had no
+information on this point, and Russell "acquiesced in the expediency of
+disregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought
+by my successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further
+postponed, at his lordship's suggestion."
+
+The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that Russell
+refrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of which Dallas
+knew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by Adams, and
+especially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's motion, which
+was one for _recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the South_,
+would be postponed. If there was a pledge here it was a pledge not to
+recognize Southern sovereignty until after Adams' arrival.
+
+But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no question,"
+writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his father, "that the
+proclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly haste.... The purpose
+was manifest. It was to have the status of the Confederacy as a
+belligerent an accomplished fact before the arrival of the newly
+accredited minister. This precipitate action was chiefly significant as
+indicating an animus; that animus being really based on ... the belief,
+already matured into a conviction, that the full recognition of the
+Confederacy as an independent power was merely a question of time, and
+probably of a very short time[191]." The author does not, however,
+support the contemporary American contention that _any_ Proclamation was
+contrary to international custom and that no recognition of belligerent
+status was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced the
+mother country itself to recognize the division as fully accomplished,
+even while war still continued. Indeed American practice was flatly
+contradictory of the argument, as in the very pertinent example of the
+petty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when President Van Buren had promptly
+issued a proclamation of neutrality. It is curious that in his several
+replies to Seward's complaints Russell did not quote a letter from
+Stevenson, the American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May
+22, 1838. Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the
+"Caroline" affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertible
+principle "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, as to
+belligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same ground,
+and are governed by the same principles; that whenever a portion of a
+State seek by force of arms to overthrow the Government, and maintain
+independence, the contest becomes one _de facto_ of war[192]." This was
+as exact, and correct, a statement of the British view as could have
+been desired[193].
+
+The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did not
+then hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus." On July 2, 1861,
+his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our side; of that I
+have no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of this.] But they
+thought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and as we seemed to have
+made up our minds to it, that their Proclamation was just the thing to
+keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned out otherwise
+they did their best to correct their mistake[194]." The modern
+historical judgment of the best American writers likewise exonerates the
+British Government of "unfriendly animus[195]," but is still apt to
+refer to the "premature" issue of the Proclamation.
+
+This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the Government be
+criticized even as exercising an unwise (not unfriendly) haste? Henry
+Adams wrote that the British thought the "dissolution seemed inevitable"
+and "we seemed to have made up our minds to it." Certainly this was a
+justifiable conclusion from the events in America from Lincoln's
+election in November, 1860, to his inauguration in March, 1861--and even
+to a later date, almost in fact to the first week in April. During this
+period the British Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy.
+Then, suddenly, actual conflict begins and at once each side in America
+issues declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade and
+piracy, indicative that _maritime_ war, the form of war at once most
+dangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in British
+citizens, was the method first to be tried by the contestants. Unless
+these declarations were mere bluff and bluster England could not dare
+wait their application. She must at once warn her citizens and make
+clear her position as a neutral. The Proclamation was no effort "to keep
+straight with both sides"; it was simply the natural, direct, and prompt
+notification to British subjects required in the presence of a _de
+facto_ war.
+
+Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was fortunate
+that the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The theory of the
+Northern administration under which the Civil War was begun and
+concluded was that a portion of the people of the United States were
+striving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance, and that there
+could be no recognition of any Southern _Government_ in the conflict. In
+actual practice in war, the exchange of prisoners and like matters, this
+theory had soon to be discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theory
+nevertheless in looking forward to the purely domestic and
+constitutional problem of the return to the Union, when conquered, of
+the sections in rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreign
+nations, and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet under
+that theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation of
+Neutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded otherwise
+than to protest, officially, against any British declaration of
+neutrality, declaring that his Government did not acknowledge a state of
+war as existing, and threatening to take his leave. It would have been
+his duty to _prevent_, if possible, the issue of the Proclamation.
+Dallas, fortunately, had been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams,
+fortunately, arrived too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely to
+complain. The "premature" issue of the Proclamation averted an
+inevitable rupture of relations on a clash between the American theory
+of "no state of war" and the international fact that war existed. Had
+that rupture occurred, how long would the British Government and people
+have remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of the
+United States[196]?
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 127: Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better informed in the
+early stages of the American conflict than any of his ministerial
+colleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the reviews and his
+unsigned article in the _Edinburgh_, April, 1861, on "The Election of
+President Lincoln and its Consequences," was the first analysis of real
+merit in any of the reviews.]
+
+[Footnote 128: In his _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, Malmesbury makes but
+three important references to the Civil War in America.]
+
+[Footnote 129: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 165.]
+
+[Footnote 130: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, pp. 227-8.]
+
+[Footnote 131: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 132: It was generally whispered in Southern political circles
+that Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him, fearing his
+interference at home. If true, this is further evidence of Davis'
+neglect of foreign policy.]
+
+[Footnote 133: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 134: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, pp. 149-51.]
+
+[Footnote 135: Possibly the best concise statement of the effect on the
+North is given in Carl Schurz, _Reminiscences_, Vol. II, p. 223. Or see
+my citation of this in _The Power of Ideals in American History_, ch. I,
+"Nationality."]
+
+[Footnote 136: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1207-9.]
+
+[Footnote 137: See _ante_, p. 60.]
+
+[Footnote 138: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, pp. 83-4. Dallas
+to Seward, May 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 139: An error. Mann did not arrive in London until May 15. Du
+Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 140: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann was not present at the
+first interview with Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 141: F.O., America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell to Lyons, May
+11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the
+Queen." The greater and essential part has been printed in
+_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil
+War in United States." No. 33.]
+
+[Footnote 142: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604.]
+
+[Footnote 143: Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum sent to Lyons is
+undated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May 4, in which it was
+enclosed, it is presumable that the date of May 3 for the Memorandum
+is correct.]
+
+[Footnote 144: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 145: F.O., Am., Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to Lyons, May 6,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 146: It is to be remembered that the United States had given
+no notice of the existence of a state of war.]
+
+[Footnote 147: In diplomatic usage official notification of neutrality
+to a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters show him to have
+appreciated a peculiar delicacy here.]
+
+[Footnote 148: F.O., France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft. Printed in
+_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on
+International Maritime Law." No. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 149: It is interesting that on this same day Lyons was writing
+from Washington advocating, regretfully, because of his sympathy with
+the North, a strict British neutrality:
+
+     "The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally inclined
+     towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that
+     anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here
+     would place us in a position which would soon become
+     untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they
+     would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of
+     our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt
+     sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to
+     reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce
+     the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all
+     events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might
+     lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all
+     chance of this to be gone for ever."
+
+Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 150: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 677.]
+
+[Footnote 151: _Ibid._, No. 684. Printed in part in _Parliamentary
+Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on International
+Maritime Law." No. 3.]
+
+[Footnote 152: _Times_, May 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 153: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 154: So stated by the _Times_, May 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 155: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, pp. 1378-9. This blunt
+expression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary offers an interesting
+comparison with the words of the American President Wilson, in a
+parallel statement at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Wilson on
+August 3, 1914, gave a special audience to newspaper correspondents,
+begging them to maintain an attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4
+he issued the first of several neutrality proclamations in which,
+following the customary language of such documents, the people were
+notified that neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expression
+of sympathies in public and in private." But on August 18 in an address
+to the people of the United States, this legal phraseology, required by
+traditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that "we must be
+impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our
+sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as
+a preference of one party to the struggle before another." And three
+weeks later, on September 8, came the proclamation setting aside October
+4 "as a day of prayer to Almighty God," informing Him that war existed
+and asking His intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithy
+expression was better suited to the forthrightness of the
+British public.]
+
+[Footnote 156: Hansard, _ibid_., pp. 1564-7. Gregory, a
+"Liberal-Conservative," though never a "good party man" was then
+supporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in Parliament,
+representing by his prominence in sport and society alike, the
+"gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and was a valuable
+influence for the South.]
+
+[Footnote 157: This subject is developed at length in Chapter V on "The
+Declaration of Paris Negotiation."]
+
+[Footnote 158: See _ante, p_. 88. The chronology of these rapidly
+succeeding events is interesting:
+
+  April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was received
+    this day."
+  May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American waters.
+  May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas.
+  May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake keep out of
+    it."
+  May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and Rost.
+  May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum.
+  May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular war."
+  May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize Southern
+    belligerency.
+  May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize Southern belligerency.
+  May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can not be
+    treated as pirates.
+    [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin in the late
+      afternoons, the instructions to diplomats were drawn before
+      the statement in Parliament.]
+  May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and Rost.
+  May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation of Neutrality
+    will be issued soon.
+  May 13--The Proclamation authorized.
+  May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool.
+  May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the _London Gazette_.
+  May 14--Adams in London "ready for business."
+
+It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2
+indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified to
+Lyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the governmental
+position had become definitely fixed, even though official instructions
+were not sent Lyons until the 6th.]
+
+[Footnote 159: F.O., Am., Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to Russell, April 19,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 160: F.O., Am., 789, Monson to Alston, received May 21.]
+
+[Footnote 161: F.O., Am., 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell, received May
+26. The full statement is:
+
+     "To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare of
+     this country, the present state of things is peculiarly
+     painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more
+     complete community of race and language, enlist his
+     sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he
+     cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant
+     war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both
+     sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead
+     only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life
+     and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would
+     be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of
+     the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of
+     Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to
+     England than to the Northern States themselves."
+
+[Footnote 162: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, p. 1763.]
+
+[Footnote 163: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34. In the general discussion in the
+Lords there appeared disagreement as to the status of privateering.
+Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it as piracy. Earl Hardwicke
+thought privateering justifiable. The general tone of the debate, though
+only on this matter of international practice, was favourable to
+the North.]
+
+[Footnote 164: For example see Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, Vol.
+I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813 during the
+Spanish-American colonial revolutions.]
+
+[Footnote 165: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXII, pp. 2077-2088.]
+
+[Footnote 166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 35. Russell to
+Lyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for Lyons' precaution was that while
+his French colleague, Mercier, had been instructed to support the
+British Proclamation, no official French Proclamation was issued until
+June 10, and Lyons, while he trusted Mercier, felt that this French
+delay needed some explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of his
+instructions and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request made
+no official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure.
+This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one, though
+it irritated both the British and French Ministers.]
+
+[Footnote 167: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 85. Adams to
+Seward, May 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 168: Bedford died that day.]
+
+[Footnote 169: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, pp. 90-96. Adams
+to Seward, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 170: Bernard, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the
+American Civil War_, p. 161. The author cites at length despatches and
+documents of the period.]
+
+[Footnote 171: _Spectator_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Spectator_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 173: _Saturday Review_, June 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 174: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 82.]
+
+[Footnote 175: _Ibid._, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June 7, 1861. See also
+p. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 176: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 177: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 178: F.O., Am., Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to Russell, June 17,
+1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with that of Lyons, is in
+_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 106. Seward to Adams, June
+19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 179: Bancroft in his _Seward_ (II, p. 183) prints a portion of
+an unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in Paris, July 1, 1861, as
+"his clearest and most characteristic explanation of what the attitude
+of the government must be in regard to the action of the foreign nations
+that have recognized the belligerency of the 'insurgents.'"
+
+     "Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor both
+     together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the
+     sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor
+     confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to
+     last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the
+     whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for
+     disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and
+     shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign
+     nations to respect and observe the treaties.
+
+     "We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the
+     fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain
+     and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent
+     party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes,
+     but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their
+     public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless,
+     reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that
+     concludes the fact."
+
+[Footnote 180: The _Times_, June 3, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 181: _Ibid._, June 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 182: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 87.]
+
+[Footnote 183: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 56. Lyons to
+Russell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with Seward on June 15.]
+
+[Footnote 184: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, p. 104. Adams to
+Seward, June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 185: Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes the view that
+the protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in regard to privateering
+and against interviews with the Southern commissioners were all
+unjustifiable. The first, he says, was based on "unsound reasoning" (II,
+177). On the second he quotes with approval a letter from Russell to
+Edward Everett, July 12, 1861, showing the British dilemma: "Unless we
+meant to treat them as pirates and to hang them we could not deny them
+belligerent rights" (II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners he
+asserts that Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps he
+remembered that he himself had recently communicated, through three
+different intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners to
+Washington, and would have met them if the President had not forbidden
+it." Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 179.]
+
+[Footnote 186: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 606.]
+
+[Footnote 187: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters, 1861-1865_, Vol. I, p. 11.
+Adams to C.F. Adams, Jnr., June 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 188: See _ante_, p. 98. Russell's report to Lyons of this
+interview of June 12, lays special emphasis on Adams' complaint of
+haste. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence
+on Civil War in the United States," No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June
+21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 189: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21, March 13,
+1865.]
+
+[Footnote 190: See _ante_, p. 85.]
+
+[Footnote 191: C.F. Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 172. In preparing
+a larger life of his father, never printed, the son later came to a
+different opinion, crediting Russell with foresight in hastening the
+Proclamation to avoid possible embarrassment with Adams on his arrival.
+The quotation from the printed "Life" well summarizes, however, current
+American opinion.]
+
+[Footnote 192: _U.S. Documents_, Ser. No. 347, Doc. 183, p. 6.]
+
+[Footnote 193: The United States Supreme Court in 1862, decided that
+Lincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was "itself official
+and conclusive evidence ... that a state of war existed." (Moore, Int.
+Law Digest, I, p. 190.)]
+
+[Footnote 194: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 16. Henry Adams to
+C.F. Adams, Jnr.]
+
+[Footnote 195: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, III, p. 420
+(_note_) summarizes arguments on this point, but thinks that the
+Proclamation might have been delayed without harm to British interests.
+This is perhaps true as a matter of historical fact, but such fact in no
+way alters the compulsion to quick action felt by the Ministry in the
+presence of probable _immediate_ fact.]
+
+[Footnote 196: This was the later view of C.F. Adams, Jnr. He came to
+regard the delay in his father's journey to England as the most
+fortunate single incident in American foreign relations during the
+Civil War.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD
+
+The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been considered
+solely from the point of view of a formal American contention as to
+correct international practice and the British answer to that
+contention. In fact, however, there were intimately connected wth these
+formal arguments and instructions of the American Secretary of State a
+plan of possible militant action against Great Britain and a suspicion,
+in British Governmental circles, that this plan was being rapidly
+matured. American historians have come to stigmatize this plan as
+"Seward's Foreign War Panacea," and it has been examined by them in
+great detail, so that there is no need here to do more than state its
+main features. That which is new in the present treatment is the British
+information in regard to the plan and the resultant British suspicion of
+Seward's intentions.
+
+The British public, as distinguished from the Government, deriving its
+knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and past
+utterances, might well consider him as traditionally unfriendly to Great
+Britain. He had, in the 'fifties, vigorously attacked the British
+interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized Great
+Britain as "the most grasping and the most rapacious Power in the
+world"; he had long prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to the
+United States; he had not disdained, in political struggles in the State
+of New York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism to
+Great Britain; and more especially and more recently he had been
+reported to have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civil
+conflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by fomenting a
+quarrel with England and engaging in a war against her[197]. Earlier
+expressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a politician
+never over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of foreign nations
+and peoples, for he had been even more outspoken against the France of
+Louis Napoleon, but the Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mind
+as indicative of a probable animus when the politician had become the
+statesman responsible for foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did,
+that he had ever uttered the words alleged[198], and his friend Thurlow
+Weed might describe the words as "badinage," in a letter to the London
+_Times_[199], but the "Newcastle story" continued to be matter for
+frequent comment both in the Press and in private circles.
+
+British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to Seward's
+speeches intended for home political consumption, or to a careless bit
+of social talk, had there not been suspicion of other and more serious
+evidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an unusually able and
+well-informed Minister, and from the first he had pictured the
+leadership of Seward in the new administration at Washington, and had
+himself been worried by his inability to understand what policy Seward
+was formulating. But, in fact, he did not see clearly what was going on
+in the camp of the Republican party now dominant in the North. The
+essential feature of the situation was that Seward, generally regarded
+as the man whose wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himself
+thinking this to be his destined function, early found his authority
+challenged by other leaders, and his policies not certain of
+acceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly, the
+situation at Washington.
+
+[Illustration: WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD (_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord
+Lyons," by kind permission_)]
+
+Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been elected as
+a Republican by a political party never before in power. Many of the
+leading members of this party were drawn from the older parties and had
+been in administrative positions in either State or National
+Governments, but there were no party traditions, save the lately created
+one of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the Territories. All
+was new, then, to the men now in power in the National Government, and a
+new and vital issue, that of secession already declared by seven
+Southern States, had to be met by a definite policy. The important
+immediate question was as to whether Lincoln had a policy, or, if not,
+upon whom he would depend to guide him.
+
+In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular estimate,
+were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the Secretary of the
+Treasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of State. Both were
+experienced in political matters and both stood high in the esteem of
+the anti-slavery element in the North, but Seward, all things
+considered, was regarded as the logical leading member of the Cabinet.
+He had been the favoured candidate for Republican Presidential
+nomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln only on the theory that the
+latter as less Radical on anti-slavery, could be more easily elected.
+Also, he now held that position which by American tradition was regarded
+as the highest in the Cabinet.
+
+In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that Seward would
+determine the policy of the new administration. Seward's own attitude is
+well summed up in a despatch to his Government, February 18, 1861, by
+Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from the Republic of Bremen. He described a
+conversation with Seward in regard to his relations with Lincoln:
+
+     "Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever remark,
+     that there is no great difference between an elected
+     president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The
+     latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth,
+     the former through the chances which make his election
+     possible. The actual direction of public affairs belongs to
+     the leader of the ruling party, here as well as in any
+     hereditary principality.
+
+     "The future President is a self-made man and there is
+     therefore as little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial
+     honesty ('honest old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he
+     does not lack common sense. But his other qualities for the
+     highest office are practically unknown. His election may
+     therefore be readily compared with a lottery. It is possible
+     that the United States has drawn the first prize, on the
+     other hand the gain may only have been a small one. But
+     unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may
+     have been merely a blank."
+
+The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; the
+second is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later Schleiden
+sent home a further analysis of Lincoln:
+
+     "He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and
+     healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He
+     seems to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which
+     rests upon him. But at the same time it appears as if he had
+     lost some of his famous firmness and resoluteness through the
+     novelty of the conditions which surround him and the hourly
+     renewed attempts from various sides to gain influence over
+     him. He is therefore at present inclined to concede double
+     weight to the superior political experience of his Secretary
+     of State[200]."
+
+This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly described.
+Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not unchallenged and
+soon a decision was called for that in its final solution was to
+completely overthrow his already matured policy towards the seceding
+States. Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possession
+of federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federal
+troops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation he
+had refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce and
+re-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson. On
+March 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yielded
+unless reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay and
+indecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of his
+Cabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an issue the
+whole question of Seward's policy and leadership.
+
+For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatory
+delay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting to
+time and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and people
+to a less violent attitude. He sincerely believed in the existence of an
+as yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in those
+States which were wavering on secession. He was holding communications,
+through intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" in
+Washington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence that
+State against secession. To all these Southern representatives he now
+conveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that Sumter
+would be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own "policy"
+would be approved by the President. His argument in reply to Lincoln's
+call for an opinion was positive against reinforcing Fort Sumter, and it
+seemed to meet, for the moment, with the approval of the majority of his
+Cabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself made no pertinent comment, yet did
+not commit himself.
+
+There the matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners,
+regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the maturing
+of Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw[201]," did not care to
+press for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal pledge that
+in case it were, after all, determined to reinforce Sumter, notification
+of that determination would at once be given to South Carolina. The days
+went by, and it was not until the last week of March that Lincoln,
+disillusioned as to the feasibility of Seward's policy of conciliation,
+reached the conclusion that in his conception of his duty as President
+of the United States he must defend and retain Federal forts, or attempt
+to retain them, for the preservation of the Union, and decided to
+reinforce Fort Sumter. On March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon and
+learned Lincoln's determination.
+
+This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it also
+threatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet understand fully
+that either supreme leadership, or control of policy, had been assumed
+by Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that astonishing document entitled,
+"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," which at once reveals
+his alarm and his supreme personal self-confidence. This document
+begins, "We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without
+a policy either domestic or foreign." It then advocates as a domestic
+policy, "_Change The Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery,
+Or About Slavery_, for a question upon _Union or Disunion_." Then in a
+second section, headed "For Foreign Nations," there followed:
+
+     "I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
+     categorically, at once.
+
+     "I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and
+     send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse
+     a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this
+     continent against European intervention.
+
+     "And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from
+     Spain and France.
+
+     "Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
+
+     "But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic
+     prosecution of it.
+
+     "For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
+     and direct it incessantly.
+
+     "Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
+     while active in it, or
+
+     "Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
+     debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.
+
+     "It is not in my especial province;
+
+     "But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility[202]."
+
+Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically gentle,
+yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed with his own
+superior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's "domestic policy"
+was exactly his own, except that he did not intend to abandon Fort
+Sumter. As to the warlike foreign policy Lincoln pointed out that this
+would be a sharp reversal of that already being prepared in circulars
+and instructions to Ministers abroad. This was, indeed, the case, for
+the first instructions, soon despatched, were drawn on lines of
+recalling to foreign powers their established and long-continued
+friendly relations with the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated as
+to the required "guiding hand," "I remark that if this must be done, I
+must do it.... I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of
+all the Cabinet[203]."
+
+This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to direct
+affairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had he not,
+momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific policy toward
+the South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of Lincoln's quiet
+persistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate issue, the relief of
+Sumter (though attempting to divert reinforcements to another quarter)
+but did not as yet wholly yield either his policy of conciliation and
+delay, nor give up immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union by
+plunging it into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurances
+to the Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that he
+could and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in this
+confidence that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained up
+to the second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the ships
+despatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day Governor
+Pickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the Northern
+purpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon the
+South; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemed
+inevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel.
+
+The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a day and
+a half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13--for
+as an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of Sumter changed, as
+in a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people. There was now a
+nearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union _by force_. Yet
+Seward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the "sober
+second thought" of the South would offer a way out toward reunion
+without war. In official utterances and acts he was apparently in
+complete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South. Davis'
+proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered by
+the Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yet
+officially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward at
+least one last straw of conciliation available. In this situation
+Schleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April
+24 and offered his services as a mediator[204].
+
+Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the South
+until the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathing
+spell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides. He had
+consulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Seward
+favourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the
+Confederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend,
+Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal. Seward at once took
+Schleiden to see Lincoln. The three men, with Chase (and the Prussian
+Minister) were the only ones in the secret. Lincoln's first comment was
+that he was "willing to make an attempt of contributing to the
+prevention of bloodshed and regretted that Schleiden had not gone to
+Richmond without consulting him or Seward." Lincoln further stated that
+"he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, but
+merely the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibility
+to govern everywhere," a concluding phrase that should have enlightened
+Schleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union. Lincoln
+said he could neither authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, but
+that he would gladly consider any such proposals voluntarily made.
+Schleiden asked for a definite statement as to whether Lincoln would
+recall the blockade proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis would
+recall the letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused to
+commit himself.
+
+This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward still
+thought something might result from the venture, and on that evening,
+April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided by Seward with
+a pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the afternoon of the
+twenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city was convinced that his
+mission would be a failure. All along his journey, at each little
+station, he saw excited crowds assembled enthusiastic for secession,
+bands of militia training, and every indication of preparation for war.
+Already, on that same day, the Virginia secession ordinance had been
+published, and the State convention had ratified the provisional
+constitution of the Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notified
+Stephens of his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, and
+was at once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frank
+and positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settle
+peacefully the differences between the two sections were futile." Formal
+letters were exchanged after this conference, but in these the extent to
+which Stephens would go was to promise to use his influence in favour of
+giving consideration to any indication made by the North of a desire
+"for an amicable adjustment of the questions at issue," and he was
+positive that there could be no return of the South to the Union.
+
+On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington. He found
+that three days had made a great change in the sentiment of the Capitol.
+"During my short absence," he wrote, "many thousands of volunteers had
+arrived from the North. There was not only a feeling of security
+noticeable, but even of combativeness." He found Seward not at all
+disposed to pursue the matter, and was not given an opportunity to talk
+to Lincoln; therefore, he merely submitted copies of the letters that
+had passed between him and Stephens, adding for himself that the South
+was arming _because_ of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers.
+Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that he had
+no fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding that Stephens'
+letters gave no ground for action since the "Union of these States is
+the supreme as it is the organic law of this country," and must be
+maintained.
+
+This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be regarded as
+Seward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued policy of
+conciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden to Richmond,
+but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had encouraged and aided
+Schleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27, hope had vanished, and
+Seward's "domestic policy," as set forth in his "Thoughts for the
+President's Consideration" on April 1, was discredited, and inevitably,
+in some measure, their author also. The dates are important in
+appreciating Seward's purposes. On April 27, the day of Schleiden's
+return to Washington, there was sent to Adams that "sharp" despatch,
+taking issue with British action as foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9,
+and concluding by instructing Adams to lose no time in warning Russell
+that such action would be regarded by the United States as "injurious to
+its rights and derogating from its dignity[205]." It appears, therefore,
+that Seward, defeated on one line of "policy," eager to regain prestige,
+and still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found to
+avert domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick at those
+threads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the Union through
+a foreign war. He was now seeking to force the acceptance of the second,
+and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts for the President."
+
+Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no secret
+at Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to Schleiden this
+fantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse
+for a war with England, France, or Spain," he said "that would be the
+best means of re-establishing internal peace[206]." Again, on February
+10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same topic, and complained that
+there was no foreign complication offering an excuse for a break. Lyons
+knew of this attitude, and by February 4 had sent Russell a warning, to
+which the latter had replied on February 20 that England could afford to
+be patient for a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" must
+not be indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarked
+in his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line,
+addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for established
+friendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction to
+Adams, April 10[207], in the concluding paragraph of which Seward wrote,
+"The United States are not indifferent to the circumstances of common
+descent, language, customs, sentiments, and religion, which recommend a
+closer sympathy between themselves and Great Britain than either might
+expect in its intercourse with any other nation." True, on this basis,
+Seward claimed a special sympathy from Great Britain for the United
+States, that is to say, the North, but most certainly the tone of this
+first instruction was one of established friendship.
+
+Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell "refuses
+to pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to threats. What
+other explanation is possible except that, seeking to save his domestic
+policy of conciliation and to regain his leadership, he now was
+adventuring toward the application of his "foreign war panacea" idea.
+Lyons quickly learned of the changed tone, and that England, especially,
+was to hear American complaint. On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell in
+cypher characterizing Seward as "arrogant and reckless toward Foreign
+Powers[208]." Evidently Seward was making little concealment of his
+belligerent attitude, and when the news was received of the speeches in
+Parliament of the first week in May by which it became clear that Great
+Britain would declare neutrality and was planning joint action with
+France, he became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter home
+exhibiting, still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his own
+foreign policy.
+
+     "A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save it
+     had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence,
+     needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate
+     position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do
+     too much for my country, lest some advantage may revert
+     indirectly to my own fame.
+
+     "... They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe,
+     Great Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the
+     South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to
+     make war against her, as the ally of the traitors.... I am
+     trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet before
+     it is too late[209]."
+
+The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10," of May 21,
+already commented upon in the preceding chapter. But as sent to Adams
+it varied in very important details from the draft submitted by Seward
+to Lincoln[210].
+
+Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a challenge. Its
+language implied that the United States desired war, and Seward's plan
+was to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, give him a copy of it,
+and then discontinue diplomatic relations so long as Russell held either
+official or unofficial intercourse with the Southern Commissioners. This
+last instruction was, indeed, retained in the final form of the
+despatch, but here, as elsewhere, Lincoln modified the stiff expressions
+of the original. Most important of all, he directed Adams to consider
+the whole despatch as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion.
+The despatch, as amended, began with the statement that the United
+States "neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound the
+sensibilities of that or any other European nation.... The paper itself
+is not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any of
+its positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly made
+known. But its spirit will be your guide[211]." Thus were the teeth
+skilfully drawn from the threat of war. Even the positive instructions,
+later in the despatch, as to the Southern Commissioners, need not have
+been acted upon by Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But even
+with alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarm
+Adams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The Government
+seems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe, and
+almost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the Ministers
+here in a certain contingency.... I scarcely know how to understand Mr.
+Seward. The rest of the Government may be demented for all I know; but
+he surely is calm and wise. My duty here is in so far as I can do it
+honestly to prevent the irritation from coming to a downright quarrel.
+It seems to me like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy[212]."
+
+Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the source of
+American belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment of what was
+wise at the moment coincided with that of Lincoln's--though of this he
+had no knowledge. In the event Adams' skilful handling of the situation
+resulted favourably--even to the cessation of intercourse between
+Russell and the Southern Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no more
+than earlier, was to be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's
+"foreign war panacea" was stillborn.
+
+The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Seward
+at last realized that the President intended to control policy, and
+though it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln's
+customary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now established
+between himself and his chief. Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though
+free in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter,
+avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the
+altered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them
+simple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with
+Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a "leak"
+of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to Despatch
+No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence by
+Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This was particularly
+true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England that
+Seward most directed his enmity. There resulted for British diplomats
+both at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long
+after he had made a complete face-about in policy. This suspicion
+influenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War.
+
+On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a long
+twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward's
+warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly ignorant of
+foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward, having lost
+strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recover
+influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet is
+strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought, should maintain a
+stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and make close contacts with
+France. He was evidently anxious to impress upon Russell that Seward
+really might mean war, but he declared the chief danger to lie in the
+fact of American belief that England and France could not be driven into
+war with the United States, and that they would submit to any insult.
+Lyons urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to
+correct this false impression[213]. Again, on the next day, May 21, the
+information in his official despatch was repeated in a private letter to
+Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as mere bluster. Yet
+he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any case insists that the best
+preventative of war with the United States is to show that England is
+ready for it[214].
+
+It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. May 22,
+he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him to make
+defensive preparation[215]. The following day he dilated to Russell,
+privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the bounds of
+decency even in ordinary social intercourse[216] ..." and in an official
+communication of this same day he records Washington rumours of a
+belligerent despatch read by Seward before the Cabinet, of objections by
+other members, and that Seward's insistence has carried the day[217].
+That Seward was, in fact, still smarting over his reverse is shown by a
+letter, written on this same May 23, to his intimate friend and
+political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had evidently cautioned him against
+precipitate action. Seward wrote, "The European phase is bad. But your
+apprehension that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will you
+consent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have audiences
+and compliments in the Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs'
+[Confederate Secretary of State] emissaries have access to his
+bedroom[218]?"
+
+Two interpretations are possible from this: either that Seward knowing
+himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had not yet
+yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the changes made in his
+Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation seems the more likely, for
+though Seward continued to write for a time "vigorous" despatches to
+Adams, they none of them approached the vigour of even the amended
+despatch. Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and the
+complete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24
+to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to
+Bremen of that date[219]. And on the same day Seward himself told
+Schleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a break
+with England[220]." On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspicious
+that an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was able
+to report a better tone from Seward[221].
+
+British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they
+were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the
+American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in
+comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are very
+unpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and
+uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political
+calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]." He believed
+that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary
+measure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, be
+local"--a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British
+Ministers. Russell was less perturbed. He had previously expressed
+appreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a
+very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223],"
+and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage
+him in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so
+reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man[224]." But at
+Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As a
+result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not
+Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6,
+stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the
+United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means
+impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]."
+This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the
+probability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should be
+conducted. England should strike at once with the largest possible naval
+force and bring the war to an end before the United States could
+prepare. Otherwise, "the spirit, the energy, and the resources of this
+people" would make them difficult to overcome. England, on her part,
+must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and she
+would be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping
+Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter and
+advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to write
+it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he would exert
+every effort and use every method to conciliate America[226].
+
+In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had so
+renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press reception of
+the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. The Northern people,
+counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy on
+anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at the
+moment loudly voicing their vexation. Had Seward not already been turned
+from his foreign war policy he now would have received strong public
+support in it. But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to his
+own advantage in the Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report on
+June 14 that Russell had no intention of holding further interviews with
+the Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington could
+learn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from the
+Secretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. On June
+15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in which
+Seward had positively refused to receive the Queen's Proclamation, but
+had throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill. Lyons so
+reported the conversation[228]. June 15 may, in fact, be taken as the
+date when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war. Possibly he
+found it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy to
+fair weather. June 21, he wrote that the "lull" was still
+continuing[229]. June 24, he at last learned and described at length the
+details of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10[230]. He did not
+know the exact date but he expressed the opinion that "a month or three
+weeks ago" war was very near--a misjudgment, since it should be
+remembered that war seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and that
+on this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumed
+leadership into the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants.
+
+Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge of
+American foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinking
+that an American attack on England was either imminent or intended.
+Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward's prestige and
+Lincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. It was long, indeed,
+before he could escape from suspicion of Seward's purposes, though
+dropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war. A month
+later, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for a
+confidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that there
+never had been any intention of stirring agitation against England.
+Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble "by refusing to take
+official cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerent
+rights of the South," and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell that
+previous strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powers
+understand the intensity of Northern feeling[231].
+
+Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change,
+mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all to
+the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmost
+bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London,
+Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen's
+Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams'
+representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" consisted.
+
+Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons was the receipt of a
+despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had reported
+that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that the knowledge
+in Washington of the result of their previous interviews had brought
+satisfaction, and Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had "learned,
+through another member of the diplomatic corps, that no further
+expression of opinion on the subject in question would be
+necessary[232]." This referred, presumably, to the question of British
+intention, for the future, in relation to the Proclamation of
+Neutrality. Adams wrote: "This led to the most frank and pleasant
+conversation which I have yet had with his lordship.... I added that I
+believed the popular feeling in the United States would subside the
+moment that all the later action on this side was known.... My own
+reception has been all that I could desire. I attach value to this,
+however, only as it indicates the establishment of a policy that will
+keep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In
+reply to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his
+interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view that the
+British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was not
+defensible in international law. There was not now, nor later, any
+yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was intended for
+Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer, much
+as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great Britain:
+
+     "I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I may at
+     any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and
+     profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has
+     prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned
+     remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or
+     measure of recognition of the insurgents by the government of
+     Great Britain. I write in the same spirit now; and I invoke
+     on the part of the British government, as I propose to
+     exercise on my own, the calmness which all counsellors ought
+     to practise in debates which involve the peace and happiness
+     of mankind[233]."
+
+Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform oratory leads
+to the suspicion that the writer is thinking, primarily, of the ultimate
+publication of his despatches. Thus Seward seems to have been laying the
+ground for a denial that he had ever developed a foolish foreign war
+policy. History pins him to that folly. But in another respect the
+interview with Lyons on July 20 and the letter to Adams of the day
+following overthrow for both Seward and for the United States the
+accusations sometimes made that it was the Northern disaster at Bull
+Run, July 21, in the first pitched battle with the South, which made
+more temperate the Northern tone toward foreign powers[234]. It is true
+that the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, but
+internal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before there
+was any news from the battle-field, and the interview with Lyons on the
+20th proves that the military set-back had no influence on Seward's
+friendly expressions. Moreover, these expressions officially made were
+but a delayed voicing of a determination of policy arrived at many weeks
+earlier. The chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapter
+will have shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward's
+leadership, and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone,"
+preceded any news whatever from England, lightening the first
+impressions. The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, even
+know that England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knew
+merely of Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and the
+friendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received in
+Washington until the month following.
+
+In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not deserve the
+place in history usually accorded it as a moment of extreme crisis in
+British-American relations. There was never any danger of war from it,
+for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud. The public excitement in
+America over the Queen's Proclamation was, indeed, intense; but this did
+not alter the Governmental attitude. In England all that the public knew
+was this American irritation and clamour. The London press expressed
+itself a bit more cautiously, for the moment, merely defending the
+necessity of British neutrality[235]. But if regarded from the effect
+upon British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly even
+vital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had been
+gravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely alarmed,
+was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in London the
+suspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years of the war, and
+to British Ministers it seemed that at any moment he might recover
+leadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British attitude toward
+America was affected in two opposite ways; Britain was determined not to
+be bullied, and Russell himself sometimes went to the point of arrogance
+in answer to American complaints; this was an unfortunate result. But
+more fortunate, and _also a result_, was the British Government's
+determination to step warily in the American conflict and to give no
+just cause, unless on due consideration of policy, for a rupture of
+relations with the United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, from
+every angle but a short-lived "brain-storm," served America well in the
+first years of her great crisis.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 197: See _ante_, p. 80.]
+
+[Footnote 198: Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, II, p. 378. Seward to
+Weed, December 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 199: _Ibid._, p. 355. Weed's letter was on the _Trent_ affair,
+but he went out of his way to depict Seward as attempting a bit of
+humour with Newcastle.]
+
+[Footnote 200: Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was educated at the
+University of Berlin, and entered the Danish customs service. In the
+German revolution of 1848 he was a delegate from Schleswig-Holstein to
+the Frankfort Parliament. After the failure of that revolution he
+withdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was sent by that Republic to the United
+States as Minister. By 1860 he had become one of the best known and
+socially popular of the Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimate
+relations with leading Americans both North and South. His reports on
+events preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archives
+of Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor's
+thesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten
+Staaten waehrend des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My facts with
+regard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis, in part from an
+article by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond, April 25,
+1861," printed in the _Annual Report of the American Historical
+Association_ for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies of some of Schleiden's
+despatches are on deposit in the Library of Congress among the papers of
+Carl Schurz. Through the courtesy of Mr. Frederic Bancroft, who
+organized the Schurz papers, I have been permitted to take copies of a
+few Schleiden dispatches relating to the visit to Richmond, an incident
+apparently unknown to history until Dr. Lutz called attention to it.]
+
+[Footnote 201: This is Bancroft's expression. _Seward_, II, p. 118.]
+
+[Footnote 202: Lincoln, _Works_, II, 29.]
+
+[Footnote 203: _Ibid._, p. 30.]
+
+[Footnote 204: For references to this whole matter of Schleiden's visit
+to Richmond see _ante_, p. 116, note 1.]
+
+[Footnote 205: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 82. This, and
+other despatches have been examined at length in the previous chapter in
+relation to the American protest on the Queen's Proclamation of
+Neutrality. In the present chapter they are merely noted again in their
+bearing on Seward's "foreign war policy."]
+
+[Footnote 206: Quoted by Lutz, _Am. Hist. Assn. Rep_. 1915, p. 210.]
+
+[Footnote 207: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 80. This
+despatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W. H. Russell, correspondent
+of the _Times_, who commented that it contained some elements of danger
+to good relations, but it is difficult to see to what he could have had
+objection.--Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 103. ]
+
+[Footnote 208: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 209: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 169.]
+
+[Footnote 210: Yet at this very time Seward was suggesting, May 14, to
+Prussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland a joint naval
+demonstration with America against Japan because of anti-foreign
+demonstrations in that country. This has been interpreted as an attempt
+to tie European powers to the United States in such a way as to hamper
+any friendly inclination they may have entertained toward the
+Confederacy (Treat, _Japan and the United States_, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50.
+Also Dennet, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," in _Am. Hist. Rev_., Vol.
+XXVIII, No. 1. Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as in
+harmony with his determined policy in the Far East.) Like Seward's
+overture, made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention to
+guarantee the independence of San Domingo (F.O., Am., Vol. 763, No. 196,
+Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to me to
+have been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude while in the
+process of developing a really serious policy--the plunging of America
+into a foreign war.]
+
+[Footnote 211: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 88. The exact
+facts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10, though soon known in
+diplomatic circles, were not published until the appearance in 1890 of
+Nicolay and Hay's _Lincoln_, where the text of a portion of the
+original draft, with Lincoln's changes were printed (IV, p. 270). Gideon
+Welles, Secretary of the Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a short
+book in 1874, _Lincoln and Seward_, in which the story was told, but
+without dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it.
+Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and the
+contents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and the
+Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sumner.]
+
+[Footnote 212: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 21.
+Reprint from _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 213: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 206. Confidential.]
+
+[Footnote 214: Russell Papers. This letter has been printed, in part, in
+Newton, _Lyons_, I, 41.]
+
+[Footnote 215: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 216: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 217: F.O., Am., Vol. 764, No. 209, Confidential, Lyons to
+Russell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" from this despatch was printed
+in the British _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States," No. 48. The
+"extract" in question consists of two short paragraphs only, printed,
+without any indication of important elisions, in each of the
+paragraphs. ]
+
+[Footnote 218: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 174. ]
+
+[Footnote 219: Lutz, "Notes." The source of Schleiden's information is
+not given in his despatch. He was intimate with many persons closely in
+touch with events, especially with Sumner, Chairman of the Senate
+Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Blair, a member of
+the Cabinet.]
+
+[Footnote 220: _Ibid._, Schleiden to Republic of Bremen, May 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 221: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 179, sets the date as June 8
+when Seward's instructions for England and France show that he had
+"recovered his balance." This is correct for the change in tone of
+despatches, but the acceptance of Lincoln's policy must have been
+immediate. C.F. Adams places the date for Seward's complete change of
+policy much later, describing his "war mania" as lasting until the
+Northern defeat of Bull Run, July 21. I think this an error, and
+evidence that it is such appears later in the present chapter. See
+Charles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," _Mass.
+Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 222: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 223: Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 224: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, May 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 225: F.O., Am., Vol. 765, No. 253.]
+
+[Footnote 226: _Ibid._, No. 263, Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 227: See _ante_, p. 106.]
+
+[Footnote 228: See _ante_, p. 102. Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181, using
+Seward's description to Adams _(U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p.
+106) of this interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thus
+preventing a joint notification by England and France of their intention
+to act together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as
+"diplomatic skill of the best quality." But in Lyons' report the
+emphasis is placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons felt
+that the knowledge of British-French joint action had been made
+sufficiently clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their common
+though unofficial representation to Seward.]
+
+[Footnote 229: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 230: _Ibid_, To Russell. Lyons' source of information was not
+revealed.]
+
+[Footnote 231: _Ibid._, To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 232: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 110.]
+
+[Footnote 233: _Ibid._, p. 118. To Adams.]
+
+[Footnote 234: C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris." p. 29,
+and so argued by the author throughout this monograph. I think this
+an error.]
+
+[Footnote 235: The _Spectator_, friend of the North, argued, June 15,
+1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next best thing for the
+North to a definite British alliance. Southern privateers could not now
+be obtained from England. And the United States was surely too proud to
+accept direct British aid.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION
+
+If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology there
+accompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with Great
+Britain which was of importance as the first effort of the American
+Secretary of State to bring European nations to a definite support of
+the Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation undertaken by
+Adams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic service he attached
+to it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, to the extent of
+permitting personal chagrin at the ultimate failure of the negotiation
+to distort his usually cool and fair judgment. The matter in question
+was the offer of the United States to accede by a convention to the
+Declaration of Paris of 1856, establishing certain international rules
+for the conduct of maritime warfare.
+
+This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It failed to
+result in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be negligible. Yet it
+was at the time of very great importance in affecting the attitude
+toward each other of Great Britain and the United States, and of the men
+who spoke for their respective countries. The bald facts of the
+negotiation appear with exactness in Moore's _Digest of International
+Law_[236], but without comment as to motives, and, more briefly, in
+Bernard's _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil
+War_[237], at the conclusion of which the author writes, with sarcasm,
+"I refrain from any comment on this negotiation[238]." Nicolay and Hay's
+_Lincoln_, and Rhodes' _United States_, give the matter but passing and
+inadequate treatment. It was reviewed in some detail in the American
+argument before the Geneva court of arbitration in the case of the
+_Alabama_, but was there presented merely as a part of the general
+American complaint of British neutrality. In fact, but three historical
+students, so far as the present writer has been able to discover, have
+examined this negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions as
+to purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of British
+intentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidly
+spreading in America.
+
+These three, each with an established historical reputation, exhibit
+decided differences in interpretation of diplomatic incidents and
+documents. The first careful analysis was presented by Henry Adams, son
+of the American Minister in London during the Civil War, and then acting
+as his private secretary, in his _Historical Essays_, published in 1891;
+the second study is by Bancroft, in his _Life of Seward_, 1900; while
+the third is by Charles Francis Adams (also son of the American
+Minister), who, in his _Life_ of his father, published 1900, gave a
+chapter to the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laid
+down by his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion,
+through further study, that he had earlier been in error and developed a
+very different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward and the Declaration
+of Paris."
+
+[Illustration: C.F. ADAMS (_From a photograph in the United States
+Embassy, London, by kind permission_)]
+
+If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking as they
+do of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise general in
+treatment, the author's answer is that the personality of two of the
+writers mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the effect of the
+negotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in London are
+themselves important historical data; a further answer is the fact
+that the materials now available from the British Foreign Office
+archives throw much new light both on the course of the negotiation and
+on British purposes. It is here planned, therefore, first to review the
+main facts as previously known; second, to summarize the arguments and
+conclusions of the three historians; third, to re-examine the
+negotiation in the light of the new material; and, finally, to express
+an opinion on its conduct and conclusions as an evidence of
+British policy.
+
+In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the chief
+maritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily agreed to
+respect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or the enemy's flag.
+This was a distinct step forward in the practice of maritime warfare,
+the accepted international rules of which had not been formally altered
+since the Napoleonic period. The action of Great Britain was due in
+part, according to a later statement in Parliament by Palmerston, March
+18, 1862, to a fear that unless a greater respect were paid than
+formerly to neutral rights, the Allies would quickly win the ill-will of
+the United States, then the most powerful maritime neutral, and would
+run the danger of forcing that country into belligerent alliance with
+Russia[239]. No doubt there were other reasons, also, for the barbarous
+rules and practices of maritime warfare in earlier times were by now
+regarded as semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly the
+action of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in the
+result was written into international law at the Congress of Paris in
+1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and some
+leading neutrals were gathered.
+
+The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four points:
+
+     "1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished.
+
+     "2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
+     of contraband of war.
+
+     "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
+     are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.
+
+     "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;
+     that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to
+     prevent access to the coast of the enemy[240]."
+
+This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia,
+Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed that a general
+invitation to accede should be extended to all nations, but with the
+proviso "that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shall
+accede thereto, shall not in future enter into any arrangement,
+concerning the application of the law of neutrals in time of war, which
+does not rest altogether upon the four principles embodied in the said
+declaration[241]." In other words it must be accepted in whole, and not
+in part, and the powers acceding pledging themselves not to enter into
+any subsequent treaties or engagements on maritime law which did not
+stipulate observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly all
+the maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to the
+Declaration of Paris.
+
+But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in the
+advance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. Little by
+little her avowed principles of international law as regards neutrals,
+first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in treaty stipulations.
+Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in July, 1856, that the United
+States would accede to the Declaration if a fifth article were added to
+it protecting all private property at sea, when not contraband. This
+covered not only cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect would
+have been to exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy's
+goods under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned.
+Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to battles
+between governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule were adopted
+also, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States could not forgo
+the right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her most
+effective maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had no
+large navy, were essential to her fighting power."
+
+"War on private property," said the Americans, "had been abolished on
+land; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" The American
+proposal met with general support among the smaller maritime nations. It
+was believed that the one great obstacle to the adoption of Marcy's
+amendment lay in the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and that obstacle
+proved insurmountable. Thus the United States refused to accede to the
+Declaration, and there the matter rested until 1861. But on April 17
+Jefferson Davis proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue of
+privateers against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructed
+representatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and expressing the
+hope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, but
+authorizing them to enter into conventions for American adherence to the
+Declaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sent
+to the Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria,
+Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands.
+
+Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his first
+meeting with Russell on May 18, after having developed at length the
+American position relative to the issue of the British Proclamation of
+Neutrality, briefly added that he was directed to offer adherence by
+means of a convention, to the Declaration of Paris. Russell replied that
+Great Britain was willing to negotiate, but "seemed to desire to leave
+the subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he had
+already transmitted authority[242]...." Adams therefore did not press
+the matter, waiting further information and instruction from Washington.
+Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, approached the Government
+of France with a suggestion that the two leading maritime powers should
+propose to the American belligerents adherence to the second and third
+articles of the Declaration of Paris. France had agreed and the date of
+Russell's instruction to Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview with
+Adams. Confusion now arose in both London and Washington as to the place
+where the arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusion
+will be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to note
+that the negotiation was finally undertaken at London.
+
+On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready to enter
+into a convention with the United States, provided a similar convention
+was signed with France at the same time. This convention, as submitted
+by Adams, simply recorded an agreement by the two powers to abide by the
+four points of the Declaration of Paris, using the exact wording of that
+document[243]. Adams' draft had been communicated to Russell on July 13.
+There then followed a delay required by the necessity of securing
+similar action by Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29
+Adams reported to Russell that this had been done and that he was ready
+to sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, was
+ready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on the part
+of Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will not
+invalidate anything already done[244]." It was not until August 8,
+however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to France, reported that
+Dayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign Minister, that he was
+ready to sign the similar convention with France[245]. With no
+understanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, and
+professing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's phrase, just
+quoted[246], Adams waited the expected invitation to an official
+interview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was a condition of
+the negotiation that this should be done simultaneously in London and
+Paris, the further delay that now occurred caused him no misgivings.
+
+On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day "in the
+course of this week," and prefaced this request with the statement that
+he enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he proposed to make in
+writing, upon signing the convention. "You will observe," he wrote,
+"that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of
+the engagement to be taken by Her Majesty." The proposed
+Declaration read:
+
+     "In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day
+     between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland
+     and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares,
+     by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend
+     thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any
+     bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now
+     prevailing in the United States[247]."
+
+Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and simple
+adherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now go on to
+official signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. Sincerely believing,
+as he stated to Russell in a communication of August 23, that the United
+States was "acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a
+permanent doctrine for all time," and with the object of "ameliorating
+the horrors of warfare all over the globe," he objected "to accompany
+the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous," which on the
+face of it seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain that
+the United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in the
+Declaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable policy, but
+with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy
+struggle which is going on at home[248]." He also pointed out that
+Russell's proposed declaration either was or was not a part of the
+convention. If it was a part then the Senate of the United States must
+ratify it as well as the convention itself, and he would have gone
+beyond his instructions in submitting it. If not a part of the
+convention there could be no advantage in making the Declaration since,
+unratified by the Senate, it would have no force. Adams therefore
+declined to proceed further with the matter until he had received new
+instructions from Washington.
+
+To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit exposition of
+his reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her neutrality in the
+American conflict, thereby recognizing the belligerent rights of the
+South. It followed that the South "might by the law of nations arm
+privateers," and that these "must be regarded as the armed vessels of a
+belligerent." But the United States had refused to recognize the status
+of belligerency, and could therefore maintain that privateers issued by
+the Southern States were in fact pirates, and might argue that a
+European Power signing a convention with the United States, embodying
+the principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat the
+privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates." Hence
+Russell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from contradictory
+premises as to the status of the conflict in America, might become
+involved in charges of bad faith and of violation of the convention. He
+had therefore merely intended by his suggested declaration to prevent
+any misconception by the United States.
+
+     "It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government decline
+     to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their
+     part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an
+     adoption of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be
+     construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy
+     dissensions now prevailing in the United States; an
+     interference which would be contrary to Her Majesty's public
+     declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which Her
+     Majesty has deliberately sanctioned[249]."
+
+Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the proposed
+declaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to Adams, in
+London, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar declaration had
+been insisted upon by France, but he did not argue the question save in
+generalities. He told Dayton that the supposed possible "intervention"
+which Great Britain and France seemed to fear they would be called upon
+to make was exactly the action which the United States desired to
+forestall, and he notified Adams that he could not consent since the
+proposed Declaration "would be virtually a new and distinct article
+incorporated into the projected convention[250]." The first formal
+negotiation of the United States during the Civil War, and of the new
+American Minister in London, had come to an inglorious conclusion.
+Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, and
+were even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, not at the
+moment informed save on the American offer and the result, paid little
+attention to these "inner circle" controversies[251].
+
+What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the negotiating
+powers. The first answer in historical writing was that offered by Henry
+Adams[252], in an essay entitled "The Declaration of Paris, 1861," in
+the preparation of which the author studied with care all the diplomatic
+correspondence available in print[253]. His treatment presents Russell
+as engaged in a policy of deception with the view of obtaining an
+ultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of commercial rivalry
+and maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' argument Russell, on May
+9, brought to the attention of France a proposal for a joint request on
+the American belligerents to respect the second and third articles of
+the Declaration of Paris, and received an acquiescent reply. After some
+further exchanges of proposed terms of instructions to the British and
+French Ministers at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch to
+Lyons with instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in his
+first interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] could
+have left the Foreign Office," and replying to Adams' proposal to
+negotiate on the Declaration of Paris as a _whole_--that is to say, on
+all four articles--intimated that instructions had already gone to
+Lyons, with directions to assent to any modification of the article on
+privateering that the United States might desire. Adams understood
+Russell to prefer that the negotiation (for such Adams thought it was to
+be) should take place in Washington, and did not press the matter.
+
+This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since the
+interview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's country
+house nine miles from London, and in all reasonable supposition the
+despatch to Lyons would not have been sent until the Foreign Secretary's
+return to his office; second because Lyons was not instructed to
+_negotiate_ on the Declaration. The interpretation is justified
+therefore that Russell "evaded the offer of the United States
+Government." The result of this evasion was delay, but when Seward
+learned from Lyons that he had no authority to negotiate a convention
+and Adams received renewed instructions to proceed, the latter "kept his
+temper, but the affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shook
+his faith in the straightforwardness of the British Government." In
+renewing his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of the
+previous "misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further
+"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview.
+
+Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit and
+evasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that Lyons, at
+Washington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward the South,
+Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a line of policy
+distinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each point in the
+negotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as follows:
+
+     "The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues ...
+     induced the French Government to violate the pledge in the
+     protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to
+     both belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the
+     United States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of
+     Paris, while it placed both belligerents on the same apparent
+     footing. These steps were taken in haste before Adams could
+     obtain an interview. When Adams by an effort unexpected to
+     Russell obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of
+     Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May
+     21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to
+     the Declaration of Paris,' Russell evaded the offer, saying
+     that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons,
+     although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they
+     been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his
+     notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made
+     such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as
+     coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams.
+     When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell
+     declared that he had never heard of it before, although he
+     had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to
+     him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration,
+     Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure
+     and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams
+     overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written
+     proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent
+     ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but
+     insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a
+     declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be
+     disregarded[254]."
+
+In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points are
+insisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question of
+who first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams'
+conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed by
+Russell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying one
+device after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from the
+written declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference than
+that Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, in
+order to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]." The
+_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been a
+deep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, the
+earlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subject
+to belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was the
+American stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled Great
+Britain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now,
+to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's hands, but if there
+were no such complete adherence and only temporary observation of the
+second article, after the war had resulted in the disruption of the
+United States, thus removing the chief supporter of that article, Great
+Britain would feel free to resume her old-time practice when she engaged
+in war. If Great Britain made a formal treaty with the United States she
+would feel bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stood
+constituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord Malmesbury
+declared, only so long as it was convenient to respect it[256]." Thus
+the second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first on
+privateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the negotiation
+of 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner in which Russell
+received the advances of President Lincoln, no American Minister in
+London could safely act on any other assumption than that the British
+Government meant, at the first convenient opportunity, to revive the
+belligerent pretensions dormant since the War of 1812[257]."
+
+This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly summarized it
+depicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude on the part of Russell
+and Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, selfish British policy, and
+throughout a blind following on by France, yielding to Russell's
+leadership. The American proposal is regarded merely as a simple and
+sincere offer to join in supporting an improved international practice
+in war-times. But when Frederic Bancroft, the biographer of Seward,
+examined the negotiation he was compelled to ask himself whether this
+was all, indeed, that the American Secretary of State had in view.
+Bancroft's analysis may be stated more briefly[258].
+
+Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April 24,
+nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southern
+belligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to remove all
+excuse for such action." In despatches to Dayton, Seward asserted a
+twofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with other progressive
+nations in the melioration of the rigours of maritime war," and "to
+remove every cause that any foreign Power could have for the recognition
+of the insurgents as a belligerent Power[259]." This last result was not
+so clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the mechanism of operation ever
+openly stated by Seward. But he did write, later, that the proposal of
+accession to the Declaration of Paris was tendered "as the act of this
+Federal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal
+citizens." "It did not," writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecy
+to tell what would result in case the offer of accession on the part of
+the United States should be accepted[260]."
+
+Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position where
+they, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard Southern
+privateers as pirates, and treat them as such. This was a conceivable
+result of the negotiation before European recognition of Southern
+belligerency, but even after that recognition and after Dayton had
+pointed out the impossibility of such a result, Seward pressed for the
+treaty and instructed Dayton not to raise the question with France. He
+still had in mind this main object. "If Seward," says Bancroft, "had not
+intended to use the adherence of the United States to the declaration as
+a lever to force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates,
+or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily and
+unofficially have removed all such suspicions[261]." In an interview
+with Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of the treaty,
+arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could be determined
+afterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave warning to Russell.
+"Probably it was this advice that caused Russell to insist on the
+explanatory declaration[262]."
+
+It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the acuteness of
+Russell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into a trap." Nor
+could his claim "that there was no difference between a nation entirely
+at peace and one in circumstances like those of the United States at
+this time" be taken seriously. "He was furnishing his opponent with
+evidences of his lack of candour." This clouded the effect that would
+have followed "a wise and generous policy toward neutrals, which had
+doubtless been in Seward's mind from the beginning[263]." In the end he
+concluded the negotiation gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge of
+American respect for the second and third articles of the Declaration of
+Paris--exactly that which Lyons had originally been instructed by
+Russell to secure.
+
+     "We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag,
+     according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods
+     not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not
+     contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found
+     under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be
+     committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our
+     citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or
+     property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective,
+     must be respected[264]."
+
+Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part the
+result of humanitarian motives and in part as having a concealed purpose
+of Northern advantage. This last he calls a "trap." And it is to be
+noted that in Seward's final pledge to Adams the phrase "those of any of
+our citizens" reserves, for the North, since the negotiation had failed,
+the right to issue privateers on her own account. But Russell also, says
+Bancroft, was not "altogether artless and frank." He had in view a
+British commercial advantage during the war, since if the United States
+respected the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, and
+"if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships and
+goods of citizens of the North, all the better for other commercial
+nations; for it would soon cause the commerce of the United States to be
+carried on under foreign flags, especially the British and French[265]."
+Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed to both parties in the
+negotiation, and that of Seward is treated as conceived at the moment
+when a policy of seeking European friendship was dominant at Washington,
+but with the hope of securing at least negative European support.
+Seward's persistence after European recognition of Southern belligerency
+is regarded as a characteristic obstinacy without a clear view of
+possible resulting dangerous complications.
+
+This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of State and
+it does not completely satisfy the third historian to examine the
+incident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of British policy.
+Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, writing in 1899,
+followed in the main the view of his brother, Henry Adams. But in 1912
+he reviewed the negotiation at great length with different
+conclusions[266]. His thesis is that the Declaration of Paris
+negotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war policy," in
+that in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and France and then
+those Powers refused to aid in the suppression of Southern privateering,
+or at least permitted them access to British and French ports, a good
+ground of complaint leading to war would be established. _This_ was the
+ultimate ulterior purpose in Seward's mind; the negotiation was but a
+method of fixing a quarrel on some foreign Power in case the United
+States should seek, as Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at home
+by a foreign war.
+
+In the details of the negotiation C.F. Adams agrees with Bancroft, but
+with this new interpretation. The opening misunderstanding he ascribed,
+as did Lyons, to the simple fact that Seward "had refused to see the
+despatch" in which Russell's proposals were made[267]. Seward's
+instructions of July 6, after the misunderstanding was made clear to
+him, pushing the negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding a
+very high horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21st
+of the previous May[268]," and this warlike charger he continued to ride
+until the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, put an end to
+his folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory he would have gone
+on with his project. Now, with the end of a period of brain-storm and
+the emergence of sanity in foreign policy, "Secretary Seward in due time
+(September 7) pronounced the proposed reservation [by Russell] quite
+'inadmissible.' And here the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged and
+not altogether creditable diplomatic farce[269]."
+
+Incidentally C.F. Adams examined also British action and intention.
+Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly said that his
+course throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism[270]." And
+Lyons is quoted as having understood, in the end, the real purpose of
+Seward's policy in seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russell
+on December 6 upon the American publication of despatches, accompanying
+the President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after reading
+the papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to the
+effect it would have on the privateering operations of the Southern
+States; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, after
+having accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers as
+pirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground of
+quarrel[271]...." As to Russell, combating Henry Adams' view, it is
+asserted that it was the great good fortune of the United States that
+the British Foreign Secretary, having declared a policy of neutrality,
+was not to be driven from its honest application by irritations, nor
+seduced into a position where the continuation of that policy would be
+difficult.
+
+Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly available
+British materials on the negotiation--materials which will in themselves
+offer sufficient comment on the theories of Henry Adams, and in less
+degree of Bancroft--it is best to note here the fallacy in C.F. Adams'
+main thesis. If the analysis given in the preceding chapter of the
+initiation and duration of Seward's "foreign war policy" is correct,
+then the Declaration of Paris negotiation had no essential relation
+whatever to that policy. The instructions to Adams were sent to eight
+other Ministers. Is it conceivable that Seward desired a war with the
+whole maritime world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberate
+proposal of a foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and in
+fact stamps the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europe
+which Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war did
+not come to a head until the news had been received of England's
+determination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the second
+week of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked the decline,
+not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the President's
+orders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh certainly, Seward had
+yielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to expressions of
+friendship[272]. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's first
+instructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June that the
+"misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were despatched by Seward
+to push the Declaration of Paris negotiations at London and Paris. The
+battle of Bull Run had nothing to do with a new policy. Thus chronology
+forbids the inclusion of this negotiation, either in its inception,
+progress, or conclusion, as an agency intended to make possible, on just
+grounds, a foreign war.
+
+A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and in
+archives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the Declaration of
+Paris. Recalling the facts of the American situation known in London it
+will be remembered that on May 1 the British Government and Parliament
+became aware that a civil war was inevitable and that the South planned
+to issue privateers. On that day Russell asked the Admiralty to
+reinforce the British fleet in West Indian waters that British commerce
+might be adequately protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced in
+the Commons that Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that a
+policy of close harmony with France was being matured; and on this day
+he proposed through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France each
+ask _both_ the contending parties in America to abide by the second and
+third articles of the Declaration of Paris[273]. If there was ulterior
+motive here it does not appear in any despatch either then or later,
+passing between any of the British diplomats concerned--Russell, Cowley,
+and Lyons. The plain fact was that the United States was not an adherent
+to the Declaration, that the South had announced privateering, and the
+North a blockade, and that the only portions of the Declaration in
+regard to which the belligerents had as yet made no statement were the
+second and third articles.
+
+It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On May 9
+Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's attitude
+toward a British subject serving on a Southern privateer[274]. The next
+day in the Lords there occurred a debate the general burden of which was
+that privateering was in fact piracy, but that under the conditions of
+the American previous stand, it could not be treated as such[275]. Both
+in the Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcoming
+Proclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in both
+debates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent to
+Cowley, on May 11[276]. By that despatch France was asked to send an
+instruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft instruction
+intended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to Cowley, the object
+being to secure from the American belligerents adherence to _all_ the
+articles, privateering included, of the Declaration of Paris[277].
+
+Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original suggestion, it
+met with a prompt check from France. On May 9 Thouvenel had agreed
+heartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the practical advice that the
+best method of approach to the Confederacy would be through the consuls
+in the South[278]. Now, on May 13, Russell was informed that Thouvenel
+feared that England and France would get into serious trouble if the
+North agreed to accede on privateering and the South did not. Cowley
+reported that he had argued with Thouvenel that privateers were pirates
+and ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do more
+than instruct Mercier on the second and third articles[279]. For the
+moment Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. On
+May 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in which he
+mentioned a communication about to be made to the South[280]; and on May
+15 the London _Times_, presumably reflecting governmental decision, in
+commenting on the Proclamation of Neutrality, developed at some length
+the idea that British citizens, if they served on Southern privateers,
+could claim no protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treat
+them as pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had written
+Mercier in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, but
+omitting the part about privateering[281], and on this same day Russell
+sent to Cowley a copy of a _new_ draft of instructions to Lyons,
+seemingly in exact accord with the French idea[282]. On the seventeenth,
+Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to Thouvenel[283]. Finally
+on May 18 the completed instruction was despatched.
+
+It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview with
+Russell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had been
+based on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had no
+knowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams,
+toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority to
+negotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So far
+as he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of an
+agreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in fact
+completed, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on the
+sixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was a
+completed agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instruction
+already given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams'
+conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought.
+The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a status
+of belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been
+wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This required
+consideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again open
+up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and
+permanent renunciation of privateering?
+
+For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May
+18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to
+privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to
+Mercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had already
+transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of the
+only point in issue which the Government of the United States might
+prefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty
+whatever[284]." This clearly referred to privateering. Russell's
+instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in
+reverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by all
+nations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized as
+law, both in Great Britain and in the United States." The second
+article, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the
+history of their independence," had been opposed, formerly, by Great
+Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means to
+adhere to the principle she then adopted." Thus briefly stating his
+confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles,
+Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the
+American crisis.
+
+     "There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that
+     relating to privateering, from which the Government of the
+     United States withheld their assent. Under these
+     circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on
+     this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be
+     borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or
+     other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and
+     abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the
+     most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no
+     question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship
+     bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry
+     on their hostilities according to the established laws of
+     war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any
+     Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for,
+     and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her
+     Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of
+     vessels sailing under such letters of marque.
+
+     "In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a
+     certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new
+     principle.
+
+     "You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]."
+
+What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to him
+were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that
+Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be
+piracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce
+privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln's
+proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an
+object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russell
+could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in
+treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as
+close to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would use
+vigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might be
+interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the
+_facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern
+activities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in the
+proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel's
+criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and
+a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal
+letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was also
+dated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British
+Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction
+"to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled
+Confederate States," and he further explained his purpose and the
+British position:
+
+     "... You will not err in encouraging the Government to which
+     you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which
+     they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in
+     regard to privateering....
+
+     "You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government
+     cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of
+     the Government of the United States if coupled with the
+     condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the
+     Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue
+     letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent
+     operations of vessels holding from them such letters of
+     marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the
+     recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of
+     the law of nations[287]."
+
+Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy
+of neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared by
+Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a
+half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a
+renunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced of
+the wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenel
+might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this
+same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:
+
+     "I have further to state to you, with reference to my
+     despatch of this day that H.M. Govt. were in the first
+     instance inclined to propose to both of the contending
+     parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of
+     Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after
+     communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit
+     our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch.
+
+     "I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M.
+     Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the
+     abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action
+     is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to
+     exercise it[288]."
+
+Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward's
+mind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his
+own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only
+as the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatever
+method seemed most "conciliatory." His first private comment on
+receiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when he
+finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the
+Southern privateering[289]," and in an official confidential despatch of
+the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward
+expected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did the
+matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a
+time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the
+transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in London
+Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June
+6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he
+understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an
+American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; "... it may open the way
+to the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But ... we ought
+not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining
+this desirable object[292]." Evidently, in his opinion, the South would
+not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days
+later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in
+Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States
+that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote
+that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].
+Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection
+to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could
+not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared
+neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American
+Secretary of State.
+
+Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had
+specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed
+would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern
+privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to
+impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to
+Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which
+was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the
+two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that
+joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as
+acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he
+read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent
+by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not
+pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons
+told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some
+intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British
+interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its
+eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were
+doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons
+thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal
+knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the
+negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this
+postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date,
+indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution
+of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the
+Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to
+be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor
+of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate
+Government[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated,
+feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous," but believing they had
+prevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of
+an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions
+and those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify
+Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, that
+such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to
+issue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions
+to make this clear--let alone any "latitude" to deal with
+privateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward
+his personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this was
+not an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the
+"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were being
+sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His only
+subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he
+learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no
+further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in
+case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the
+Declaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no
+circumstances should a convention be signed without a distinct
+declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern
+privateers[301].
+
+The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' report
+of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to
+Adams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that
+Adams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, and
+that he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offer
+to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.
+On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step
+indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior
+motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no
+resulting irritations or complications with the United States. He
+recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the
+Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons
+should act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall was
+now made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritation
+without any adequate result," but if in the meantime Lyons had already
+started negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to the
+end[303]."
+
+Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the
+United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American
+adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the
+convention at once. The warnings received from many sources did not
+dismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue,
+believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.
+Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have
+been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he
+telegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signing
+a Convention with the U.S. Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to
+the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answer
+immediately by telegraph[304]." Cowley replied on the sixteenth that
+Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley in
+a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "very
+cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams," it would be
+better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again
+his fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The same
+objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a
+reply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that
+while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the
+same time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late
+afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for your
+despatches to-morrow," and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308],
+and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by
+Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to
+act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of
+Adams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be
+informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter
+the Proclamation of Neutrality[309].
+
+The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310].
+Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar French
+convention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continued
+French reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for the
+affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous
+promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
+understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be
+attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton
+refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident
+sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion
+that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"
+from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the
+Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint
+Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had
+been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long
+since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this
+negotiation.
+
+But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that
+in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of
+any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of
+British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting
+to secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this
+was by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True he
+probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing
+privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not
+to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of
+belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six
+months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to
+maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he
+returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their
+proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as
+final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed
+it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would
+be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid
+in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument,
+but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the
+recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply
+could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have
+constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the
+existence of a state of war.
+
+In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simple
+and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a
+conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules
+advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both
+personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed
+toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the
+negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far
+as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was
+concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the
+straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry
+was gone[316]."
+
+And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not,
+it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a
+high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British
+neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually
+effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of
+Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly
+attitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the
+moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with
+the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of
+offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration
+of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a
+portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the
+larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United
+States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against
+warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the
+instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by
+Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France,
+and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting
+declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence
+of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if
+obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly
+admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good
+understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated,
+suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality
+could long be maintained[318].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.]
+
+[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.]
+
+[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275.]
+
+[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562.]
+
+[Footnote 241: _Ibid._, p. 563.]
+
+[Footnote 242: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams to
+Seward, May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol
+XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 18.]
+
+[Footnote 244: _Ibid._, No. 25.]
+
+[Footnote 245: _Ibid._, No. 26.]
+
+[Footnote 246: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams to
+Seward, Aug. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV,
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, No. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 249: _Ibid._, No. 32.]
+
+[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581.]
+
+[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early in
+the London press. Thus the _Saturday Review_. June 8, 1861, commenting
+on the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration of
+Paris, stated that this could have no effect on the present war but
+would be welcomed for its application after this war was over.]
+
+[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the Geneva
+Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British
+diplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gain
+the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and
+third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected
+and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be
+deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain." Cited in
+Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280.]
+
+[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279.]
+
+[Footnote 254: _Ibid._, p. 271.]
+
+[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 273.]
+
+[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, p. 277.]
+
+[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without stating
+details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of Henry
+Adams," Private Edition, p. 128.]
+
+[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189.]
+
+[Footnote 260: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 261: _Ibid._, p. 193.]
+
+[Footnote 262: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 263: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 264: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward to
+Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is not
+supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. While
+it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out
+by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 266: C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Mass.
+Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]
+
+[Footnote 267: _Ibid._, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons
+of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward
+had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and
+considered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts of
+Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The
+incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I
+regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily
+a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality.
+Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to
+be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation,
+thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181.)
+I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the
+negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some
+reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused
+a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and
+Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)]
+
+[Footnote 268: _Ibid._, p. 51.]
+
+[Footnote 269: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
+
+[Footnote 270: _Ibid._, p. 60.]
+
+[Footnote 271: _Ibid._, p. 58.]
+
+[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130.]
+
+[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 1. It was
+with reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "If
+any step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feeling
+our way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the men
+who have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, who
+is about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a political
+friend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; but
+still he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take any
+step." (Palmerston MS.)]
+
+[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., Vol. CLXII, p. 1763.]
+
+[Footnote 275: _Ibid._, pp. 1830-34.]
+
+[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentary
+papers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion,
+for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against French
+advice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence in
+seeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declaration
+of Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at which
+Russell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 277: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft.]
+
+[Footnote 278: F.O., France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May
+9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 279: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May
+13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II,
+p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 281: F.O., France, Vol. 1391. No. 733.]
+
+[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 283: _Ibid._, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding document
+are all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendment
+of Russell's plan did not appear.]
+
+[Footnote 284: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward,
+May 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons,
+had been officially received in London on May 10.]
+
+[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 288: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. and the
+Queen."]
+
+[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printed
+in Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42.)]
+
+[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 12. Marked
+"Received," June 17.]
+
+[Footnote 291: F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8,
+1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to act
+extended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, which
+they also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to order
+the French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis.
+Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on this
+planned proposal to the Confederacy.]
+
+[Footnote 292: F.O., France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld.
+Palmerston and the Queen."]
+
+[Footnote 293: In Washington, so different was the point of view, Lyons
+and Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of the
+proposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them their
+passports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward his
+instructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North was
+concerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit and
+representation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June
+15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learned
+the effect of this "joint proposal." F.O., Am., Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons
+to Russell, June 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 10. Russell
+to Grey, June 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state to
+which the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to a
+serious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until results
+were clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi mon
+avis." (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359.)]
+
+[Footnote 296: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 278.]
+
+[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 14. Lyons to
+Russell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30." It was in this interview that
+Lyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of the
+proposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had no
+instructions to sign a convention.]
+
+[Footnote 298: F.O., Am., Vol. 766. No. 284.]
+
+[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 22. Writing
+privately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution"
+in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal,
+rather than official communication of documents to Seward was Mercier's
+idea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but had
+agreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony with
+France. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 303: F.O., Am., Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell was
+writing privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of the
+British position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding,
+"It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates,
+and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless we
+mean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny them
+belligerent rights." C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
+pp. 49-50.]
+
+[Footnote 304: F.O., France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. Russell to
+Cowley, July 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 305: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.]
+
+[Footnote 306: Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July 16 Cowley
+repeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not yet approached
+France. (F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 871.)]
+
+[Footnote 307: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. Palmerston's
+Note to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact language is used in
+the last paragraph of the communication to Adams, November 18, as
+printed in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 19.]
+
+[Footnote 308: F.O., France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell to Cowley, July
+17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th at 4.30 p.m.]
+
+[Footnote 309: _Ibid._, No. 729.]
+
+[Footnote 310: See _ante_ pp. 142-45.]
+
+[Footnote 311: F.O., France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley to Russell, July
+26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 312: It should be noted that during this period Russell
+learned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall of
+instructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at Charleston the
+overtures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved this action
+(_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence
+respecting International Maritime Law." No. 23.)]
+
+[Footnote 313: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley to Russell,
+August 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 314: Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmerston, August 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 315: See C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris,"
+pp. 58 and 74.]
+
+[Footnote 316: Adams, _Life of C.F. Adams_, p. 209.]
+
+[Footnote 317: The Confederate Commissions on August 14, 1861, just
+before the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris negotiation, had
+made vigorous protest against this British order, characterizing it as
+giving a "favour" to the Government at Washington, and thus as lacking
+in neutrality. Quoted by C.F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of
+Paris," p. 31.]
+
+[Footnote 318: A few facts about Southern privateering not directly
+pertinent to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was no
+case during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer
+(i.e., a private vessel operating under government letters of marque)
+from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p.
+38.) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard,
+_Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general
+instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia in
+August, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to the
+United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen at
+the time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the Russian
+Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U.S. would
+equip privateers in case war should break out with England and France.
+Seward replied 'that is a matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon
+remarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted to
+cruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the
+only state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates
+in accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then
+exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about
+it.'" (Schleiden MS.)]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER
+
+The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the preceding
+chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and Ministers as important
+in themselves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon all
+parties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. But
+the public knew nothing of the details of the inconclusive negotiation
+and the Press merely gave a hint now and then of its reported progress
+and ultimate failure. Newspapers continued to report the news from
+America in unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort
+Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both sides
+in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in arms for
+which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for
+75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 additional. The
+regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy by 18,000 men. Naval
+vessels widely scattered over the globe, were instructed to hasten their
+home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an available land force, however
+badly trained and organized, of over 300,000, though these were widely
+scattered from the Potomac in the east to the Missouri in the west.
+
+In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for 100,000
+volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the newly-born
+Confederacy. The seven states already in secession were soon joined,
+between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas, Virginia, North
+Carolina and Tennessee in order, but the border states of Maryland,
+Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly sympathetic with the rest of the
+South, were held to the Union by the "border state policy" of Lincoln,
+the first pronouncement of which asserted that the North had no purpose
+of attacking slavery where it existed, but merely was determined to
+preserve the Union. The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session on
+July 4, heartily approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized an
+army of 500,000, provided for a loan of $200,000,000, sanctioned the
+issue of $50,000,000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both direct
+and by tariffs to meet these expenditures.
+
+In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed determination of
+the South to secede and the uncertainty of the North had led the British
+press to believe that the decision rested wholly with the South. Now the
+North by its preparations was exhibiting an equally fixed determination
+to preserve the Union, and while the British press was sceptical of the
+permanence of this determination, it became, for a short time, until
+editorial policy was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The
+_Economist_ on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatal
+step" rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionate
+desire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so proud,
+but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of population and
+wealth, be the victor, though this could not conceivably result in any
+real reunion, rather in a conquest requiring permanent military
+occupation. Southern leaders were mad: "to rouse by gratuitous insult
+the mettle of a nation three times as numerous and far more than three
+times as powerful, to force them by aggressive steps into a struggle in
+which the sympathy of every free and civilized nation will be with the
+North, seems like the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and hearts
+hardened by the evil cause they defend."
+
+Two weeks later, the _Economist_, while still maintaining the justice of
+the Northern cause, though with lessened vigour, appealed to the common
+sense of the North to refrain from a civil war whose professed object
+was unattainable. "Everyone knows and admits that the secession is an
+accomplished, irrevocable, fact.... Even if the North were sure of an
+easy and complete victory--short, of course, of actual subjugation of
+the South (which no one dreams of)--the war which was to end in such a
+victory would still be, in the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, an
+objectless and unprofitable folly[319]." But by the middle of June the
+American irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudly
+and angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British press
+resentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of British
+attitude. "We _do_ believe the secession of the Slave States to be a
+_fait accompli_--a completed and irreversible transaction. We believe it
+to be impossible now for the North to lure back the South into the Union
+by any compromise, or to compel them back by any force." "If this is an
+offence it cannot be helped[320]."
+
+The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed through the
+same shifts of opinion and expression as the _Economist_; first
+upbraiding the South, next appealing to the North not to wage a useless
+war, finally committing themselves to the theory of an accomplished
+break-up of the Union and berating the North for continuing, through
+pride alone, a bloody conflict doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummer
+attention was diverted from the ethical causes at issue by the
+publication in the _Times_ of Motley's letter analysing the nature of
+the American constitution and defending the legal position of the North
+in its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against the
+general British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness in
+England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our
+downfall, but to accept the fact[321]...."
+
+He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South into
+subjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is written on
+the record of our race. British and American history is made up of
+rebellion and revolution.... There can be nothing plainer, then, than
+the American right of revolution. But, then, it should be called
+revolution." "It is strange that Englishmen should find difficulty in
+understanding that the United States Government is a nation among the
+nations of the earth; a constituted authority, which may be overthrown
+by violence, as may be the fate of any state, whether kingdom or
+republic, but which is false to the people if it does not its best to
+preserve them from the horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood."
+
+Motley denied any _right_ of _peaceful_ secession, and his
+constitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view. But he
+was compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the sense of
+Lincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no purpose of
+emancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that slavery within
+a state was sacred from all interference by the general government, or
+by the free states, or by individuals in those states; and the Chicago
+Convention [which nominated Lincoln] strenuously asserted that
+doctrine." Coming at the moment when the British press and public were
+seeking ground for a shift from earlier pro-Northern expressions of
+sympathy to some justification for the South, it may be doubted whether
+Motley's letter did not do more harm than good to the Northern cause.
+His denial of a Northern anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a,
+professedly, more calm and judicial examination of the claimed
+_Southern right_ of secession, and his legal argument could be met, and
+was met, with equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as to
+the nature of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity of
+Lincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even to
+warnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring into
+consideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial that
+there were any great moral principles at stake in the American conflict.
+
+In the meantime the two sections in America were busily preparing for a
+test of strength, and for that test the British press, reporting
+preparations, waited with interest. It came on July 21 in the first
+battle of Bull Run, when approximately equal forces of raw levies,
+30,000 each, met in the first pitched battle of the war, and where the
+Northern army, after an initial success, ultimately fled in disgraceful
+rout. Before Bull Run the few British papers early taking strong ground
+for the North had pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous as
+inevitably destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The
+_Daily News_ lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of a
+great leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all free
+people a question of upholding the eternal principles of liberty,
+morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be civil war, may
+perhaps without impiety be called 'God's most perfect instrument in
+working out a pure intent[322].'" The disaster to the Northern army, its
+apparent testimony that the North lacked real fighting men, bolstered
+that British opinion which regarded military measures against the South
+as folly--an impression reinforced in the next few months by the long
+pause by the North before undertaking any further great effort in the
+field. The North was not really ready for determined war, indeed, until
+later in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the British
+press upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military weakness.
+
+Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment were
+the letters of W.H. Russell to the _Times_. This famous
+war-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 by
+Delane, editor of the _Times_, his first letter, written on March 29,
+appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through the South, was
+met everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man of his reputation and
+one representing the most important organ of British public opinion,
+returned to the North in late June, and at Washington was given intimate
+interviews by Seward and other leaders. For a time his utterances were
+watched for, in both England and America, with the greatest interest and
+expectancy, as the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest,
+dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of slavery,
+terming apologists of that institution "the miserable sophists who
+expose themselves to the contempt of the world by their paltry theiscles
+on the divine origin and uses of Slavery[323]...." and writing "day
+after day ... the impression of my mind was strengthened that 'States
+Rights' meant protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, and
+free-trade in slave produce with the other world[324]." But at the same
+time he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the South in
+high colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in the North.
