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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Art of War
+
+Author: Baron Henri de Jomini
+
+Release Date: September 28, 2004 [EBook #13549]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Suzanne Shell, Stephen Schulze and the Online Distributed
+Proofreaders Team
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+ART OF WAR
+
+BY
+
+BARON DE JOMINI,
+
+GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.
+
+A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps.
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
+
+BY
+
+Capt. G.H. MENDELL,
+
+CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY,
+
+AND
+
+Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL,
+
+CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY.
+
+
+Originally published in 1862
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand
+which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in
+making a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too
+rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and
+on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case the
+sense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy to
+preserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators of
+Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored to
+render their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding to
+his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms.
+
+To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is
+not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To
+those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more
+interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass
+of the American public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said
+with entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent
+judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this
+or any other day.
+
+The translation now presented to the people has been made with the
+earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As the
+existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed
+incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that
+military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the
+people. If by the present work the translators shall find they have
+contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object,
+they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it.
+
+To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is
+recommended to begin at the article "Strategy," Chapter III., from that
+point to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return to
+Chapters I. and II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be
+appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially
+true of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is
+quite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all
+other recent writers on the military art.
+
+U.S. Military Academy,
+West Point, N.Y.
+January, 1862.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.
+
+  ART. I.--Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.
+
+  ART. II.--Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a
+            Military View.
+
+  ART. III.--Wars of Expediency.
+
+  ART. IV.--Wars with or without Allies.
+
+  ART. V.--Wars of Intervention.
+
+  ART. VI.--Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other
+            Causes.
+
+  ART. VII.--Wars of Opinion.
+
+  ART. VIII.--National Wars.
+
+  ART. IX.--Civil and Religious Wars.
+
+  ART. X.--Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.
+
+
+CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY.
+
+  ART. XI.--Military Statistics and Geography.
+
+  ART. XII.--Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a
+             War.
+
+  ART. XIII.--The Military Institutions of States.
+
+  ART. XIV.--The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations.
+
+  ART. XV.--The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III. STRATEGY.
+Definition of Strategy and Tactics.
+THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+  ART. XVI.--The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.
+
+  ART. XVII.--The Theater of Operations.
+
+  ART. XVIII.--Bases of Operations.
+
+  ART. XIX.--Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater
+             of War, and Objective Points of Operation.
+
+  ART. XX.--Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense,
+            and Strategic Positions.
+
+  ART. XXI.--Zones and Lines of Operations.
+
+  ART. XXII.--Strategic Lines of Maneuver.
+
+  ART. XXIII.--Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases
+               or Strategic Reserves.
+
+  ART. XXIV.--The Old and New Systems of War.
+
+  ART. XXV.--Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.
+
+  ART. XXVI.--Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched
+              Lines.--Wars of Sieges.
+
+  ART. XXVII.--Intrenched Camps and Tętes de Ponts in their Relation to
+               Strategy.
+
+  ART. XXVIII.--Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.
+
+  ART. XXIX.--Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
+
+  Epitome of Strategy.
+
+
+CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
+
+  ART. XXX.--Positions and Defensive Battles.
+
+  ART. XXXI.--Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.
+
+  ART. XXXII.--Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.
+
+  ART. XXXIII.--Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
+
+  ART. XXXIV.--Surprises of Armies.
+
+  ART. XXXV.--Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de
+              Main generally.
+
+
+CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN
+THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.
+
+  ART. XXXVI.--Diversions and Great Detachments.
+
+  ART. XXXVII.--Passage of Rivers and other Streams.
+
+  ART. XXXVIII.--Retreats and Pursuits.
+
+  ART. XXXIX.--Cantonments and Winter Quarters.
+
+  ART. XL.--Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.
+
+
+CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
+
+  ART. XLI.--A few Remarks on Logistics in general.
+
+  ART. XLII.--Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate
+              Information of the Enemy's Movements.
+
+
+CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
+
+  ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
+
+  ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry.
+
+  ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry.
+
+  ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery.
+
+  ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together.
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+SUPPLEMENT.
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+SECOND APPENDIX.
+
+SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
+
+
+
+SUMMARY OF
+
+THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely
+military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
+Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto
+unrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_.
+Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the
+profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be
+denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is
+indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all
+the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
+various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
+should have a place in a work like this.
+
+To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--
+
+1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
+
+2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of
+war, either for defense or for invasion.
+
+3. Grand Tactics.
+
+4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
+
+5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications.
+
+6. Minor Tactics.
+
+It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
+branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of
+engineering.
+
+Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good
+infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a
+staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.
+
+
+Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
+concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
+determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the
+war.
+
+A government goes to war,--
+
+To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
+
+To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
+manufactures, or agriculture;
+
+To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
+safety of the government or the balance of power;
+
+To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;
+
+To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to
+defend them;
+
+To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of
+territory;
+
+To defend the threatened independence of the state;
+
+To avenge insulted honor; or,
+
+From a mania for conquest.
+
+It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
+degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for
+the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to
+the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and
+there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
+conduct of a war, as,--
+
+1. A state may simply make war against another state.
+
+2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each
+other.
+
+3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.
+
+4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.
+
+5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning
+or after it has commenced.
+
+6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
+ally, or upon its own.
+
+7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant
+territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and
+adventurous.
+
+8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the
+enemy.
+
+9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.
+
+War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the
+art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the
+operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances
+of the case.
+
+For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
+Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
+same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
+compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
+they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
+march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
+of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
+between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in
+nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
+circumstances and events.
+
+To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
+statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
+of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong
+exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the
+highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE I.
+
+Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.
+
+
+When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to
+enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before
+action.
+
+The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
+which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with
+the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our
+times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
+though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
+reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
+Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
+settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
+general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
+all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
+legatee.
+
+Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
+old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
+doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
+he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
+and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
+such attempts can be justified.
+
+In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
+by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
+should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
+would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
+be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
+of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
+by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his
+own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
+able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
+an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
+the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
+enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
+and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
+guarantees to other states.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE II.
+
+Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
+View.
+
+
+A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
+without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
+honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
+awaiting the attack on the frontiers.
+
+There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
+advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
+internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
+party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
+soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on
+the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers,
+and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely
+military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own
+territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial
+features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
+the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
+constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.
+
+These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;
+but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different
+with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of
+communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of
+states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to
+prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles
+which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and
+skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
+variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to
+execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.
+
+For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
+differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of
+Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and
+possess no steadiness under misfortunes.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE III.
+
+Wars of Expediency.
+
+
+The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
+Succession, were wars of expediency.
+
+There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
+undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
+reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to
+prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a
+state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to
+form a coalition for that purpose.
+
+These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE IV.
+
+Of Wars with or without Allies.
+
+
+Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being
+equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker
+states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than
+either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops,
+but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening
+portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All
+history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
+neglected by any power, however formidable.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE V.
+
+Wars of Intervention.
+
+
+To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a
+state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain.
+The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole
+weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when
+it can make decisive use of its resources.
+
+There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal
+affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.
+
+Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the
+first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
+interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured
+in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful.
+While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland,
+Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere
+in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
+
+Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
+perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
+right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it
+certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may
+reach the adjoining states.
+
+There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
+wars,--viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain
+the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the
+war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not
+to be obtained otherwise.
+
+History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect
+of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the
+immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become
+the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the
+proper time."
+
+In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new
+and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be
+decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference
+to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807
+Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Königsberg,
+leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
+launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder,
+it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there
+is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the
+Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred
+thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field,
+and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the
+proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.
+
+There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
+interventions:--
+
+1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force
+specified by former treaties.
+
+2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending
+his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.
+
+3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of
+war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against
+one.
+
+4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or
+interferes before the declaration of war.
+
+When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
+treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice
+in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and
+with an imposing force, the case is quite different.
+
+The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
+Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
+still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
+Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
+far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
+of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
+maneuvering of their allies.
+
+Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
+operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
+this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the
+military character of these expeditions.
+
+It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
+distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
+territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
+is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
+in a measure, an advantage to the state.
+
+In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
+both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
+allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
+finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
+the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
+number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
+struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.
+
+The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
+whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
+than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,
+but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813.
+Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking
+his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with
+two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
+regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany,
+which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention
+Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her
+favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages.
+
+Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater
+was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible
+display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already
+in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and
+at the time most opportune for her.
+
+This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
+monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence
+when they know how to profit by it.
+
+Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
+boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy,
+and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held
+France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and
+arrested the great conqueror in his career.
+
+In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
+to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the
+recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of
+Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized
+Prince Eugene.
+
+Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
+opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they
+could not add to the conviction of the reader.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VI.
+
+Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.