+The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he rode out from
+Washington to meet the defeated army, and his description of the routed
+rabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy toward the Capitol, so ridiculed
+Northern fighting spirit as to leave a permanent sting behind it. At
+the same time it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that the
+Northern effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himself
+guarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and France
+think of it?' is the question which is asked over and over again," wrote
+Russell on July 24[325], expatiating on American anxiety and chagrin in
+the face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he recorded in his
+diary the beginnings of the American newspaper storm of personal attack
+because of his description of the battle in the _Times_--an attack which
+before long became the alleged cause of his recall by Delane[326]. In
+fact Russell's letters added nothing in humiliating description to the
+outpourings of the Northern press, itself greedily quoted by
+pro-Southern foreign papers. The impression of Northern military
+incapacity was not confined to Great Britain--it was general throughout
+Europe, and for the remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured to
+assert a Northern success in the war[327].
+
+Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the policy of
+strict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The truth is, the
+North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by professional
+politicians, while the South are fighting for what they consider rightly
+or wrongly vital interests," thus explaining to his own satisfaction why
+a Northern army of brave men had _chosen_ to _run_ away[328], but the
+Government was careful to refrain from any official utterances likely to
+irritate the North. The battle served, in some degree, to bring into the
+open the metropolitan British papers which hitherto professing
+neutrality and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now each
+took a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke of
+Argyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear of
+British interference[329], and to Gladstone (evidently controverting the
+latter's opinion) that slavery was and would continue to be an object in
+the war[330], but the press, certainly, was not united either as to
+future British policy or on basic causes and objects of the war. The
+_Economist_ believed that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, if
+coming soon, would "so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Union
+that the contest will be abandoned on the instant.... Some day, with
+scarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has been
+agreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been signed[331]." John
+Bright's paper, the _Morning Star_, argued long and feverishly that
+Englishmen must not lose sight of the fact that slavery was an issue,
+and made appeal for expressions, badly needed at the moment, of
+pro-Northern sympathy[332]. To this _John Bull_ retorted:
+
+     "Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery has
+     nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America.... The
+     people of America have erected a political idol. The
+     Northerners have talked and written and boasted so much about
+     their Republic that they have now become perfectly furious to
+     find that their idol can be overthrown, and that the false
+     principles upon which the American Republic is built should
+     be exhibited to the world, that their vaunted democracy
+     should be exposed as a mere bubble or a piece of rotten
+     timber, an abominable and worthless tyranny of the sovereign
+     mob[333]."
+
+Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at issue[334].
+_John Bull_, the "country squire's paper," might venture to voice the
+thought, but more important papers were still cautious in expressing it.
+W.H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is quite obvious, I think,
+that the North will succeed in reducing the South[335]." But Delane
+permitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the _Times_. Darwin is
+good testimony of the all-prevalent British feeling: "I hope to God we
+English are utterly wrong in doubting whether the North can conquer the
+South." "How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquer
+the South; and I never meet a soul, even those who would most wish it,
+who think it possible--that is, to conquer and retain it[336]."
+
+In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned, there
+appeared several books and articles on the American question which gave
+opportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and controversy. A Dr.
+Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of St. John's College,
+Oxford," published a work, _The American Crisis Considered_, chiefly
+declamatory, upholding the right of Southern secession, stating that no
+one "who has the slightest acquaintance with the political action of
+history would term the present movement rebellion." With this the
+_Spectator_ begged leave to differ[337]. The _Saturday Review_
+acknowledged that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipation
+to the front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this view
+as a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe,
+who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of her
+pamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. Under the
+caption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings," the _Saturday Review_
+avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy War" in America. "The North
+does not proclaim abolition and never pretended to fight for
+anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the Sacred
+Symbol of Justice to the Negro; its _cri de guerre_ is not unconditional
+emancipation." "The Governmental course of the British nation ... is not
+yet directed by small novelists and their small talk[338]." Thomas
+Hughes also came in for sarcastic reference in this article, having
+promptly taken up the cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attack
+through the columns of the _Spectator_, reasserting slavery as an issue
+and calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of Americans
+and realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations of mean
+motives," and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A nation engaged in
+a life and death struggle should not be treated in a tone of flippant
+and contemptuous serenity. The British press had chosen "to impute the
+lowest motives, to cull out and exult over all the meanness, and
+bragging, and disorder which the contest has brought out, and while we
+sit on the bank, to make no allowances for those who are struggling in
+the waves[339]."
+
+Besides the _Spectator_, on the Northern side, stood the _Daily News_,
+declaring that the South could not hold out, and adding,
+"The Confederate States may be ten millions, but they _are_
+wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong[340]." The _Daily News_, according
+to its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone in steadfast advocacy of
+the Northern cause[341]. This claim of unique service to the North is
+not borne out by an examination of newspaper files, but is true if only
+metropolitan dailies of large circulation are considered. The
+_Spectator_ was a determined and consistent friend of the North. In its
+issue of September 28 a speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized and
+attacked. The speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union would
+be beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen size
+and strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that the
+final outcome would be not two, but at least four separate nations, and
+stated his belief that the friendly emulation of these nations would
+result for Americans in a rapid advance in art and commerce such as had
+been produced in the old commonwealths of Greece. The _Spectator_
+answered that such a breaking up of America was much more likely to
+result in a situation comparable to that in South America, inquired
+caustically whether Bulwer Lytton had heard that slavery was in
+question, and asserted that his speech presumably represented the
+official view of the Tories, and embodied that of the English governing
+class[342].
+
+In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861 there is
+little on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality is approved
+by all papers and public speakers. But as the months passed without
+further important military engagements attention began to be directed
+toward the economic effects on England of the war in America and to the
+blockade, now beginning to be made effective by the North. The _Saturday
+Review_, though pro-Southern, declared for neutrality, but distinguished
+between strict observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognition
+of the _de facto_ government of the Confederacy "as soon as the Southern
+States had achieved for their independence that amount of security with
+which Great Britain had been satisfied in former cases[343]." But
+another article in the same issue contained a warning against forcibly
+raising the blockade since this must lead to war with the North, and
+that would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. Two weeks later
+appeared a long review of Spence's _American Union_, a work very
+influential in confirming British pro-Southern belief in the
+constitutional right of the South to secede and in the certainty of
+Southern victory. Spence was "likely to succeed with English readers,
+because all his views are taken from a thoroughly English
+standpoint[344]." The week following compliments are showered upon the
+"young professor" Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the Present
+American War," in which he distinguished between recognition of
+belligerency and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the former
+was inevitable and logical. The _Saturday Review_, without direct
+quotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early recognition
+of Southern independence on the ground that it was _a fait accompli_,
+and expressed approval[345].
+
+These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and reputable
+journals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side or the other
+throughout the months from June to December, 1861. All publications had
+much to say of the American struggle and varied in tone from dignified
+criticism to extreme vituperation, this last usually being the resort of
+lesser journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writing
+in a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was a
+characteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined with a
+supercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior nation, gave
+great offence to Americans, whether North or South. But the British
+press was yet united in proclaiming as correct the governmental policy
+of neutrality, and in any event Motley was right in stating "the Press
+is not the Government," adding his opinion that "the present English
+Government has thus far given us no just cause of offence[346]."
+Meanwhile the Government, just at the moment when the Declaration of
+Paris negotiation had reached an inglorious conclusion, especially
+irritating to Earl Russell, was suddenly plunged into a sharp
+controversy with the United States by an incident growing out of
+Russell's first instructions to Lyons in regard to that negotiation and
+which, though of minor importance in itself, aroused an intensity of
+feeling beyond its merits. This was the recall by Seward of the
+exequatur of the British consul Bunch, at Charleston, South Carolina.
+
+It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on the
+Declaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at Charleston, be
+commissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance of the binding force
+of the second and third articles, but that Lyons and Mercier, fearing
+Seward's irritation, had hesitated to proceed in the matter. Later
+Russell had recalled his instructions, but before this recall could
+reach Lyons the latter had decided to act[347]. On July 5 Lyons gave
+explicit directions to Bunch not to approach the Confederate Government
+directly, but to go to Governor Pickens of South Carolina and explain
+the matter to him verbally, adding "you should act with great caution,
+in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the new
+Confederation by Great Britain." Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I am
+authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this
+matter to you," thus after all implying that a real _negotiation_ with
+the South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent similar
+instructions to St. Andre, the French Acting-Consul at Charleston[348].
+Bunch received Lyons' official letter on July 19[349], together with a
+private one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was to put nothing in
+writing, and that he and his French colleagues were to keep the names of
+Lyons and Mercier out of any talk, even, about the matter. Bunch was to
+talk as if his instructions came directly from Russell. Lyons hoped the
+South would be wise enough not to indulge in undue publicity, since if
+"trumpeted" it might elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal from
+France and England." Both the official and the private letter must,
+however, have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all a
+negotiation and that he had been entrusted with it[350].
+
+Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with the
+Southern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his environment,
+become more friendly to it[351]. He now acted with promptness and with
+some evident exultation at the importance given him personally. In
+place of Governor Pickens an experienced diplomat, William Henry
+Trescott, was approached by Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. Andre, was
+then the French agent at Charleston[352]. Trescott went directly to
+President Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not been
+made through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhat
+unwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the Confederate
+Congress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris except for the
+article on privateering[353]. Bunch took great pride in the secrecy
+observed. "I do not see how any clue is given to the way in which the
+Resolutions have been procured.... We made a positive stipulation that
+France and England were not to be alluded to in the event of the
+compliance of the Confederate Govt.[354]," he wrote Lyons on August 16.
+But he failed to take account either of the penetrating power of
+mouth-to-mouth gossip or of the efficacy of Seward's secret agents. On
+this same day, August 16, Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on the
+fourteenth, of one Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage for
+Liverpool carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to the
+British Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. The
+letters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch's
+recent activities and stated that "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy,
+communicated to me also that the first step of recognition was
+taken[355]." The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams to
+Russell with an enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on the
+alleged "negotiation" with the South.
+
+Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as a
+passport, as did the United States. This also was made matter of
+complaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented to
+Russell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the three
+principal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a negotiation
+with the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a passport, not
+countersigned by the Secretary of State as required by the United States
+rules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he had permitted the person
+to whom this passport was issued to carry letters from the enemies of
+the United States to their agents abroad. On these grounds the British
+Government was requested to remove Bunch from his office. On first
+learning of Mure's arrest Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch's
+conduct had been perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be found
+to contain nothing supporting the suspicion of the American
+Government[356]. The language used by Lyons was such as to provide an
+excellent defence in published despatches, and it was later so used. But
+privately neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of the
+correctness of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest on
+August 18, and at once protested that no passport had been given, but
+merely a "Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a British
+Merchant residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he was
+carrying official despatches to the Foreign Office[357]. In fact Mure
+had long since taken out American citizenship papers, and the
+distinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion.
+Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, in
+taking charge of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. Bunch's
+confidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me not to
+forward himself any letters alluding to military or political events,
+excepting letters to or from British officials[358]." This made good
+reading when put in the published Parliamentary Papers. But in reality
+the sending of private letters by messenger also carrying an official
+pouch was no novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that this
+was his practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for the
+merchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I must
+leave it to your Lordship and H.M.'s Government to support me. My own
+despatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so I take the
+responsibility of aiding British interests by sending the mercantile
+letters as well[359]." And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons on Mure's
+arrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could not consider
+him [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer of a bag to Earl
+Russell, by his doing what everyone who left Charleston was doing
+daily[360]...."
+
+Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation with
+Belligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington, writing,
+"I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult
+and delicate, was managed with great tact and good judgment by the two
+Consuls[361]." But this referred merely to the use of Trescott and its
+results, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British Government was, indeed,
+prepared to defend the action of its agents in securing, _indirectly_,
+from the South, an acknowledgment of certain principles of
+international law. Russell did not believe that Lincoln was "foolhardy
+enough to quarrel with England and France," though Hammond (Under
+Secretary of Foreign Affairs) "is persuaded that Seward wishes to pick a
+quarrel[362]." Enquiry was promptly made of France, through Cowley, as
+to her stand in the matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russell
+intimating by an enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), as
+to the initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it was
+Thouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through the
+Consuls[363]. This was an error of memory[364], and Cowley was perturbed
+by Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. The latter
+stated that if a like American demand were made on France "undoubtedly
+he could not give up an Agent who had done no more than execute the
+orders entrusted to him[365]." This looked like harmony, but the
+situation for the two countries was not the same as no demand had been
+made for the recall of Belligny. Cowley was, in reality, anxious and
+suspicious, for Thouvenel, in conversation, attributed Seward's anger to
+Bunch's alleged indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that France
+would not "stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against the
+fact of a communication (not a _negotiation_) having been held with the
+Confederacy[366]. Before the French reply was secured Russell had
+prepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him that the bag
+from Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain "correspondence of
+the enemies of the Government of the United States" as had been
+suspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's explanation of the reason
+for forwarding private letters[367]. In another letter to Adams of the
+same date Russell avowed the Government's responsibility for Bunch's
+action on the Declaration of Paris, and declined to recall him, adding:
+
+     "But when it is stated in a letter from some person not
+     named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern
+     States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs
+     to decline all responsibility for such a statement.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the
+     belligerent character of the Southern States, and they will
+     continue to recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's
+     Government have not recognized and are not prepared to
+     recognize the so-called Confederate States as a separate and
+     independent State[368]."
+
+Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13[369], and merely
+stated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That Russell
+was anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to Lyons instructing
+him if sent away from Washington "to express in the most dignified and
+guarded terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be
+the result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire
+to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon cease,
+and the former friendly relations be restored[370]." Meantime Russell
+was far from satisfied with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform him
+that the "statements made in regard to his proceedings require
+explanation[371]." The failure of Seward to demand Belligny's recall
+worried Russell. He wrote to Palmerston on September 19, "I cannot
+believe that the Americans, having made no demand on the French to
+disavow Belligny, or Baligny, will send away Lyons," and he thought that
+Seward ought to be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive part
+of Bunch's supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sending
+reinforcements to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel about
+Bunch, we may rest on our oars for the winter[372]." There was nothing
+further to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of the British
+refusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at Washington was writing
+in a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract assertions of principles," but
+accustoming the North to the _practice_ of British recognition of
+Southern belligerent rights[373]. Lyons believed that Seward would not
+go further than to withdraw Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious for
+the return of Mercier (long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "our
+position is unluckily not exactly the same with that of France[374]." On
+October 12 Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, as
+usual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter just
+received from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not "unfriendly
+to the United States," and "appeared anxious not to pick a quarrel, yet
+hardly knowing how to retract from his original position." Lyons told
+Seward that it would be "impossible to carry on the Diplomatic
+business ... on the false hypothesis that the United States Government"
+did not _know_ England and France had recognized the belligerent rights
+of the South, and he urged Russell to get from France an open
+acknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated" with
+the Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid this, thus
+seeking to bring pressure on the British Government to adopt his plan
+of an early recognition of Southern independence. Like Cowley, Lyons
+was disturbed at the French evasion of direct support in the Bunch
+affair[375].
+
+Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him by the
+United States was confined to three points; he asserted his disbelief
+that Mure carried any despatches from the _de facto_ government at
+Richmond; he protested that "there was not one single paper in my bag
+which was not entirely and altogether on Her Majesty's service"; and he
+explained the alleged "passport" was not intended as such, but was
+merely "a certificate stating that Mr. Mure was charged by me with
+despatches," but he acknowledged that in the certificate's description
+of Mure as a "British merchant" a possible error had been committed,
+adding, however, that he had supposed anyone would understand, since the
+words "British subject" had not been used, that Mure was in reality a
+naturalized citizen of America[376]. This explanation was received by
+Russell on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, made
+without knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, was
+that if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letters
+carried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I mean
+the distinction between B. merchant and B.S., and the distinction
+between a document requesting that the bearer '_may be permitted to pass
+freely and receive all proper protection and assistance_' and a
+passport[377]." Russell, on receipt of Bunch's explanation was also
+dissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated Lyons' instructions
+against entrusting despatches to persons carrying private
+correspondence, and second, because Bunch "gives no distinct denial" to
+the newspaper stories that he had gossiped about his activities and had
+stated them to be "a first step toward recognition[378]." These
+criticisms were directed entirely to Bunch's conduct subsequent to the
+overture to the South; on the propriety of that act Russell supported
+Bunch with vigour[379]. October 26, Seward read to Lyons the instruction
+to Adams on the revocation of Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken for
+this, reported Lyons, was an evasion of that charge of communicating
+with the South for which Russell had avowed responsibility, and a
+turning to the charge that Bunch was personally unacceptable longer to
+the United States because of his partisanship to the South, as evidenced
+by various acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion that
+Great Britain had taken "a first step to recognition." "Never," wrote
+Lyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation." "No
+one who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to me can
+consider him as in the least degree a partisan of the Southern cause."
+"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent.
+After a short pause I took leave of him courteously, and
+withdrew[380]."
+
+As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American decision
+against Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been relieved that this
+would be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. His despatch just
+cited may be regarded as a suggestion of the proper British refutation
+of charges, but with acceptance of the American decision. Nevertheless
+he wrote gloomily on the same day of future relations with the United
+States[381]. At the same time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action,
+was not disturbed. He thought it still "not off the cards that the
+Southern Confederates may return to the Union.... Our conduct must be
+strictly neutral, and it will be[382]." Upon receipt of Lyons' despatch
+and letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attach
+much importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of Seward to
+feed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the most
+grateful food he can offer[383]." For Russell saw clearly that Great
+Britain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personal
+grounds alleged by Seward. There followed in due course the formal
+notification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned of
+the _Trent_ affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarming
+incident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, for
+while both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentative
+papers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, the
+only point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britain
+that future occasions might arise where, in defence of British
+interests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with the
+Confederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its citizens,
+but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British agent who
+should act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell closed the matter
+by stating that he did "not perceive that any advantage would be
+obtained by the continuance of this correspondence[384]." Bunch was
+expected to leave Charleston as soon as a safe conveyance could be
+provided for him, but this was not immediately forthcoming. In fact he
+remained at Charleston until February, 1863, actively engaged, but
+official papers were signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement over
+the _Trent_, he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official as
+he did from the public horizon[385].
+
+The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so far as the
+alleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had its real
+significance in the effort of Great Britain to make contact with the
+Southern Government--an effort incautiously entered upon, and from which
+an attempt to withdraw had come too late. The result was British
+assertion of a right in case of necessity to make such contact, having
+recognized the South as a belligerent, but a discontinuance of the
+practice, under the American protest[386]. While this controversy was in
+progress the attention of the British Government was directed to a
+proposal urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared to
+have the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, so
+Lyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel expressing
+great concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, due
+to the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informed
+Lyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, complete
+harmony of action between England and France; second, recognition of
+Southern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade;
+fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment,"
+when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a good
+one[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would be
+deterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument over
+this suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but
+thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the
+idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop
+other sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusive
+dependence on the United States. Mercier answered that France was in
+dire need and could not wait and he urged that mere recognition of the
+South would not secure cotton--it was necessary also to break the
+blockade. In comment to Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, but
+thought the fact in itself an argument against accepting Mercier's
+ideas: "The time is far distant when the intervention of England and
+France in the quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion,
+tolerated by the American peoples." The South had not yet "gone far
+enough in establishing its independence to render a recognition of it
+either proper or desirable for European powers," and he stated with
+emphasis that recognition would _not_ end the war unless there was also
+an _alliance_ with the South[388].
+
+In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was being
+directed to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any push from the
+British manufacturing interest, but because of queries addressed to it
+by the French Minister in London. Russell wrote to Palmerston, referring
+to the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree with you that the cotton question
+may become serious at the end of the year," but he added that Lindsay
+had informed him that in any case cotton could not be brought in the
+winter-time from the interior to the Southern ports[389]. In truth any
+serious thought given at this time to the question of cotton appears to
+be the result of the French arguments at London and Washington
+advocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier
+renewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this
+time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons
+insisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any power
+that recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more
+suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage
+of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in
+dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of
+attitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified
+when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward,
+after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward
+said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign
+power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France
+could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He
+acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed
+Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On his
+part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible
+outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel that
+the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and
+"bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to Russell is that
+Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification of
+Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learn
+whether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercier
+replied "no," and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to
+Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--a
+caution with which Lyons was very content[391].
+
+Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at a
+rather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint about
+Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would
+magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before
+Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote to
+Palmerston:
+
+     "There is much good sense in Mercier's observations.
+     But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything,
+     it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England
+     and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting
+     cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents,
+     Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms
+     of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you
+     accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts
+     them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end,
+     and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would
+     be quite ready to hold this language with us.
+
+     "If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it
+     would be the end of the year, or immediately before the
+     meeting of Parliament[392]."
+
+Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat
+carried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly held
+thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Nor
+was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not
+inclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell:
+
+     "As to North America, our best and true policy seems to
+     be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the
+     conflict between North and South.... The only
+     excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening
+     parties if the conflict went on; but in the American
+     case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.
+
+     "I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would
+     not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress
+     created by that want was far more serious than it is likely
+     to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way
+     to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply
+     than usual from other quarters.
+
+     "The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars
+     and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel
+     with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights
+     and those of our fellow countrymen[395]."
+
+In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward,
+outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared
+despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was
+one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we
+consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed
+to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what
+the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]."
+Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none
+the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. Since
+Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point which
+Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs no
+expanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyons
+by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister
+could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and
+Russell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied.
+Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not
+become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share
+in the discussion[397].
+
+Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still
+another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with
+Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of
+national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views
+became very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed with
+more vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyons
+into acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he
+"had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered the
+time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the
+South" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier replied
+that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it
+would be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positive
+exception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written on
+November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred
+an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than
+any other during the Civil War.
+
+The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression of
+Northern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage and
+determination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, a
+favourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed,
+as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatory
+statement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell felt
+that Britain had just escaped a "trap." Two weeks after this Russell
+learned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch's
+recall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six days
+later, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8.
+It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increasing
+uncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also an
+increasing irritation at having to guard their steps with such care in a
+situation where they sincerely believed the only possible outcome was
+the dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when the
+news of the _Trent_ affair was received they had pursued a policy, so
+they believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and were fixed in the
+determination not to permit minor controversies or economic advantage to
+divert them from it.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 319: _Economist_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 320: _Ibid._, June 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 321: J.L. Motley, _The Causes of the American Civil War_.
+Published as a pamphlet. N.Y., 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 322: _Daily News_, July 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 323: Russell, _My Diary, North and South_, p. 159, Boston,
+1863. This work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the
+_Times_, but contains many intimate descriptions not given in the
+newspaper.]
+
+[Footnote 324: _Ibid._, p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 325: The _Times_, August 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 326: Russell, _My Diary_, London, 1863, II, p. 296. This
+edition varies somewhat from that published at Boston and previously
+cited. The _New York Times_ became Russell's most vicious critic,
+labelling him "Bull Run Russell," a name which stuck, and beginning its
+first article on his sins "The terrible epistle has been read with quite
+as much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcely
+exaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on the
+minds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at _Bull's
+Run_ was, what will Russell say?" _Ibid._, p. 297. As to his recall
+Russell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance of
+opinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in sympathy
+and in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be examined later when
+Russell's position as an independent editor in London becomes
+important.]
+
+[Footnote 327: For similar German impressions see G.H. Putnam, _Memories
+of My Youth_, N.Y., 1914, p. 187.]
+
+[Footnote 328: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, p. 48. In the same view Russell
+wrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of Manassas or Bull's Run seems
+to me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the descendants
+of the men of 1776 and indeed of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage."
+(Lyons Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 329: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 31. August 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 330: Gladstone Papers, August 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 331: _Economist_, Aug. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 332: _Morning Star_, Sept. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 333: _John Bull_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 334: To be discussed fully in Chapter XVIII.]
+
+[Footnote 335: Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, _Delane_, II, p. 34.]
+
+[Footnote 336: Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861. Cited in
+_Rhodes_, III, p. 510.]
+
+[Footnote 337: _Spectator_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 338: _Saturday Review_, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 339: _Spectator_, Sept. 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 340: _Daily News_, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1861. The statement
+is in reply to an article in the _Times_ of October 9, arguing that even
+if the South were regarded as in the wrong, they had ten millions, a
+fact that was conclusive.]
+
+[Footnote 341: _The Daily News Jubilee_. By Justin McCarthy and John E.
+Robinson, pp. 69-77.]
+
+[Footnote 342: _Spectator_, Sept. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 343: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 344: _Ibid._, Nov. 16. Spence's book rapidly went through many
+editions, was widely read, and furnished the argument for many a
+pro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon became the intimate friend
+and adviser of Mason, the Confederate envoy to England.]
+
+[Footnote 345: _Ibid._, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference from Bernard's la
+guage is perhaps permissible, but not inevitable.]
+
+[Footnote 346: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 37. To his mother, Oct.
+18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 347: See _ante_, Ch. V.]
+
+[Footnote 348: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law." No. 21 and
+Inclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at Charleston who acted
+with Bunch.]
+
+[Footnote 349: F.O., Am., Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 2,
+1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days were here required to
+transmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached its
+destination in two days. Lyons states that he does not intend to inform
+Mercier of Russell's attempted recall of instructions.]
+
+[Footnote 350: F.O., Am., Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure No. 2. Private.
+Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to Lyons, also used the
+word "negotiation."]
+
+[Footnote 351: When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch had thought this
+indicated a "low morality" and that Southern privateers would be in
+reality pirates. F.O., Am., Vol. 763. Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch to
+Russell, April 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 352: Bancroft's account, _Seward_, II, pp. 197-203, states
+that Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's account privately was
+that he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally unfit to be intrusted with
+anything in which judgment and discretion are at all necessary." (Lyons
+Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 16, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 353: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 198.]
+
+[Footnote 354: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 355: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 4. Adams to
+Russell, Sept. 3, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 356: _Ibid._, No. 2. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 357: Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18, 1861. Copy in
+Lyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 358: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 7. Lyons to
+Russell, Aug. 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 359: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 360: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15.
+Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 361: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting International
+Maritime Law." No. 39. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 362: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 6, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 363: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 6. Russell
+to Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 364: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. 17,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 365: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 10. Cowley to
+Russell, Sept. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 366: F.O., France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley to Russell,
+Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept.
+10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 367: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 9. Russell
+to Adams, Sept. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 368: _Ibid._, No. 8. Two days later, September 11, Russell
+wrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant of Seward's intentions, and
+that the Queen wished a modification of the "phrase about not being
+prepared to recognize," but that he was against any change.
+Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 369: _Ibid._, No. 12. Adams to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 370: Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited in Newton,
+_Lyons_, I, p. 52.)]
+
+[Footnote 371: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 11. Russell
+to Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 372: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 373: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. _Private_. Sept. 24,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 374: _Ibid._, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts about Belligny were,
+as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before Bunch's activities became
+known, the French Consul had been recalled and replaced by another man,
+St. Andre. It will have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier sent
+their instructions to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier was
+addressed to St. Andre. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thus
+there was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft
+(_Seward_, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward "thought
+it important not to give them (England and France) a common grievance."]
+
+[Footnote 375: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 376: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 15.
+Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 377: Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and Confidential, Lyons to
+Bunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in this letter that Mure had
+been set free.]
+
+[Footnote 378: F.O., Am., Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to Lyons. Draft.
+Oct. 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 379: The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were not printed in
+the _Parliamentary Papers_. Bunch did later deny specifically that he
+had told anyone of his activities. _(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_,
+Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No.
+22. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 380: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 17. Lyons
+to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting unindicated
+elisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating them in brackets
+the sentences run: first:--
+
+"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges brought
+against Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed proceeding being
+deemed advisable with a view to gratify the American Public, Mr. Bunch
+has merely been selected as a safer object of attack than the British or
+French Government.] I can not help saying that never were more serious
+charges, etc.," and second:--
+
+"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. [I
+allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me to be apparent
+in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward's
+character, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say would
+make so much impression upon him as my maintaining an absolute silence.]
+After a short pause, etc." (F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to
+Russell, Oct. 28, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 381: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 382: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 383: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861. He
+added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of the
+bully and coward."]
+
+[Footnote 384: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 26. Russell
+to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 385: Bonham, _British Consuls in the Confederacy_, p. 45.
+Columbia University, _Studies in History, Economics and Public Law_,
+XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons
+thought. Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privately
+at Charleston. (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. Lyons
+to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the
+United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious
+circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister
+resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United
+States and Colombia." (Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, V, p. 22.)]
+
+[Footnote 386: Bancroft, _Seward, II_, p. 203, says that if Great
+Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that British representatives
+were careful to preserve perfect secrecy." I have found no evidence of
+any similar communication with the South.]
+
+[Footnote 387: As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier as
+urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governments
+authority to recognize the South whenever they thought "the right time"
+had come. Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that
+the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him
+in his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea,
+and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England and France
+had acted. Russia could then also recognize the South without offending
+the North. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., April 2-14, 1861.
+No. 863.)]
+
+[Footnote 388: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 389: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1861. On
+Oct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the winter and
+spring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we shall attain a
+great object." (Lyons Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 390: F.O., America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 21,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 391: _Ibid._, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to Russell.
+Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 392: Walpole, _Russell_, II, 344.]
+
+[Footnote 393: See _ante_, p. 194.]
+
+[Footnote 394: "The Americans certainly seem inclined to pick a quarrel
+with us; but I doubt their going far enough even to oblige us to
+recognize the Southern States. A step further would enable us to open
+the Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity."
+(Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 245. Granville to Clarendon. No exact date is
+given but the context shows it to have been in October, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 395: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 218-19. On October 30, Russell
+wrote to Gladstone expressing himself as worried about cotton but
+stating that the North was about to try to take New Orleans and thus
+release cotton. (Gladstone Papers).]
+
+[Footnote 396: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 219. Bancroft cites also a
+letter from Seward to his wife showing that he appreciated thoroughly
+the probability of a foreign war if France should press on in the
+line taken.]
+
+[Footnote 397: F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 623. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Nov. 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 398: _Ibid._, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 8,
+1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that suspicion of France
+indicated by Cowley, and for both men these suspicions date from the
+moment when France seemed lukewarm in support of England in the matter
+of Bunch.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+THE "TRENT"
+
+The _Trent_ affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax of American
+arrogance[399]. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at the outbreak of
+the Civil War had accomplished little, and after seven months of waiting
+for a more favourable turn in foreign relations, President Davis
+determined to replace them by two "Special Commissioners of the
+Confederate States of America." These were James M. Mason of Virginia,
+for Great Britain, and John Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Their
+appointment indicated that the South had at last awakened to the need of
+a serious foreign policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by the
+Southern press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North,
+almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to secure
+recognition abroad were tantamount to the actual accomplishment of
+their object.
+
+Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at Charleston on the
+night of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate steamer _Theodora_[400],
+and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, on the fourteenth, thence
+proceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, Cuba, and from that point
+journeyed overland to Havana, arriving October 22. In the party there
+were, besides the two envoys, their secretaries, McFarland and Eustis,
+and the family of Slidell. On November 7 they sailed for the Danish
+island of St. Thomas, expecting thence to take a British steamer for
+Southampton. The vessel on which they left Havana was the British
+contract mail-packet _Trent_, whose captain had full knowledge of the
+diplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 the
+_Trent_ was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United States sloop of
+war, _San Jacinto_, Captain Wilkes commanding, by a shot across the
+bows, and a boarding party took from the _Trent_ Mason and Slidell with
+their secretaries, transferred them to the _San Jacinto_, and proceeded
+to an American port. Protest was made both by the captain of the _Trent_
+and by Commander Williams, R.N., admiralty agent in charge of mails on
+board the ship[401]. The two envoys also declared that they would yield
+only to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid upon shoulders
+and coat collars, and, accepting this as the application of _force_,
+they were transferred to the _San Jacinto's_ boats. The scene on the
+_Trent_, as described by all parties, both then and later, partakes of
+the nature of comic opera, yet was serious enough to the participants.
+In fact, the envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the conviction
+that the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the early
+realization of the object of their journey--recognition of the South,
+at least by Great Britain[402]. Once on board the _San Jacinto_ they
+were treated more like guests on a private yacht, having "seats at the
+captain's table," than as enemy prisoners on an American war-ship.
+
+Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even without any
+recent official information from Washington. He was returning from a
+cruise off the African coast, and had reached St. Thomas on October 10.
+A few days later, when off the south coat of Cuba, he had learned of the
+Confederate appointment of Mason and Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth,
+in Havana harbour, he heard that the Commissioners were to sail on the
+_Trent_. At once he conceived the idea of intercepting the _Trent_,
+exercising the right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of the
+alleged objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. The
+result was that quite without authority from the United States Navy
+Department, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge was
+addressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas," certain to be accepted
+by that nation as an insult to national prestige and national pride not
+quietly to be suffered.
+
+The _San Jacinto_ reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of November 15.
+The next day the news was known, but since it was Saturday, few papers
+contained more than brief and inaccurate accounts and, there being then
+few Sunday papers, it was not until Monday, the eighteenth, that there
+broke out a widespread rejoicing and glorification in the Northern
+press[403]. America, for a few days, passed through a spasm of
+exultation hard to understand, even by those who felt it, once the first
+emotion had subsided. This had various causes, but among them is evident
+a quite childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason and
+Slidell. Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics of
+the previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressed
+antipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been a
+leader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was a
+United States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by birth,
+but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in business there,
+and had for nearly twenty years been the political "boss" of one faction
+of the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in the State. With much
+previous experience in diplomacy, especially that requiring intrigue and
+indirect methods (as in the preliminaries of the Mexican War), and
+having held his seat in the United States Senate until the withdrawal of
+Louisiana from the Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and more
+detested, but both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on the
+personal side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing[404].
+
+Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until the news
+of the capture was received no portion of the public had given serious
+thought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise also played its part
+when the affair became known in England, though in official circles
+there had been some warning. It had already been reported in the British
+press that Mason and Slidell had run the blockade at Charleston, were in
+Cuba, and were about to set sail for England on the Confederate steamer
+_Nashville_, but the British Government, considering that the envoys
+might perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer for
+Southampton, became much concerned over a possible American interference
+with that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to the
+Advocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to the
+presence at Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking whether
+this vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be entitled to
+interfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with beyond the territorial
+limits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond three miles from the
+British Coast."
+
+[Illustration: _Photo: Handy, Washington_ JAMES M. MASON]
+
+     "Whether for instance she might cause the West India Mail
+     Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers,
+     open the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine
+     the luggage of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason
+     and Slidell in person, or seize their Credentials and
+     Instructions and Despatches, or even put a Prize Crew on
+     board the West India Steamer and carry her off to a Port of
+     the United States; in other words what would be the right of
+     the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers and crew
+     and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet on
+     the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and
+     confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches;
+     would the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and
+     everything in her back to America or would she be obliged to
+     land in this Country or in some near port all the people and
+     all the unseizable goods[405]?"
+
+Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an immediate
+reply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in Southampton on
+November 12. The opinion of the law officer consulted is best given in
+Palmerston's own words in a letter to Delane, Editor of the _Times_:
+
+     "_94 Piccadilly,
+     November 11, 1861_.
+
+     "MY DEAR DELANE,
+
+     "It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr.
+     Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of
+     Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider
+     what we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no
+     doubt, to search the West Indian packet supposed to be
+     bringing hither the two Southern envoys; and, much to my
+     regret, it appeared that, according to the principles of
+     international law laid down in our courts by Lord Stowell,
+     and practised and enforced by us, a belligerent has a right
+     to stop and search any neutral not being a ship of war, and
+     being found on the high seas and being suspected of carrying
+     enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American
+     cruiser might, by our own principles of international law,
+     stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern
+     men and their despatches and credentials were found on board,
+     either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back
+     to New York for trial. Such being the opinion of our men
+     learned in the law, we have determined to do no more than to
+     order the _Phaeton_ frigate to drop down to Yarmouth Roads
+     and watch the proceedings of the American within our
+     three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, and to prevent
+     her from exercising within that limit those rights which we
+     cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit.
+
+     "In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk
+     this morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and
+     finding it blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the
+     night within Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the
+     Southampton river.
+
+     "I mention these things for your private information.
+
+     Yours sincerely,
+
+     PALMERSTON[406]."
+
+Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to Delane, and
+sincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a difficult
+situation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to Adams on the
+next day, November 12, and asking for an interview. His note took Adams
+by surprise, but he promptly waited upon Palmerston, and was told of the
+latter's disturbance at the presence of the American ship _James Adger_,
+Captain Marchand commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the alleged
+purpose of stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting the
+journey of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not pretend
+to judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right to stop a
+foreign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated," and he urged on
+Adams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither did the object
+to be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it was surely of no
+consequence whether one or two more men were added to the two or three
+who had already been so long here. They would scarcely make a difference
+in the action of the Government after once having made up its
+mind[407]."
+
+The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the same day,
+November 12, was reassuring:
+
+     "MY DEAR DELANE,
+
+     "I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the
+     American paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the _Nashville_
+     if found in these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under
+     a foreign flag. He said he had seen the commander, and had
+     advised him to go straight home; and he believed the steamer
+     to be now on her way back to the United States. This is a
+     very satisfactory explanation.
+
+     Yours sincerely,
+
+     PALMERSTON[408]."
+
+In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded quite
+the same statement as that here attributed to him by Palmerston, and
+this became later, but fortunately after the question of the _Trent_ had
+passed off the stage, a matter of minor dispute. Adams' own statement
+was that he had told Palmerston the _James Adger_ was seeking to
+intercept the _Nashville_ and "had no instruction" to interfere with a
+British Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already had
+instructions "not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag[409]."
+But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had been
+warned by its legal advisers that if that which actually happened in the
+case of the _Trent_ should occur, English practice, if followed, would
+compel acquiescence in it[410]. This is not to say that a first legal
+advice thus given on a problematical case necessarily bound the
+Government to a fixed line of action, but that the opinion of the
+Government was one of "no help for it" if the case should actually arise
+is shown by the instructions to Lyons and by his reaction. On November
+16, Hammond wrote to Lyons stating the opinion of the Law Officers that
+"we could do nothing to save the Packet being interfered with outside
+our three miles; so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him that
+the American [the _James Adger_] had no instructions to meddle with any
+ship under English colours ... that her orders were not to endeavour to
+take Mason and Slidell out of any ship under foreign colours[411]." On
+receipt of this letter subsequent to the actual seizure of the envoys,
+Lyons hardly knew what to expect. He reported Hammond's account to
+Admiral Milne, writing that the legal opinion was that "Nothing could be
+done to save the Packet's being interfered with outside of the Marine
+league from the British Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed that
+the Law Officers decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out of
+the Packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's being
+interfered with," thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinion
+which was to come _after_ the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so uncertain as
+to what his instructions would be that he thought he "ought to maintain
+the greatest reserve here on the matter of the _Trent_[412]."
+
+This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complication
+occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before that
+fact was known in London. "Adams," wrote Russell, "says it was all a
+false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggerated
+notions[413]." But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that the
+North, especially Seward, was so eager for continued British
+neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes' action
+was received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it a
+continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a direct
+affront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, was
+stirred at first to keen resentment, writing "of this wretched piece of
+American folly.... I am all against submitting to any clean breach of
+International Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414]." The
+Law Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon
+the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sending
+the _Trent_ as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415]." This
+was still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could not
+be considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the _Trent_
+as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was
+to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would have
+prohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port for
+trial by a prize court.
+
+But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon
+the United States. The case was one for a quick demand of prompt
+reparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was
+couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an
+unfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a
+breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without
+orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an
+apology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to
+propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British
+position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy
+of it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russell
+authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward,
+if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether
+"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied
+with[418]." And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons
+instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from
+anything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Government
+hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began
+preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated
+munitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but faint
+hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be
+avoided[420].
+
+It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost
+immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was
+softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point
+being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was
+unauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to the
+receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he
+stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict
+silence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the
+realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could
+divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands
+over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in
+America this was a far-fetched notion. The efforts promptly made by the
+Confederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showed
+how little Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained very
+quiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain
+intended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and
+30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but received
+in reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them
+"in the present state of affairs[425]."
+
+The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportation
+before even the first American reaction to the British demand could be
+received in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a more
+careful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really felt
+and desired. Gladstone wrote: "It is a very sad and heart-sickening
+business, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426]."
+Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone
+of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on
+technical grounds of international law. "War with America is such a
+calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not only
+ourselves, but all our North American colonies[427]." But war seemed to
+both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by Cornewall
+Lewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in a
+position midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429]. Yet Russell,
+with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's policy, as also
+believing that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was less
+pessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediate
+hostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense.
+On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston: "I incline more and more to the
+opinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive
+answer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to ask
+compliance.... I do not think the country would approve an immediate
+declaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand of a
+restoration of the prisoners.... Lyons gives a sad account of Canada.
+Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430]." And on December 20
+he wrote, "Adams' language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding
+to us, if our tone is not too peremptory.... If our demands are
+refused, we must, of course, call Parliament together. The sixth
+of February will do. In any other case we must decide according to
+circumstances[431]."
+
+Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America without
+the sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for delay. He was
+reacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought which was
+experienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager British
+"Southerner," in public and in newspaper circles. The first explosion of
+the Press, on receipt of the news of the _Trent_, had been a terrific
+one. The British lion, insulted in its chosen field of supremacy, the
+sea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at first preserving a certain
+slow dignity of motion. Customary "strong leader-writing" became
+vigorous, indeed, in editorial treatment of America and in demand for
+the prompt release of the envoys with suitable apology. The close touch
+of leading papers with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the
+_Times_, by the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28
+there was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with much
+questioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be doubtful.
+But even if old British practice seemed to support Captain Wilkes, the
+present was not to be controlled by a discarded past, and "essential
+differences" were pointed out. This tone of vexed uncertainty changed to
+a note of positive assurance and militant patriotism on November 30 when
+the Government made its demand. The _Times_ up to December 2, thought it
+absolutely certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devoted
+much space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policy
+toward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But on
+December 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American news of
+the arrival of the _San Jacinto_ at Fortress Monroe, and this contained
+a positive statement by Wilkes that he had had no orders. The _Times_
+was sceptical, but printed the news as having an important bearing, if
+true, and, at the same time, printed communications by "Justicia" and
+others advising a "go slowly" policy[432]. Yet all British papers
+indulged in sharp reflections on American insults, displayed keen
+resentment, and demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand.
+
+An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward on
+November 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of feeling as
+has been created by the news of the boarding of [the Trent]. The people
+are frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men out
+of a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot
+resist the impulse if he would." And another American, in Edinburgh,
+wrote to his uncle in New York: "I have never seen so intense a feeling
+of indignation exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and may
+make itself heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinet
+officers[433]." If such were the British temper, it would require
+skilful handling by even a pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Even
+without belligerent newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in
+_Punch's_ cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of
+the water," portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at least
+implied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a general
+hope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement from the
+American General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that he had said the
+action of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at Washington before he
+sailed for Europe, and asserting that no orders were given to seize the
+envoys on board any British or foreign vessel[434]. Nevertheless, Adams,
+for the moment intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose of
+British policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "The
+expression of the past summer might have convinced you that she [Great
+Britain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May she
+drove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a few
+spiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong enough to hold
+her from driving it home. Little do you understand of this fast-anchored
+isle[435]."
+
+There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and sharper tone
+in the British press was the reception of the counter-exultation of the
+American press on learning of the detention and the exercise of "right
+of search" on a British ship. The American public equally went "off its
+head" in its expressions. Writing in 1911, the son of the American
+Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, jun., in 1861, a young
+law-student in Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course of
+the half-century's retrospect ... any occurrence in which the American
+people were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment losing
+possession of their senses, as during the weeks which immediately
+followed the seizure of Mason and Slidell[436]." There were evident two
+principal causes for this elation. The North with much emotion and high
+courage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of restoring the Union
+and hoping for quick success, had now passed through a wearisome six
+months with no evident progress towards its object. Northern failure had
+developed a deep mortification when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a bold
+naval captain, on his own initiative, appeared to have struck a real
+blow at the South. His action seemed to indicate that the fighting
+forces of the North, if free from the trammels of Washington red tape,
+could, and would, carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slight
+incident to create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a sudden
+lifting from despondency to elation.
+
+But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on American
+minds the notion that the United States had at last given to Great
+Britain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had exercised upon
+a British ship that "right of search" which had been so keenly resented
+by America as to have become almost a _permanent_ cause of a sense of
+injury once received and never to be forgotten. There was no clear
+thinking about this; the obnoxious right of search in times of peace for
+vagrant seamen, the belligerent right exercised by Britain while America
+was a neutral, the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain as
+necessary in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confused
+by the American public (as they are still in many history textbooks to
+this day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a general
+American jubilation that the United States had now revenged herself for
+British offences, in a manner of which Great Britain could not
+consistently complain. These two main reasons for exultation were shared
+by all classes, not merely by the uninformed mob of newspaper readers.
+At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in Boston on November 26, Governor
+Andrews of Massachusetts called Wilkes' action "one of the most
+illustrious services that had made the war memorable," and added "that
+there might be nothing left [in the episode] to crown the exultation of
+the American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of
+the ship that bore the British lion at its head[437]."
+
+All America first applauded the act, then plunged into discussion of its
+legality as doubts began to arise of its defensibility--and wisdom. It
+became a sort of temporarily popular "parlour game" to argue the
+international law of the case and decide that Great Britain could have
+no cause of complaint[438]. Meanwhile at Washington itself there was
+evidenced almost equal excitement and approval--but not, fortunately, by
+the Department responsible for the conduct of foreign relations.
+Secretary of the Navy Welles congratulated Wilkes on his "great public
+service," though criticizing him for not having brought the _Trent_ into
+port for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2,
+thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to give
+him a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence of
+approbation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of national
+responsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, therefore, and
+on the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the Cabinet, like Sumner,
+Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful solution. Thoroughly alarmed
+and despondent, anxious as to the possible fate of Canada[439], he
+advised against any public preparations in Canada for defence, on the
+ground that if the _Trent_ affair did blow over it should not appear
+that we ever thought it an insult which would endanger peace[440]. This
+was very different from the action and attitude of the Government at
+home, as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advising
+like caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, at
+the moment, was also a friendly service to the United States.
+
+The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became known to
+the British press some six days after its own spasm of anger, and three
+days after the Government had despatched its demand for release of the
+prisoners and begun its hurried military preparations. On December 3 the
+_Times_ contained the first summary of American press outpourings. The
+first effect in England was astonishment, followed by renewed and more
+intense evidences of a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, there
+began to appear a note of caution and more sane judgment of the
+situation, though with no lessening of the assertion that Britain had
+suffered an injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy of
+delight seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gave
+pause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright made a
+great speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British precedent for
+Wilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American leadership in democracy,
+and stating his positive conviction that the United States Government
+was as much astonished as was that of Great Britain by the attack on the
+_Trent._[441] To this the _Times_ gave a full column of report on
+December 5 and the day following printed five close-type columns of the
+speech itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling the
+speech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where the
+orator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why Manchester or
+Liverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the _Times_ was
+attempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" Bright as an apostle of
+democracy rather than to fan the flames of irritation over the _Trent_,
+and the prominence given to Bright's speech indicates a greater
+readiness to consider as hopeful an escape from the existing crisis.
+
+After December 3 and up to the ninth, the _Times_ was more caustic about
+America than previously. The impression of its editorials read to-day is
+that more hopeful of a peaceful solution it was more free to snarl. But
+with the issue of December 10 there began a series of leaders and
+communications, though occasionally with a relapse to the former tone,
+distinctly less irritating to Americans, and indicating a real desire
+for peace[442]. Other newspapers either followed the _Times_, or were
+slightly in advance of it in a change to more considerate and peaceful
+expressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw no
+change in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction of the
+"insult and injury thought to be endured," but he recognized in the next
+few days that a slow shift was taking place in the British temper and
+regretted the violence of American utterances. December 12, he wrote to
+his son in America: "It has given us here an indescribably sad feeling
+to witness the exultation in America over an event which bids fair to be
+the final calamity in this contest...." Great Britain "is right in
+principle and only wrong in point of consistency. Our mistake is that we
+are donning ourselves in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worth
+wearing[443]." His secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hateful
+as I am of Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at the
+same time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloody
+set of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable could
+you suppose that England would sit quiet under such an insult. _We_
+should have jumped out of our boots at such a one[444]."
+
+The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope or
+pessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for an
+honourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they trusted
+the observations of Lyons, they might find themselves aiding a slave as
+against a free State. On November 29, Lyons had written a long account
+of the changes taking place in Northern feeling as regards slavery. He
+thought it very probable that the issue of emancipation would soon be
+forced upon Lincoln, and that the American conflict would then take on a
+new and more ideal character[445]. This letter, arriving in the midst of
+uncertainty about the _Trent_ solution, was in line with news published
+in the British papers calling out editorials from them largely in
+disapproval[446]. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If the prisoners
+were not given up, what, he asked, ought England then to do? Would it be
+wise to delay hostilities or to begin them at once?
+
+"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise the
+blockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent the egress
+of numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will be sent against
+our commerce." But then, there was Canada, at present not defensible. He
+had been reading Alison on the War of 1812, and found that then the
+American army of invasion had numbered but 2,500 men. "We may now expect
+40 or 50,000[447]." Two days later he wrote to Gladstone that if America
+would only "let the Commissioners free to go where they pleased," he
+would be satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very glad
+to make a treaty with the U.S., giving up our pretensions of 1812 and
+securing immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels or to
+persons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. This would be
+a triumph to the U.S. in principle while the particular case would be
+decided in our favour[448]."
+
+On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was well-known
+that he had long been a brake upon the wheel of Palmerston's foreign
+policy and, to the initiated, his last effort in this direction--the
+modification of the instruction to Lyons on the _Trent_--was no secret.
+There is no evidence that his death made any change in the British
+position, but it was true, as the American Minister wrote, that "Now
+they [the British public] are beginning to open their eyes to a sense of
+his value. They discover that much of their political quietude has been
+due to the judicious exercise of his influence over the Queen and the
+Court, and they do not conceal their uneasiness as to the future without
+him[449]." The nation was plunged into deep mourning, but not to
+distraction from the American crisis, for on the day when all papers
+were black with mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news of
+the approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a summary
+of Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their astonishment, made
+no mention of the _Trent_ affair. The Congressional approval caused
+"almost a feeling of consternation among ourselves," but Lincoln's
+silence, it was argued, might possibly be taken as a good omen, since it
+might indicate that he had as yet reached no decision[450]. Evidently
+there was more real alarm caused by the applause given Wilkes by one
+branch of the government than by the outpourings of the American press.
+The next day several papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the
+_Times_ gave a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he had
+ignored the issue with Great Britain[451]. On the eighteenth this
+journal also called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to the
+report of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, not
+unmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the increase
+of the army to 700,000 men in less than nine months. The _Times_
+continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance on the _Trent_, but
+devoted most of its energy to combating the suggestions, now being made
+very generally, advocating a recourse to arbitration. This would be
+"weak concession," and less likely to secure redress and peace for the
+future, than an insistence on the original demands.
+
+Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson wrote
+that "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute may after
+all be settled without war[452]." Cornewall Lewis thought the "last mail
+from America is decidedly threatening, not encouraging[453]." But on
+December 19, Adams was at last able to give Russell official assurance
+that Wilkes had acted without authorization. Russell at once informed
+Lyons of this communication and that he had now told Adams the exact
+terms of his two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructed
+Lyons to accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes'
+action was unauthorized--a very important further British modification,
+but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of the
+affair at Washington[454]. Meanwhile a notable change had taken place in
+American public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes affair
+unfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at all[455]," a
+reaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of the
+British demand and the unanimous support given it by the British
+public[456]. On Great Britain the alteration in the American tone
+produced less effect than might have been expected, and this because of
+the persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt,
+would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that he
+had long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was the
+time when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow Weed,
+Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London and
+attempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of the
+_Times_. His communication was printed, but his assertion that Seward's
+unfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle story," were
+misunderstood, did not convince the _Times_, which answered him at
+length[457], and asserted its belief "... that upon his ability to
+involve the United States in a war with England, Mr. Seward has staked
+his official, and, most probably, also his political existence." The
+Duke of Newcastle's report of Seward's remarks, wrote George Peabody
+later, "has strongly influenced the Government in war preparations for
+several months past[458]." Adams himself, though convinced that Seward's
+supposed animosity "was a mistake founded on a bad joke of his to the
+Duke of Newcastle," acknowledged that: "The Duke has, however,
+succeeded in making everybody in authority here believe it[459]." Surely
+no "joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; but
+British Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious reasons,
+as previously related[460].
+
+As time passed without an answer from America, British speculation
+turned to estimates of the probable conditions of a war. These were not
+reassuring since even though postulating a British victory, it appeared
+inevitable that England would not escape without considerable damage
+from the American navy and from privateers. Americans were "a powerful
+and adventurous people, strong in maritime resources, and participating
+in our own national familiarity with the risks and dangers of the
+deep[461]." Englishmen must not think that a war would be fought only on
+the shores of America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashed
+and intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed in
+the _Daily News_ on December 25, 26 and 27, by W. W. Story, an artist
+resident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice Story,
+whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain[462]. By the last
+week of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager to
+find a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to an
+extreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave they
+have themselves created[463]." He greatly regretted the death of the
+Prince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the United
+States instead of repelling them." On December 27, Adams wrote Seward:
+"I think the signs are clear of a considerable degree of reaction." He
+also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European support of
+England in this contention: "Unquestionably the view of all other
+countries is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new
+and large modifications of international law which will hereafter
+materially restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on the
+ocean[464]."
+
+Adams' estimate was correct. Even the _Morning Post_, generally accepted
+as Palmerston's organ[465], and in the _Trent_ crisis the most
+'vigorous' of all metropolitan journals, commented upon the general
+public hope of a peaceful solution, but asked on December 30, "... can a
+Government [the American] elected but a few months since by the popular
+choice, depending exclusively for existence on popular support, afford
+to disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question must,
+we fear, be in the negative...." The _Post_ (thereby Palmerston?) did
+indeed, as later charged, "prolong the excitement," but not with its
+earlier animosity to America. The very fact that the _Post_ was accepted
+as Palmerston's organ justified this attitude for it would have been
+folly for the Government to announce prematurely a result of which there
+was as yet no definite assurance. Yet _within_ the Cabinet there was a
+more hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell of
+December 19 was practically conclusive[466], and Adams himself now
+thought that the prevalent idea was waning of an American plan to
+inflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at least in this case
+nothing of the kind had been intended[467]." Everyone wondered at and
+was vexed with the delay of an answer from America, yet hopefully
+believed that this indicated ultimate yielding. There could be no
+surety until the event. Russell wrote to Palmerston on January 7, "I
+still incline to think Lincoln will submit, but not until the clock is
+59 minutes past 11. If it is war, I fear we must summon Parliament
+forthwith[468]."
+
+The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage of at
+Washington, but not to the full seven days permitted for consideration
+by Russell's November thirtieth instructions to Lyons. These were
+received on December 18, and on the next day Lyons unofficially
+acquainted Seward with their nature[469]. The latter expressed
+gratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" of Lyons and
+asked for two days' time for consideration. On Saturday, December 21,
+therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a formal presentation of demands
+but was met with a statement that the press of other business had
+prevented sufficient consideration and was asked for a further two days'
+postponement until Monday. Hence December 23 became the day from which
+the seven days permitted for consideration and reply dated. In the
+meantime, Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong support
+given by France to the British position.
+
+The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first learning
+of Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic fever and for a
+saner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written to his brother that if
+the prisoners were not given up, "this nation means to make war." To
+this the brother in America replied "this nation doesn't[470]," an
+answer that sums up public determination no matter how loud the talk or
+deep the feeling. Seward understood the change and had now received
+strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in
+Paris[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America must
+yield. Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in
+an impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released _if the
+demand were made_. The comment of those who were "wise after the event"
+was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the
+prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any
+complaint could be received from Great Britain. This leaves out of
+consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration
+already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the
+war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself
+a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all
+probability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in
+the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems
+to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they
+might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to
+notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].
+
+On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great
+Britain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden,
+earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of
+British feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against
+the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be
+made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede
+what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give
+another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your
+country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on
+Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that
+his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's
+discussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the next
+day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his
+associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply in
+the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on
+the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did not
+contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be
+released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great
+Britain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantially
+complied with" that he should remain at his post until he received
+further orders[474].
+
+Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyons
+reported that it was very well received and that the public was calm and
+apparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus the
+preparation for war ... has prevented war." Seward's argument reviewed
+at great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on many
+points of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated the
+past relations of the two nations on "right of search," and finally took
+the ground that Mason and Slidell were contraband of war and justly
+subject to capture, but that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the
+_Trent_, with her passengers, into port for trial by an American prize
+court. Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handed
+over promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, says
+Seward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in argument,
+and contained many contradictions[476], but, he adds, that it was
+intended primarily for the American public and to meet the situation at
+home. Another critic sums up Seward's difficulties: he had to persuade a
+President and a reluctant Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day,
+to reconcile a Congress which had passed resolutions highly commending
+Wilkes, and to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch[477].
+Still more important than ill-founded assertions about the nature of
+contraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the _neutral port_
+destination of the _Trent_, was the likening of Mason and Slidell to
+"ambassadors of independent states." For eight months Seward had
+protested to Europe "that the Confederates were not belligerents, but
+insurgents," and now "his whole argument rested on the fact that they
+were belligerents[478].... But this did not later alter a return to his
+old position nor prevent renewed arguments to induce a recall by
+European states of their proclamations of neutrality.
+
+On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was received in
+London, stating that the envoys would be released and the next day came
+his despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. The envoys themselves
+did not reach England until January 30, and the delay in their voyage
+gave time for an almost complete disappearance of public interest in
+them[479]. January 10, Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain was
+well satisfied with the fact and manner of the American answer, and
+regarded the incident as closed, but that it could not agree with
+portions of Seward's argument and would answer these later. This was
+done on January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is of
+interest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the legal
+advisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutes
+contraband[480]. Possibly the British Government was embarrassed by the
+fact that while France had strongly supported England at Washington,
+Thouvenel had told Cowley "... that the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes,
+whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or
+as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of
+all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had
+ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to
+Seward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially
+as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens
+and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main
+reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was
+the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent
+maritime power.
+
+In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated
+that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they
+were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as
+distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious,
+seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own
+house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after
+listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had
+hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart
+from a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested that
+Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does not
+necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is
+exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners
+before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have
+been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell
+and a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence of
+Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also,
+in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarily
+at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "I
+do not," he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosity
+to this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it was
+beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone"
+which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as
+especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based
+upon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit
+of this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations that
+the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign
+interference. The final decision in the _Trent_ affair, such was the
+situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and that
+decision was, from the first, for peace.
+
+Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America in
+general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed,
+was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred and
+the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up the
+traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect the
+discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and then fight Great
+Britain[486]." Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his "Bigelow
+Papers," wrote, on January 6, 1862:
+
+     "It don't seem hardly right, John,
+     When both my hands was full,
+     To stump me to a fight, John--
+     Your cousin, tu, John Bull!
+          Ole Uncle S., sez he, 'I guess
+     We know it now,' sez he,
+     'The lion's paw is all the law,
+     Accordin' to J.B.,
+     Thet's fit for you an' me[487]!'"
+
+It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and Slidell that
+in the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of the British press
+and the preparations of the Government. Even after their surrender
+America was further incensed by British boasting that America had
+yielded to a threat of war, as in the _Punch_ cartoon of a penitent
+small boy, Uncle Sam, who "says he is very sorry and that he didn't mean
+to do it," and so escapes the birching Britannia was about to
+administer. America had, in all truth, yielded to a threat, but disliked
+being told so, and regarded the threat itself as evidence of British
+ill-will[488]. This was long the attitude of the American public.
+
+In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great national
+sigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulder
+to the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earlier
+careers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than any
+other men," were responsible for the traditional American "insane
+prejudice against England," an assertion for which no facts were offered
+in proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidell
+on American politics before secession. They were "about the most
+worthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of the
+American lion ... So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will not
+give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation." Continuing, the
+_Times_ argued:
+
+     "What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our
+     conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not
+     suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great
+     war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our
+     eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their
+     own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the
+     swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right
+     to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason
+     and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of
+     these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town,
+     and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen
+     to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have
+     to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation."
+
+This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading British
+newspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections save
+the extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "The
+first effect of the surrender ... has been extraordinary. The current
+which ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seems
+to be going with equal fury in our favour[489]." Officially on the same
+day he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in the
+crisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet and
+religious citizens of the middle classes," that if Great Britain did
+engage in war with the United States she would be forced to become the
+ally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]."
+
+Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during the
+period of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer was
+received. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "we
+necessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of the
+South[491]." Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Story
+the British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was with
+the North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery]
+in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one let
+or stop," but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object had
+largely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusable
+though a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr.
+Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]." He
+assured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "I
+have not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay at
+the prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds with
+America[493]." And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purpose
+of the North is also understood at last; ... there is no longer the
+notion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494].'"
+
+A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passed
+resolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation of
+Seward," and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with a
+slave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not
+_publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, is
+certain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touring
+America, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignation
+against Captain Wilkes, wrote:
+
+     "These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our
+     books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image,
+     are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their
+     vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them.
+     They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our
+     greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff
+     of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States
+     would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the
+     world's surface[496]."
+
+The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, be
+regarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions.
+Much more exactly and with more authority as representing that
+thoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of John
+Stuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862,
+making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling about
+the _Trent_:
+
+     "We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity,
+     and something more than an indignity, which, not to have
+     resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of
+     insults and injuries from the same and from every other
+     quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done;
+     yet it is impossible to think, without something like a
+     shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of
+     the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in
+     Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until
+     we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us
+     to prevent the enslaving of the negro ... _we_ should have
+     lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding
+     positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only
+     to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism...."
+
+No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliance
+with the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debate
+upon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lords
+the Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank and
+open apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with having
+yielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" for
+recognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendship
+for America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves better
+informed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speaking
+for the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of the
+Washington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted a
+personal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy,
+"although circumstances may arise which may call for a different
+course." On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like general
+tenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby)
+in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult position
+in which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit for
+the energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position of
+strict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an important
+declaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. In
+substance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government's
+stand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497].
+
+A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February
+17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the military
+contingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generously
+trusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, and
+it is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him
+_in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolition
+of slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter of
+slavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as a
+necessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for American
+consumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showing
+that even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show of
+force to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would long
+be the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedly
+correct in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one." And
+looked at from a distance of time it would seem that a British
+Government, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness,
+which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand for
+reparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill was
+right in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then so
+also were the military preparations.
+
+Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make more
+clear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November,
+1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to be
+weakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the point
+of any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at the
+slow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to
+_think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear to
+Lyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, if
+Schleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reported
+on December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at the
+peaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England will
+be too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence of
+the South as long as possible after this experience[498]." But the
+_Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. It
+brought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least as
+regards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of the
+conviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the British
+public an even greater expression of relief, when the incident was
+closed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section of
+that public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of the
+Cabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support of
+which England could not possibly take a stand.
+
+This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section of
+the public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it did
+indicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and a
+determination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward,
+"I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the
+_Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was rather
+opportune than otherwise[499]." Hotze, the confidential agent of the
+Confederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done us
+incalculable injury," Russell is now "an avowed enemy of our
+nationality[500]." Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declared
+to Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral ... what a fuss
+we have had about these two men[501]."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of more
+contemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of more
+historical writing later, than any other incident of diplomatic
+relations between the United States and Great Britain during the Civil
+War--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account given
+in this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement of
+the facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out by
+hitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of British
+public attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _after
+effect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service to
+list all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in all
+histories, whether British or American and in works devoted to
+international law. The contemporary American view is well stated, though
+from a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T.L., _The Trent
+Affair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its many
+citations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review is
+that of C.F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts Historical
+Society for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R.H. Dana, and
+a rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912.]
+
+[Footnote 400: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 41-2.)]
+
+[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 1. Inclosure. Williams to
+Patey, Nov. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes the
+exact _force_ used.]
+
+[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., XLV, pp. 509-22.)]
+
+[Footnote 404: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, pp. 39-40.)]
+
+[Footnote 405: F.O., America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond to
+Advocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 406: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 54.)]
+
+[Footnote 407: _Ibid._, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 408: _Ibid._, p. 55.]
+
+[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the American
+volume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter with
+Adams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:
+
+"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question that
+Her Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with any
+vessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard to
+vessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean to
+dispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War to
+search them; but that the exercise of that right and the right of
+detention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt with
+according to the circumstances of the case, and that it was not
+necessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not in
+point; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War to
+harass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence of
+preventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contraband
+of War.
+
+"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account which
+Lord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, and
+Mr. Adams agreed in its accuracy.
+
+"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as to
+Lord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state the
+real facts to Mr. Seward." (F.O., Am., Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_.)
+
+This resume by Russell contained still other variations from the
+original reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did not
+think it worth while to call attention to them.]
+
+[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error in
+stating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an American
+war vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port for
+adjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason
+and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue
+her voyage." Certainly Palmerston did not so understand the
+advice given.]
+
+[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O., Private. Nov. 16,
+1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not to
+endeavour, etc.," is in line with Palmerston's understanding of the
+conversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reporting
+Adams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions to
+meddle," which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructions
+not to meddle." Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood.
+He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ at
+Southampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell that
+Palmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "I
+had seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him to
+intercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to do
+so, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British ships
+as might be going to the United States with contraband of war. Lord
+Palmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this last
+particular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactly
+that which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said in
+the instructions about other British ships." (State Dept., Eng., Vol.
+78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861.) Hammond's letter mentions
+also the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had
+"sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet...."]
+
+[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 413: _Ibid._, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 415: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass.
+Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 58.)]
+
+[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much argued
+international law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _in
+extenso_ by Moore.]
+
+[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 418: _Ibid._, No. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 419: _Ibid._, No. 29. Inclosure.]
+
+[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted,
+after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance which
+permitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to Great
+Britain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St.
+Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. When
+permission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly ordered
+that all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting to
+Canada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kind
+without exception or reservation.'" It is true that the American press
+made much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported by
+Lyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application from
+a private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggage
+at Portland." (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862.) Lyons
+was much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to the
+Governor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia
+and New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward's
+permission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops were
+marched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell,
+Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26.]
+
+[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November
+30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint and
+argument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the
+_Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Acts
+of violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched"
+in the "ordinary way," but "certain Passengers" were demanded and taken
+by force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violating
+neutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes.
+(5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship"
+except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court.
+(6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, and
+intended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "It
+is essential for British Interests, that consistently with the
+obligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_
+blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of Her
+Majesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States." These seven
+points were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to the
+British position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of the
+Cabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on more
+mature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F.O., Am., Vol. 758.
+No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 78. Russell to
+Yancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 425: _Ibid._, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec.
+7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec.
+7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 427: _Ibid._, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon,
+Dec. 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 429: _Ibid._, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec.
+17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 431: _Ibid._, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _The
+Trent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous,
+anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examination
+of the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequently
+to communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but one
+side of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fair
+treatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the
+_Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers.
+Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-British
+feeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. The
+British press made exactly similar quotations from the American
+newspapers.]
+
+[Footnote 433: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc. XLV, p. 43, note.) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the London
+Press, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that there
+were but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue and
+cry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and one
+in Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384.)
+This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than the
+picture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm,
+sorrowful, astonished determination."]
+
+[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from Percy
+Doyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements were
+made. (F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure.)]
+
+[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 95.)]
+
+[Footnote 436: _Ibid._, p. 37.]
+
+[Footnote 437: _Ibid._, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19,
+stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with more
+genuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of the
+capture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason.... We have not the slightest idea
+that England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaud
+the gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, and
+such an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defended
+and invariably pursued ... as for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let
+the handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him.
+Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest and
+costliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved such
+a victory." Note the "_Fourth_ of July."]
+
+[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861.
+"Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm and
+proving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H.M.'s mail boat."]
+
+[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightened
+me by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at this
+moment." (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861.)]
+
+[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on international
+law points by "Historicus," answering and belittling American legal
+argument. W.V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributed
+very acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the American
+civil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North.
+Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitators
+are still doing their worst." (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392.) Cobden was
+himself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess I
+have not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers or
+Palmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr.
+Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
+Relations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is a
+very peaceable and safe man." _(ibid._, p. 386, to Lieut.-Col.
+Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861.) It is interesting that Canadian opinion
+regarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will toward
+Britain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce"
+(J.H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the
+_Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was that
+if _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was a
+British, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life of
+Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348.) Yet the author states that
+in the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the
+_Trent_ as did Great Britain.]
+
+[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2.]
+
+[Footnote 444: _Ibid._, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams,
+Jr., Dec. 13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first time
+the _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied to
+emancipation.]
+
+[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. On
+the same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubt
+that we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes.... but I wish
+we had not done them.... It is all terrible and awful, and I hope and
+pray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first natural
+burst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready to
+execrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not taken
+to prevent so fearful a calamity." (Dana, _The Trent Affair.
+(Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 528.))]
+
+[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ]
+
+[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message,
+on December 16 and 17.]
+
+[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon,
+Dec. 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec.
+19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "no
+authorization of Wilkes." Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, since
+this had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The point
+was later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it as
+indicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to an
+English Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston,
+1862.) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston had
+intentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes.
+"Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated to
+Russell_ on the 19th]... virtually settled the matter. To keep alive the
+wicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, was
+like the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it." (Morley,
+_Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan., 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C.F. Adams, _The
+Trent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 107.)]
+
+[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing of
+lesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared,
+in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whose
+commanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders"
+not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presence
+was, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the
+_Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage and
+to give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to Great
+Britain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearer
+recognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly a
+myth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863,
+not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainly
+responsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of Thurlow
+Weed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7.) Reliable historians like Rhodes
+make no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russian
+fleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "The
+Russian Fleet and the Civil War," _Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915.]
+
+[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61.]
+
+[Footnote 458: _Ibid._, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV.]
+
+[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp.
+108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured their
+publication through Dicey.]
+
+[Footnote 463: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26,
+1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc., XLV, p. 109).]
+
+[Footnote 464: _Ibid._, p. 110.]
+
+[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the
+_Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of any
+party or faction.]
+
+[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 467: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan.
+2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reported
+that he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
+_Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 19.
+Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) shows
+that Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on the
+nineteenth.]
+
+[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C.F. Adams, Jr.,
+to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December
+3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th.]
+
+[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wise
+view, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason and
+Slidell, and that he overrode Seward, e.g., Welles, _Lincoln and
+Seward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, and
+Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the general
+contemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy," even in
+Washington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate of
+Bremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhurst
+had been seen by Lincoln.
+
+"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned them
+with the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent on
+war.' At the same time the President has assured my informant that he
+would examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, in
+order that no expression should remain which could create bad blood
+anew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some of
+his former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England"
+(Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At first
+glance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he was
+putting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleiden
+apparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date when
+this was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to accepting
+Seward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparing
+your answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why they
+ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the
+reasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the points
+on each side." Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer to
+Great Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234).]
+
+[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright to
+Sumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are all
+printed in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the
+_Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University.]
+
+[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec.
+27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 475: F.O., Am., Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31,
+1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in the
+Senate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitter
+feeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world ... we ask help of Thee for
+our rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and with
+one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness and
+reproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained by
+the remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment,
+succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers.
+Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862).]
+
+[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53.]
+
+[Footnote 477: C.F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist.
+Soc., XLV. p. 75).]
+
+[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250.]
+
+[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered to
+the British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax the
+ship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her to
+St. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton.]
+
+[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence respecting the _Trent_." Nos. 27 and 35. February 3,
+Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he was
+in possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November
+12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the Law
+Officers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell).]
+
+[Footnote 481: F.O., France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell,
+Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine.]
+
+[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73.]
+
+[Footnote 483: F.O., Am., Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons,
+Feb. 11, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 484: F.O., France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell to
+Cowley, Jan. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec.
+27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John." After the
+release of the envoys there was much correspondence between friends
+across the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attempted
+to explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture on
+receiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this is
+in a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Field
+and Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between Great
+Britain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote,
+"The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes where
+we thought we had friends," p. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc.,
+XLV, pp. 508-22).]
+
+[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 490: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan.
+10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Also
+expressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid._, Jan. 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105.
+Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 493: _Ibid._, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meeting
+at Bromley-by-Bow.]
+
+[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862),
+I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in the
+spring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer,
+and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to the
+North, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause and
+prophesied its victory.]
+
+[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, p. 12 _seq_., though not
+consecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on the
+Address to the Throne.]
+
+[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen.]
+
+[Footnote 499: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward,
+Feb. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+THE BLOCKADE
+
+The six months following the affair of the _Trent_ constituted a period
+of comparative calm in the relations of Great Britain and America, but
+throughout that period there was steadily coming to the front a Northern
+belligerent effort increasingly effective, increasingly a cause for
+disturbance to British trade, and therefore more and more a matter for
+anxious governmental consideration. This was the blockade of Southern
+ports and coast line, which Lincoln had declared _in intention_ in his
+proclamation of April 19, 1861.
+
+As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of the
+relation of British ships and merchants to the secession port of
+Charleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an evasive
+reply[502]. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the possibility of a
+blockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent would at least
+require it to be an effective one, while Lyons made great efforts to
+convince Seward that _any_ interference with British trade would be
+disastrous to the Northern cause in England. He even went so far as to
+hint at British intervention to preserve trade[503]. But on April 15,
+Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade was possible, thought
+that the attempt to institute one was less objectionable than
+legislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports of Entry," in reality a
+mere paper blockade and one which would "justify Great Britain and
+France in recognizing the Southern Confederacy...." Thus he began to
+weaken in opposition to _any_ interference[504]. His earlier expressions
+to Seward were but arguments, without committing his Government to a
+line of policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously.
+
+Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a blockade
+campaign. But when the Civil War actually began and Lincoln, on April
+19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade," and
+that when a "competent force" had been posted "so as to prevent entrance
+and exit of vessels," warning would be given to any vessel attempting to
+enter or to leave a blockaded port, with endorsement on her register of
+such warning, followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass the
+blockade, Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonable
+consideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the Law
+of Nations, I suppose it must be recognized[505]." The Proclamation
+named the original seven seceding states, and on April 27 Virginia was
+added. The blockade was actually begun at certain Virginia ports on
+April 30, and by the end of May there were a few war-ships off all the
+more important Southern harbours[506]. This method of putting a blockade
+into effect by warning at the port rather than by a general notification
+communicated to European governments and setting a date, involved a
+hardship on British merchants since they were thereby made uncertain
+whether goods started for a Southern port would be permitted to enter.
+In practice vessels on their first departure from a blockaded harbour
+were warned and permitted to go out, but those seeking to enter were
+warned and turned back. In _effect_, while the blockade was being
+established, Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for the
+timid British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paper
+blockade. This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutrals
+must acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition,"
+but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet" British
+trade could be carried on[507].
+
+Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long conversation on
+April 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3,000 mile coast line, but
+Seward assured him it would be done and effectively[508]. The British
+press was equally sceptical, and in any case believed that the war would
+be of short duration, so that there need be no anxiety over next year's
+supply of cotton[509]. In Parliament Russell took the stand that the
+blockade, if carried on in accordance with international law and made
+effective, required British recognition and respect. He also defended
+Lincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might seem
+a hardship, but was perfectly legal[510]. Thus there was early and easy
+acquiescence in the American effort, but when, in June, there was
+revived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by legislative action,
+Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous opposition. Lyons learned that
+a Bill would be introduced in Congress giving the President authority,
+among other powers, to "proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifying
+foreign nations not to attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpected
+application of the Northern theory that the South was not a belligerent
+and had no rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paper
+blockade[511].
+
+The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not direct
+the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern ports--it merely
+gave him the power to do so. Almost from the first Lyons thought that
+Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue such a proclamation[512].
+Nevertheless it was his duty to be on guard and to oppose the plan. For
+six weeks there was much communication in regard to the "Southern Ports
+Bill," as all parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with
+Cowley in France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter,
+almost rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the
+small importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the
+reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest.
+Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in official
+remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British
+recognition of Southern belligerency.
+
+Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell
+addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged a
+stiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was seemingly
+indifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest, then drew back
+and on three separate occasions promised support only to withdraw such
+promise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to join in a "friendly hint"
+to America because of the touchy sensibilities lately shown by Seward,
+and feared a direct protest might result in an American declaration of
+war. In any case why not wait until the President _did_ act, and even
+then the proper method would be a protest rather than "reprisals." "I
+wish," wrote Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to be
+more _bumptious_, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all times
+rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them on[513]...."
+Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would not
+observe a "legislative closing" of Southern ports[514]. On July 12 Lyons
+telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, and on the
+sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much disturbed over
+its possible consequences since "even Sumner was for it[515]," as this
+indicated a real intention to carry it into effect[516]. On August 8,
+Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to be
+handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise
+discretion as to communicating the despatch[517].
+
+The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised in
+July, concluded with language that might well draw out Thouvenel's
+objection to a threat of "reprisals." It read that "H.M.G. ...
+reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other Nations in
+opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of Commercial Countries
+and so manifest a violation of International Law[518]." This high tone
+had been modified possibly by French opposition, possibly by Lyons'
+early opinion that the Bill would not be made operative. Indeed on July
+24 Russell told Lyons that no final instruction of protest would be sent
+him until the President actually issued a proclamation[519]. Yet in
+spite of being fairly well assured that there was no danger in the
+"Southern Ports Bill," Russell did send the instruction of August 8,
+still distinctly "vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of
+"reprisals." His reason for doing so is difficult to understand.
+Certainly he was hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiff
+instruction would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of the
+American Cabinet[520], or else he strangely misjudged American
+temperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to print
+a Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was exercising in
+guarding British interests.
+
+Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had voluntarily
+reassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons reported this,
+privately, on July 20[521], but on the same day also reported,
+officially, that two days earlier, that is on the eighteenth, he and
+Mercier had discussed the "Southern Ports" Bill and that as a result
+Mercier had then gone, that same day, to Seward to state that France
+must regard such a measure as merely a paper blockade[522]. "We were not
+very sanguine of success," wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him
+[Mercier] with calmness," and personally seemed disinclined to issue the
+required Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England and
+France were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having a
+difficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the Parliamentary
+Papers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and in spite of the
+reassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally not for printing)
+presumably received in the same mail with the official despatch, it
+furnished the basis of his "strong" instruction of August 8.
+
+At Washington also there were indications of an effort to prepare a good
+case for the British public and Parliament. July 23, so Lyons wrote
+privately, Seward had prevented the issue of the "Southern Ports"
+Proclamation[523], and on the next day he was shown by Seward,
+confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers abroad in
+which was maintained the right to close the ports by proclamation, but
+stating the Government's decision not to exercise the right. Lyons
+believed this was the end of the matter[524]. Yet on August 12, he
+presented himself formally at the Department of State and stated that he
+had instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's Government would
+consider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possession
+of the insurgent or Confederate States as null and void, and that they
+would not submit to measures taken on the high seas in pursuance of such
+decree."... "Mr. Seward thanked me for the consideration I had shown;
+and begged me to confine myself for the present to the verbal
+announcement I had just made. He said it would be difficult for me to
+draw up a written communication which would not have the air of a
+threat." To this Lyons agreed[525].
+
+This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the
+"forthright yet friendly" tone of British diplomats when dealing with
+Seward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, not yet received
+by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet there is a
+possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward had
+asked him to play it. On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged the
+receipt of Russell's communication of July 24, in which it was stated
+that while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the "Southern Ports"
+Bill _no final instructions_ would be sent until Lincoln issued a
+Proclamation. Lyons now explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this
+moment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be
+guided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating your
+decision about the matter[526]." Is it possible that Seward really
+wished to have a "strong," yet not "too strong" statement from Lyons in
+order to combat the advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are many
+ramifications of diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government.
+At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no
+question now of issuing the Proclamation[527]." And on the nineteenth
+could write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed
+been issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528].
+
+The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more space in the
+British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from the
+British Government than it would seem to have merited from the
+Washington attitude toward it. The Bill had been drawn by the Secretary
+of the Treasury, and its other sections related to methods of meeting a
+situation where former customs houses and places for the collection of
+import duties were now in the hands of the Confederacy. The fourth
+section alone implied a purpose to declare a paper blockade. The idea
+of proclaiming closed the Southern ports may have at first received the
+sanction of Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a
+war; or it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy[529],
+but the more reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of
+many ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by
+the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any public
+means to attack the South. But the interest attached to the measure in
+this work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt that Russell,
+in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear two
+points: first, the close harmony with France--which in fact was not so
+close as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the Foreign
+Secretary in guarding British interests. Now in fact British trade was
+destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been
+greatly hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade
+feasible. Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the
+"Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_
+blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:
+
+     "If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern
+     Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by
+     agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles,
+     creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run
+     for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be
+     transhipped. But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such
+     plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]."
+
+A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to
+Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the
+remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of
+cotton in any considerable amount. His bays and creeks did indeed long
+provide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for the
+transport of a bulky export like cotton[531]. To Russell, however, the
+blockade appearing negligible in probable effect and also not open to
+objection by neutrals if regularly established, it seemed that any
+immediate danger to British trade was averted by the final American
+action on the "Southern Ports" Bill. It was not until the blockade did
+begin to be thoroughly effective that either the British public or
+Government gave it serious consideration.
+
+Not again until late November did Russell return with any interest to
+the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an American effort
+which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of blockading squadrons and
+a plan to remedy this by unusual, even "uncivilized," if not illegal,
+methods. This was the "Stone Boat Fleet" plan of blocking Charleston
+harbour by sinking vessels across the entrance bar[532]. The plan was
+reported by Lyons and the news received in England at the most uncertain
+moment as to the outcome of the _Trent_ controversy[533]. British press
+and Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of
+the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor matter.
+In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an opinion on
+the blockade, answered:
+
+     "I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer your
+     question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is
+     certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense
+     extent of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose
+     the ships which run it successfully both in and out are more
+     numerous than those which are intercepted. On the other hand
+     it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many
+     vessels are captured; it is a most serious interruption to
+     Trade; and if it were as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis
+     says in his Message, he would not be so very anxious to get
+     rid of it[534]."
+
+This was a very fair description of the blockade situation. Lyons,
+unaffected by irritations resulting from the _Trent_, showed the frame
+of mind of a "determined neutral," as he was fond of describing himself.
+His answer was the first given to Russell indicating a possibility that
+the blockade might, after all, become strictly effective and thus
+exceedingly harmful to British trade. There is no direct _proof_ that
+this influenced Russell to denounce the plan of blocking Southern
+harbours with stone-laden boats sunk in the channel, but the existence
+of such a motive seems probable. Moreover his protest was not made until
+December 20, the _day after_ he had learned officially from Adams that
+Wilkes was unauthorized in searching the _Trent_--a day on which strain
+and uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly lessened.
+Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be stated,
+"apparently on good authority," that the declared purpose of the stone
+boat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for ever." He
+characterized this as implying "utter despair of the restoration of the
+Union," and as being only "a measure of revenge and irremediable injury
+against an enemy."
+
+"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary war,
+such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the commerce of
+nations and the free intercourse of the Southern States of America with
+the civilized world. It is a project worthy only of times of barbarism."
+
+Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it was
+hoped, would disavow the project[535].
+
+There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American newspaper
+extracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation and
+expostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in America the
+project had been characterized as "odious and barbarous," adding, "The
+question seems to depend on the extent to which the harbours will be
+permanently injured[536]." It will be noted that Russell did not refer
+to information received from Lyons (though it was already in hand), but
+to "apparently good authority" in justification of his vigorous
+denunciation. But like vigour, and like characterization of American
+"barbarism" did not appear in the British press until after the news
+arrived of the release of Mason and Slidell. Then the storm broke, well
+summed up in the Punch cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very Sad
+Picture.) War Dance of the I.O.U. Indian," and showing Uncle Sam in
+war-feathers and with war-club, in his hand a flag made of the _New York
+Herald_, dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour across
+which stretched a row of sunken ships[537].
+
+On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the attention
+of the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour had been
+closed by stone boats and urged governmental remonstrance[538]. Hammond
+at once replied quoting the language of Russell's letter of December 20
+and stating that further representations would be made[539]. On the
+sixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but now was
+much less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury in the future
+to the United States itself in case the harbours were permanently
+destroyed since "... the object of war is peace, and the purposes of
+peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous commercial intercourse[540]."
+To-day it seems absurd that any save the most ignorant observer should
+have thought the North contemplated a permanent and revengeful
+destruction of Southern port facilities. Nor was there any just ground
+for such an extreme British view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert
+Browning was affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do," he
+wrote Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again[541]?" a query
+expressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the intense
+bitterness, indicating a long war, of the American belligerents. How
+absurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British concern at an American
+"lapse toward barbarism" was soon made evident. On January II Lyons,
+acting on the instructions of December 20, brought up the matter with
+Seward and was promptly assured that there was no plan whatever "to
+injure the harbours permanently." Seward stated that there had never
+been any plan, even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, but
+merely the lesser channels, because the Secretary of the Navy had
+reported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the 'large
+holes,'" but "could not stop up the 'small ones.'" Seward assured Lyons
+that just as soon as the Union was restored all obstructions would be
+removed, and he added that the best proof that the entrance to
+Charleston harbour had not been destroyed was the fact that in spite of
+blockading vessels and stone boats "a British steamer laden with
+contraband of war had just succeeded in getting in[542]." Again, on
+February 10, this time following Russell's instruction of January 16,
+Lyons approached Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that
+"all the vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared for
+obstructing the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is not
+likely that any others will be used for that purpose[543]." This was no
+yielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's accusation of
+barbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction of harbours,
+extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been undertaken by the
+Navy with little expectation of success, and, on the first appearance of
+new channels made by the wash of waters, was soon abandoned[544].
+
+The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America was
+conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem at first
+glance to have been merely manifestations of a British tendency to
+meddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other states and to
+give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose civilization was
+presumably less advanced than that which stamped the Englishman was,
+according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a characteristic of
+British public and Government alike[545]. But this is scarcely a
+satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the first place it
+is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions in an enemy's
+harbours in order to render more effective a blockade was no novelty in
+maritime warfare, as Russell must have well known, and that there was no
+modern record of such obstructions having permanently destroyed a
+harbour. A far more reasonable explanation is that which connects the
+energy of the British Government in opposing a proposed American closing
+of Southern harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energy
+against the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightly
+regarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but both
+methods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because they were
+very evidently the result of efforts to find a way in which an as yet
+ineffective blockade could be made more rigorous. On the impossibility
+of an effective blockade, if conducted on customary lines, the British
+people and Foreign Secretary had pinned their faith that there would be
+no serious interruption of trade. This was still the view in January,
+1862, though doubts were arising, and the "stone boat" protest must be
+regarded as another evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce with
+the South. The very thought that the blockade might become effective, in
+which case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly caused
+Russell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the North for
+a planned "barbarity."
+
+Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be made
+the subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on the Civil
+War in America. In another three months the Government began to feel a
+pressure from its associate in "joint attitude," France, to examine
+again with much care its asserted policy of strict neutrality, and this
+because of the increased effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhile
+another "American question" was serving to cool somewhat British
+eagerness to go hand in hand with France. For nearly forty years since
+independence from Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thorny
+problem to European nations since it was difficult, in the face of the
+American Monroe Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for the
+satisfaction of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measures
+were being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly in
+the matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures, President
+Buchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1860, had
+sounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that American principles
+would compel the use of force in aid of Mexico if debt-collecting
+efforts were made the excuse for a plan "to deprive our neighbouring
+Republic of portions of her territory." But this was at the moment of
+the break-up of the Union and attracted little attention in the United
+States. For the same reason, no longer fearing an American block to
+these plans, the three European Governments, after their invitation to
+the United States to join them had been refused, signed a convention,
+October 31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledged
+themselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not to
+interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.
+
+In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon III was
+not--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood even by his
+Ministers[546]. A joint expedition under the leadership of the Spanish
+General Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took possession of
+customs houses and began to collect duties. It soon became evident to
+the British and Spanish agents on the spot that France had far other
+objects than the mere satisfaction of debts. The result was a clash of
+interests, followed by separate agreements with Mexico and the
+withdrawal of forces by Great Britain and Spain. This difference of view
+on Mexican policy had become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador at
+Paris, by January, 1862, and from that month until the end of March his
+private letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general are
+almost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley learned
+that earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the Archduke
+Maximilian of Austria upon the _Throne_ of Mexico, far from being
+unfounded, were but faint indications of a great French "colonial
+Empire" scheme, and he thought that there was "some ill-will to the
+United States at the bottom of all this[547]...." He feared that the
+Mexican question would "give us a deal of trouble yet[548]," and by
+March was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt." made by
+France[549].
+
+These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he hastened,
+in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also did Spain. Great
+Britain believed that she had been tricked into a false position in
+Mexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view of the close relation of
+joint policy with France toward the Civil War in America, undertook no
+direct opposition though prophesying an evil result. This situation
+required France to refrain, for a time, from criticism of British policy
+and action toward the North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy,
+rather than one based on its own initiative. On the British side the
+French Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposes
+and objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow to
+accept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to that war
+Great Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a very
+advantageous situation for the North, as the event was to prove. On the
+purely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity to assure Seward
+that Great Britain was "entirely averse to any interference in the
+internal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing could be further from their
+wishes than to impose upon the Mexican Nation any Government not of its
+own choice[550]."
+
+British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to swell the breeze
+of amity toward America that had sprung up once the _Trent_ was beyond
+the horizon, and made, temporarily, for smooth sailing in the relations
+of Great Britain and the North. Lyons wrote on February 7 that the
+"present notion appears to be to overwhelm us with demonstrations of
+friendship and confidence[551]." Adams' son in London thought "our work
+here is past its crisis," and that, "Our victory is won on this side the
+water[552]," while the American Minister himself believed that "the
+prospect of interference with us is growing more and more remote[553]."
+Russell also was optimistic, writing to Lyons, "Our relations have now
+got into a very smooth groove.... There is no longer any excitement here
+upon the question of America. I fear Europe is going to supplant the
+affairs of America as an exciting topic[554]," meaning, presumably,
+disturbances arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic
+duties as "almost in a state of profound calm[555]."
+
+This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter what
+anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the blockade
+there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its legality. That
+there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an urgent letter from
+Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, asserting that if cotton
+brought but four pence at Charleston and thirteen pence at Liverpool
+there must be some truth in its alleged effectiveness:
+
+     "I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do not let
+     us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that they
+     failed thro' our interference.... Patience for a few more
+     weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient
+     policy[556]."
+
+[Illustration: KING COTTON BOUND: Or, The Modern Prometheus. _Reproduced
+by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the blockade
+and on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more weeks" had no
+place in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he wrote to Lyons in
+regard to assertions being made that the blockade was ineffective
+because certain vessels had eluded it:
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that,
+     assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a
+     number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a
+     port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create
+     an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these
+     ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact
+     that various ships may have successfully escaped through it
+     (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of
+     itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by
+     international law[557]."
+
+From this view Russell never departed in official instructions[558].
+England's position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable that
+she should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautious
+in criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history and
+probable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far
+more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to
+British commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with the
+South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they would
+do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition of
+the sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be made by it, send
+supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails."
+
+But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on the
+Government. In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive at
+his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearly
+took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's position. They
+had now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adams
+he "had no intention of seeing them again." Very angry they planned a
+formal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rost
+counselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559]. On his arrival Mason ignored
+this situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in
+pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private
+reception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed,
+somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity for
+evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confident
+of quick advantages for the South. On the day after his arrival he wrote
+unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State "... although the
+Ministry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition through
+the Queen's speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popular
+voice through the House of Commons will demand both."... "I shall be
+disappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by the
+Ministry[560]...."
+
+Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of many
+English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take was
+to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urge
+European repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived in Paris, wrote
+Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should "make only a
+passing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating that on that
+point I am not disposed at present to press consideration. But I shall
+insist upon the inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of the
+stone fleet,' etc[561]." Mason was urged to take a like course with
+Russell. Both men were much excited by a document a copy of which had
+been secured by Mann purporting to be a "confidential memorandum"
+addressed by England to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time
+had not come to raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, but
+Slidell and Mason believed it genuine[562]. They had great hopes of the
+opening of Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and
+the only references in debate were to the _Trent_ and its fortunate
+outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It is thought that
+silence as to the blockade was intended to leave that question
+open[563]." This, no doubt, was the consolatory explanation of his
+friends, but the unofficial interview with Russell, at his home, on
+February 10, chilled Mason's hopes.
+
+As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by Mason on
+the blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to Richmond shows
+that he proceeded with great caution, omitting portions of his
+instructions on cotton for fear of arousing antagonism, and venturing
+only a slight departure by expressing the hope that if Great Britain
+wished to renew communication with the Confederacy it might be made
+through him, rather than through the British consuls at the South.
+Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I might find my residence in London
+agreeable." He refused to see Mason's credentials, stating this to be
+"unnecessary, our relations being unofficial." He listened with
+courtesy, asked a few questions, but "seemed utterly disinclined to
+enter into conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and
+only said, in substance, they must await events." Certainly it was a
+cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that Russell's
+"personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy inaction[564]."
+But Mason still counted on parliamentary pressure on the Government, and
+he was further encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at
+Liverpool, stating that he had just received a request to come to London
+"from a government quarter, of all the _most important_[565]."
+
+The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself feared
+somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to Mason that
+interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with Russell, that he had
+unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, while not citing these men
+directly, declared the general "London idea" to be that of
+"postponement"; since it was inevitable that "the North will break down
+in a few months on the score of money," and that "We have only to wait
+three months." Evidently Spence believed he was being used as an
+intermediary and influential adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade
+them to a period of quiet. This, he thought, was unwise since delay
+would be injurious[566]. Of like opinion were the two Members of
+Parliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be his
+closest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former possessing
+somewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class, the latter the
+largest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice also was to press on
+the blockade question[567], as a matter of primary British commercial
+interest, and they believed that France was eager to follow a British
+lead. This was contrary to Slidell's notion at the moment, but of this
+Mason was unaware[568].
+
+The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before Parliament the
+papers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of one hundred and
+twenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3, 1861, to February
+17, 1862. In it were the details of the institution of the blockade,
+reports from British consuls on its effectiveness, lists of vessels
+captured and of vessels evading it, all together furnishing a very
+complete view of this, the principal maritime belligerent effort of the
+North[569]. The Blockade Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired,
+and especially so as almost at the end of this document appeared that
+instruction of February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly stated
+British acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview with
+Russell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had been
+urged vainly to use his influence for "postponement," Russell, so it
+must appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting the
+effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost immediately made known
+to Parliament by the presentation of papers.
+
+Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without further
+protest, in governmental policy they must now make some decided effort.
+This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons, on March 7, of a
+motion by Gregory urging the Government to declare the blockade
+ineffective[570], and of a similar debate on March 10 in the Lords. As
+is inevitable where many speakers participate in a debate the arguments
+advanced were repeated and reiterated. In the Commons important speeches
+for the motion were made by Gregory, Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, Lord
+Robert Cecil and Lindsay, while against it appeared Forster and Monckton
+Milnes. The Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Government
+view. Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that while
+himself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion had no
+essential bearing on that question and was directed wholly to a
+_fact_--that the blockade was not in reality effective and should not be
+recognized as such. He presented and analysed statistics to prove the
+frequency with which vessels passed through the blockade, using the
+summaries given by Mason to Russell in their interview of February 10,
+which were now before Parliament in the document on the blockade just
+presented, and he cited the reports of Bunch at Charleston as further
+evidence. This was the burden of Gregory's argument[571], but he glanced
+in passing at many other points favourable to the South, commenting on
+its free trade principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity,
+asserting the right of the South to secede, declaring that France
+regarded British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking to
+future wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of American
+inconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for all
+those principles of international law, which we have ever upheld, they
+are as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of the
+moment[572]." Gregory concluded with the statement that the United
+States should be treated "with justice and nothing more."
+
+When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree on a
+line of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the blockade was
+that it was wise to minimize the question of recognition, and Gregory
+had laboured to prove that this was not related to a refusal longer to
+recognize the blockade. But Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion,
+promptly undid him for he unhappily admitted that recognition and
+blockade questions were so closely interwoven that they could not be
+considered separately. This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who led
+in opposition. Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearing
+to pieces of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the alleged
+blockade runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which,
+by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then
+make a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade of
+main ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was proved, he
+declared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where it was 100 per
+cent. greater than in the South, and of salt in Charleston, where the
+importer could make a profit of 1,000 per cent. To raise the blockade,
+he argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality. The
+real reason for this motion was not the _ineffectiveness_ of the
+blockade, but the effectiveness, and the real object an English object,
+not a Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion to
+recognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew the
+former would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended to
+secure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of the
+Government in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any other
+conduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would have had to
+fight for slavery against her kinsmen."
+
+Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a judicial tone
+of argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one who knows his
+cause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and was characterized by
+Henry Adams, an interested auditor, as "listened to as you would listen
+to a funeral eulogy."... "The blockade is now universally acknowledged
+to be unobjectionable[573]." This estimate is borne out by the speech
+for the Government by the Solicitor-General, who maintained the
+effectiveness of the blockade and who answered Gregory's argument that
+recognition was not in question by stating that to refuse longer to
+recognize the blockade would result in a situation of "armed
+neutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war." He pictured the disgust of
+Europe if England should enter upon such a war in alliance "with a
+country ... which is still one of the last strongholds of slavery"--an
+admission made in the fervour of debate that was dangerous as tending to
+tie the Government's hands in the future, but which was, no doubt,
+merely a personal and carelessly ventured view, not a governmentally
+authorized one. In general the most interesting feature of this debate
+is the hearty approval given by friends of the North to the Government's
+entire line of policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play at
+the moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy,
+was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make no
+criticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of British
+neutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, in
+specific cases, in neutral duty.
+
+The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for the
+motion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there was no
+indication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a similar
+debate in the Lords was of importance only as offering Russell, since he
+was now a member of the upper chamber, an opportunity to speak for
+himself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any intention to attack the
+blockade since Russell, on February 15, had officially approved it, but
+criticized the sending to Lyons of the despatch itself. Russell upheld
+the strict legality and effectiveness of the blockade, stated that if
+England sided with the South in any way the North would appeal to a
+slave insurrection--the first reference to an idea which was to play a
+very important role with Russell and others later--and concluded by
+expressing the opinion that three months would see the end of the
+struggle on lines of separation, but with some form of union between the
+two sovereignties[574]. Russell's speech was an unneeded but emphatic
+negative of the pro-Southern effort.
+
+Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics by
+pressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason were
+dashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to force the
+Government to a decided stand when they preferred, as the summons of
+Spence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance for a time any
+further declaration on the blockade. The refusal of Mason and his
+Southern friends to wait compelled a governmental decision and the
+result was Russell's instruction to Lyons of February 15. The effect of
+the debate on Mason was not to cause distrust of his English advisers,
+but to convince him that the existing Government was more determined in
+unfriendliness than he had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: "... no
+step will be taken by this Government to interfere with it[575]." He
+thought the military news from America in part responsible as: "The late
+reverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate effect
+upon the minds of our friends here[576]...." Spence was opposed to any
+further move in Parliament until some more definite push on the
+Government from France should occur[577]. Slidell, anxiously watching
+from Paris the effort in England, had now altered his view of policy and
+was convinced there was no hope in France until England gave the signal.
+Referring to his previous idea that the Continent could be put in
+opposition to Great Britain on the blockade he wrote:
+
+     "I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was such
+     that any view of the question which he might urge on the
+     British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to
+     change entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all
+     that concerns us the initiative must be taken by England;
+     that the Emperor sets such value on her good will that he
+     will make any sacrifice of his own opinions and policy to
+     retain it[578]."
+
+On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason[579]. It was a correct
+judgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that his was to
+be the first place in importance in any and all operations intended to
+secure European support for the Confederacy, but he could not conceal
+from himself that the first steps undertaken in that direction had been
+premature. From this first failure dated his fixed belief, no matter
+what hopes were sometimes expressed later, that only a change of
+Government in England would help the Southern cause.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 502: See _ante_, p. 52.]
+
+[Footnote 503: See _ante_, pp. 61 and 65-66.]
+
+[Footnote 504: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 505: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell. Private. April 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 506: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain_, pp. 80-1.]
+
+[Footnote 507: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 508: Bernard, p. 229.]
+
+[Footnote 509: _Saturday Review_, May 18, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 510: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIII, pp. 188-195.]
+
+[Footnote 511: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 512: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, July 2, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 513: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The important
+correspondence on this subject is found in: F.O., France, Vol. 1393. No.
+796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. _Ibid._, No. 804. Cowley to
+Russell, July 4, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1377. No. 704. Russell to Cowley,
+July 10, 1861. _Ibid._, Vol. 1394. No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17,
+1861. _Ibid._, No. 922. Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. _Ibid._, No.
+923. Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers.
+Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, July 28,
+1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to support England in
+remonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill" appears, through Cowley's
+communications, in the printed Parliamentary Papers. A study of these
+alone would lead to the judgment that France _had been the first_ to
+raise the question with England and had heartily supported England. The
+facts were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions from
+Thouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (_Parliamentary Papers_,
+1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United
+States." No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 514: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 61.]
+
+[Footnote 515: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 516: Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to the Bill and
+Sumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact spoken publicly in
+favour of the measure. Probably he told Schleiden that privately he was
+against it. Schleiden reported Sumner as active in urging the Cabinet
+not to issue a Proclamation closing the ports (Schleiden Papers.
+Schleiden to Senate of Bremen, July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier later
+informed Thouvenel that Sumner declared the Bill intended for the
+Northern public only, to show administration "energy," and that there
+was never any intention of putting it into effect. F.O., France, 1394.
+No. 931. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 517: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." Nos. 70 and 71.
+Thouvenel did finally consent to support Russell's protest.]
+
+[Footnote 518: F.O., Am., Vol. 755. No. 168.]
+
+[Footnote 519: F.O., Am., Vol. 756.]
+
+[Footnote 520: F.O., France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley to Russell, Aug.
+8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 521: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 522: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 68. Lyons to
+Russell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a copy of the six lines of
+Thouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier, dated July 4, the very brevity of
+which shows that this was in fact no instruction at all, but merely a
+comment by Thouvenel to Mercier.]
+
+[Footnote 523: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 524: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, August 1, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 525: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 81. Lyons to
+Russell, Aug. 12, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 526: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Aug. 13,
+1861.]
+
+[Footnote 527: _Ibid._, Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 528: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 83.]
+
+[Footnote 529: Lyons thought this possible. Russell Papers. Lyons to
+Russell. Private. July 20, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 530: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. Aug. 16, 1861.
+And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent smuggling over 3,000 miles
+of coast and 1,500 miles of land frontier seems to me impossible"
+(_Ibid._, Aug. 17, 1861). Russell had received some two weeks earlier, a
+letter from Bunch at Charleston, urging that England make no objection
+to the blockade in order that the South might be taught the lesson that
+"King Cotton," was not, after all, powerful enough to compel British
+recognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at the
+failure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they both
+could and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F.O., Am., Vol. 781.
+No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on July 23 that the
+South planned to hold back its cotton until Great Britain and France
+raised the blockade (_Ibid._, No. 87). Bunch was now impressed with
+Southern determination.]
+
+[Footnote 531: The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia), Wilmington
+(North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah (Georgia),
+Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston (Texas).]
+
+[Footnote 532: The first important reference to the blockade after
+mid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed through Lyons, not
+to give advice to British merchants in Charleston as to blockade runners
+that had gotten into port having any "right" to go out again (F.O., Am.,
+Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 533: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 125. Lyons to
+Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 534: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 535: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 127.]
+
+[Footnote 536: _Ibid._, No. 126. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861.
+Received Dec. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 537: _Punch_, Feb. 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 538: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 141.]
+
+[Footnote 539: _Ibid._, No. 142. Jan. 15, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 540: _Ibid._, No. 143.]
+
+[Footnote 541: James, _W. W. Story_, II, p. 111, Jan. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 542: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
+"Correspondence on Civil War in the United States." No. 153. Lyons to
+Russell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan. 27.]
+
+[Footnote 543: _Ibid., Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Despatch from Lord Lyons
+respecting the Obstruction of the Southern Harbours." Lyons to Russell,
+Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb. 24.]
+
+[Footnote 544: Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of
+G.V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy_, 1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pont
+to Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited as _Fox, Confid. Corresp_. This
+letter shows clearly also that the Navy had no thought of a _permanent_
+obstruction.]
+
+[Footnote 545: _Vide_ Arnold, _Friendship's Garland_.]
+
+[Footnote 546: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 249. Thouvenel
+could mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13, 1862. "Nous ne voulons
+pas cependant imposer une forme de gouvernement aux Mexicains..."]
+
+[Footnote 547: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Jan. 17,
+1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to Flahault in London, hoped
+England would feel that she had a common interest with France in
+preventing Mexico from falling under the yoke of Americans either "unis
+ou secedes." (Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 226).]
+
+[Footnote 548: _Ibid._, Jan. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 549: _Ibid._, March 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 550: F.O., Am., Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 28,
+1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France just as Napoleon's plans
+for Mexico took clearer form has been made the ground for assumptions
+that he immediately gave assurance of Southern acquiescence and
+encouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have found no good evidence of
+this--rather the contrary. The whole plan was clear to Cowley by
+mid-January before Slidell reached Paris, and Slidell's own
+correspondence shows no early push on Mexico. The Confederate agents'
+correspondence, both official and private, will be much used later in
+this work and here requires explanation. But four historical works of
+importance deal with it extensively, (1) Richardson, _Messages and
+Papers of the Confederacy_, 2 vols., 1905, purports to include the
+despatches of Mason and Slidell to Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory.
+Important despatches are missing, and elisions sometimes occur without
+indication. (2) Virginia Mason, _The Public Life and Diplomatic
+Correspondence of James M. Mason_, 1906, contains most of Mason's
+despatches, including some not given by Richardson. The author also used
+the _Mason Papers_ (see below). (3) Callahan, _The Diplomatic History of
+the Southern Confederacy_, 1901, is the most complete and authoritative
+work on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used the collection known
+as the "Pickett Papers," for official despatches, supplementing these
+when gaps occurred by a study of the _Mason Papers_, but his work,
+narrative in form, permits no extended printing of documents. (4) L.M.
+Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. (Am. Hist.
+Rev. Jan., 1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the
+_Mason Papers_. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or packages in
+the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and in addition
+there is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to Richmond. These
+contain the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell while in Europe.
+Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's letters are copies in Slidell's
+hand-writing, made apparently at Mason's request and sent to him in May,
+1865. A complete typed copy of this correspondence was taken by me in
+1913, but this has not hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master's
+degree thesis by Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat,"
+Stanford University, 1915, and for a few citations by C. F. Adams, _A
+Crisis in Downing Street_ (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914).
+The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's English friends,
+Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others.]
+
+[Footnote 551: Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought France also
+included in these demonstrations.]
+
+[Footnote 552: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 113. Henry Adams to
+Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Feb. 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 553: _Ibid._, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 554: Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 555: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son.]
+
+[Footnote 556: Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 557: Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with Russell but adds
+that Great Britain, in the early stages of the blockade, was indulgent
+to the North, and rightly so considering the difficulties of
+instituting it.]
+
+[Footnote 558: He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863, that he saw "no
+reason to qualify the language employed in my despatch to Lord Lyons of
+the 15th of February last." (Bernard, p. 293).]
+
+[Footnote 559: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II,
+p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 560: Mason, _Mason_, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 561: Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 562: Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" to Jefferson
+Davis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no indication of how
+he obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To his astonishment
+Slidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France knew nothing of such a
+memorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by some enterprising "Southern
+friend" in need of money.]
+
+[Footnote 563: Mason, _Mason_, p. 258. Mason to Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 564: _Ibid._, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch No. 4. Feb. 22,
+1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson.) Slidell was more
+warmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same line of argument and
+apparently made a favourable impression. Cowley reported Thouvenel,
+after the interview, as expressing himself as "hoping that in two or
+three months matters would have reached such a crisis in America that
+both parties would be willing to accept a Mediation...."
+
+(F.O., France., Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to Russell,
+Feb. 10, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 565: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, 1862. This was
+that James Spence, author of _The American Union_, a work strongly
+espousing the Southern cause. This book was not only widely read in
+England but portions of it were translated into other languages for use
+on the Continent. Spence was a manufacturer and trader and also operated
+in the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason,
+was early active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans in
+England, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was much
+less favourably regarded and the impression created by his frequent
+letters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre elated by the
+prominent part he seemed to be playing in what he took to be the birth
+of a new State.]
+
+[Footnote 566: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 567: Mason, _Mason p_. 258.]
+
+[Footnote 568: Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging that
+Continental interests and British interests in the blockade were
+"directly antagonistic," basing his argument on England's forward look
+as a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862. Richardson, II,
+p. 186).]
+
+[Footnote 569: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Papers
+relating to the Blockade."]
+
+[Footnote 570: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp.
+1233-43.]
+
+[Footnote 571: Mason's authenticated statistics, unfortunately for his
+cause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply that
+after that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and which
+certainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective to
+prevent regular and frequent communications between the government at
+Richmond and its agents abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when he
+promptly incorporated Mason's figures in the papers presented to
+Parliament? These figures showed that according to reports from four
+Southern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29
+and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the date
+December 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing from
+Cuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockade
+running. Seven of these were listed as "captured." Those reaching Cuba
+were described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3
+American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the names
+of the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper though
+apparently included in the list submitted by Mason. These figures did in
+fact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861. The American
+blockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available material
+and were slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy could
+not enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directing
+their efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render a
+large blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive effort
+and it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet of
+blockaders was seriously undertaken. (See _Fox, Confid. Corresp._, I,
+pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tribute
+to the energy with which the South for "thirteen long months" had
+defended its important port shore lines.) If Gregory had been able to
+quote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would have
+had a strong argument. "The blockade runners are doing a great
+business.... Everything is brought in in abundance. Not a day passes
+without an arrival or a departure. The Richmond Government sent about a
+month ago an order to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went from
+Nassau to New York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thence
+here, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of the
+order. Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels are
+all changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and no
+one seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed,
+there is not." (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862).]
+
+[Footnote 572: I have nowhere found any such statement by Seward.
+Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of May 27, 1861,
+printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds that temporary absence
+of blockading ships does not impair the blockade nor render "necessary a
+new notice of its existence."]
+
+[Footnote 573: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 119-20. Henry Adams
+to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., March 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 574: This "three months" statement returned to plague Russell
+later, British merchants complaining that upon it they had based plans
+in the belief that the Government had something definite in view.
+Spence's reference to this "three months" idea, after his conferences in
+London, would indicate that Russell was merely indulging in a
+generalization due to the expected financial collapse of the North. The
+Russian Ambassador in London gave a different interpretation. He wrote
+that the Northern victories in the West had caused Great Britain to
+think the time near when the "border states," now tied to the Union by
+these victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separation
+from the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other that
+Russell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken." (Brunow to
+F.O., March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so state, but his
+despatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk with Russell. If
+so, it would indicate an attempt to interpret Lincoln's "border state
+policy" in a sense that would appear reasonable in the British view that
+there could be no real hope at Washington of restoring the Union.]
+
+[Footnote 575: Mason, _Mason_, p. 264. Despatch No. 6. March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 576: _Ibid._, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken by Grant on
+February 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture of these two
+places gave an opening for the advance of the Western army southwards
+into Tennessee and Mississippi.]
+
+[Footnote 577: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 578: Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, March 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 579: Mason Papers.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+ENTER MR. LINDSAY
+
+The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the threatening
+_Trent_ episode, appears to have made Secretary Seward believe that the
+moment was opportune for a renewal of pressure on Great Britain and
+France for the recall of their Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing upon
+the victories of Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams on
+February 28 explaining that as a result the United States, now having
+access to the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas,
+"had determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland ways
+and waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experiment
+succeeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on the
+sea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of the
+blockade." He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations would
+"go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw their
+"belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as we
+conceive, to the insurgents[580]." This was large talk for a relatively
+unchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the door
+in the West and was still far from having "access to the interior
+districts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of this
+despatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said the
+position and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved and
+notable successes probable, it could not be maintained that hostilities
+were "so near their conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scale
+as to disqualify either party for the title of Belligerents[581]." Lyons
+and Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal of
+belligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received that the
+purpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the news quite
+took Thouvenel's breath away[582]. As yet, however, Seward did no more
+than hint and Adams was quick to advise that the moment had not yet come
+"when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use[583]."
+
+Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no doubt
+intended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the North, yet also
+truly indicative of a Northern temper toward the South and its "domestic
+institution." This was the negotiation of a Slave-Trade treaty with
+Great Britain, by which America joined, at last, the nations agreeing to
+unite their efforts in suppression of the African Slave Trade. The
+treaty was signed by Seward and Lyons at Washington on April 7. On the
+next day Seward wrote to Adams that had such a treaty been ratified "in
+1808, there would now have been no sedition here, and no disagreement
+between the United States and foreign nations[584]," a melancholy
+reflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsible
+for the long delay of American participation in a world humanitarian
+movement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "to
+save the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if he
+should make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing the
+Union[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of the
+intensity of both Northern and Southern feeling if regarded from our
+present knowledge, but a view natural enough to the foreign observer at
+the moment. Lyons, in this letter, correctly stated the rising
+determination of the North to restore the Union, but underestimated the
+rapid growth of an equal determination against a restoration with
+slavery. The real motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Trade
+treaty was the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic,
+affairs. Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken
+"the risk of going a little faster" than his instructions had
+indicated[586].
+
+In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over recent
+military successes. The campaign in the West had been followed in the
+East by a great effort under McClellan to advance on Richmond up the
+peninsula of the James river and using Chesapeake Bay as a means of
+water transportation and supply. This campaign had been threatened by
+the appearance of the iron-clad ram _Merrimac_ and her attack on the
+wooden naval vessels operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9
+the _Monitor_, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove the
+_Merrimac_ from her helpless prey, and removed the Southern threat to
+McClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the Civil
+War the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck the
+imagination of the British people, and justly so because of its
+significance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has been
+the main talk of the town," wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, in
+Parliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and naval
+people. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era in
+warfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]."
+The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in British
+eyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, and especially
+the ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden ships on the
+day previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future.
+Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle.
+"Only think," he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankees
+turning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphs
+they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight of
+metal[588]."
+
+This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while American
+ingenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded the
+death-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in the character of
+navies was immediately possible. Moreover British shipbuilders could
+surely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any other
+nation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the British
+Government as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in the
+North promising further and more important successes on land. The
+Government hoped for such Northern success not because of any belief
+that these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission,
+for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with the
+conviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. The
+idea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting ability
+and realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle,
+was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusion
+that the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation.
+Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the
+"morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]." He
+believed that the end of the war would be hastened by Northern
+victories, and he therefore rejoiced in them.
+
+Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in April,
+began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and to write
+warnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the West
+at Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, called
+out such a flood of Northern expressions of determination to drive the
+war to the bitter end as to startle Lyons and cause him, in a remarkably
+clear letter of survey, to recast his opinions. He wrote:
+
+     "The general opinion is that the Campaign of this Spring will
+     clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the War. If
+     the Military successes of the North continue, the
+     determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last
+     really put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military
+     reverses, the loss of the Border States, and the occupation
+     of the most important points on the Coast, the Southern men
+     hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their
+     cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be
+     removed and then retire into the interior with their families
+     and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but
+     barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal
+     Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to
+     continue the enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation
+     to protracting the War indefinitely. I confess, however, that
+     I fear that a protraction of the War during another year or
+     longer, is a not less probable result of the present posture
+     of affairs, than either the immediate subjugation of the
+     South or the immediate recognition of its independence[590]."
+
+This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line with
+Confederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. There was
+indeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a hypothetical defensible
+interior which impressed Englishmen, but had no foundation in
+geographical fact. Meanwhile British attention was eagerly fixed on the
+Northern advance, and it was at least generally hoped that the
+projected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsula
+toward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict in
+America. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of any
+conclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importance
+of Grant's western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the news
+of the capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days to
+make up their minds to believe it[591]," but even the capture of this
+the most important commercial city of the South was not regarded as of
+great importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond.
+
+News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching England
+as was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during this advance
+and previous to the capture of New Orleans that two remarkable
+adventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly on
+individual initiative, by a Frenchman in America and an Englishman in
+France. Mercier at Washington and Lindsay at Paris conceived, quite
+independently, that the time had come for projects of foreign mediation.
+
+French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have been
+that the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result in such a
+rehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions of now
+recognizing the _facts_ of the situation and acknowledging the
+independence of the South would not be unfavourably received. In this
+sense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, privately, on March 13, but was
+careful to state that the word "mediation" ought not to be uttered. His
+letter dilated, also, on French manufacturing difficulties at home due
+to the lack of cotton[592]. This was in no way an instruction to
+Mercier, but the ideas expressed were broached by him in a conversation
+with Seward, only to be met with such positive assertions of intention
+and ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the French
+Minister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that he
+wished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself that there
+also they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which the
+latter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier asserted to
+Thouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eager
+acquiescence in a suggestion made _without previous thought_, but that
+on consideration he returned to Seward and accepted the proposal,
+outlining the substance of what he intended to say at Richmond. He
+should there make clear that the anxiety of France was above all
+directed toward peace as essential to French commercial interests; that
+France had always regarded the separation of North and South with
+regret; that the North was evidently determined in its will to restore
+the Union; and, in repetition, that France wished to aid in any way
+possible the early cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him to
+add that he, personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" of
+any persons whom the South wished to elect[593].
+
+Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatient
+sympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the balance
+and good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons." "Quite unnecessarily,
+Seward helped him to make the trip[594]." A circumstance apparently not
+known to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, before
+departure, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and a
+proposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materially
+different from the report made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These merit
+expanded treatment as new light on a curious episode and especially as
+revealing the British policy of the moment, represented in the person of
+the British Minister in Washington[595].
+
+On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to set out
+for Richmond and that he had "been for some little time thinking of
+making this journey." He told of _making the suggestion to Seward_, and
+that this "rather to his surprise" had been "eagerly" taken up.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital
+     importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed,
+     was to put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and
+     generally to a state of things which caused so grievous an
+     interruption of the trade between Europe and this country. It
+     was, he said, possible that he might hasten the attainment of
+     this object by conferring personally with the Secession
+     leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances
+     their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in
+     all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought
+     to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a
+     state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to
+     Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the
+     European Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed
+     principles. They would recognize any people which
+     established its independence, but they could not encourage
+     the prolongation of a fruitless struggle.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very
+     much discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from
+     the Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down
+     blow ('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them.
+     It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all
+     events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might
+     be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr.
+     Seward his notion of using this language, and had added that
+     of course as a Minister accredited to the United States, and
+     visiting Richmond with the consent of the United States
+     Government, he could not speak to the Southern men of any
+     other terms for ending the War than a return to the Union.
+
+     "Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely
+     approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had
+     authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course
+     from the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward,
+     personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to
+     apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to
+     their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of
+     political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so
+     much to any other person, but that he would tell Monsieur
+     Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political station
+     and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards the
+     South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand
+     or fall by it."
+
+This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased the
+American Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond to have
+constituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be regarded as
+at all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor as expressive of
+Thouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain from much comment on the
+matter of Mercier's proposed representations at Richmond. He was more
+concerned that the trip was to be made at all; was in fact much opposed
+to it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity of
+French-British attitude which was so desirable. Nor was he without
+suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate
+advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the
+South. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to
+accompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any
+interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the
+Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea." Lyons
+frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of
+declining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed since
+this certainly looked like a break in "joint policy," and he objected
+positively on the same ground to Stoeckl's going[596]. Mercier yielded
+the latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of his
+consultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objection
+would be obviated. Finding that Mercier "was bent on going," Lyons
+thought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts to
+driving home the idea that no opening should be given for a "separate
+agreement" with the South.
+
+     "I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans,
+     and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I
+     said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to
+     remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would
+     be possible to inveigle France or any other great European
+     Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to
+     believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected
+     by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to
+     the exclusion of others. I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson
+     Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish
+     a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any
+     mind in which it had found place[597]."
+
+Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and fourteenth
+and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, "without saying
+anything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it." This
+was intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France,
+and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the result of my communications with
+M. Mercier entitles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmond
+with my acquiescence[598]." Nevertheless he both believed, and declared
+to Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening of
+determination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor South
+was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace.
+He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy proved
+well founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of the
+results of the journey. Mercier returned to Washington on April 24,
+reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day
+called on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate
+Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled
+determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under
+extreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected
+European assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leaders
+professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe," and that
+confident in their own power they "desired no aid." Cautiously adverting
+to his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in view French
+commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received any
+proposals of benefit in return for recognition. Mercier answered with a
+simple negative. He then further developed the interview with
+Benjamin[599].
+
+     "He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of
+     the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the
+     particular language which he had intended to hold was
+     entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found
+     the Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that
+     they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for
+     making terms with the North. What he had said to them about
+     the recognition of their Independence was that the principal
+     inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her
+     doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening
+     peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any
+     such effect; that it would embroil France with the United
+     States, and that would be all[600]."
+
+Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercier
+to convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, in
+fact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he had
+approached Benjamin with the simple declaration "that the purpose of my
+journey was merely to assure myself, for myself, of the true condition
+of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it."
+Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to
+Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the
+trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make
+them. They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in some
+degree also to Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. The
+report to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated
+to Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principal
+inducement" thereto[601]. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views on
+recognition:
+
+     "He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration
+     of the old Union was impossible. He believed that, if the
+     Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last
+     for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South
+     must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the
+     Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable
+     opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War.
+     The present opportunity would however, he thought, be
+     particularly unfavourable."
+
+Lyons writes:
+
+     "I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be
+     eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur
+     Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that
+     there was nothing to do at the present moment but to watch
+     events."
+
+On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of Mercier's
+trip and was given a very different view of the situation at Richmond.
+Seward said:
+
+     "He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur Mercier's
+     account of what had passed, that the Confederates were about
+     to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought
+     into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they
+     were now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be
+     offered them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was
+     idle. If the United States were undisputed masters of the
+     Border States and the Sea Coast, there would be no occasion
+     for any more fighting. Those who chose to retire into the
+     interior were welcome to do so, and to stay there till they
+     were tired."
+
+"The truth," wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the South
+probably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those of Monsieur
+Mercier." Lyons concluded his report of the whole matter:
+
+     "The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to bring
+     him back precisely to the point at which he was three months
+     ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had
+     somewhat shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the
+     South, and consequently his opinions as to the policy to be
+     adopted by France. The sentiments he now expresses are
+     exactly those which he expressed at the beginning of the
+     year[602]."
+
+In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early recognition of
+the South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons the effect of the
+adventure to Richmond was just the reverse of this; and on Russell also
+its influence was to cause some doubt of Southern success. Appended to
+Lyons' report stands Russell's initialled comment:
+
+     "It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which the
+     Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms
+     they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will
+     cause but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can
+     the country be held permanently by the U.S. Armies if the
+     Confederates have small bodies in Arms resisting the
+     authority of the U.S. Congress?
+
+     Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union
+     feeling in the South will be of great value in forming a
+     judgment on the final issue."
+
+Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid public
+misconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on Mercier's
+trip. This appeared May 6, in the New York _Times_, the paper more
+closely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout the war, representing
+Mercier as having gone to Richmond by order of Napoleon and with
+Lincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to surrender and to
+encourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons commented on this
+article that the language attributed to Mercier was "not very unlike
+that which he intended to hold," but that in fact he had not used
+it[603]. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. Indeed everyone in London
+and Paris was much astonished, and many were the speculations as to the
+meaning of Mercier's unusual procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing
+"Que diable allait il faire dans cette galere[604]?" and Cowley, at
+Paris, could give no light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumours
+of Mercier's trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this could
+be true[605]." May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicable
+unless the Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is not
+the case[606]." The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, was
+assured by the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier's
+conduct, and that he greatly regretted it," being especially disturbed
+by a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with the British
+Representative" at Washington[607]. This was reassuring to Russell, yet
+there is no question that Mercier's conduct long left a certain
+suspicion in British official circles. On May 2, also, Thouvenel wrote
+to Flahault in London of the Emperor's displeasure, evidently with the
+intention that this should be conveyed to Russell[608].
+
+Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate agents in
+Europe. At first they believed Mercier must have had secret orders from
+Napoleon, and were delighted; then on denials made to Slidell by
+Thouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an unfavourable sense as
+Seward's agent. Later they returned to the theory of Napoleon's private
+manipulation, and being confident of his friendship were content to wait
+events[609]. Slidell had just received assurance from M. Billault,
+through whom most of his information came, "that the Emperor and all
+the Ministers are favourable to our cause, have been so for the last
+year, and are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M.
+Thouvenel is of course excepted, but then he has no hostility[610]." But
+a greater source of Southern hope at this juncture was another
+"diplomatic adventure," though by no accredited diplomat, which
+antedated Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not only
+the Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well.
+
+This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament, Lindsay, in
+the role of self-constituted Southern emissary to Napoleon. Lindsay, as
+one of the principal ship-owners in England, had long been an earnest
+advocate of more free commercial intercourse between nations, supporting
+in general the principles of Cobden and Bright, and being a warm
+personal friend of the latter, though disagreeing with him on the
+American Civil War. He had been in some sense a minor expert consulted
+by both French and British Governments in the preparation of the
+commercial treaty of 1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himself
+to Cowley asking that an audience with the Emperor be procured for him
+to talk over some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the request
+seemed reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On the
+twelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon's
+conversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs[611].
+
+The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction that re-union
+between North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he was
+ready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him the
+example." More than once he had expressed these ideas to England, but
+"they had not been attended to" and he should not try again. He
+continued:
+
+     "... that France ought not to interfere in the internal
+     affairs of the United States, but that the United States
+     ought equally to abstain from all interference in the
+     internal concerns of France; and that His Majesty considered
+     that the hindrance placed by the Northern States upon the
+     exportation of cotton from the South was not justifiable, and
+     was tantamount to interference with the legal commerce of
+     France."
+
+He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established. He had
+made observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, but they
+had not been replied to." Then "His Majesty asked what were the opinions
+of Her Majesty's Govt.; adding that if Her Majesty's Govt. agreed with
+him as to the inefficiency of the blockade, he was ready to send ships
+of war to co-operate with others of Her Majesty to keep the Southern
+ports open." Finally Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and find
+out what he thought of these ideas.
+
+Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever having been
+made by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion was "that it
+might be true that the North and the South would never re-unite, but
+that it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of the blockade was a
+legal and international question, and that upon the whole it had been
+considered by Her Majesty's Govt. as efficient, though doubtless many
+ships had been enabled to run it"; and "that at all events there could
+not be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question both of the
+recognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. The
+time was gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--for
+every mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting with
+success upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of the
+blockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her Majesty's Govt.
+would consent to send a squadron to act as the Emperor had indicated,
+but that I could only give a personal opinion, which might be corrected
+if I was in error by Mr. Lindsay himself seeing Lord Russell."
+
+On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay and
+Napoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to Napoleon
+Cowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a contrary view
+of the situation, Napoleon:
+
+     "... repeated the statement that two long despatches with his
+     opinion had been written to M. de Flahault, which had not
+     been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he
+     expressed a desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London,
+     lay His Majesty's views before Lord Palmerston and Lord
+     Russell, and bring their answers direct to him as quickly as
+     possible, His Majesty observing that these matters were
+     better arranged by private than official hands.... Mr.
+     Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be back in
+     Paris on Thursday morning."
+
+In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty intrigue."
+Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and Thouvenel had denied
+all knowledge and declared that certainly no such proposals as Lindsay
+reported the Emperor to have mentioned had ever been sent to England.
+Cowley wrote:
+
+     "My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations with me,
+     which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood
+     hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor
+     his own views, and that those views are supported by the
+     majority of the people of England, and by the present
+     Opposition in Parliament, who would denounce the blockade if
+     in power; that he has found a willing listener in the
+     Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any means; and I
+     am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make
+     political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the
+     Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose
+     no time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over
+     to-night, and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord
+     Palmerston as soon as possible[612]."
+
+The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown by his
+conveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was jubilant, writing
+to Mason:
+
+     "Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor who is
+     prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has
+     always been ready to do so and has twice made representations
+     to England, but has received evasive responses. He has now
+     for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr.
+     Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely
+     confidential but you can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory,
+     etc., that I now have positive and _authoritative_ evidence
+     that France now waits the assent of England for recognition
+     and other more cogent measures[613]."
+
+Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in substance
+very similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though more highly
+coloured as favourable to the South, but he added an important feature
+which, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, but which had not been
+stated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to see Derby and Disraeli, the
+leaders of the parliamentary opposition, and inform them of his views--a
+suggestion which if known to the British Ministry as coming from
+Napoleon could not fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believed
+that, failing British participation, the Emperor might act separately in
+recognition of the South[614].
+
+April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval of the
+language used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was about to write
+to Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to bring them also on
+my part officially to your [Russell's] notice[615]." This official
+report does not differ materially from that in Cowley's private letter
+of the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally, aspersions on Lindsay and
+suspicions of the use to which he might put his information[616]. Cowley
+had held a long conversation with Thouvenel, in which it was developed
+that the source of the Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce,
+who was very anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared that
+Lindsay in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "_I_ [Cowley]
+_coincided in his views_." This exasperated Cowley, and he resented
+Lindsay's "unofficial diplomacy," telling Thouvenel that he "was placed
+in a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. M. Thouvenel
+exclaimed that his own position was still more false, and that he should
+make a point of seeing the Emperor, on the following morning, and of
+ascertaining the extent of His Majesty's participation in the
+proceeding." This was done, with the result that Napoleon acknowledged
+that on Lindsay's request he had authorized him to recount to Russell
+and Palmerston the views expressed, but asserted that "he had not
+charged him to convey those opinions." Cowley concluded his despatch:
+
+     "Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not understand
+     the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had
+     confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate
+     proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more
+     preoccupied with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's
+     Government seemed to be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in
+     his communications with M. de Flahault, but that he knew too
+     well the general opinions prevailing in England to have made
+     proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what proposals could have
+     been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the Emperor and M.
+     Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the South would
+     not bring Cotton into the markets, while any interference
+     with the blockade would probably have produced a collision.
+     At the same time he could not conceal from me the just
+     anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not
+     the Northern States be induced to declare some one port
+     Neutral, at which the trade could be carried on?
+
+     I said that the events which were now passing in America
+     demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two
+     Governments. The recognition of the South would not have
+     prevented the North from continuing its armaments and
+     undertaking the expedition now in progress, and a refusal to
+     acknowledge the blockade as efficient must have been followed
+     by the employment of force, on a question of extreme
+     delicacy[617]."
+
+Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this Russell
+stated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation was alarming,
+but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so the remedy." He
+assured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish to take no step in
+respect to the Civil War in America except in concert with France and
+upon full deliberation[618]." Meanwhile Lindsay's diplomatic career had
+received a severe jolt in London. Confidently addressing to Russell a
+request for an interview, he received the reply "that I thought the best
+way for two Govts. to communicate with each other was through their
+respective Embassies.... He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you
+[Cowley] had not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make the
+proposal through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked to
+see me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and the
+French Ambassr. could make the most Confidential as well as Official
+Communications[619]." This rebuff was not regarded as final, though
+exasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all being
+agreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in their favour.
+Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and on April 18 had
+still another conversation with Napoleon. He reported Russell's refusal
+of an interview, and that he had seen Disraeli, but not Derby, who was
+ill. Disraeli had declared that he believed Russell and Seward to have a
+"secret understanding" on the blockade, but that if France should make a
+definite proposal it would probably be supported by a majority in
+Parliament, and that Russell would be compelled to assent in order to
+avoid a change of Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsay
+expressions of vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon
+(according to Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting to
+learn the result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an event
+which "he did not anticipate," but which, if it occurred, "might render
+it inexpedient to act[620]."
+
+Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to London,
+found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English repetition. He wrote
+that Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had attempted to get at
+Palmerston, but with no success. Thereupon Lindsay turning to the
+Opposition had visited Disraeli a second time and submitted to him
+Palmerston's rebuff. The strongest expression that fell from Disraeli
+was--"if it is found that the Emperor and Russell are at issue on the
+question the session of Parliament would not be as quiet as had been
+anticipated." This was scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was all
+important. Yet "on the whole Lindsay is hopeful," wrote Mason in
+conclusion[621]. Within a fortnight following arrived the news of the
+capture of New Orleans, an event upon which Seward had postulated the
+relief of a European scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers a
+serious blow. May 13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him,
+personally, that "he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the
+moment but to watch events[622]." Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the
+effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, "that
+it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control of
+the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would not in any way
+modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to an
+extermination[623]." Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all from his
+section, never fully realizing the importance of the Confederate
+South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about Richmond, was telling
+the "nervous amongst our friends" that New Orleans would "form a barren
+acquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as a
+stimulant[624]."
+
+If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeated
+doses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In England,
+Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, but
+thought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in that
+direction. May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of British
+public opinion, "there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as
+ever that we must ultimately fail[625]," but on May 16, that "the effect
+of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ...
+the _Times_ came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it
+had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning it
+has an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first time
+that it sees little more chance for the South. There is, we think, a
+preparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and
+acknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all the
+national territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory will
+bring us up to this, I am confident[626]."
+
+This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep pace
+with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry was
+simply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and to
+restrain its French partner in a "wait for events" policy. The "one more
+victory" so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and the
+attention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waited
+in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of
+Northern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond.
+McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington
+that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This was treated at
+some length in the semi-official _National Intelligencer_ of May 16 in
+an article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating that
+mediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, but
+would otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly
+represented the situation[627].
+
+There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was largely the
+result of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of ultimate Southern
+success and his somewhat free private communications. He may, indeed,
+have been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxiety at
+Northern success, for McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily,
+if slowly, progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recent
+instruction from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yet
+he thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan on
+Lyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of the
+situation were as follows:
+
+     "M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility
+     that the South may be victorious both in the battle in
+     Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite
+     confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not
+     give in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his
+     Government to endeavour to put an end to the war by
+     intervening on the first opportunity. He is, however, very
+     much puzzled to devise any mode of intervention, which would
+     have the effect of reviving French trade and obtaining
+     cotton. I should suppose he would think it desirable to go to
+     great lengths to stop the war; because he believes that the
+     South will not give in until the whole country is made
+     desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim
+     immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of
+     cotton for an indefinite time.
+
+     I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It
+     appears to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation.
+     There is a good deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations
+     of evil, but I do not see my way to doing any good.
+
+     If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a
+     month or six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will
+     be at Richmond, having very probably got there without much
+     real fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if
+     so far....
+
+     The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the
+     summer. It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as
+     Trade and Cotton are concerned, we may be next Autumn, just
+     in the situation we are now. If the South really defeated
+     either or both the Armies opposed to them I think it would
+     disgust the North with the war, rather than excite them to
+     fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much from disease,
+     recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the
+     Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it
+     would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is
+     possible, under such circumstances that a Peace Party might
+     arise; and perhaps just _possible_ that England and France
+     might give weight to such a Party[628]."
+
+In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation unless
+a strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and even then
+regarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just _possible_." Nor was
+Russell inclined to depart from established policy. He wrote to Lyons at
+nearly the same time:
+
+     "The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth seems to
+     portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see
+     therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population
+     entertain those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which
+     were so freely expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate
+     Statesmen at Richmond. I know not how to answer this
+     question. But there are other questions not less important to
+     be solved in the North. Will the Abolitionists succeed in
+     proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all those who have
+     resisted? I guess not.
+
+     But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and
+     its old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair
+     solution except separation--but that the North will not hear
+     of--nor in the moment of success would it be of any use to
+     give them unpalatable advice[629]."
+
+Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully informed of
+Mercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France had no intention
+to depart from her attitude of strict neutrality and that it was more
+than ever necessary to wait events[630].
+
+Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation were then
+wholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as yet taken up
+this plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern successes were
+continued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction from his former high
+hopes, summed up the situation in a few words: "This Government passive
+and ignorant, France alert and mysterious. The Emperor alone knows what
+is to come out of it, and he keeps his own secret[631]." The Southern
+play, following the ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quiet
+and extended even to discouraging public demonstrations against
+governmental inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration by
+cotton operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matter
+of judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory as I
+think probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success and
+power, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would have
+resulted[632]." The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell was
+conceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediately
+following the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions to
+Dayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of the
+declaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel replied
+with some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strong
+representation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton and
+tobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had little
+expectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute the
+orders," advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customary
+arguments on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usual
+refusal to alter British policy[634]. If Seward was sincere in asking
+for a retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistook
+European attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories to
+return to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable in
+causing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well chosen.
+Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward's
+renewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there was no immediate
+reason to require his presence in America, ill and fearing the heat of
+summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to take leave of absence
+for a trip home. On June 6 he received this permission, evidence that
+Russell also saw no cause for anxiety, and on June 13 he took leave
+of Lincoln.
+
+     "I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this
+     morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more
+     or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on
+     political matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in
+     England think a great deal more of me than I deserve, pray
+     tell 'em I mean 'em no harm[635].'"
+
+Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of news on any
+striking military event in America. New Orleans was an old story, and
+while in general it was believed that Richmond must fall before
+McClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid declarations that
+they would never submit gave renewed courage to their British friends.
+Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might be wise, after all, to make
+some effort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumours
+were becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motion
+demanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, an
+offer of mediation be made to the contending parties in America.
+Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had
+failed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to a
+terrible war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure.
+Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined
+to make the effort[636]. Probably he was still smarting under his
+reverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personal
+clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influence
+on governmental attitude--perhaps might even indicate a governmental
+purpose to alter its policy.
+
+This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston to
+Adams on the publication in the _Times_ of General Butler's famous order
+in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as "women of the
+town" those women who publicly insulted Northern troops. The British
+press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similar
+to that on the Northern "barbarity" of the Stone Fleet episode.
+Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies received need no further
+notice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than to
+explain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and with
+great violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, but
+in very dignified if irritating terms[637]. In British opinion Butler's
+order was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americans
+understood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. In
+fact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers,
+whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick to
+accept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if not
+impossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited in
+the mind of every honourable man by the general order of General
+Butler...." "If the Federal government chooses to be served by men
+capable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by the
+deserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]." This
+extraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry and
+perturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an intention to
+change British policy and that Palmerston was but laying the ground for
+some "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, after his wont when striking
+out on a new line. He was further confirmed in this view by an editorial
+in the _Times_ on June 12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by news
+from France that Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such a
+step. But however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as a
+diplomat. His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerston
+enquiring whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him
+"officially ... or purely as a private expression of sentiment between
+gentlemen[639]."
+
+There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were contemplating a
+change of policy--rather the reverse. But it does appear that Palmerston
+wished to be able to state in Parliament that he had taken Adams to task
+for Butler's order, so that he might meet an enquiry already placed on
+the question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. This
+question was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russell
+wrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and that
+Palmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do not
+see why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of war
+do not sanction such conduct[640]." This was very different from the
+tone used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way."
+Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:
+
+     "Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you
+     have written him about Butler.
+
+     I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do
+     nothing more till I had seen or written to you.
+
+     What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your
+     interpretation of the order.
+
+     But it is not clear that the President approves of the order,
+     and I think if you could add something to the effect that you
+     respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish
+     to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him.
+
+     If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the
+     best. But this you may not like to do[641]."
+
+It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move against
+Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last,
+he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order,
+was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicion
+proving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended,
+returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was not
+until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far different
+language seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet making
+no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded
+with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being
+official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous
+assertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell,
+who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but
+had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding
+was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June
+19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect
+still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the
+"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organ
+for communications...." In conclusion he expressed gratification that
+reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans had
+been curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpreting
+Palmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that he
+would not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]."
+
+Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew there was
+to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move may
+even have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in that
+policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends of
+the South thought the _Times_ editorial indicated "that some movement is
+to be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor for
+it[644]." But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state
+in Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal from
+France to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it
+on our part[645]." This was the exact language used by Palmerston in
+reply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but was
+assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "still
+hold his motion under consideration[647]." Lindsay, according to his own
+account, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knew
+privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for
+his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone
+it[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead of
+mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to
+Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to
+the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the
+moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in
+despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what
+prospect of success, to _demand_ recognition from France[649]. This
+alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging
+against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there
+would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's
+motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, including
+Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it "has been so far reduced
+and diluted ... as to make it only expressive of the opinion of the
+House that the present posture of affairs in America made the question
+of the recognition of the Confederate States worth the serious
+consideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent the
+Ministry making an issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it
+would be sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined to
+postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from this
+quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' to
+turn the screw still further[651]." On June, 20 Lindsay gave this notice
+of postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was a
+moment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe.
+Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demanding
+recognition and wrote:
+
+     "The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and
+     almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be
+     consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way
+     advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that
+     we would have done better to withdraw after our first
+     interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]."
+
+[Illustration: PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH (_From a photograph by Elliott &
+Fry, Ltd._)]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 580: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 41.]
+
+[Footnote 581: F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 582: F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell,
+March 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 583: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 54.
+Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 584: _Ibid._, p. 65.]
+
+[Footnote 585: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. April 8,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 586: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 587: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son, April 4,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 588: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 589: Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 590: F.O., Am., Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. Lyons to Russell,
+April 11, 1802.]
+
+[Footnote 591: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 143. Adams to his son,
+May 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 592: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 247.]
+
+[Footnote 593: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, pp. 120-122. Mercicr to
+Thouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of this despatch was printed,
+with some minor inaccuracies, in the New York _Tribune_, Feb. 5, 1863,
+and of Mercier's report, April 28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb.
+9, under the caption "The Yellow Book." It is interesting that the
+concluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the
+_Tribune_, are not given in the printed volume of _Documents
+Diplomatiques_, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and to
+certain pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferences
+with French vessels. How the _Tribune_ secured these paragraphs, if
+authentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the publication was an
+attack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in an effort to cause his
+removal from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 371-2.]
+
+[Footnote 594: Bancroft, _Seward_. II, 298-99. Bancroft's account is
+based on the _Tribune_ translation and on Seward's own comments to Weed
+and Bigelow. _Ibid._, 371-72.]
+
+[Footnote 595: Newton. _Lord Lyons_, I, pp. 82-85, gives an account of
+the initiation of Mercier's trip and prints Lyons' private letter to
+Russell of April 25, describing the results, but does not bring out
+sufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks that
+Mercier "whether instructed from home or not ... after the manner of
+French diplomatists of the period ... was probably unable to resist the
+temptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_...."]
+
+[Footnote 596: Stoeckl's report does not agree with Mercier's statement.
+He wrote that he had been asked to accompany Mercier but had refused and
+reported a conversation with Seward in which the latter declared the
+time had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would not
+be accepted in that role, and that if ever mediation should become
+acceptable, Russia would be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to
+F.O., April 23-May 5, 1862. No. 927).]
+
+[Footnote 597: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 250. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 598: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 599: This suspicion was a natural one but that it was
+unfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of Mercier's
+visit, describing the language used in almost exactly the same terms
+that Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached by
+Benjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by the fact that he did
+not write to Slidell about it until July. Richardson, II, 260. Benjamin
+to Slidell, July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 600: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 601: _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, pp. 122-124.]
+
+[Footnote 602: F.O., Am., Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, April 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 603: F.O., Am., Vol. 829. No. 315. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, May 9, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 604: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 605: F.O., France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley to Russell,
+April 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 606: _Ibid._, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To Russell. Mercier's
+conduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy confidence"
+to Lyons. _Ibid._, No. 566. May 1, 1862. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 607: _Ibid._, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, May 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 608: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 299.]
+
+[Footnote 609: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862.
+Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 610: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, May 16, 1862. Billault was a
+member of the French Ministry, but without portfolio.]
+
+[Footnote 611: Several accounts have been given of this episode. The two
+known to me treating it at greatest length are (1) Callahan, _Diplomatic
+History of the Southern Confederacy_ and (2) Sears, _A Confederate
+Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. Am. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1921. Both
+writers drew their information wholly from Confederate documents, using,
+especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neither
+treats the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based my
+account on the unused letters of British officials, citing other
+materials only where they offer a side light. The principal new sources
+are Cowley's private and official letters to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 612: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. April 13,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 613: Mason Papers. April 12, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 614: Richardson, II, 239. April 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 615: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private.]
+
+[Footnote 616: F.O., France, Vol. 1437. No. 497. _Confidential_. Cowley
+to Russell April 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 617: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 618: F.O., France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell to Cowley,
+April 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 619: _Ibid._, No. 415. Russell to Cowley, April 16, 1862.
+Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with a mission must
+remain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have prevaricated--or at
+least so officially reported. He had
+
+     "Le 20 Avril, 1862.
+
+     Mon cher Lord Cowley:
+
+     Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'espere comme vous que
+     bientot nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de tout
+     ete choque de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas recu Mr. Lindsay.
+     Celui-ci m'avait demande l'autorisation de rapporter au
+     principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais
+     consenti et voila tout.
+
+     Croyez a mes sentiments d'amitie.
+
+     Napoleon."
+]
+
+[Footnote 620: Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin, April 18, 1862.
+New Orleans was captured on April 25.]
+
+[Footnote 621: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 622: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 623: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 624: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, May 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 625: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 139.]
+
+[Footnote 626: _Ibid._, p. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 627: F.O., Am., Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to Russell, May 16,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 628: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. May 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 629: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. May 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 630: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, p. 124. May 15.]
+
+[Footnote 631: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 632: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 633: F.O., France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley to Russell, May
+23, 1862, and _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 127. Thouvenel to
+Mercier, May 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 634: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862_, pp. 97-99. Adams to
+Seward, May 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 635: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, 88.]
+
+[Footnote 636: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 637: All the letters are given in Adams, _C.F. Adams_, Ch.
+XIII.]
+
+[Footnote 638: _Ibid._, pp. 248-9.]
+
+[Footnote 639: _Ibid._, p. 251.]
+
+[Footnote 640: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 641: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 642: Adams, _C.F. Adams_, pp. 253-55.]
+
+[Footnote 643: _Ibid._, pp. 256-60.]
+
+[Footnote 644: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 645: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 646: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 543. June 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 647: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 648: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. Lindsay wrote:
+
+     "Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of my
+     motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced
+     the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have
+     told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to
+     him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the
+     House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even
+     if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a
+     majority of votes might have been obtained in its
+     favour--that a majority of votes _would_ be obtained within
+     the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope
+     that the Government would move (as the country, and France,
+     are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the
+     necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which
+     belonged to the Executive.
+
+     "I further told his Lordship that recognition was a _right_
+     which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the
+     fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the
+     majority of the leading men in the Northern States would
+     thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself
+     might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse
+     for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged
+     his people. I further said, that if the question is settled
+     _without_ our recognition of the South, he might _rest
+     certain_ that the Northern Armies _would_ be marched into
+     Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and
+     thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for _sub
+     rosa_, I saw that the House was not _yet_ prepared to vote,
+     and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in
+     idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm."
+]
+
+[Footnote 649: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 650: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 651: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 652: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 810.]
+
+[Footnote 653: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO
+
+
+CHAPTER                                         PAGE
+    X. KING COTTON  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1
+   XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN .  .  .  .  .  .  33
+  XII. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION  .  .  .  .  75
+ XIII. THE LAIRD RAMS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 116
+  XIV. ROEBUCK'S MOTION   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 152
+   XV. THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION   . 186
+  XVI. BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH   .  .  . 219
+ XVII. THE END OF THE WAR .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 247
+XVIII. THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE  .  .  . 274
+       INDEX  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 307
+
+
+
+LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+PART TWO
+
+PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . _Frontispiece_
+_From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd_.
+
+JOHN SLIDELL  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  _facing p. 24_
+_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham
+Lincoln," by permission of the Century Co., New
+York._
+
+"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD"  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     "    102
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851) .  .  .  .  .  .     "    134
+_From Reid's "Life of Forster" (Chapman & Hall,
+Ltd._)
+
+"THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS--HABET!"   .  .  .  .     "    248
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH COLUMBIA"  .  .  .     "    262
+_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of
+"Punch_"
+
+JOHN BRIGHT .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     "    294
+_From Trevelyan's  "Life  of John  Bright"
+(Constable & Co., Ltd_.)
+
+
+
+GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+KING COTTON
+
+For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England.
+But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance on
+Richmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the much
+heralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrous
+failure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns in
+the West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored or
+their significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war in
+America approached a stalemate. The time had come with the near
+adjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort must
+be made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it was
+hoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadily
+increasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to the
+Southern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and private
+efforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review the
+cotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern to
+both friend and foe of the North and in less degree to the
+Ministry itself.
+
+"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no great
+revolution," says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such convenient and
+soothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the time
+of the organization of the Confederacy.... In any case, hostilities
+could not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what the
+Confederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced to
+aid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terrible
+distress that was sure to follow a blockade[654]." This confidence was
+no new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats of
+secession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of that
+section had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producing
+industry of America and as the one product which would compel European
+acquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, or
+of the South if she should secede. In the financial depression that
+swept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leading
+financial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of the South is
+permanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Events
+now transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbug
+explodes[655]." On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina,
+asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished for
+three years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, but
+this is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the whole
+civilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war on
+cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_
+King[656]." Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 in
+which the main question was that of the territorial expansion of
+slavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believing
+that "the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the
+world.... Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and
+we have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry
+it out successfully[657]."
+
+These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might be
+amplified and repeated from a hundred sources.
+
+Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand in
+hand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter of
+the world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In the three million
+bags of cotton," said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, "the slave-labour
+annually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing more
+to advance civilization ... than all the canting philanthropists of New
+England and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone of
+the Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturing
+system[658]...." Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before the
+Civil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:
+
+     "Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton
+     crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care
+     about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and
+     slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that
+     subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested
+     in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern
+     States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and
+     all Lancashire would deplore a successful insurrection of the
+     slaves, if such a thing were possible[659]."
+
+On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession.
+Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported a
+conversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now a
+consistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan of
+close commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation,
+postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South for
+cotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I would remark," wrote Bunch, "all
+their calculations are based[660]." Such was, indeed, Southern
+calculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an article
+declaring that "the first demonstration of blockade of the Southern
+ports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hovering
+on the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially the
+free flow of cotton to English and French factories.... A stoppage of
+the raw material ... would produce the most disastrous political
+results--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of English
+statesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cotton
+associations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661]."
+
+The historical student will find but few such British utterances at the
+moment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics or
+in commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesied
+results accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmental
+foreign policy neglected all other considerations and the first
+Commission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demand
+recognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt British
+acquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidence
+but did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. In
+June, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that "Great
+Britain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, to
+prevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton," and he enclosed a copy of
+an article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: "The
+cards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _the
+bankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or the
+acknowledgment of our independence_[663]." As late as March, 1862, Bunch
+was still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described the
+newly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly due
+to the fact that he was the leader of the "King Cotton" theory of
+diplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that British
+persistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by the
+lack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leading
+Richmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration of
+Jefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms of
+Confederate foreign policy:
+
+     "'Cotton,' said the Charleston _Mercury_, 'would bring
+     England to her knees.' The idea was ludicrous enough that
+     England and France would instinctively or readily fling
+     themselves into a convulsion, which their great politicians
+     saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. But the
+     puerile argument, which even President Davis did not hesitate
+     to adopt, about the power of 'King Cotton,' amounted to this
+     absurdity: that the great and illustrious power of England
+     would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging
+     its dependency on the infant Confederacy of the South, and
+     the subserviency of its empire, its political interests and
+     its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in
+     America[665]!"
+
+But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in cotton
+extended the actual hardships of England were in all truth serious
+enough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to Southern
+sympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" have
+frequently been treated by historians at much length[666] and need here
+but a general review. More needed is an examination of some of the
+erroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an examination
+of the extent to which the question of cotton supply affected or
+determined British governmental policy toward America.
+
+English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of importance
+equalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on varying statistics
+diverge as to exact proportions, but all agree in emphasizing the
+pre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining the general prosperity of
+the nation. Surveying the English, not the whole British, situation it
+is estimated that there were 2,650 factories of which 2,195 were in
+Lancashire and two adjacent counties. These employed 500,000 operatives
+and consumed a thousand million pounds of cotton each year[667]. An
+editorial in the _Times_, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth of
+the entire English population was held to be dependent, either directly
+or indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts[668], and
+therefore also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South,
+since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton supplied
+from America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. of the total
+English importation[669].
+
+The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly 4,000,000
+bales, and the foreign shipments, without question hurried because of
+the storm-cloud rising at home, had been practically completed by April,
+1861. Of the 3,500,000 bales sent abroad, Liverpool, as usual, received
+the larger portion[670]. There was, then, no immediate shortage of
+supply when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of raw
+stocks, even permitting some reshipment to the Northern manufacturing
+centres of America where the scarcity then brought high prices. In
+addition, from December, 1860, to at least April, 1861, there had been
+somewhat of a slump in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturers
+due to an over-production of goods in the two previous years. There had
+been a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financial
+crisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous demand
+from the Far East--India especially--set the mills running again on full
+time, while many new mills were brought into operation. But by May,
+1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy demands and the rest of the
+year saw uncertainty of operations and brought expressions of fear that
+the "plunge" to produce had been overdone. Manufactured stocks began to
+accumulate, and money was not easy since 1860 brought also a combination
+of events--deficient grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold from
+England to France for investment in French public works, demand of
+America for gold in place of goods, due to political uncertainties
+there--which rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half per
+cent. in January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861,
+the Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in a
+dangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreased
+exports of goods[671]. The news of war actually begun in America came as
+a temporary relief to the English cotton trade and in the prospect of
+decreased supply prices rose, saving many manufacturers from impending
+difficulties. A few mills had already begun to work on part-time because
+of trade depression. The _immediate_ effect of Lincoln's blockade
+proclamation was to check this movement, but by October it had again
+begun and this time because of the rapid increase in the price of raw
+cotton as compared with the slower advance of the price of goods[672].
+
+In substance the principal effect of the War on the English cotton trade
+for the first seven or eight months was felt, not in the manufacturing
+districts but in the Liverpool speculative and importing markets of raw
+cotton. Prices rose steadily to over a shilling a pound in October,
+1861. On November 23 there was a near panic caused by rumours of British
+intervention. These were denounced as false and in five days the price
+was back above its previous figure. Then on November 27 came the news
+of the _Trent_ and the market was thrown into confusion, not because of
+hopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war with
+America would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators breathed
+freely again only when peace was assured. This speculative British
+interest was no cause for serious governmental concern and could not
+affect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, presumably, a more
+serious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or even impossible to obtain,
+a serious situation would demand consideration.
+
+In the generally accepted view of a "short war," there was at first no
+great anticipation of real danger. But beginning with December, 1861,
+there was almost complete stoppage of supply from America. In the six
+months to the end of May, 1862, but 11,500 bales were received, less
+than one per cent. of the amount for the same six months of the previous
+year[673]. The blockade was making itself felt and not merely in
+shipments from the South but in prospects of Southern production, for
+the news came that the negroes were being withdrawn by their masters
+from the rich sea islands along the coast in fear of their capture by
+the Northern blockading squadrons[674]. Such a situation seemed bound in
+the end to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmental
+action to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explained
+by Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as follows:
+
+     "The immediate result of the American war was, at this time,
+     to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in
+     the raw material and the producers and dealers in
+     manufactures, from a serious and impending difficulty. They
+     had in hand a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption
+     of two-thirds of a year, therefore a rise in the price of the
+     raw material and the partial closing of their establishments,
+     with a curtailment of their working expenses, was obviously
+     to their advantage. But to make their success complete, this
+     rise in the price of cotton was upon the largest stock ever
+     collected in the country at this season. To the cotton trade
+     there came in these days an unlooked for accession of wealth,
+     such as even it had never known before. In place of the hard
+     times which had been anticipated, and perhaps deserved, there
+     came a shower of riches[675]."
+
+This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar analysis,
+no doubt on the explanations offered by his English friends, of "the
+question of cotton supply, which we had supposed would speedily have
+disturbed the level of their neutral policy" was made by Mason in March,
+1862. "Thus," he concluded, "it is that even in Lancashire and other
+manufacturing districts no open demonstration has been made against the
+blockade[676]." Manufactures other than cotton were greatly prospering,
+in particular those of woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that the
+cotton lords were not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profited
+by it--was bruited even during the war. _Blackwood's Magazine_, October,
+1864, held this view, while the _Morning Post_ of May 16, 1864, went to
+the extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, relieved just in
+the nick of time by the War, preventing a financial crash, "which must
+sooner or later have caused great suffering in Lancashire."
+
+Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the _immediate_
+effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton industry from great
+disaster and that there _immediately_ resulted large profits to the
+manufacturers from the increased price of stocks on hand. In fact his
+description of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages
+show, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are
+concerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. For
+though prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any
+large quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost no
+transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677].
+Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just
+been abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen
+to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The English
+producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking an
+effective market. The importance of this in British foreign policy is
+that at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was there
+likely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America.
+Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern ports
+and a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged great
+losses incurred and patriotically borne in silence. Certainly in
+Parliament the members from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent with
+the Government policy of neutrality for in the various debates on
+blockade, mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire,
+Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, or
+referred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to any
+other cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the war[679].
+
+But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. Whatever the
+causes of short-time operation in the mills or of total cessation of
+work the situation was such that from October, 1861, more and more
+operatives were thrown out of employment. As their little savings
+disappeared they were put upon public poor relief or upon private
+charity for subsistence. The governmental statistics do not cover,
+accurately, the relief offered by private charity, but those of public
+aid well indicate the loss of wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called
+"Distressed Districts" of Lancashire and the adjoining counties it
+appears that poor relief was given to 48,000 persons in normal times,
+out of a total population of 2,300,000. In the first week of November,
+1861, it was 61,207, and for the first week of December, 71,593;
+thereafter mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of
+113,000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there was a
+slight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief resumed an
+upward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, when it reached
+its highest point of 284,418. In this same first week of December
+private relief, now thoroughly organized in a great national effort, was
+extended to 236,000 people, making a grand total at high tide of
+distress of over 550,000 persons, if private relief was not extended to
+those receiving public funds. But of this differentiation there is no
+surety--indeed there are evidences of much duplication of effort in
+certain districts. In general, however, these statistics do exhibit the
+great lack of employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoying
+unusual prosperity[680].
+
+The manufacturing operative population of the district was estimated at
+between 500,000 and 600,000. At the time of greatest distress some
+412,000 of these were receiving either public or private aid, though
+many were working part-time in the mills or were engaged on public
+enterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. But there was no starvation
+and it is absurd to compare the crisis to the Irish famine of the
+'forties. This was a _cotton_ famine in the shortage of that commodity,
+but it was not a _human_ famine. The country, wrote John Bright, was
+passing through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive by
+the contributions of the country[681]." Nevertheless a rapid change from
+a condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on charity--a
+change ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either directly or
+indirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might have been expected
+to arouse popular demonstrations to force governmental action directed
+to securing cotton that trade might revive. That no such popular effect
+was made demands careful analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--but
+here the _fact_ is alone important, and the fact was that the operatives
+sympathized with the North and put no pressure on the Cabinet. Thus at
+no time during the war was there any attempt from Lancashire, whether of
+manufacturers or operatives, to force a change of governmental
+policy[682].
+
+As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public discussion and
+consideration were inevitably aroused. But there was little talk of
+governmental interference and such as did appear was promptly met with
+opposition by the leading trade journals. July 13, 1861, the _Economist_
+viewed the cotton shortage as "a _temporary_ and an _immediate_ one....
+We have--on our hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of our
+supply for _one_ year, and that the very _next_ year." Would it _pay_,
+asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think myself it would be
+cheap ... at the cost of a war with the United States[683]." This was
+also the notion of the London _Shipping Gazette_ which, while
+acknowledging that the mill-owners of England and France were about to
+be greatly embarrassed, continued: "_But we are not going to add to the
+difficulty by involving ourselves in a naval war with the Northern
+States_[684]...." The _Times_ commented in substance in several issues
+in September, 1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time as a
+precaution against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of the
+glutted state of distant markets for manufactured goods[685]." October
+12, the _Economist_ acknowledged that the impatience of some mill-owners
+was quite understandable as was talk of a European compulsion on America
+to stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, but then entered upon an
+elaborate discussion of the principles involved and demonstrated why
+England ought not to intervene. In November Bright could write: "The
+notion of getting cotton by interfering with the blockade is abandoned
+apparently by the simpletons who once entertained it, and it is accepted
+now as a fixed policy that we are to take no part in your
+difficulties[686]." Throughout the fall of 1861 the _Economist_ was
+doing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging that due to the "glut" of
+manufactured goods short-time must have ensued anyway, pointing out that
+now an advanced price was possible, and arguing that here was a
+situation likely to result in the development of other sources of supply
+with an escape from the former dependence on America. In view of the
+actual conditions of the trade, already recounted, these were appealing
+arguments to the larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running on
+short order supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were less
+easily convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influence
+and hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of the
+new year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners and
+manufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for any
+_immediate_ change[687]."
+
+Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the
+_Trent_ reached England: that of January, 1862, just after that
+controversy had been amicably settled. The _Trent_ had both diverted
+attention from cotton and in its immediate result created a general
+determination to preserve neutrality. It is evident that even without
+this threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon the
+Government. With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes were
+aroused that the war would soon end or that at least some cotton
+districts would be captured to the relief of England. Seward held out
+big promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a time
+calmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that
+the inability to secure the country back of the city, together with the
+Southern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into
+the hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the
+Mississippi valley[688]. This was still not a matter of _immediate_
+concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinion
+that it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for the
+distress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload their
+stocks[689]. But in considering and judging the attitude of the British
+public on this question of cotton it should always be remembered that
+the great mass of the people sincerely believed that America was
+responsible for the distress in Lancashire. The error in understanding
+was more important than the truth.
+
+In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causes
+of distress in England is the more important element. The "Cotton Lords"
+did not choose to reveal it. One must believe that they intentionally
+dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause. In the first important
+parliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of any
+other element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word
+advocating a change in British neutral policy[690]. It is to be noted
+also that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers on
+poor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and the
+general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious it
+was not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it. There was
+not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressed
+governmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, "We must, I
+believe, get thro' the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland works
+and railroads in India[692]." Moreover the Southern orders to destroy
+cotton rather than permit its capture and export by the North
+disagreeably affected British officials[693]. Up to the end of August,
+1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity for
+cotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern
+policy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special official
+consideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time came
+wholly from France[694].
+
+It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July of
+the Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695]. June had
+seen the collapse of Lindsay's initial move, and Palmerston's answer to
+Hopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offer
+mediation, appeared final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat,
+that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwood
+had withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked
+whether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the country,
+the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and the
+hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend to
+take any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise,
+to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?" This was
+differently worded, yet contained little variation from his former
+question of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that the
+Government certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of success
+but that at present "both parties would probably reject it. If a
+different situation should arise the Government would be glad to
+act[696]." This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July
+11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety of
+offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities," and
+insisted upon a debate.
+
+Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours of
+British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams was
+keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presented
+to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote "under the
+President's instructions" that such recurrent rumours were highly
+injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South has
+been encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession. Having
+developed this complaint at some length Seward went on to a brief
+threat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreign
+nations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, the
+North would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used,
+namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters. This was
+clearly a threat of a "servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--a
+war which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view
+of her anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams'
+discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from
+presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the
+American Minister anxious[697]. No answer was given by Russell for over
+a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. Soon
+the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope of
+British concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny in
+conversation had assured him "that this Government is now more anxious
+than ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour." Slidell
+asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged that
+everything depended on Palmerston: "that august body seems to be as
+afraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their
+pedagogue[698]."
+
+Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private instructions
+now being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a visit to London.
+The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croit
+pas le moment venu de reconnaitre le Sud[699]." Palmerston had already
+answered this question in Parliament and Thouvenel was personally very
+much opposed to the Emperor's suggestion. There were press rumours that
+he was in London to bring the matter to a head, but his report to
+Mercier was that interference in America was a very dangerous matter and
+that he would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if he
+had suggested any change in neutral policy[700].
+
+In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of Foreign
+Affairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern hopes was the
+knowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay chose his time well
+for on July 16 the first thorough report on Lancashire was laid before
+Parliament[701], revealing an extremity of distress not previously
+officially authenticated, and during this week the papers were full of
+an impending disaster to McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on his
+vacation trip, was concerned for the future mainly because of cotton,
+but did not believe there was much danger of an immediate clash with
+America[702]. But the great Southern argument of the moment was the
+Northern military failure, the ability of the South to resist
+indefinitely and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18
+all London was in excitement over press statements that the latest news
+from America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of his
+entire army.
+
+Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams thought
+the story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to carry the
+House of Commons off their feet in its debate to-night[703]." The
+debate itself may be regarded as a serious attempt to push the Ministry
+into a position more favourable to the South, and the arguments advanced
+surveyed the entire ground of the causes of secession and the
+inevitability of the final separation of North and South. They need but
+brief summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponement
+because "the South was winning anyway," argued that slavery was no
+element in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and that
+England, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring to a
+conclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune since
+mediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, and he
+quoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, stating, "We
+think it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they so
+richly deserve."