+
+
+There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
+state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
+great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
+
+Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Cćsar,
+and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
+there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
+incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
+and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
+furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however,
+was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
+contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to
+make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
+was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
+yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
+to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
+teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
+disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.
+
+A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a
+crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
+induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.
+
+The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
+and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
+threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
+author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
+general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
+successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
+majority of the people whose territory was invaded.
+
+These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
+same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
+the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
+never to have been changed.
+
+Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
+than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
+spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the
+proper time.
+
+An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
+end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.
+
+An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
+likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as
+was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the
+Revolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was
+better prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was
+attacked by all Europe upon both land and sea.
+
+Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of
+Turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national
+resistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him
+to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were
+twice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and
+Turks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united
+people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element
+of religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was
+formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found,
+while in the interior all was weakness.
+
+When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the
+inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular
+feeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt.
+(These military points are treated of in Article XXIX.) But when the
+invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success
+will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to
+insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a
+state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops,
+and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations,
+depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must
+have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this
+possible.
+
+Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not
+powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may
+arrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805
+and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The
+invasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by
+Austria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a
+wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VII.
+
+Wars of Opinion.
+
+
+Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes
+confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.
+
+Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and,
+lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior
+without being intestine or civil.
+
+Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of
+intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party
+desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it
+desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. Although
+originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most
+deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and
+become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.
+
+The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of
+the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is
+the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of
+dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire
+than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not
+sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman
+Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a
+crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of
+gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.
+
+The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for
+it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For
+instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France,
+had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may,
+however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the
+dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter
+enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.
+
+The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
+about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
+thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous
+declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly
+alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing
+the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing
+it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
+inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the
+human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it
+is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and
+for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a
+factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these
+storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to
+restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
+explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
+better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to
+try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.
+
+After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
+Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
+armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
+upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
+never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of
+Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to
+clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is
+probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the
+Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good,
+temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and
+the immemorial traditions of the French.
+
+In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not
+only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of
+an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party
+will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of
+another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all
+the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
+supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the
+support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did
+one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do
+for the Coalition in 1793?
+
+History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the
+Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of
+attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the
+military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before
+deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what
+would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of
+destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the
+commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to
+France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with
+two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
+again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection
+of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to
+decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have
+depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem
+thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave
+one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say.
+Experiment alone could have determined it.
+
+The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
+wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
+should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
+reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of
+less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be
+made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
+constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
+independence or the integrity of its territory.
+
+The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of
+this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the
+conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was
+made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de
+Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national
+war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
+thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
+opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous
+difference in the results.
+
+Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoulęme was well carried out.
+Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the
+above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there
+divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of
+strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were
+sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the
+instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of
+the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and
+the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps
+have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody
+one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
+similar to that of 1807.
+
+Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
+was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it
+behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from
+that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged
+with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
+Cadiz.
+
+If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship
+was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid
+order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its
+commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the
+counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of
+its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand
+blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep
+veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority
+for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
+nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have
+been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew
+into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,--a striking lesson, by
+which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land,
+although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
+reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
+construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful
+conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated
+from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the
+general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its
+support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not
+less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who
+were in the best position to know it.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VIII.
+
+National Wars.
+
+
+National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of
+invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied
+to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of
+them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their
+independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its
+camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the
+sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.
+
+The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
+though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
+admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of
+humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be
+confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions
+of the state and directed by the government.
+
+This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
+rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters,
+affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them
+the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical
+people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic
+in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
+institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most
+dear.
+
+The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a
+national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and
+are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it,
+their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the
+facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all
+the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will
+be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.
+
+The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility
+of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always
+most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive
+forests.
+
+The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that
+of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
+Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally,
+the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the
+inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer
+time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference
+in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of
+the countries.
+
+Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
+defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that
+any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or
+canals, admits of a formidable defense.
+
+The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as
+in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general
+conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest
+of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the
+English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary
+struggle of La Vendée with the victorious Republic, those of Spain,
+Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the
+Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of Queen
+Christina, are still more striking illustrations.
+
+The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by
+a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an
+army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly
+in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each
+individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the
+non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every
+means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which
+he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and
+multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step.
+
+These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is
+difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their
+connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the
+commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the
+slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best
+measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information
+of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to
+gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only
+in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his
+combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted
+movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is
+about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs
+of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is
+attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications,
+destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his
+depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must
+inevitably yield after a time.