+
+Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. Gregory
+said: "We should remember what is impending over Lancashire--what want,
+what woe, what humiliation--and that not caused by the decree of God,
+but by the perversity of man. I leave the statistics of the pauperism
+that is, and that is to be, to my honourable friends, the
+representatives of manufacturing England." No statistics were
+forthcoming from this quarter for not a representative from Lancashire
+participated in the debate save Hopwood who at the very end upbraided
+his fellow members from the district for their silence and was
+interrupted by cries of "Divide, Divide." Lindsay's quoted letter was
+met by opponents of mediation with the assertion that the operatives
+were well known to be united against any action and that they could be
+sustained "in luxury" from the public purse for far less a cost than
+that of a war with America.
+
+But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. Forster
+in a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a consideration of the
+effect of mediation on _England_, advanced the idea that such a step
+would not end the war but would merely intensify it and so prolong
+English commercial distress. He did state, however, that intervention
+(as distinct from mediation) would bring on a "servile war" in America,
+thus giving evidence of his close touch with Adams and his knowledge of
+Seward's despatch of May 28. In the main the friends of the North were
+content to be silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay.
+This was good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence by
+evidence early given in the debate that there would be no positive
+result from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real _attack_ on
+the Government by his bitter criticisms of Russell's "three months"
+speech[704].
+
+At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, their
+immediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to adjourn the
+debate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed that everyone
+earnestly wished the war in America to end, but he declared that such
+debates were a great mistake unless something definite was to follow
+since they only served to create irritation in America, both North and
+South. He concluded with a vigorous assertion that if the Ministry were
+to administer the affairs of the nation it ought to be trusted in
+foreign affairs and not have its hands tied by parliamentary expressions
+of opinion at inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yet
+securely established its independence and hence could not be recognized.
+This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and thus
+be fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention in the
+future. Having now made clear the policy of the Government Palmerston
+did not insist upon a division and the motion was withdrawn[705].
+
+On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in ignominious
+failure. Lyons called it "ill-timed.... I do not think we know here
+sufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] to be able to
+come to any conclusion as to what the European Powers should do." But
+the impression left by the debate that there was a strong parliamentary
+opinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: "I suppose Mercier will
+open full cry on the scent, and be all for mediation. I am still afraid
+of any attempt of the kind[706]." Very much the same opinion was held by
+Henry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has again passed by for the moment and
+we breathe more freely. But I think I wrote to you some time ago that if
+July found us still in Virginia, we could no longer escape interference.
+I think now that it is inevitable." A definite stand taken by the North
+on slavery would bring "the greatest strength in this running
+battle[707]."
+
+In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" the
+"pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and Mason
+and their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the Cabinet, reacting
+to the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the Northern defeats, and the
+distress in Lancashire, was seriously considering the possibility of
+taking some step toward mediation. On July 16, two days before the
+debate in the Commons, Slidell at last had his first personal contact
+with Napoleon, and came away from the interview with the conviction that
+"if England long persists in her inaction he [Napoleon] would be
+disposed to act without her." This was communicated to Mason on July
+20[708], but Slidell did _not_ as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that in
+the interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separate
+action by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special commercial
+treaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for Mexican affairs,"
+this last without any authority from Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary
+of State. On July 23 Slidell made a similar offer to Thouvenel and left
+with him a full memorandum of the Southern proposal[709]. He was
+cautioned that it was undesirable his special offer to France should
+reach the ears of the British Government--a caution which he transmitted
+to Mason on July 30, when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, but
+still without revealing the full extent of his own overtures
+to Napoleon.
+
+[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL (_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of Abraham
+Lincoln": The Century Co. New York_)]
+
+In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to pull off a
+special diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, and in line,
+also, with a persistent theory that the policy most likely to secure
+results was that of inducing France to act alone. But he was repeatedly
+running against advice that France must follow Great Britain, and the
+burden of his July 20 letter to Mason was an urging that a demand for
+recognition be now made simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel,
+not at all enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this was
+at least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the demand
+should be made at once[710]. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay,
+Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request for
+recognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the debate of
+July 18[711]. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell referring to their
+interview of February, 1862, in which he had urged the claims of the
+Confederacy to recognition and again presented them, asserting that the
+subsequent failure of Northern campaigns had demonstrated the power of
+the South to maintain its independence. The South, he wrote, asked
+neither aid nor intervention; it merely desired recognition and
+continuation of British neutrality[712]. On the same day Mason also
+asked for an interview[713], but received no reply until July 31, when
+Russell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until "after a
+Cabinet" and that an interview did not seem necessary[714].
+
+This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in uncertainty. It
+is significant that Russell took this moment to reply at last to
+Seward's protestations of May 28[715], which had been presented to him
+by Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at Washington that his delay
+had been due to a "waiting for military events," but that these had
+been indecisive. He gave a resume of all the sins of the North as a
+belligerent and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sins
+had not "induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from an
+impartial neutrality[716]." Here was no promise of a continuance of
+neutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one member of
+the Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote privately:
+
+     "It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and
+     purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been
+     plain enough that the whole question was whether the South
+     was earnest and united. That has now for some months been
+     demonstrated; and the fact thus established at once places
+     the question beyond the region even of the most brilliant
+     military successes[717]...."
+
+Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial situation.
+Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a change of
+policy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to Stuart:
+
+     "...I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under which I
+     should think the intervention of England in the quarrel
+     between the North and South advisable....
+
+     "But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is
+     apparent from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other
+     ports. And the distress in the manufacturing districts
+     threatens to be so great that a pressure may be put upon the
+     Government which they will find it difficult to resist[718]."
+
+In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the expense of
+the silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to the fury of
+Cobden[719]. Of this period Arnold later sarcastically remarked that,
+"The representatives of Lancashire in the Houses of Parliament did not
+permit the gaieties of the Exhibition season wholly to divert their
+attention from the distress which prevailed in the home county[720]."
+
+Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on August 1 a
+long appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, using exactly those
+arguments advanced by Lindsay in debate[721]. The answer, evidently
+given after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had been waiting,
+was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to Seward on July 28,
+called attention to the wholly contradictory statements of North and
+South on the status of the war, which, in British opinion, had not yet
+reached a stage positively indicative of the permanence of Southern
+independence. Great Britain, therefore, still "waited," but the time
+might come when Southern firmness in resistance would bring
+recognition[722]. The tone was more friendly than any expressions
+hitherto used by Russell to Southern representatives. The reply does not
+reveal the decision actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wrote
+to Argyll on August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on the
+question "to move or not to move, in the matter of the American Civil
+War...." He had come away before a decision when it became evident the
+prevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both parties
+are desirous of it." Gladstone thought this very foolish; he would have
+England approach France and Russia, but if they were not ready, wait
+until they were. "Something, I trust, will be done before the hot
+weather is over to stop these frightful horrors[723]."
+
+All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for the
+Cabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at present"
+and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. Apparently one
+Southern friend, on his own initiative, felt the need to splutter. On
+the next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the Lords moved for the
+production of Russell's correspondence with Mason, making a very
+confused speech. "Society and Parliament" were convinced the war ought
+to end in separation. At one time Campbell argued that reconquest of the
+South was impossible; at another that England should interfere to
+prevent such reconquest. Again he urged that the North was in a
+situation where she could not stop the war without aid from Europe in
+extricating her. Probably the motion was made merely to draw from
+Russell an official statement. Production of the papers was refused.
+Russell stated that the Government still maintained its policy of strict
+neutrality, that if any action was to be taken it should be by all the
+maritime powers and that if, in the parliamentary recess, any new policy
+seemed advisable he would first communicate with those powers. He also
+declared very positively that as yet no proposal had been received from
+any foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfect
+accord" between Great Britain and France[724].
+
+Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying and
+naturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that France
+would promptly make this clear[725]. But France gave no sign of lack of
+"perfect accord." On the contrary Thouvenel even discouraged Slidell
+from following Mason's example of demanding recognition and the formal
+communication was withheld, Mason acquiescing[726]. Slidell thought new
+disturbances in Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of French
+interest in the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustration
+of high hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:
+
+     "You will find by my official correspondence that we are
+     still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off
+     but a strong and continued current of important successes in
+     the field.
+
+     I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she
+     desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the
+     North shall be entirely exhausted and broken down.
+
+     Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen
+     except their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting
+     about their disinterested magnaminity and objection of all
+     other considerations than those dictated by a high-toned
+     morality, while their entire policy is marked by egotism and
+     duplicity. I am getting to be heartily tired of Paris[727]."
+
+On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day of the
+session an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire by
+authorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. Like
+Slidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that in August
+there had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for a change in
+British policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell had merely
+declared that the time for action was "not yet" come, but this was
+regarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in informed Southern nor
+Northern circles outside the Cabinet was there any suspicion, _except by
+Adams_, that in the six months elapsed since Lindsay had begun his
+movement the Ministry had been slowly progressing in thoughts of
+mediation.
+
+In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had been
+_favourable_ to mediation when "both parties were ready for it" and that
+such readiness would come soon most Members were convinced. This was a
+convenient and reasonable ground for postponing action but did not
+imply that if the conviction were unrealized no mediation would be
+attempted. McClellan, driven out of the Peninsula, had been removed, and
+August saw the Northern army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was now
+Washington and not Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely the
+North must soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reports
+early in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of a
+strong peace party.
+
+But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of enormous new
+Northern levies of men and of renewed courage[728]. By mid-August,
+writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any quantity of
+it "seems hopeless," and at the same time reported the peace
+party fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of the
+Administration[729]. As to recognition, Stuart believed: "There is
+nothing to be done in the presence of these enormous fresh levies, but
+to wait and see what the next two months will bring forth[730]." The
+hopes of the British Ministry based on a supposed Northern weariness of
+the war were being shattered. Argyll, having received from Sumner a
+letter describing the enthusiasm and determination of the North, wrote
+to Gladstone:
+
+     "It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the prospects
+     of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any
+     approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of
+     mediation[731]...."
+
+To this Gladstone replied:
+
+     "I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to
+     mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty
+     to determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I
+     cannot subscribe to the opinion of those who think that
+     Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness
+     these horrors and absurdities, which will soon have consumed
+     more men, and done ten times more mischief than the Crimean
+     War; but with the difference that there the end was
+     uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole
+     world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled to point
+     out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled by
+     the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any
+     interference or warning from third powers, and as far as
+     principle goes there never was a case in which warning was so
+     proper and becoming, because of the frightful misery which
+     this civil conflict has brought upon other countries, and
+     because of the unanimity with which it is condemned by the
+     civilized world[732]."
+
+The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were known to
+Russell early in August, came as a surprise to the British Ministry.
+Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. Lindsay's
+initial steps, resented as an effort in indirect diplomacy and not
+supported by France officially, had received prompt rejection
+accompanied by no indication of a desire to depart from strict
+neutrality. With the cessation in late June of the Northern victorious
+progress in arms and in the face of increasing distress in Lancashire,
+the second answer to Lindsay was less dogmatic. As given by Palmerston
+the Government desired to offer mediation, but saw no present hope of
+doing so successfully. Finally the Government asked for a free hand,
+making no pledges. Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but when
+August dawned plans were already on foot for a decided change. The
+secret was well kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait on
+events, two days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondence
+with Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, was
+writing to Palmerston:
+
+     "Mercier's notion that we should make some move in October
+     agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England
+     before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of
+     course the war may flag before that.
+
+     "I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice
+     should be the first step; but we must be prepared to answer
+     the question on what basis are we to negotiate[733]?"
+
+The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to come, not
+from Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the South, but from
+the British Ministry itself.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 654: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 204.]
+
+[Footnote 655: _De Bow's Review_, Dec., 1857, p. 592.]
+
+[Footnote 656: Cited in Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_,
+p. 66.]
+
+[Footnote 657: _Ibid._, p. 64.]
+
+[Footnote 658: Cited in Smith, _Parties and Slavery_, 68. A remarkable
+exposition of the "power of cotton" and the righteousness of slavery was
+published in Augusta, Georgia, in 1860, in the shape of a volume of nine
+hundred pages, entitled _Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments_.
+This reproduced seven separate works by distinguished Southern writers
+analysing Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral and
+political philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology,
+international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united publication
+was to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of slavery, the
+prosperity of America as based on cotton, and the power of the United
+States as dependent on its control of the cotton supply. The editor was
+E.N. Elliot, President of Planters' College, Mississippi.]
+
+[Footnote 659: Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p.
+237.]
+
+[Footnote 660: _Am. Hist. Rev._, XVIII, p. 785. Bunch to Russell. No.
+51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here printed this letter shows two
+dates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the original in the Public Record Office
+is dated Dec. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 661: pp. 94-5. Article by W.H. Chase of Florida.]
+
+[Footnote 662: Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, learned from
+Toombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to Yancey. Had he been
+instructed to negotiate commercial treaties with European powers? Mr.
+Yancey had received no intimation from any source that authority to
+negotiate commercial treaties would devolve upon the Commission. 'What
+then' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be your instructions?' The President, Mr.
+Yancey said, seemed to be impressed with the importance of the cotton
+crop. A considerable part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and a
+full crop will soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton,
+so far as he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacy
+expected of the Commission" (Du Bose, _Life and Times of Yancey_, 599).]
+
+[Footnote 663: F.O., Am., Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to Russell, June 5,
+1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the South in industries
+other than its staple products is well illustrated by a request from
+Col. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the Confederacy, to Mason, urging him
+to secure _three_ ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote,
+"The reduction of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (Mason
+Papers. Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861).]
+
+[Footnote 664: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. Bunch to
+Russell, March 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 665: p. 130]
+
+[Footnote 666: The two principal British works are: Arnold, _The History
+of the Cotton Famine_, London, 1864; and Watts, _The Facts of the Cotton
+Famine_, Manchester, 1866. A remarkable statistical analysis of the
+world cotton trade was printed in London in 1863, by a Southerner
+seeking to use his study as an argument for British mediation. George
+McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_.]
+
+[Footnote 667: Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, pp. 263-4.]
+
+[Footnote 668: Lack of authentic statistics on indirect interests make
+this a guess by the _Times_. Other estimates run from one-seventh to
+one-fourth.]
+
+[Footnote 669: Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the Civil War," p. 408
+(in _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_, Vol. 16), 78.8 per cent.
+(Hereafter cited as Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton_.) Scherer, _Cotton as a
+World Power_, p. 264, states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, _Cotton
+Famine_, pp. 36-39, estimates 83 per cent.]
+
+[Footnote 670: Great Britain ordinarily ran more than twice as many
+spindles as all the other European nations combined. Schmidt, _Wheat and
+Cotton_, p. 407, _note_.]
+
+[Footnote 671: This Return for April is noteworthy as the first
+differentiating commerce with the North and the South.]
+
+[Footnote 672: These facts are drawn from Board of Trade Reports, and
+from the files of the _Economist_, London, and _Hunt's Merchants
+Magazine_, New York. I am also indebted to a manuscript thesis by T.P.
+Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War Blockade on the Cotton Trade of
+the United Kingdom," Stanford University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presented
+at Harvard University a thesis for the Ph.D degree, entitled "The
+Influence of Trade (in Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations,
+1829-1846," but has not yet carried his more matured study to the Civil
+War period.]
+
+[Footnote 673: Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 89.]
+
+[Footnote 674: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to Russell, Jan. 8,
+1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were being transformed to
+corn production and that even the cotton on hand was deteriorating
+because of the lack of bagging, shut off by the blockade.]
+
+[Footnote 675: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 81.]
+
+[Footnote 676: Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, March 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 677: Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. _Monthly Accounts
+of Trade and Navigation_ (in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_.
+Vol. LV, and 1863, _Commons_, Vol. LXV).]
+
+[Footnote 678: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, pp. 174 and 215.]
+
+[Footnote 679: In 1861 there were 26 Members from Lancashire in the
+Commons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. The suffrage was such
+that only 1 in every 27 of the population had the vote. For all England
+the proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, 359). _Parliamentary Papers_,
+1867-8, _Lords_, Vol. XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs and
+Counties of England."]
+
+[Footnote 680: The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's "Reports on
+Distress in the Manufacturing Districts," 1862. _Parliamentary Papers,
+Commons_, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. _Ibid._, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from
+"Summary of the Number of Paupers in the Distressed Districts," from
+November, 1861, to December, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. LII. Farnall's
+reports are less exact than the _Summary_ since at times Liverpool is
+included, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do not
+appear in his reports until 1864. The _Summary_ consistently includes
+Liverpool, and fluctuates violently for that city whenever weather
+conditions interfered with the ordinary business of the port. It is a
+striking illustration of the narrow margin of living wages among the
+dockers of Liverpool that an annotation at the foot of a column of
+statistics should explain an increase in one week of 21,000 persons
+thrown on poor relief to the "prevalence of a strong east wind" which
+prevented vessels from getting up to the docks.]
+
+[Footnote 681: Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 309. To Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 682: The historians who see only economic causes have
+misinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton famine." Recently,
+also, there has been advanced an argument that "wheat defeated
+cotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England itself during the war by
+pro-Northern friends who pointed to the great flow of wheat from the
+North as essential in a short-crop situation in Great Britain. Mr.
+Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American
+Relations during the Civil War," a paper read before the American
+Historical Association, Dec. 1917, and since published in the _Iowa
+Journal of History and Politics_, July, 1918, presents with much care
+all the important statistics for both commodities, but his conclusions
+seem to me wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependence
+on Northern wheat ... operated as a contributing influence in keeping
+the British government officially neutral ..." (p. 423), a cautious
+statement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did not
+escape the attention of the English government," since leading journals
+referred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: "But it was
+Northern wheat that may well be regarded as the decisive factor,
+counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in keeping the British
+government from recognizing the Confederacy" (p. 437). "That the wheat
+situation must have exerted a profound influence on the government ..."
+(p. 438). And finally: "In this contest wheat won, demonstrating its
+importance as a world power of greater significance than cotton" (p.
+439). This interesting thesis has been accepted by William Trimble in
+"Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the United States,
+1862-1902" (_Am. Hist. Assoc. Reports_, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I think
+Mr. Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognition
+of the South was in governmental consideration. He places it in
+midsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of that
+year. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a parity,
+since the former could not be obtained in quantity from _any_ source
+before 1864, while wheat, though coming from the United States, could
+have been obtained from interior Russia, as well as from the maritime
+provinces, in increased supply if Britain had been willing to pay the
+added price of inland transport. There was a real "famine" of cotton;
+there would have been none of wheat, merely a higher cost. (This fact, a
+vital one in determining influence, was brought out by George McHenry in
+the columns of _The Index_, Sept. 18, 1862.) (3) The fact, in spite of
+all Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently a
+subject of governmental concern in _memoranda_ and in private notes
+between members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one single case of
+the mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in negation of Mr.
+Schmidt's thesis.]
+
+[Footnote 683: Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited in _Hunt's
+Merchants Magazine_, Vol. 45, pp. 326-7.]
+
+[Footnote 684: _Ibid._, p. 442.]
+
+[Footnote 685: e.g., The _Times_, Sept. 19, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 686: To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_,
+XLVI, p. 97.]
+
+[Footnote 687: _Ibid._, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. 157.]
+
+[Footnote 688: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to Russell, June 25,
+1862. He reported a general burning of cotton estimating the amount so
+destroyed as nearly one million bales.]
+
+[Footnote 689: Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression that England
+was at first unanimous in attributing the cotton disaster to the War.
+Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was the general public belief
+but not that of the well informed. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that it
+was not until January, 1863, that it was "begun to be understood" that
+famine was not wholly caused by the War, but partly by glut.]
+
+[Footnote 690: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. Debate on "The
+Distress in the Manufacturing Districts." The principal speakers were
+Egerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. Another debate on "The Cotton
+Supply" took place June 19, 1862, with no criticism of America. _Ibid._,
+CLXVII, pp. 754-93.]
+
+[Footnote 691: See _ante_, p. 12.]
+
+[Footnote 692: Gladstone Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 693: F.O., Am., Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to Russell, May 12,
+1862. A description of these orders as inclusive of "foreign owned"
+cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had been purchased and
+stored, waiting export, by British citizens. Molyneaux at Savannah made
+a similar report. _Ibid._, Vol. 849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 694: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 214-18.]
+
+[Footnote 695: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 228, quotes a song in the
+"improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where operatives were being given a
+leisure-time education. One verse was:
+
+     "Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are
+     the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by
+     English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war
+     is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for
+     more."
+]
+
+[Footnote 696: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVII, p. 1213.]
+
+[Footnote 697: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
+Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 1.
+Reed. June 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 698: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 699: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 352. The exact
+length of Thouvenel's stay in London is uncertain, but he had arrived by
+July 10 and was back in Paris by July 21. The text of the telegram is in
+a letter to Flahault of July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself very
+averse to any move which may lead to war with America, "an adventure
+more serious than that of Mexico" (_Ibid._, p. 353).]
+
+[Footnote 700: _Ibid._, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See also resume in
+Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, II, 55.]
+
+[Footnote 701: Farnall's First Report. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
+_Commons_, Vol. XLIX.]
+
+[Footnote 702: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, 1862.
+
+     "Public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for
+     the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not
+     be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from
+     the U.S. ..."
+
+     "However, the real question of the day is cotton...."
+
+     "The problem is of how to get over _this next_ winter. The
+     prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy."
+
+     "...If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton
+     for England before the winter, you will have done a greater
+     service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century;
+     but nobody expects it."
+]
+
+[Footnote 703: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 166. To his son, July 18,
+1862. He noted that the news had come by the _Glasgow_ which had sailed
+for England on July 5, whereas the papers contained also a telegram from
+McClellan's head-quarters, dated July 7, but "the people here are fully
+ready to credit anything that is not favourable." Newspaper headings
+were "Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on a
+steamer." _Ibid._, 167. Henry Adams to C.F. Adams, Jr., July 19.]
+
+[Footnote 704: Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract from the _Dubuque
+Sun_, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a repudiation of all debts to
+England, and solemnly held this up as evidence of the lack of financial
+morality in America. If he knew of this the editor of the small-town
+American paper must have been tickled at the reverberations of
+his humour.]
+
+[Footnote 705: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, for the entire
+debate.]
+
+[Footnote 706: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 707: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 168-9. To Charles
+Francis Adams, Jr., July 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 708: Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's letter to
+Mason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of
+Napoleon III," _Am. Hist. Rev._, Jan., 1921, p. 263. C.F. Adams, "A
+Crisis in Downing Street," Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, p.
+379, is in error in dating this letter April 21, an error for which the
+present writer is responsible, having misread Slidell's difficult
+hand-writing.]
+
+[Footnote 709: Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to Benjamin, July
+25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned the details of
+Slidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of July 20, wrote:
+"There is an important part of our conversation that I will give you
+through Mr. Mann," who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London to
+enlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go to
+London, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he could
+guess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sent
+to him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything on
+Mexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" to
+France. In C.F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street," p. 381, it is
+stated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time of
+Mercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a result
+of Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin's
+instructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, while
+it was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it will
+no doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informed
+Mercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as in
+Chapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons at
+their face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothing
+in French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour,
+while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it.]
+
+[Footnote 710: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 711: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19.]
+
+[Footnote 712: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
+No. 7.]
+
+[Footnote 713: _Ibid._, No. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 714: _Ibid._, No. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 715: See _ante_, p. 18.]
+
+[Footnote 716: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further
+Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States." No. 2.
+Russell to Stuart, July 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 717: Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 718: Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 719: Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, II, p. 276. July
+31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 720: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 175.]
+
+[Footnote 721: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition."
+No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 722: _Ibid._, No. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 723: Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, p.
+191.]
+
+[Footnote 724: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXVIII, p. 1177 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 725: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 726: F.O., France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley to Russell, Aug.
+8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, 1862. Mason to
+Slidell, Aug. 21.]
+
+[Footnote 727: Richardson, II, p. 315.]
+
+[Footnote 728: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 729: _Ibid._, To Russell, Aug. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 730: _Ibid._, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing to be done" refers,
+not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July that the time was ripe
+for recognition. He was wholly at variance with Lyons on
+British policy.]
+
+[Footnote 731: Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 732: _Ibid._, Aug. 29, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 733: Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN
+
+The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmental
+inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of the
+British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that
+direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna,
+was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private
+correspondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have
+made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaning
+McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign
+he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his
+[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not last
+long[735]." Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _The
+Index_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom and
+necessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declared
+rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense of
+England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of close
+sympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to,
+in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the end
+the chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognition
+seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation
+because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public
+manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].
+
+The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are,
+however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were
+based on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan
+now in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering
+it have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is
+here proposed to review them in the light of all available important
+materials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with more
+citation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tell
+the story of this, the most critical period in the entire course of
+British attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, Great
+Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the
+American conflict[739].
+
+Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18,
+and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the
+North stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he
+wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough
+could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will
+only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts.
+The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this
+very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure
+governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the
+South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but
+ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing British
+neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's
+fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward.
+On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining
+the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy
+should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to
+Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat
+discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the
+possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of
+such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It does
+not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given
+serious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys a
+very erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch very
+specifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that if
+approached by the British Government with propositions implying
+a purpose:
+
+     "To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit
+     or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to
+     debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or
+     transmit, any communication of the kind.... If you are asked
+     an opinion what reception the President would give to such a
+     proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not
+     instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it
+     would be entertained."
+
+This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunction
+with other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adams
+was immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive," wrote
+Seward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with
+the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you
+will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]."
+
+This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any
+intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully
+committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if the
+need arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least now
+knew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction he
+held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. He
+did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the
+Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that
+the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the
+presumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could not
+have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made
+owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation
+and that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was as
+yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.
+
+Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their
+determination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from
+Washington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier,
+that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even
+though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong
+personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially
+any by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell as
+well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with
+Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of
+straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This,
+thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an
+attempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full
+month in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue an
+emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of
+Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at
+best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to
+influence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed with
+Stuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think," he wrote, "we
+must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before
+we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]." But
+this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October
+would be a "ripe time." Soon he was journeying to the Continent in
+attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great
+plan[751].
+
+Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that date
+he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel,
+_privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston
+commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall
+Jackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. In
+October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]." Similar reactions
+were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same
+reasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:
+
+     "The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
+     Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
+     Confederates."
+
+     "If this should happen, would it not be time for us to
+     consider whether in such a state of things England and France
+     might not address the contending parties and recommend an
+     arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"
+
+Russell replied:
+
+     "... I agree with you that the time is come for offering
+     mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the
+     recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree
+     further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to
+     recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For
+     the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must
+     have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit
+     me for the meeting[755]."
+
+The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the
+unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This,
+considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by
+Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held a
+long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation
+as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "to
+wait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercier
+apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the
+Northern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace party
+gains the ascendant," Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far
+committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be set
+aside." He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and France
+might expect if they recognized the South.
+
+     "I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation,
+     and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and
+     let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the
+     recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such
+     recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it."
+
+     Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.
+
+     "...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
+     Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
+     mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal...."
+
+     "It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
+     the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]."
+
+Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell
+had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than
+formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for
+Foreign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on American
+policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded
+conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will,
+if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was still
+more important. It was already known through the French press that a
+sharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and all
+signs pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would exclude
+Thouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford to
+discount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready to
+go--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidently
+in Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26.
+
+     "I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough
+     for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which
+     Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the
+     interval between this time and the middle of next month.
+     These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the
+     first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to
+     recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of
+     separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of
+     neutrality[757]."
+
+The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication to
+Palmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to be
+sent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone.
+Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen.
+"She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I said
+that should be done, but we must consult France first." Also enclosed
+was a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as just
+returned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken of
+the present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europe
+would have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759].
+Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved the
+plans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well to
+include Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she might
+probably decline." As to the other European powers the matter could wait
+for an "after communication." Yet that Palmerston still wished to go
+slowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:
+
+     "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the
+     north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great
+     effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a
+     great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and
+     the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other
+     hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and
+     see what may follow[760]...."
+
+Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France in
+Russell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had not
+been sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26
+indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that on
+September 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date for
+his departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out for
+an opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much out
+in his reckoning[761]." Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind and
+now thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being
+"particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word
+_separation_," but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. With
+full approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote to
+Gladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreement
+that an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers,
+but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of the
+Cabinet[763]." Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exact
+nature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughly
+worked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown by
+Palmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which is
+outlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade,
+and negotiation on the basis of separation[765].
+
+Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposed
+overture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would be
+opposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queen
+at Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russell
+opposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion in
+this wise:
+
+     "...I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition
+     of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid
+     drifting into it."
+
+     "...I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to
+     depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you
+     and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong
+     antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South,
+     and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such
+     general approval from Parliament, the press, and the
+     public[766]."
+
+But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days later
+he wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:
+
+     "I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it
+     decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to
+     do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it;
+     and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It
+     appears to me a great mistake[767]."
+
+Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrived
+confused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of a
+check to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought the
+battle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Maryland
+campaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the old
+defensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, for
+McClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered for
+an advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory and
+was now doubtful whether the time had come after all for European
+overtures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:
+
+     "MY DEAR RUSSELL,
+
+     "I return you Granville's letter which contains much
+     deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that
+     the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be
+     accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It
+     would give the South in principle the points for which they
+     are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come
+     from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the
+     principle for which they have been fighting so long as they
+     had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they
+     could carry their point. The condition of things therefore
+     which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be
+     great success of the South against the North. That state of
+     things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has
+     been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course
+     of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about
+     to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer
+     light upon future prospects.
+
+     "As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns
+     following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the
+     South, it is quite true that we should have less to care
+     about that resentment in the spring when communication with
+     Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily
+     operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are
+     cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.
+
+     "But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time
+     by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would
+     probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like
+     one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would
+     render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the
+     acknowledgment of which would have caused it.
+
+     "The first communication to be made by England and France to
+     the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of
+     mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not
+     come when it might be well for the two parties to consider
+     whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any
+     other result than separation; and whether it might not
+     therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must
+     necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at
+     once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of
+     separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of
+     the contest, however long it may last.
+
+     "The best thing would be that the two parties should settle
+     details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps
+     with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this
+     might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would
+     do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An
+     armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades,
+     would be all in favour of the North, especially if New
+     Orleans remained in the hands of the North.
+
+     "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be
+     cleared up by some more decided events between the contending
+     armies...."
+
+     PALMERSTON[768]."
+
+Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour
+of cautious delay. American military events more than Granville's
+arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much
+more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. Cornewall
+Lewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmitted
+to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also,
+momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:
+
+     "This American question must be well sifted. I send you a
+     letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ..."
+
+     "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia
+     holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the
+     rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the
+     16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day,
+     but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish
+     to stop it, write to Hammond[769]."
+
+From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that
+Russell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed
+private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was
+waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If so
+his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French
+Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any
+other matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal
+retirement from office did not take place until October 24. Several
+Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into
+retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The
+Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the
+last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as
+soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a
+serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was
+more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of
+previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].
+
+Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while
+wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that
+England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or
+private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for
+granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by
+the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of
+Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for
+Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to
+return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:
+
+     "I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
+     very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
+     proposing to North and South to come to terms.
+
+     "Two things however must be made clear:
+
+     (i) That we propose separation,
+
+     (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
+     ourselves[775]."
+
+How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made
+clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a
+memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines
+of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became
+evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart,
+written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a
+suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell
+now thought:
+
+     "If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be
+     adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
+     North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
+     course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition
+     if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over
+     on the 25th[777]."
+
+British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign
+Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and
+vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side,
+if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to be
+considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content
+with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already
+troubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This was
+Gladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was
+devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis
+had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still
+greater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at
+first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the
+intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line
+earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground.
+His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was
+certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental
+action. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early
+recognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressure
+is not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truth
+is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in
+complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from
+Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any
+hesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention
+in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make
+the good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did
+not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not
+yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the
+traditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken without
+authorization and "off his own bat."
+
+The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy,
+immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general
+belief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of raw
+cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them
+to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be
+no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the other
+hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone was
+merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and
+Russell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "your
+old acquaintance and friend[780]." The leading newspapers while at first
+accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and
+generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was
+still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made
+clear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to be
+supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his
+unusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however much
+disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was
+reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the
+plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Six
+days after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, a
+memorandum on America[782].
+
+This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its
+power to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion
+of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be
+wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing
+of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was
+no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the
+loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile
+war--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that the
+Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty
+to propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmly
+the advantages of peace[783]." This was a far cry from mediation and
+recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an
+armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about
+and making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly
+negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is
+to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption and
+now determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply in
+a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet
+decision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford on
+October 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that
+it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying
+Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office
+memorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorously
+maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ plan
+of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his
+speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.
+
+Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather he
+treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the
+Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground
+of British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain his
+arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet
+acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was
+his private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must
+acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to be
+undecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when
+it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of
+international law that the independence of the Southern States had been
+established[786]." In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet
+decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet
+traditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, but
+excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had
+forced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose
+and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. Meanwhile
+Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in
+uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult,
+indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This was
+done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby
+was averse to action.
+
+     "He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_
+     recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the
+     ground that recognition would merely irritate the North
+     without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a
+     single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present
+     temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the
+     mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair
+     basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having
+     that which the other declared was vitally essential to its
+     existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out
+     the stipulations of a treaty of peace.... The recognition of
+     the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant
+     to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of
+     hostility towards the North[789]."
+
+More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess,
+fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis was
+Clarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of his
+male friends[790]." They were in constant communication as the Cabinet
+crisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately after
+Palmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewis
+circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. He
+agreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation in
+America, but added with sarcasm:
+
+     "A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the
+     historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war
+     should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between
+     the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any
+     proposal of the English Government will be made, not by
+     dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent
+     partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal
+     indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it
+     would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it
+     is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be
+     addressed."
+
+Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably was
+intended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argument
+against, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity of
+bitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by the
+belligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the
+only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for
+the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary
+and sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strict
+neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as
+yet. Statesmanship required great caution; "... looking to the probable
+consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we
+may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the
+chances of good, and whether it is not--
+
+     'Better to endure the ills we have
+     Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'"
+
+At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on
+the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received
+at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British
+special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States.
+Anderson's reports emphasized three points:
+
+(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of
+ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;
+
+(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing
+cotton for a long time to come;
+
+(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of
+vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met
+with enthusiasm[792].
+
+This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for
+Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on
+Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still
+argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm
+and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition
+"would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now
+heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged
+to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the
+ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was
+the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with
+an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons
+gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the
+extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without
+Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for
+the immediate present, writing to Russell:
+
+     "Your description of the state of things between the two
+     parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much
+     inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no
+     step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition
+     with any advantage."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position
+     would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree
+     to an armistice but whether they might not turn their
+     thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the
+     answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The
+     Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement
+     would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say
+     their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North
+     of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and
+     should only have pledged each party more strongly to the
+     object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined
+     to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the
+     Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am
+     very much come back to our original view of the matter, that
+     we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall
+     have taken a more decided turn[796]."
+
+By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinet
+to consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though a
+few members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russell
+still justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and the
+majority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action was
+possible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared that
+Russell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yielding
+and did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoon
+of this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon the
+speeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell and
+was informed that the Government was not inclined at present to change
+its policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appeared
+to Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain and
+has been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams'
+confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparently
+unconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily lead
+to the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, require
+any departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one side
+Russell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing an
+outworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europe
+and of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, as
+insisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to the
+preservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote his
+approval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of
+"no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admitted
+it" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: "... to talk to the
+belligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking the
+winds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]."
+
+This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparently
+had come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence of
+Russell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of the
+twenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I put
+it off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for the
+present, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons...."
+
+     "G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never
+     thought of making. He says I propose that England and France
+     and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to
+     suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal.
+
+     "I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and
+     England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would
+     not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any
+     specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G.
+     Lewis' invention.
+
+     "I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is
+     much pleased[802]."
+
+Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made by
+England and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than five
+powers would not do." But whatever the number required he still desired
+a proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to the
+informal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum in
+answer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctly
+interpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "in
+contemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. The
+advisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted,
+was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved this
+advisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer to
+Lewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definite
+plans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus by
+letter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gave
+notice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone also
+circulated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England,
+France and Russia[804].
+
+Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by his
+Cabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merely
+putting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a member
+of the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and on
+October 24 wrote to Lewis:
+
+     "Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American
+     question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny
+     [Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is
+     prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in
+     his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for
+     yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to
+     your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position
+     we should occupy, either in having presented our face
+     gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in
+     being asked what practical solution we had to propose after
+     an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no
+     discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the
+     Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to
+     draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]."
+
+On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell's
+newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:
+
+     "The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable
+     soreness, for which you are specially bound to make
+     allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He
+     had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out
+     of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was
+     not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is
+     therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a
+     deal more training before he can appear in public again."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as
+     effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by
+     Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the
+     Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did
+     so without in the smallest degree committing either the
+     Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]."
+
+In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell's
+complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but
+there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which,
+if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question.
+This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect
+overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an
+opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended upon
+as an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this was
+written the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon's
+silence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the
+succession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertion
+of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition"
+was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it should
+not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show
+pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]." But this yielding to
+the Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and
+his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.
+
+On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which
+American affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France and
+Russia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he had
+no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a
+proposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for the
+present excitement to calm down[809]...." The next day Cowley reported
+that Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put an
+end to the War," but that he was himself doubtful whether it would not
+be better to "wait a little longer," and in any case if overtures to
+America were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain and
+France in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this was
+exactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and if
+officially notified to the British Government would require a renewed
+consideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had been
+going on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push.
+October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of the
+Emperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about an
+armistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he had
+now been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor's
+orders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers in
+England and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the three
+powers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspension
+of the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to European
+commerce[812].
+
+Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was not
+regarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:
+
+     "As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States,
+     we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets,
+     which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as
+     would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is
+     it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to
+     be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would
+     give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they
+     may want?"
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of
+     runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal
+     which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England
+     would approve of. The French Government are more free from
+     the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these
+     matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would
+     be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over
+     before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to
+     put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning
+     by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from
+     that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]."
+
+But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort of
+proposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:
+
+     "My notion is that as there is little chance of our good
+     offices being accepted in America we should make them such as
+     would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to
+     answer the French proposal therefore by saying,
+
+     "That in offering our good offices we ought to require both
+     parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any
+     terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the
+     Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there
+     are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.
+
+     "We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it
+     would be essential in our view, that after what has taken
+     place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation
+     being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain
+     emancipated her slaves in 1833.
+
+     "If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
+     slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.
+
+     "This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the
+     Cabinet.
+
+     "It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
+     probably the South will refuse it[814]."
+
+Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and
+South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them
+certain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager to
+present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the
+previous decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom
+of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of
+the French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and of
+Russell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston,
+again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another
+memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words.
+This was in the main an historical resume of past British policy in
+relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such
+cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a
+revolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on.
+Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, by
+legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own
+interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn
+the just gratitude of the civilized world." But the question, as he had
+previously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of a
+concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of the
+five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to
+set in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to
+satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first
+to satisfy one another." Who could tell what divergence might arise on
+the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might
+find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?
+
+Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its
+appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international
+law. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, there
+appeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus," on "The
+International Doctrine of Recognition," outlining in briefer form
+exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and
+advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality.
+"Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughter
+who was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were all
+trained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that premature
+action by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the
+"Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]."
+
+Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisis
+was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offer
+was not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two days
+the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewis
+described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that
+Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the
+effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French
+proposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would not
+cause irritation[819]."
+
+     "Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain
+     his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the
+     recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable
+     opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen
+     their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France,
+     Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with
+     France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of
+     separating France and England. He therefore advised that the
+     proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed
+     Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal.
+     His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy
+     with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of
+     mitigating it [_sic_].
+
+     "The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who
+     proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a
+     stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who
+     supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who
+     expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the
+     proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a
+     suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly
+     unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was
+     no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time,
+     Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was
+     against being a party to the representation, and he
+     capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it
+     certainly was not hearty ... I ought to add that, after the
+     Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had
+     been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular
+     sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation,
+     and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came
+     rather late ... I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_
+     at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of
+     the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He
+     admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from
+     Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of
+     displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive
+     was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article
+     in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I
+     take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of
+     the Cabinet[820]."
+
+Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief
+account:
+
+     "Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again
+     to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the
+     business of America. But I will send you definite
+     intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right._
+     Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well.
+     Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without
+     resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we
+     decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in
+     terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov.
+     13. I think the French will make our answer about America
+     public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not
+     take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may
+     themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur
+     with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to
+     Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]."
+
+The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France
+and in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent views
+and humane intentions," agreed that "if the steps proposed were to be
+taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" but
+remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia
+wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to
+hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any
+overture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of its
+being accepted by the two contending parties[822]." The argument of
+Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though
+earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due to
+the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St.
+Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answer
+to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason
+for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision
+within the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia acceded
+England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion,
+adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result
+reached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his view
+than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at
+the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As to
+the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it
+smoother[824]."
+
+Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinet
+decision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this country
+against interference[825]," an estimate justified if the more important
+journals are taken into account but not true of all. The _Times_ of
+November 13 declared:
+
+     "We are convinced that the present is not the moment for
+     these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that
+     by means of their own internal action the Americans may
+     themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe
+     could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it
+     would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our
+     self-denial at such a moment as this.... We quite agree with
+     Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on
+     turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with
+     the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our
+     back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in
+     defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are
+     as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty
+     or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as
+     this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia
+     belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor
+     of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits
+     in this American mediation league."
+
+This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no English
+statesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made in
+such a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. On
+the other hand the _Herald_, always intense in its pro-Southern
+utterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itself
+unable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positively
+informed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed to
+them," the _Herald_ declared, "we must hope against hope that they are
+innocent." If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire
+(depicted in lurid colours):
+
+     "A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon
+     them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and
+     delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the
+     task before them and the power to perform it in their
+     hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven
+     cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country,
+     dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might
+     do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the
+     infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"
+
+In the non-political _Army and Navy Gazette_ the returned editor, W.H.
+Russell, but lately the _Times_ correspondent in America, jeered at the
+American uproar that might now be expected against France instead of
+England: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New York
+Scarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, and
+threatens him with the loss of his throne," but the British public must
+expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be
+ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. _Blackwood's_ for
+November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act.
+The _Edinburgh_ for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry
+and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of
+the war. _The Index_ naturally frothed in angry disappointment,
+continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial
+decision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, or
+the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell might
+contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his
+country and her ally[829]." An editorial from the _Richmond_ (Virginia)
+_Whig_ was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as
+"two old painted mummies," who secretly were rejoiced at the war in
+America as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, and
+expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North
+and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation,
+said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous
+fear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of the
+bluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]." Even as late as May of the year
+following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "a
+statesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" was
+primarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct of
+Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never
+shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of
+these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than
+useless[832]."
+
+_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet
+Russell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed,
+wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the
+only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the
+Emperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had been
+led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--so
+much so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone's
+attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was at
+last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer
+to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on
+American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind was
+of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--a
+plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment,
+save to his correspondent.
+
+In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the
+public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new
+policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when
+the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.
+Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"
+were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it
+would only do harm until there was a change of Government in
+Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation
+useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and
+that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the
+blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].
+Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of
+conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in
+comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern
+arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a
+single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].
+In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and
+England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British
+feeling[839].
+
+The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of
+European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It
+expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to
+animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally
+responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no
+cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific
+instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to
+present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward
+believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He
+wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession
+intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget
+them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by
+Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to
+the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that
+answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that
+Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].
+
+So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribed
+to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for
+immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons,
+that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his
+return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening
+the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on
+by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and
+directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the
+tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his
+resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused
+both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control
+which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy
+"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much
+more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man
+more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years
+ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell
+wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a
+remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward
+had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in
+the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"
+being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief
+in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.
+
+Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a
+polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of
+armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The
+projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed
+destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the
+British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South
+was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some
+time come when European recognition would have to be given the
+Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of
+the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the
+attitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their
+sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in
+evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the
+expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations
+_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result
+in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised
+good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though
+personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in
+the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which
+determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw
+his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover
+both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as
+the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were
+brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true
+policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].
+
+For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous
+crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been
+adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that
+Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued
+between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other
+respects the independence of the South would have been established.
+Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of
+life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed
+that Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to
+servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that
+proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against
+any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there
+serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil
+War[845].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March
+16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a
+purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the
+Confederacy.]
+
+[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report
+of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his
+speech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit to
+England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not
+come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends.
+(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they
+are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't
+say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I
+am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]
+
+[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much
+length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.
+Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his
+_Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp.
+400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis
+in Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp.
+372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion
+of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]
+
+[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.]
+
+[Footnote 741: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp.
+165-168.]
+
+[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. First
+printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]
+
+[Footnote 743: _Ibid._, p. 390.]
+
+[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32.]
+
+[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862.
+Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the
+newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on
+consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only
+make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next
+spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21,
+1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer
+of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open
+the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before
+leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on
+mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager
+for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the
+other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to
+yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right
+(_Ibid._, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).]
+
+[Footnote 748: _Ibid._, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.]
+
+[Footnote 749: _Ibid._, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22,
+Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely
+political."]
+
+[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a
+letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an
+accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the
+war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).]
+
+[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes
+the date of Russell's letter.]
+
+[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360.]
+
+[Footnote 755: _Ibid._, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This
+is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to
+mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.]
+
+[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.]
+
+[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.]
+
+[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the
+exact text paraphrased by Morley.]
+
+[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire
+letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes
+much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the
+Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that
+she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to
+Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have
+counted for little.]
+
+[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is
+printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.]
+
+[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized,
+(1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering
+good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much
+importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of
+success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in
+which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed
+likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just
+ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the
+action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay
+it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political
+necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian
+Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.)
+Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter
+from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow
+expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to
+introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the
+differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This
+seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to
+Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of
+extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct.
+3, 1862 (O.S.).)]
+
+[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, pp. 438-9.]
+
+[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 773: _Ibid._, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 774: Even the _Edinburgh Review_ for October, 1862, discussed
+recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against
+such action.]
+
+[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for
+the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to
+postpone. This study reverses the roles.]
+
+[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see _ante_ p. 41. Stuart to Lyons.
+The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.]
+
+[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862.
+Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.]
+
+[Footnote 778: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 79. Morley calls this
+utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who
+himself later so characterized it.]
+
+[Footnote 779: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 402.]
+
+[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to a
+Ministerial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipation
+proclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as a
+wise measure.]
+
+[Footnote 781: The _Times_, October 9 and 10, while surprised that
+Gladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech as
+equivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the _Times_ makes no
+further comment of moment until November 13. The _Morning Post_
+(regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October
+9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with much
+laudation of Gladstone's northern tour but _with no mention whatever_ of
+his utterances on America.]
+
+[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining that
+he had intended no "official utterance," and pleaded that Spence, whom
+he had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words
+(Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. "... Still you must
+allow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which all
+speakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made a
+nation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think the
+Cabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this very
+topic" _(Ibid.)_]
+
+[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the texts
+of the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September
+22, and an extract from the _National Intelligencer_ of September 26,
+giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists.]
+
+[Footnote 784: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 80, narrates the "tradition."
+Walpole, _Twenty-five Years_, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also
+_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later an
+anonymous writer in the _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exact
+details of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited in
+Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, pp. 404-5.) C.F. Adams,
+_Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, Ch. III, repeats the tradition,
+but in _A Crisis in Downing Street_ he completely refutes his earlier
+opinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter,
+especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis acted
+solely on his own initiative.]
+
+[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the _Edinburgh_, for April, 1861, Lewis
+had written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears never
+to have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquer
+the South.]
+
+[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 407.]
+
+[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized
+Gladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice.
+Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to
+Lewis' speech. Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon,
+Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think
+this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of
+the falsity of Palmerston's initiative. _Ibid._, p. 267.]
+
+[Footnote 788: _The Index_, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of
+Gladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy,
+asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly
+interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitter
+enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord
+Russell...." Throughout the war, Russell, to _The Index_, was the evil
+genius of the Government.]
+
+[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 790: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 279.]
+
+[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 792: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. I XII.
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862.
+Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British
+subjects into the Northern Army.]
+
+[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston's
+organ, the _Morning Post_, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with
+a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was also
+reflected upon, but less severely.]
+
+[Footnote 797: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]
+
+[Footnote 798: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223.
+Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in _A Crisis in Downing
+Street_, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was
+"to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positive
+assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.]
+
+[Footnote 799: _The Index_, Oct. 23, 1862. "... while our people are
+starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry
+have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands,
+talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and
+wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up."]
+
+[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 801: _Ibid._, To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862."]
+
+[Footnote 804: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84. Morley was the first to make
+clear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hitherto
+accepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives a
+resume of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc., and places October
+23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informally
+agreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also
+"complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others depends
+in some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an important
+interview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but this
+was copied as October 22 in Bigelow's _France and the Confederate Navy_,
+p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediation
+proposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes'
+supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known to
+Russell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions is
+evidently erroneous.]
+
+[Footnote 805: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265.]
+
+[Footnote 806: _Ibid._, p. 266.]
+
+[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.
+Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs.]
+
+[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 810: F.O., France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28,
+1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn de
+Lhuys' "hesitation." It appears from the Russian archives that France
+approached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructed
+that while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America,
+she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, and
+was against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contrary
+effect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediation
+Russia, "being too far away," would not join, but might give her moral
+support. (Russian Archives, F.O. to D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.). No.
+320.) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, and
+was instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but to
+limit his efforts to approval of any _agreement_ by the North and South
+to end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (as
+Gortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both North
+and South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of some
+friendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contending
+parties themselves to begin direct negotiations (_Ibid._, F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O.S.).)]
+
+[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell's
+full report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345.]
+
+[Footnote 812: F.O., France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neither
+party would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (Russell
+Papers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862.) Morley, _Gladstone_, II,
+84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation."
+There was no renewal for this was the _first_ proposal, and it was not
+one of mediation though that was an implied result.]
+
+[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, was
+the 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote.]
+
+[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has the
+additional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone.]
+
+[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the case
+of the _Trent_, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 they
+were put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: _Letters by
+Historicus on some questions of International Law_, London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 817: The _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 818: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch
+respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley, Nov.
+13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see _ante_,
+p. 59, _note_ 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced that
+the time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia to
+join. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an article
+on his overtures that had appeared in the _Journal de Petersbourg_, and
+thought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (Russian
+Archives. D'Oubril to F.O., Nov. 15, 1862 (N.S.), Nos. 1908 and 1912.)]
+
+[Footnote 820: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 268. The letter, as printed, is
+dated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday." This appears to
+be an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11
+and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlined
+on the latter date. The article in the _Times_, referred to by Lewis,
+appeared on Nov. 13.]
+
+[Footnote 821: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85.]
+
+[Footnote 822: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America." Russell to Cowley,
+Nov. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 823: F.O., Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. The
+same day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between the
+French Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russia
+would take no chances of offending the North. _Ibid._, No. 408.]
+
+[Footnote 824: Morley, _Gladstone_, II ,85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862.
+Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministry
+due to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which it
+was urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation because
+of Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account of
+a "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that
+_ten_ Southerners had been executed because of _one_ Northerner seized
+by Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers.) The Russell Papers contain a
+series of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W."
+(Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities," and urges that, if
+Russia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote,
+"I had supposed the question to be closed." "C.W." (Charles Wood), "This
+is horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to be
+pursued." "C.P.V." (C.P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the French
+proposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan of
+the South.]
+
+[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 826: The _Times_, Nov. 15, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 827: The _Herald_, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed by
+Hotze of _The Index_, as on his "pay roll." Someone evidently was trying
+to earn his salary.]
+
+[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell's
+editorials either with his later protestations of early conviction that
+the North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that he
+was _constantly_ pro-Northern in sentiment, e.g., Henry Adams, in _A
+Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 14l.]
+
+[Footnote 829: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56.]
+
+[Footnote 830: _Ibid._, Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191.]
+
+[Footnote 831: _Ibid._, Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201.]
+
+[Footnote 832: _Ibid._, May 28, 1863, p. 72.]
+
+[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. This
+despatch is not in Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+and illustrates the gaps in that publication.]
+
+[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at a
+banquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it.
+_The Ottawa Sun_, Nov. 16, 1904.]
+
+[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington,
+Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England and
+France planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused the
+South would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office:
+"What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the ports
+were forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thought
+England understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urge
+that if all European Powers joined England and France they would be
+merely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. This
+would weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit her
+special relationship with the United States. He was against any _joint_
+European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 5-17, 1862,
+No. 2002.) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouve
+son opinion tres sage." If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then the
+latter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russell
+had been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England's
+refusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised
+(_Ibid._, to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170).]
+
+[Footnote 838: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1832, _Commons_, Vol. LXXII,
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who had
+been Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, felt
+that he had been deceived by the Democrats. F.O., Am., Vol. 784, No. 38.
+Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 839: F.O., Am., Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons,
+Dec. 4, 1862. Also F.O., Am., Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) to
+Russell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred and
+jealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at the
+North. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element to
+Southern dislike."]
+
+[Footnote 840: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow
+was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern
+confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts
+with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the
+Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and
+judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so
+that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. _Ibid._,
+p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He
+wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the
+American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec.
+12, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell
+expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement
+that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United
+States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed
+her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and
+understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason
+for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1,
+1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow
+knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.]
+
+[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as
+the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will
+be shown.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
+
+The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relative
+to proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the moment
+though time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full of
+suggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from France
+since that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with the
+United States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the same
+view, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to Napoleon
+III, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleon
+dictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation in
+courteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intended
+recognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approached
+Lyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _New
+York Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt this
+would be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained in
+French-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons was
+disinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise his
+Government to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made no
+comment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that the
+Settlement of the Contest should be made without the intervention
+of England."
+
+A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiring
+to discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone,
+or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to the
+North[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary of
+war, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did not
+think that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions;
+but he was somewhat suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quite
+forget that Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go to
+Richmond together last Spring[850]." The day after this despatch was
+written Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and on
+February 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet polite
+language, but positively declining the proposal[851]. Evidently Lyons
+was a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, Napoleon's overture
+to America was officially stated to be unobjectionable, as indeed was
+required by the implications of the reply of November 13, to France.
+Russell, on February 14, answered Lyons' communications in a letter
+marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the Queen":
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at
+     present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer
+     good offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would
+     feel no jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part
+     of France alone[852]."
+
+The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France had
+already acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate any
+governmental feeling of a break in previous close relations with France
+on the American question. Yet this was indubitably the case and became
+increasingly evident as time passed. Russell's despatch to Lyons of
+February 14 appears rather to be evidence of the effect of the debates
+in Parliament when its sessions were resumed on February 5, for in both
+Lords and Commons there was given a hearty and nearly unanimous support
+of the Government's decision to make no overture for a cessation of the
+conflict in America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditions
+of mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South had
+practically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action by
+neutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be fully
+prepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and strict
+neutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved strict neutrality
+but caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle speech and sharply
+attacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable policy--merely a party
+speech. Russell upheld the Government's decision but went out of his way
+to assert that the entire subjugation of the South would be a calamity
+to the United States itself, since it would require an unending use of
+force to hold the South in submission[853]. Later, when news of the
+French offer at Washington had been received, the Government was
+attacked in the Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, Lord
+Campbell, on the ground of a British divergence from close relations
+with France. Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments that
+the time had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to show
+the possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasis
+that recognition of the South could justly be regarded by the North as
+an "unfriendly act[854]."
+
+Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in America,
+basing this attitude on neutral duty and national interests, and with
+barely a reference to the new policy of the North toward slavery,
+declared in the emancipation proclamations of September 22, 1862, and
+January 1, 1863, Had these great documents then no favourable influence
+on British opinion and action? Was the Northern determination to root
+out the institution of slavery, now clearly announced, of no effect in
+winning the favour of a people and Government long committed to a world
+policy against that institution? It is here necessary to review early
+British opinion, the facts preceding the first emancipation
+proclamation, and to examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln.
+
+Before the opening of actual military operations, while there was still
+hope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been with the North
+on the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as against a slave-owning
+society. But war once begun the disturbance to British trade interests
+and Lincoln's repeated declarations that the North had no intention of
+destroying slavery combined to offer an excuse and a reason for an
+almost complete shift of British opinion. The abolitionists of the North
+and the extreme anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few in
+number in both countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the cause
+of the war," but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen by
+thoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct bearing on
+the position of Great Britain when the war was concluded. In May, 1861,
+Palmerston declared that it would be a happy day when "we could succeed
+in putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of our
+North American cousins," but added that the difficulty for England was
+that "_We_ could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment of
+slavery[855]...."
+
+Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, indeed, a
+perplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to the final
+outcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken for granted.
+Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon largely
+disappeared from British discussion and in its place there cropped out,
+here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as to whether the war
+could long continue without a "servile insurrection," with all its
+attendant horrors.
+
+On July 6, 1861, the _Economist_, reviewing the progress of the war
+preparations to date, asserted that it was universally agreed no
+restoration of the Union was possible and answered British fears by
+declaring it was impossible to believe that even the American madness
+could contemplate a servile insurrection. The friendly _Spectator_ also
+discussed the matter and repeatedly. It was a mistaken idea, said this
+journal, that there could be no enfranchisement without a slave rising,
+but should this occur, "the right of the slave to regain his freedom,
+even if the effort involve slaughter, is as clear as any other
+application of the right of self-defence[856]." Yet English
+abolitionists should not urge the slave to act for himself, since "as
+war goes on and all compromise fails the American mind will harden under
+the white heat and determine that the _cause_ of all conflict must
+cease." That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northern
+denial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted Harriet
+Martineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to her as
+clear as anything in reason[857]. She had no patience with English
+anti-slavery people who believed Northern protestations, and she did
+not express concern over the horrors of a possible servile insurrection.
+Nevertheless this spectre was constantly appearing. Again the
+_Spectator_ sought to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimed
+that even such a contingency was less fearful than the consolidation of
+the slave-power in the South[858].
+
+Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument which
+pro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the bulk of the
+British press was constant in holding up this bogie to its readers, even
+going to the point of weakening its argument of the impossibility of a
+Northern conquest of the South by appealing to history to show that
+England in her two wars with America had had a comparatively easy time
+in the South, thus postulating the real danger of some "negro Garibaldi
+calling his countrymen to arms[859]." Nor was this fear merely a
+pretended one. It affected all classes and partisans of both sides. Even
+official England shared in it; January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "The
+question is rapidly tending towards the issue either of peace and a
+recognition of the separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and the
+raising of a servile insurrection[860]." At nearly the same time
+Russell, returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden,
+expressed his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation,
+meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been since
+the revival of letters[861]." John Stuart Mill, with that clear logic
+which appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able examination of
+the underlying causes and probable results of the American conflict,
+excused the Northern leaders for early denial of a purpose to attack
+slavery, but expressed complete confidence that even these leaders by
+now understood the "almost certain results of success in the present
+conflict" (the extinction of slavery) and prophesied that "if the
+writers who so severely criticize the present moderation of the
+Free-soilers are desirous to see the war become an abolition war, it is
+probable that if the war lasts long enough they will be gratified[862]."
+John Bright, reaching a wider public, in speech after speech, expressed
+faith that the people of the North were "marching on, as I believe, to
+its [slavery's] entire abolition[863]."
+
+Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition war," and
+believed the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, feared the same
+development; friends of the North pushed aside the thought of a "negro
+terror," yet even while hoping and declaring that the war would destroy
+slavery, could not escape from apprehensions of an event that appeared
+inevitable. Everywhere, to the British mind, it seemed that emancipation
+was necessarily a provocative to servile insurrection, and this belief
+largely affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a fact
+almost wholly lost sight of in historical writing.
+
+Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation weaken
+this belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great advocate of
+abolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake was Charles
+Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He early
+took the ground that a proclamation everywhere emancipating the slaves
+would give to the Northern cause a moral support hitherto denied it in
+Europe and would at the same time strike a blow at Southern resistance.
+This idea was presented in a public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts,
+in October, 1861, but even Sumner's free-soil friends thought him
+mistaken and his expressions "unfortunate." By December, however, he
+found at Washington a change in governmental temper and from that date
+Sumner was constant, through frequent private conversations with
+Lincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal activities
+for their realization were well known to English friends, as in his
+letters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English public in general
+through Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long been a well-known figure
+in the British press[864].
+
+Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist," in spite of his famous utterance in
+the 'fifties that the United States could not indefinitely continue to
+exist "half-slave and half-free," had, in 1861, disapproved and recalled
+the orders of some of the military leaders, like Fremont, who without
+authority had sought to extend emancipation to slaves within the lines
+of their command. But as early as anyone he had foreseen the gradual
+emergence of emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to that
+wise "border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of the
+slave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union and
+to that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the time was
+ripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the gradual approach
+through legislation and administrative act. In February, 1862, a Bill
+was under discussion in Congress, called the "Confiscation Bill," which,
+among other clauses, provided that all slaves of persons engaged in
+rebellion against the United States, who should by escape, or capture,
+come into the possession of the military forces of the United States,
+should be for ever free; but that this provision should not be operative
+until the expiration of sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunity
+to cease their rebellion and retain their slaves[865]. This measure did
+not at first have Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on the
+loyalists of the border states. Nevertheless he realized the growing
+strength of anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized with
+it where actual realization did not conflict with the one great object
+of his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred in a
+measure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, freeing the
+slaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where there was no
+question of the constitutional power of the national Government.
+
+From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation
+proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict
+between Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation.
+Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadily
+toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery in
+the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation.
+Neither party spoke the word "servile insurrection," yet both realized
+its possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see and
+use it as a threat. A brief summary of measures will indicate the
+contest. March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that a
+joint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national
+Government to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed
+purpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in the
+hope that this might influence the Southern states[866]. Neither the
+House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to this
+resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but it
+passed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved by
+Lincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme radical element in Congress
+had yielded, momentarily, to the President's insistence on an
+olive-branch offering of compensated emancipation. Both as regards the
+border states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was
+determined to give this line of policy a trial. The prevailing
+sentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive Confiscation
+Bill.
+
+At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department of the
+South," which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina,
+Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in these
+states free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln immediately countermanded
+Hunter's order, stating that such action "under my responsibility, I
+reserve to myself[867]." He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnest
+appeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by the
+Congressional resolution of April 10. In truth, border state attitude
+was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntary
+emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan.
+Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation
+Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his
+signature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify that
+fact to Congress until July 17._ On this same day of signature, July 12,
+Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in
+voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the
+congressional representatives of the border states seeking their
+definite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority were
+emphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect the
+border states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire to
+free the slaves even if compensated[868].
+
+Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forced
+toward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the Confiscation
+Bill. On the day following his failure to win the border state
+representatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him,
+that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issue
+of a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within the
+competence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered a
+few objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more than
+listen to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjourned
+on July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of an
+emancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of which
+referred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would be
+rigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to their
+allegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of a
+gradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning that
+for states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipation
+of slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved except
+Blair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching November
+elections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicated
+purpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recent
+military disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. The
+measure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of an
+exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth
+its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to
+the government. It will be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat."
+He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern victory. This
+appealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside,
+waiting for victory[871]."
+
+Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at Antietam,
+and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. Five days later,
+September 22, Lincoln issued the proclamation, expanded and altered in
+text from the draft of July 22, but in substance the same[872]. The
+loyal border states were not to be affected, but the proclamation
+renewed the promise of steps to be taken to persuade them to voluntary
+action. On January 1, 1863, a second proclamation, referring to that of
+September 22, was issued by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vested
+as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time
+of actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of the
+United States...." The states affected were designated by name and all
+persons held as slaves within them "are, and henceforward shall be,
+free...." "I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to
+abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence...." "And
+upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by
+the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate
+judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God[873]."
+
+Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical Sumner began
+his pressure for action, to September, 1862, when Lincoln's pledge of
+emancipation was made. Did these steps indicate, as British opinion
+unquestionably held, an intention to rouse a servile insurrection? Was
+the Confiscation Bill passed with that purpose in view and had Lincoln
+decided to carry it into effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is,
+indeed, the great marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not in
+England only, but in America also. It was the expectation of the North
+and the constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the
+_purpose_ of the emancipation proclamation?
+
+This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by American
+historians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to motives
+at the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are made to cover
+nearly the entire argument for emancipation in September, 1862, but in
+just what manner the military prowess of the North was to be increased
+was not at first indicated. In 1864, Lincoln declared that after the
+failure of successive efforts to persuade the border states to accept
+compensated emancipation he had believed there had arrived the
+"indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the
+blacks[874]." Repeatedly in later defence of the proclamation he urged
+the benefits that had come from his act and asserted that commanders in
+the field "believe the emancipation policy and the use of coloured
+troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion[875]." He
+added: "negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do
+anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their
+lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the
+promise of freedom."
+
+There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor did
+Lincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his mind,
+though the thought of such possible result must have been present--was,
+indeed, present to most minds even without a proclamation of
+emancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply to draw away slaves,
+wherever possible, from their rebellious masters, thus reducing the
+economic powers of resistance of the South, and then to make these
+ex-slaves directly useful in winning the war. But after the war, even
+here and there during it, a theory was advanced that an impelling motive
+with the President had been the hope of influencing favourably foreign
+governments and peoples by stamping the Northern cause with a high moral
+purpose. In popular opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as a
+far-visioned statesman in anticipating that which ultimately came to
+pass. This has important bearing on the relations of the United States
+and Great Britain.
+
+There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had believed in
+1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize strongly with the
+North. The event did not prove this to be the case, nor could the North
+justly complain in the face of administration denials of an anti-slavery
+purpose. The English Government therefore was widely upheld by British
+opinion in regarding the struggle from the point of view of British
+interests. Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution of
+slavery compelled British governmental consideration. As early as
+December, 1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reported
+a conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that the
+South would expect to revive the African Slave Trade[876]. This was
+limited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which in
+substance left the matter to the individual states--a condition that
+Southern agents in England found it hard to explain[877]. As already
+noted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even after
+Lincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the American
+rupture[878]. By September, 1861, John Bright was writing to his friend
+Sumner that, all indications to the contrary, England would warmly
+support the North if only it could be shown that emancipation was an
+object[879]. Again and again he urged, it is interesting to note, just
+those ideals of gradual and compensated emancipation which were so
+strongly held by Lincoln. In this same month the _Spectator_ thought it
+was "idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of all
+disunion," and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the cause
+rather than at the effect[880]." Three weeks later the _Spectator_,
+reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as follows:
+
+     "If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think you
+     madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of
+     Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in
+     holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud
+     your worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set
+     forth continually that you have forfeited all claim to the
+     _popular_ sympathy of England."
+
+This, said the _Spectator_, had been stated in the most objectionable
+style by the _Times_ in particular, which, editorially, had alleged that
+"the North has now lost the chance of establishing a high moral
+superiority by a declaration against slavery." To all this the
+_Spectator_ declared that the North must adopt the bold course and make
+clear that restoration of the Union was not intended with the old canker
+at its roots[881].
+
+Official England held a different view. Russell believed that the
+separation of North and South would conduce to the extinction of slavery
+since the South, left to itself and fronted by a great and prosperous
+free North, with a population united in ideals, would be forced,
+ultimately, to abandon its "special system." He professed that he could
+not understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the war and thought she and
+Sumner "animated by a spirit of vengeance[882]." If the South did yield
+and the Union were restored _with_ slavery, Russell thought that
+"Slavery would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wish
+for separation[883]." These views were repeated frequently by Russell.
+He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, but was
+careful to state, "I give you these views merely as speculations," and
+it is worthy of note that after midsummer of 1862 he rarely indulged in
+them. Against such speculations, whether by Russell or by others, Mill
+protested in his famous article in _Fraser's_, February, 1862[884].
+
+On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did so.
+Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search off the
+African Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression of the
+African Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by Great Britain
+but persistently refused by the United States. It could not well be
+declined now by the British Government and was signed by Seward, April
+8, 1862[885], but if he expected any change in British attitude as a
+result he was disappointed. The renewal by the South of that trade might
+be a barrier to British goodwill, but the action of the North was viewed
+as but a weak attempt to secure British sympathy, and to mark the limits
+of Northern anti-slavery efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eager
+for the treaty on other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt any
+interest in the suppression of the slave trade ... whatever they have
+done ... they have done grudgingly and imperfectly[886]."
+
+This was written at the exact period when Palmerston and Russell were
+initiating those steps which were to result in the Cabinet crisis on
+mediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly the Slave Trade treaty
+with America had not influenced governmental attitude. At this juncture
+there was founded, November, 1862, the London Emancipation Society, with
+the avowed object of stirring anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against
+"favouring the South." But George Thompson, its organizer, had been
+engaged in the preliminary work of organization for some months and the
+Society is therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small group
+who were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the cause
+and object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln's
+proclamation[887]. Thus for England as a whole and for official England
+the declarations of these few voices were regarded as expressive of a
+wish rather than as consistent with the facts. The moral uplift of an
+anti-slavery object was denied to the North.
+
+This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by the
+emancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for so
+believing. It is true that this aspect had at various times, though
+rarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, American Minister
+at Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September 14, 1861, strongly
+urging the declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war and
+asserting that public opinion in Europe would then be such in favour of
+the North that no government would "dare to place itself, by declaration
+or act, upon the side of a universally condemned institution[888]."
+There is no evidence that Seward showed this despatch to Lincoln, but in
+January, 1862, Schurz returned to America and in conversation with the
+President urged the "moral issue" to prevent foreign intervention. The
+President replied: "You may be right. Probably you are. I have been
+thinking so myself. I cannot imagine that any European power would dare
+to recognize and aid the Southern Confederacy if it became clear that
+the Confederacy stands for slavery and the Union for freedom[889]." No
+doubt others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreign
+friend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of the
+North[890], and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second work
+in the spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue."
+The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instant
+proclamation of Northern _intention_ to free the slaves[891].
+Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumner
+pressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition arguments
+which did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign effect. On the
+general question of emancipation Lincoln listened, even telling Sumner
+that he "was ahead of himself only a month or six weeks[892]."
+
+Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, 1862, when
+strong abolitionist pressure was brought on the President to issue a
+general proclamation of emancipation, he reasserted in the famous reply
+to Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one single purpose to restore the Union
+"with or without slavery."
+
+     "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
+     could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree
+     with them.
+
+     "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
+     could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
+     with them.
+
+     "_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to
+     save or to destroy slavery_[893]."
+
+Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown
+to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed
+in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presented
+abolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later,
+September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had
+an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid
+stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was but
+nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied
+much as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede that
+Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are
+incited by something more than ambition[894]." Immediately after the
+event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party,
+Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake.... It is
+now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take
+action upon it[895]." Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual
+message to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreign
+countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt
+mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896].
+
+Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been
+convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation.
+On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_
+the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lain
+the true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was now
+for "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it." After
+all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the
+President's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this
+entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation
+Bill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to the
+Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile
+insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. At
+times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--at
+times not.
+
+Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal to
+Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could not
+state explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had been met with
+what he considered a "cold" and premature as well as unjustifiable
+declaration of neutrality. From the first day of the conflict Lyons and
+Mercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by the
+American war upon the economic interests of their respective countries.
+Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Seward
+kept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the raw
+cotton. He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans,
+but the results were disappointing. As time went on Seward became
+convinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude and
+action of Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on hand
+in the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when the
+war was over _provided_ the war did not take on an uncivilized and
+sanguinary character through a rising of the slaves. If that occurred
+cotton would be burned and destroyed and cotton supply to Europe would
+be not merely a matter of temporary interruption, but one of
+long-continued dearth with no certainty of early resumption. Fearing the
+growth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Seward
+threatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat not
+so much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of the
+material interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreign
+attitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to the
+winning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of servile
+insurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for fear it would
+cause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent.
+
+His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In February, 1862,
+the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in Congress. In April,
+Mercier's trip to Richmond[897] had caused much speculation and started
+many rumours in London of plans of mediation[898]. On May 28, Seward
+wrote to Adams at great length and especially emphasized two points:
+first that while diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted from
+discussing slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized to
+state that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppression
+of slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreign
+nations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war,
+Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all European
+interests[899]...." A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell on
+June 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query about
+mediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adams
+perfectly understood Seward's policy.
+
+On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipation
+proclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Seward
+commented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all its
+bearings before committing himself[901]. The day following he
+transmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced into
+Congress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensated
+emancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sent
+the Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that this
+method and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with his
+theory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than would
+an outright proclamation of emancipation.
+
+Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British
+neutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he had
+learned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon
+"take new ground[903]." This despatch if it reached Seward previous to
+the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of
+the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet,
+Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that
+he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a
+Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton's
+notes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to prevent
+the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton.... We break up our
+relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty
+years[904]." These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed
+action. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams
+covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which,
+fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it there
+was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the
+South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Seward
+was clinging to his theory of correct policy.
+
+Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmental
+circles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the day before
+Lincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewing
+military prospects wrote: "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening
+the South is included a servile war[906]." To this Russell replied: "...
+I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make
+other nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating and
+destructive conflict[907]." This was but brief reiteration of a more
+exact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward's first hint of
+servile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been
+given to Russell on June 20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward's
+arguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the American
+conflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:
+
+     "The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr.
+     Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another
+     element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of
+     property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a
+     country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908]."
+
+In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the
+Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuart
+presented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909]. On August
+22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as purely a
+manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign
+governments[910]. Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward,
+since he also reported the latter's success in postponing the
+proclamation?
+
+In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in the
+light of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both believed such
+an event would add to the argument for foreign intervention. The
+_threat_ Seward had regarded as useful; the _event_ would be highly
+dangerous to the North. Not so, however, did emancipation appear in
+prospect to American diplomats abroad. Adams was a faithful servant in
+attempting to carry out the ideas and plans of his chief, but as early
+as February, 1862, he had urged a Northern declaration in regard to
+slavery in order to meet in England Southern private representations
+that, independence won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradual
+emancipation to be applied "to all persons born after some specific
+date[911]." Motley, at Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, in
+private letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step on
+slavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into the
+selected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far more
+important was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month after
+he had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward,
+to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign intervention
+would be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object in
+the war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offer
+of mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery such
+mediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an end
+to the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen the
+Northern position abroad[913].
+
+This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it was
+assertion of the value of a higher "moral issue." Meanwhile, on July 24,
+Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote to
+Motley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not be
+encouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northern
+attempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousand
+times No," and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September
+25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring that
+for Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was not
+scarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could but
+know what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on the
+Government[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree with
+Seward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when the
+day, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. On
+that day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief.
+The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach of
+which he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad," and
+he laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamation
+was to convince the South that its true interests were in the
+preservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result was
+the return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was far
+from a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward's
+first thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrection
+he must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment was
+improved, for he began, and thereafter maintained with vigour, the "high
+moral purpose" argument as evinced in the emancipation proclamation.
+"The interests of humanity," he wrote to Adams, "have now become
+identified with the cause of our country[918]...."
+
+That the material interests of Great Britain were still in Seward's
+thought is shown by the celerity with which under Lincoln's orders he
+grasped at an unexpected opening in relation to liberated slaves. Stuart
+wrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, secretary of the colony of
+British Guiana, was coming from Demerara to Washington to secure
+additional labour for the British colony by offering to carry away
+ex-slaves[919]. This scheme was no secret and five days after the issue
+of the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a convention by which the
+British Government would be permitted to transport to the West Indies,
+or to any of its colonies, the negroes about to be emancipated. On
+September 30, Adams was instructed to take up the matter at London[920].
+Russell was at first disinclined to consider such a convention and
+discussion dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed,
+this time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediate
+influence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on the
+attitude of the British Government[921].
+
+To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matter
+for astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at once
+convince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it be
+remembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted, save
+by a small abolitionist faction, with doubt extending even to bitter
+opposition and that British governmental and public opinion had long
+dreaded a servile insurrection--even of late taking its cue from
+Seward's own prophecies--the cool reception given by the Government, the
+vehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem so
+surprising. "This Emancipation Proclamation," wrote Stuart on September
+23, "seems a brutum fulmen[922]." One of the President's motives, he
+thought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is no
+pretext of humanity about the Proclamation.... It is merely a
+Confiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct encouragement
+to servile insurrections[923]." Received in England during the Cabinet
+struggle over mediation the proclamation appears not to have affected
+that controversy, though Russell sought to use it as an argument for
+British action. In his memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell strove
+to show that the purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt both
+on the horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:
+
+     "What will be the practical effect of declaring emancipation,
+     not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed by the
+     Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and
+     retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile
+     community, it is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms
+     of the United States penetrate, a premium will be given to
+     acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge. The
+     military and naval authorities of the United States will be
+     bound by their orders to maintain and protect the
+     perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the
+     Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be
+     disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors
+     of land alike reduced to beggary[924]."
+
+The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating the
+proclamation with derision and contempt and no other one situation in
+the Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. Citations setting
+forth such comment have frequently been gathered together illustrative
+of the extent of press condemnation and of its unity in vicious
+editorials[925]. There is no need to repeat many of them here, but a few
+will indicate their tone. The _Times_ greeted the news with an assertion
+that this was a final desperate play by Lincoln, as hope of victory
+waned. It was his "last card[926]," a phrase that caught the fancy of
+lesser papers and was repeated by them. October 21, appeared the
+"strongest" of the _Times_ editorials:
+
+[Illustration: ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR. _Reproduced
+by permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+     "... We have here the history of the beginning of the end,
+     but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet
+     to be filled before the inevitable separation is
+     accomplished? Are scenes like those which we a short time
+     since described from Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the
+     reign of the last PRESIDENT to go out amid horrible massacres
+     of white women and children, to be followed by the
+     extermination of the black race in the South? Is LINCOLN yet
+     a name not known to us as it will be known to posterity, and
+     is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue of
+     monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind?
+
+     "... We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to
+     what the consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be,
+     except that it certainly will not have the effect of
+     restoring the Union. It will not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the
+     distinctive affix which he will share with many, for the most
+     part foolish and incompetent, Kings and Emperors, Caliphs and
+     Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the Last.'"
+
+The _Times_ led the way; other papers followed on. The _Liverpool Post_
+thought a slave rising inevitable[927], as did also nearly every paper
+acknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or professedly neutral, while
+even pro-Northern journals at first feared the same results[928].
+Another striking phrase, "Brutum Fulmen," ran through many editorials.
+The _Edinburgh Review_ talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair[929]," which
+was little different from Seward's feared "last shriek." _Blackwood's_
+thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, devilish." It "justifies
+the South in raising the black flag, and proclaiming a war without
+quarter[930]." But there is no need to expand the citation of the
+well-nigh universal British press pouring out of the wrath of heaven
+upon Lincoln, and his emancipation proclamation[931].
+
+Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at first
+expected servile war to follow the proclamation it is apparent that here
+and there a part of this British wrath was due to a fear that, in spite
+of denials of such influence, the proclamation was intended to arouse
+public opinion against projects of intervention and _might so arouse
+it_. The New York correspondent of the _Times_ wrote that it was
+"promulgated evidently as a sop to keep England and France quiet[932],"
+and on October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a very
+important object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognition
+cannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro or
+the South, but at Europe." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_ believed that it
+was now "the imperative duty of England and France to do what they can
+in order to prevent the possible occurrence of a crime which, if carried
+out, would surpass in atrocity any similar horror the world has ever
+seen[933]." "Historicus," on the other hand, asked: "What is that
+solution of the negro question to which an English Government is
+prepared to affix the seal of English approbation[934]?" Mason, the
+Confederate Agent in London, wrote home that it was generally believed
+the proclamation was issued "as the means of warding off recognition....
+It was seen through at once and condemned accordingly[935]."
+
+This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictum
+that the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate British
+governmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief that
+strong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating an
+argument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet the
+new "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to his
+friends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration in
+favour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted is
+not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own
+him unless he is loyal to the United States." ... "There is no morality
+whatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon its
+merits as a political measure[936]." Two weeks later, reporting a public
+speech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in which
+Lincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_,
+while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it was
+not to be understood as fully defending a system of government which
+chose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]."
+
+Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though loudly
+applauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincoln
+was disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent,
+though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow up
+the victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November went
+heavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground of
+the President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole was
+not favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best as
+but a useless bit of "waste paper[939]." In England, John Bright, the
+most ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaud
+heartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and even
+then in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public interest was
+much aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date set
+by Lincoln for actual enforcement of emancipation[940]. In a speech at
+Birmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emancipation;
+rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South for
+admitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was the
+very "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and society[941]. A few
+public meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown were
+tried in October and November with some success but with no great show
+of enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of public
+opinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by the
+proclamation began to veer in favour of the emancipation edict[942]. By
+the end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrified
+hands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]."
+
+Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause of
+emancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by Jefferson
+Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared that
+Lincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection,"
+and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in arms
+be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective
+States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of
+said State." This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting for
+his freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gave
+a good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944].
+
+Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December that
+the promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hoped
+that neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliation
+would be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1
+proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]."
+
+But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an
+"abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week of
+December, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, there
+took place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were passed
+enthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emancipation proclamation
+and pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ from
+week to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, noting
+fifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. The
+American Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engraved
+resolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations.
+The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield,
+January 10:
+
+     "_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery
+     is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the
+     American States, and that the object of the leaders of the
+     rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman
+     system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion
+     may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the
+     Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its
+     emancipation policy till not a slave be left on the American
+     soil[947]."
+
+Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of
+"nobodies." Adams commented:
+
+     "They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, but
+     they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most
+     exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave
+     Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol,
+     and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to
+     the complete emancipation of the negro slaves in the British
+     dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of
+     the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I
+     feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective
+     sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]."
+
+Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expression
+of the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working classes,"
+and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949].
+The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to the
+emancipation proclamation, accepted and printed communications with
+increasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in the
+public meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press.
+Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letter
+writer to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northern
+cause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just and
+holy[950]." In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of the
+proclamation to touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clear
+the fact that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edict
+to states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalled
+the old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetings
+attended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spoken
+twenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence.
+Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slavery
+feeling, now strongly for the North[952].
+
+Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in an
+address to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe now
+replied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. A
+largely signed "round robin" letter assured her that English women were
+still the foes of slavery and were indignantly united against
+suggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working class
+Britain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those of
+Manchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter of
+thanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardships
+resulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot"
+he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [of
+human slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not
+been surpassed in any age or in any country[954]." Nonconformist England
+now came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London,
+made his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthen
+the North; give victory to their arms[955]." Further and more general
+expression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letter
+received February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen,
+urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln.
+The London and Manchester Emancipation Societies combined in drawing up
+a document for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoption
+at a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "An
+Address to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominations
+throughout the States of America." There was a "noisy opposition" but
+the address was carried by a large majority and two representatives,
+Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to the
+brethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblical
+sanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading this
+sanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957].
+Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied in
+a pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" His
+position and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally to
+the North.
+
+Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, became
+aroused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamation
+made good his pledge of the previous September: other elements of
+opinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like measure, and
+everywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrection
+largely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to such
+lengths in its support of emancipation as to astound and alarm the
+_Saturday Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival of
+cant[959]." More neutral minds were perplexed over the practical
+difficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January,
+1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free men
+slaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popular
+approval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of the
+twenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great mass
+meeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had been
+advertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hall
+was jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptly
+organized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admission
+crowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand.
+Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Hall
+and cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. Newman
+Hall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted to
+heckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961].
+
+The "carnival of cant," as the _Saturday Review_ termed it, was truly a
+popular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported by
+the working and non-enfranchised classes. Its first effect was to
+restore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upper
+classes. Bright had welcomed emancipation, yet with some misgivings. He
+now joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on
+"Slavery and Secession," gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts.
+
+In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_,
+which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influenced
+largely upper-class attitude in favour of the South, Cairnes had
+published his pamphlet, "Slave Power." This was a reasoned analysis of
+the basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis of
+Spence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power,
+Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be read
+with more conviction by that class which until now had been coldly
+neutral and which wished a more reassured faith in the Northern cause
+than that stirred by the emotional reception given the emancipation
+proclamation. Yet at bottom it was emancipation that brought this
+reasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logical
+basis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterances
+previously made in private correspondence, or in governmental
+conversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North.
+On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, the
+Duke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in a
+speech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors of
+Civil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position to
+object to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one," Argyll
+said, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of the
+Bible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that the
+contest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it that
+great blessing to the white race which shall consist in the final
+freedom of the black[963]."
+
+The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America that
+governmental England would show some evidence of a more friendly
+attitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas he
+thought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read:
+
+     "Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have
+     tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the
+     world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation,
+     upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental
+     object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery,
+     therefore,
+
+     _Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be
+     recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and
+     civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men
+     everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost,
+     such recognition or admission[964]."
+
+This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Washington, in
+November, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation proclamation as a
+political manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administration
+he thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This was
+the burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but does
+not appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to give
+offence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt the
+correctness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasm
+leading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorship
+measures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound by
+the social and educational traditions of his class, and had at first not
+the slightest conception of the force or effect of emancipation upon the
+public in middle-class England. He feared an American reaction against
+England when it was understood that popular meetings would have no
+influence on the British Government.
+
+     "Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the
+     effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to
+     fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely
+     round to the North that the Government will be obliged to
+     favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do
+     so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it,
+     unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had little
+relation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude toward
+emancipation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile war
+might be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain,
+from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emancipation into
+effect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, in
+part by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier British
+newspaper speculations, was strongly associated with emancipation, in
+the English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862,
+proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the public
+with apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile war
+ensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emancipation
+and the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave of
+relief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not so
+quickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that England
+which was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exulted
+and now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affect
+governmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyons
+correctly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to press
+the British Government on points previously glossed over, and in the
+same month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a head
+a controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during the
+war and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctly
+unfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building in
+British ports of Confederate naval vessels of war.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturing
+Palmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III.]
+
+[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]
+
+[Footnote 848: F.O., Am., Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to be
+already in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint of
+it in the interview with Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offer
+of mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructions
+and those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelled
+to face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offer
+without England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O.S.)).]
+
+[Footnote 850: F.O. Am., Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons to
+Russell, Feb. 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348.]
+
+[Footnote 852: F.O., Am., Vol. 868, No. 86.]
+
+[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152.]
+
+[Footnote 854: _Ibid._, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs.
+Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 859: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 17, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contest
+in America."]
+
+[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69.]
+
+[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers of
+Abraham Lincoln_, p. 243.]
+
+[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, pp. 229-32.]
+
+[Footnote 867: _Ibid._, p. 233, May 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 868: A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, 1862, on the lines
+of Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July 12, but no action was
+taken on it.]
+
+[Footnote 869: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 70-71.]
+
+[Footnote 870: Abraham Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 213.]
+
+[Footnote 871: Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2.]
+
+[Footnote 872: As issued September 22, the first paragraph refers to his
+plan of securing legislation to aid compensated voluntary emancipation,
+the next sets the date January 1, 1863, for completed emancipation of
+slaves in states still in rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concern
+the carrying out of the confiscation law. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II,
+pp. 237-8.]
+
+[Footnote 873: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, 260-61.]
+
+[Footnote 874: Rhodes, IV, p. 214.]
+
+[Footnote 875: _Ibid._, p. 410. In letter, August 26, 1863, addressed to
+a Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional Union men."]
+
+[Footnote 876: American Hist. Rev., XVIII, pp. 784-7. Bunch to Russell,
+Dec. 5, 1860.]
+
+[Footnote 877: Southern Commissioners abroad early reported that
+recognition of independence and commercial treaties could not be secured
+unless the South would agree to "mutual right of search" treaties for
+the suppression of the African Slave Trade. Davis' answer was that the
+Confederate constitution gave him no authority to negotiate such a
+treaty; indeed, denied him that authority since the constitution itself
+prohibited the importation of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin's
+instructions see Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 591-96.]
+
+[Footnote 878: _Spectator_, May 4, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 879: Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol.
+XLVI, p. 95.]
+
+[Footnote 880: Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 881: October 5, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 882: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 883: _Ibid._, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The same ideas are
+officially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, 1861, and May 1,
+1862. (F.O., Am., Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and _Ibid._, Vol. 819, No.
+197, Draft.).]
+
+[Footnote 884: See ante, p. 81.]
+
+[Footnote 885: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65.]
+
+[Footnote 886: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, p. 227. Palmerston to Russell,
+Aug. 13, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 887: Garrison, _Garrison_, IV, p. 66. Many distinguished names
+were on the roster of the Society--Mill, Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton,
+Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes,
+Cairns, Herbert Spencer, Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, and
+others. Frederick W. Chesson was secretary, and very active in
+the work.]
+
+[Footnote 888: Schurz, _Speeches and Correspondence_, I, 190.]
+
+[Footnote 889: Schurz, _Reminiscences_, II, 309.]
+
+[Footnote 890: Gasparin, _The Uprising of a Great People_, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 891: Gasparin, _America before Europe_, Pt. V, Ch. III. The
+preface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work went through three American
+editions in 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 892: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, p. 63. No exact date, but Spring of
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 893: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, p. 253.]
+
+[Footnote 894: _Ibid._, p. 256.]
+
+[Footnote 895: Rhodes, IV, p. 162.]
+
+[Footnote 896: Lincoln's _Complete Works_, II, p. 454. But the
+_after-comment_ by Lincoln as to purpose was nearly always in line with
+an unfinished draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864,
+when the specific object was said to be "inducing the coloured people to
+come bodily over from the rebel side to ours." _Ibid._, p. 564.]
+
+[Footnote 897: See _ante_, Ch. IX.]
+
+[Footnote 898: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 83.
+Adams to Seward, May 8, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 899: _Ibid._, pp. 101-105.]
+
+[Footnote 900: _Ibid._, p. 122. Adams to Seward, July 3, 1862. In his
+despatch Adams states the conversation to have occurred "last Saturday,"
+and with an "unofficial person," who was sounding him on mediation. This
+was Cobden.]
+
+[Footnote 901: Welles, _Diary_, I, p. 70.]
+
+[Footnote 902: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 135.]
+
+[Footnote 903: _Ibid._, p. 133. To Seward. His informant was Baring.]
+
+[Footnote 904: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 333.]
+
+[Footnote 905: See _ante_, p. 35.]
+
+[Footnote 906: _Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords_, Vol. XXIX.
+"Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
+America." No. 8. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 907: _Ibid._, No. 10. Russell to Stuart, Aug. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 908: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further correspondence
+relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America." No. 2.
+To Stuart.]
+
+[Footnote 909: _Ibid._, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence
+relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America," No.
+20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 910: See _ante_, p. 37.]
+
+[Footnote 911: State Department, Eng., Vol. 78, No. 119. Adams to
+Seward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar representation made
+on Jan. 17, 1862. (_U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I,
+p. 16.)]
+
+[Footnote 912: e.g., Motley, _Correspondence_, II, pp. 64-5. To O.W.
+Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 913: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 140.
+Adams to Seward, July 17, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 914: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 336.]
+
+[Footnote 915: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 191.
+Adams to Seward, Sept. 12, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 916: _Ibid._, p. 199.]
+
+[Footnote 917: _Ibid._, p. 195.]
+
+[Footnote 918: _Ibid._, p. 202. Seward to Adams, Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons,
+on his return to Washington, wrote that he found Seward's influence much
+lessened, and that he had fallen in public estimation by his "signing
+the Abolition Proclamation, which was imposed upon him, in opposition to
+all his own views, by the Radical Party in the Cabinet." (Russell
+Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 14, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 919: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 19, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 920: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 202. The
+instruction went into great detail as to conditions and means. A similar
+instruction was sent to Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen.]
+
+[Footnote 921: There was much talk and correspondence on this project
+from Sept., 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was suspicious of some "trap."
+Russell at one time thought the United States was secretly planning to
+colonize ex-slaves in Central America. Some of the Colonies were in
+favour of the plan. (Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862.
+F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 922: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 923: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 26, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 924: Gladstone Papers. British agents still residing in the
+South believed the proclamation would have little practical effect, but
+added that if actually carried out the cultivation of cotton "would be
+as completely arrested as if an edict were pronounced against its future
+growth," and pictured the unfortunate results for the world at large.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 846, No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 925: See Rhodes, IV, 344, _notes_.]
+
+[Footnote 926: October 6, 1862. The _Times_ had used the "last card"
+phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations on the effect of
+Sumner's agitation for emancipation.]
+
+[Footnote 927: Oct. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 928: e.g., _Dublin Nation_, Oct. 11, 1862. _Manchester
+Guardian_, Oct. 7. _London Morning Advertiser_, Oct. 9. _North British
+Review_, Oct., 1862. _London Press_, Oct. 11. _London Globe_, Oct. 6.
+_London Examiner_, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag," and Oct. 18:
+"The Instigation to Servile War." _Bell's Weekly Messenger_, Oct. 11.]
+
+[Footnote 929: October, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 930: November, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 931: It is worthy of note that the French offer of joint
+mediation made to Britain in October specified the danger of servile war
+resulting from the proclamation as a reason for European action.
+(France, _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 142.)]
+
+[Footnote 932: The _Times_, Oct. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 933: Oct. 18, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 934: Communication in the _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 935: Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 936: _Spectator_, Oct. 11, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 937: _Ibid._, Oct. 25, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 938: Rhodes, IV, 162-64.]
+
+[Footnote 939: Perry, _Henry Lee Higginson_, p. 175.]
+
+[Footnote 940: Rhodes, IV, p. 349, _note_. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 941: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, pp. 216 ff.]
+
+[Footnote 942: _Liberator_, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a meeting at Leigh,
+Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At Sheffield, Dec. 31,
+1862, an amended resolution calling for recognition of the South was
+voted down and the original pro-Northern resolutions passed. There were
+speakers on both sides. _Liberator_, Jan. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 943: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 113. J.S. Mill to
+Motley, Jan. 26, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 944: Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order applied also to all
+Northern white officers commanding negro troops. It proved an
+idle threat.]
+
+[Footnote 945: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30, 1862. And
+again, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a servile
+insurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move for its
+authors." Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed regret that the
+emancipation proclamation had been issued, since it set up a further
+barrier to the reconciliation of North and South--always the hope of
+Russia. Seward replied that in executing the proclamation, there would
+be, no doubt, many modifications. Stoeckl answered that then the
+proclamation must be regarded as but a futile menace. (Russian Archives.
+Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2171.)]
+
+[Footnote 946: Rhodes, IV, p. 357.]
+
+[Footnote 947: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 55.
+Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863, transmitting this and other resolutions
+presented to him. Adams by March 20 had reported meetings which sent
+resolutions to him, from Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills,
+Salford, Cobham, Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow,
+Liverpool, South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh,
+Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle, Bury,
+Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Huddersfield, Ashford,
+Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton, Newark, and York. See also
+Rhodes, IV, 348-58, for resume of meetings and opinions expressed.]
+
+[Footnote 948: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 300. Adams to
+Seward, Jan. 22, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 949: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 100.
+Adams to Seward, Feb. 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 950: Goddard, _Letters on the American Rebellion_, p. 287.
+Goddard contributed seventy letters before 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 951: _Ibid._, p. 307. Letter to _Daily Gazette_, May 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 952: _The Liberator_, Feb. 27, 1863. At Bristol the opposition
+element introduced a resolution expressing abhorrence of slavery and the
+hope that the war in America might end in total emancipation, but adding
+that "at the same time [this meeting] cannot but regard the policy of
+President Lincoln in relation to slavery, as partial, insincere,
+inhuman, revengeful and altogether opposed to those high and noble
+principles of State policy which alone should guide the counsels of a
+great people." The resolution was voted down, and one passed applauding
+Lincoln. The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologize
+for slurring remarks on Thompson.]
+
+[Footnote 953: _Atlantic Monthly_, XI, p. 525.]
+
+[Footnote 954: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 302.]
+
+[Footnote 955: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, p. 306. Also Rhodes, IV, p.
+351.]
+
+[Footnote 956: Massie, _America: the Origin of Her Present Conflict_,
+London, 1864. This action and the tour of the two delegates in America
+did much to soothe wounded feelings which had been excited by a
+correspondence in 1862-3 between English, French and American branches
+of similar church organizations. See _New Englander_, April, 1863,
+p. 288.]
+
+[Footnote 957: Jan. 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 958: Published Oxford and London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 959: Rhodes, IV, p. 355.]
+
+[Footnote 960: Lutz, _Notes_. Schleiden's despatch, No. 1, 1863. German
+opinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal Germany sympathized
+strongly with the North; while the aristocratic and the landowning class
+stood for the South. The historian Karl Friedrich Neumann wrote a
+three-volume history of the United States wholly lacking in historical
+impartiality and strongly condemnatory of the South. (Geschichte der
+Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 1863-66.) This work had much influence on
+German public opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]
+
+[Footnote 961: _Liberator_, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of J.P. Jewett to W.L.
+Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in England who may still
+sympathize with slavery and the Southern rebels, will be rendered
+absolutely powerless by these grand and powerful uprisings of
+THE PEOPLE."]
+
+[Footnote 962: Duffus, _English Opinion_, p. 51.]
+
+[Footnote 963: Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 196-7.]
+
+[Footnote 964: Trevelyan, _John Bright_. Facsimile, opp. p. 303. Copy
+sent by Sunmer to Bright, April, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 965: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. Lyons
+was slow to favour the emancipation proclamation. The first favourable
+mention I have found was on July 26, 1864. (Russell Papers. To Russell.)
+In this view his diplomatic colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December,
+1863, wrote that slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, and
+that even in the South its form must be altered if it survived. (Russian
+Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358.) But
+immediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoeckl
+could see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made of
+universal application it would have been a "great triumph for the
+principle of individual liberty," but as issued they could only mean
+"the hope of stirring a servile war in the South." _(Ibid._, Dec. 24,
+1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70.)]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII
+
+THE LAIRD RAMS
+
+The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like the
+_Alabama_ and the subsequent controversy and arbitration in relation
+thereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed from every aspect
+of legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, and principles of
+international law. There is no need and no purpose here to review in
+detail these matters. The purpose is, rather, to consider the
+development and effect at the time of their occurrence of the principal
+incidents related to Southern ship-building in British yards. The
+_intention_ of the British Government is of greater importance in this
+study than the correctness of its action.
+
+Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of a
+belligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in the
+ports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definite
+application in international law. There were general principles already
+established that the neutral must not do, nor permit its subjects to do,
+anything directly in aid of belligerents. The British Foreign Enlistment
+Act, notification of which had been given in May, 1861, forbade subjects
+to "be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming,
+of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel
+shall be employed in the service ..." of a belligerent, and provided for
+punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this prohibition
+were disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such punishment, or
+seizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. Here was the weak
+point of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were maintained by offenders
+the proof was available only after the offence had been committed and
+one of the belligerents injured by the violation of the law. Over twenty
+years earlier the American Government, seeking to prevent its subjects
+from committing unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellion
+of 1837, had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they then
+stood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and therefore
+limited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a more perfect
+law, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral duty, had given
+federal officials power to act and seize _on suspicion_, leaving the
+proof of guilt or innocence to be determined later. But the British
+interpretation of her own neutrality laws was that proof was required in
+advance of seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basic
+principle that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to that
+preservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so promptly
+asserted at the beginning of the Civil War[966].
+
+The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, early
+conceived the idea of using neutral ports for the construction of war
+vessels. Advice secured from able British lawyers was to the effect that
+if care were taken to observe the strict letter of the Foreign
+Enlistment Act, by avoiding warlike equipment, a ship, even though her
+construction were such as to indicate that she was destined to become a
+ship of war, might be built by private parties in British yards. The
+three main points requiring careful observance by the South were
+concealment of government ownership and destination, no war equipment
+and no enlistment of crew in British waters.
+
+The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these lines was
+Captain J.D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive of his work
+that he never violated British neutrality law and that prevailing legal
+opinion in England supported him in this view[967]. In March, 1862, the
+steamer _Oreto_ cleared from Liverpool with a declared destination of
+"Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica." She was not heard of until
+three months later when she was reported to be at Nassau completing her
+equipment as a Southern war vessel. In June, Adams notified Russell
+"that a new and still more powerful war-steamer was nearly ready for
+departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand[968]." He
+protested that such ships violated the neutrality of Great Britain and
+demanded their stoppage and seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when this
+second ship, "No. 290" (later christened the _Alabama_) left Liverpool,
+Adams and the United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy in
+securing evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To each
+protest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had been
+referred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, when
+there was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's Counsel,
+Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive against the
+"290," that Russell appears to have been seriously concerned. On July
+28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for an immediate opinion,
+and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent to Liverpool and to other
+ports to stop and further examine the vessel. But the "290" was well
+away and outside of British waters[969].
+
+The _Alabama_, having received guns and munitions by a ship, the
+_Bahama_, sent out from England to that end, and having enlisted in the
+Confederate Navy most of the British crews of the two vessels, now
+entered upon a career of destruction of Northern commerce. She was not a
+privateer, as she was commonly called at the time, but a Government
+vessel of war specially intended to capture and destroy merchant ships.
+In short her true character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that of
+a "commerce destroyer." Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, she
+traversed all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal and
+stores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she evaded
+battle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear that an
+almost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to British or other
+foreign register took place, in the mercantile marine. The career of the
+_Alabama_ was followed with increasing anger and chagrin by the North;
+this, said the public, was a British ship, manned by a British crew,
+using British guns and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had been
+winked at by the British Government. What further evidence was necessary
+of bad faith in a professed strict neutrality?
+
+Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion and
+anger. At the last moment it had appeared as if the Government were
+inclined to stop the "290." Was the hurried departure of the vessel due
+to a warning received from official sources? On November 21, Adams
+reported that Russell complained in an interview of remarks made
+privately by Bright, to the effect that warning had come from Russell
+himself, and "seemed to me a little as if he suspected that Mr. Bright
+had heard this from me[970]." Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any such
+imputation, but at the same time expressed to Russell his conviction
+that there must have been from some source a "leak" of the Government's
+intention[971]. The question of advance warning to Bullock, or to the
+Lairds who built the _Alabama_, was not one which was likely to be
+officially put forward in any case; the real issue was whether an
+offence to British neutrality law had been committed, whether it would
+be acknowledged as such, and still more important, whether repetitions
+of the offence would be permitted. The _Alabama_, even though she might,
+as the American assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us a
+sick turn[972]," could not by herself greatly affect the issue of the
+war; but many _Alabamas_ would be a serious matter. The belated
+governmental order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the future
+since in reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospective
+claim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop had
+been given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and that in
+strict law there had been no neglect of governmental duty[973]. If this
+were so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit official
+interference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet of
+Southern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a real offence to
+the North had taken place. He might write, "I confess the proceedings of
+that vessel [the _Alabama_] are enough to _rile_ a more temperate
+nation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on that
+account[974]," but this was of no value to the North if the governmental
+decision was against interference without complete and absolute proof.
+
+It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringing
+home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in American
+eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were to
+be continued. An immediate downright threat of war would have been
+impolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point of
+resentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required of
+Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat as
+would involve the two nations in war--a result that would have marked
+the success of Southern secession. That Seward was able to find the way
+in which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination and
+gift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the
+Civil War[975].
+
+In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the "290,"
+June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contracts
+made with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of two
+vessels far more dangerous than the _Alabama_ to the Northern cause.
+These were the so-called Laird Rams. They were to be two hundred and
+thirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four and
+one-half inch iron plate and be provided with a "piercer" at the prow,
+about seven feet long and of great strength. This "piercer" caused the
+ships to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped
+it was expected the "piercer" would be three feet under the surface of
+the water. This was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was
+unusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at
+sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close blockade
+at some Southern port. While there was much newspaper comment in England
+that the vessels were "new _Alabamas_," and in America that they were
+"floating fortresses," suitable for attack upon defenceless Northern
+cities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockading
+squadrons[976].
+
+Shortly before the escape of the _Alabama_ and at a time when there was
+but little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly after
+the news was received in Washington that still other vessels were
+planned for building in the Lairds' yards, a Bill was introduced in
+Congress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque and
+privateering. This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wrote
+to Adams of the proposed measure specifying that the purpose was to
+permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the _Alabama_ or
+other vessels of a like type. He characterized this as a plan "to
+organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque and
+reprisal[977]." Neither here nor at any time did Seward or Adams allege
+in diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than the pursuit of
+_Alabamas_, nor is it presumable that in July, 1862, the construction
+plans of the Rams were sufficiently well known to the North to warrant a
+conclusion that the later purpose of the proposed privateering fleet was
+_at first_ quite other than the alleged purpose. Probably the Bill
+introduced in July, 1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the
+_Oreto_ (or _Florida_) and to the failure of early protests in the case
+of the _Alabama_. Moreover there had been an earlier newspaper agitation
+for an increase of naval power by the creation of a "militia of the
+seas," though with no clear conception of definite objects to be
+attained. This agitation was now renewed and reinforced and many public
+speeches made by a General Hiram Wallbridge, who had long advocated an
+organization of the mercantile marine as an asset in times of war[978].
+But though introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" was
+not seriously taken up until February, 1863.
+
+In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of introduction,
+Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to encourage
+privateers to pursue British ships when, as was expected, they should
+"turn Confederate." Sumner objected that the true business of privateers
+was to destroy enemy commerce and that the South had no such _bona fide_
+commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his opinion also, but explained
+that the administration wanted the measure passed so that it might have
+in its hands a power to be used if the need arose. The general opinion
+of the Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, but
+without definite action, so that it could at any time be called up
+again[979]. Six months later the progress of construction and the
+purpose of the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7,
+1863, the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referred
+to the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 was
+passed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March 2 it was
+given a third reading and passed without debate[980]. In the Senate,
+Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the
+Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to
+break our blockade of their coast," and that the privateers were to
+"assist in maintaining blockades." There was no thorough debate but a
+few perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power in
+the hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistent
+opponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to the
+North since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral
+commerce. No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were
+to be used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an
+"administration measure."
+
+Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russell
+at the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge. At first he
+had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment
+Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the
+law officers of the Crown. Russell had even offered to take up with
+America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their
+neutrality laws at the same moment. This was in December, 1862, but now
+on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment
+had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981].
+While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from
+Seward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of the
+privateering bill.
+
+"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of the
+United States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in any
+war in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expected
+that the Bill will become a law. Lord Lyons suggests that the
+transaction may possibly be misapprehended abroad, if it come upon
+foreign powers suddenly and without any explanations. You will be at
+liberty to say that, as the Bill stands, the executive Government will
+be set at liberty to put the law in force in its discretion, and that
+thus far the proper policy in regard to the exercise of that discretion
+has not engaged the President's attention. I have had little hesitation
+in saying to Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there
+will be entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating
+to him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part of
+friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be feared would
+be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall be found expedient
+to put the Act in force against the insurgents of the United
+States[982]."
+
+Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object might
+be asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents," the hint
+was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be "incidentally
+and indirectly affected." And so both Lyons and Seward understood the
+matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a long conversation with
+Seward in which after pointing out the probable "bad effect" on Europe,
+Lyons received the reply that some remedy must be found for the fact
+that "the law did not appear to enable the British Government to
+prevent" the issue of Confederate "privateers[983]." On March 8, Seward
+followed this up by sending to Lyons an autograph letter:
+
+     "I am receiving daily such representations from our sea-ports
+     concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by the
+     vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I
+     do most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into
+     the unhappy condition of affairs, which, with all the best
+     dispositions of your Government and my own, cannot long be
+     controlled to the preservation of peace.
+
+     "If you think well of it, I should like that you should
+     confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more
+     armed vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English
+     ports is a thing to be deprecated above all things."
+
+On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and it
+appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward stated
+that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about the _Alabama_,
+declaring:
+
+     "That no American merchant vessels would get freights--that
+     even war with England was preferable to this--that in that
+     case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least
+     find a profitable employment in cruising against British
+     trade."
+
+Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyons
+protested vigorously and implied that war must result.
+
+     "Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience
+     not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: that he
+     should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity
+     altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came
+     from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure
+     would be unavoidable[984]."
+
+Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must not
+be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling on
+the notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutral
+Mexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruise
+in destruction of French commerce, adding that "one might almost
+suppose" some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for the
+purpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985].
+Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9,
+that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present to
+Russell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance that
+no further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports.
+This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language but
+in no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering
+bill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national navigating
+interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ... the enforcement
+of the neutrality law of Great Britain[986]...."
+
+Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was read to
+him. Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateers
+would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interfered
+with neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in an
+awkward position. To this Adams replied that the privateers would seek
+and capture, if possible, vessels like the _Alabama_, but Russell asked
+Lyons to find out "whether in any case they [privateers] will be
+authorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case in
+what case, and to what extent[987]." Three days later, on March 26,
+Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as "not
+unfriendly in tone," but in the long conversation that ensued the old
+result was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent in
+performance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stop
+Southern shipbuilding if full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams
+concluded that "he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but it
+had become a most difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons,
+"Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured for
+peace between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and those
+of the two Governments fail of success[988]."
+
+In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to a
+head both in America and England. At Washington, from March seventh to
+the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisal
+had been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposed
+them was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to the
+intentions of Great Britain. The final decision was to wait later news
+from England[989]. This was Seward's idea as he had not as yet received
+reports of the British reaction to his communications through Lyons and
+Adams. March 27 was the critical day of decision in London, as it was
+also the day upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most
+vigorously debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Preceding
+this other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the first
+days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official assurances
+that if the South wished to build ships in French yards "we should be
+permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea[990]." This
+suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the intention, no
+doubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In the winter of
+1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic fleet to cruise in
+western waters and there was first a suspicion in America, later a
+conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was distinctly friendly to
+the North--that the orders might even extend to actual naval aid in case
+war should arise with England and France. In March, 1863, this
+was but vague rumour, by midsummer it was a confident hope, by
+September-October, when Russian fleets had entered the harbours of New
+York and San Francisco, the rumour had become a conviction and the
+silence of Russian naval officers when banqueted and toasted was
+regarded as discreet confirmation. There was no truth in the rumour, but
+already in March curious surmises were being made even in England, as to
+Russian intentions, though there is no evidence that the Government was
+at all concerned. The truth was that the Russian fleet had been ordered
+to sea as a precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, in
+case the difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead to
+war with France and England[991].
+
+In England, among the people rather than in governmental England, a
+feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the Ministry had been lax
+in regard to the _Alabama_, and as news of her successes was received
+this feeling was given voice. Liverpool, at first almost wholly on the
+side of the Lairds and of Southern ship-building, became doubtful by
+the very ease with which the _Alabama_ destroyed Northern ships.
+Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests might,
+after all, be directly opposed to those of the ship-builders. Meetings
+were held and the matter discussed. In February, 1863, such a meeting at
+Plaistow, attended by the gentry of the neighbourhood, but chiefly by
+working men, especially by dock labourers and by men from the
+ship-building yards at Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman be
+requested to write to the Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestly
+entreating him to put in force, with utmost vigilance, the law of
+England against such ships as the _Alabama_[992]." Such expressions were
+not as yet widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulge
+in much discussion, but British _doubt_ was developing[993].
+
+Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt as to
+Britain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in Parliament
+which Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all the speeches he
+has made since I have been at this post[994]." On March 26, came the
+presentation by Adams of Seward's instruction of which Russell wrote to
+Lyons as made in no unfriendly tone and as a result of which Adams
+wrote: "The conclusion which I draw ... is, that the Government is
+really better disposed to exertion, and feels itself better sustained
+for action by the popular sentiment than ever before[995]." Russell told
+Adams that he had received a note from Palmerston "expressing his
+approbation of every word" of his speech three days before. In a portion
+of the despatch to Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence,
+Adams advised against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the present
+favourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to run the
+risk of changing the current in Great Britain by the presentation of a
+new issue which might rally all national pride against us as was done in
+the _Trent_ case[996]." That Russell was indeed thinking of definite
+action is foreshadowed by the advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27,
+as to the latter's language in the debate scheduled for that day on the
+Foreign Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interview
+with Adams:
+
+     "The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked him
+     what he had to propose in reference to the _Alabama_ was that
+     the Government should declare their disapproval of the
+     fitting out of such ships of war to prey on
+     American commerce.
+
+     "Now, as the fitting out and escape of the _Alabama_ and
+     _Oreto_ was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can
+     have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the
+     Government disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law
+     with a view to assist one of the belligerents[997]."
+
+But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the hopeful view
+of the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to Sumner, "badly
+managed and told against us[998]," and Bright himself participated in
+this "bad management." For over a year he had been advocating the cause
+of the North in public speeches and everywhere pointing out to
+unenfranchised England that the victory of the North was essential to
+democracy in all Europe. Always an orator of power he used freely
+vigorous language and nowhere more so than in a great public meeting of
+the Trades Unions of London in St. James' Hall, on March 26, the evening
+before the parliamentary debate. The purpose of this meeting was to
+bring public pressure on the Government in favour of the North, and the
+pith of Bright's speech was to contrast the democratic instincts of
+working men with the aristocratic inclinations of the Government[999].
+Reviewing "aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said:
+
+     "Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this contest,
+     and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your
+     streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has
+     beheld an afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has
+     beheld thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without
+     emperor, without king, without the surroundings of a court,
+     without nobles, except such as are made by eminence in
+     intellect and virtue, without State bishops and
+     State priests.
+
+     "'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation,' without
+     great armies and great navies, without great debt and without
+     great taxes.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for
+     yourselves.... Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the
+     worst foes of freedom that the world has ever seen.... You
+     will not do this. I have faith in you. Impartial history
+     will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly
+     neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your
+     press--which ought to have instructed and defended--was
+     mainly written to betray, the fate of a Continent and of its
+     vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an
+     unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make
+     it the heritage of all His children[1000]."
+
+The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in support of
+the North held throughout the whole course of the war, and it was also
+the most notable one as indicating the rising tide of popular demand for
+more democratic institutions. That it irritated the Government and gave
+a handle to Southern sympathizers in the parliamentary debate of March
+27 is unquestioned. In addition, if that debate was intended to secure
+from the Government an intimation of future policy against Southern
+shipbuilding it was conducted on wrong lines for _immediate_
+effect--though friends of the North may have thought the method used was
+wise for _future_ effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster,
+leading in the debate[1001], called on Ministers to explain the
+"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer some
+pledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should have been
+active on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead of waiting to
+be urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a certain degree of
+complicity in the escape of the _Alabama_. The Solicitor-General
+answered in a legal defence of the Government, complained of the offence
+of America in arousing its citizens against Great Britain upon
+unjustifiable grounds, but did not make so vigorous a reply as might,
+perhaps, have been expected. Still he stood firmly on the ground that
+the Government could not act without evidence to convict--in itself a
+statement that might well preclude interference with the Rams. Bright
+accused the Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality," and
+referred at length to the public meeting of the previous evening:
+
+     "If you had last night looked in the faces of three thousand
+     of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London, as
+     I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for
+     that country for which you appear to care so little, you
+     would imagine that the more forbearing, the more generous,
+     and the more just the conduct of the Government to the United
+     States, the more it would recommend itself to the magnanimous
+     feelings of the people of this country."
+
+This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the people
+was not likely to win or to convince men, whether pro-Southern or not,
+who were opponents of the speaker's long-avowed advocacy of more
+democratic institutions in England. It is no wonder then that Laird, who
+had been castigated in the speeches of the evening, rising in defence of
+the conduct of his firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I would
+rather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen _Alabamas_
+than as a man who applies himself deliberately to set class against
+class, and to cry up the institutions of another country which, when
+they come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the
+very name of liberty to an utter absurdity." This utterance was greeted
+with great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the _Alabama_ as
+in approval of the speaker's defiance of Bright.
+
+[Illustration: WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)]
+
+In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some immediate pledge
+by the Government, had gone the wrong way about to secure it. Vigour in
+attack was no way to secure a favourable response from Palmerston.
+Always a fighting politician in public it was inevitable that he should
+now fight back. Far from making the statement recommended to him by
+Russell, he concluded the debate by reasserting the correctness of
+governmental procedure in the case of the _Alabama_, and himself with
+vigour accused Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as to
+increase rather than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading of
+the speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows that
+while vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they were
+avoiding _any_ pledge of whatever nature, for the future.
+
+Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of the debate
+was "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of Lord Russell's
+speech than to confirm it[1002]." He and his English advisers were very
+uneasy, not knowing whether to trust to Russell's intimations of more
+active governmental efforts, or to accept the conclusion that his advice
+had been rejected by Palmerston[1003]. Possibly if less anxious and
+alarmed they would have read more clearly between the lines of
+parliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to hurry
+the Government into public announcement of a new policy was no proof
+that old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the result in
+Parliament, they forgot that the real pressure on Government was coming
+from an American declaration of an intention to issue privateers unless
+something were done to satisfy that country. Certainly Russell was
+unmoved by the debate for on April 3 he wrote to Palmerston:
+
+     "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the
+     ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have
+     thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained.
+     The Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the
+     measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law.
+
+     "We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we
+     have satisfied the opinion which prevails here as well as in
+     America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be
+     allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it[1004]."
+
+Two days later, on April 5, the _Alexandra_, a vessel being equipped to
+join the _Alabama_ as a commerce destroyer, was seized on the ground
+that she was about to violate the Enlistment Act and a new policy, at
+least to make a test case in law, was thereby made public. In fact, on
+March 30, but three days after the debate of March 27, the case of the
+_Alexandra_ had been taken up by Russell, referred to the law officers
+on March 31, and approved by them for seizure on April 4[1005]. Public
+meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's action,
+as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people applauded the
+seizure of the _Alexandra_, demanded vigorous prosecution of the Lairds
+and others, and urged governmental activity to prevent any further
+ship-building for the South[1006].
+
+On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be
+     procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate
+     service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings
+     which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from
+     justice of the _Oreto_ and _Alabama_[1007]."
+
+It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on _evidence_ to be
+sure, but on evidence of the vessels being "_apparently_ intended" for
+the South. This was far from being the same thing as the previous
+assertion that conclusive evidence was required. What, then, was the
+basic consideration in Russell's mind leading to such a face-about on
+declared policy? Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing
+neutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for the
+rising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful
+than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent in
+application of the American "privateering" Bill. How did Russell, and
+Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foresee
+and fear?
+
+As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had been
+introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason passed
+without serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles,
+Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that
+"something must be done" because vessels were building in England
+intended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under construction were
+clearly understood to have that purpose. If privateers were to offset
+the action of the Rams there must be some definite plan for their use.
+Seward and Adams repeatedly complained of British inaction yet in the
+same breath asserted that the privateers were intended to chase and
+destroy _Alabamas_--a plan so foolish, so it seemed to British
+diplomats, as to be impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of
+Seward. How, in short, _could_ privateers make good an injury to
+blockade about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockading
+squadrons on station off the Southern ports they would but become so
+much more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of
+_Alabamas_ the chances were that they would be the vanquished rather
+than the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile marine for
+them to attack and privateering against "enemy's commerce" was thus out
+of the question since there was no such commerce.
+
+There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended use of
+privateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the close blockade
+the only recourse of the North would be to establish a "cruising
+squadron" blockade remote from the shores of the enemy. If conducted by
+government war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to British
+interpretation of international law[1008]. But the Northern navy,
+conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfere
+seriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy or
+carrying cotton from Southern ports. A "flood of privateers," scouring
+the ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effective
+that closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in the
+Northern war programme.
+
+This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he saw in it
+a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clash
+leading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's desire should be
+Russell's reaction, though never specifically explaining the exact
+purpose of the privateers. Moreover, nine-tenths of the actual
+blockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being so
+it was to be presumed that "privateers" searching for possible blockade
+runners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences with
+British merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in
+ordinary trade between non-belligerent ports.
+
+Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill,
+Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raise
+objections though not formally making official protest, and had asked
+for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of such
+vessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by the
+Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventing
+unwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce by
+privateers[1009]. The alteration of governmental policy as indicated in
+the arrest of the _Alexandra_, it might be hoped, would at least cause a
+suspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired.
+Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations,
+had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet
+uninformed of the _Alexandra_ action, was still much alarmed. On April
+13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative
+to the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a last
+effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had made
+imminent[1010]." Lyons had argued with Seward the inadvisability of
+sending such a despatch, since it was now known that Russell had "spoken
+in a satisfactory manner" about Confederate vessels, but Seward was
+insistent. Lyons believed there was real cause for anxiety, writing:
+
+     "A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design
+     of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate
+     England, but still there can be little doubt that the
+     exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute a
+     serious danger. It is fully shared by many important members
+     of the Cabinet--nor are the men in high office exempt from
+     the overweening idea of the naval power of the United States,
+     which reconciles the people to the notion of a war with
+     England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned the flame in
+     order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I believe,
+     seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong
+     measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the
+     Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance
+     to them. If no military success be obtained within a short
+     time, it may become a Party necessity to resort to some means
+     of producing an excitement in the country sufficient to
+     enable the Government to enforce the Conscription Act, and to
+     exercise the extra-legal powers conferred by the late
+     Congress, To produce such an excitement the more ardent of
+     the party would not hesitate to go, to the verge of a war
+     with England. Nay there are not a few who already declare
+     that if the South must be lost, the best mode to conceal the
+     discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be to go
+     to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to
+     English interference[1011]."
+
+On the same day Lyons wrote, privately:
+
+     "I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some
+     better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted
+     out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my
+     opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without
+     leading the people here to think that they had gained their
+     point by threats[1012]."
+
+So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, he
+cipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing[1013], but
+soon his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could report
+that Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended for
+communication to Russell[1014], and on the twenty-fourth when
+presenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against the
+privateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that the
+"latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of the
+_Alexandra_, had caused Seward to become very conciliatory. Lyons was
+assured that the plan "was for the present at rest[1015]." Apparently
+Seward now felt more security than did Lyons as to future British action
+for three days later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milne
+that an American issue of letters of marque would surely come if
+England did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a way
+as to indicate his own opinion that effective steps _must_ be taken to
+prevent their escape[1016].
+
+The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show that he
+regarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern ship-building in
+British yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. Seward became unusually
+friendly, even embarrassingly so, for in August he virtually forced
+Lyons to go on tour with him through the State of New York, thus making
+public demonstration of the good relations of the two Governments. This
+sweet harmony and mutual confidence is wholly contrary to the usual
+historical treatment of the Laird Rams incident, which neglects the
+threat of the privateering bill, regards American protests as steadily
+increasing in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note by
+Adams to Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September.
+Previously, however, American historians have been able to use only
+American sources and have been at a loss to understand the privateering
+plan, since Seward never went beyond a vague generalization of its
+object in official utterances. It is the British reaction to that plan
+which reveals the real "threat" made and the actual crisis of
+the incident.
+
+It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires less
+extended treatment than is customarily given to it. The correct
+understanding of this later story is the recognition that Great Britain
+had in April given, a pledge and performed an act which satisfied Seward
+and Adams that the Rams would not be permitted to escape. It was their
+duty nevertheless to be on guard against a British relaxation of the
+promise made, and the delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing the
+Rams, caused American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of the
+sincerity of British actions.
+
+Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against Southern
+ship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the Foreign Office by a
+group of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting an alteration in the
+Foreign Enlistment Act if this were needed to prevent the issue of
+Southern ships, and pointing out that the "present policy" of the
+Government would entail a serious danger to British commerce in the
+future if, when England herself became a belligerent, neutral ports
+could be used by the enemy to build commerce destroyers[1017]. The
+memorial concluded that in any case it was a disgrace that British law
+should be so publicly infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gave
+the old answer that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtained
+of any act done with the intent to violate it[1018]." Evidently
+ship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutely
+alarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the _Alexandra_,
+and on June 22, a decision was rendered against the Government, but was
+promptly appealed.
+
+This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and the
+latter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams. Rumours
+were spread that the vessels were in fact intended for France, and when
+this was disproved that they were being built for the Viceroy of Egypt.
+This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was declared that the real
+owners were certain French merchants whose purpose in contracting for
+such clearly warlike vessels was left in mystery, but with the
+intimation that Egypt was to be the ultimate purchaser. Captain Bullock
+had indeed made such a contract of sale to French merchants but with the
+proviso of resale to him, after delivery. On his part, Russell was
+seeking _proof_ fully adequate to seizure, but this was difficult to
+obtain and such as was submitted was regarded by the law officers as
+inadequate. They reported that there was "no evidence capable of being
+presented to a court of justice." He informed Adams of this legal
+opinion at the moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearing
+completion, and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlier
+determination, began that series of diplomatic protests which very
+nearly approached a threat of war.
+
+At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's decision in
+the _Alexandra_ case, and shortly after the great Northern victories at
+Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11,
+which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war. In substance
+Seward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of Great
+Britain would find a way to nullify the _Alexandra_ decision, but
+renewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northern
+intention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to
+"pursue" Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019]. But there are
+two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative the
+belligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not read or communicate
+it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and he
+did not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell. The latter never
+heard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United States
+diplomatic correspondence[1020].
+
+In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidence
+secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urge
+their immediate seizure. Adams here but performed his duty and was in
+fact acting in accordance with Russell's own request[1021]. On July 16
+he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of the
+South[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety
+because of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape,
+Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a
+participant in the war[1023]. Further affidavits were sent to Russell on
+August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that the
+Government was legally advised "they cannot interfere in any way with
+these vessels," Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed his
+regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the grave
+nature of the crisis pending between the United States and Great
+Britain. To this Russell replied that the matter was "under serious and
+anxious consideration," to which, on September 5, in a long
+communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped: "It would be
+superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war."
+
+The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war on
+the explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in the
+war. There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell's
+"change of policy" of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact was
+that on September 1, Russell had already given directions to take steps
+for the detention of the Rams and that on September 3, positive
+instructions were given to that effect[1024], though not carried out
+until some days later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy"
+of April; the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to
+secure evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for
+acting in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to
+be the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the
+_Alabama_. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain Bullock that
+complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was forced, finally, to
+act without it[1025].
+
+It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston, on
+September 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no Cabinet
+approval for this step had yet formally been given, since Russell
+notified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if he
+disapproved, to call a Cabinet at once[1026]. The _plan_ to stop the
+Rams must have long been understood for Palmerston called no Cabinet.
+Moreover it is to be presumed that he was preparing the public for the
+seizure, for on this same September 3, the _Times_, in a long editorial,
+argued that the law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmony
+with true neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to British
+commerce, as had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the _Times_ was at
+this period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at least
+inferential that the editorial was an advance notice of governmental
+intention to apply a policy known in intimate circles to have been for
+some time matured. Four days later, while governmental action was still
+unknown to the public another editorial advocated seizure of the
+Rams[1027]. Russell had acted under the fear that one of the Rams might
+slip away as had the _Alabama_; he had sent orders to stop and
+investigate, but he delayed final seizure in the hope that better
+evidence might yet be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letters
+with Lairds (the builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It was
+only on September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send the
+vessels on a "trial trip," and it was not until September 16 that public
+announcement was made of the Government's action[1028].
+
+Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it was not
+until September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him the Rams would
+be seized, even though three days before, on September 5, this
+information had been sent to Washington. The explanation is Russell's
+eager search for evidence to _convict_, and his correspondence with
+Lairds which did not come to a head until the eighth, when the builders
+refused to give information. To the builders Russell was writing as if a
+governmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no chance
+of a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed, Adams was well
+satisfied though his immediate reaction was to criticize, not Russell,
+but the general "timidity and vacillation" of the law officers of the
+Crown[1029]. Two days later, having learned from Russell himself just
+what was taking place, Adams described the "firm stand" taken by the
+Foreign Secretary, noted the general approval by the public press and
+expressed the opinion that there was now a better prospect of being able
+to preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since his
+arrival in London[1030]. Across the water British officials were
+delighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada expressed his
+approval[1031]. Lyons reported a "great improvement" in the feeling
+toward England and that Seward especially was highly pleased with
+Russell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem for Seward together
+with the hope that he would remain in office[1032].
+
+The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur until
+mid-October, though they had been placed under official surveillance on
+September 9. Both sides were jockeying for position in the expected
+legal battle when the case should be taken up by the courts[1033]. At
+first Russell even thought of making official protest to Mason in London
+and a draft of such protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officers
+and subsequently revised by Palmerston, but finally was not sent[1034].
+Possibly it was thought that such a communication to Mason approached
+too nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for in
+December the protest ultimately directed to be made through
+Consul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond and
+after stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing the
+Confederacy to present the following:
+
+     "It appears from various correspondence the authenticity of
+     which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate Government
+     having no good ports free from the blockade of the Federals
+     have conceived the design of using the ports of the United
+     Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be
+     equipped and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce
+     of the United States of America, a State with which Her
+     Majesty is at peace...."
+
+     "These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity
+     which ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a
+     Neutral Power.
+
+     "Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly
+     to observe it.
+
+     "You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his
+     Government to forbear from all acts tending to affect
+     injuriously Her Majesty's position[1035]."
+
+To carry out this instruction there was required permission for Crawford
+to pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when Lyons made the
+request[1036].
+
+Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's course in
+seizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very generally against
+the act. Adams now pressed either for an alteration of the British law
+or for a convention with America establishing mutual similar
+interpretation of neutral duty. Russell replied that "until the trials
+of the _Alexandra_ and the steam rams had taken place, we could hardly
+be said to know what our law was, and therefore not tell whether it
+required alteration. I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Seward
+that the wish and intention of Government were to make our neutrality an
+honest and bona-fide one[1037]." But save from extreme and avowed
+Southern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less to
+the stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political character,
+attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign Minister and his
+humiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to American threats."
+Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling of Parliament, a party
+attack was made on Russell and the Government by Derby in the House of
+Lords. Derby approved the stopping of the Rams but sought to prove that
+the Government had dishonoured England by failing to act of its own
+volition until threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of July
+II with much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printed
+American diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was not an
+instruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell flat for
+Russell simply replied that Adams had never presented such an
+instruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on February 15
+he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the dates of various
+documents that "at the last moment" Adams made a threat of war and
+Russell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was brief and to the effect
+that orders to stop the Rams had been given before the communications
+from Adams were received. Finally, on February 23, a motion in the
+Commons called for all correspondence with Adams and with Lairds, The
+Government consented to the first but refused that with Lairds and was
+supported by a vote of 187 to 153.[1038]
+
+Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of Russell the
+Tories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was virtually a vote
+of censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud as was the Government
+in praise of Adams and in approval of the seizure of the Rams. Naturally
+their cause was weakened, and the Ministry, referring to expressions
+made and intentions indicated as far back as March, 1863, thus hinting
+without directly so stating that the real decision had then been made,
+was easily the victor in the vote[1038]. Derby had committed an error as
+a party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, 1864, he
+attempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on dates of
+documents. Russell's reply ignored that point altogether[1039]. It did
+not suit his purpose to declare, flatly, the fact that in April
+assurances had been given both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward,
+that measures would be taken to prevent the departure of Southern
+vessels from British ports. To have made this disclosure would have
+required an explanation _why_ such assurance had been given and this
+would have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northern
+plan to create a _cruising squadron blockade by privateers_. _There_ was
+the real threat. The later delays and seeming uncertainties of British
+action made Adams anxious but there is no evidence that Russell ever
+changed his purpose. He sought stronger evidence before acting and he
+hoped for stronger support from legal advisers, but he kept an eye on
+the Rams and when they had reached the stage where there was danger of
+escape, he seized them even though the desired evidence was still
+lacking[1040]. Seward's "privateering bill" plan possibly entered upon
+in a moment of desperation and with no clear statement from him of its
+exact application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats became
+pronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, the
+interpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been the
+cessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America complained.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 966: In other respects, also, this question of belligerent
+ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguely
+defined. As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independence
+against Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at
+sea. Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firm
+of Lizardi & Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, the
+ships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the
+guns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British
+Navy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority to
+purchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strict
+neutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country.
+Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command. One Mexican vessel,
+the _Guadaloupe_, left England with full equipment as originally
+planned; the other, the _Montezuma_, was forced to strip her equipment.
+But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were
+permitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. In
+all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, but
+it is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusion
+as to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See my book, _British
+Interests and Activities in Texas_, Ch. IV.]
+
+[Footnote 967: Bullock, _Secret Service under the Confederacy_.]
+
+[Footnote 968: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American
+Civil War_, p. 338-9.]
+
+[Footnote 969: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama.'" Also _ibid._, "Correspondence
+between Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities at
+Liverpool relating to the 'Alabama.'" The last-minute delay was due to
+the illness of a Crown adviser.]
+
+[Footnote 970: State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264. Adams to
+Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 971: Selborne, in his _Memorials: Family and Personal_, II, p.
+430, declared that in frequent official communication with all members
+of the Cabinet at the time, "I never heard a word fall from any one of
+them expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the detention
+of the _Alabama_ were sent too late." Of quite different opinion is
+Brooks Adams, in his "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (_Proceedings_,
+Mass. Hist. Soc., Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, the
+American Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what
+purported to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse,
+Southern agent in England, warning him of danger to his "protege." "This
+Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office." (_Ibid._, p.
+260, _note_.)]
+
+[Footnote 972: Fox, _Confidential Correspondence_, I, p. 165. Fox to
+Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 973: It is interesting that the opinion of many Continental
+writers on international law was immediately expressed in favour of the
+American and against the British contention. This was especially true of
+German opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]
+
+[Footnote 974: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 975: I am aware that Seward's use of the "Privateering Bill,"
+now to be recounted is largely a new interpretation of the play of
+diplomacy in regard to the question of Southern ship-building in
+England. Its significance became evident only when British
+correspondence was available; but that correspondence and a careful
+comparison of dates permits, and, as I think, requires a revised
+statement of the incident of the Laird Rams.]
+
+[Footnote 976: Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers and laying
+Northern cities under contribution. According to a statement made in
+1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the rams, no instructions as
+to their use had been given him by the Confederate Government, but his
+plans were solely to break the blockade with no thought of attacking
+Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV. 385, _note_.)]
+
+[Footnote 977: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, p. 134.]
+
+[Footnote 978: Wallbridge, _Addresses and Resolutions_. Pamphlet. New
+York, n.d. He began his agitation in 1856, and now received much popular
+applause. His pamphlet quotes in support many newspapers from June,
+1862, to September, 1863. Wallbridge apparently thought himself better
+qualified than Welles to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his
+agitation as instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet.
+Welles professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress
+unknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a statement
+difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon it.]
+
+[Footnote 979: Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. IV, pp.
+3271, 3325 and 3336.]
+
+[Footnote 980: _Ibid._, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, 393, and Part II,
+pp. 960, 1028, 1489.]
+
+[Footnote 981: Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams." (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, pp. 265-6.)]
+
+[Footnote 982: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 116,
+Feb. 19, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 983: F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 984: _Ibid._, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to Russell, March 10,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 985: _Ibid._, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, March 13, 1863.
+Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. (Russell Papers. To
+Russell, March 24, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 986: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 141.
+Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 987: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to Lyons, March 24,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 988: _Ibid._, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell to Lyons, March 27,
+1863.]
+
+[Footnote 989: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 245-50.]
+
+[Footnote 990: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 634, Slidell to Benjamin,
+March 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 991: For example of American contemporary belief and later
+"historical tradition," see Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, pp. 24-38.
+Also for a curious story that a large part of the price paid for Alaska
+was in reality a repayment of expenses incurred by Russia in sending her
+fleet to America, see _Letters of Franklin K. Lane_, p. 260. The facts
+as stated above are given by F.A. Golder, _The Russian Fleet and the
+Civil War_ (_Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915, pp. 801 _seq_.). The plan was
+to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of aid to the North
+was "born on American soil," and Russian officers naturally did nothing
+to contradict its spread. In one case, however, a Russian commander was
+ready to help the North. Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the
+harbour of San Francisco was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours
+of the approach of the _Alabama_ and gave orders to protect the city. He
+acted without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his
+superiors at home.]
+
+[Footnote 992: _The Liberator_, March 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 993: American opinion knew little of this change. An
+interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan to thwart
+Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by the United
+States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams outright by the offer
+of such a price as, it was thought, would be so tempting to the Lairds
+as to make refusal unlikely. Two men, Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to
+England with funds and much embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetly
+refrained from stating details, but yet permitted him to guess their
+object. The plan of buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic
+protests on England's duty in international law and the agents
+themselves soon saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the
+Navy, wrote to Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in
+England, I think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.)
+Thurlow Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of
+Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 632.) Forbes
+reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on with the plan.
+"We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we have put new fire into
+Mr. Dudley by furnishing _fuel_, and he is hard at it getting
+evidence.... My opinion _to-day_ is that we can and shall stop by legal
+process and by the British Government the sailing of ironclads and other
+war-ships." (Forbes MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department
+plan and was disliked by State Department representatives is shown by
+Dudley's complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately
+discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding
+citations, in his _Studies Military and Diplomatic_, Ch. IX. "An
+Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by Chittenden
+written in 1890, in which bad memory and misunderstanding played sad
+havoc with historical truth.]
+
+[Footnote 994: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To
+Seward, March 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 995: _Ibid._, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 996: State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356. Adams to
+Seward, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 997: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 27, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 998: Rhodes, IV, p. 369, _notes_, April 4, 1863. Bright was
+made very anxious as to Government intentions by this debate.]
+
+[Footnote 999: This topic will be treated at length in Chapter XVIII. It
+is here cited merely in relation to its effect on the Government at
+the moment.]
+
+[Footnote 1000: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, 307-8.]
+
+[Footnote 1001: Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for entire debate.]
+
+[Footnote 1002: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 164.
+Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1003: Rhodes, IV, 369-72.]
+
+[Footnote 1004: Palmerston MS.]
+
+[Footnote 1005: Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in June, and the
+seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government this decision was
+upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It was again appealed, and
+the Government defeated in the House of Lords in April, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1006: _Manchester Examiner and Times_, April 7, 1863. Goldwin
+Smith was one of the principal speakers. Letters were read from Bright,
+Forster, R.A. Taylor, and others.]
+
+[Footnote 1007: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 183.]
+
+[Footnote 1008: "Historicus," in articles in the _Times_, was at this
+very moment, from December, 1862, on, discussing international law
+problems, and in one such article specifically defended the belligerent
+right to conduct a cruising squadron blockade. See _Historicus on
+International Law_, pp. 99-118. He stated the established principle to
+be that search and seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels
+actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but
+those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have
+been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the
+blockade." (_Ibid._, p. 108.)]
+
+[Footnote 1009: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to Lyons, March
+28, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1010: F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 1011: _Ibid._, No. 310. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1012: Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1013: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy enclosed in Lyons to
+Russell, April 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1014: Russell Papers. To Russell.]
+
+[Footnote 1015: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to Russell, April
+24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1016: Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons wrote: "The stories
+in the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England are
+untrue. But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearly
+determined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatches
+sent were not satisfactory. It is very easy to see that if U.S.
+privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on charges
+of breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations would
+have soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must
+have ensued."]
+
+[Footnote 1017: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on Foreign Enlistment Act."]
+
+[Footnote 1018: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1019: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, pp.
+308-10.]
+
+[Footnote 1020: The despatch taken in its entirety save for a few
+vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's phrase-making, is not at
+all warlike. Bancroft, II, 385 _seq_., makes Seward increasingly anxious
+from March to September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to
+Adams, September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivings
+reported in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my
+interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made in
+April would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to Russell
+a communication from Seward denying that his July 11 despatch was
+intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to Great Britain.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons, April 3, 1864.)]
+
+[Footnote 1021: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII.
+"Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels building at Birkenhead."]
+
+[Footnote 1022: See next chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 1023: State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No. 452, and No. 453
+with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1024: Rhodes, IV, 381.]
+
+[Footnote 1025: Many of these details were unknown at the time so that
+on the face of the documents then available, and for long afterwards,
+there appeared ground for believing that Adams' final protests of
+September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to yield. Dudley, as late as 1893,
+thought that "at the crisis" in September, Palmerston, in the absence of
+Russell, had given the orders to stop the rams. (In _Penn. Magazine of
+History_, Vol. 17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England during
+the Late War.")]
+
+[Footnote 1026: Rhodes, IV, p. 382.]
+
+[Footnote 1027: The _Times_, Sept. 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1028: _Ibid._, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863. The Governmental
+correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a motion in Parliament, Feb.
+23, 1864, but the Government was supported in refusing it. A printed
+copy of this correspondence, issued privately, was placed in Adams'
+hands by persons unnamed and sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Seward
+thereupon had this printed in the _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1864-5,
+Pt. I, No. 633.]
+
+[Footnote 1029: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 492. Adams to
+Seward, Sept. 8, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1030: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 370.
+To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at the whole matter of the
+Rams and the alleged "threat of war" of Sept. 5, from the point of view
+of his own anxiety at the time, was naturally inclined to magnify the
+effects of his own efforts and to regard the _crisis_ as occurring in
+September. His notes to Russell and his diary records were early the
+main basis of historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disproved
+the accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass.
+Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, p. 293, _seq._) ignores Rhodes,
+harks back to the old argument and amplifies it with much new and
+interesting citation, but not to conviction. My interpretation is that
+the real crisis of Governmental decision to act came in April, and that
+events in September were but final applications of that decision.]
+
+[Footnote 1031: Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. 26, 1863. Copy in
+Stuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1032: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1033: Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You will learn by the
+papers that we have at last seized the Iron Clads. Whether we shall be
+able to bring home to them legally that they were Confederate property
+is another matter. I think we can, but at all events no moral doubt can
+be entertained of the fact, and, therefore, we are under no anxiety
+whether as to the public or Parliamentary view of our proceeding. They
+would have played the devil with the American ships, for they are most
+formidable ships. I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably in
+consequence." (Lyons Papers.) The Foreign Office thought that it had
+thwarted plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea.
+(F.O., Am., Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine to
+Hammond, Oct. 26, 1863.).]
+
+[Footnote 1034: F.O., Am., Vol. 929. Marked "September, 1863." The draft
+summarized the activities of Confederate ship-building and threatened
+Southern agents in England with "the penalities of the law...."]
+
+[Footnote 1035: F.O., Am., Vol. 932, No. 1. F.O. to Consul-General
+Crawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7, 1863, had already
+"expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to protest against this
+also. (_Ibid._, No. 4.)]
+
+[Footnote 1036: Bonham. _British Consuls in the South_, p. 254.
+(Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43.)]
+
+[Footnote 1037: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5, 1863. Bullock,
+_Secret Service_, declares the British Government to have been neutral
+but with strong leaning toward the North.]
+
+[Footnote 1038: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIII, pp. 430-41, 544-50,
+955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by Brooks Adams,
+_The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, pp. 312-324.]
+
+[Footnote 1039: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXIV, pp. 1862-1913. _The Index_,
+naturally vicious in comment on the question of the Rams, summed up its
+approval of Derby's contentions: "Europe and America alike will
+inevitably believe that it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothing
+else, which induced the Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the
+1st September, and they will draw the necessary conclusion that the way
+to extort concessions from England is by bluster and menace." (Feb. 18,
+1864, p. 106.)]
+
+[Footnote 1040: Lairds brought suit for damages, but the case never
+reached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by the Government.
+This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the Government that it had
+no case. In my view the failure to push the case to a conclusion was due
+to the desire not to commit Great Britain on legal questions, in view of
+the claim for damages certain to be set up by the United States on
+account of the depredations of the _Alabama_.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV
+
+ROEBUCK'S MOTION
+
+In the mid-period during which the British Government was seeking to
+fulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards ship-building and
+while the public was unaware that such a promise had been given, certain
+extreme friends of the South thought the time had come for renewed
+pressure upon the Government, looking toward recognition of the
+Confederacy. The _Alexandra_ had been seized in April, but the first
+trial, though appealed, had gone against the Government in June, and
+there was no knowledge that the Ministry was determined in its stand.
+From January to the end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations in
+approval of the emancipation proclamation had somewhat checked
+expressions of Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friends
+had recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came forward
+in the person of Roebuck.
+
+Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends had not
+ceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less vigorous tone. For
+four months after the British refusal of Napoleon's overtures on
+mediation, in November, 1862, the friends of the South were against
+"acting now," but this did not imply that they thought the cause lost or
+in any sense hopeless. Publicists either neutral in attitude or even
+professedly sympathetic with the North could see no outcome of the Civil
+War save separation of North and South. Thus the historian Freeman in
+the preface to the first volume of his uncompleted _History of Federal
+Government_, published in 1863, carefully explained that his book did
+not have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued that the
+breaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent weakness in a
+federal system, but took it for granted that American reunion was
+impossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a long tour of the
+North, beginning in September, 1861, published late in 1862 a two-volume
+work, _North America_, descriptive of a nation engaged in the business
+of war and wholly sympathetic with the Northern cause. Yet he, also,
+could see no hope of forcing the South back into the Union. "The North
+and South are virtually separated, and the day will come in which the
+West also will secede[1041]."
+
+Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual; they
+were, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in November,
+1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to prove it to be so
+for never again was there so near an approach to British intervention.
+Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think that true Southern policy
+was now to make an appeal to the Tories against the Government. In
+January, 1863, he was planning a new move:
+
+     "I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time for a
+     thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a
+     vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body
+     and if so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I
+     have seen Mr. Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself
+     in communication with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for
+     action for this seems to me now our best card[1042]."
+
+That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the attitude
+of the _Index_ which all through the months from November, 1862, to the
+middle of January, 1863, had continued to harp on the subject of
+mediation as if still believing that something yet might be done by the
+existing Ministry, but which then apparently gave up hope of the
+Palmerstonian administration:
+
+     "But what the Government means is evident enough. It does not
+     mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if it
+     can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States,
+     unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over
+     which they have no control,' which leave weak men and weak
+     ministers no choice. They will not, if they are not forced to
+     it, quarrel with Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will
+     let Lancashire starve; they will let British merchantmen be
+     plundered off Nassau and burnt off Cuba; they will submit to
+     a blockade of Bermuda or of Liverpool; but they will do
+     nothing which may tend to bring a supply of cotton from the
+     South, or to cut off the supply of eggs and bacon from the
+     North[1043]."
+
+But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant encouragement
+and was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by the debate in
+Parliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby gave explicit
+approval of the Government's refusal to listen to Napoleon[1044]. By
+February, Russell, having recovered from the smart of defeat within the
+Cabinet, declared himself weary of the perpetual talk about mediation
+and wrote to Lyons, "... till both parties are heartily tired and sick
+of the business, I see no use in talking of good offices. When that time
+comes Mercier will probably have a hint; let him have all the honour and
+glory of being the first[1045]." For the time being Spence's idea was
+laid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from Mason:
+
+     "The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at
+     present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be
+     useless to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North.
+     Any motion on the subject will be received with disfavour,
+     consequently the way in which it will be treated will only
+     make the North more elated, and will irritate the South
+     against us. If I saw the slightest chance of a motion being
+     received with any favour I would not let it go into other
+     hands, but I find the most influential men of all Parties
+     opposed to it[1046]."
+
+Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in France,
+reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the Foreign Office"
+that "It is believed that every possible thing has been done here in
+your behalf--we must now await the action of England, and it is through
+that you must aim all your efforts in that direction[1047]."
+
+With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to move the
+British Government or to stir Parliament, energies were now directed
+toward using financial methods of winning support for the Southern
+cause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken with the double
+object of providing funds for Southern agents in Europe and of creating
+an interested support of the South, which might, it was hoped,
+ultimately influence the British Government.
+
+By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the blockade, for
+the Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its agents abroad.
+Bullock, especially, required large amounts in furtherance of his
+ship-building contracts and was embarrassed by the lack of business
+methods and the delays of the Government at home. The incompetence of
+the Confederacy in finance was a weakness that characterized all of its
+many operations whether at home or abroad[1048] and was made evident in
+England by the confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. At
+first the Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with drafts
+upon the house of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, of Liverpool, a branch of
+the firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina, purchasing its
+bills of exchange with its own "home made" money. But as Confederate
+currency rapidly depreciated this method of transmitting funds became
+increasingly difficult and costly. The next step was to send to Spence,
+nominated by Mason as financial adviser in England, Confederate money
+bonds for sale on the British market, with authority to dispose of them
+as low as fifty cents on the dollar, but these found no takers[1049]. By
+September, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted and
+some new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was found in
+adopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made the basis for
+an advance of L60,000, a form of cotton bond being devised which fixed
+the price of cotton at eightpence the pound. These bonds were not put on
+the market but were privately placed by Lindsay & Company with a few
+buyers for the entire sum, the transaction remaining secret[1050].
+
+In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to the
+authorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton should be
+purchased by the Government, stored, and certificates issued to be sold
+abroad, the purchaser being assured of "all facilities of shipment."
+Spence was to be the authorized agent for the sale of these "cotton
+certificates," but before any reached him various special agents of the
+Confederacy had arrived in England by December, 1862, with such
+certificates in their possession and had disposed of some of them,
+calling them "cotton warrants." The difficulties which might arise from
+separate action in the market were at once perceived and following a
+conference with Mason all cotton obligations were turned to Fraser,
+Trenholm & Company. Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but no
+further attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants"
+were considered a better means of raising funds.
+
+It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved a
+governmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants" partook
+of the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point the Richmond
+authorities, after the first failure to sell "money bonds" abroad were
+not keen to attempt anything that could be stamped as a foreign
+"government loan." Their idea was rather that a certain part of the
+produce of the South was being set aside as the property of those who in
+England should extend credit to the South. The sole purpose of these
+earlier operations was to provide funds for Southern agents. By July,
+1862, Bullock had exhausted his earlier credit of a million dollars. The
+L60,000 loan secured through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demand
+and this had been followed by a development on similar lines of the
+"cotton certificates" and "warrants" which by December, 1862, had
+secured, through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars or
+thereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of this
+method and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however, there was
+broached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for the definite
+floating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan."
+
+This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by the
+well-established firm of Erlanger & Company. First approached by this
+company in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but found the latter
+strongly committed to his own plans with Spence[1051]. But Slidell
+persisted and Mason gave way[1052]. Representatives of Erlanger
+proceeded to Richmond and proposed a loan of twenty-five million
+dollars; they were surprised to find the Confederate Government
+disinclined to the idea of a foreign loan, and the final agreement, cut
+to fifteen millions, was largely made because of the argument advanced
+that as a result powerful influences would thus be brought to the
+support of the South[1053]. The contract was signed at Richmond, January
+28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the day
+following[1054]. But there was no Southern enthusiasm for the project.
+Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy disclaimed the "desire or
+intention on our part to effect a loan in Europe ... during the war we
+want only such very moderate sums as are required abroad for the
+purchase of warlike supplies and for vessels, and even that is not
+required because of our want of funds, but because of the difficulties
+of remittance"; as for the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would have
+declined it altogether but for the political considerations indicated by
+Mr. Slidell[1055]...."
+
+From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from
+Slidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the purpose
+of establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to suspend the
+operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's offer was learned,
+but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing agent of the Confederacy,
+caused a further sale of "cotton warrants[1056]." Spence, fearing he was
+about to be shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while
+Slidell regarded Spence[1057] as a weak and meddlesome agent[1058]. But
+on February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and
+uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and
+agreed to co-operate in floating the loan[1059]. Then followed a
+remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so much as regards
+the financial returns to the South, for these were negligible, as in
+relation to the declared object of Slidell and the Richmond
+Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would accompany the
+successful flotation of a loan.
+
+Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to receive
+promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress authorizing the
+loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this contract Erlanger &
+Company, sole managers of the loan, had guaranteed flotation of the
+entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77, the profit of the Company to be
+five per cent., plus the difference between 77 and the actual price
+received, but the first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the
+disposal of the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19,
+in London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically
+all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was
+entitled "_Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States of
+America for_ 3 _Millions Sterling at_ 90 _per Cent_." The bonds were to
+bear interest at seven per cent. and were to be exchangeable for cotton
+at the option of the holder at the price of sixpence "for each pound of
+cotton, at any time not later than six months after the ratification of
+a treaty of peace between the present belligerents." There were
+provisions for the gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who
+did not desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on
+application. 10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the
+days, the first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the
+first of August, September and October.
+
+Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound it was
+thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at least a good
+chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. True "the loan was
+looked upon as a wild cotton speculation[1060]," but odds were so large
+as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed hardly conceivable
+that cotton could for some years go below sevenpence per pound, and even
+that figure would have meant profit, _if_ the Confederacy were
+established. Moreover, even though the loan was not given official
+recognition by the London stock exchange, the financial columns of the
+_Times_ and the _Economist_ favoured it and the subscriptions were so
+prompt and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as
+over-subscribed three times in London alone[1061]. With the closing of
+the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. Slidell wrote: "It is a
+financial recognition of our independence, emanating from a class
+proverbially cautious, and little given to be influenced by sentiment or
+sympathy[1062]." On Friday, March 27, the allotment took place and three
+days later Mason wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on
+the triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, _malgre_ all
+detraction and calumny, that cotton is king at last[1063]."
+
+"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble and it
+took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep him in
+state[1064]." On April 1, the flurry of speculation had begun to falter
+and the loan was below par; on the second it dropped to 3-1/2 discount,
+and by the third the promoters and the Southern diplomats were very
+anxious. They agreed that someone must be "bearing" the bonds and
+suspected Adams of supplying Northern funds for that purpose[1065].
+Spence wrote from Liverpool in great alarm and coincidently Erlanger &
+Company urged that Mason should authorize the use of the receipts
+already secured to hold up the price of the bonds. Mason was very
+reluctant to do this[1066], but finally yielded when informed of the
+result of an interview between Spence, Erlanger, and the latter's chief
+London agent, Schroeder. Spence had proposed a withdrawal of a part of
+the loan from the market as likely to have a stabilizing effect, and
+opposed the Erlanger plan of using the funds already in hand. But
+Schroeder coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative
+refused to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market,
+then Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their
+contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued it,
+they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up their
+instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent sacrificed
+is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government at all, but the
+profits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co., actually in their hands, and they
+cannot be expected to take a worse position. At any rate they will not
+do so, and unless the compact can be made on the basis we name, matters
+must take their course[1067]."
+
+In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he "could not
+hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, as
+well as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068]." Mason
+gave the required authorization and this was later approved from
+Richmond. For a time the "bulling" of the loan was successful, but again
+and again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bonds
+and in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy. Some
+$6,000,000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entire
+operation it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the
+Confederacy, although, as stated by the _Economist_, over $12,000,000 of
+the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investors
+at the end of the war[1069].
+
+The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell,
+a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer of
+Southern fortunes[1070]. From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loan
+bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked the
+regard attached to sound investment. This fact in itself denied to the
+loan any such favourable influence, or "financial recognition of the
+Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success,
+attributed to it. The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited it
+and tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus
+"confidence in the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of
+increased by this turning from political to financial methods of
+bringing pressure upon the Government[1071].
+
+Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reserved
+from January to June, 1863. Public attention was distracted from the war
+in America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly during
+the months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relations
+existing between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent on
+going beyond British "meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily
+might lead to war with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America,
+and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish
+question than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was
+still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary "push"
+and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancashire
+little attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have been
+seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration. This was
+a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directed
+against the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees' sufferings.
+Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and
+his brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet
+no effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of the
+South[1072].
+
+In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to make
+advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton loan, though
+fairly strong again because of Confederate governmental aid, was in fact
+a failure in its expected result of public support for the South;
+something must be done to offset that failure. In Polish affairs France
+had drawn back; presumably Napoleon was again eager for some active
+effort. Best of all, the military situation in America was thought to
+indicate Southern success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt
+with the stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at
+Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly
+defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a
+definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance north
+did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in a select
+circle in England and much was expected of it. The time seemed ripe,
+therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck of a motion for
+the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the real purpose of which
+was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' which had been advocated by
+Spence in January, but postponed on the advice of Gregory[1073]. _The
+Index_ clearly indicated where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now
+asks what will be the policy of Great Britain towards America; but
+everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will do."
+
+     "... England to-day pays one of the inevitable penalties of
+     free government and of material prosperity, that of having at
+     times at the head of national affairs statesmen who belong
+     rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and
+     merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details,
+     acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient
+     comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies....
+
+     "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a
+     diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or
+     determination, except where the display of these qualities
+     was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From
+     Great Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet
+     at Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States
+     nothing to expect[1074]."
+
+Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The _Times_
+minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as required for
+political effect to hold the north-western states loyal to the Union,
+and while indulging in no prophecies as to the fate of Vicksburg,
+expressing the opinion that, if forced to surrender it, the South could
+easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at some other point[1075]. Naturally
+_The Index_ was pleased with and supported this view[1076]. Such
+ignorance of the geographic importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful
+misleading of the public; but professed British military experts were
+equally ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at
+Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American campaigns,
+centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia and
+reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, any
+Northern attack[1077]. He dismissed the western campaigns as of no real
+significance. W.H. Russell, now editor of the _Army and Navy Gazette_,
+better understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed
+Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the
+Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the success
+of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck's motion
+for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it.
+
+     "If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the
+     North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and
+     trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it
+     to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can
+     breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered
+     Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who
+     imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South,
+     divide the nations on each side of the black and white line
+     for ever, and bring this war to the end. There is probably
+     not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define
+     the limits of the State to be recognized.... And, over and
+     above all, recognition, unless it meant 'war,' would be an
+     aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid
+     the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity
+     and the fury of the North[1078]."
+
+The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck's
+motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has given notice of
+a motion to recognize the South. But I think it certain that neither
+Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no great
+number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from all parties will compose the
+minority[1079]." Russell was correct in this view but not so did it
+appear to Southern agents who now became active at the request of
+Roebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of
+willingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word.
+There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but there
+seemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one.
+The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. On
+June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuck
+asking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrote
+that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance that
+he, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far he
+might communicate them to "our friends in the House[1081]." Slidell saw
+the Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of "forcing the
+English Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry," asked that an
+interview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury,
+a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in
+a Tory cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid
+in upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested
+interview and declared he would go to the length of officially informing
+the British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss the
+advisability of recognizing the South[1082].
+
+This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from Mocquard
+stating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London, had been
+instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and Lindsay had hurried
+to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the twenty-fifth, Slidell
+reported that they were authorized to state in the House of Commons that
+France was "not only willing but anxious to recognize the Confederate
+States with the co-operation of England[1083]." Slidell added, however,
+that Napoleon had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal
+proposal to Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received by
+Slidell from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance be
+known to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on
+June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and asked
+for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being permitted
+to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed instruction[1084], he received a
+reply indicating confusion somewhere:
+
+     "I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires Etrangeres
+     on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just left me.
+     M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to Baron
+     Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he
+     directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading
+     Members of Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the
+     subject of American affairs were unchanged. That he was
+     disposed with the co-operation of England immediately to
+     recognize the Confederate States; this was in the form of a
+     draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he officially
+     instructed the Baron to sound _Palmerston_ on the subject and
+     to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This was
+     done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the
+     Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait
+     bien d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis decide a
+     reconnaitre le Sud.' This is by far the most significant
+     thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the
+     others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England
+     may do or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press
+     his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's
+     declaration. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute it and
+     the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest
+     entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not heard from
+     Baron Gros the result of his interview with Palmerston. I
+     see that the latter has been unwell and it is probable that
+     the former had not been able to see him. There can be no
+     impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will
+     doubtless give him information which he will use to
+     advantage. I write in great haste; will you do me the favour
+     to let Lord Campbell know the substance of this note,
+     omitting that portion of it which relates to the Emperor's
+     inclination to act alone. Pray excuse me to Lord Campbell for
+     not writing to him, time not permitting me to do so[1085]."
+
+This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, "Can I
+put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by
+Corcoran[1086]." To which Slidell replied by letter:
+
+     "For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write to
+     say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be
+     _used in any way_. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay
+     when they were here and have no objection that they should
+     again see it confidentially[1087]."
+
+On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the information that
+no formal communication had been made to Russell. The next day in an
+effort in some way to secure an admission of what Mason and his friends
+believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell asked Russell in the House of
+Lords if he had received either a document or a verbal communication
+outlining Napoleon's desires. Russell replied that Baron Gros had told
+him "an hour ago" that he had not even received any instruction to
+deliver such a communication[1088]. This was in the hours preceding the
+debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had been an
+error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck and Lindsay,
+or else there was a question of veracity between Russell, Baron Gros
+and Napoleon.
+
+Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the Queen to
+enter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation in
+recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had in
+fact established its independence and that this was greatly to England's
+advantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in the
+West. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancashire--a
+point his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerous
+concern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and
+minimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easy
+victory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the
+Government Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon,
+claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to
+action and asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply
+again to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was
+concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, he
+added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could be
+renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, through
+Lyons, the contents of a former application.
+
+Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat
+perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot with
+all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was direct
+attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate.
+Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, was
+sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field of
+diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in the
+war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality.
+Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government,
+while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or
+South, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster
+to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was
+positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck's
+motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herself
+to any line of policy, especially as military events were "now
+occurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "the
+main result of the contest was not doubtful." Here spoke that element of
+the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success.
+
+If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends
+might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change
+of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself
+than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in
+meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and
+emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home
+Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself
+to be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It early
+became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had
+been committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new
+French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of
+it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to
+unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a
+support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck
+"feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party strongly
+supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere
+party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial
+resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and
+in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government.
+Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British
+emancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most
+powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In
+particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of
+Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his
+"friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by
+recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond
+of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated upon
+the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor
+of France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, he
+asserted, was in great danger of being too much represented in
+Parliament[1091].
+
+The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting to
+Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they
+were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal to
+permit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's assertions.
+Mason wrote:
+
+     "I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of
+     to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was
+     present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell
+     said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair
+     remains in a 'muss,' unless the Emperor will show his hand
+     _on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or
+     derive any benefit from his private and individual
+     revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can
+     be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one language in
+     private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge,'
+     and another to his ambassador here. The debate is adjourned
+     to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his
+     explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no
+     confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from
+     him so far can invite only distrust[1092]."
+
+As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of the
+Confederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic with
+the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no value
+unless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedly
+opposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring that
+premature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war
+by the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to be
+renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and return
+to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layard
+reaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received from
+France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a British
+revelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the document
+in question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward's
+attention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence
+wrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion:
+
+     "I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and
+     great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr.
+     Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated
+     by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the
+     North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the
+     minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North....
+
+     "The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on
+     the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which
+     tells injuriously instead of being the great support....
+
+     "If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to
+     support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In
+     the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and
+     would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members
+     are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the
+     vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]."
+
+On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured an
+agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]."
+Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the
+matter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy
+and actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a
+feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a
+pro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wishing to avoid further
+discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrote
+in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9:
+
+     "Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you,
+     and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping
+     altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further
+     mention or discussion of what passed between you and Mr.
+     Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the
+     other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the
+     other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The
+     British Parliament receives messages and communications from
+     their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other
+     countries...."
+
+     "No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor
+     from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the
+     multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused
+     for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr.
+     Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any
+     discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations
+     between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you
+     to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow
+     traveller[1099]."
+
+The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to
+withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the
+uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed
+to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the
+debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of
+the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper
+matters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the French
+Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this
+case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay
+entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the
+accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not
+to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The _Scotia_,
+he said was due and any moment news from America might change the
+governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply
+disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's
+actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for
+continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's
+"diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and
+those of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the
+motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord
+Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this
+was finally done[1100].
+
+All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's
+advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yet
+at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive
+campaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, that
+Lee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met by
+a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and
+eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101].
+Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victorious
+advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came
+out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion,
+arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no
+hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck
+moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the
+impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay,
+his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own
+"amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon
+and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact,
+"employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in
+reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this
+would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his
+duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have
+passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]."
+
+The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of
+the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of
+the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover
+into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal
+veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt
+the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon
+which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a
+deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might
+now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no
+evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any
+consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even to
+the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the
+Government in relation to Southern ship-building.
+
+Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern
+victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be
+overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on
+the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at
+Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_
+two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army
+had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it
+was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope
+there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of
+the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from
+Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though
+efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither
+side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous
+assertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose
+Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the
+capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great
+disaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly a
+British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_
+since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of
+Vicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place renders
+the blow heavier[1107]."
+
+"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week,
+never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that
+the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds
+and that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they had
+refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109].
+
+If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern
+effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from
+the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune
+of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental
+attitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by
+the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was
+acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the
+Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention
+had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the
+Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing
+that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined
+not to receive him:
+
+     "Under these circumstances, your continued residence in
+     London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent
+     with the dignity of this Government, and the President
+     therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end,
+     and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from
+     London[1110]."
+
+A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain
+if there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but since
+the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made
+public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received,
+September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the
+very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though
+there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping
+of Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was with
+the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of
+Roebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "serious
+reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England
+"has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention
+or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict
+neutrality[1111]."