+
+In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When
+Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of
+the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four
+brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish
+forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago
+de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo,
+Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the
+companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never
+able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal
+escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had
+thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single
+division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the
+Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part
+of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind
+the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a
+league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when
+he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the
+regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard
+Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the
+marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
+this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
+information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them
+fall more readily into snares.
+
+No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a
+system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all
+the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at
+the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy
+wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of
+respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what
+force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the
+safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?
+
+The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the
+obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the
+occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What
+efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops
+of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for
+six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and
+Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford,
+Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castańos, Reding, and Ballasteros!
+
+If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will
+be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops
+proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered,
+calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time
+and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and,
+particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the
+League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
+Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendée, are models of their kind, which may be
+employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable
+order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the
+late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the
+success of their enterprises.
+
+The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars
+have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any
+other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being
+also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders.
+This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its
+consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the
+people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be
+convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of
+conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only
+to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests,
+should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how
+to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred
+thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with
+the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and
+without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole
+population--men, women, and children--of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne,
+and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled
+town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and
+incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the
+Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces,
+who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of
+them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The
+difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor
+of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion
+without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of
+extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the
+people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will
+it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to
+organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their
+governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take
+in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?
+
+I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the
+cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French
+troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the
+better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to
+fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or
+arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands.
+To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good
+national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive
+in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system
+was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the
+whole of Germany in 1813.
+
+I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian
+philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of
+extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the
+defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good
+political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.
+
+As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized
+assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that
+my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and
+English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at
+Fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women,
+and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE IX.
+
+Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.
+
+
+Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally
+the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious
+sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the
+collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most
+deplorable.
+
+We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force
+against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would
+weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that
+it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in
+French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is
+difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis
+XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put
+upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are
+horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful
+when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the
+League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is
+difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time
+of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a
+state of brutality.
+
+To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon
+which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two
+parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to
+reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the
+intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with
+ambitious views.
+
+Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a
+political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although
+these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is
+possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in
+religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had
+no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to
+subject France to his influence, or to dismember it.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE X.
+
+Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once.
+
+
+The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at
+the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the
+necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.
+
+A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring
+states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally
+to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of
+the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations
+allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter
+into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it
+will be an ordinary war.
+
+Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon,
+sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests
+arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on
+the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from
+imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking
+alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish
+something like equality between the strength of the parties.
+
+The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his
+designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had
+alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only
+oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more
+equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding
+to the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the
+subsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different
+states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of
+Europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends.
+
+Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was
+almost impossible to avoid.
+
+France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of
+the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of
+the Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets
+they would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd
+calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France
+miraculously escaped.
+
+Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has
+voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable
+wars,--with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case
+he expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of
+Turkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so
+that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been
+generally supposed.
+
+It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made
+against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary,
+and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in
+opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For
+instance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and
+Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with
+Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter
+contests belong to ordinary wars.
+
+It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if
+possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more
+prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them,
+until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule,
+however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the
+localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure,
+equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will
+influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
+noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+MILITARY POLICY.
+
+
+We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
+the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
+political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
+there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
+war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
+include these under the head of _Military Policy_.
+
+Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
+projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
+and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
+assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
+without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise
+on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
+operations.
+
+Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
+fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
+their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
+or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
+and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
+of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
+operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
+force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
+statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
+resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of
+which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
+
+There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
+should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and
+that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the
+arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points
+which ought to guide in this sort of combinations.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XI.
+
+Military Statistics and Geography.
+
+
+By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
+possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy
+with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
+topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all
+the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the
+examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in
+the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the
+country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his
+chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of
+cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day,
+despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical,
+diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two
+examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the
+Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and
+forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the
+declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with
+their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
+sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
+
+The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the
+interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no
+district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding
+it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.
+
+All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to
+the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was
+given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable
+barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which I, having lived
+in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply
+rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of
+which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and
+would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
+that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in
+the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities
+more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects
+of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old
+system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the
+empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
+multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a
+national defense.
+
+Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography
+and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in
+treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon
+them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not
+fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he
+represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
+Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
+with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and
+1809.
+
+But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the
+European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for
+instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. Awaiting
+the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and
+unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and
+strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of
+topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the
+excellent charts published in all European countries within the last
+twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography was
+in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
+works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian
+staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
+charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and
+Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise
+to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.
+
+Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
+vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
+navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by
+a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan
+operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
+subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
+enterprises.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XII.
+
+Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War.
+
+
+As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
+enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts
+to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this
+point under the head of national wars.
+
+On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his
+own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he
+endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike
+susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary
+with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has
+been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and
+of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and
+those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of
+their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
+miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
+different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who
+inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of
+electrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute the
+advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in
+battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
+impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in
+maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it,
+disorder easily results.
+
+The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the
+armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to
+rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value
+of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared
+with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly
+organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against
+undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave
+may be its individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order
+produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without
+discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would
+not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and
+nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt
+with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a
+Napoleon.
+
+The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences
+the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are
+tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match
+for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal.
+
+As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of
+victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals
+have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make
+a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the
+hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general
+had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
+cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to
+deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This
+risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they
+are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to
+apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this
+truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this
+objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in
+providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
+course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
+battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
+accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.
+
+If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it
+will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of
+the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the
+most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately,
+this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank,
+age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as
+the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we
+will devote to it a separate article.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of
+the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication,
+&c., and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat very
+disastrous.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIII.
+
+Military Institutions.
+
+
+One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is
+the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a
+general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with
+a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a
+great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be
+combined.
+
+Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:--
+
+1. To have a good recruiting-system;
+
+2. A good organization;
+
+8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
+
+4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as
+well as those of a campaign;
+
+5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
+subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the
+formalities of the service;
+
+6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
+
+7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
+
+8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
+defensive and offensive arms;
+
+9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
+organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical
+education of its officers;
+
+10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
+administration;
+
+11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the
+principal operations of war;
+
+12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.
+
+To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
+equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of
+battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the
+troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and
+health of veterans.
+
+None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
+inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
+national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in
+fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has
+often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good
+army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and
+instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable
+of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate
+India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive
+love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
+an army capable of executing his great enterprises.
+
+A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
+culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
+standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing
+for it success. We are far from saying that a government should
+sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it
+ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the
+prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
+fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case--which is, unfortunately,
+of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise
+institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the
+general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of
+national reserves.
+
+There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
+executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
+Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
+Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
+operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle,
+it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form
+of government exercises a great influence in the development of the
+military strength of a nation and the value of its troops.
+
+When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected
+by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and
+penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive,
+whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a
+chief devoted to all the national interests.
+
+The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to
+this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most
+far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war,
+whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at
+some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist
+sudden aggressions.
+
+In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members
+of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus,
+Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the
+institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
+to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
+exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and
+their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to
+the more statesmanlike preparations for war?
+
+I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
+sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
+things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
+except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean
+that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in
+a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. And the
+wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation
+as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system
+of military policy.
+
+If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
+governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are
+less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a
+formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these
+deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and
+have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength.
+Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list
+of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
+under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
+extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
+themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
+and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which
+overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here
+it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of
+power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the
+true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
+after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public
+Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the
+dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank
+of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that
+countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and
+militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they
+present decided advantages.
+
+It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in
+the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to
+degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies,
+and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly
+resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in
+preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from
+becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors
+useful for the defense of the country.
+
+The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
+possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
+permanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. In general terms,
+the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and
+if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable
+elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
+copied from it.
+
+As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service,
+and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the
+promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the
+remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On
+the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be
+suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the
+other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.
+
+The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:
+it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of
+success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau
+and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer
+to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
+cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the
+great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would
+not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a
+very different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been the
+victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a
+little more trouble to carry than a saber!
+
+The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the
+state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great
+advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the
+offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the
+attention of a provident government.
+
+The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
+revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone
+will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios
+and Cćsars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the
+nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.
+
+The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful
+rapidity.[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it
+is said the Austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which
+throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the Perkins
+steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will
+multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau,
+Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the
+European races.
+
+If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
+inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the
+half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture
+with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be
+obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a
+battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.
+
+We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor,
+and horses also will require the same protection.
+
+While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is,
+however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which
+should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused
+by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.
+
+We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the
+military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.
+
+1. The prince should receive an education both political and military.
+He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils
+than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the
+latter himself.
+
+2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his
+first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He
+must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the
+general most capable of directing his armies.
+
+3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
+footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by
+reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and
+discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;
+its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and
+superior if possible.
+
+4. The matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and
+abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals.