+
+Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction
+and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed
+making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took
+place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the
+regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened to
+join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in
+her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from
+the _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the only
+Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the
+Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all
+hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt
+distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.
+
+On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly
+in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made
+public, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the folly
+of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In
+general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let
+Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal
+understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict
+neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of
+the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy
+but also with seeming finality:
+
+     "I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which
+     have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the
+     overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto
+     prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the
+     accredited Minister of an established State.
+
+     "These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to
+     repeat them.
+
+     "I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating
+     your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of
+     affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and
+     satisfaction[1116]."
+
+Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were
+still to be his, but the chief role there was now assigned to others and
+the principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully
+concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is
+evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He
+regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an
+English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of
+Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the
+Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston
+were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of
+action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his
+acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.
+
+If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was
+correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was
+officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same
+private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a
+notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by
+England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_,
+unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of
+a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea
+came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result
+of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the
+war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory
+clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American
+Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing
+difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was
+quick to see the danger. He wrote:
+
+     "Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath
+     from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be
+     denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be
+     founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end
+     firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But
+     then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not
+     allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its
+     being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal
+     on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to
+     break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force
+     the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the
+     United States Government and people would become more
+     difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am
+     going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only
+     an excuse for doing so[1118]."
+
+Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's
+readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of
+1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a
+contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught
+napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general
+speculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think the
+Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any
+European Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it
+will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of
+withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his
+representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the
+matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:
+
+     "I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think
+     this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship
+     which might turn sour like beer if there should be a
+     thunder-storm.
+
+     "But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers
+     with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom
+     our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United
+     States[1121]."
+
+If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there
+was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the
+South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I
+hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the
+past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry
+Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open
+public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two
+pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123].
+Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was
+bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams,
+by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the
+ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125].
+
+Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the
+cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of
+activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the military
+situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely
+negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by
+organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West
+had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September
+18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover
+Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled
+to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen
+back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable
+front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been
+expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.
+Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small
+wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now
+declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count
+much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published
+book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the
+organization of the "Southern Independence Association." Seeking a
+specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first
+fixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appeal
+from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On
+December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to
+town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would
+again be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the
+seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to
+Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or
+on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128].
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124.]
+
+[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.]
+
+[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in
+control of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing
+this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the
+support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all
+the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never
+to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made
+notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in
+the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a
+letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a
+copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy
+letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16,
+1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F.
+Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams'
+death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My
+references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and
+transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities
+to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_,
+he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, had
+seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant
+distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American
+whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the
+question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to
+Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his
+regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the
+Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on
+the _Times_.]
+
+[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI.]
+
+[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3,
+1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.]
+
+[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives the
+best analysis and history of Southern financing.]
+
+[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to
+contractors in payment for materials.]
+
+[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to
+Erlanger's son.]
+
+[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in
+recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe
+that even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influence
+will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin,
+Oct. 28, 1862.)]
+
+[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31.
+Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond,
+since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact
+with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.]
+
+[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1058: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1059: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to
+Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.]
+
+[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._, p. 33. In France permission to advertise the
+loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of
+the Emperor.]
+
+[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at
+Stanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I am
+much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."]
+
+[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the
+real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental
+intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary
+debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other
+hand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4
+they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be
+presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had
+not failed to reach the bond market.]
+
+[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1067: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was
+written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact
+statement of what had occurred.]
+
+[Footnote 1068: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger &
+Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves
+been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the
+presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly
+unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market
+showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to
+Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.]
+
+[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run by
+Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a
+recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per
+cent. discount.]
+
+[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and
+published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which
+appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a serious
+one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his
+_Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many
+writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic
+denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley,
+_Gladstone_, II, p. 83.]
+
+[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.]
+
+[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155.]
+
+[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.]
+
+[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland
+and Virginia_, London, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1078: _Army and Navy Gazette_, June 6, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1080: Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the Southern
+Confederacy_, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England"
+is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in the
+Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himself
+notes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misled
+some historians who have derived from his work the idea that the
+critical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863,
+whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt,
+"Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War," pp. 413 _seq_. Schmidt's thesis
+is largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).]
+
+[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell.]
+
+[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5.]
+
+[Footnote 1083: _Ibid._, p. 186. To Benjamin.]
+
+[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Mason
+wrote: "The question of veracity is raised."]
+
+[Footnote 1085: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1086: _Ibid._, To Slidell.]
+
+[Footnote 1087: _Ibid._, To Mason. "Monday eve." (June 29, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXI, p. 1719.]
+
+[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrier
+labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his enemies.]
+
+[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends.
+They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy their
+friendship.]
+
+[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate of
+June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London on
+his way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before the
+debate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he
+expected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck
+sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story--the
+story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not cross
+swords with me again." Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck given
+by Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I ever
+witnessed." (_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 161-2.)]
+
+[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. 67-73.]
+
+[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli,
+throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing with
+many of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately as
+believing the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrain
+from such comment publicly. (Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, p. 328.)]
+
+[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. 252.]
+
+[Footnote 1098: _The Index_ felt it necessary to combat this, and on
+July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to be
+negligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "All
+the sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been with
+the South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated the
+line which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist
+_Debats_, Republican _Siecle_, The Palais Royal _Opinion_, all join in
+the halloo against the South."]
+
+[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 _seq_., July 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New York
+correspondent of the _Times_, containing a similar prediction but in
+much stronger terms. For the last half of the war the _Times_ was badly
+served by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation from
+an extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay who
+served the _Times_ in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865.
+(Mackay, _Forty Years' Recollections_, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had
+strict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to
+Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported that
+Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington should
+fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, since
+it would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could no
+doubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southern
+defeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought
+the complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie
+Stephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this
+time. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met
+Seward, being received with much cordiality as a _verbal_ champion in
+England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on the
+war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of the
+friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on political
+economy. (Maitland, _Leslie Stephen_, p. 120.)]
+
+[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent,
+dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, would
+welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride in
+triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiastic
+multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America." The New York
+city which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give some
+ground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless--and New
+York was not the North.]
+
+[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 _seq_. Ever afterwards
+Roebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. At
+a banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "political
+testament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of
+America." (Leader, _Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck_, p. 330.)]
+
+[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce another
+recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance to
+make it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act.
+The reply was a brief negative.]
+
+[Footnote 1105: The _Times_, July 18, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1106: The power of the _Times_ in influencing public opinion
+through its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in the
+lead in its foreign correspondence and the information printed
+necessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the British
+public. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread about
+America by the _Times_, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so
+much as in this matter the enormous power which the _Times_ has, not
+from the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but
+from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to a
+vast number of minds. The _ignorance_ in which it has been able to keep
+a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. Beesly. Haultain,
+_Correspondence of Goldwin Smith_, p. 11.)]
+
+[Footnote 1107: _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics are
+mine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one of
+rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No _Englishman_ would be likely
+to regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing.]
+
+[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1109: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329.
+Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1110: Mason, _Mason_, p. 449.]
+
+[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The _Times_ was now printing American
+correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg
+when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated
+upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the
+writer's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had
+fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).]
+
+[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863.
+Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his
+opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value
+diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all others
+would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason,
+had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his
+family's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.]
+
+[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1115: e.g., _Manchester Guardian_, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in
+_The Index_, Sept. 24, p. 343.]
+
+[Footnote 1116: Mason's _Mason_, p. 456.]
+
+[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1118: _Ibid._, Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a
+despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1119: F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell,
+Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement
+of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States
+and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would
+have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of the
+two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the
+struggle--the coasts of the United States would present few points open
+to attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the
+neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas,
+would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might at
+the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops
+into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been
+immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. It
+seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without
+difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force
+which Great Britain would be likely to place there."]
+
+[Footnote 1120: _Ibid._, Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]
+
+[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1123: _The Liberator_, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt upon
+Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in
+"winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a gifted
+public orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majority
+in each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of
+opinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exalt
+Beecher's services.]
+
+[Footnote 1124: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 319. The words are Dodd's.]
+
+[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to
+Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The preface
+in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863.
+For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_.]
+
+[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV
+
+THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION
+
+Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public
+meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1,
+1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends,
+confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally
+confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion
+in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public
+expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to
+November, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But by
+the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion
+that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others,
+especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern
+sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his
+initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that
+others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In
+Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist
+meeting in the Free Trade Hall":
+
+     "These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of
+     energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It
+     appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint
+     money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the
+     truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and
+     you will see there are here the germs of important work--but
+     they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good
+     deal of money individually but I see room for the use of L30
+     or L40 a month or more[1129]."
+
+The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the
+required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate
+secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions
+willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste
+for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat
+dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of
+patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence
+succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24,
+1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course
+of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form
+an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the
+auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
+Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay,
+Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and
+others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and
+postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the
+principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never
+_publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:
+
+     "The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the
+     war is to be worked out to success without the action of
+     Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a
+     power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred
+     up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most
+     agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition
+     signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and
+     brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of
+     4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them
+     completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial
+     to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings,
+     Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We
+     have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury,
+     Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work
+     up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the
+     latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon
+     the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I
+     think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert
+     latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side
+     to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse
+     that power. At any rate the object is worth the
+     effort[1131]."
+
+In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. In
+nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the
+speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were
+voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called
+"indefatigable":
+
+     "The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded
+     with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout
+     the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_
+     policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood
+     are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while
+     England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It
+     remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have
+     any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."
+
+By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation
+was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was
+really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as
+characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement
+lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an
+association which should become the main-spring of further activities.
+Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to
+draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from
+the big blockade-running firms
+
+     "Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific
+     sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in
+     proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was
+     near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote
+     a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the
+     blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once
+     L500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and
+     have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you
+     see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."
+
+Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too
+late:
+
+     "Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings
+     make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered
+     round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The
+     _Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more
+     especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York.
+     I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat,
+     so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our
+     side[1135]."
+
+Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:
+
+     "I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to
+     move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the
+     end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible
+     that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our
+     Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say:
+     'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought
+     back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the
+     efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or
+     death what effort should be spared[1136]?"
+
+The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by
+Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts.
+On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) took
+place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster
+referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts
+being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American
+affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and
+plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston,
+Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of
+Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed
+in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the
+district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she
+should lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club.
+"Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be
+formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence
+Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the
+reassembling of Parliament.
+
+The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern
+Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright
+and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily
+the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly
+represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to
+influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from
+Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by
+those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of
+their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in
+the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so
+diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _London
+Confederate States Aid Association_ which came to the attention of Adams
+and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early
+meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who
+reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3
+Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons
+and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome
+guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and
+got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was
+present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing
+a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in
+such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South.
+Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold
+regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a
+shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for
+non-attendance[1142].
+
+Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly
+its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal
+to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence
+Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to
+match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and
+carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles
+of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their
+cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places,
+ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity
+toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of
+America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the
+South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's
+emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers
+of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling
+and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of
+the constitution read:
+
+     "The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation
+     of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of
+     the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily
+     but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition
+     by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system
+     of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England,
+     in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine
+     the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of
+     property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true
+     civilization of the negro race[1144]."
+
+The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of
+heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one
+guinea annually) was large enough to attract the elite, but it remained
+to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet
+the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a
+curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring
+that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000
+at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on
+January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade
+Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to
+a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall
+in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent
+of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their
+resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against
+them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while _The
+Index_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great
+activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The
+reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters,
+from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective
+counties[1146]."
+
+Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association
+programme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of
+standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes
+it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England--already
+largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his
+"Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made
+the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest
+presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of
+Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith
+appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the
+aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the
+Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause.
+Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list
+of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title
+and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for
+its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].
+
+It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern
+Independence Association at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the end
+of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public
+meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy
+organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first
+move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the
+_Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should
+render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On
+January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the
+public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen
+the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the
+Government is entirely wrong":
+
+     "I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the
+     Government persisted in proceeding further, that our
+     Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed)
+     would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if
+     we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that
+     we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the
+     purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the
+     South might not require them. I think public opinion will go
+     with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his
+     failings--loves fair play[1149]."
+
+It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was
+thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the
+_Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's
+policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to
+bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an
+_Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a
+corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a
+Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the
+"acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":
+
+     "Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is
+     blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark.
+     We can trace his influence in the detention of the
+     _Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which
+     have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at
+     Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to
+     alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in
+     accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When
+     one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to
+     marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one
+     reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is
+     Earl Russell[1151]."
+
+But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152],
+the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home
+the meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging the
+Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an
+effort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, to
+belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by
+the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries
+out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent.
+Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus
+on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building.
+Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into
+details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on
+the _policy_ of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of
+the _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the
+uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of
+justice[1153]."
+
+As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff
+manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other
+were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to
+protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language.
+Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the
+North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for
+interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South
+on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate
+debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern
+answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by
+force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were
+already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As
+to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never
+pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great
+Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for
+ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid
+no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in
+political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the
+measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by
+Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of
+establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on
+imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to
+explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great
+Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be
+refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British
+withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold
+Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the
+project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it
+and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a
+matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to
+learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and
+France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly
+at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed
+to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican
+policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of
+helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].
+
+For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a
+firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately
+the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he
+began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the
+South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.
+As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could
+be made to see this.
+
+     "... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it
+     worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they
+     are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or
+     lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it.
+     If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New
+     Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates
+     Charleston and Savannah[1159]."
+
+This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the
+United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the
+warlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, long
+confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was
+acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"
+must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864,
+Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of
+the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military
+expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the
+arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially
+by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote,
+often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing
+of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to
+avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he
+ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."
+
+Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and
+disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already
+attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety
+to Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the
+Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry
+in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an
+increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in
+large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle
+'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply,
+easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few
+Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive
+immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the
+efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid
+resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of
+Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental
+agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into
+the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered
+under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit.
+Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of
+these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to
+secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to
+red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.
+
+As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps
+were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few
+cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of
+_bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations
+in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of
+enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams,
+investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized
+Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been
+dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour
+emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden
+increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and
+public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel
+_Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board
+fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received
+indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men
+had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at
+Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well
+under way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed the
+men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give
+orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation
+against the consul but it still remained a question whether the
+commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British
+neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded
+guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of
+the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise,
+April 11, of further investigation[1166].
+
+The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in
+1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not,
+therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past,
+named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying
+off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly,
+forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject
+of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply
+made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law
+and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations
+than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the
+Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July,
+1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of
+Russell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed on
+many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry
+for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of
+Danish policy.
+
+In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side
+in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question
+which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence
+until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of
+Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the
+Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of
+Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional
+act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The
+law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days
+later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to
+hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from
+Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The
+Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of
+Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had
+given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various
+occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour
+for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point
+of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A
+distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when
+Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her,
+thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed
+command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.
+
+This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's
+utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet
+colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British
+public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain
+could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on
+Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the
+Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time
+threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and
+unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government
+laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that
+should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige.
+Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark,
+broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which
+could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it
+became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the
+defence of the Danish King.
+
+From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier
+stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential
+bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that
+in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association
+on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities,
+Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move
+by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other
+rumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that an
+important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore,
+the herald of this glad news also wrote:
+
+     "Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The
+     Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar
+     the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain
+     in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."
+
+Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme
+Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made
+clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect
+the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant
+and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political
+questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon
+disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and
+threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much
+trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public
+demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be
+known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and
+recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once
+declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties.
+Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break
+up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of
+the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would
+be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready
+to support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ and
+from experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debate
+in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the
+provinces[1175]."
+
+Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began
+anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in
+America. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at the
+very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited
+the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had
+then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no
+moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would
+result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and
+defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to
+Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with
+Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential
+feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a
+_party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing
+Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly
+understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial
+desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to
+find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American
+policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:
+
+     "I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter
+     of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in
+     regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am
+     therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On
+     this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on
+     Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another
+     meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there
+     as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at
+     present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by
+     the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent
+     our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the
+     motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point
+     will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings
+     forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see
+     the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the
+     American question are so well known. As no competent member
+     however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the
+     responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable
+     to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the
+     subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He
+     sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had,
+     therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the
+     result of which was that if I brought forward a motion
+     somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be
+     prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him
+     again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about
+     was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply
+     regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the
+     people of the United States and the Confederate States of
+     North America by the continuance of the war which has been so
+     long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government
+     will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in
+     conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a
+     cessation of hostilities.'"
+
+Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to
+return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this
+Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay
+strongly urged Mason to come over:
+
+     _I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston.
+     It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters
+     I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of
+     much service to the South[1177]."
+
+Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association
+permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _The
+Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letter
+was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had
+come for action:
+
+     "215 _Regent Street,
+     London, W.
+     May 28th_, 1864.
+
+     "SIR,
+
+     "The Society which has the honour to present to you the
+     accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in
+     Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken
+     by the Government of this country in concert with other
+     Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the
+     belligerents in North America.
+
+     "I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you
+     will, before the Session closes, support a motion in
+     Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see
+     evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in
+     this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before
+     you[1178]."
+
+Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred
+the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter,
+following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive.
+The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful.
+Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall,
+that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and
+that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay
+had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to
+shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority
+to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined
+to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation,
+or at least suggestion:
+
+     "Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation
+     with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not
+     have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once
+     acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to
+     a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.
+
+     "Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special
+     Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full
+     powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire
+     to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even
+     without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have
+     had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."
+
+The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last
+paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay
+renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming
+success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston
+and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures
+when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of
+recognition of the Confederacy:
+
+     "I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering
+     that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly
+     hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc.,
+     etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable
+     effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He
+     again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South
+     could not be effected by the North, and he added that he
+     thought the people of the North were becoming more and more
+     alive to the fact every day."
+
+Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell
+and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be
+plain sailing:
+
+     "Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern
+     facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that
+     all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an
+     end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow.
+     He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I
+     ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I
+     may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has
+     been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day,
+     that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion
+     at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared
+     to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed
+     much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it
+     is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is
+     supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby
+     is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive,
+     and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would
+     seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any
+     motion which would not be carried."
+
+Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.
+
+     "Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must
+     earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much
+     wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can
+     do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great
+     service to your country_[1180]."
+
+Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have
+amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his
+"gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary
+motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked
+for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other
+light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from
+joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the
+Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not
+clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been
+hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much
+was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters.
+The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In
+addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over
+Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in
+this the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the
+Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular
+letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on
+Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture.
+Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the
+feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not
+be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in
+Parliament:
+
+     "The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is
+     disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here
+     contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation
+     would strengthen his hands[1182]."
+
+This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later
+objective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be
+unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of
+the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern Independence
+Association_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to
+join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some
+specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he
+favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and
+as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the
+mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:
+
+     "Although this quite expresses the object of our Society,
+     still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to
+     have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have
+     consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to
+     bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the
+     Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the
+     resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be
+     allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only
+     quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will
+     avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'
+
+     "This is just leaving the Government where they have been all
+     along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest
+     opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"
+
+Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the
+leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay
+the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his
+motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it.
+Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it
+should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern
+forces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meeting
+fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy
+advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the
+West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in
+England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason
+understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and
+had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the
+interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:
+
+     "Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance
+     that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well
+     disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that
+     the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and
+     that neither could union be restored nor the South brought
+     under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell
+     said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for
+     discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is
+     to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."
+
+This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest
+opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell
+scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It
+must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to
+Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but
+political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming
+contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary
+management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with
+Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to
+suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories,
+and found him unexpectedly in agreement:
+
+     "I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter,
+     editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his
+     connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the
+     latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands
+     and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he
+     would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_.
+     Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon
+     our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay
+     that the movement could not be in better hands and as there
+     were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I
+     thought the better policy would be for the present that he
+     should be silent and to await events[1186]."
+
+Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best
+advantage the South to be rid of Russell:
+
+     "If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful,
+     Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being
+     brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he
+     can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us
+     perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified
+     assent[1187]."
+
+But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British
+policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a
+change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory
+attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of
+course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the
+Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was
+renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster
+followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of
+censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental
+policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the
+Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial
+majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of
+Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was
+needed[1189].
+
+Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with
+Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in
+view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it
+resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the
+South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to
+acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming
+Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have
+said little.
+
+     "At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that
+     he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt
+     obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the
+     obligation would be increased if I could take with me any
+     expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared
+     to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense
+     that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as
+     I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be
+     better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my
+     opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as
+     that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."
+
+Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason
+wrote:
+
+     "My own impressions derived from the whole interview are,
+     that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the
+     separation of the States is final and the independence of the
+     South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under
+     the menaces of the North[1191]."
+
+Slidell's comment was bitter:
+
+     "I am very much obliged for your account of your interview
+     with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had
+     anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said
+     even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has
+     now arrived when it is comparatively of very little
+     importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A
+     plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."
+
+Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had
+nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge
+the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed much
+the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _Morning
+Herald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview
+with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":
+
+     "The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the
+     result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of
+     implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment;
+     that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated,
+     and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."
+
+In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen,
+noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential
+gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a
+cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of
+the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting
+the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution
+_after_ the political storm had passed and not before--when the
+deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no
+deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before
+the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no
+party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received
+Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was
+to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation
+itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this
+demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _The
+Index_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:
+
+     "... He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he
+     has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he
+     can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by
+     telling them that
+
+     They who in quarrels interpose
+     Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--
+
+     a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the
+     British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as
+     not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]."
+
+Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come into
+personal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charming
+contrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]."
+But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey to
+London and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a bad
+taste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of those
+who were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they had
+been deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to London
+was formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argument
+for recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on the
+break-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which was
+due the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, and
+recognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war without
+intervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated that
+mediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merely
+desired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yet
+one not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, as
+reported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had but
+just started and little was known of the strength of his army or of the
+powers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded as
+of minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond that
+British attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses of
+the North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grant
+to besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemed
+to indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"
+was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of each
+of the three preceding years.
+
+Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practically
+ended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, but
+British confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, a
+confidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed its
+strength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harped
+upon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1130: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1131: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1132: _The Index_, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518.]
+
+[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London was
+ignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C.F. Adams, "My recollection is that
+while many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those who
+favoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open
+(i.e., non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South,
+much as its splendid courage was admired." (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, in
+Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVII, p. 55.) No doubt many of
+these pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not is
+clear from the reports in _The Index_.]
+
+[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1135: _Ibid._, The _weight_ of the _Times_ is here evident
+even though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence,
+R.I., in 1864, be true that the London _Daily Telegraph_, a paper not
+committed to either side in America, had three times the circulation of
+the _Times_. (_The Liberator_, Sept. 30, 1864.) Smith's speech was made
+on the occasion of receiving the degree of LL.D. from Brown University.]
+
+[Footnote 1136: _Ibid._, That Mason did contribute Confederate funds to
+Spence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount is
+uncertain.]
+
+[Footnote 1137: _The Index_, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance of
+representatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifested
+throughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R.
+Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs.
+Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W.
+Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse,
+Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, the
+Secretary of the Association, was also present. The districts were
+severally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs.
+Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J.
+Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield;
+Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf and
+Saddleworth--Mr. Lees, J.P.; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge;
+Heywood--Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley
+(Chorley)---Mr. J. Beesley, etc., etc."]
+
+[Footnote 1138: So reported by _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, in
+comment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughout
+Lancashire.]
+
+[Footnote 1139: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22.]
+
+[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason.]
+
+[Footnote 1141: _The Liberator_, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract from
+the London _Morning Star_ of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson.]
+
+[Footnote 1142: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18.
+Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by the
+Association.]
+
+[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women.
+"Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insulted
+virtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty and
+omnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object the
+highest human aims--the amelioration and exaltation of humanity."]
+
+[Footnote 1144: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee of
+organization was as follows:--
+
+     The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian,
+     The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath,
+     The Lord Robert Cecil, M.P.,
+     The Lord Eustace Cecil,
+     The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe.
+     The Right Honourable Lord Campbell,
+     The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M.P.,
+     The Honourable Robt. Bourke,
+     Edward Akroyd, Esq., Halifax,
+     Colonel Greville, M.P.,
+     W.H. Gregory, Esq., M.P.,
+     T.C. Haliburton, Esq., M.P.,
+     A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.,
+     W.S.Lindsay, Esq., M.P.,
+     G.M.W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.,
+     Wm. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.,
+     James Spence, Esq., Liverpool,
+     William Vansittart, Esq., M.P.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     Chairman: A.J.B. Beresford Hope, Esq.
+     Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil.
+]
+
+[Footnote 1145: _The Liberator_, Feb. 26, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1146: _The Index_, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing reply
+from an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. One
+would like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was.
+"An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate to
+become a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should take
+that open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere to
+the neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high and
+responsible judicial situation in this country, I have hitherto
+invariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am of
+opinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by my
+former rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from the
+reflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of the
+Southern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectually
+in my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my
+'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunities
+of doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself.'"]
+
+[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman had
+much vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in the
+Southern States of America." By Rev. T.D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozanne
+wrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy,
+increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedom
+of discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque,
+patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, it
+favours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class of
+thoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends to
+elevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially he
+insisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissed
+slavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higher
+objects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175).]
+
+[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1150: The _Alexandra_, as a result of the Court's decision,
+was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceeded
+to Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of
+the Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the close
+of the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard,
+pp. 354-5.)]
+
+[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73.]
+
+[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII.]
+
+[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1154: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1156: F.O., Am., Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1157: _Ibid._, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1158: _Ibid._, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1160: April, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, and
+F.O., Am., Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. A
+Captain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmed
+Lyons' reports.]
+
+[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The tone
+of the _New York Herald_ might well have given cause for anxiety. "In
+six months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to a
+close. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments that
+have either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'the
+belligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aid
+which they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how they
+swell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall have
+unemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troops
+in the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive the
+French out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of our
+powerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in European
+affairs." (Quoted by _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 203.)]
+
+[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 563, states that great
+efforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both to
+secure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and even
+since the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreign
+element, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no way
+of determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics were
+kept. A Memorandum prepared by the U.S. War Department, dated July 15,
+1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by the
+several boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at which
+time, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), the
+figures of nativity stood: United States, 341,569; Germany, 54,944;
+Ireland, 50,537; British-America, 21,645; England, 16,196; and various
+other countries no one of which reached the 3,500 mark. These statistics
+really mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do not
+show _when_ the foreign-born came to America; further, from the very
+first days of the war there had been a large element of American
+citizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, the
+British statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figures
+given above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38,000
+subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862,
+48,000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130,000, and this
+figure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds were
+from Ireland. Now of the 94,000 from Ireland in 1863, considering the
+number of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evident
+that the bulk must have gone into labour supply.]
+
+[Footnote 1164: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.
+"Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of British
+subjects."]
+
+[Footnote 1165: The _Times_, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII.
+"Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen at
+Queenstown." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
+
+[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney case
+see _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence
+respecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United States
+Army." Also "Further Correspondence," etc.]
+
+[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353,
+and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, papers
+were asked for on "Emigration to America," and readily granted by the
+Government.]
+
+[Footnote 1169: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
+VI.]
+
+[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell)
+was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at this
+time entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of the
+Queen. (Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, Ch. XVI.)]
+
+[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason,
+April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received by
+Delane from Mackay, the _Times_ New York correspondent. The expected
+Southern victory was to come "in about fourteen days." (Mason Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 1173: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1175: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers.]
+
+[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1180: _Ibid._, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a dark
+picture for Northern armies.]
+
+[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed by
+F.W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec.]
+
+[Footnote 1183: _Ibid._, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng., Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams to
+Seward, June 2, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Mason
+wrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends and
+followers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motion
+as that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's _Mason_, p. 500. To Benjamin, June
+9, 1864.) Evidently the friend was Hunter.]
+
+[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1188: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1189: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch.
+VI.]
+
+[Footnote 1190: Mason's _Mason_, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1192: _Ibid._, To Mason, July 17, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1193: _The Index_, July 21, 1864, p. 457.]
+
+[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI
+
+BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH
+
+After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and of
+Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but later
+involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, had
+reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To the
+European neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appeared
+to the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years of
+fighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied a
+short conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and with
+each additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increase
+of the forces employed and a psychological change in the people whereby
+war seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American Civil
+War, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources
+employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," to
+date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreign
+observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparent
+check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America had
+become engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope of
+emergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge of
+the steady decline of the resources of the South even though Jefferson
+Davis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, had
+spoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief in
+stalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for
+the function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until its
+independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England both
+felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitude
+of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefinite
+Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions.
+
+There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered these
+Southern champions. The North was at last fully identified with the
+cause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By
+1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject and
+even in the original constitution and address of the Southern
+Independence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for the
+gradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason some
+heartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply
+being that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offered
+gratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that
+the topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand,
+at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, there
+arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "In
+Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and the strongest man on the
+board, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I went
+up to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]."
+
+Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southern
+armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," and by mere
+iteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it was
+repeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled to
+meet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," argued the
+error of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in
+characterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there could
+be no effective British push for Southern independence and it asserted
+that slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not exist
+in the Confederacy.
+
+     "... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the
+     condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and
+     otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending
+     such practices to say that the South does none of these
+     things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in
+     practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a
+     soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in
+     the social order in a subordinate place, and of an
+     intellectual organization which requires guardianship with
+     mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery,
+     because it developed itself out of an older and very
+     different one of that name, but for this the South is not
+     to blame.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so
+     long as they make no determined effort to relieve the
+     Southern character from this false drapery, they will never
+     gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of
+     Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke
+     effective assistance.... The best assurance you can give that
+     the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands
+     is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she
+     has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and
+     benefactor of that race.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such
+     expressions as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from
+     the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As
+     a concession they are useless; as a confession they are
+     untrue.... Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen
+     that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say
+     the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not
+     that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves
+     never were treated before, that she has used power as no
+     nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she
+     has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem
+     which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he
+     might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at
+     hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark
+     and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required
+     all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now
+     is[1200].'"
+
+In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slavery
+was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic
+institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was
+evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation
+edicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March,
+quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon a
+report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read
+before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author
+and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the
+contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and
+placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a
+fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to
+emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American
+War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel
+with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is
+justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate
+a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political
+freedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]...."
+
+Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many
+sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_,
+acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the
+carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and
+intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the
+end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern
+meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief
+period in the fall just before the Presidential election in
+America[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole
+period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were
+almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and
+religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An
+analysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, and
+in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following
+classification[1203]:
+
+     YEAR.      NUMBER.               CHARACTER.
+                             ANTI-SLAVERY
+                             AND RELIGIOUS   WORKING-MEN.
+     1860          3              3              -
+     1861          7              7              -
+     1862         16             11              5
+     1863         82             26             56
+     1864         21             10             11
+     1865          5              4              1
+
+Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as
+speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with
+frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John
+Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A.
+Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and
+Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great
+majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing
+districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old
+anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most
+active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the
+moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompson
+asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and
+energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or
+city[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the
+most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others,
+not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206].
+Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the
+North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament,
+rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and
+became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested
+by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the
+appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred
+Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of
+San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern
+commerce[1207].
+
+This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the
+relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus
+indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation
+of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of
+English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of
+resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was
+exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the
+more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a
+sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in
+opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and
+France[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of
+the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these
+Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He
+wrote to Lyons:
+
+     "I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes
+     of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward
+     should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to
+     distract their attention from the arduous task they have so
+     wantonly undertaken[1209]."
+
+Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought
+that the current of political opinion was running against the
+re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of
+expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the
+"peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any
+solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly
+advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment
+the better[1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he
+stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military
+probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout
+all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of
+warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.
+
+But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory
+of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only
+hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading
+British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in
+the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected
+defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the
+few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily
+professing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of the
+metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from
+the columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming a
+position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the
+war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent,
+Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the
+_Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its
+readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured
+to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance.
+Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation
+throughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlier
+years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year
+of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting
+reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the
+West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. The
+same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to
+be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond
+who wrote in contempt of Grant's army.
+
+     "I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in
+     which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of
+     the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured
+     victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and
+     Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines....
+     The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are
+     contemplating an army which is at once republican and
+     undisciplined[1212]."
+
+At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading
+paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to
+prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers
+to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was either
+ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment
+during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and
+determination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that the
+earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. One
+element in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartiality
+accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and
+wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as
+making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a
+_Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for
+a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared:
+
+     "Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only
+     shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian
+     philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command
+     admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and
+     contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]."
+
+Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was at
+bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said:
+"There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity
+of the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies were
+in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your
+double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus
+in[1216]." In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war the
+Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its
+preachments[1217].
+
+There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not
+greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly
+_Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war
+correspondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after his
+famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after
+the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of
+the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was
+the real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed in
+Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after
+the event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for that
+journal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidents
+unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern
+disaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those in
+the service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation of
+Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite
+readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct
+appreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time to
+time proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in such
+terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with
+the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most
+definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:
+
+     "The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by
+     itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it;
+     and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and
+     resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually
+     dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the
+     Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the
+     matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that
+     its component parts can never again be welded into a
+     Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common
+     executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only
+     that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding
+     States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has
+     arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and
+     spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the
+     Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North
+     be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the
+     action of force for that of free will, we think it will
+     reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...."
+
+Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the
+"Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiate
+the _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description and
+estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them
+and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a
+fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment
+editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:
+
+     "The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North
+     have so long been fixed promises to become a source of
+     fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not
+     advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously
+     with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has
+     eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the
+     enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been
+     nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington
+     civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous
+     spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]."
+
+Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the
+Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's
+defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the
+citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern
+weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed
+in _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, got
+frequent quotation:
+
+     "We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you
+     have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly
+     be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years
+     longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals
+     override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings
+     forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You
+     have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory,
+     and we must have both_[1223]."
+
+It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an
+important bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressing
+admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident
+of his defeat:
+
+     "... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a
+     still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his
+     predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty
+     miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous
+     country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line
+     as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal
+     general having ventured far from water communications. That
+     Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both
+     courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in
+     a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]."
+
+And W.H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approaching
+disaster:
+
+     "The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous
+     as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman.
+     Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an
+     ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank
+     and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking
+     eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer
+     despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to
+     shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know
+     that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful
+     artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners
+     have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of
+     average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]."
+
+On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city of
+Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the
+_Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was
+unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and,
+two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political
+struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted,
+would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226].
+Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks
+earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:
+
+     "General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an
+     able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he
+     won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which
+     carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of
+     Georgia[1227]."
+
+But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would
+acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Not
+so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than he
+would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for some
+time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from the
+summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctly
+interpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a renewed
+determination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured.
+Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected:
+
+     "The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as
+     an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the
+     Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently
+     desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments
+     when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for
+     recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not
+     come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be
+     publicly made[1228]."
+
+The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in the
+election, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicate
+process of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at the
+point where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did
+so by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party
+convention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an
+excellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peace
+afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late
+analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called for
+a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restore
+peace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumed
+temporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its hands
+of further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:
+
+     For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it
+     otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that
+     we are aware of against the present Government of America.
+     Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position,
+     they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights
+     of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from
+     the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we
+     have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly
+     withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade
+     are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an
+     equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the
+     vast impulse that has been given towards the development of
+     the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not
+     been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of
+     our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and
+     without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon
+     itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from
+     his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage
+     his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less
+     and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will
+     ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more
+     likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far
+     beyond the present division between North and South.... Were
+     we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always
+     assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view
+     the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should
+     rejoice that the American people, untaught by past
+     misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end,
+     and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln
+     as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady
+     continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that
+     the people of this country view the prospect of another four
+     years of war in America with very different feelings. They
+     are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of
+     their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the
+     path that leadeth to destruction[1230].
+
+Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would
+again be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledge
+its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting
+that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty
+in escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232],"
+but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and
+results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that
+election day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanism
+known to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it
+continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it
+dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for
+justice and honour throughout the world[1233]." Again official England
+was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adams
+paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief
+informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in
+determining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by
+Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident
+unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was
+inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential election
+in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events.
+Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in
+America to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, as
+always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to
+Russell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreign
+policy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering
+purposes[1236]." Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four
+days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as
+possible all business with him until after the election[1237]." By
+November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in
+replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he was
+entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious
+difficulties with Great Britain.
+
+     "... I do not think the U.S. Government have any
+     ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing
+     themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their
+     existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and
+     buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the
+     popular clamour is over[1238]."
+
+In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212
+electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the
+_Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendous
+majority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Having
+prophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back for
+her behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith"
+against reunion:
+
+     "Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln
+     I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so
+     far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the
+     measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most
+     creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the
+     elections ... passed off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln
+     has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems
+     little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action,
+     or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of
+     his second period of government will find him President of
+     the United States[1239]."
+
+The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious in
+comment:
+
+     "Ever since he found himself firmly established in his
+     office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had
+     begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of
+     the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been
+     less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due
+     allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his
+     situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such
+     been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige
+     of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this
+     country what the necessities of his situation demanded from
+     him, and he has done no more[1240]."
+
+This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the real
+reaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix,
+bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the ashes
+where lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the
+_liberties_ of America[1241].
+
+During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election English
+friends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twitted
+that at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_,
+Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free Trade
+Hall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there
+met with opposition from those who attended. At three other places,
+Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the
+manufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, as
+reported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy,
+leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives,"
+the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, and
+presumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted
+"follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an
+appearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as
+"the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a meeting held at all
+comparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northern
+friends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture this
+meeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned by
+handbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" there
+gathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between
+5,000 and 6,000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children
+in their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment,
+had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to
+be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threatening
+violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed as
+to seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the misery
+and the revolutionary character of the meeting:
+
+     "That in consequence of the widespread distress that now
+     prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the
+     war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's
+     Government should use their influence, together with France
+     and other European powers, to bring both belligerents
+     together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of
+     life and property that is now going on in that unhappy
+     country[1246]."
+
+No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truth
+it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress in
+Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, while
+elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was with
+the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signature
+among the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by the
+administration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on the
+ground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier,
+in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he might
+the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _The
+Index_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congress
+at Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a plan
+of transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and
+thus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was
+hard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in fact
+no evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the
+part of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms
+in defence of his country[1248].
+
+This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon the
+absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however,
+permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, and
+indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in the
+spring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11,
+Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe a
+communication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto," of which the
+blockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth the
+objects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition:
+
+     "'All they ask is immunity from interference with their
+     internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the
+     undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life,
+     liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common
+     ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to
+     the Social compact[1249].'"
+
+Russell replied, November 25:
+
+     "Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception
+     of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both
+     the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement
+     of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's
+     Government have continued to entertain sentiments of
+     friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the
+     causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never
+     presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this
+     sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period
+     of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that
+     they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the
+     rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial
+     Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully
+     maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]."
+
+If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto," and had
+sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let the
+slaves win their freedom," the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yet
+at the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, the
+current of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favour
+of the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him as
+attempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":
+
+     "The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the
+     representatives of the Confederate States without appearing
+     rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to
+     acknowledge the authority of the United States without
+     affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two
+     pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts
+     his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in
+     recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the
+     other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or
+     two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto
+     stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue
+     to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting
+     that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that
+     if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict
+     neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of
+     friendship to either belligerent[1251]."
+
+This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifying
+the allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion to
+which the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed and
+that Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" from
+Atlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were
+appalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The
+son of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron
+wall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a
+step after all[1252]."
+
+The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the event
+falsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after having
+acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the
+_Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that:
+
+     "... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and
+     Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the
+     South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than
+     could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though
+     Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away
+     piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the
+     Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the
+     wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body
+     which now represents the Federal States of North
+     America[1254]."
+
+But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and foretold
+with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_,
+privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, while
+publicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had not
+been heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December
+5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficulties
+to be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on
+December 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his
+inability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta:
+
+     "If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the
+     great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into
+     Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will
+     succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that
+     his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was
+     unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the
+     most remarkable feature of the war, according to the
+     President, is the wild and desperate effort of an
+     out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position
+     which, whatever effect it may have had on the election,
+     should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at
+     all[1255]."
+
+This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review of
+Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that his
+sole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coast
+where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken a
+definite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive that
+Sherman would venture to attack Savannah:
+
+     "For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is
+     essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring
+     point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be
+     equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create
+     it[1256]."
+
+Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowed
+championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserve
+British confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of the
+North were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged in
+by that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superior
+information. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on
+the American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern
+cause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received that
+Savannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_
+recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern
+prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long
+silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial
+wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a
+complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.
+
+For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall of
+Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the
+_Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the South
+waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the
+_Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then but
+half-heartedly.
+
+     "The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's
+     march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of
+     the most singular military achievements of the war.
+
+     "... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the
+     possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his
+     army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the
+     better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as
+     desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of
+     retreat could make it, the command of a point near the
+     sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously
+     an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of
+     subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be
+     commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the
+     Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact
+     that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the
+     capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage
+     of the war.
+
+     "... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would
+     be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression
+     unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]."
+
+Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture
+presented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent,
+printed in this same issue:
+
+     "No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the
+     heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of
+     conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the
+     Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the
+     first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again,
+     and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for
+     the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the
+     next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest destiny is
+     to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to
+     conquer."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233.]
+
+[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192.]
+
+[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.]
+
+[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the
+_Reader_ for March 19.]
+
+[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have found
+record of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour
+Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_.
+Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that
+the South was the best buyer of English goods.]
+
+[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all
+held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of
+1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866.) The list may be
+regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention
+of _The Liberator_ and of Adams.]
+
+[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared
+by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English
+colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy
+and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having
+rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."]
+
+[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum,
+of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An
+Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and
+Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute
+to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with
+the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page
+list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern
+friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren,
+John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them
+Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this
+society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four
+hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the
+activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis
+Train, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-three
+speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in
+England.")]
+
+[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p.
+296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem
+held by the United States of America for the high character and steady
+friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of
+the South have been given in Chapter XV.]
+
+[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the time
+and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the
+thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing
+the development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutrality
+and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States
+and Russia_, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You
+have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you
+have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large
+and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical
+importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.]
+
+[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and
+July 5, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to
+his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the
+atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our
+success is not admitted."]
+
+[Footnote 1214: _Ibid._, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.]
+
+[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles of
+Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more
+marked in 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War ran
+two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every
+three days.]
+
+[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know,
+perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was
+tabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even after
+my return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Army
+and Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be
+weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such
+ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I
+maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment"
+(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865,
+Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the _Times_ followed my advice, how
+different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal,
+but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from
+America." (Atkins, _Life of W.H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also
+Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the
+_Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left
+it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task
+in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ may
+be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to
+the _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding
+the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for
+its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This
+dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A
+Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North
+and South'"), published in London in 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1221: _Ibid._, June 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials
+might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_
+and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not
+examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond
+determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional
+special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to
+warrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencing
+opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:
+
+     (1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in
+     Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV,
+     p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_,
+     Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the
+     United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the
+     following facts of circulation are derived:
+
+(A) _Daily Papers_:
+
+  (1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150,000 (neutral).
+
+  (2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern).
+Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but with
+small circulation (Southern).
+
+  (3) The _Times_ (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The
+prestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearing
+in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_."
+Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as
+well-known ... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our
+European kings.... The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarch
+of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)
+
+  (4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000),
+but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the
+Clubs (neutral).
+
+  (5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6,000 (Northern).
+
+  (6) _The Morning Star_, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000)
+(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright
+was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits.
+_The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular.
+
+  (7) _The Morning Post_, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as
+Palmerston's organ.
+
+  (8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties
+(neutral).
+
+(B) _Weekly Papers._--No approximate circulation figures are available,
+but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers.
+
+  (1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny
+paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing
+districts (Northern).
+
+  (2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper."
+
+  (3) _The Spectator_ (Northern).
+
+  (4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern).
+
+  (5) _The Economist_ (Neutral).
+
+  (6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern).
+
+In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment
+_The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _Westminster
+Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester
+Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and some
+few others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863.)
+The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ to
+be like that of the _Times_.
+]
+
+[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231.]
+
+[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention,
+modified this in his letter of acceptance.]
+
+[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1233: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was more
+divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in
+America. The _Siecle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman as
+about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie,
+Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neither
+occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the
+defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood
+on July 22." (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent
+wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in
+the Shenandoah Valley:
+
+"The _Siecle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal,
+whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of
+which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the
+American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are
+running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at
+last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to
+the Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high a
+pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_
+
+"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines
+undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what
+will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses
+himself relative to the issues of the coming election?
+
+'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South
+will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to
+barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the
+labour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight,
+and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify and
+regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their
+own hands....'
+
+"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the
+robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for
+the welfare of the American brethren.
+
+"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of
+delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent
+writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France.
+(_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.)
+
+A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money"
+pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, under
+the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business
+of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the
+benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This
+bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State.
+Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully
+deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he
+stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the
+French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in
+the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly
+superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his
+own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty
+toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)]
+
+[Footnote 1235: e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society,
+Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.)]
+
+[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1237: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons
+reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America.
+Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great
+Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave
+offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise
+and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government.
+No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success,
+even though at first sharing in the view that there was small
+possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to
+Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the
+relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the
+Government at home.]
+
+[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of a
+silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is
+an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those
+who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power
+though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.]
+
+[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker
+to Garrison, August 27, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1243: _Ibid._, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the
+meeting at Ashton.]
+
+[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.]
+
+[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.]
+
+[Footnote 1249: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell,
+Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden
+and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).]
+
+[Footnote 1250: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the
+"Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to
+his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233.]
+
+[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping
+up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.]
+
+[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown by
+Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams'
+Letters_, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever
+that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in
+attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is
+enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the
+sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on
+Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."]
+
+[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864.
+Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving
+such deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864,
+p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and
+threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive
+deputations.]
+
+[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for
+the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in
+Ch. XVIII.]
+
+[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII
+
+THE END OF THE WAR
+
+     "I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this
+     moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and
+     our people and indeed our Government is more moderately
+     disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from
+     a member of the Government that it is believed that the
+     feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has
+     been steadily improving[1261]."
+
+Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Three
+weeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours that
+Europe was still planning some form of intervention to save the South:
+"_All parties and classes_ here are resolved on a strict
+neutrality[1262]...." This was a correct estimate. In spite of a
+temporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewed
+assertions from the South that she "would never submit," British opinion
+was now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict was
+soon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina,
+was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, though
+since midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yet
+known to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while his
+ability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedom
+with which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederate
+capital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city.
+Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, by
+illness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could be
+spared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters.
+Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advance
+northwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee,
+to end, it was hoped, in writing _finis_ to the war.
+
+From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained in
+Savannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter date
+he moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance and
+easily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, was
+burned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in North
+Carolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress was
+encountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, in
+command of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperate
+effort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman was
+at Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared to
+cut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up an
+energetic offensive.
+
+In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond,
+thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, to
+come out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front.
+The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment of
+Richmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city on
+the night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan of
+joining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded at
+Appomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnston
+surrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of the
+war and of the Confederacy.
+
+[Illustration: THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET! _Reproduced by permission
+of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865
+when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreign
+observers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseen
+from the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperate
+courage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equally
+desperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederate
+agents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery in
+return for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, Southern
+Secretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and was
+committed to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after his
+withdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for any
+point to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort of
+Confederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any other
+representative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than a
+beneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond not
+only to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messenger
+also of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly and
+with full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction was
+therefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived in
+Paris early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry such
+an offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London.
+
+The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reached
+London there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuation
+of Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressed
+by Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wish
+to see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, on
+receiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had been
+consulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as ready
+as ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay until
+more favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason's
+instructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out or
+resign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13,
+therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview and
+was promptly granted one for the day following.
+
+Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgment
+that nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himself
+to Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country in
+condemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form of
+allusion to the _concession_ we held in reserve, as would make him
+necessarily comprehend it[1266]," and turning again and again to a
+supposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition,
+Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was not
+mentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in the
+South had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; British
+objections to recognition were those which had long since been stated,
+and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called on
+the Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he had
+long been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston's
+Government could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery to
+recognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone by
+now...." This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spoken
+boldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of
+1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its present
+overture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinion
+clashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to be
+hoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war could
+help the South.
+
+There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southern
+effort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some such
+move was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southern
+fighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attention
+was fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North and
+South and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles in
+a foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London society
+and gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosen
+enemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. The
+Russian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he had
+learned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davis
+by Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state of
+Maryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln of
+armies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would be
+popular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269]
+to-morrow." In London the _Army and Navy Gazette_ declared that Davis
+could not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any other
+terms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of a
+common aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams pictured
+all British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near,
+and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders of
+public opinion as the _Times_, adding that it was being "whispered about
+that if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great army
+left on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility to
+this country[1271]."
+
+The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator.
+He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward
+to go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. But
+Lincoln made positive in his instructions three points:
+
+     (1) Complete restoration of the Union.
+
+     (2) No receding on emancipation.
+
+     (3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war,
+     and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government."
+
+A few days later the President decided that his own presence was
+desirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton Roads
+Conference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates did
+indeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditional
+American object," using the argument that _after_ such a war restoration
+of the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was not
+Great Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There was
+much discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leading
+Southern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed for
+comment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would be
+entered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southerners
+urged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessation
+of hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads.
+Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. On
+all such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect
+about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]."
+
+When news of the holding of this conference reached England there
+occurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created by
+the prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "The
+consternation," wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]." What did the
+United States intend to do? "The impression is now very general that
+peace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with this
+country." There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefinite
+apprehension as to the future." So reported Adams to Seward; and he
+advised that it might be well for the United States "to consider the
+question how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance";
+due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders who
+had been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that might
+now fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by the
+United States might aid in the coming elections in retaining the
+Government in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to be
+desired[1274].
+
+Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of that
+given earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was then
+in no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent in
+tone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting the
+enemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposed
+of abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and the
+agreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were but
+defensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. These
+matters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but with
+discretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them as
+inopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward's
+complaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this moment
+would be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, and
+disarming our own friends[1277]." The day before this was written home
+Seward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to the
+agreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the United
+States had no intention of increasing its armaments on the Great
+Lakes[1278].
+
+Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement over
+a prospective war with America, even though no such intention was
+seriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not share
+this fear, but Delane, of the _Times_, kept it alive in the public mind,
+and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger.
+"I do not know what grounds Delane has for it," wrote W.H. Russell to
+his American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is about
+to finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcely
+less horrible[1279]." Governmental circles, however, belittled the
+agitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, was
+assured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreign
+war were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at the
+Hampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North as
+but part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had been
+flatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March
+13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures in
+Canada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations with
+America. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the general
+tone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peaceful
+relations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and left
+criticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparing
+members of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in the
+pacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch with
+America his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances that
+the present relations between the two Governments were perfectly
+friendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, was
+to quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake to
+and somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physical
+power during the war." To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence and
+moderation in tone[1283]."
+
+Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possible
+effect of this event on foreign relations had been for some time
+anticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee's
+surrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the _Times_ and
+other papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspaper
+comment on the event followed closely that of the _Times_, rendering
+honour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing
+_finis_ to the war:
+
+     "Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the
+     extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other
+     commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this
+     war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count
+     a series of more brilliant victories than the force which,
+     raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia,
+     has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the
+     hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have
+     now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious
+     until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour,
+     and then they fell with honour[1286]."
+
+The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowly
+developed but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, a
+fortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very first
+of military nations[1287]." No one remained to uphold the Southern
+banner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even they
+were hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his own
+courage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelming
+disaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peace
+on the basis of separation; finally, "5th. _I know_ that no terms of
+peace would be accepted that did not embrace independence." But at the
+conclusion of this letter he acknowledged:
+
+     "I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume,
+     that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived
+     from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace
+     would be entertained that did not rest on
+     _independence_[1288]."
+
+But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:
+
+     "I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning
+     of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With
+     Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular
+     organized armies and I can see no possible good to result
+     from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must
+     submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for
+     vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under
+     our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a
+     soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes.... I am
+     sick, sick at heart[1289]."
+
+The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of a
+serious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial on
+the end of the war the _Times_ took occasion to pay a tribute to the
+statesman whom it had been accustomed to berate.
+
+     "There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire
+     to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance
+     of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in
+     the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we
+     trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by
+     gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his
+     term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities
+     which have been raised by these years of war[1290]."
+
+Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of British
+statesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to be
+regarded in an aspect far different from that with which he was
+generally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports of
+Seward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was received
+also the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attack
+on Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror.
+"Few events of the present century," wrote Adams, "have created such
+general consternation and indignation[1291]."
+
+In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot by Booth,
+a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the box where the
+President was sitting. Lincoln died early the next morning. On the same
+evening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man was admitted to Seward's
+house on the plea that he had a message from the physician, passed
+upstairs, but was stopped by Seward's son at the door of the sick room.
+Beating the son into semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which had
+missed fire, the stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary as
+he lay in bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Seward
+rolled off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides,
+his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved,
+probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw fractured in
+the runaway accident nine days before[1292]. The assailant fought his
+way out of the house and escaped. For some days Seward's life was
+despaired of, whether from his injuries or from shock.
+
+These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit in the
+hearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense represented the
+feeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, that abroad so
+horrible a crime should react both to the detriment of the Confederacy
+and to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with the North took the form
+of a sudden exaltation of the personality of Lincoln, bringing out
+characterizations of the man far different from those which had been his
+earlier in the war. The presence of a "rural attorney" in the
+Presidential office had seemed like the irony of fate in the great
+crisis of 1861. Even so acute an observer as Lyons could then write,
+"Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto given proof of his possessing any natural
+talents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois
+village politics. He seems to be well meaning and conscientious, in the
+measure of his understanding, but not much more[1293]." But Lyons was no
+more blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all characterizations,
+whether American or foreign, were of like nature.
+
+But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a different
+estimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for the growth of
+his personal authority and for his steadiness of purpose, with criticism
+of his alleged despotism. Now, with his death, following so closely the
+collapse of the Confederacy, there poured out from British press and
+public a great stream of laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to a
+national recantation. In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb," as
+a few dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, _Punch_ led the
+way in a poem by Tom Taylor:
+
+     "_You_ lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier,
+     _You_, who with mocking pencil wont to trace,
+     Broad for the self-complacent British sneer,
+     His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer,
+     To lame my pencil and confute my pen--
+     To make me own this hind of princes peer,
+     This rail-splitter a true-born king of men[1294]."
+
+Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of Lincoln,
+stood the _Times_. Severely reprobating the act of Booth and prophesying
+a disastrous effect in the treatment of the conquered South, it
+proceeded:
+
+     "Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest
+     eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a
+     make-shift, simply because Mr. Seward and their other
+     prominent leaders were obnoxious to different sections of
+     the party, it was natural that his career should be watched
+     with jealous suspicion. The office cast upon him was great,
+     its duties most onerous, and the obscurity of his past career
+     afforded no guarantee of his ability to discharge them. His
+     shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The education of a
+     man whose early years had been spent in earning bread by
+     manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults of
+     manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the
+     outset. In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won
+     for himself the respect and confidence of all. His perfect
+     honesty speedily became apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more
+     to his credit, amid the many unstudied speeches which he was
+     called upon from time to time to deliver, imbued though they
+     were with the rough humour of his early associates, he was in
+     none of them betrayed into any intemperance of language
+     towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His utterances
+     were apparently careless, but his tongue was always under
+     command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which
+     served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy
+     of bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way
+     gradually to his conclusions, and those who will compare the
+     different stages of his career one with another will find
+     that his mind was growing throughout the course of it."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "The gradual change of his language and of his policy was
+     most remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who
+     showed the best characteristics of their race in his respect
+     for what is good in the past, acting in unison with a
+     recognition of what was made necessary by the events of
+     passing history[1295]."
+
+This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far warmer
+expressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all England, there
+appeared another and longer editorial:
+
+     "If anything could mitigate the distress of the American
+     people in their present affliction, it might surely be the
+     sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We
+     are not using the language of hyperbole in describing the
+     manifestation of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has
+     been witnessed in our generation.... But President Lincoln
+     was only the chief of a foreign State, and of a State with
+     which we were not infrequently in diplomatic or political
+     collision. He might have been regarded as not much more to us
+     than the head of any friendly Government, and yet his end has
+     already stirred the feelings of the public to their
+     uttermost depths."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "... a space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to
+     fill the country with grief and indignation, but to evoke
+     almost unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted
+     bodies. It was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the
+     murder reached us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and
+     Commons, the Corporation of the City of London, and the
+     people of our chief manufacturing towns in public meeting
+     assembled had recorded their sentiments or expressed their
+     views. In the House of Lords the absence of precedent for
+     such a manifestation was actually made the subject of remark.
+
+     "That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the
+     tragical character of the event and the horror with which the
+     crime is regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble
+     the the fact that the loss which the Americans have sustained
+     is also thought our own loss in so far as one valuable
+     guarantee for the amity of the two nations may have been thus
+     removed. But, upon the whole, it is neither the possible
+     embarrassment of international relations nor the infamous
+     wickedness of the act itself which has determined public
+     feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine
+     sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck
+     down by an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the
+     trouble which at a crisis of their destinies such a
+     catastrophe must bring. Abraham Lincoln was as little of a
+     tyrant as any man who ever lived. He could have been a tyrant
+     had he pleased, but he never uttered so much as an
+     ill-natured speech.... In all America there was, perhaps, not
+     one man who less deserved to be the victim of this revolution
+     than he who has just fallen[1296]."
+
+The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on receipt
+of the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and Commons for
+an address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next," expressing "sorrow
+and indignation" at the assassination of Lincoln[1297]. April 28,
+Russell instructed Bruce to express at Washington that "the Government,
+the Parliament, and the Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling of
+abhorrence of the criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrocious
+crimes, and sympathy for the Government and People of the United
+States[1298]...." Russell wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. The
+Queen wrote a personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Bruce
+had written from Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of the
+South in his party[1299]," and he was extremely anxious that Seward's
+recovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of Sumner's
+assumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss terribly the
+comparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward[1300]."
+
+[Illustration: BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA. _Reproduced by
+permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]
+
+The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which the
+public outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in this
+country has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes of
+society. My table is piled high with cards, letters and
+resolutions[1301]...." Indeed all the old sources of "addresses" to
+Adams on emancipation and many organizations having no professed
+interest in that subject now sent to him resolutions--the emancipation
+societies, of horror, indignation, and even accusation against the
+South; the others of sympathy, more moderate in tone, yet all
+evincing an appreciation of the great qualities of Lincoln and of the
+justice of the cause of the North, now victorious. Within two weeks
+Adams reported over four hundred such addresses from Emancipation
+Societies, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities,
+boroughs, churches, indeed from every known type of British
+organizations[1302].
+
+On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for debate. In
+the Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving qualities of
+Lincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost by his death.
+Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of the world at Booth's
+act, joined in expressions of sympathy to the United States, but
+repeated the old phrase about the "North fighting for empire, the South
+for independence," and hinted that the unusual step now being taken by
+Parliament had in it a "political object," meaning that the motion had
+been introduced in the hope of easing American irritation with Great
+Britain[1303]. It was not a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant in
+the Commons, Disraeli, saved his party from criticism by what was
+distinctly the most thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day.
+Palmerston was ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, who
+incautiously began by asserting that the majority of the people of Great
+Britain had always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of
+"No, no" and "Hear, hear." Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:
+
+     "There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation
+     approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking,
+     are supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form
+     the happy privilege of private life; and this is one. Under
+     all circumstances we should have bewailed the catastrophe at
+     Washington; under all circumstances we should have shuddered
+     at the means by which it was accomplished. But in the
+     character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his
+     last moments there is something so homely and so innocent
+     that it takes as it were the subject out of all the pomp of
+     history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart
+     of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind.
+
+     "Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this
+     House, and in the country generally on the policy of the late
+     President of the United States, on this, I think, all must
+     agree, that in one of the severest trials which ever tested
+     the moral qualities of man, he fulfilled his duty with
+     simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible for the people of
+     England, at such a moment, to forget that he sprang from the
+     same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue.
+
+     "When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to
+     fall into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of
+     the causes and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one
+     of our duties to reassure the country under unreasoning panic
+     or despondency. Assassination has never changed the history
+     of the world....
+
+     "In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the
+     citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their
+     elected Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of
+     depression, but rather let us express a fervent hope that
+     from out the awful trials of the last four years, of which
+     not the least is this violent demise, the various populations
+     of North America may issue elevated and chastened; rich in
+     that accumulated wisdom, and strong in that disciplined
+     energy which a young nation can only acquire in a protracted
+     and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not merely
+     to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will
+     renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind.
+     It is with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to
+     the Crown[1304]."
+
+Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British popular
+sympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and the North
+victorious. But officially the Government had not yet recognized this.
+Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had returned to the old proposal
+that the nations of Europe should withdraw their recognition of
+Southern belligerent rights[1305], and in March he had asked Stoeckl,
+the Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion of
+this measure to England and France[1306]. Meanwhile Sherman's army was
+rapidly advancing northward and reports were arriving of its pillagings
+and burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in the Commons whether the
+Government was taking any steps to prevent the destruction of British
+property and received from Layard an evasive reply. Merely a "confident
+hope" had been expressed to the United States that "every facility will
+be given" to British subjects to prove ownership of property[1307].
+Evidently the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions at
+a moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding events
+of the war.
+
+Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination of
+Lincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from active
+duties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on England--a
+fortunate circumstance in the relations with Great Britain in that it
+gave time for a clearer appreciation of the rapidity and completeness of
+the collapse of the South. May 15, Lord Houghton asked whether the
+Government did not intend, in view of recent events in America, "to
+withdraw the admission of belligerent rights conceded to the so-called
+Confederate States." Russell promptly objected to the form of the
+question: England had not "conceded" any rights to the South--she had
+merely issued a proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declared
+the existence of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had no
+other recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade,
+and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal of the
+neutrality proclamation this must wait upon official announcement from
+the United States that the war was at an end. Texas was still in arms
+and Galveston still blockaded, and for this section the United States
+would no doubt continue to exercise on neutral vessels a belligerent
+right of search. It followed that if Great Britain did prematurely
+withdraw her proclamation of neutrality and the United States searched a
+British vessel, it would be the exercise of a right of search in time of
+peace--an act against which Great Britain would be bound to make
+vigorous protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaiming
+the end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at the
+prospect of peace[1308].
+
+But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. Seward,
+though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was eager to
+resume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was held at his
+house. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some anxiety that America
+was about to _demand_ the withdrawal by Great Britain of belligerent
+rights to the South, that if Great Britain would but act before such a
+demand was made it would serve to continue the existing good feeling in
+America created by the sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially,
+that there was a decided danger to good relations in the fact that
+Confederate cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should be
+sent to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal and
+supplies[1309]. Three days later Bruce repeated his warning[1310]. This
+was, apparently, a complication unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In any
+case Russell at once made a complete face-about from the policy he had
+outlined in reply to Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley in
+Paris to notify France that England thought the time had arrived for
+recognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon the
+question of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper treatment
+in British ports[1311]. Thus having given to France notice of his
+intention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, on June
+2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was ended and
+stated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were to be
+treated[1312]. Here was prompt, even hurried, action though the only
+additional event of war in America which Russell could at the moment
+cite to warrant his change of policy was the capture of Jefferson Davis.
+On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce stating what had been done and
+recognizing the "re-establishment of peace within the whole territory of
+which the United States, before the commencement of the civil war, were
+in undisturbed possession[1313]."
+
+This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's caustic
+criticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's previous
+inquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government had not stuck to
+its earlier position and calling attention to the fact that the United
+States, while now proclaiming certain ports open to trade, yet specified
+others as still closed and threatened with punishment as pirates, any
+vessel attempting to enter them. Derby desired information as to what
+the Government had done about this remarkable American proclamation.
+Russell, "who was very imperfectly heard," answered that undoubtedly it
+was embarrassing that no "regular communication" had been received from
+America giving notice of the end of the war, but that the two
+Confederate cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them to
+various Australian ports had compelled some British action. He had
+consulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the United
+States would soon formally declare the end of the war. The "piracy
+proclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby pushed for an
+answer as to whether the Government intended to let it go by unnoticed.
+Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce showed that "notice" had been
+taken of it. Derby asked whether the papers would be presented to
+Parliament; Russell "was understood to reply in the affirmative[1314]."
+Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a hectoring of Russell for his quick
+shift from the position taken a month earlier. But the very indifference
+of Russell to this attack, his carelessness and evasion in reply,
+indicate confidence that Parliament was as eager as the Government to
+satisfy the North and to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" taken
+by Bruce at Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, to
+report it to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" and
+probably a mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners[1315]. Russell
+instructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had been
+captured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there was
+presumably no port left where it could be applied[1316].
+
+In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrun
+diplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces still in the
+field surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington all
+was temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illness
+of Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russell
+fortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 as
+ending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essential
+injustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South,
+and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, he
+yet admitted that normal relations were again established and
+acknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right of
+search[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament,
+reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that the
+United States could now enter again upon normal relations with Great
+Britain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had not
+expected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutrality
+position, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstood
+and were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by the
+expression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimate
+friendship between the two nations[1319]."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January,
+1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which
+occurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching
+dissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of the
+world, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hitherto
+blocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or more
+hostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become her
+plaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal
+dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which
+it has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return
+for cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed
+support. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the
+slaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for all
+nations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and
+the United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious
+projects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]."
+
+This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeated
+frequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first two
+years of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The French
+Minister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzled
+himself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her own
+interests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous joint
+action in support of the South[1321].
+
+The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded was
+such prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing,
+apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late
+'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to the
+expansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged to
+have been an error and in its place there sprang into being a conviction
+that the might of America would tend toward the greatness of England
+itself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all
+British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the
+quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there were
+those in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North and
+South, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy.
+
+The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, was
+prompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear of
+maritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North,
+which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like that
+of every other European state, believed that a revolution for
+independence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful as
+that of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on,
+the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much
+uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire was
+first of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any other
+motive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunately
+for America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by cool
+heads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved,
+permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddle
+in the American crisis.
+
+This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both North
+and South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathy
+and aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" is
+evidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment,
+could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl,
+who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state," unaffected by popular
+emotions. Aside from race, which could be claimed also by the South, the
+one great argument of the North in appeal to England lay in the cry of
+anti-slavery. But the leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itself
+unsympathetic with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, the
+British Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy of
+strict neutrality.
+
+In all this the Government but pursued that line which is the business
+of Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and power of the
+state. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and the British
+recognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there came, as is evident
+from a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone and acts, a growing belief
+that the North might after all succeed in its purpose, at least of
+subjugating the South. This would mean the possibility of continuing
+that policy of friendship for a united America which had been determined
+upon in the 'fifties. Here was no special sympathy, but merely a cool
+calculation of benefits to Great Britain, but there can be no question
+that the general attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 was
+distinctly favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" began
+to replace a "cold neutrality."
+
+But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard national
+interests and prosperity; they also must guard their own authority and
+seek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, never greatly
+stirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised an increasing
+pressure by the force of public approval. It made impossible any attempt
+to overthrow the Ministry on the score of non-interference in America,
+or of favouritism toward the North. It gave to an enthusiastic and
+vociferous section of the British public just ground for strong support
+of Lincoln and his cause, and in some degree it affected
+governmental attitude.
+
+There was, however, another question, much more vital than emancipation
+in its relation to British home politics, that ran like a constant
+thread through the whole pattern of British public attitude toward
+America. It had always been so since the days of the American revolution
+and now was accentuated by the American war. This was the question of
+the future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the result of that
+war? And if so where lay British interest? Always present in the minds
+of thoughtful Englishmen, appearing again and again through each
+changing phase of the war, this question was so much a constant that to
+have attempted discussion of it while other topics were being treated,
+would have resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore made
+the subject of a separate and concluding chapter.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1261: Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. Hist. Soc.
+_Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 132).]
+
+[Footnote 1262: To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (_Ibid._, p. 133).]
+
+[Footnote 1263: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 343]
+
+[Footnote 1264: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1265: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, March 5 and 6, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1266: _Ibid._, Mason to Slidell, March 15, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1267: Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. (Richardson, II, pp.
+709-17.)]
+
+[Footnote 1268: _Ibid._, p. 717.]
+
+[Footnote 1269: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 24, 1865. No.
+187. It is interesting that just at this time Gortchakoff should have
+sent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by one, C. Catacazy, employe of
+the Foreign Office and long-time resident in the United States, in which
+was outlined a plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandum
+specified that such an offer should be based on the idea that the time
+had come for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that both
+North and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia's
+interest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain.
+Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to Stoeckl's
+judgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian Archives. F.O. to
+Stoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1270: Feb. 4, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1271: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 254. To his son, Feb.
+10, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1272: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 410-14.]
+
+[Footnote 1273: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 256. To his son, Feb.
+17, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1274: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182.
+Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1275: _Ibid._, p. 112. Adams to Seward, Feb. 2, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1276: _Ibid._, p. 180. Seward to Adams, Feb. 21, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1277: _Ibid._, p. 199. Adams to Seward, March 9, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1278: _Ibid._, p. 197. Seward to Adams, March 8, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1279: March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, II, p. 361.)]
+
+[Footnote 1280: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. 23 and March
+13, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1281: "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted to
+have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style of
+oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of the
+House, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine,
+which has the aid of a strong and savoury medium to overwhelm the
+nauseous taste." (_U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246.
+Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1282: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1283: _Ibid._, p. 262. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Adams
+wrote of his own situation that it "seems at last to be getting easy and
+comfortable, so far as freedom from anxiety is concerned." (_A Cycle of
+Adams' Letters_, II, p. 258. To his son, March 24, 1865.)]
+
+[Footnote 1284: Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at Washington, reached New
+York on April 7. His first letter to Russell from Washington, dated
+April 14, stated that America was certainly preparing to oust Maximilian
+in Mexico, and that even the Southern prisoners were eager to join the
+United States troops in an expedition for this purpose.
+(Russell Papers.)]
+
+[Footnote 1285: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Part II, p. 323.
+Adams to Seward, April 20, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1286: April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1287: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1288: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 23, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1289: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, April 26, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1290: April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1291: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331.
+Adams to Seward, April 28, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1292: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 417.]
+
+[Footnote 1293: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 9, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1294: May 6, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1295: April 27, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1296: April 29, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1297: Hansard, 3d. Ser., CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 and 1081.]
+
+[Footnote 1298: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Correspondence respecting the Assassination of the late President of
+the United States."]
+
+[Footnote 1299: Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April 18, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1300: _Ibid._, April 24, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1301: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 267. Charles Francis
+Adams to his son, April 28, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1302: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865-66_, Pt. I, pp. 344,
+361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May 11, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1303: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVIII, p. 1219.]
+
+[Footnote 1304: _Ibid._, pp. 1242-46.]
+
+[Footnote 1305: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. 16, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1306: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F.O., March 1-13, 1865. No.
+523. Stoeckl was opposed to this.]
+
+[Footnote 1307: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXVII, p. 1922.]
+
+[Footnote 1308: _Ibid._, CLXXIX, p. 286.]
+
+[Footnote 1309: F.O., Am., Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to Russell, May 16,
+1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1310: _Ibid._, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, May 19, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1311: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North
+America." No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 1312: _Ibid._, "Correspondence respecting the Cessation of
+Civil War in North America."]
+
+[Footnote 1313: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 1314: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, pp. 1-6.]
+
+[Footnote 1315: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Correspondence respecting President's Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865."
+Bruce to Russell, May 26, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1316: _Ibid._, June 16, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1317: _Ibid._, "Further Correspondence respecting the
+Cessation of Civil War in North America." No. 9. Seward to Bruce, June
+19, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1318: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXX, p. 1143.]
+
+[Footnote 1319: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1865, _Commons_, Vol. LVII.
+"Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in North
+America." No. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 1320: Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Dec. 23, 1859/Jan. 4,
+1860. No. 146.]
+
+[Footnote 1321: _Ibid._, Stoeckl to F.O., Jan. 17-29, 1861. No. 267. He
+reports that he has seen a confidential letter from Thouvenel to Mercier
+outlining exactly his own ideas as to England being the sole gainer by
+the dissolution of the Union.]
+
+[Footnote 1322: For an analysis of this change see _The Cambridge
+History of British Foreign Policy_, Vol II, p. 277, which also quotes a
+remarkable speech by Disraeli.]
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII
+
+THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE
+
+On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's surrender
+to Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the Commons the first
+serious debate in thirty-three years on a proposed expansion of the
+electoral franchise. It was a dramatic coincidence and no mere
+fortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen who had seen in the
+Civil War a struggle as fateful in British domestic policy as in that of
+America herself. Throughout all British political agitation from the
+time of the American revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of the
+American "example" as argument to some for imitation, to others for
+warning. Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing his
+impressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental and
+political institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of what
+was desirable in his own country[1323]. In the ten years immediately
+preceding the Civil War most travellers were laudatory of American
+democracy, and one, the best in acute analysis up to the time of Lord
+Bryce's great work, had much influence on that class in England which
+was discontented with existing political institutions at home. This was
+Mackay's _Western World_ which, first published in 1849, had gone
+through four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was frequently
+reprinted[1324]. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no longer an
+experiment; its success and permanence were evident in the mighty power
+of the United States; Canada would soon follow the American example; the
+"injustice" of British aristocrats to the United States was intentional,
+seeking to discredit democracy:
+
+     "... Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with their
+     judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the
+     interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever
+     it is found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the
+     people have too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided
+     them in their object. They recognize America as the
+     stronghold of republicanism. If they can bring it into
+     disrepute here, they know that they inflict upon it the
+     deadliest blow in Europe[1325]."
+
+On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued the
+inapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain[1326]. The
+theoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects admirable
+but in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of the mob and had
+debased the nation in the estimation of the world; bribery in elections,
+the low order of men in politics and in Congress, were proofs of the
+evils of democracy; those in England who clamoured for a "numerical"
+rather than a class representation should take warning from the American
+experiment. Occasionally, though rarely, there appeared the impressions
+of some British traveller who had no political axe to grind[1327], but
+from 1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing on
+America was coloured by the author's attitude on political institutions
+at home. The "example" of America was constantly on the horizon in
+British politics.
+
+In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb since the
+high tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to have made a
+private agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory parties would
+oppose any movement toward an expansion of the franchise[1328]. Lord
+John Russell, in his youth an eager supporter of the Reform Bill of
+1832, had now gained the name of "Finality John" by his assertion that
+that Reform was final in British institutions. Political reaction was in
+full swing much to the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden and
+their supporters. When the storm broke in America the personal
+characteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and Davis,
+took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme importance as if
+representative of the political philosophies of the two sections.
+Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis' "culture" was
+aristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had "aristocratic" views
+on government[1329]. But that this issue had any vital bearing on the
+quarrel between the American sections was never generally voiced in
+England. Rather, British comment was directed to the lesson, taught to
+the world by the American crisis, of the failure of democratic
+institutions in _national power._ Bright had long preached to the
+unenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and these
+had long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a result of
+democratic institutions. At first the denial was now repeated, the
+_Saturday Review_, February 23, 1861, protesting that there was no
+essential connection between the "shipwreck" of American institutions
+and the movement in England for an expanded franchise. Even, the article
+continued, if an attempt were made to show such a connection it would
+convince nobody since "Mr. Bright has succeeded in persuading a great
+number of influential persons that the admission of working-men into the
+constituencies is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground that
+it has succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panacea
+against the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of old
+Governments in Europe." Yet that the denial was not sincere is shown by
+the further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of Birmingham and
+other kindred platforms must bear the blame of the inference, drawn
+nearly universally at the present moment, that, if the United States
+become involved in hopeless difficulties, it would be madness to lower
+the qualification for the suffrage in England."
+
+This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the American
+struggle and British institutions was not long persisted in. A month
+later the _Saturday Review_ was strong in contemptuous criticism of the
+"promiscuous democracy" of the North[1330]. Less political journals
+followed suit. The _Economist_ thought the people of England would now
+be convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who had
+advocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm,
+gratitude and shame[1331]." Soon W.H. Russell could write, while still
+at Washington "... the world will only see in it all, the failure of
+republican institutions in time of pressure as demonstrated by all
+history--that history which America vainly thought she was going to set
+right and re-establish on new grounds and principles[1332]." "The
+English worshippers of American institutions," said the _Saturday
+Review_, "are in danger of losing their last pretext for preferring the
+Republic to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England.... It now
+appears that the peaceable completion of the secession has become
+impossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground of
+superiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be advantageously
+contrasted with Queen Victoria[1333]."
+
+These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of the war
+and may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers rather than as
+attempts to read a lesson to the public. No such expressions are to be
+found in the letters of leading officials though minor ones occasionally
+indulged in them[1334]. As late as June, 1861, Adams declared that while
+some in England welcomed American disunion as a warning to their
+countrymen it was evident that but a small number as yet saw the cause
+of the North as identical with the world progress of free
+institutions[1335]. Evidently he was disappointed that the followers of
+Bright were not exhibiting more courage and demanding public support of
+the North as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangely
+silent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. It
+required time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the American
+question and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic Britain
+was first to declare a definite lesson to be learned, thereby bringing
+out the fighting qualities of British democracy. Throughout 1861, the
+comment was relatively mild. In July, _Blackwood's_ declared:
+
+     "It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of
+     America for her own institutions and political tendencies
+     that we do not now see in the impending change an event
+     altogether to be deplored. In those institutions and
+     tendencies we saw what our own might be if the most dangerous
+     elements of our Constitution should become dominant. We saw
+     democracy rampant, with no restriction upon its caprices. We
+     saw a policy which received its impulses always from below
+     ... nor need we affect particularly to lament the exhibition
+     of the weak point of a Constitution ... the disruption of
+     which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages which
+     America owes to England, and which have contributed so
+     powerfully to her prosperity...."
+
+     "With a rival Government on the frontier ... with great
+     principles to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we
+     should probably see the natural aristocracy rise from the
+     dead level of the Republic, raising the national character
+     with its own elevation[1336]."
+
+In the same month the _Quarterly_, always more calm, logical and
+convincing than _Blackwood's_, published "Democracy on its Trial[1337]."
+"The example of America kept alive, as it had created, the party of
+progress"; now "it has sunk from the decrepitude of premature old age."
+If England, after such an example, permits herself to be led into
+democracy she "will have perished by that wilful infatuation which no
+warning can dispel."
+
+Adams had complained that few British friends of progress identified the
+cause of the North with their own, but this was true of Americans also.
+The _Atlantic Monthly_ for July 1861, discussed British attitude wholly
+in terms of cotton supply. But soon there appeared in the British press
+so many preachments on the "lesson" of America that the aristocratic
+effort to gain an advantage at home became apparent to all[1338]. The
+_Economist_ moralized on the "untried" character of American
+institutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant as the
+"masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual still more
+worthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral degradation" to the
+level of their constituents[1339]. "The upper and ruling class" wrote
+Bright to Sumner, were observing with satisfaction, "that democracy may
+get into trouble, and war, and debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has done
+for this country[1340]." Thus Bright could not deny the blow to
+democracy; nor could the _Spectator_, upbraiding its countrymen for lack
+of sympathy with the North: "New England will be justified in saying
+that Old England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimental
+pretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with cotton
+against the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her gentle regret
+over the new impulse given to slavery by her lively gratification over
+the paralyzing shock suffered by Democracy[1341]." This was no taking up
+of cudgels for the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for.
+Vigour rested with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a short
+war vanished. The _Saturday Review_ asserted:
+
+     "In that reconstruction of political philosophy which the
+     American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of
+     the popular element will be reduced to its due
+     proportions.... The true guarantee of freedom will be looked
+     for more in the equilibrium of classes than in the equality
+     of individuals.... We may hope, at last, that the delusive
+     confusion between freedom and democracy is finally banished
+     from the minds of Englishmen[1342]."
+
+"The real secret," wrote Motley, "of the exultation which manifests
+itself in the _Times_ and other organs over our troubles and disasters,
+is their hatred, not to America, so much as to democracy in
+England[1343]." It was scarcely a secret in the columns of the journals
+already quoted. But no similar interpretation had as yet appeared in the
+_Times_ and Motley's implication was justified for it and other leading
+daily newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leading
+the attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright and
+his followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis. The
+_Edinburgh_ at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the American
+dispute[1344], then attributed it to the inevitable failure in power of
+a federal system of government, not mentioning democracy as in
+question[1345]. _Blackwood's_ repeatedly pushed home its argument:
+
+     "Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that the end
+     of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than
+     terrible.... But for our own benefit and the instruction of
+     the world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so
+     fatal, of their political system exposed, in the most
+     effective way.... And the venerable Lincoln, the respectable
+     Seward, the raving editors, the gibbering mob, and the
+     swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no malicious tricks
+     of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are all of
+     them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic ...
+     dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the
+     spoiled child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before
+     high heaven, and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises,
+     dies as sheerly from lack of vitality as the oldest of
+     worn-out despotisms.... In the hope that this contest may end
+     in the extinction of mob rule, we become reconciled to the
+     much slighter amount of suffering that war inflicts on
+     America[1346]."
+
+Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the cause of
+the South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished audience" used
+language insulting to the North, fawning upon the South and picturing
+the latter as wholly admirable for its aristocratic tendencies. For this
+he was sharply taken to task by the _Spectator_[1347]. More sedately the
+Earl of Shrewsbury proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracy
+and its failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union is
+inevitable, and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracy
+established in America[1348]." In all countries and at all times there
+are men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but in such
+utterances as these there is manifest not merely the customary desire to
+stand in the limelight of assured knowledge and wisdom, but also the
+happy conviction that events in America were working to the undoing of
+the Radicals of Great Britain. If they would not be supine the Radicals
+must strike back. On December 4, at Rochdale where, as the _Times_
+asserted, he was sure of an audience sympathetic on purely personal
+grounds, Bright renewed his profession of faith in the American Republic
+and sang his accustomed praises of its great accomplishments[1349]. The
+battle, for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challenge
+issued by aristocratic England, accepted.
+
+But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there stood a
+group holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the historical
+significance of the American collapse. To this group belonged Gladstone,
+as yet uncertain of his political philosophy, and regretful, though
+vainly, it would appear, of the blow to democracy. He wrote his thought
+to Brougham, no doubt hoping to influence the view-point of the
+_Edinburgh_.
+
+     "This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor
+     'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier
+     discount since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of
+     the American constitution in the main fact of the rupture.
+     On the contrary it was a great achievement to strike off by
+     the will and wit of man a constitution for two millions of
+     men scattered along a seaboard, which has lasted until they
+     have become more than thirty millions and have covered a
+     whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and follies, not to
+     say worse, with which the rupture has been met in the
+     Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not
+     exposition but) exposure have really given as I have said the
+     old lady in question such a heavy blow and great
+     discouragement that I hope you will in the first vigour of
+     your action be a little merciful and human lest you murder
+     her outright[1350]."
+
+On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions the
+American Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not believing in
+1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade advantage would lead Great
+Britain from just rules of conduct. Even in the crisis of the _Trent_
+affair he was firm in this opinion:
+
+     "Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be
+     disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils,
+     and much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make
+     democracy responsible for them, the inexorable logic of
+     events is contradicting each and every assertion based on
+     these notions, and proving that the American struggle is,
+     after all, the ever-recurring one in human affairs between
+     right and wrong, between labour and capital, between liberty
+     and absolutism. When such an issue comes to be presented to
+     the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the disguises
+     which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to
+     predict at least which side it will _not_ consent to
+     take[1351].
+
+April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on American
+democracy and December its acceptance by Bright. Throughout 1862 he
+practically deserted his seat in Parliament and devoted himself to
+stirring up labour and radical sentiment in favour of the North. In
+January, 1862, a mass meeting at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced the
+daily press and was thought of sufficient moment to be reported by
+Adams. A motion was carried:
+
+     "That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the
+     ill-disguised efforts of the _Times_ and other misleading
+     journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American
+     questions ... to decry democratic institutions under the
+     trials to which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of
+     the working-men especially as unrepresented in the National
+     Senate to express their sympathy with the United States in
+     their gigantic struggle for the preservation of the
+     Union[1352]...."
+
+The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in the
+controversy. The _Morning Post_, stating with conviction its belief that
+there could be no re-union in America, added:
+
+     "... if the Government of the United States should succeed in
+     reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still extensive
+     dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest triumph
+     since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the ample
+     satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is
+     even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate
+     not only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can
+     ride safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf
+     every other craft laden with human destinies; that it can
+     descend to the darkest depths of adversity, and rise from
+     them all the stronger for the descent.... And who can doubt
+     that Democracy will be more arrogant, more aggressive, more
+     levelling and vulgarizing, if that be possible, than it ever
+     had been before[1353]."
+
+By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that the
+political controversy in England had an important bearing on the
+attitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of _Fraser's
+Magazine_ seemed turning to one-sided presentation of the "lesson" of
+America. Mill's defence of the North, appearing in the February number,
+was soon followed in July by the first of a series of articles,
+"Universal Suffrage in the United States and Its Consequences,"
+depicting the war as the result of mob rule and predicting a military
+despotism as its inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losing
+strength, wrote Adams:
+
+     "That the American difficulties have materially contributed
+     to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the
+     leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United
+     States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on.
+     The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate
+     subdivision of America into many separate States which will
+     neutralize each other. This is most visible among the
+     conservative class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of
+     liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the
+     nursery of them[1354]."
+
+From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully aloof at
+least in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell commented to
+Palmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson by De Witt, which
+is both interesting and instructive. It shows how the Great Republic of
+Washington degenerated into the Democracy of Jefferson. They are now
+reaping the fruit[1355]." Was it mere coincidence or was there
+significance in an editorial in Palmerston's alleged "organ," the
+_Morning Post_:
+
+     "That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure to the
+     calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably false.
+     But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful
+     Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United
+     States during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a
+     democratic tyranny compared with which the most corrupt
+     despotisms of the Old World appear realms of idyllic
+     happiness and peace, have gratefully recognized the finger of
+     Providence in the strife by which they have been so
+     frightfully rent asunder[1356]...."
+
+In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again brought
+into action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than heretofore.
+"For a great number of years," said the _Quarterly_, "a certain party
+among us, great admirers of America ... have chosen to fight their
+English battles upon American soil." Now the American Government "has
+disgracefully and ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evident
+that "political equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera[1357]."
+At last, in November, the _Times_ openly took the position which its
+accusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial utterances
+almost from the beginning of the Civil War.
+
+     "These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form of
+     government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city
+     attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if
+     such a terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in
+     England we should at the earliest moment possible have sent
+     the incapables about their business, and put ourselves in the
+     hands of better men...."
+
+     "This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model
+     for imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how
+     it works now, when for the first time it has some work to do.
+     We believe that if the English system of Parliamentary action
+     had existed in America, the war could not have occurred, but
+     we are quite sure that such Ministers would have long since
+     been changed[1358]."
+
+In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the failure of
+democracy, the open friends of the South dilated also upon the
+"gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and society. This was
+the frequent burden of articles in _The Index_ in the early weeks of its
+publication. To this was soon added a picture of Northern democracy as
+composed of and controlled by the "immigrant element" which was the
+source of "the enormous increase of population in the last thirty years"
+from revolutionary areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carried
+with them more than their strong arms, they imported also their theories
+of equality.... The revolutionary party which represents them is at this
+moment master in the States of the North, where it is indulging in all
+its customary licence[1359]." This fact, complained _The Index_, was not
+sufficiently brought out in the English press. Very different was the
+picture painted by Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states:
+
+     "... this man has his romance, his high poetic feeling, and
+     above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him
+     without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers
+     and old flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws
+     the signs of ague and sickness; but he will stand upright
+     before you and speak to you with all the ease of a lettered
+     gentleman in his own library. All the odious incivility of
+     the republican servant has been banished. He is his own
+     master, standing on his own threshold, and finds no need to
+     assert his equality by rudeness. He is delighted to see you,
+     and bids you sit down on his battered bench, without dreaming
+     of any such apology as an English cotter offers to a Lady
+     Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his independence,
+     and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He tells you
+     of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will
+     always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some
+     token of advance in education. When he questions you about
+     the old country he astonishes you by the extent of his
+     knowledge. I defy you not to feel that he is superior to the
+     race from whence he has sprung in England or in Ireland."
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "It is always the same story. With us there is no level of
+     society. Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd
+     congregates near the bottom, and the lower steps are very
+     broad. In America men stand upon a common platform, but the
+     platform is raised above the ground, though it does not
+     approach in height the top of our staircase. If we take the
+     average altitude in the two countries, we shall find that the
+     American heads are the more elevated of the two[1360]."
+
+A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative and
+aristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy and its
+lesson to England was most marked and most open at the moment when the
+Government was seriously considering an offer of mediation in the war.
+Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of September, 1862, had
+appeared. It did not immediately affect governmental attitude, save
+adversely to the North, and it gave a handle for pro-Southern outcry on
+the score of a "servile war." Indeed, the radicals were at first
+depressed by it; but when months passed with no appearance of a servile
+war and when the second emancipation proclamation of January, 1863,
+further certified the moral purpose of the North, a great element of
+strength was added to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous
+"addresses" to Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for the
+cause of anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation of
+American political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter Hall,
+January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an American
+paper as largely deriving its strength from the universal
+dissatisfaction of the lower orders of the English people with their
+existing conditions under the Crown:
+
+     "The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing under
+     the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the
+     contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the
+     soil, the grievous effects of the laws of entail and
+     primogeniture, whereby they are kept poor and rendered liable
+     to starvation and pauperism--these have looked to America as
+     the model democracy which proves the poor man's capacity for
+     self-government." The meeting was called for seven o'clock
+     but at half after five the hall was filled, and at six
+     crowded. A second hall was filled and outdoor meetings of two
+     thousand people organized in Exeter Street. "All
+     working-class England was up in arms, not so much against
+     slavery as against British oligarchy[1361]."
+
+The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had caused
+anxious consideration to the managers of the _Times_, and the decision
+to step more warily. No doubt this was exaggeration of the political
+character and effect of the meeting, but certain it is that the
+political element was present joining hands with anti-slavery
+enthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the last confident and vigorous
+expression of the "failure" of democracy, from sources professedly
+neutral, appeared immediately after the St. James' Hall meeting, but was
+necessarily written before that meeting took place. _Blackwood's_, in
+its issue of February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man in
+this country now acknowledges ... that we have already gone as far
+toward democracy as is safe to go.... This is the great moral benefit
+which we have derived from the events in America." John Blackwood was an
+intimate friend of Delane, editor of the _Times_, holding similar views
+on political questions; but the _Times_ was suddenly grown cautious in
+reading English political lessons from America. In truth, attack now
+rested with the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand[1362].
+He now advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North to
+the offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merely
+because it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it desired
+to make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was the
+negro[1363]. It was now Radical purpose to keep the battle raging and
+they were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the United States might well
+recognize its opportunity in this controversy and give aid to
+its friends:
+
+     "After all, this struggle of ours both at home and abroad is
+     but a struggle between the principle of popular government
+     and government by a privileged class. The people therefore
+     all the world over are in a species of solidarity which it is
+     our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost[1364]."
+
+But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the democratic
+movement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise, developed, he yet
+feared that the extremes to which Bright and others were going in
+support of the North might create unfortunate reactions in the
+Government. Especially he was anxious that the United States should not
+offer opportunity for accusation of interference in a British political
+quarrel. It is noteworthy that while many addresses to Lincoln were
+forwarded by him and many were printed in the annual publication of
+diplomatic correspondence, those that thus appeared dealt almost
+exclusively with emancipation. Yet Adams was also forwarding addresses
+and speeches harping on American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh,
+February 19, found place, in its emancipation aspect in the United
+States documents[1365], but the burden of that meeting, democracy, did
+not. It was there proclaimed that the British press misrepresented
+conditions in America, "because the future of free political
+institutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of Independence
+and in the State Constitutions of the Northern States, would be a
+standing argument against the expansion of the franchise and the
+enjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a convenient
+argument in favour of the continued domination of our aristocratic
+parties[1366]." The tide of democratic feeling was rising rapidly in
+England. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a recent debate in
+Parliament that that body was much more judicious in expressions on
+America than it had been before 1862. "It will not escape your
+observation that the question is now felt to be taking a shape which was
+scarcely anticipated by the managers [of the _Times_] when they first
+undertook to guide the British mind to the overthrow of free
+institutions in America[1367]."
+
+On the evening of the day on which this was written there occurred the
+greatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the aristocracy, of
+the meetings held to support the cause of the North. This was the
+spectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of London at St. James' Hall,
+on March 26, usually regarded as the culminating effort in Bright's tour
+of England for the cause of democracy, but whose origin is somewhat
+shrouded in mystery. Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceived
+the idea of the meeting and was responsible for its organization[1368].
+The press generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting." Adams wrote to
+Seward of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the University
+of London, to send a representative from the American Ministry, Beesly
+expanding upon the importance and high standing of the Trades Unions. To
+this Adams demurred but finally sent his son to sit in the audience and
+report the proceedings.
+
+Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the most
+important of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the Civil
+War, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle of
+democracy." Save for some distinguished speakers those in attendance
+consisted almost wholly of three thousand picked representatives of the
+Trades Unions of London. Adams transmitted to Seward his son's report of
+the meeting, its character, composition, names of speakers and their
+emphatic expressions of friendship for the North[1369], but it is again
+noteworthy that Henry Adams' clear analysis of the real significance of
+the meeting was not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence.
+Giving due praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commenting
+on press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were only
+brought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright," Henry Adams
+continued: "That this was not the case must have been evident to every
+person present. In fact, it was only after he closed that the real
+business of the evening began." Then followed speeches and the
+introduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a bricklayer ... Mr. Odgers,
+a shoemaker ... Mr. Mantz, a compositor ... Mr. Cremer, a joiner, who
+was bitter against Lord Palmerston ... Mr. Conolly, a mason...." and
+other labouring men, all asserting "that the success of free
+institutions in America was a political question of deep consequence in
+England and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavourable
+to the North." No one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what was
+intended."
+
+     "The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength and
+     no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a
+     direct political bearing on internal politics in England it
+     needed little of doing so. There was not even a profession of
+     faith in the government of England as at present constituted.
+     Every hostile allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the
+     opinions of the 'privileged classes,' was received with warm
+     cheers. Every allusion to the republican institutions of
+     America, the right of suffrage, the right of self-taxation,
+     the 'sunlight' of republican influence, was caught up by the
+     audience with vehement applause. It may therefore be
+     considered as fairly and authoritatively announced that the
+     class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of
+     the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an
+     act almost without precedent in their history, the principle
+     that they make common cause with the Americans who are
+     struggling for the restoration of the Union and that all
+     their power and influence shall be used on behalf of the
+     North[1370]."
+
+Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege," and his
+appeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America have been
+given in a previous chapter[1371]. Evidently that appeal, though
+enthusiastically received for its oratorical brilliance, was unneeded.
+His was but an eloquent expression of that which was in the minds of his
+audience. Upon the American Minister the effect was to cause him to
+renew warnings against showing too keen an appreciation of the support
+of political radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at once
+stirred anxiety in Parliament and verged:
+
+     "... much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic
+     politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or
+     sympathize with by Foreign Governments.... Hence it seems to
+     me of the greatest consequence that the treatment of all
+     present questions between the two nations should be regulated
+     by a provident forecast of what may follow it [the political
+     struggle in England] hereafter. I am not sure that some
+     parties here would not now be willing even to take the risk
+     of a war in order the more effectually to turn the scale
+     against us, and thus, as they think, to crush the rising
+     spirit of their own population. That this is only a feeling
+     at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a policy
+     may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon
+     the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if
+     possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such
+     hopes.... We owe this duty not less to the great body of
+     those who in this kingdom are friends to us and our
+     institutions, than to ourselves[1372]."
+
+[Illustration: JOHN BRIGHT (_From a photograph taken of him in the
+attitude in which he usually spoke_) (_From Trevelyan's "Life of John
+Bright_")]
+
+Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect to
+democratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received a
+deputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutions
+passed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed fears
+that a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain and
+America, and that this would have a disastrous influence on the
+aspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms of
+appreciation for the sympathies expressed by the meeting but
+carefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose. "He was
+too prudent," said the _Times_ in reporting the deputation, "to appraise
+the importance of the particular demonstration to which his notice was
+invited ..." and his reply was given favourable comment[1373]. This
+reply, wrote Adams, "appears to have had a sedative effect[1374]."
+Meanwhile, Bright continued his preachment to the English people though
+modifying his tone of fierce accusation against "privilege," and
+confining himself to declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in the
+American conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Society
+of London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people in
+this country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I say that
+these have an interest, almost as great and direct as though they were
+living in Massachusetts or New York, in the tremendous struggle for
+freedom which is now shaking the whole North American Continent[1375]."
+Like utterances were repeated at further public meetings and so
+insistent were they as to require reply by the conservative faction,
+even if, as was supposed, the effect of the Trades' Union attitude had
+been to give a halt to the vehemence of those who had been sounding the
+"lesson" of American failure in democracy. Bright became the centre of
+attack. The _Times_ led.
+
+     "His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the
+     Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant
+     Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it
+     must go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives
+     up all his most cherished notions and all his less absorbing
+     principles...."
+
+     "Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion and
+     his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master
+     passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He
+     worshipped it while rising to its culminating point, and he
+     is obliged to turn right round to worship it while setting.
+     He did not himself know, until tested by this great trial,
+     how entirely his opinions as to war and peace, and slavery
+     and freedom, and lust of conquest and hatred of oppression,
+     were all the mere accidents which hung loosely upon him, and
+     were capable of being detached at once in the interest of the
+     ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant Democracy.
+     Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been a
+     failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright
+     up to this time has been but a foolish dream[1376]."
+
+Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness; but an
+"if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American democracy,
+caused less by the progress of the war than by the rising excitement of
+democratic England. The _Times_ editorial just quoted appeared when the
+faith was generally professed that Lee was about to end the war through
+the invasion of Pennsylvania. In the reaction created by the arrival of
+the news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned his
+Government against either a belligerent or interfering attitude toward
+Great Britain, but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supreme
+importance in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is to
+show, by our example to the people of England in particular, and to all
+nations in general, the value of republican institutions." There was
+still a general belief in the incompetency of those institutions. "The
+greatest triumph of all would be to prove these calculations vain. In
+comparison with this, what would be the gain to be derived from any
+collision with the powers of Europe[1377]?"
+
+It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of English
+opinion on American democracy few in America itself appreciated the
+significance of the British controversy. J. M. Forbes, who had been on a
+special mission to England, wrote to Lincoln, on his return[1378]:
+
+     "Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his glorious band
+     of English Republicans see that we are fighting for Democracy
+     or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal
+     institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world
+     are as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have
+     on this side.
+
+     Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and
+     the Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of
+     the People against an Aristocracy[1379]."
+
+But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly always came
+from men who had been abroad and had thus come into direct contact with
+British political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's retreat from Pennsylvania
+had produced a like retreat in the opinions on the failure of democracy
+earlier confidently held by the professedly neutral press. In September,
+having arrived at the point by the usual process of gradually facing
+about, the _Times_ was bold enough to deny that England had any personal
+feeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had anything
+to do with English attitude on the war[1380]. Thenceforth neither the
+_Times_ nor any of the leading papers saw fit to revive with vigour the
+cry of "democracy's failure," no matter how persistent in proclaiming
+ultimate victory for the South. Aristocratic exultation had given place
+to alarm and it seemed wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue[1381]. Not
+so the Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in the
+minds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence but
+increased firmness debated the question in every public meeting
+favourable to the North[1382]. Many Conservatives, Adams reported, were
+now anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a difficult
+one because of their irritation at Bright's taunts[1383]. Bright's star
+was rising. "The very moment the war comes to an end," wrote Adams, "and
+a restoration of the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reaction
+that will make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man in
+England[1384]."
+
+The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly one-sided.
+In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent upon the more
+eager and professed friends of the South to take up the cudgels. Hence,
+in part, came the organization of the Southern Independence Association
+and the attempt to hold public meetings favourable to the South, in the
+early months of 1864. Much talk had been spent on the "British issue"
+involved in the war; there was now to be vigorous work to secure
+it[1385]. _The Index _plunged into vigorous denunciation of "The
+Manchester School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better for
+the future call the American School." Even the Government was attacked
+for its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining as a
+member Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that he shared
+Bright's views on democracy:
+
+     "That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter the
+     Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament
+     despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and
+     vituperation, his vulgarity, and his incurable want of
+     veracity, had made him so hateful to the educated classes
+     that it would have required no common courage to give him
+     office; his insolent sneers at royalty would have made his
+     appointment little less than a personal insult to the Queen;
+     and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable
+     colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a
+     faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other
+     existence but what it borrowed from him, while its previous
+     life and education had accustomed it to the society of
+     statesmen and of gentlemen[1386]."
+
+Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they were
+too evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical and
+pro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the Southern
+Independence Association, analysed with clarity the situation. Answering
+criticisms of the passionate mob spirit of Northern press and people, he
+accused the _Times_ of having
+
+     "... pandered to the hatred of America among the upper
+     classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at
+     least had been taught by what we have lately seen not to
+     shrink from an extension of the suffrage, if the only bad
+     consequence of that measure of justice would be a change in
+     government from the passions of the privileged class to the
+     passions of the people.... History will not mistake the
+     meaning of the loud cry of triumph which burst from the
+     hearts of all who openly or secretly hated liberty and
+     progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the Great
+     Republic." British working men "are for the most part as well
+     aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right
+     of labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can
+     be that the other cause in his[1387]."
+
+The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as an
+institution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the front
+in politics. This was very largely a result of the American Civil War.
+Roebuck, after the failure of his effort for mediation in 1863, was
+obsessed with a fear of the tendency in England. "I have great faith in
+my countrymen," he wrote, "but the experience of America frightens me. I
+am not ashamed to use the word _frightened_. During my whole life I have
+looked to that country as about to solve the great problem of
+self-government, and now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth and
+manhood are destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my political
+philosophy, and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point[1388]."
+More philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule of
+aristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the discovery
+of some middle ground or method--some "influence [which] may help us to
+prevent the English people from becoming, with the growth of democracy,
+_Americanized_[1389]." "There is no longer any sort of disguise
+maintained," wrote Adams, "as to the wishes of the privileged classes.
+Very little genuine sympathy is entertained for the rebels. The true
+motive is apparent enough. It is the fear of the spread of democratic
+feeling at home in the event of our success[1390]."
+
+The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser Conservative
+elements in proclaming the "lesson" of American democracy--a retreat
+caused by alarm at the vigour with which Radicals had taken up the
+challenge. Conservative hopes were still fixed upon Southern success and
+Conservative confidence loudly voiced. Even the pride of the _Times_ in
+the accuracy of its news and in its military forecasts was subordinated
+to the purpose of keeping up the courage of the faction it
+represented[1391]. Small wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving the
+news of Sherman's arrival before Savannah, should be made physically ill
+and write to Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow to us as well
+as to the South." The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed about
+Sherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the mischief[1392]."
+"Attenuation" of Northern progress in arms was, indeed, attempted, but
+the facts of the military situation were too strong for continued
+concealment. From January, 1865, only the most stubborn of Southern
+friends could remain blind to the approaching Northern victory. Lord
+Acton, a hero-worshipper of the great Confederate military leader,
+"broke his heart over the surrender of Lee," but was moved also by keen
+insight as to the political meaning of that surrender[1393].
+
+So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War in
+America was closing in Northern victory that the final event was
+discounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for an
+English political struggle on the great issue heralded as involved in
+the American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a motion in
+Parliament for expansion of the franchise the ultra-Conservatives
+attempted to read a "lesson" from America. The _Quarterly_ for April,
+1865, asserted that even yet "the mass of educated men in England retain
+the sympathy for the South which they have nourished ever since the
+conflict assumed a decided shape." America was plainly headed in the
+direction of a military despotism. Her example should warn England from
+a move in the same direction. "The classes which govern this country are
+in a minority," and should beware of majority rule. But events
+discredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination of
+Lincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring of
+expressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exalt
+Lincoln's leadership in democracy[1394].
+
+In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new Parliament. Not a
+single member who had supported the cause of the North failed of
+re-election, several additional Northern "friends" were chosen, and some
+outspoken members for the South were defeated. Adams thought this a
+matter deserving special notice in America, and prophesied a new era
+approaching in England:
+
+     "As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period marks
+     an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure
+     old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the
+     confidence of the country that it will not appear in that
+     guise any more. Unless some new and foreign element should
+     interpose, I look for decided progress in enlarging the
+     popular features of the constitution, and diminishing the
+     influence of the aristocracy.... It is impossible not to
+     perceive traces of the influence of our institutions upon all
+     these changes.... The progress of the liberal cause, not in
+     England alone, but all over the world, is, in a measure, in
+     our hands[1395]."
+
+The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams anticipated.
+Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October 18, 1865. Russell
+succeeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost immediately declared
+himself in favour of Parliamentary reform even though a majority in both
+Houses was still opposed to such a measure. Russell's desertion of his
+earlier attitude of "finality" on franchise expansion correctly
+represented the acceptance, though unwillingly, by both political
+parties of the necessity of reform. The battle, long waged, but reaching
+its decisive moment during the American Civil War, had finally gone
+against Conservatism when Lee surrendered at Appomatox. Russell's
+Reform Bill of 1866 was defeated by Tory opposition in combination with
+a small Whig faction which refused to desert the "principle" of
+aristocratic government--the "government by the wise," but the Tories
+who came into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voiced
+even to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill.
+Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises,"
+which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to British
+working-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic criticism that all
+the planned advantages to Conservatism were soon thrown overboard, and a
+Bill presented so Radical as to permit a transfer of political power to
+the working classes[1396]. The Reform Bill of 1867 changed Great Britain
+from a government by aristocracy to one by democracy. A new nation came
+into being. The friends of the North had triumphed.
+
+Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the incidental
+frictions, the effect on trade relations, the applications of British
+neutrality, and the general policy of the Government, there existed for
+Great Britain a great issue in the outcome of the Civil War--the issue
+of the adoption of democratic institutions. It affected at every turn
+British public attitude, creating an intensity and bitterness of tone,
+on both sides, unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. In
+America this was little understood, and American writers both during the
+war and long afterwards, gave little attention to it[1397]. Immediately
+upon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during the
+conflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that "the
+territorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of the
+Established Church" would have been excusable "if they could only have
+said frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions opposed to
+their own, instead of talking about their sympathy for the weak, and
+their respect for national independence, and their anxiety for the
+triumph of Free Trade[1398]." This was stated before the democratic hope
+in England had been realized. Three years later the same staunch friend
+of the North, now removed to America and occupying a chair of history at
+Cornell University, wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of their
+attitude: "I fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, that
+their defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But I
+daresay we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been born
+members of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under the
+blessed influence of equality and justice[1399]."
+
+Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian as
+well-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one fought
+first of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue of democracy
+in England seemed of little moment and little to excuse either the "cold
+neutrality" of the Government or the tone of the press. To Americans
+Great Britain appeared friendly to the dissolution of the Union and the
+destruction of a rival power. Nationality was the issue for the North;
+that democracy was an issue in America was denied, nor could it, in the
+intensity of the conflict, be conceived as the vital question
+determining British attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a new
+British nation into existence, the nation decrying American institutions
+was dead and a "sister democracy" holding out hands to the United
+States had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for the
+North long remained blind. Not during the generation when Americans,
+immersed in a life and death struggle for national existence, felt that
+"he who is not for me is against me," could the generally correct
+neutrality of the British Government and the whole-hearted support of
+Radical England be accepted at their true value to the North. For nearly
+half a century after the American Civil War the natural sentiments of
+friendship, based upon ties of blood and a common heritage of literature
+and history and law, were distorted by bitter and exaggerated
+memories.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1323: See my article, "The Point of View of the British
+Traveller in America," _Pol. Sci. Quarterly_, June, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 1324: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World; or Travels in the
+United States in_ 1846-47.]
+
+[Footnote 1325: _Ibid._, Fourth Edition, London, 1850, Vol. III, p. 24.]
+
+[Footnote 1326: Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, _The Constitution of the
+United States compared with Our Own_, London, 1854.]
+
+[Footnote 1327: e.g., William Kelly, _Across the Rocky Mountains from
+New York to California_, London, 1852. He made one acute observation on
+American democracy. "The division of parties is just the reverse in
+America to what it is in England. In England the stronghold of democracy
+is in the large towns, and aristocracy has its strongest supporters in
+the country. In America the ultra-democrat and leveller is the western
+farmer, and the aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst the
+manufacturers and merchants of the eastern cities." (p. 181.)]
+
+[Footnote 1328: Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, pp. 293-4, states a Tory
+offer to support Palmerston on these lines.]
+
+[Footnote 1329: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 217.]
+
+[Footnote 1330: March, 30, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1331: March 16, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1332: To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861. (Bigelow,
+_Retrospections_, I, p. 347.)]
+
+[Footnote 1333: April 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1334: Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861, that the war in
+America was the "natural result of the much vaunted system of government
+of the United States"; it had "crumbled to pieces," and this result had
+long been evident to the public mind of Europe. (F.O., Am., Vol.
+780, No. 58.)]
+
+[Footnote 1335: State Department, Eng., Vol. 77, No. 9. Adams to Seward,
+June 21, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1336: I have made an effort to identify writers in
+_Blackwood's_, but am informed by the editors that it is impossible to
+do this for the period before 1870, old correspondence having been
+destroyed.]
+
+[Footnote 1337: July, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1338: The _Atlantic Monthly_ for November, 1861, takes up the
+question, denying that democracy is in any sense "on trial" in America,
+so far as the permanence of American institutions is concerned. It still
+does not see clearly the real nature of the controversy in England.]
+
+[Footnote 1339: Aug. 17, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1340: Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p.
+94.)]
+
+[Footnote 1341: Sept. 7, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1342: Sept. 14, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1343: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 35. To his mother,
+Sept. 22, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1344: April, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1345: Oct., 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1346: Oct., 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching by Example."]
+
+[Footnote 1347: Nov. 23, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1348: Cited by Harris, _The Trent Affair_, p. 28.]
+
+[Footnote 1349: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, pp. 177 _seq._]
+
+[Footnote 1350: Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27, 1861.]
+
+[Footnote 1351: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 78, No. 95. Adams to Seward,
+Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt.
+I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word "_not_" is unindicated, by the
+failure to use italics.]
+
+[Footnote 1352: _Ibid._, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams to Seward, Jan. 31,
+1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1353: Feb. 22, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1354: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 80, No. 206. Adams to Seward,
+Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV, 78) writes that "the
+most significant and touching feature of the situation was that the
+cotton operative population was frankly on the side of the North." Lutz,
+_Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten
+waehrend des Sezessionskrieges_, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysis
+of the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude by
+factional political idealisms in Germany.]
+
+[Footnote 1355: Palmerston MS., Aug. 24, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1356: Aug. 30, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1357: October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle and
+Recognition."]
+
+[Footnote 1358: Nov. 4, 1862.]
+
+[Footnote 1359: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63. (Communication.)]
+
+[Footnote 1360: Anthony Trollope, _North America_, London, 1862, Vol. I,
+p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862, and was in its third
+edition by the end of the year. It was also published in New York in
+1862 and in Philadelphia in 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1361: _The Liberator_, March 13, 1863, quoting a report in the
+_New York Sunday Mercury_.]
+
+[Footnote 1362: Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince, _John Bright_, p.
+204, as stating that Bright "was the greatest master of English oratory
+that this generation--I may say several generations--has seen. I have
+met men who have heard Pitt and Fox, and in whose judgment their
+eloquence at its best was inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright.
+At a time when much speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated,
+eloquence, he maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style in
+which he gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts he
+desired to utter."]
+
+[Footnote 1363: Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863. (Robertson, _Speeches
+of John Bright_, I, pp. 234 _seq._)]
+
+[Footnote 1364: Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863. (Bigelow,
+_Retrospections_, I, p. 600.)]
+
+[Footnote 1365: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 123.]
+
+[Footnote 1366: State Dept., Eng., Adams to Seward. No. 334. Feb. 26,
+1863. enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as printed in _The
+Weekly Herald, Mercury and News_, Feb. 21, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1367: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157.]
+
+[Footnote 1368: Spargo, _Karl Marx, _pp. 224-5. Spargo claims that Marx
+bent every effort to stir working men to a sense of class interest in
+the cause of the North and even went so far as to secure the presence of
+Bright at the meeting, as the most stirring orator of the day, though
+personally he regarded Bright "with an almost unspeakable loathing." On
+reading this statement I wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence and
+received the reply that he believed the tradition unquestionably well
+founded, though "almost the only testimony available consists of a
+reference or two in one of his [Marx's] letters and the ample
+corroborative testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others."
+This is scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talk
+with Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary, and
+who attended and reported the meeting, the information was given that
+Henry Adams himself had then understood and always since believed Marx's
+to have been the guiding hand in organizing the meeting.]
+
+[Footnote 1369: _U.S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 162.
+(Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.)]
+
+[Footnote 1370: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 358. Adams to Seward,
+March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams. There was also enclosed
+the printed report, giving speeches at length, as printed by _The Bee
+Hive_, the organ of the London Trades Unions.]
+
+[Footnote 1371: See _ante_, p. 132.]
+
+[Footnote 1372: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 82, No. 360. Adams to Seward,
+April 2, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1373: May 5, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1374: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 243.
+Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1375: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, p. 264. In a
+letter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863, Bright estimated that there were
+seven millions of men of twenty-one years of age and upward in the
+United Kingdom, of whom slightly over one million had the vote.
+(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 610.)]
+
+[Footnote 1376: July 2, 1863. The editorial was written in connection
+with Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise interesting for an
+attempt to characterize each of the speakers in the Commons.]
+
+[Footnote 1377: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Part I, p. 319.
+To Seward, July 23, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1378: See _ante_, p. 130, _note_ 2.]
+
+[Footnote 1379: MS. letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession of C. F. Adams,
+Jr.]
+
+[Footnote 1380: Sept. 24, 1863.]
+
+[Footnote 1381: Even the friendly Russian Minister in Washington was at
+this time writing of the "rule of the mob" in America and trusting that
+the war, "the result of democracy," would serve as a warning to Europe.
+(Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900.)]
+
+[Footnote 1382: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and 559. Adams to
+Seward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to "keep out of it."]
+
+[Footnote 1383: _Ibid._, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to Seward, Jan. 29,
+1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was partly the
+aristocratic antipathy to Bright that had _produced_ the ill-will to the
+United States.]
+
+[Footnote 1384: _Ibid._]
+
+[Footnote 1385: See Ch. XV.]
+
+[Footnote 1386: _The Index_, Jan. 28, 1864, p. 58.]
+
+[Footnote 1387: Goldwin Smith, _A Letter to a Whig Member of the
+Southern Independence Association_, London, 1864, pp. 14, 68, and 71.]
+
+[Footnote 1388: Leader, _Roebuck_, p. 299. To William Ibbitt, April 26,
+1864.]
+
+[Footnote 1389: Arnold, _Mixed Essays_, p. 17. N.Y., Macmillan, 1883.]
+
+[Footnote 1390: State Dept., Eng., Vol. 86, No. 709. Adams to Seward,
+June 9, 1864]
+
+[Footnote 1391: See _ante_, Ch. XVI.]
+
+[Footnote 1392: Dasent, _Delane_, II, pp. 135-6. Delane to Dasent, Dec.
+25 and 26, 1864. The _Times_ on December 26 pictured Sherman as having
+_escaped_ to the sea, but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements.]
+
+[Footnote 1393: _Lord Acton's Letters to Mary Gladstone_, p. 183.]
+
+[Footnote 1394: These were not confined to Great Britain. The American
+Legation in Berlin received addresses of sympathy from many
+organizations, especially labour unions. One such, drawn by W.
+Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in part: "Members of the
+working-class, we need not affirm to you the sincerity of these our
+sympathies; for with pride we can point to the fact, that, while the
+aristocracy of the Old World took openly the part of the southern
+slaveholder, and while the middle class was divided in its opinions, the
+working-men in all countries of Europe have unanimously and firmly stood
+on the side of the Union." (_U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865_, Pt.
+IV, p. 500.)]
+
+[Footnote 1395: _U.S. Messages and Documents, 1865_, Pt. I, p. 417.
+Adams to Hunter, July 13, 1865.]
+
+[Footnote 1396: Disraeli was less disturbed by this than were other Tory
+leaders. He had long before, in his historical novels, advocated an
+aristocratic leadership of democracy, as against the middle class. Derby
+called the Bill "a leap in the dark," but assented to it.]
+
+[Footnote 1397: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 151-153, summarizes the
+factors determining British attitude and places first the fear of the
+privileged classes of the example of America, but his treatment really
+minimizes this element.]
+
+[Footnote 1398: Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in America: An Address
+read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation
+Society." (Jan. 26, 1866.) London, 1866, pp. 71-75.]
+
+[Footnote 1399: Goldwin Smith, _America and England in their present
+relations_, London, 1869, p. 30.]
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+Aberdeen, Lord, i. 10, 13, 14, 15; ii. 117 _note_[1]
+Acton, Lord, ii. 301
+Adams, Brooks, _The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, cited, ii. 120
+  _note_[2], 125 _note_[1], 147 _note_[1], 150
+  _note_[1]
+Adams, Charles Francis, i. 49, 62-3, 80-1;
+  attitude in the early days of the American crisis, 49 _and
+    note_, 55, 63;
+  appointed American Minister in London, 62, 80-1, 96;
+  impressions of English opinion on the crisis, 96, 97, 98, 107;
+  alarm at Seward's Despatch No. 10, i. 127;
+  attitude of, to the Palmerston-Russell ministry, 170;
+  controversy on General Butler's order, 302-5;
+  reports to Seward on British public meetings on Emancipation
+    Proclamation, ii. 107 _and note_[3], 223;
+  view of the popular manifestations on Emancipation, 108;
+  view as to decline of British confidence in the South, 184;
+  and the London Confederate States Aid Association, 191, 192;
+  receives deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall
+    of Savannah, 245 _and note_[1];
+  quoted on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war,
+    ii. 251-2, 253;
+  on effect in England of the Hampton Roads Conference, 253;
+  advice of, to Seward on attitude to be observed to Britain, 253-255;
+  attitude to Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences,
+     253-4;
+  comments of, on parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of
+     confidence in Lincoln, 255 _and note_[1];
+  on feeling in Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt
+     on Seward, 257, 262-3;
+  receives addresses of sympathy from British organizations, 262-3;
+  and formal declaration of the end of the war, 268;
+  faith of, in ultimate British opinion on the issues in the Civil
+    War, ii. 283;
+  views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing
+    attitude to America 284, 285;
+  advice to Seward on the political position in relation to
+    democracy, 290, 294, 296, 298 _note_[1];
+  quoted on the rising of democratic feeling in Britain, 291;
+  disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, 278, 279,
+    280;
+  report of, on London mass meeting in favour of the North, 284;
+  and the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292, 294-5;
+  quoted on John Bright, 298;
+  on the attitude of the privileged classes to democracy,
+    298 _note_[2], 300;
+  on the influence of American institutions on the political
+    movement in Great Britain, 302
+
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to:_
+    _Alabama case_: ii. 35, 120 _and note_[2], 121, 131
+    British Foreign Enlistment Act, i. 135, 148-9; ii. 201-2
+    Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190, 193, 195
+    Confederate Commissioners: representations on intercourse with,
+       i. 105-6, 107
+    Confederate Cotton Loan: reported connection with, ii. 161
+      _and note_[4];
+      views on, 179
+    Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. 118,
+      128, 131, 137, 143, 145 _note_[2];
+      and U.S. Navy Department plan to stop, 130 _note_[2];
+      Laird Rams incident, 144, 146, 147 _note_[1], 150
+    Cotton: report on British position, ii. 99
+    Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+      action on proposed convention, i. 141-69 _passim_;
+      view of American intention, 144, 169;
+      failure of his negotiation, 137, 145-6, 169-71
+    Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. 55
+    Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. 201-2
+    Lindsay's efforts for mediation, ii. 34-5. 212
+    Mediation:
+      presents the "servile war" threat against, ii. 18-19, 95;
+      view of England's reply to French proposals on, 71;
+      advantages of an anti-slavery avowal, 98-9
+    Neutrality Law, _See_ British Foreign Enlistment Act _supra_
+    Privateering Bill, ii. 122-3, 125, 127;
+      advises against issue of privateers, 131
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, The:
+      representations on, i. 98-100, 101, 105, 107 _and note_[2], 300-1;
+      despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, 134;
+      protests against British recognition of belligerency, 159;
+      advice to Seward on, 275
+    Roebuck's motion: report on, ii. 144
+    "Servile War" threat, ii. 18-19, 95 _and note_[4]
+    Slavery:
+      urges Northern declaration on, ii. 98-9;
+      comments on _Times_ criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108
+    Southern Ports: plan of collecting duties at, ii. 198
+    _Trent_ Affair, the:
+      interviewed by Palmerston, i. 208-9;
+      statement on the _James Adger_, 209-10;
+      suspicion of British policy in, 218;
+      views on public opinion in, 222-3;
+      officially states Wilkes acted without authorization, 226;
+      report on English hope of peaceful settlement, 228, 229;
+      on British opinion after settlement of, 238, 240;
+      on effect of, in Great Britain, 243;
+      view of popular attitude in Britain in the crisis of, ii. 283
+    Appreciation and criticisms on:
+      Characterized in _The Index_, ii. 196
+      Lord Lyons', report on, i. 62-3;
+        opinion on, ii. 71 _note_[4]
+      Lord Russell's view of his diplomacy, ii. 128
+      Tory approval of, ii. 197
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 1, 2, 129, 198, 263, 274, 276;
+      ii. 31, 100
+Adams, C.F., Jun.,
+  view of British attitude and the Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 109, 110;
+  view of the delay in his father's journey to England, 112 _note_;
+  view on Seward's attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 138,
+    153-6;
+  examination of British action in the negotiation, 154-5;
+  review of the _Trent_ affair, cited, 203 _note, et seq.
+    passim_;
+  on American feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, 218;
+  and the Hotze materials, ii. 154 _note_
+Adams, E.D.:
+  _British Interests and Activities in Mexico_, cited ii. 117 _note_[1]
+  "The Point of View of the British Traveller in America," cited,
+    i. 23 _note_; ii. 274 _note_[1]
+Adams, Henry, i. 138;
+  ii. 292 _note_[1];
+  view of, on W.E. Forster, i. 58 _note_[2];
+  on British Proclamation of Neutrality, 110;
+  on American exultation in _Trent_ affair, 223;
+  on British attitude in _Trent_ affair, 230;
+  view of Gregory's speech on the blockade, 270;
+  on British view of prospects in the War, 297;
+  on possibility of intervention, ii. 23;
+  on advantage of a Northern declaration on slavery, 23;
+  on the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292 _and note_[1] 293
+  "Declaration, The, of Paris,"
+    1861 ... reviewed, 146 _et seq._, 153;
+    view of Russell's policy in, 146-150, 159;
+    view of Lyons, 147, 150
+  _Education of Henry Adams_ quoted, i. 149 _note_[3];
+    ii. 172 _note_[2];
+    cited, ii. 50 _note_[1]
+Adams, John (Second President of the U.S.), i. 62, 81
+Adams, John Quincy, i. 11, 20, 62, 81
+African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. 85-6;
+  ii. 88;
+  suppression of, international efforts for, i. 8-10;
+  punishment to slave traders in American law, 9;
+  American attitude to right of search, 9, 10, 219;
+  British anti-slavery policy, 31-2;
+  wane of British interest in, 10, 32;
+    ii. 90;
+  Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. 10, 275, 276;
+    ii. 90, 91
+Agassiz, L., i. 37 _note_.
+Akroyd, Edward, ii. 193 _note_.
+_Alabama_, The, ii. 35, 116, 119-120;
+  departure of, from Liverpool, 118;
+  British order to stop
+  departure, 119, 120 _and note_[2], 133;
+  Russell's private feelings as to, 121, 124;
+  public opinion in Great Britain on, 129-130;
+  Palmerston's defence of Government action on, 134-5;
+  American anger over, 119, 127;
+  measures against, 121-3, 127;
+  New York Chamber of Commerce protest on, 126;
+  claim for damages on account of, 151 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, i. 138; ii. 129 _note_[1], 131, 134, 136, 145, 146
+_Alexandra_, case, The:
+  Seizure of the vessel, ii. 136, 139, 140, 152, 161 _note_[4];
+    public approval, 136;
+    law actions on, 136 _note_[2], 142, 149, 152, 185, 195;
+    American anxiety at Court decision, 143;
+    final result, 196 _note_[2]
+America, Central: British-American
+  disputes in, i. 16, 17
+American:
+  Civil War: i. 86, 87 _and note_[2], 99;
+    British public and official views at the commencement of, 40-60;
+    origins of; American and British views, i. 47-8;
+    efforts at compromise, 49;
+    British official attitude on outbreak of, 73;
+    European opinion of, after duration of three years, ii. 219;
+    compared with the Great War in Europe, 219;
+    British attitude to democracy as determining attitude to the War,
+      i. 77; ii. 303-5;
+    bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain, 299
+  Union, The: British views of, i. 15;
+    prognostications of its dissolution, 36, 37
+  War of Independence, i. 2-3, 17;
+    adjustments after the Treaty of Peace, 3;
+    as fostering militant patriotism, 7, 8 _note_;
+    commercial relations after, 17-18
+  "War of 1812" i. 4, 7, 18;
+    causes leading to, 5-7;
+    New England opposition to, 7, 18;
+    effect of, on American National unity, 7
+  _See also under_ United States
+Anderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. 117
+Anderson's Mission, ii. 53 _note_[3];
+  reports, ii. 53 _and note_[2]
+Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. 219-20
+Anthropological Society of London, ii. 222
+Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. 43, 85, 105;
+  effect of, on Lord Palmerston, 43
+Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. 63, 64
+Argyll, Duke of, i. 179, 212;
+  anti-slavery attitude of, i. 179, 238; ii. 112;
+  views of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 212, 215, 229, 238;
+  on calamity of war with America, 215, 238;
+  on Northern determination, ii. 30
+Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. 172
+_Army and Navy Gazette_, The, ii. 228, 229;
+  attitude in the conflict, 229-30, 236;
+  on the Presidential election, 235-6, 238;
+  summary of military situation after Atlanta, 243;
+  on "foreign war" rumours, 251;
+  cited or quoted, 68, 166, 232-3, 243.
+  (_See also under_ Russell, W.H.)
+Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. 47;
+  on British "superiority," 258;
+  on the rule of aristocracy and growth of democracy, ii. 300
+Arnold, _The History of the Cotton Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2], 10, 11;
+  quoted: first effects of the war on the cotton trade, 9-10;
+  cotton operatives' song, 17 _note_[6];
+  on the members for Lancashire, 26-7
+Ashburton, Lord, i. 13;
+  Ashburton Mission, i. 13
+Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. 233-5;
+  effect of, on Northern attitude, 233-4;
+  effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, 235
+_Atlantic Monthly_, The, ii. 109 _note_[3]; 279 _and note_[3]
+
+Bagley, Mr., ii. 224
+Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, cited, ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Baligny. _See_ Belligny
+Bancroft, Frederic, cited, i. 117 _note_;
+  analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 150-3;
+  view on Russell's aims in, 152 _and note_[2]
+  _Life of Seward_, cited or quoted, i. 106 _note_[1], 118 _note_,
+    130 _note_[3]; 132 _note_[3], 138, 150-3, 186 _notes_,
+    191 _note_[4], 196 _note_[1], 200 _note_[2],
+    213 _note_[4], 231 _note_[3], 280
+    _and note_[1], 281; ii. 1-2, 96,
+    99 _note_[2], 143 _note_[3], 253 _note_[1],
+    258 _note_[1]
+Banks, Governor, i. 37 _note_
+Baring, ii. 96 _note_[3]
+Bath, Marquis of, ii. 193 _note_
+Beals, Mr., ii. 191
+Bedford, Duke of, i. 96 _and note_[3]
+_Bee Hive, The, _cited, ii. 293 _note_
+Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. 184 _and
+  note_[3]
+Beesly, Professor, speech of, at
+  Trades Unions of London Meeting,
+  ii. 292
+_Belfast Whig_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  231 _note_
+Belligny, French Consul at Charleston,
+  i. 185 _note_[1], 186, 188, 189,
+  191 _and note_[4]
+_Bell's Weekly Messenger_, quoted,
+  ii. 104
+Benjamin, Confederate Secretary
+  of State, ii. 5; Mercier's interview
+  with, i. 284, 285; report of,
+  to Slidell on Mercier's visit,
+  284 _note_[2]; instructions of, to
+  Slidell offering commercial advantages
+  for French intervention,
+  ii. 24 _and note_[2]; on idea
+  of Confederate loan, 158-9; recalls
+  Mason, 179; and recognition
+  of the Confederacy, 217; on the
+  attitude of France to the Confederacy,
+  236 _note_[2]; plan of
+  offering abolition of slavery in
+  return for recognition, 249;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 292;
+  ii. 88 _note_[2], 148, 154 _note_[1], 213
+  _note_[1]
+Bentinck, i. 268, 269
+Bernard, Montague:
+  _Neutrality, The, of Great Britain
+    during the American Civil War_,
+    quoted, i., 100 _and note_[1],
+    137-8; ii. 118; cited, i. 171
+    _note_[1], 245 _note_[3], 246 _note_[2],
+    263 _notes_; ii. 136 _note_[2]; on
+    the American representations
+    on the British Proclamation
+    of Neutrality, i. 100; on
+    Declaration of Paris negotiations,
+    137-8; on the Blockade,
+    263 _and notes_
+   "Two Lectures on the Present
+    American War": on recognition,
+    cited, i. 183
+Bigelow, John, ii. 71 _note_[3]:
+  _France and the Confederate Navy_,
+    cited, ii. 57 _note_[2]
+  _Retrospections of an Active Life_,
+    cited, i. 56 _note_, 217 _note_[2];
+    ii. 71 _note_[3], 88 _note_[2], 128 _note_[3],
+    130 _note_[2]; Gladstone and the
+    Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; U.S.
+    stimulation of immigration,
+    200 _note_[1]; cited, 229 _note_[1];
+  Quoted, ii. 254; advice of, on the
+    political position in Britain;
+    quoted, 290; cited, 295 _note_[3]
+Billault, M., i. 288, 289 _and note_[1]
+Birkbeck, Morris, _Letters from Illinois_,
+  quoted, i. 25
+_Birmingham Post_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_; letters of S.A.
+  Goddard in support of emancipation
+  in, ii. 108-9
+Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. 224
+Bismarck, ii. 203
+Black, Judge, American Secretary
+  of State, i. 52, 244
+Blackwood, John, political views
+  of, ii. 289
+_Blackwood's Magazine_, ii. 279 _note_[1];
+  on cotton and the blockade, 10;
+  on French mediation proposals,
+  68; on the Emancipation Proclamation,
+  103; on democracy
+  as cause of the war, 278-9, 281,
+  289
+Blair, member of the United States
+  Cabinet, i, 130 _note_[1], 231; ii. 85,
+  251, 252
+Blockade of Southern Ports, the:
+  Lincoln's declaration on, i. 83,
+  89, 90, 92, 111, 121, 122, 244,
+  245; commencement of, i. 245;
+  method of warning at the port,
+  245, 246; as involving hardship
+  to British merchants, 245-6;
+  effectiveness of, 252-71 _passim_;
+  effect on British Trade, 252, 254,
+  263; effect on Cotton Trade,
+  262; ii. 8, 9; statistics as to
+  effectiveness, i. 268 _note_[3]
+  Southern Ports Bill, i. 246 _et seq._
+  Stone Boat Fleet Blockade,
+    i. 253 _et seq._, 269, 302
+  British attitude to, i. 95, 244, 245,
+    246, 263 _and note_[2], 267, 270;
+    ii. 5, 265; Parliamentary debate
+    on, i. 267 _et seq._; Gregory's motion
+    268 _et seq._; press attitude,
+    246; Bright's view, ii. 14, 15
+  Confederate representations on,
+    i. 265
+  Napoleon's view of, i. 290
+Booth, assassinator of Lincoln,
+  ii. 258, 259, 263
+Border States, The: efforts at
+  compromise, i. 49; sympathies
+  in, 173; the "Border State
+  policy" of Lincoln, 173, 176,
+  272 _note_[1]; ii. 82; and Confiscation
+  Bill, Lincoln's fears, 82;
+  attitude of, to emancipation,
+  ii. 83, 84, 87; not affected in Proclamation
+  of Emancipation, 86
+Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. 187, 193
+Boynton, Rev. C.B., _English and
+  French Neutrality, etc._, cited
+  and quoted, ii. 225 _note_[1]
+Bright, John, i. 58 _note_[2], 77;
+  quoted on _Times_ attitude towards
+  the United States, 55
+  _note_[3]; view of the Northern
+  attempt at reconquest, 72; views
+  of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality,
+  108, 110; speech on
+  _Trent_ affair, 221-2; letter to
+  Sumner on _Trent_ affair, influence
+  on Lincoln, 232; speech on
+  Britain's attitude on conclusion
+  of _Trent_ affair, 241-2; view on the
+  war as for abolition, 241; on
+  distress in Lancashire, ii. 13, 14;
+  view of the blockade, 14, 15;
+  on the cotton shortage, 15;
+  and Gladstone's Newcastle
+  speech, 48; view of Emancipation
+  Proclamation, 48 _note_[2],
+  105-6, 111-12; on England's
+  support if emancipation an object
+  in the war, 88-9; the escape
+  of the _Alabama_, 120; at Trades
+  Unions of London meeting, 132-3,
+  134, 291-3; support of the
+  North, 132, 283-4, 290, 291-295;
+  on the interests of the unenfranchised
+  in the American conflict,
+  132, 295; on the unfriendly
+  neutrality of the Government,
+  134; rebuked by Palmerston,
+  135; trouncing of Roebuck, 172
+  _and note_[2]; on Britain's neutrality
+  (Nov., 1863), 184; championship
+  of democratic institutions, i.
+  221-2; ii. 132-3, 276-7, 282, 283;
+  popularity of, as advocate of
+  Northern cause, 224, 225; influence
+  of, for the North, i. 58
+  _note_[2]; ii. 224; Lincoln's pardon
+  of Alfred Rubery in honour of,
+  225 _and note_[1]; quoted on feeling
+  of the British Government and
+  people towards United States in
+  Jan., 1865, etc., 247; confidence
+  of, in pacific policy of Lincoln,
+  255 _and note_[1]; quoted on the
+  ruling class and democracy, 280;
+  attack on Southern aristocracy
+  by, 290; heads deputation to
+  Adams, 294; eulogy of George
+  Thompson by, 224 _note_[1]
+  Adams' opinion on, ii. 298;
+    view of, in _The Index_, ii. 298-9;
+    Laird's view of, ii. 134;
+    Karl Marx's view of, 292
+    _note_[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted
+    on the oratory of, 290 _note_[1],
+    the _Times_ attack on, 295-6
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 69, 179,
+    289; ii. 68, 69, 132 _note_[1], 172
+    _note_[1], 186, 187, 191, 278, 281.
+   (See also under _Morning Star_)
+British, _See also under _Great
+  Britain
+British emigration to America, i.
+  23 _et seq_, 35; effect of American
+  political ideals on, 23, 24, 25, 26
+British Foreign Enlistment Act,
+  ii. 116-7, 118; application of, in
+  American crisis, question in
+  Commons, i. 94; Russell's idea
+  of amending, ii. 124, 196;
+  Russell's advice to Palmerston
+  on, 131; debate in Parliament
+  on, 132, 133-4, 135; Forster and
+  the violation of, 133; Government
+  reply to Liverpool shipowners
+  on, 142; _Kearsarge_ incident,
+  202
+British Press. _See under names
+  of Papers and under subject
+  headings_
+_British Standard_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]
+British travellers' views on America,
+  i. 23 _and note_, 24, 28, 30; ii. 274-5
+Brooks, i. 80
+Brougham, i. 94 _note_[2]; ii. 282
+Brougham, Lord, i. 19
+Brown, John, raid of, i. 33 _note_[2]
+Browning, Robert, pro-Northern
+  sentiment of, i. 70; on stone-boat
+  blockade, 256; on Slavery a
+  factor in the struggle, 238-9; on
+  British dismay at prospect of
+  war in _Trent_ crisis, 240; mentioned,
+  228 _note_[4]
+Bruce,--, British Ambassador in
+  Washington, ii. 255 _note_[4]; report
+  of American intentions against
+  France in Mexico, 255 _note_[4];
+  comment of, on Lincoln, Seward
+  and Sumner, 262; warns Russell
+  of probable American demands
+  at end of war, 266, 268; attitude
+  to "piracy" proclamation, 268.
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 262, 269.
+Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador:
+  on British policy,
+  i. 50-1, 74; interpretation of
+  Russell's "three months" statement,
+  272 _note_[1]; report of, on
+  Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45
+  _note_[3]; interview of, with Russell
+  on joint mediation offer, 73
+  _note_[1]
+Bryce, Lord, i. 30; ii. 188 _note_[3], 274
+Buchanan, President, i. 16, 49, 52, 117, 259; ii. 278
+Buckingham, James Silk, _America, Historical, Statistic and Descriptive_,
+  cited, i. 29
+Buckley, Victor, ii. 120 _note_[2]
+Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. 135, 154, 176, 201;
+  as affecting Seward's policy, considered, 154, 155-6;
+  effect of, in Great Britain:
+    press views, 176, 177-8, 179;
+    official views, 178, 179 _and note_[1];
+    public opinion, 201
+Bullock, Captain J.D., Confederate Agent in Britain, ii. 118, 129, 145;
+  on the proposed use of the Laird rams, 122 _note_[1], 143;
+  shipbuilding contracts of, ii. 156, 157;
+  _Secret Service under the Confederacy_, cited, ii. 118, 149 _note_
+Bunch,--, British Consul at Charleston,
+  description of Jockey Club dinner, i. 43;
+  on Southern anti-British sentiment, 44 _note_[2], ii. 71 _note_[2];
+  instructions to, on the secession, i. 53 _note_[1];
+  appeal of, to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, 52;
+  characterizations of Southern leaders, 59;
+  view of President Davis, 59;
+  views on the South and secession, 59, 93;
+  characterizations of Southern Commissioners, 63;
+  negotiations of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris,
+    168 _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 193;
+  attitude of, to the South, 185 _and note_[4], 103, 195 _note_[2];
+  American complaints of, 187, 189, 193-4;
+  recall of exequatur of, 184, 187 _et seq_., 193, 194-5, 201;
+  defence of his action in the Mure case, 187, 188, 192, 199;
+  subsequent history of, 195 _note_[2];
+  view of, as scapegoat, 195 _note_[2];
+  on attitude to the Blockade, 252 _note_[2], 253 _note_[2], 268;
+  on Southern intentions, 252 _note_[2];
+  view of Southern determination, 252 _note_[2];
+  on Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, 63,
+    252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5;
+  on effect of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, 9 _note_[2];
+  on burning of Mississippi cotton, 16 _note_[1], 17 _note_[4];
+  on the American system of government as the cause of the Civil War,
+    278 _note_[2]
+  British attitude to the controversy over, i. 188-9, 190, 191, 194;
+  French attitude, i. 189, 191 _and_ _note_[4], 192, 201 _note_
+  Lyons' views on Bunch controversy, i. 187, 193, 194 _and note_[1]
+  Russell's views, i. 187, 190, 193, 194 _and note_[4]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 66; ii. 88
+Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with America,
+  ii. 254
+Butler, General,
+  order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i. 302-4, 305; ii. 68;
+  Palmerston and Adams controversy on, i. 302-5;
+  Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, 303, 304
+
+Cairnes, Professor, ii. 224 _note_[3];
+  pamphlet by, on "Slave Power," 112
+_Caledonian Mercury_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_
+California, acquisition of, by U.S., i. 15, 16
+Callahan,--, _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_, cited,
+i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 167 _notes_, 169 _note_[4]
+Campbell, Lord, i. 271, 292; ii, 28, 77, 169, 172, 193
+Canada:
+  Rebellion of 1837 in, i. 4, 109; ii. 117;
+  British fear of American attack on, i. 4;
+  sentiment in, as affected by the American Wars against England, 8 _note_;
+  suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U.S., 54-5;
+  "compensation" in, idea in British press, 54-5;
+  and in views of American political leaders, 55;
+  Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. 69-70;
+  military defence of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 213, 241-2;
+  views in, on _Trent_ affair, 222 _note_;
+  on British policy and defence, 222 _note_;
+  view of the _Times_ in, 222 _note_
+  Free Trade policy and, a Southern premonition as to, i. 22
+  Reciprocity Treaty of, with U.S., ii. 198, 253-4
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 251, 254, 275
+Canning, i. II, 12, 20
+Cardwell, ii. 64
+Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. 172
+Carolina, South, secession of, i. 41, 43-44, 55; ii. 3-4;
+  seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. 52;
+  requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter, 117
+"Caroline" affair, The, i. 109
+Case, Walter M., _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_,
+  cited and quoted, i. 261 _note_; ii. 161 _and note_[3]
+Catacazy, C., and mediation by Russia, ii. 251 _note_[1]
+Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. 187, 189, 193
+Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i. 268;
+  supports Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 175-6;
+  on Committee of Southern Independence Association, 187, 193
+Charleston, S.C.:
+  Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. 43, 44 _note_;
+  seizure of customs house at, 52;
+  British appeal on question of port dues at, 52, 244;
+  "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, 253;
+  evacuation of, ii. 248, 249
+Charleston _Mercury_, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. 5
+Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. 115, 121; ii. 72, 283;
+  quarrel with Seward, 72
+Chase, W. H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. 4
+Chattanooga, ii. 185
+Cheever, Rev. Dr., ii. 224
+Chenery, ii. 301
+Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. 165
+Chesson, F. W., ii. 224
+Chicago Convention, the, i. 175
+Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. 49 _note_[3]
+Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. 184
+Chittenden, cited, ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. 203
+Clanricarde, Lord, ii. 168
+Clarendon, Earl of, i. 199 _note_[3], 215;
+  ii. 3, 51-8 _passim_, 63, 203 _note_[2];
+  on Russell's mediation project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, 57-8
+Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation of, i. 113
+Cobden, i. 77; quoted, on the _Times_, 222 _note_;
+  opinion of Seward, 222 _note_;
+  and Sumner, 222 _note_;
+  on Palmerston's action in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[3];
+  letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, 232
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 289; ii. 26, 67, 80, 95 _and note_[4], 166, 276
+Collie, ii. 189
+Collier, legal advice of, on _Alabama_, ii. 118-9
+Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. 83
+Columbia, S.C., burning of, ii. 248, 249
+Combe, George, _Notes on the United States, etc._, cited, i. 29
+Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the:
+  Bunch's characterization of, i. 63;
+  unofficial interview with Russell, 85-6, 106, 158;
+  protest against closing of British ports, 170 _note_[2];
+  replaced by "Special Commissioners," 203;
+  attempt to make use of the _Trent_ affair, 214;
+  British attitude to, not modified by _Trent_ affair, 235;
+  policy of, with regard to recognition and the blockade,
+    i. 264-5, 267, 273, 300;
+  acquire a "confidential" document, 265 _and note_[2];
+  hopes of, from Parliament, 265, 266, 272;
+  instructions of the first Commissioners, ii. 4 _and note_[3];
+  failure of the first Commission, 4-5;
+  suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, 88 _note_[2];
+  slavery abolition offer, 249
+  Confederate Agents' correspondence, collections of, i. 261 _note_[1]
+    _See also under personal names_
+Confederates, _See under_ Southern States
+Confiscation Bill, The, ii. 82, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95;
+  Lincoln's attitude to, 82, 84;
+  Lord Russell's comment on, 97
+_Constitutionel_, The, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Continental Press and American News, ii. 71 _note_[2]
+Corcoran, ii. 169
+Cotton supplies and slavery, i. 13;
+  in British-American commercial relations, 21, 22;
+  British manufacturers' dependence on, 22;
+  effect of the Civil War on, 55, 246; ii. 53;
+  the crop of 1860 ... ii. 7
+  Blockade, The, and, i. 252 _and note_[2], 253; ii. 9;
+    effect of, on price, i. 262, 270;
+    Napoleon's views on, 290
+  England, need of, for, i. 196-7, 200 _note_[1], 294, 296; ii. 17, 99;
+    cotton famine in, 294; ii. 6, II _et seq._, 16 _note_[1];
+    cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii. 6-7, 8;
+    first effects of the war on, 8, 9, 10.
+    _See also under_ Lancashire.
+  France, necessity of, for cotton, i. 279, 290, 293, 294, 296, 300;
+    ii. 17; Mercier's plan to relieve, i. 196-201
+  Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on price of, ii. 48;
+    "King Cotton" theory, i. 63; ii. i _et seq._;
+    belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy, 2-3, 4, 5
+  Southern orders for destruction of, ii. 16, 17 _note_[4];
+    effect of, on British officials, 17
+Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. 88;
+  reports French agreement with British policy on Southern belligerent
+    rights, 88;
+  in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, 88, 143, 156, 157, 158,
+    162, 167;
+  conversations with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, 189;
+  disturbed at French evasion of direct support, 189, 192, 201 _note_[1];
+  in _Trent_ affair fears war with America, 214;
+  communications on Southern Ports Bill, 247 _and note_[2];
+  view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill, 247;
+  on French policy in Mexico, 260, 261 _note_; ii. 46;
+  quoted, on Thouvenel's view on mediation in Feb., 1862 ... i.
+    266 _note_[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 288;
+  statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with Napoleon, 290;
+  on the possibility of reunion, 290;
+  on the blockade, 290-1;
+  denial of Napoleon's "offer" to England, 290, 291;
+  reports of, on Lindsay's mission, 291-2, 293, 295 _note_[1];
+  conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, 291, 293-4;
+  Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted, 295 _note_[2];
+  interview with Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 38, 39
+    _and note_, 46;
+  on Napoleon's suggestion of joint mediation, 59;
+  instructed to notify France of England's view of the war as ended and
+    of attitude to Confederate cruisers, 266-7
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 218 _note_
+Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. 148
+Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce, i. 139
+Crittenden, i. 49
+
+_Daily Gazette_, The, cited, ii. 109 _note_
+_Daily News_,
+  attitude of, during the American Civil War, i. 69-70 _and note_
+    1, 176, 181-2; ii. 230 _note_[3],
+  on Lincoln's message to Congress, i. 176;
+  letters of W.W. Story in, 228
+_Daily Telegraph_, cited, ii. 50 _note_[1],
+  attitude and circulation of, 189 _note_[2], 226, 230 _note_[3]
+Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. 62;
+  lack of instructions on American intentions, 62, 108, 112;
+  communications with Lord Russell, 62, 66, 74;
+  despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions, 66-7;
+  Russell's pledge of delay to, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108;
+  report on proposed British joint action with France, 84-5, 86
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 74, 96, 156 _note_[1]
+Dana, R.H., cited, i. 218;
+  _The Trent Affair_, cited, 203 _note_, 205 _note_[2], 237 _note_
+Danish question, The, ii. 203-5, 214
+Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. 180 _and note_[4]
+Davis, Bancroft, _Times_ correspondent in New York, i. 56
+Davis, Jefferson,
+  personal characteristics of, i. 59, 81, 82: ii. 276;
+  attitude of, in the opening of the crisis, i. 49;
+  elected President of the Southern Government, 59, 81;
+  foreign policy of, 81-2;
+  aristocratic views of, on government, ii. 276;
+  proclamation of, on marque and privateering, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111,
+    121, 122, 141, 160;
+  defensive measures of, in the South, 172;
+  on Bunch's negotiations on Declaration of Paris, 186;
+  replaces Confederate agents to Europe, 203;
+  and the African Slave Trade, ii. 88 _note_[2];
+  proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation,
+    106 _and note_[4];
+  on England's conduct towards the South, 184;
+  on Southern disorganization, 219;
+  flight of, from Richmond, 248;
+  approves plan of offering abolition of slavery in return for
+    recognition, 249;
+  capture of, 267
+  British views on, ii. 276
+  Bunch's characterization of, i. 59, 185 _note_[4]
+  Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. 47
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 163 _note_[1], 185 _note_[4], 254, 265
+    _note_[2], 283; ii. 5, 6, 176 _note_[3], 251, 252, 285
+Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. 129, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 163,
+  165, 167 _note_[3], 168, 200, 231, 300
+de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. _See under_ Brunow
+de Flahault, French Ambassador. _See under _Flahault
+_Debats_:
+  French press views on military situation, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3]
+_De Bow's Review_,
+  eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii. 2, 3, 4;
+  on cotton and slavery, 3;
+  view of England's action on blockade, 4
+Declaration of Paris, The, i. 102, 139-40;
+  attitude of United States to, 140-1, 156;
+  American offer of adherence during the Civil War, 104, 137, 141-2,
+    150, 151
+Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. 137 _et seq._, 184, 201;
+  British suggestion to France in, i. 88, 91, 142, 146-7, 156, 157
+    _and note_[3];
+  American offer of adherence, 104, 137, 141-2, 150, 151;
+  convention agreed between Britain, France, and America, 142-3;
+  addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed
+    by Lord Russell, 143-6, 149, 151, 154, 68, 170, 201;
+  American rejection of convention, 145, 168, 201
+  American argument at Geneva on effect of British diplomacy in, i. 146
+    _note_[2]
+  Confederates:
+    approach of, in the negotiation, i. 161, 164, 165, 166, 168
+      _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 192, 193;
+    Confederate Congress resolution of approval in, 186
+  Convention, the, proposed by U.S.
+    Cowley's opinion on, i. 167 _and note_[3];
+    Thouvenel's opinion on, 167;
+    Palmerston's suggestion on, 167 _and note_[4]
+  Seward's motives in, _See under_ Seward
+Delane, editor of the _Times:_
+  Palmerston's letters to, on American rights in interception of
+    Confederate Commissioners, i. 207-8, 209;
+  close relations of, with Palmerston, 229 _note_[2]; ii. 145;
+  anticipations of Southern victory, ii. 204 _and note_[2];
+  on prospective war with America, 254;
+  effect of Sherman's arrival at Savannah on, 245 _and note_[2], 300-1
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 177, 178, 180; ii. 65, 289
+de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier,
+  ii. 59 _and note_[4], 60, 63 _note_[5], 168
+Democratic element in British Society:
+   lack of press representation, i. 24, 41
+Democracy:
+  British views on American institutions, i. 24, 28, 30, 31; ii. 274-5;
+  view of the American struggle as a failure of, 276 _et seq. passim;_
+  Press comments on the lesson from failure of American democratic
+    institutions, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 297;
+  bearing of the Civil War on, 299;
+  aristocratic and conservative attitude to, 286, 287, 297, 298, 300, 301;
+  rise of democratic feeling in Great Britain, 291;
+  effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, 304
+Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. 76, 77, 79, 94
+  _and note_[2], 240, 241;
+  attitude to recognition and mediation, i. 240; ii. 51, 52, 53, 54, 77;
+  attacks governmental policy in relation to Laird Rams and Southern
+    shipbuilding, 149-50, 197;
+  approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation proposals, 154-5;
+  speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination,
+    263;
+  attacks Government on American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war,
+    267-8;
+  attitude to expansion of the franchise, i. 77;
+    ii. 276, 303 _and note_[1]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 292, 295; ii. 51 _note_[2], 166, 210, 214
+_Dial_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]
+Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. 79;
+  on _Trent_ affair, 241;
+  connection with Lindsay's motion, 292, 295, 296, 306;
+  ii. 213 _and note_[1];
+  approval of neutrality, ii. 77, 174 _note_[1];
+  in Roebuck's motion, 153, 171, 174;
+  attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, 197;
+  speech, of, on the motion for the
+  Address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, 263-4;
+  Reform Bill of (1867) ... 3 03 _and note_[1]
+  Mentioned, ii. 270 _note_[3]
+Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. 204 _and note_[2];
+   reply to Mason, 250-1
+D'Oubril, ii. 59 _note_[4], 62 _note_[5]
+Doyle, Percy, i. 218 _note_[1]
+_Dublin News_, quoted, i. 45, 46 _note_[1]
+_Dubuque Sun_, The, ii. 22 _note_
+Dudley, U.S. Consul at Liverpool,
+  ii. 118, 130 _note_[2], 144, 145 _note_[2]
+Dufferin, Lord, i. 240
+Duffus, R. L., "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the American Civil
+  War," i. 41 _note_[1]; quoted, 41, 48;
+  cited, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 112 _note_[1]
+Dumfermline, Lady, i. 224 _note_[3]
+Dumping of British goods:
+  effect on American feeling, i. 19, 21
+
+_Economist_, The:
+  attitude in the struggle, i. 41, 54, 57, 173-4;
+    ii. 15, 173, 231 _note_;
+  cited or quoted:
+    on Lincoln's election, i. 39 _and note_[1];
+    on impossibility of Northern reconquest, 57;
+    on secession an accomplished fact, 174; ii. 79;
+    on Bull Run, i. 179;
+    on cotton shortage, i. 55; ii. 14, 15;
+    on servile insurrection, 79;
+    on Cotton Loan, 160, 162;
+    on Roebuck's motion, 173;
+    on extension of the franchise, 277;
+    on American institutions and statesmen, 279-80
+_Edinburgh Review_, The:
+  attitude to slavery, i. 33, 45; ii. 281;
+  attitude in the conflict, i. 42; ii. 50 _note_[2], 68;
+  on recognition, 46 _note_[3];
+  on the Emancipation Proclamation, 103;
+  on the causes of the war, 281
+Elliot, charge, i. 14
+Elliott, E.N., editor of _Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments_,
+  ii. 3 _note_[2]
+Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. 74, 78, 80, 86 _and note_[1], 91;
+  idea of military necessity for, 81, 82, 85, 87;
+  Lincoln's alleged purpose in, 87;
+  purpose of, according to Seward, 99-100;
+  viewed as an incitement to servile insurrection, 49, 74, 98, 101, 103
+    _note_[6]
+  American reception of, ii. 101, 105
+  British attitude to, ii. 101 _et seq._;
+  Press denunciation of, 102-5, 106;
+  public meetings in favour of, 106 _and note_[2], 107, 108;
+  English women's support of, 109;
+  Nonconformist support, 109, 110;
+  Emancipation societies support of, 110
+  Confiscation Bill, _See that heading_
+  _See also_ Border States _and sub-heading under_ Lincoln
+Emigration, British, to America, i. 23-4; ii. 200-1;
+  _Kearsarge_ incident, 200-1
+England: cotton famine. _See under_ Cotton.
+  _See_ Great Britain
+Erlanger & Co. and Confederate Cotton Loan,
+  ii. 158-60, 161, 162 _and note_[3]
+European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years, ii. 219
+Eustis, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]
+Evans, William, ii. 224
+Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of Neutrality,
+  i. 166 _note_[3]
+Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i. 90
+Expatriation, American and British views on, i. 16
+
+Fairfax, Lieut., of the _San Jacinto_, i. 205
+Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts,"
+  ii. 12 _note_, 20
+Fawcett, Prof., ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Featherstonaugh, G.W., _Excursion through the Slave States_, cited, i. 29
+Federals. _See under _Northern
+Ferguson, Sir James, i. 268; ii. 175
+Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii. 164
+_Fishmongers of London_: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii. 223 _note_[1]
+Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. 306; ii. 25
+Fitzwilliam, Hon. C., ii. 193
+Flahault, M. de, French Ambassador, i. 88, 197, 260 _note_[1],
+  288, 291, 293; ii. 19 _note_[3], 45
+Forbes, J.M., and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2], 297
+Forbes, J. M., quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for Democracy,
+  ii. 297
+Forster, William E., i. 58 _and note_[2];
+  a friend of the North, 58 _note_[2]; ii. 224;
+  quoted, on Harriet Martineau, i. 70 _note_[3];
+  question in Commons on privateering, 94, 157;
+  speech against Gregory's motion on blockade, 268, 270;
+  speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion,
+     ii. 22;
+  close touch with Adams, 22, 36;
+  attacks Government in debate on Southern shipbuilding, 133;
+  rebuked by Palmerston, 135;
+  in Roebuck's motion, 171-2, 175;
+  comment on Southern meetings, 190 _and note_[2]
+Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note_[1], 274
+Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note[1]_, 274
+Fox, G.V.: _Confidential Correspondence_, cited,
+  i. 257 _note_[3], 268 _note_[2]; ii. 120 _note_[3];
+  quoted, on Confederate ironclads in England, 130 _note_[2]
+France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. 6;
+  and American contentions on neutral rights, 18;
+  Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2]
+  Cotton: lack of, i. 279, 290, 293-4, 296, 300; ii. 17
+  Mediation and armistice, attitude to British unofficial overture
+     on, ii. 38-9, 45-6, 59-60
+  Ministerial crisis, ii. 39, 45, 59
+  Neutrality of, i. 299;
+  Northern sentiment on, ii. 225 _and note_[2]
+  Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great Britain, i.
+     84, 88, 156, 166 _note_[1], 196, 249-50, 252, 259, 260, 284,
+     294; ii. 28, 75, 198;
+    break in, 77
+  Press of, and the events in U.S., ii. 174 _note_[3], 236
+     _note_[2]
+  _See also under _Mercier, Napoleon, Thouvenel, _and under
+     subject-headings_
+_Fraser's Magazine_, ii. 284;
+  J.S. Mill's articles in, i. 240, 242; ii. 81, 90, 285
+Fraser, Trenholm & Company: Confederate financial agents in
+     Liverpool, ii. 156, 157
+Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203
+Free Trade, i. 21; ii. 304
+Freeman, E.A., _History of Federal Government_, cited, ii. 152-3
+Fremont, ii. 82
+
+Gallenga,----, _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 189
+Gait, Sir J.T., i. 221 _note_[1]; 222 _note_
+Galveston, Tex. i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 266, 268
+Garrison, W.L., American abolitionist, editor of the _Liberator_,
+  i. 31, 33, 46 _and note_[1]
+Garrison, _Garrison_, cited, ii. 91 _note_[1], 111 _note_[3]
+Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. 92 _notes_
+Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British Neutrality,
+     in, i. 138;
+  American argument before, on Declaration of Paris, 146
+     _note_[2]
+German opinion on the Civil War, i. 178 _note_[3]; ii. 111
+     _note_[2];
+  press attitude, 285 _note_[1]
+Germany: the _Index_ quoted on "aid given by, to the North," ii.
+  236 _note_[2]
+Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. 143, 176 _note_[2], 185, 296
+Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the _Times_, i. 32, 33
+  _The Englishman in Kansas_, i. 32 _note_
+Gladstone, W.E., i. 76, 78;
+  fear of war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215;
+  influence of the commercial situation on, ii. 26;
+  attitude to intervention, 26, 27, 30-1, 48, 57;
+  Newcastle speech, 47 _and note_[3], 48, 49, 50 _and
+     note_[1], 51 _and notes_, 55, 58;
+  memorandum in reply to Lewis, 57;
+  supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and blockade, ii. 64,
+     69;
+  account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's suggestion, 65 _and
+     note_[1];
+  idea of offering Canada to the North, 69, 70 _and note_[1];
+  and the Confederate Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2];
+  reply of, in Roebuck's motion, 170-1;
+  quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to democracy, 282-3
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 179, 200 _note_[1], 224, 266; ii. 59,
+     66, 77, 80
+Goddard, S.A., ii. 108
+  _Letters on the American Rebellion_, cited, ii. 108
+     _note_[3], 109 _note_[1]
+Godkin, E.L., _Daily News_ correspondent, i. 70 _and note_[2]
+Golder, Dr. F.A., cited, i. 53 _note_[3].
+  "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War," cited, i. 227 _note_[1];
+     ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for foreign war,
+  ii. 199 _note_[3]
+Gorgas, Col., ii. 5 _note_[1]
+Gortchakoff, comment of,
+  on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 _note_[2];
+  and idea of Russian mediation, 251 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, i. 164 _note_[1];
+  ii. 59 _note_[4], 66 _note_[2], 70 _note_[2]
+Grant, General,
+  capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i. 273 _note_[1], 274;
+  victory at Shiloh, 278;
+  captures New Orleans, 279;
+  Western campaign of, ii. 164, 166, 184-5;
+  capture of Vicksburg by, 176 _note_[2], 185;
+  advance to Richmond, 217, 219;
+  siege of Southern lines at Petersburg, 217;
+  capture of Petersburg and Richmond by, 247-8;
+  _Times_ report of reverses to, 212, 227, 243;
+  condition of his army, Southern account in _Times_, 227;
+  W.H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign, 232-3;
+  Henry Adams, quoted, on, 243
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 215, 249, 256
+Grant's _The Newspaper Press_, cited and quoted, ii. 231 _note_
+Granville, Lord, i. 76,
+  quoted, 199 _note_[3];
+  on difficulties in Washington and attitude of neutrality, 241;
+  opposition of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. 42 _and note_[2],
+    43, 44, 46;
+  mentioned, i. 94 _note_[3]; ii. 203 _note_[2]
+Grattan, Thomas Colley,
+  quoted, i. 36;
+  _Civilized America_, i. 36 _note_[1]
+Great Britain:
+  Citizenship, theory of, i. 5-6
+  Colonial system: trade basis of, i. 17, 20, 21
+  Commercial relations with America after independence, i. 17 _et seq_., 22
+  Franchise,
+    expansion of the, in, i. 26, 28; ii. 274, 276-7, 301, 302, 303, 304;
+    effect of the American example on political agitation in, 274;
+    connection of the American struggle with the franchise movement in,
+      276, 277, 278, 286;
+    Radical acceptance of the challenge on democracy, 282, 283, 290, 298,
+      300;
+    aristocratic and conservative attitude to democracy, 286, 287, 298,
+      300, 301
+  Policy toward America:
+    conditions affecting, i. 2 _et seq_. 35; ii. 270;
+    the right of search controversy, i. 6-10;
+    territorial expansion 13-15, 16;
+    extension of slavery, 13, 15;
+    Mexican War, 15-16;
+    commercial interests, 19-22;
+    in the Civil War, 50-4, 58, 59, 79, 84, 136, 178, 199; ii. 270-2;
+    influence of democracy in determining, ii. 303-5;
+    policy of joint action with France. _see under_ France.