+National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all
+improvements in this matériel made in other countries.
+
+5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
+encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
+military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
+securing for the army men of merit and genius.
+
+6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
+preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should
+be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all
+statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and
+papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
+of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently
+stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be
+simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret
+department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of
+the corps.
+
+7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
+and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their
+material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the
+strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should
+be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they
+acquit themselves with marked ability.
+
+8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
+entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of
+operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well
+as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the
+enterprise.
+
+9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the
+war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the
+country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of
+the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and
+material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring
+into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable
+alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties
+during the war.
+
+10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the
+chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute
+to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great
+in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when
+armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last
+crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well
+organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least
+for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure
+soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and
+honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made
+to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the
+enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which
+cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its
+efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of
+the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that
+France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
+200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while
+meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.
+
+A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very
+badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the
+strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the
+scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy
+combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of
+well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts
+to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of
+sustaining a long war.
+
+A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
+a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron,
+and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This
+result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of
+the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing
+resources to an assailant.
+
+We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are
+not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our
+purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be
+for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and
+localities may make in these relations.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this many
+years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
+attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which
+he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important
+improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less
+marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no
+civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for
+depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--TRANSLATORS.]
+
+[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall
+of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
+efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIV.
+
+The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.
+
+
+Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by
+the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain
+that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or
+Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of
+performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would
+be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.
+
+As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more
+fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince,
+(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will
+only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other
+respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who
+is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he
+is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much
+by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public
+resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
+accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be
+devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
+enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the
+execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and
+in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to
+induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and
+the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no
+military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
+influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good
+results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will
+present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience
+necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his
+judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and
+opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
+if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
+accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the
+contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his
+presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to
+great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its
+communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad
+results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at
+head-quarters!
+
+When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
+armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
+direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the
+Prussian government with Blücher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two
+generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability,
+the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be
+harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army
+of Silesia in 1813.
+
+The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
+proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has
+frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred
+that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser,
+who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
+the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward
+with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
+think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is
+deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known
+that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity
+than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret
+authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and
+allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill
+and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.
+
+If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles,
+he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
+selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same
+titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of
+the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in
+execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these
+counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.
+
+We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in
+person, his most important duty will be to have the position of
+commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done.
+Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the
+more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
+Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the
+ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After
+Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of
+Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont
+succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
+Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for
+mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough
+to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational
+nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an
+influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the
+prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
+But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be
+profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will
+be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a
+judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general
+requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
+military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be
+guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper
+influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is
+at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
+the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained
+a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not
+always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the
+government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there
+may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In
+this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better
+than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
+their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
+position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
+Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
+subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
+astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their
+appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by
+appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be
+deceived in his selections.
+
+One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
+realizing the beautiful fiction of Fénélon in Telemachus, by finding a
+faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the
+prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his
+more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in
+reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their
+character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to
+personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
+rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all
+the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed
+so much luster upon the Russian arms.
+
+It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing
+could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Cćsar, when he was
+ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte
+at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two
+directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public
+sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises
+and the experience of events.
+
+The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
+follow:--First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_;
+Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. His
+scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned
+characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It
+is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His
+knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
+perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
+in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is
+gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others
+instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit
+conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even
+pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
+merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are
+always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
+little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing
+that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the
+glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.
+
+The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to
+assign to the command a general of long experience in service with
+troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little
+experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war
+is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be
+able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment
+against an enemy. Peter the Great, Condé, Frederick, and Napoleon are
+instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the
+staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will
+not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that
+he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural
+genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a
+general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of
+conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question
+does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
+negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of
+the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to
+a rational conclusion:--
+
+1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery,
+who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal
+chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one
+arm or special corps.
+
+2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war,
+will be equally fitted for the command.
+
+3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
+commander-in-chief.
+
+Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the
+requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the
+principles of the art of war.
+
+The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the
+formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may
+advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the
+operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of
+organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction
+into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.
+
+Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
+thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General
+Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible
+rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step
+from the sublime to the ridiculous!
+
+Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and
+his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man
+of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice
+of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a
+general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit
+him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;
+for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
+fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The
+best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of
+several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.
+
+It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent
+councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
+weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if
+the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find
+in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of
+the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
+expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
+originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
+which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his
+own conception?