+      _See also under_ Lyons, Russell, _and subject-headings._
+  Public opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America,
+    i. 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30
+  Public opinion and official views in,
+    at the opening of the Civil War, i. 40-60;
+    doubts of Northern cause, 48, 50;
+    attitude to recognition of the South, 53 _note_[1],
+    on secession, 54, 55, 57
+  Trade:
+    exclusive basis in, i. 17, 20, 21;
+    effect of American retaliatory system on, 20;
+    free trade theory, 21; ii. 304;
+    hopes from cotton interests, i. 22
+  Working classes in: Northern sympathies of, ii. 284, 285 _note_[1]
+  _See also subject-headings_
+Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. 4; ii. 253, 254
+Greeley, Horace, editor of _New York Times_,
+  attack on Seward by, i. 280 _note_[1];
+  and Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. 75;
+  Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, 92-3
+Gregg, Percy, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South),
+  i. 90, 91 _note_[1], 267;
+  motion of, for recognition of the South, 85, 91, 108;
+  advice to Mason on blockade question, 267;
+  motion to urge the blockade ineffective, 268-72;
+  speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire, ii. 21, 22 _and note_;
+  quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and recognition, 155;
+  view of Roebuck's motion, 175;
+  question of, on the destruction of British property in America, 265;
+  mentioned, i. 292; ii. 153, 164
+Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. 3
+Greville. Colonel, ii. 193 _note_
+Grey, Sir George, i. 163, 207; ii. 171, 263
+Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii. 123-4
+Gros, Baron, ii. 167, 168-9, 170
+Grote, George, quoted, i. 1
+
+Haliburton, T.C., ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Hall, Capt. Basil, _Travels in North America_, cited, i. 26-7
+Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. 111, 224
+Hamilton, R.C., "The English Press and the Civil War," i. 38 _note_[2]
+Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, _Men and Manners in America_, quoted, i. 27
+Hammond, E., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. 189;
+  enquiry as to possible action of American Navy to intercept Southern
+    Commissioners, 206-7, 210, 211 _and note_[1];
+  on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. 142;
+  letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird Rams, 147 _note_[4];
+  quoted, on public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, 66;
+  mentioned, i. 256; ii. 45
+Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. 2-3
+"Hampton Roads Conference," The, ii. 252-3
+Harcourt, Sir William,
+  quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship during the American Civil War,
+    i. 1;
+  letters of, in the _Times_ on questions of International Law,
+    i. 222 _note_; ii. 63 _and note_[2];
+  _and see under_ "Historicus"
+Hardwicke, Earl, i. 94 _note_[2]
+Harris, T.L., _The Trent Affair_,
+  cited, i. 203 _note_, 205 _note_[1], 217 _note_[1],
+    227 _note_[1], 231 _note_[2]; ii. 282 _note_[2];
+  citations of anti-Americanism in _Times_, i. 217 _note_[1]
+Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. 47
+Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. 129, 197 _note_[2]
+Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, cited, i. 94 _note_[3]
+"Historicus," Letters of, to the _Times_, cited and quoted,
+  i. 222 _note_; ii. 63, 104, 138 _note_[1]
+Holmes, O.W., i. 37 _note_
+Hood, General, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Hope, A.J. Beresford, ii. 187, 189, 193 _note_, 281-2
+Hopwood, i. 305; ii. 11, 18, 21
+Horsfall, Mr., ii. 153
+Horton, Wilmot, i. 23;
+  Committee on Emigration to America, 23, 24
+Hotze, H., Confederate agent,
+  quoted on effect of _Trent_ affair, i. 243;
+  descriptive account of his activities, ii. 154 _note_[1];
+  and the "foul blot" phrase, 240;
+  and the Southern arming of negroes, 241;
+  mentioned, ii. 68 _note_[1], 180 _note_[3], 213
+  Hotze Papers, The, ii. 154 _note_[1], 180
+  _note_[2], 185 _note_[1]
+Houghton, Lord, ii. 265-6, 267
+Hughes, Thomas, i. 181; ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Hunt, James, _The Negro's Place in Nature_, cited, ii. 222
+Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. 8 _note_[2], 14 _note_[1]
+Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. 264
+Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. 84
+Hunter, Mr., editor of the _Herald, _ ii. 213 _and note_[1]
+Huse, Caleb, ii. 120 _note_[2], 159
+Huskisson, cited, i. 20
+Huxley's criticism of Hunt's _The Negro's Place in Nature_, ii. 222
+
+Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i. 6, 7, 8, 16
+_Index, The_, ii., 33 _and note_[3];
+  agitation of, for recognition of the South and mediation, 33-4, 153-4;
+  on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 51 _note_[3];
+  views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, 51 _note_[3],
+    55 _and note_[4], 68, 69, 165, 196, 197;
+  on reply to French joint mediation offer, 68-9;
+  on Laird Rams, 150 _note_[2];
+  quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents, 154, 164-5;
+  connection with Hotze, 154 _note_[1];
+  and the fall of Vicksburg, 165, 178 _and note_[1];
+  on French press and policy of France, 174 _note_[3], 180;
+  reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, 188,
+    190 _and notes_, 194 _and note_[2], 195,
+    239 _and note_[4], 240;
+  comments on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 215-6;
+  criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on mediation, 216;
+  view of mediation, 217;
+  defence of slavery in the South, 220-2, 240-1;
+  criticism of the _Times_, 228;
+  quotations from the French press on the war, 236 _note_[2];
+  and the Presidential election, 236 _note_[2];
+  on Germany's aid to the North, 236 _note_[2];
+  on reception of Northern deputations by Adams, 245 _note_[1];
+  on characteristics of Southern leaders and society, 287;
+  view of Northern democracy, 287;
+  denunciation of the Manchester School 298-9;
+  cited, ii. 181 _note_[2], 186, 190 _note_[3], 199
+  _note_[4], 232, 241 _note_[1], 242;
+  quoted, 192, 193 _note_[1]
+Ionian Islands, control of, i. 79
+Ireland:
+  Irish emigration to America, i. 29; ii. 200, 201;
+  enlistments in, for Northern forces, 200, 201;
+  the _Kearsarge_ incident, 201-2;
+  petitions circulated in, in support of the North, 240
+Italy, disturbances in, ii. 29
+
+Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia:
+  effect of, on Russell and Palmerston, ii. 38
+Jackson, W.A., ii. 191
+James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_,
+  quoted, i. 228 _and note_[4];
+  cited, 256 _note_[4]
+_James Adger_, The, American war-ship,
+  i. 208, 209, 210, 211 _note_[1]
+Jameson, Professor J.F., ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Japan:
+  Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against,
+    i. 126 _note_[1]
+Jefferson, President, i. 7, 11, 18
+Jewett, J.P., quoted, ii. 111 _note_[3]
+_John Bull_, ii. 231 _note_;
+  quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. 179;
+  Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. 179-80
+Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. 248, 274
+Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. 193-4. 195. 224
+Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. 198
+"Justicia," letters of, in the _Times_, i. 217
+
+Kansas border struggles, i. 32
+_Kearsarge_ incident, The, ii. 201-2
+Kelly, William, _Across the Rocky Mountains, etc._, cited and quoted,
+  ii. 275 _note_[3]
+Kennedy, William, _Texas, etc._, cited, i. 29
+Kenner, Duncan F., Confederate Commissioner, ii. 249-50
+Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. 173
+Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. 175
+
+_La France_, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Laird Brothers:
+  builders of the _Alabama_ and _Laird Rams_, ii. 120, 121-2, 129;
+  prosecution of, demanded, 136;
+  officially ordered not to send Rams on trial trip, 146, 149;
+  Government's correspondence with, 146 _and note_[2], 149-50
+Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government, ii. 134
+Laird Rams, the, ii. 121-2, 123, 124, 137, 140 _et seq._, 196;
+  description and purpose of, 122 _and_ _note_[1];
+  British Government position, 133, 134;
+  rumours regarding, 142-3;
+  seizure of, 145-50, 179-80, 182;
+  suit for damages, 151 _note_[1];
+  British Government purchase of, 151 _note_[1];
+  U.S. Navy plan to purchase, 130 _note_[2];
+  usual historical treatment of the incident, 141, 147 _and note_[1]
+Lamar, Confederate representative:
+  account of Roebuck and Bright, ii. 172 _note_[2]
+Lancashire:
+  Cotton trade,
+    distress in, ii. 6, 11 _et seq._, 21, 26, 29, 31, 240;
+    attitude in, to Government policy, 10, 11, 13-15;
+    attitude of the "Cotton Lords" to, 10, 16;
+    Farnall report on, 12, 20;
+    Northern sympathies of cotton operatives, 13, 285 _note_[1]
+  Cotton factories, statistics, ii 6
+  Cotton manufacturers, attack on in Commons, ii. 163-4
+_Lane, Franklin K., Letters of_, cited ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Layard, reply of,
+  on Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 173;
+  on destruction of British property in America, 265
+_Le Siecle_, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 _note_[2]
+Lee, General,
+  turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii. 1;
+  defeated at Antietam, 43, 85;
+  retreat of, through Shenandoah valley, 43;
+  advance in Pennsylvania,
+  163 _note_[1], 164, 176;
+  defeats Hooker at Chancellorsville, 164;
+  retreat from Gettysburg, 163 _note_[1], 178, 179, 297;
+  defence of Richmond, 185, 217, 247, 248;
+  surrender, 248, 255, 256-7, 265, 301, 303
+  _Times_, quoted or cited, on his campaign, ii. 227, 256, 296
+Lees, Mr., ii, 220
+Lempriere, Dr., i. 180; ii. 191
+Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. 76, 78 _and note_, 94; ii. 52;
+  views of, on the Civil War, ii. 50 _and note_[2], 51;
+  article on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences,"
+    i. 78 _note_;
+  fears war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215, 226;
+  objections of, to mediation, ii. 44-6;
+  Hereford speech of, in reply to Gladstone, 50 _and note_[1], 51, 55, 58;
+  view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 52;
+  action of, on Russell's proposed intervention, 52 _et seq_., 73-4;
+  memorandum of, on British policy in opposition to Russell, 62-3;
+  account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion, 63-5;
+  Hereford speech, effect on Adams, ii. 55;
+  Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, 56;
+  Russell's reply to Lewis, 56, 57
+_Liberator, The_,
+  Garrison's abolition organ, i. 31, 33 _and note_[3];
+  46 _and note_[1], 47;
+  cited or quoted, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 106 _note_[2], 107,
+  109 _note_[2]; III _note_[3], 130, 184 _note_[3],
+  189 _note_[2], 191 _note_[2], 194, 223 _and note_[2],
+  224 _note_[2], 237 _note_[1], 239 _notes_, 240
+  _note_[2], 289
+Liebknecht, W., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+Lincoln, President, i. 115
+  Characteristics of, i. 115, 119, 120, 127-8;
+    influence of, in Britain, ii. 276
+  Election and inauguration, i. 36, 38, 39, 48, 51, 64, 82, 110, 115;
+  inaugural address, 38, 50, 71, 175;
+  personal view of terms of election, 49;
+  popular views on 79, 114, 115
+  Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. 117, 118, 119, 120;
+  and defend Federal forts, 118;
+  attitude to Seward's foreign war policy, 119-20, 136;
+  reply to Seward's "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration,"
+    119-20, 124;
+  modifies Despatch No. 10, 126-7;
+  attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, 121 122;
+  emergency measures of, 172, 173
+  _Policy and views of, on:_--
+    Blockade proclamation, i. 83, 110, 111, 244. _See heading_ Blockade
+    Border State policy of, i. 173, 176, 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82
+    Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. 82, 84
+    Emancipation Proclamation of, _See that heading_
+    Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. 252-3
+    Intervention, on, ii. 36
+    Piracy proclamation, i. 83, 111, 160
+    Servile insurrection, ii. 83
+    Slavery:
+      inaugural address on, i. 38. 50, 71, 175;
+      view of the terms of his election regarding, 49;
+      denial of emancipation as an issue, 239; ii. 88;
+      reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. 49 _note_[3];
+      declarations on, 78;
+      conversations with Sumner on, 82;
+      attitude to emancipation, 82, 83-4, 96;
+      and anti-slavery sentiment, 83;
+      denial of, as a cause of the war, 88;
+      reply to Schurz on emancipation, 72;
+      reply to Greeley, 93, 94;
+      orders of, as to liberated slaves, 100
+    _Trent_ affair;
+      attitude to release of envoys, i. 231 _and note_[2],
+      British view of, in, i. 225, 226, 230
+    Union, the:
+      efforts to preserve, i. 49, 121;
+      efforts to restore, ii. 82, 83, 93-5;
+      reply to Greeley on, 92-3
+  Attitude of, to England, i. 301;
+    curtails authority of General Butler, 305;
+    settles quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. 72;
+    letter to Manchester supporters of the North, 109;
+    drafts resolution for use in British public meetings on slavery, 113;
+    British addresses to, 288, 290-1
+  Re-election, ii. 226, 234, 235, 238;
+  expectations of his defeat, 226, 231;
+  British Press views on, 234-5, 238;
+  _Punch_ cartoon, 239 _and note_[1];
+  complaints of his despotism and
+  inefficiency in press, ii. 176, 232;
+  his terms to the South, 251, 252
+  Assassination of, ii. 257-8, 265;
+  political effect of,
+    in Britain, 301,
+    and in Germany, 301 _note_[3];
+  British sympathy, 259-64
+    Appreciations of, ii. 258-61
+      British opinion of, during the War, ii. 239 _note_[1]
+        Bright's confidence in, ii. 255 _and note_[1]
+        Lyons' view on, i. 51; ii. 258-9
+        Press views, i. 38-9; ii. 102-5 _passim_
+      Schleiden's view of, i. 116
+    Influence of Bright's letters on, i. 232;
+      pardons Rubery in honour of Bright, ii. 225 _and note_[1]
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 59, 81, 149, 223; ii. 39, 68, 91,
+    109 _note_[2], 126, 225, 251, 278, 281, 297
+Lindsay, William Schaw:
+  descriptive account of, i. 267, 289;
+  on the blockade and French attitude to intervention, 267;
+  project of mediation of, 279;
+  account of interview with Napoleon III, 289-90;
+  interview with Cowley, 290-1;
+  second interview with Napoleon, 291;
+  effect of interviews on Confederate Commissioners, 292;
+  refused an interview by Russell and Palmerston, 294-5, 296;
+  third interview with Napoleon, 295;
+  interview with Disraeli, 295, 296;
+  proposed motion in Parliament, 301-2, 305-6, 307;
+  account of a letter to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion,
+    305 _and note_[5];
+  introduces motion in Parliament on mediation, ii. 18, 20, 21-23;
+  withdrawal of, 23, 34;
+  with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on recognition, 166, 167, 168, 169,
+    172, 173, 174-5, 177;
+  suggestion by, on Confederate finance, 156;
+  proposes a further recognition motion, 178 _note_[1];
+  connection with Southern Independence Association, 193, 195, 204,
+    205, 206, 211;
+  hopes of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern
+    vessels, 185, 195, 196;
+  hopes from Napoleon and from Southern victory, 204;
+  fresh agitation for mediation and recognition, 205-6, 209, 210;
+  interviews Palmerston, 206-7, 209;
+  urges Mason to interview Palmerston, 207, 208, 209;
+  interview with Lord Russell 209-10, 212-13;
+  use of the Danish question, 206, 210;
+  hopes from Disraeli, 213;
+  postponement of his motion, 214, 215, 218
+  Friendship with John Bright, ii. 172 _note_[1];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 197, 268; ii. 25, 181
+Lindsay & Co., ii. 157
+Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the _Alabama_, ii. 129-30
+_Liverpool Post_, The, cited on the Emancipation Proclamation, ii. 103
+Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing of
+  Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats," i. 256
+_London Chronicle_, The, quoted, i. 46
+London Confederate States Aid Association,
+  ii. 191, 192 _and note_[2], 195
+London Emancipation Society, ii. 91, 110;
+  distinguished members of, 91 _note_[1]
+_London Gazette_, The, i. 94
+_London Press_, The, quoted i. 54-5, 68
+_London Review_, The, cited, i. 46 _and note_[4]
+Longfellow, H. W., i. 37 _note_, 55 _note_[2]
+Lothian, Marquis of, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Lousada, letter to Lyons on _Trent_ affair, quoted, i. 220 _note_[2]
+Lowell, J. R., i. 37 _note_, 236
+Lushington, Dr., i. 207
+Lutz, Dr. Ralph H.,
+  cited, i. 117 _note_; ii. 111 _note_[2]; 121 _note_[1]
+  _Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland_, etc., cited, i.
+    117 _note_; ii. 285 _note_[1]
+Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. 42, 51, 114;
+  attitude in the American dispute, 51, 53, 88 _note_[2],
+    93 _and note_[3], 254; ii. 237 _note_[4];
+  on Southern clamour at Lincoln's election, i. 51;
+  views on the personnel of the Northern Government, i. 59-60;
+  view of Seward, 59, 60, 65, 114, 129; ii. 72;
+  fears from Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-36 _passim_;
+  efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the South,
+    i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244;
+  views on the American controversy, 72, 73;
+  advises joint action
+  with France, 84;
+  receives instructions on British policy, 87;
+  and course of action if disavowed by America, i. 190;
+  suspicion of French policy, 201 _and note_;
+  survey of the situation after Shiloh, 278;
+  farewell interview with Lincoln, 301;
+  opinion of Adams, ii. 71 _note_[4];
+  views on Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, 106;
+  friendliness of Seward to, 72, 141, 176 _note_[2];
+  report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, 147, 182;
+  report on "scare" at Lee's advance, 176 _note_[2];
+  view after Gettysburg, 176 _note_[2];
+  protests against Russell's motion to withdraw belligerent rights
+    to the North, 182, 183;
+  attitude to American public animosity towards Great Britain, 197, 198;
+  on Seward's plan to collect import duties at Southern ports, 198;
+  description of American readiness for foreign war,
+    183 _and note_[2], 199;
+  on arrogance of American ministers, 199;
+  advises quiet attitude towards the North, 226;
+  view of Northern determination 226, 233;
+  view of Lincoln's chances of re-election, 226, 233;
+  on effect of the fall of Atlanta, 234;
+  advice on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, 237;
+  illness of, 233, 237;
+  return to London, 237 _note_[4];
+  appreciation of diplomatic service of, 237 _note_[4]
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_:
+    Belligerent rights to the South, i. 87;
+      attitude to request for withdrawal, i. 274-5; ii. 198
+    Blockade, i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244-5; ii. 226;
+      and legislative closing of Southern ports, i. 244, 246;
+      communications with Seward on, 244, 245, 246, 250, 257;
+      opinion on, 254
+      Southern Ports Bill, i. 246-50 _passim_
+    Bunch controversy, i. 184 _et seq._;
+      view on Bunch's conduct, 187;
+      conferences with Seward in, 191-2, 193, 194 _and note_[1];
+      comment on Bunch's explanation, 192-3;
+      attitude to American decision in, 193, 194
+    Cotton, i. 54 _note_[1], 64, 196-7; ii. 20 _and note_[3]
+    Declaration of Paris negotiations:
+      alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. 151, 163 _notes_;
+      view of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, 153 _and note_[2];
+      communications with Confederates in, 161, 163 _notes_,
+        164, 165, 166, 168 _note_[4], 185, 188;
+      view on the American proposal, 154, 162, 164
+    Emancipation, as an issue, i. 223
+    Emancipation proclamation, ii. 106, 113, 114 _and note_
+    Intervention, i. 197; ii. 26, 36;
+      fears commercial influence on policy, 26;
+      _See also_ Mediation _infra_
+    Irish emigrants: enlistment of, ii. 201
+    Mediation, i. 284, 286, 297, 298-9; ii. 23, 37 _note_[1], 70;
+      summary of Mercier's plan of, i. 298-9;
+      report on French isolated offer of, ii. 75-6;
+      on Russian suggestion of, 76
+    Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 281 _et seq. passim_;
+      ii. 24 _note_[2];
+      comment on the result of, i. 286;
+      effect of, on, 287;
+      comment on newspaper report of, 287
+    Privateering Bill, ii. 125, 126, 127
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of, to Seward,
+      i. 102, 103, 132, 133, 163 _note_[3], 164, 184
+    Recognition of the South, i. 65, 66, 73, 197, 198; ii. 70
+    Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-9, 130, 132, 133, 136;
+      advice to Russell on, 128-9, 131;
+      anxiety as to Canada, 128, 129, 131
+    Slave Trade Treaty, i. 276
+    Slavery, i. 52, 73, 93 _and note_[3];
+      account of changes in Northern feeling on, 223
+    Southern Commissioners, i. 65, 72
+    Southern shipbuilding, ii. 127, 139-141;
+      on American War feeling over, 139-40
+    _Trent_ affair, i. 210, 211, 221;
+      instructions in, 212-4;
+      anxiety for Canada in, 221
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 43, 57, 59, 74, 242, 243; ii. 147 _note_[4], 170
+Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. 182
+
+McClellan, General:
+  advance of, on Richmond, i. 276, 279, 297, 298, 301; ii. i, 33;
+  defeat of, by Lee, 1, 18, 33;
+  rumoured capture of, 20, 21 _note_;
+  Adams' opinion on rumours, 20, 21 _note_;
+  British newspaper reports of capture of, 20, 21 _note_;
+  removal of, 30;
+  defeats Lee at Antietam, 43, 85;
+  fails to follow up his victory, 43, 105;
+  as candidate in Presidential election, 234 _note_[2], 238
+McFarland, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]
+McHenry, George, _The Cotton Trade_, cited,
+  ii. 6 _note_[2], 13 _note_[2], 185 _note_[2]
+Mackay, Alexander, _The Western World,_ cited and quoted, i. 30; ii. 274-5
+Mackay, Charles, i. 37 _and note_, 46 _note_[4];
+   as _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 176 _notes_; 189, 226
+  _Forty Years' Recollections_, cited, ii. 176 _note_[2]
+  "John and Jonathan" poem, quoted, i. 37 _note_
+  _Life and Liberty in America_, quoted, i. 37 _note_
+Mackay, Dr., editor of the _London Review_, i. 46 _note_[4]
+McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837), i. 4
+McLaren, Duncan, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. 180 _note_[3]
+Madison, President, i. 11
+"Madison's War," i. 4
+Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. 4, 9
+Malmesbury, Lord, i. 79, 84, 149; ii. 25, 167
+Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. no, 224 _note_[3]
+_Manchester Examiner and Times_, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_; cited, ii. 136 _note_[2]
+_Manchester Guardian_, The, ii. 231 _note_;
+  cited, 181 _note_[2]
+Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of delegates,
+  ii. 190 _and note_[2]
+"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society," The, ii. 110;
+  leading members and activities of, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85 _notes_;
+  264, 265, ii. 24 _note_[2], 241
+  _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners
+Marchand, Captain, of the American ship, _James Adger_, i. 208;
+  instructions of, to intercept the _Nashville_,
+  209, 210, 211 _note_[1]
+Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i. 140-1
+Marryat, Captain Frederick: _A Diary in America_, etc.,
+  cited and quoted, i. 27
+Martin, M. Henri, ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Martin, T.P., theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations,
+  ii. 8 _note_[2]
+Martineau, Harriet:
+  faith of, in democracy, i. 27;
+  ardent advocate of the North, 70 _and note_[3];
+  view of slavery as cause of the Civil War, ii. 79-80
+Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii. 291,
+  292 _and note_[1]
+Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i. 173
+Mason, James M., Special Commissioner of the Confederates to Britain,
+  i. 183 _note_[2], 203;
+  relations with Spence, 183 _note_[2], 266 _note_[3];
+  captured in the _Trent_, 204 _et seq._, 234 _and note_[2];
+  reception of, in England, 264;
+  interview with Russell, 265-6, 267, 268;
+  statistics of, on the blockade, 268 _and note_[2];
+  effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, 272, 273;
+  hope in a change of Government, 273;
+  views of, on capture of New Orleans, 296;
+  comment of, on mediation after the Northern successes, 300,
+    and Lindsay's motion, 305, 306-7;
+  on the state of the cotton trade in England, ii. 10;
+  request to Lord Russell for recognition of the South, 25, 28;
+  and Slidell's offer to France, 24 _and note_[2];
+  refused an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, 27;
+  view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 104;
+  nominates Spence as financial adviser in England, 156;
+  and Confederate cotton obligations, 157, 158, 159;
+  and Confederate Cotton Loan, 161, 162;
+  in Roebuck's motion, 167, 168-9, 172-3;
+  opinion of Napoleon, 172-3;
+  recall of, 179, 181-2;
+  determines to remain in Europe,
+  182; hope from a change of
+  Government, 185, 213-4; demonstration
+  against, after a Southern
+  meeting, 191; representations on
+  _Kearsarge_ enlistment of Irishmen,
+  201; interview with Palmerston
+  suggested to, 207, 208-9,
+  214-5; returns to London, 212;
+  opinion of Palmerston and
+  Russell's attitude in interview
+  with Lindsay, 213; suggests
+  Disraeli to handle Lindsay's
+  motion, 213; protests against
+  clause in Southern Independence
+  Association address, 220; attitude
+  of, to slavery, 249, 250;
+  interview of, with Palmerston,
+  on Confederate offer to abolish
+  slavery, 250; interview with
+  Earl of Donoughmore, 250-1;
+  quoted on Lee's surrender, 256
+  Correspondence of, i. 261 _note_
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 255,
+    263 _note_[3], 267, 292; ii. 19, 31,
+    147, 154 _note_[1], 185, 186, 195,
+    206, 241
+Mason Papers, cited, i. 261 _note_[1]:
+  ii. 24, _et passim_
+Massie, Rev., ii. no, 190 _note_[3], 239
+Maximilian, Archduke, i. 260;
+  ii. 255 _note_[1]
+Melish, John, _Travels_, quoted, i. 25
+Mercier, French Minister in Washington:
+  with Lyons attempts
+  official presentation to Seward of
+  Proclamations of Neutrality, i.
+  96 _note_[1], 102, 103, 132, 164; in
+  Declaration of Paris negotiations
+  157, 158, 162, 163 _note_[3], 165;
+  negotiations with Confederates,
+  163 _notes_, 164, 165, 184, 185,
+  191 _note_[4]; plan for recognition
+  of Southern independence, 192;
+  plan to relieve French need for
+  cotton, 196-201; supports British
+  demands in _Trent_ affair, 230;
+  on withdrawal of belligerent
+  rights to South, 275; efforts
+  for mediation, 279, 298, 300;
+  ii, 36, 37 _note_[1], 41, 70 _note_[2], 71 _note_[1]
+  75, 76 _note_[1]; idea of an armistice, 41, 47
+  Richmond visit, i. 280 _ct seq._, ii. 24 _note_[2], 95;
+    Seward's acquiescence
+    in, i. 280, 281, 282; consultation
+    with Lyons on, 281-2,
+    283; result of, 284-5; report to
+    Thouvenel on, 285; effect of,
+    on Lyons and Russell, 287;
+    _New York Times _report
+    of, 287; effect of, in Paris
+    and London, 287-8; ii. 95;
+    effect of, on Confederate agents,
+    i. 288
+  Southern Ports Bill, attitude to,
+  i. 247 _note_[2], 248 _note_[3], 249; views
+  of, on recognition, 285-6; belief
+  of, in ultimate Southern success,
+  298; and isolated French offer of
+  mediation, ii. 75; proposes Russo-French
+  mediation, 76 _note_[1]; precautions
+  of, during Lee's northern
+  advance, 176 _note_[2]
+  Bancroft quoted on, i. 280
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 166 _note_[1]
+    191; ii. 23, 40, 155, 270 _note_[2]
+_Merrimac_, The, i. 276, 277
+Mexican War of 1846, i. 7, 15, 206
+Mexico, British influence in, i. 13;
+  revolt of Texas from, 12-15;
+  ii. 117 _note_[1]; contract of, for
+  ships and equipment in Britain,
+  117 _note_[1]; British policy towards,
+  after revolt of Texas, i. 13-14; war
+  with United States, 1846 ... 7,
+  15, 206; expectation in, of British
+  aid, 15; loss of California by, 15;
+  joint action of France, Great
+  Britain and Spain against, for
+  recovery of debts, 259-60; designs
+  of France in, 260; ii. 46;
+  American idea to oust France
+  from, 198, 251, 252, 255 _note_[4]
+Mill, J.S., ii. 224 _note_[3]; article
+  in defence of the North contributed
+  to _Fraser's Magazine_,
+  cited or quoted, i. 240, 242;
+  ii. 80-1, 90, 285; on _Trent_
+  affair, i. 240, 242; on slavery,
+  i. 240; ii. 80-1
+Milne, Admiral, i. 211; Lyons'
+  letter to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American
+  letters of marque, ii. 140, 141 _and note_
+Milner-Gibson, i. 226; ii. 36;
+  attack on, by _The Index_, 298
+Milnes, Monckton, i. 268
+Missouri, State of, and the Union:
+  effect of the "border state"
+  policy, i. 173
+Mobile, Ala., i. 253 _note_[1]
+Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's
+  proposal on recognition in
+  Roebuck's motion, ii. 167, 168,
+  169, 172
+Monck, Viscount, ii. 140; approves
+  seizure of Laird Rams, 147
+_Monitor_, The: duel of with the
+  _Merrimac_, i. 276; effect of, in
+  Great Britain, 276, 277
+Monroe Doctrine, The, i. 11, 12, 259;
+  as a medium for American territorial expansion, 12
+Monroe, President, i. 11
+Monson, cited, i. 93
+Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. 170;
+  amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, 170, 171
+Montgomery, Ala., i. 81, 82
+Moore, _Digest of International Law_, cited, i. 137, 145,
+  195 _note_[2], 212 _note_[3]
+Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky:
+  speech of, at Liverpool, accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. 105
+_Morning Herald_, The, ii. 67, 68 _note_[1], 231 _note_;
+  quoted, 67-8; cited, 215
+_Morning Post_, The, i. 229;
+  ii. 231 _note_;
+  in _Trent_ crisis, i. 226 _note_[3], 229;
+  views on the conflict and democratic tyranny, 229;
+  ii. 284, 285-6;
+  on the war and the cotton industry, ii. 10;
+  on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 49 _note_[1], 55 _note_[1]
+_Morning Star_, The, i. 69, 70 _note_[1], 179;
+  ii. 191 _note_[2], 231 _note_;
+  criticism of _Times_ war news in, 228
+Motley, J.L., United States Minister at Vienna:
+  letter of, analysing nature of the American constitution, i. 174-6;
+  urges forward step on slavery, ii. 98;
+  reply to Seward on effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, 99;
+  quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in the British Press, 280-1;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 190 _note_[2], 191
+  _Causes, The, of the American Civil War_, i. 174, 175
+  _Correspondence_, i. 179 _note_[2], 184;
+    ii. 33, 98 _note_[4], 106 _note_[3], 280-1
+Motley, Mrs., i. 179
+Mure, Robert:
+  arrest of, i. 186-8, 192, 193 _note_[1], 201;
+  Lyons' views on, 187-8
+
+Napier, Lord, ii. 63, 66
+Napoleon I., Emperor, i. 4, 8;
+  and American contentions on neutral rights, i. 18
+  Napoleonic Wars, i. 4-7, 23
+Napoleon III., Emperor:
+  American policy of, ii. 39;
+  differences with Thouvenel on, ii. 19 _and note_[2], 39
+  Blockade, view of, on the, i. 290
+  British policy:
+    vexation at, i. 295
+  Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2]
+  Mediation:
+    hopes for, ii. 23, 59;
+    suggests an armistice for six months, 59, 60 _et seq._, 69;
+    request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on, 60;
+    British views on, 60-65;
+    British reply, 65 _and_ _note_[1], 66, 152, 155;
+    Russian attitude to, 59 _note_[4], 63 _and _[3], 64, 66;
+    offers friendly mediation, 75-6
+    Interview with Lindsay on, i. 289 _et seq._;
+      reported offer on, to England, 290, 291
+    Interviews with Slidell on, ii. 24, 57 _note_[2], 60
+  Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of with, i. 287, 288;
+    displeasure at, 288
+  Mexican policy of, i. 259-61;
+    ii. 163, 198
+  Polish question, ii. 163, 164
+  Recognition:
+    private desires for, ii. 20;
+    endeavours to secure British concurrence, 19-20, 38;
+    reported action and proposals in Roebuck's motion, 166-77 _passim_;
+    interview with Slidell on abolition in return for recognition, 249-50
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 114, 191;
+    ii. 32, 54, 71, 180, 204, 270
+    Benjamin's view of, ii. 236 _note_[1]
+    Mason's opinion of, ii. 172-3
+    Palmerston's views of, ii. 59
+_National Intelligencer_, The, i. 297;
+  ii. 49 _note_[2]
+Neumann, Karl Friedrich:
+  History of the United States by, cited, ii. 111 _note_[2]
+Neutrality, Proclamations of:
+  British i. 93, 94-6, 100, 110, 111, 134, 157, 168, 174;
+    statements on British position, 99, 111, 163 _note_[3];
+    ii. 265; British Press views on, i. 136 _note_
+  French, i. 96 _note_[1], 102
+  American attitude to, i. 96-110 _passim_, 132, 135, 136, 142, 174;
+    British-French joint action, 102, 132 _and_ _note_[2];
+    Seward's refusal to receive officially, 102, 103, 132 _and note_[2];
+    133, 164, 169;
+    view of, as hasty and premature,
+    107-8, 109, 110, 112; Seward's
+    view of, 134-5; modern American
+    judgment on, 110
+New England States, The, i. 17, 18;
+  opposition of, to war of 1812 ...
+  i. 7
+_New Nation_, The (New York),
+  quoted on Lincoln's despotism,
+  ii. 232
+New Orleans, i. 253 _note_[1]; capture
+  of, 279, 296; ii. 16; effect of, on
+  Confederates, i. 296; Seward's
+  promises based on, ii. 16, 26
+New York, rumour of Russian
+  fleet in harbour of, ii. 129
+New York Chamber of Commerce,
+  The, protest by, on the _Alabama_,
+  ii. 126
+New York City: anti-British attitude
+  of, i. 29; idea of separate
+  secession, 83
+_New York Herald, _The, i. 56, 255;
+  ii. 199 _note_[4]
+_New York Times, _The, attack on
+  W.H. Russell in, i. 178 _note_[2];
+  quoted on _Trent_ affair, 220 _note_[1];
+  report of Mercier's Richmond
+  visit, 287
+Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement
+  to, i. 80, 114, 216, 227
+_Newcastle Chronicle_, The, i. 70 _note_[1];
+  ii. 231 _note_
+Newfoundland fisheries controversy,
+  i. 4
+Newman, Professor, ii. 224
+Newton, Dr., in _Cambridge History
+  of British Foreign Policy_, cited,
+  i. 35 _note_
+Nicaragua, i. 16
+Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, cited,
+  i. 126 _note_[2], 138, 146 _note_[2]
+_Nonconformist_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii.
+  231 _note_
+Nonconformist sympathy with
+  emancipation proclamations, ii.
+  109-10
+Norfolk, Va., i. 253 _note_[1]
+  "No 290," Confederate War Vessel.
+  See _Alabama_
+Northern States:
+  Army, foreign element in, ii.
+    200 _note_[1]
+  Emancipation: identified with,
+    ii. 220
+  Immigration and recruiting in,
+    ii. 200
+  "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War,
+    i. 96, 102, 103 _and note_[1], 111, 246
+  Intervention: determination to
+    resist, ii. 35-6, 71
+  "Piracy" declaration, ii. 267-8
+  Public and Press views in, at
+    the outbreak of the struggle, i.
+    42
+  Union, the: determination to
+    preserve, i. 54, 55, 173, 236;
+    ii. 226
+  Western and Eastern States
+    attitude to the War, compared,
+    ii. 53
+
+_Opinion Nationale_, The, cited, ii.
+  174 _note_[2], 236 _note_[2]
+Oregon territory controversy, i. 15
+_Oreto_, The, Confederate steamer,
+  ii. 118, 123, 131, 136
+_Ottawa Sun_, The, cited, ii, 70 _note_[1]
+Ozanne Rev. T.D., _The South as_
+  _it is, etc._, quoted, ii. 195 _note_[1]
+
+Page, Captain, instructions to,
+  on the use of the Laird Rams, ii. 122 _note_[1]
+Pakenham, British Minister to
+  Mexico, i. 13-14
+Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General,
+  i. 268, 271
+Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government
+  of, in 1859 ... i. 76,
+  77, 78; on Seward's attitude,
+  130; on reinforcement of Canada,
+  130-1; statement of reasons for
+  participation in Declaration of
+  Paris, 139; suggests method
+  of approach in Declaration of
+  Paris negotiations, 156 _note_[1];
+  on the object of the belligerents,
+  178; on British policy and the
+  cotton shortage, 199-200; on
+  possible interception of Mason
+  and Slidell, 207-8, 209; action
+  of, in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[2], 229,
+  241; statement of, on British
+  neutrality, 241; interview with
+  Spence, 266; refusal to interview
+  Lindsay, 295-6; letters
+  to Adams on General Butler's
+  order, 302-5; reply to Hopwood
+  on mediation, ii. 18; definition
+  of British policy in debate on
+  Lindsay's motion, 22-3; sneers
+  at the silent cotton manufacturers,
+  26; views of, on mediation,
+  31; participates in Russell's
+  mediation plan, 34, 36, 40-44, 46,
+  51, 54, 56, 73; traditional connection
+  with Lewis' Hereford
+  speech, 50 _and note_[1]; 51 _note_[2];
+  on the folly of appealing to the
+  belligerents, 56, 59, 73; opinion
+  of Napoleon, 59; views on
+    French proposals for armistice, 60-1;
+    on British position in regard to slavery, 61, 78-9;
+    approves Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, 131;
+    defends Government procedure in _Alabama_ case, 134-5;
+    accusation of, against Forster and Bright, 135;
+    attitude to seizure of Laird Rams, 145;
+    on the use of Napoleon's name in Roebuck's motion, 174-5, 177;
+    the crisis over Danish policy of, 203-4, 210, 214, 216;
+    interviews with Lindsay, 206-8, 209, 210, 213;
+    consents to interview Mason, 207;
+    opinion of, on the ultimate result of the Civil War, 209, 215;
+    attitude to resolution of Southern Societies, 211;
+    interview with Mason, 214-5;
+    reply to joint deputation of Southern Societies, 216;
+    reply to Mason's offer on abolition, 250;
+    assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads
+      Conference, 255;
+    attitude to expansion of the franchise, 276 _and note_[1];
+    death of, 302
+  Characteristics of, as politician, ii. 134
+  Cobden quoted on, i. 226 _note_[2]
+  Delane, close relations with, i. 229 _note_[2]
+  _Index_: criticism of, in the, ii. 216
+  Press organ of, i, 229
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 168, 194, 262;
+    ii. 19, 68, 90, 112, 168, 170, 173, 185, 188, 190, 249, 263, 285, 293
+Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 ... i. 4
+Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. 129 _note_[1]
+Paris, Congress of (1856), i. 139
+Peabody, George, quoted, i. 227
+Peacocke, G.M.W. ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Persigny, i. 303;
+  conversation with Slidell on intervention, ii. 19
+Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. 248
+Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern army,
+  ii. 202 _and note_[2]
+Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina,
+  i. 120, 185, 186 _and note_[1]
+Pickett Papers quoted, i. 243;
+  ii. 155;
+  cited, i. 261 _note_; ii. 69 _note_[5]
+Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question,
+  ii. 129, 163, 164
+Pollard, _The Lost Cause_,
+  quoted on attitude of England on the cotton question, ii. 5-6
+Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. 164, 224, _and note_[3]
+Prescott, i. 37 _note_
+Press, British,
+  the attitude of, in the American Civil War.
+  _See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc._
+Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i. 259
+Prince Consort, The, i. 76, 213, 224-5;
+  influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy, 224;
+  policy of conciliation to United States, 228;
+  Adams, C. F., quoted on, 225, 228
+Privateering, i. 83 _et seq_., 153 _et seq. passim_
+  Russian convention with U.S. on, i. 171 _note_[1]
+  Southern Privateering, i. 86, 89, 153, 156, 164, 165, 167, 171
+    _note_[1], 186.
+    Proclamation on, _see under_ Davis.
+    British attitude to, i. 86, 89-92, 95, 158, 160, 161, 163, 166;
+      Parliamentary discussion on, 94, 95, 157;
+      closing of British ports to, 170 _and note_[2]
+    French attitude to, i. 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165
+    Northern attitude to, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 163;
+      Seward's motive against in Declaration of Paris negotiation,
+        162, 164, 169;
+      Northern accusations against Britain on, 91
+  United States policy on, i. 141, 156.
+    _See_ Privateering Bill, _infra_
+  _See also under_ Declaration of Paris negotiation
+Privateering Bill, The, ii. 122 _et seq_.;
+  purpose of, 122-3, 125, 137;
+  discussion in Senate on, 123-4;
+  passed as an administrative measure, 124, 137;
+  influence of, on Russell's policy, 137;
+  British view of American intentions, 137-8;
+  historical view, 141;
+  Seward's use of, 121 _note_[2]
+Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203-4
+_Punch_, cartoons of, cited:
+  on _Trent_ affair, i. 217-8, 237;
+  on Stone Boat Blockade, 255;
+  suggesting intervention by France, ii. 75 _note_[1];
+  on Roebuck, 170 _note_[1];
+  on Lincoln's re-election, 239 _and note_[1]
+  Poem in, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259
+Putnam, G.H., _Memories of My Youth_, cited, i. 178 _note_[3]
+Putnam, G.P., _Memoirs_, cited, ii. 163 _note_[2]
+
+_Quarterly Review_, The, i. 47;
+  views on the Southern secession, 47;
+  on the lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, 47;
+    ii. 279, 286, 301;
+  attitude in the conflict, 199, 301;
+  on British sympathy for the South, 301
+
+_Reader_, The, cited, ii. 222, _and note_[2]
+Reform Bill of 1832 ... i. 26, 28; ii. 276;
+  of 1867 ... 303, 304
+Republican Party, The, i. 114, 115
+Rhett, cited, ii. 4 _and note_[3], 88
+Rhodes, _United States_, cited or quoted,
+  i. 110 _note_[4], 138, 217 _note_[2], 231 _note_[2];
+  ii. 16 _note_[2], 57 _note_[2], 147 _note_[1],
+  285 _note_[1] _et passim_.
+Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_,
+  cited or quoted, i. 261 _note_, 266 _note_[1];
+  ii. 57 _note_[2], 69 _note_[5], 155 _note_[6],
+  _et passim_.
+Richmond, Va., Southern Government head-quarters at, i. 81;
+  capture of, by Grant, ii. 248
+_Richmond Enquirer_, The, quoted on attitude of France to the
+  Confederacy, ii. 180
+_Richmond Whig_, The, cited, ii. 68
+Right of Search controversy, i. 6-10 _passim_, 16;
+  recrudescence of, in _Trent_ affair, 218, 219, 233, 235
+Robinson, Chas. D., Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. 93 _note_[4]
+Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. 34 _note_[1];
+  motion of, for recognition of the Confederacy,
+  74 _note_[1], 144, 152, 164 _et seq._; 296 _note_[1];
+  W.H. Russell's views on, 166;
+  Lord Russell's opinion on, 166;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, 167;
+  Parliamentary debate on, 170-2, 176-8;
+  withdrawal of motion, 175, 176-7;
+  subsequent attitude of, to America, 177 _note_[1], 299-300;
+  opinion on the failure of democracy in America, 299-300;
+  _Punch_ cartoon on, 170 _note_[1];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 306
+Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. 224 _note_[3]
+Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. 184
+Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85, 86, 264
+Rouher, M., French Minister of Commerce, i. 293, 294
+Roylance, ii. 110
+Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. 225 _and note_[1]
+Russell, Lord John, i. 42, 76, 77, 78-9, 81;
+  attitude of, in the early days of the American struggle,
+    42, 51, 53, 57, 60, 73-4, 79, 84;
+  views on the secession, 52-3;
+  views and action in anticipation of war, 57-8;
+  instruction on possible jingo policy toward England, 60-1;
+  recommends conciliation, i. 67, 74;
+  refusal to make a pledge as to British policy,
+    67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 125;
+  promise of delay to Dallas, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108;
+  plan of joint action with France, 84, 85;
+  advises Parliament to keep out of the Civil War, 90 _and note_[3];
+  uncertainty as to American intention, 201-2; ii. 237;
+  interview with Spence, i. 266;
+  "three months" statement, 272 _and note_[1]; ii. 22;
+  effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii. 38;
+  effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, 49;
+  idea of withdrawal of belligerent rights to the North, 182, 183;
+  on relations with United States and Seward, 183-4;
+  attitude to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern
+    ports, 198;
+  views on the conflict: belief in ultimate Southern independence,
+    198-9, 212, 271;
+  and the Danish question, 203;
+  action in withdrawing neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights,
+    266-7, 268, 269;
+  attitude to piracy proclamation, 267-8, and the Reform Bill,
+    276, 302, 303;
+  quoted on the degeneration of the American Republic, 285;
+  succeeds to Premiership, 302
+
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_:
+    _Alabama_, the, ii. 120, 121, 124;
+      interview with Adams on, 128, 131;
+      private feelings on 121, 124, 130
+  Belligerent rights to the South, i. 86, 87, _and note_[3];
+    reply to Houghton on, ii. 265-6, 267
+  Blockade, the:
+    views on, i. 58, 91, 246, 252-3;
+    instructions to Lyons on, 58, 244, 248, 263, 267, 271, 272;
+    instructions to Bunch, 253 _note_[2];
+    view on notification at the port method, 246;
+    on British Trade under, 252, 253;
+    aim in presenting Parliamentary Papers on, 252, 267;
+    on irritation caused by, ii. 225-6
+    Southern Ports Bill, protests against, i. 247-51;
+      instructions to Lyons on, 248, 249
+    Stone Boat Fleet, i. 254-5, 256
+  Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190-5;
+    letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture, 190;
+    anxiety in, 190, 191
+  Butler's, General, order to troops:
+    advice to Palmerston on, i. 303-4;
+    reply to Adams, 304
+
+  Confederate Commissioners:
+    attitude to, i. 67, 68;
+    interviews with, i. 85-6, 158;
+    declines official communication with, 214 _and note_[4], 265-6;
+    reception of Mason, 235, 265-6, 267, 268;
+    suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of Slidell, 235;
+    reply to Mason's notification of his recall, ii. 181;
+    reply to Confederate "Manifesto," 241-2
+  Confederate Shipbuilding:
+    reply to Adams' protests, ii. 118, 120-1, 127;
+    advice to Palmerston on, 131;
+    orders detention of contractors, 135;
+    seizure of _Alexandra_, 136;
+    stoppage of, 197;
+    result of _Alexandra_ trial, 197.
+    _See also sub-headings_ Alabama, Laird Rams
+  Confederates:
+    negotiations with, i. 161, 163, 166, 168 _note_[4], 170, 184;
+    attitude to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, 189;
+    explanation to Adams of British attitude to, 190
+  Cotton supply:
+    attitude to French proposals on, i. 197, 199, 294
+
+  Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+    request to France in, i. 142, 146-7, 156, 157 _and note_[3];
+    instructions to Lyons on, 146-62 _passim_, 184;
+    interviews with Adams, 141-8, 158;
+    proposals to the United States, 153 _and note_[2], 170;
+    instructions to Cowley, 156-9 _passim_;
+    suggested declaration in proposed convention, 143-6,
+    146 _note_[1], 149, 151, 154, 168, 170, 201
+  Emancipation Proclamation:
+    views on, ii. 101-2, 107 _and note_[1]
+
+  Foreign Enlistment Act:
+    idea of amending, ii. 124;
+    offer to United States on, 124-5;
+    reply to Adams' pressure for alteration of, 149
+
+  Gregory's motion, i. 108
+
+  Irishmen:
+    recruiting of, ii. 201-2
+
+  Laird Rams:
+    conversations with Adams on, ii. 144;
+    orders detention of, 144-5, 146, 150, 151;
+    correspondence with the Lairds, 146;
+    drafts protest to Mason, 147, 148 _and note_[1];
+    reply to attack on Government policy on, 149-50
+  Lindsay:
+    approval of Cowley's statement to, i. 293, 294;
+    reply to request of, for an interview, 294-5;
+    interview with, on motion for mediation and recognition, ii. 212-13
+
+  Mediation:
+    advice to Palmerston on reported French offer, i. 305;
+    reply to Seward's protest, ii. 19, 25-6, 27;
+    project of, with Palmerston, ii. 31-2, 34, 36 _et seq._, 91, 271;
+    instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel, 38;
+    letters to Gladstone on, 40, 41;
+    points of, 46;
+    responsibility for, 46 _note_[4];
+    Russia approached, 45;
+    memorandum on America, 49 _and note_[3];
+    proposal of an armistice, 31-2, 49, 53-5, 56-7;
+    comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion, 61-2, 64;
+    wish for acceptance, 62, 64;
+    declaration of no change in British policy, 71;
+    end of the project, 72, 155;
+    motive in, 73;
+    viewed as a crisis, 73;
+    comments of, to Brunow
+    on joint mediation offer 73 _note_[1]
+  Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 287, 288
+
+  Privateering, i. 89, 91, 159-63 _passim_;
+    possible interference of, with neutrals, ii. 127, 138-150;
+    opinion of, on intended use of privateers, 138
+  Proclamation of Neutrality.
+    British position in, i. 166 _note_[2]; ii. 265-6
+
+  Recognition of the Confederacy:
+    attitude to, i. 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 242, 243; ii. 54, 59, 77-8;
+    influence of _Trent_ affair on, i. 243;
+    reply to Mason's requests for, ii. 25, 27;
+    opinion of Roebuck's motion on, 166, 177;
+    denies receipt of proposal from France on 168-9, 172
+
+  Servile War, ii. 80, 97, 98
+  Slavery, ii. 89, 90;
+    view of Seward's proposal for transport of emancipated slaves, 100
+
+  _Trent_ affair, view of, i. 212;
+    letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America over, 215;
+    on possible ways of settlement of, 224;
+    instructions to Lyons on learning officially that Wilkes acted
+    without authorization, 226
+  Policy of, in the American Civil War:
+    i. 145, 202, 243, 299; ii. 271-2;
+    declaration to Adams on, 55, 71
+    Attitude to Adams, i. 81;
+      view of, i. 131; ii. 128
+    View of Lincoln, i. 189; ii. 263
+    View of Seward, i. 67, 68, 131, 235-6;
+      improved relations with, ii. 72, 197
+  Criticism and view of, in _The Index_,
+    ii. 51 _note_[2], 68, 69, 196
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 101 _note_[1], 198, 274, 277;
+    ii. 190, 208, 254
+Russell, Lady, quoted on _Trent_ affair, i. 224 _note_[3]
+Russell, W.H., _Times_ correspondent, i. 44, 56, 66, 177;
+  letters of, to the _Times_, 71, 177; ii. 229 _note_[1];
+  on the secession, i. 56, 177;
+  impression of Lincoln, 61 _note_[2];
+  description of Bull Run, 177-8; ii. 229 _note_[1];
+  abhorrence of slavery, i. 71, 177;
+  American newspaper attacks on 178 _and note_[2];
+  recall of, 178 _and note_[2];
+  ii. 228, 229 _note_[1];
+  on Napoleon's mediation offer, 68;
+  on recognition, 166;
+  editor of _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 68, 228, 229 _and note_[1];
+  belief of, in ultimate Northern victory, i. 178 _note_[2], 180;
+    ii. 68 _note_[2], 228, 229 _and note_[1];
+  view of the ending of the War, 229-30;
+  on campaigns of Grant and Sherman, 230, 232-3, 243;
+  quoted on Delane, 254;
+  on prospective war with America, 254;
+  on failure of republican institutions, 277
+  _My Diary North and South_, i. 177 _notes_;
+     quoted 44 _note_[1], 61, 71;
+     cited, 124, 178, ii. 229 _note_[1]
+Russia:
+  attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 164 _note_[1];
+  convention with United States on privateering, 171 _note_[1];
+  attitude to recognition of the South, 196 _note_[2]; ii. 59;
+  and mediation, i. 283 _note_[1];
+  ii. 37 _note_[1], 39, 45 _note_[2];
+  British approach to, on mediation, 40, 45, _and note_[2];
+  attitude to joint mediation, 59 _note_[2], 63 _and note_[5],
+    66 _and note_[2], 70 _note_[2];
+  on joint mediation without Britain, 76 _and note_[1];
+  plan of separate mediation, 251 _note_[1];
+  Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights,
+    265 _and note_[2];
+  policy of friendship to United States,
+    45 _note_[2], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2];
+  United States friendship for, 225
+  Polish question, ii. 129, 163
+  Fleets of, in Western waters:
+    story of, in _Trent_ affair, i. 227 _note_[1];
+    ii. 129 _and note_
+  _See also under_ Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl
+
+St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston,
+  i. 185, 186, 191 _note_[4]
+Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. 290 _note_[1]
+Salt, price of, in Charleston:
+  effect of the blockade, i. 270
+San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention to
+  guarantee independence of, i. 126 _note_[1]
+San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. 129 _and note_[1]
+_San Jacinto_, the, i. 204, 205, 216
+_Saturday Review_, The:
+  views of, on Lincoln's election, i. 39;
+  judgment of Seward, 39;
+  views at outbreak of war, 41, 46;
+  on Southern right of secession, 42;
+  on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100-1;
+  on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, 146 _note_[1];
+  on slavery as an issue: attack on Mrs. H.B. Stowe, 180-1;
+  on blockade and recognition, 183;
+  on duration of war and cotton supply, 246 _note_[3];
+  on servile insurrection, ii. 80;
+  and the relation between the American struggle and British
+    institutions, 276, 277-8, 280;
+  on the promiscuous democracy of the North, 277;
+  on the Republic and the British Monarchy, 277-8;
+  cited, 111, 231 _note_
+Savannah, Ga., i. 253 _note_[1];
+  captured by Sherman, ii. 245, 249, 300-1
+Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, cited, ii. 6
+Schilling, C., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen,
+  i. 115, 116 _note_, 130;
+  views of, on Seward and Lincoln, 115-6;
+  offers services as mediator: plan of an armistice, 121, 122;
+  visit of, to Richmond, 121-3;
+  failure of his mediation, 122-3;
+  report of Russian attitude to privateers, 171 _note_[1];
+  on _Trent_ affair, 231 _note_[2], 242;
+  on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of envoys, 231 _note_[2];
+  on attitude of Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _note_[3];
+  quoted, on slavery, ii. 111 _and note_[2]
+Schleswig-Holstein question, i. 79; ii. 203-4
+Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War_, cited,
+  ii. 7 _notes_; 167 _note_[1];
+  arguments in, examined, 13 _note_[2]
+Scholefield, Wm., ii. 193 _note_
+Schouler,----, on diplomatic controversies between England and America,
+  cited, i. 35
+Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate Cotton
+  Loan, ii. 161-2
+Schurz, Carl,
+  papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i. 117 _note_;
+  advocates declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. 91, 92;
+  cited i. 83 _note_[2]
+Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, cited,
+  ii. 156 _note_[1], 158 _note_[4], 160 _notes_,
+  162 _note_[3]
+Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in _Trent_
+  affair, i. 218
+Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_,
+  cited, i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 24 _note_[1]
+Secession States, ports of, i. 253 _note_[1]
+Semmes, captain of the _Alabama_, ii. 119
+Senior, Nassau W., article on "American Slavery," i. 33;
+  quoted, 33 _note_[1], 34
+Servile insurrection, i. 271; ii. 83, 87;
+  British apprehension of, i. 93; ii. 49, 79, 80, 81, 101, 110;
+  emancipation viewed as provocative of, 49, 81, 86, 98, 101, 114;
+  as an argument for intervention, 98, 101, 103 _note_[6];
+  use of as a threat, 18-19, 83, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 114
+Seward, W.H., American Secretary of State,
+  i. 39, 49, 59, 60, 64, 79, 80, 115;
+  British view of, 60, 80,
+  view of, as unfriendly to Great Britain,
+    39, 67, 68, 113-4, 125 _et seq._ 242;
+  reputation as a politician, 80, 114, 115;
+  efforts of, to secure European support for the North, 67, 137, 152;
+  view of his relation to Lincoln, 114, 115-6, 118, 120, 127-8, 130;
+  document "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration,"
+    118-9, 123, 124;
+  advice on Fort Sumter, 118, 120;
+  his "Despatch No. 10", 125-30, 154, 155;
+  reversal of his policy, 130, 132;
+  action on Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, 164;
+  instructions to American diplomats on slavery as issue, i. 176; ii. 95;
+  offers facilities for transport of British troops, i. 213 _note_[4];
+  change of attitude to England, ii. 72;
+  quarrel with Chase, 72;
+  influence of, lessened by signing Abolition Proclamation, 100 _note_[2];
+  friendliness to Lyons, 72, 141;
+  appreciation of Russell's expression of esteem, 147;
+  attitude to Russell, 197;
+  policy in regard to reunion, 197;
+  plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, 198;
+  tests British-French harmony, 198;
+  anxiety to avoid irritating incidents, 199;
+  considers abrogation of treaties with Canada, 253-4;
+  denies rumours of prospective foreign war, 254;
+  accepts notification of ending of British neutrality, 268-9;
+  meets with an accident, 257;
+  attempted murder of, 257-8, 265
+  _Diplomatic action and views of, with regard to:_
+    Belligerent rights to South
+      denial of, i. 87, 102, 169, 233, ii. 182;
+      remonstrance on concession of, i. 247, 274,
+      proposes withdrawal of, ii. 264-5, 266;
+      _See also under_ Declaration of Paris _and_ Neutrality _infra_.
+    Blockade, i. 54 _note_[1], 65, 246, 295;
+      interviews with Lyons on, 244, 245, 246, 251, 256, 257;
+      suggested alleviation of, i. 274
+      Southern Ports Bill:
+        reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. 249;
+        attitude to issue of, 248 _note_[3], 250, 251, 252;
+        on closing of ports by proclamation, 250, 252
+      Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement on, i. 256-7
+    Bunch affair, i. 184, 189, 191 _and note_[4], 192, 193,
+      194 _and note_[1]
+    Confederate debts: statement on, ii. 197
+    Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i. 105
+    Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. 121, 139, 140;
+      effect of seizure of the _Alexandra_ on, 140;
+      despatch on _Alexandra_ case decision, 143 _and note_[2];
+      refuses to allow British Consul through the blockade, 148
+    Cotton:
+      on proposed French intervention to secure, i. 198, 200;
+      promises of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. 16
+    Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 137, 141, 145, 147, 150 _et seq._;
+      statement in refusing convention as modified by Russell, 145;
+      motives in, 150-2, 153, 169;
+      hope to influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent
+        rights, 150-1, 162, 164, 165, 169;
+      as part of foreign war policy: considered, 153-4, 155-6
+    Emancipation Proclamation:
+      urges postponement of, ii. 37. 85, 95, 96, 98, 114;
+      informed as to effect of, on intervention, 98, 99
+      comments on purpose of, 99-100
+      the "high moral purpose" argument, ii. 100;
+      proposes convention for transport of emancipated slaves, 100
+    Hampton Roads Conference, ii. 252;
+      attitude to Britain after, 253-4
+    Intervention:
+      attitude to, i. 145, 178, 200;
+      threat of servile war and, ii. 18-19, 22, 95;
+      instructions to Adams on, 35-6, 96-7;
+      view of the effect of emancipation, on, 98, 114.
+      _See also_ Mediation _infra_.
+    Irish Emigrants:
+      enlistment of, ii. 201
+    Mediation:
+      attitude to, i. 283 _note_[1], 297; ii. 18, 57 _note_[2];
+      by France, i. 283 _note_[1];
+      by Russia, 283 _note_[1];
+      view of England's refusal to act with France in, ii. 71, 72;
+      declines French offer of, 76
+      _See also_ Intervention _supra_.
+    Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 280-4, 286;
+      statement to Lyons:
+        view of Confederate position, 286;
+      newspaper statement on, 287
+    Napoleon's Mexican policy:
+      attitude to, ii. 198
+    Neutrality Proclamations:
+      representations on, i. 100, 101;
+      despatch on American view of, 101, 103 _note_[1], 134;
+      refusal to receive officially, 102-3, 132, 133,
+        153 _and note_[2], 164;
+      efforts to secure recall of, 152-3, 169, 198, 234, 274-5, 300, 301
+    Privateering, i. 160;
+      convention with Russia, 171 _note_.
+      _See also_ Southern Privateering _infra_.
+    "Privateering Bill:"
+      use of, ii. 121 _note_[3], 141, 151;
+      on the purpose and use of the privateers, 122-3, 125, 137, 143;
+      conversations with Lyons on, 125, 126;
+      on necessity for issuing letters of marque, 126, 143;
+      advised by Adams against issue of privateers, 131, 139
+    Recognition of Southern Independence, i. 65, 74, 198
+    Servile War threat, ii. 18-19, 22, 83, 95, 98
+    Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. 10, 275, 276; ii. 90
+    Southern privateering:
+      view of, i. 104, 105;
+      efforts to influence European attitude to,
+      i. 104, 150-1, 154, 162, 164, 169;
+      attitude on issue of privateers from British ports, ii. 126, 127
+    _Trent_ affair:
+      reception of British demands in, i. 230, 232, 233;
+      on Wilkes' action, 231;
+      attitude to release of envoys, 231 _and note_[2], 232, 233, 234, 236;
+      British opinion on Seward in, 239
+  Foreign Policy:
+    high tone, i. 236, 252 _and note_[1], 301;
+    restoration of the Union as basis of, 236;
+    influences affecting, ii. 95, 100
+  Foreign war panacea, i. 60, 113, 120, 123-4, 125, 126 _note_[1],
+  127, 130, 132, 134-5, 137, 154, 155, 214;
+    appreciation of, 136.
+  Southern conciliation policy of, i. 49, 83, 117, 118, 120-1, 123, 125;
+    expectations from Union sentiment in the South, 60, 117;
+    aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, 121-3;
+    communications with Confederate Commissioners, 117-8, 120
+  Appreciation and criticism of:
+    by British statesmen and press in 1865.... ii. 257;
+    _Times_ tribute to, 257;
+    Horace Greeley's attack on, i. 280 _note_[1];
+    Gregory's attack on, i. 269;
+    Lyons' view of, i. 59, 60;
+    Adams' admiration for i. 80, 127
+  British suspicion of, i. 113, 114, 128, 133, 136, 227, 235-6;
+    ii. 101 _note_[1];
+    the Newcastle story, 80, 114, 216, 227;
+    Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, 227;
+    Adams' view, 227
+  Otherwise mentioned,
+    i. 66, 163 _notes_, 177, 186, 188, 209, 212, 213, 217;
+    ii. 39, 84, 123 _note_[2], 170, 173, 175, 223, 225,
+    245 _note_[1], 259, 281
+Shelburne, Earl of, i. 240
+Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on,
+  ii. 236 _note_[2]
+Sherman, General:
+  Atlanta campaign of, ii. 217;
+  captures Atlanta, 233;
+  march to the sea, 243-5;
+  captures Savannah, 245, 249, 300-1;
+  campaign against Johnston, 248;
+  reports of pillaging and burning by his army, 265;
+    mentioned, 215
+  Russell, W.H., views of, on Sherman's campaigns, ii. 230, 232-3, 243
+  _Times_ view of his campaigns, ii. 212, 227, 232, 243-6
+Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. 278
+Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. 116, 117 _note_[1], 128;
+  Continental opinion of international law on, 121 _note_[1]
+_Shipping Gazette_, quoted, ii. 14
+Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its failure, ii. 282
+Slavery:
+  cotton supplies and, i. 13;
+  controversy in America on, 32, 36;
+  English opinion on, 31-5, 37-8, 40;
+  as an issue in the Civil War, 45, 46, 173, 175, 176, 179, 181, 241, 242;
+    ii. 78, 88-93, 222;
+  Confederates identified with, i. 71; ii. 220;
+  Southern arguments for, 3 _and note_[2];
+  attitude of the North to, 78;
+  growth of anti-slavery sentiment, 83, 84;
+  failure of the slaves to rise, 86;
+  Northern declaration on, urged, 98-9, 107;
+  British public meetings on, 109 _note_[2];
+  Southern declaration on, 106.
+  _See also_ African Slave Trade, Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc.
+Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to France,
+  i. 203; captured on the _Trent_, 204-5, 234 _and note_[2];
+  connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, 261 _note_[1];
+  plan of action of, 264-5;
+  received by Thouvenel, 266 _note_[1];
+  view on Continental and British interests in the blockade,
+    267 _note_[3], 273;
+  view of Mercier's Richmond visit, 228;
+  on Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, 292;
+  views of, on the capture of New Orleans, 296;
+  idea to demand recognition from France, 306, 307; ii. 25, 28;
+  hopes of mediation by France, ii. 19, 25;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, 23, 24;
+  makes offers to Napoleon and to Thouvenel, 24, 25;
+  letter to Benjamin on failure to secure intervention, 29;
+  interview with Napoleon on Armistice, 59 _and note_[2], 60;
+  memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking for separate recognition, 75;
+  on shipbuilding for Confederates in France, 128;
+  quoted on position of France
+    in relation to mediation, 155;
+    and Confederate Cotton Loan, 158 _and note_[3], 159, 161, 163;
+  interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition, 167;
+  and Napoleon's instruction on recognition
+    in Roebuck's motion, 168-9, 172;
+    and Mason's recall, 180, 181, 182;
+  opinion of Russell, 213;
+  suggestion on Lindsay's motion, 213;
+  disappointment at result of Mason's interview with Palmerston, 215;
+  opinion on European attitude to the South, 215;
+  interview with Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for
+    recognition, 249-50;
+  quoted on Lee's surrender 256-7;
+  appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii. 25, 180 _note_[3];
+  correspondence of, i. 261 _note_;
+  otherwise mentioned, ii. 154 _note_[1].
+  _See also under heading_ Confederate Commissioners
+Smith, Goldwin, ii. 136 _note_[2], 189 _note_[2];
+  on Gladstone and Canada, 69, 70 _note_[1];
+  quoted on the influence of the _Times_,
+  178 _note_[3], 189 _note_[2];
+  on the _Daily Telegraph_, 189 _note_[2];
+  tribute of, to T.B. Potter, 224 _note_[3];
+  view of the _Times_ attitude to democracy, 299;
+  criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, 303-4
+  _America and England in their present relations_, quoted,
+    ii. 304, _and note_[2]
+  _Civil War, The, in America_, cited, ii. 223 _note_[2],
+    224 _note_[3]; quoted, 304 _note_[1]
+    Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?" ii. 110
+  _Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence
+    Association_, ii. 194-5; quoted, 299
+Smith, T.C., _Parties and Slavery_, cited, ii. 3 _note_[2]
+Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America, ii. 207;
+  letters of, to Members of Parliament, 207-8, 210-11;
+  deputation of, to Palmerston, 216
+Somerset, Duke of, i. 207
+South Carolina, secession of, i. 41, 44;
+  _Times_ view on, 55;
+  and restoration of Colonial relations: some British misconceptions
+  on, 43, 44 _and note_
+Southern Independence Association, The, ii. 185, 189, 191-5, 204, 220, 298;
+  cessation of meetings of, 193-4, 222-3;
+  apathy and dissension in, 205, 207, 208;
+  resolution and deputation to Palmerston, 210-2, 216;
+  ticket meetings, 239;
+  Oldham meeting, 239, 240
+Southern Ports Bill. _See_ Blockade
+Southern States:
+  attitude of, to protection policy, i. 21, 47;
+  and reciprocity treaty with British-American provinces, 21-2;
+  influences directing British trade to, 22;
+  British press attitude to, 40-48 _passim_;
+  characterization of, 41;
+  right of secession, 42, 82, 175, 176, 269;
+  tariff as a cause for secession, 47;
+  question of recognition considered, 58;
+  secession, 172-3;
+  preparations for war, 172;
+  recognized as belligerents, 190, 191, 172;
+  expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. 148 _note_[2];
+  activities of British friends of, 152, 187-8, 190, 193-4, 239, 298;
+  Conservative hopes for success of, 300;
+  views on French attitude, ii. 236 _note_[2];
+  effect of the fall of Savannah on, 246;
+  end of the Confederacy, 248, 259, 268;
+  hope of, from "foreign war," 252;
+  effect on, of Lincoln's assassination 258;
+  withdrawal of belligerent rights to, 264-6;
+  end of the war; naval policy towards, 266-7
+  Belligerent rights, recognition of,
+    i. 87, 88, 95, 108, 109, 150, 151, 155, 166 _note_[3].
+    _See_ Neutrality Proclamations.
+  Commissioners of, _See under_ Confederate Commissioners
+  Cotton, obsession as to, i. 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5
+  Cotton Loan, ii. 155 _et seq._ 179;
+    reception of, in England, 160-1;
+    amounts realized by, 162
+  Declaration of Paris negotiation:
+    attitude to, i. 186
+  Finance, ii. 156 _et seq._
+  Hampton Roads Conference:
+    suggestions in, ii. 252-3
+  Leaders of:
+    British information on, i. 58-9
+  Manifesto to Europe, ii. 241 _and note_[2], 242
+  Mediation:
+    feeling in, on England's refusal of, ii. 71 _and note_[2];
+    hope of change in British policy on, 213-4
+  Military resources:
+    decline of, ii. 219;
+    desertions from the Army, 222
+  Negroes, arming of, ii. 240-1, 251
+  Privateering. _See that heading._
+  Recognition of independence:
+    anger at failure to secure, i. 252 _note_[2];
+    desire for, without mediation, ii. 217
+  Secret service funds, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+  Shipbuilding in British ports for, ii. 115 _et seq._;
+    British protest to, on, 148.
+    _See also under_ Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc.
+  Slavery attitude, ii. 88 _and note_[3];
+    intention of gradual emancipation, 98;
+    British views on, 220;
+    offer of abolition in return for recognition, 249-51
+Spain, and Mexican debts, i. 259, 260
+Spargo, _Karl Marx_, cited, ii. 292 _note_[1]
+_Spectator_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_;
+  constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. 39;
+  on Lincoln's election, 39;
+  views on the Civil War, 41, 69, 100, 181;
+  on secession, 57;
+  on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100, 136 _note_[1];
+  attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech on dissolution of the Union, 182;
+  on servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. 79, 80;
+  on British Press attitude to emancipation, 89;
+  on declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, 89;
+  on the Emancipation Proclamation, 104-5;
+  on British lack of sympathy with the North, 280;
+  on anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, 280;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 180; ii. 105, 223 _note_[1], 282
+Spence, James, i. 183 _note_[2], 266 _and note_[2];
+  conferences of, in London, 266, 267, 272 _and note_[1], 273;
+  prevents demonstration by cotton operatives, 300;
+  plan to appeal to the Tories, ii. 153, 155, 164;
+  as Confederate financial adviser, 156, 157, 158;
+  and Confederate Cotton Loan, 159, 161-2;
+  urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, 173-4;
+  effect of the fall of Vicksburg on, 179;
+  organization of Southern Clubs by, 186-7, 188, 189, 190;
+  hopes for intervention, 187-8, 189-90;
+  organization of Southern Independence Association by, 191;
+  organization of meetings by, 191, 222-3;
+  organizes petitions to Parliament, 193;
+  comments of, on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 216-7;
+  on slavery clause in Southern Independence Association's address, 220
+  Slidell's opinion of, i. 266 _note_[3]; ii. 159;
+    Otherwise mentioned, i. 302; ii. 49 _note_[2], 181, 193
+  _The American Union_, i. 183 _and note_[2], 266 _note_[3];
+    ii. 112
+Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. 38
+Spurgeon, C. H., prayer of, for victory of the North, ii. 109-110
+Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. 42
+Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. 176 _note_[2]
+Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of Southern Government,
+  i. 59, 81, 121;
+  interview of, with Schleiden, 122, 123;
+  discussion of, with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. 252
+Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to Palmerston,
+  quoted, i. 109-10
+Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington:
+  view of the secession, i. 53 _note_[3];
+  on Russian policy in Declaration of Paris negotiations, 164 _note_[1];
+  on privateers in Northern Pacific, 171 _note_[1];
+  and recognition of the South, 196 _note_[3],
+  and Mercier's Richmond visit, 283 _and note_[1];
+  on mediation, 283 _note_[1];
+  ii. 37 _and note_[1], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2], 76;
+  comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation, 107 _note_[1];
+  on the reconciliation of North and South followed by a foreign war, 251;
+  Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, 265;
+  views on probable policy of Britain at the beginning
+  of the Civil War, 269-70, 271;
+  on the Civil War as a warning against democracy, 297 _note_[4];
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 54 _note_[1]; ii. 45 _note_[2]
+Stone Boat Fleet. _See_ Blockade.
+Story, William Wetmore, i. 228, 256;
+  letters of, in _Daily News_, 228 _and note_[4]
+Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the _Saturday Review_, i. 181;
+  mentioned, ii. 89-90, 109
+  _Uncle Tom's Cabin_, i. 33 _and note_[1]
+Stowell, Lord, i. 208
+Stuart--, British Minister at Washington:
+  report of new Northern levies of men, ii. 30;
+  on recognition, 30 _and note_[3];
+  views on British policy, 30 _note_[3];
+  attitude to intervention and recognition, 36, 37, 66 _note_[3];
+  report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, 37, 98;
+  suggestion of armistice, 47;
+  account of Federal "reprisals," 66 _note_[3];
+  on servile insurrection, 97;
+  describes Emancipation proclamation as a _brutum fulmen_, 101
+  Otherwise mentioned, ii. 25, 26, 66 _note_[3], 70, 100,
+    101 _note_[1]
+Sturge, Joseph, _A Visit to the United States in_ 1841, cited, i. 29
+Sumner, Charles, i. 79, 80;
+  Brooks' attack on, 33, 80;
+  hope of, for appointment as Minister to England, 55 _and note_[2];
+  views on annexation of Canada, 55;
+  in _Trent_ affair, 231, 232, 234 _note_[3];
+  attitude to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _and note_[3];
+  advocacy of abolition, ii. 81, 90;
+  conversations with Lincoln on abolition, 82, 86;
+  attitude to Privateering Bill, 123, 124;
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 49 _note_, 83, 130 _note_[1], 220;
+  ii. 80, 132, 184, 247, 262, 280
+Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. 63, 73, 74, 83, 120, 172, 173;
+  Seward's policy on reinforcement of, 118
+Sutherland, Rev. Dr., prayer of in American Senate, i. 233 _note_
+
+Tariff Bill (U.S.) of 1816, i. 19;
+  of 1828, 21
+Taylor, P.A., abolitionist, ii. 224;
+  eulogy of George Thompson, 224 _note_[1]
+Taylor, Tom, poem by, in _Punch_, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259
+Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. 173
+Texas, State of:
+  revolts from Mexico, i. 12;
+  Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular agents to, 12;
+  independence of, as affecting British policy, 13-16;
+  enters the American Union, 14, 15, 16;
+  in War of Independence against Mexico protests against shipbuilding
+  for Mexico in Britain, ii. 117 _note_[1];
+  mentioned, 266
+Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of G.V. Fox,
+  etc._, cited, i. 257 _note_[3]
+Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society, ii. 91;
+  work of, for emancipation, 109, 224 _and note_[1];
+  mentioned, 109 _note_[2], 184, 191
+Thouvenel, M., French Foreign Minister, i. 88, 143;
+  in the Declaration of Paris negotiations,
+    151, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163;
+  initiates negotiations with Confederates, 157, 189;
+  policy of, for relief of French need for cotton, 196, 197, 198;
+  attitude of, in Charleston consuls case, 189;
+  and Southern Ports Bill, 247, 248 _and notes_, 249 _and note_[4];
+  interview with Slidell, 266 _note_[1];
+  attitude of, to mediation, 266 _note_[1], 279; ii. 19-20, 28;
+  on difficulties due to lack of cotton, i. 279, 293-4;
+  conversations on Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, 291, 293;
+  and Mercier's Richmond visit, 280, 281, 282, 285, 288, 299;
+  conversation with Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of
+    the South, 294;
+  on French neutrality, 299;
+  opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii. 19 _and note_[3], 20, 39;
+  Slidell's offer to, on mediation, 24, 25;
+  reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of mediation, 38-9, 46;
+  retirement of, 45, 59;
+  view of England's advantage from dissolution of the Union, 270 _note_[2];
+  otherwise mentioned, i. 275, 289
+_Times_, The:
+  characteristics of, as newspaper, i. 42, 229 _note_[2];
+  ii. 178 _note_[2], 228, 230 _note_[2], 234;
+  influence on public opinion, 178 _note_[3], 189 _and note_[2], 228;
+  influence on public press, 226, 230 _note_[3];
+  accuracy of reports in, 226;
+  pro-Southern attitude in last year of the conflict, 226-8, 242, 244
+    _and note_[3];
+  attitude to Hotze, 154 _note_[1];
+  relations of, with W. H. Russell,
+    i. 177, 178, ii. 228, 229 _and note_[1]
+  Criticisms of:
+    John Bright's view of, i. 55 _note_[3];
+    citations of anti-Americanism in, 217 _note_[1];
+    Cobden, on, 222 _note_;
+    Canadian opinion on, 222 _note_;
+    in _Index_, ii. 228;
+    in _Morning Star_, 228;
+    Goldwin Smith's attack on, 299
+  "Historicus," articles by, in. _See under_ "Historicus."
+  _Views expressed in, on:_
+    Civil War: non-idealistic, i. 89, 97;
+    prints Motley's letter on causes of, 174-5
+    Confederate Manifesto, ii. 242
+    Cotton, i. 55; ii. 7 _and note_[1], 14 15
+    Democracy: attitude to, i. 8; ii. 280-1, 284, 289, 297, 300;
+      change of view on, 289-90, 291, 297;
+      comparison of British and United States Governments, 286;
+      attack on John Bright, 295-6
+    Foreign war plans of America on, ii. 252, 254
+    Gladstone's speech, ii. 49 _note_[1]
+    Laird Rams, ii. 146
+    Lincoln:
+      on Slavery speech of, i. 38;
+      on re-election of, ii. 234-5, 238;
+      appreciations of, after his death, ii. 259-61
+    Lindsay's proposed motion: ii. 205-6
+    Mediation, i. 303, 305; ii. 67
+    Military situation, ii. 165, 176 _and note_[2], 178, 297;
+      after Gettysburg, ii. 180 _and note_[1], 228 _note_[3];
+      Lee's Northern advance, 176;
+      on Grant's reverses and Sherman's march on Atlanta,
+        212, 227, 232, 243;
+      capture of Atlanta, 233, 234, 235;
+      fall of Savannah, 245-6, 300-1;
+      Lee's surrender, 255-6;
+      appreciation of Lee's campaign, 256;
+      Northern ability in war, 256;
+      Sherman's campaign, 301 _note_[1]
+    Neutrality in non-idealistic war i. 89, 97
+    Northern ability in war, ii. 256
+    Privateers, i. 158
+    Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 103-4, 158
+    Roebuck's motion, ii. 173, 176, 296 _note_[2]
+    Secession, i. 45, 68
+    Seward, i. 216; ii. 257
+    Slavery:
+      attitude to controversy on, i. 32, 55;
+      condemnation of, 38-9, 40, 71;
+      on Northern attitude to, ii. 89;
+      Emancipation Proclamation, 102-3, 104;
+      criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108;
+      on Biblical sanction of, 110
+    South, The:
+      condemnation of, i. 38-9, 40;
+      lawless element in, 40, 41;
+      changing views on, at opening of the war,
+        55 _and note_[3], 56-7, 68-9;
+      demand of, for recognition, ii. 181;
+      renewed confidence in, ii. 210 _and note_[2]
+    Southern shipbuilding, ii. 145, 146
+    _Trent_ affair, i. 216-7, 225-6, 237
+    War of 1812 ... i. 8
+    "Yankee," The, ii. 246
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 174; ii. 65 _and note_[1],
+  160, 201 _and note_[2], 204 _and note_[2], 295
+Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. 129; ii. 4 _note_[3]
+Toronto _Globe_, the, cited, i. 222 _note_
+Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. 132-3, 134, 291-3
+Train, George Francis, of the _New York Herald_, speeches of,
+  in England, ii. 224 _note_[2]
+Treaty of Washington (1842) i. 4, 9
+Tremenheere, H.S., _The Constitution of the United States_, etc.,
+  cited, ii. 275 _note_[2]
+Tremlett, F.W., quoted, ii. 211-12
+_Trent_ affair. The, i. 195, 203 _and note_, 204 _et seq._
+  British demands in, i. 212-3, 226, 230,
+    points of the complaint, 214 _note_[1];
+    American reply, 232, 234
+  British views on, i. 203, 216, 216-8, 221-4, 225, 226-7;
+    American exultation in, 205-6, 218, 219;
+    effect of in Canada, 222 _note_;
+    Cabinet members' sentiments on, 223;
+    change in American views, 226, 230-1;
+  British speculation on probable war, 228, 229;
+  European support of Britain in, 229, 235;
+  French views on, 230, 234-5;
+  release of envoys, 235;
+  American feeling after settlement of, 236 _and note_[3], 237;
+  Parliamentary debate on conclusion of, 240-1, 262, 265, 274;
+  influence of, on British policy in relation to the Civil War, 242;
+    ii. 15-16;
+  Southerners' action in, i. 211 _note_[1];
+  effect of, on British cotton trade, ii. 9
+
+  Otherwise mentioned, i. 171 _note_[1], 201, 202, 244, 253, 254;
+    ii. 72, 131
+Trescott, William Henry, i. 186, 188
+_Tribune_, The New York, cited, i. 280 _note_[1]
+Trimble, W., "Surplus Food Production of the United States,"
+  cited, ii. 13 _note_[2]
+Trollope, Anthony, i. 239 _and note_[5], 240; ii. 153;
+  description of the United States citizen by, ii. 287-8
+  _North America_, i. 239; ii. 153, 287, 288 _and note_[1]
+Trollope, Mrs., i. 27, 48
+Tyler, President, i. 10
+
+Union and Emancipation Society of London, The:
+  Bright's speech to, ii. 295
+United Empire Loyalists, i. 8 _note_
+United States:
+  Citizenship: theory of, i. 5-6 _and note_
+  Commercial relations with Great Britain, i. 17 _et seq._
+  Democracy in, _See under_ Democracy.
+  International law, influence of U.S. on, belligerent and neutral
+    rights in, i. 5-10, 140
+  Naval power:
+    agitation for increase of, i. 123
+  Policy in the Civil War, ii. 197
+    _See under_ Adams, Lincoln, Seward, _and subject-headings_
+  Political principles of:
+    British sympathy for, i. 3, 26
+  Political institutions in:
+    views of travellers and writers, i. 30; ii. 274 _et seq._
+  Population, growth of, i. 12
+  Protection policy:
+    beginnings of, i. 18-19, 20-1;
+    reaction against in the South, 21
+  Territorial expansion, i. 12 _et seq._
+
+  _See also under subject-headings._
+
+United States Supreme Court:
+  decision on Lincoln's blockade proclamations, i. 110 _note_[3]
+
+Van Buren, President, i. 109
+Vansittart, William, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Vicksburg, capture of,
+  ii. 143, 165, 176 _note_[2], 178, 228 _note_[3], 296;
+  Southern defence of, 164, 165, 178;
+  importance of, in the military situation, 165
+Victoria, Queen, i. 76, 96, 168, 190 _note_[2]; ii. 40, 190, 262;
+  pro-German influence of, 203 _note_[3];
+  writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln, 262
+Vignaud, Henry, ii. 154 _note_[1]
+Virginia, State of, i. 121, 122, 172, 245
+Vogt, A., ii. 301 _note_[3]
+
+Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, ... i. 80
+Walker, Mr., and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii. 100
+Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. 123 _and note_[2]
+Warburton, George _Hochelaga_: i. 29
+Washington, President, i. 11
+Watts, _Cotton, Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2]
+Weed, Thurlow, i. 114 _and notes_, 129, 227, 231; ii. 130 _note_[2]
+Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. 199;
+  in _Trent_ affair, congratulates Wilkes, i. 220;
+  attitude to the "Privateering Bill," ii. 123 _note_[2], 128, 137;
+  mentioned, 84, 96
+West Indian Colonies, i. 3;
+  American trade with, 17, 19, 20, 21;
+  slavery in, 31
+Westbury, Lord, i. 262-3; ii. 64
+_Westminster Review_, The, i. 48, 70 _and note_[1], 71
+Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. 187, 193 _note_
+Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. 13 _note_[2]
+Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. 26, 28
+White, Andrew D., "A Letter to W.H. Russell,"
+  etc. cited, ii. 229 _note_[1]
+Whittier, J.G., i. 29, 47
+Wilberforce, Samuel, i. 31
+Williams, Commander, R.N., i. 204
+Wilkes, Captain, of the _San Jacinto_, intercepts the _Trent_,
+  i. 204, 216, 219-20;
+  American national approbation of, 219-20;
+  Seward on, 233;
+  his action officially stated to be unauthorized, 226, 254
+Wilmington, N.C., i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 247
+Wilson, President, i. 90 _note_
+Wodehouse, Lord, i. 84
+
+Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. 63, 82 _and note_, 85, 86, 264;
+  ii. 4 _note_[3], 223 _note_[1]
+Yeomans, cited, i. 38
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Great Britain and the American Civil
+War, by Ephraim Douglass Adams
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