+
+I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and
+no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than
+myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is
+absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military
+officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
+accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount
+of dissent.
+
+What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
+proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
+maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
+them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
+difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting
+them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
+executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved
+failures?
+
+In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be
+useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case
+they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition,
+may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use
+every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only
+advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply
+consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this
+harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce
+unfortunate results.
+
+Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of
+organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by
+experience, is--
+
+1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
+and of unshaken firmness in danger.
+
+2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
+faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
+harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
+the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher,
+aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
+not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
+is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
+a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
+general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.
+
+Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
+influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the
+seat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
+from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
+from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
+saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
+repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
+fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
+individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
+war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
+duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
+but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
+opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
+decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
+connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
+operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
+campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
+battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
+determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations,
+whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
+these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
+levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
+it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
+ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
+limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
+to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
+the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
+unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
+responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
+who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
+directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
+scene of operations.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
+save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
+order to form an oblique line.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XV.
+
+The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.
+
+
+The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
+would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
+military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
+situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
+that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
+decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
+habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
+or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
+virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
+Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
+virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
+as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
+the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
+whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
+neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
+industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
+should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
+strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
+heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
+whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
+death in the footsteps of the Cćsars than to fatten upon the public
+miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
+Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
+tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
+estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
+health, or fortune to the defense of his country.
+
+The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
+with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
+to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
+in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
+government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
+qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
+institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
+worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
+contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
+against the employment of officers of the army in other public
+functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
+offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments
+demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
+abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
+prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
+of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
+retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
+it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
+lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
+in the theaters and public clubs?
+
+It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
+the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
+military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
+to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
+early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
+bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
+that they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealous
+of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
+the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
+twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
+in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
+advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
+where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
+the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
+military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
+employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
+spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
+comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.
+
+However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
+government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
+order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
+the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
+insult and dependency.
+
+It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
+but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
+what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
+regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
+wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.
+
+The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
+different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
+the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
+temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance,
+or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
+skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is
+more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
+object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage
+should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
+respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
+rather than in external forms only.
+
+The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
+faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
+possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
+more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is
+necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
+difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
+opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
+with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.
+
+By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
+in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
+their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
+love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
+every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
+punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain
+a high military spirit.
+
+Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
+formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
+the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
+heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
+lost.
+
+I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
+the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he
+encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'
+troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
+contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.
+
+The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics
+which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
+by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
+surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
+thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
+Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
+charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
+fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
+panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
+is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
+becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
+maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
+resource but in ignominious flight.
+
+Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
+and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
+it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
+been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
+which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
+pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
+of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
+the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
+more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
+hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
+days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
+vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.
+
+Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
+more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
+who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
+promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.
+
+In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
+The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
+degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
+soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
+of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
+the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
+precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
+contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
+most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
+slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
+or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
+rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
+momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
+offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
+the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
+powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
+obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
+There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
+for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
+soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
+when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
+them,--which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
+exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
+rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
+in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.
+
+It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
+trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
+are purely military.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
+from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
+colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
+most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]
+
+[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should
+pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
+and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+STRATEGY.
+
+DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+
+The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
+consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
+Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
+We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
+In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
+when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
+importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
+necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
+ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
+and handling of a great army.
+
+We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
+commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
+character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
+and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
+consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.
+
+The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
+of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
+select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
+temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
+namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
+opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
+operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
+temporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this front
+of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.
+
+When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
+resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
+him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
+lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
+degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
+confounded.
+
+To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
+lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.
+
+If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
+annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
+dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
+be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
+be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
+result.
+
+The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
+enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
+be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
+point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
+point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
+commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
+detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
+strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
+less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
+leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
+thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.
+
+If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
+it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
+important objective point.
+
+If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
+intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
+occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
+strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
+also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
+streams, it will construct _tętes de pont_; and, if the bridges are
+within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
+means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
+strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.
+
+Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
+order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
+equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
+and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.
+
+When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
+field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
+is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
+campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
+differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
+activity and energy to attain prompt success.
+
+Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
+while discussing combinations which result from these operations.
+
+Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:--
+
+1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
+different combinations of which it admits.
+
+2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
+the most favorable direction for operations.
+
+3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
+operations.
+
+4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
+
+5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
+
+6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
+strategic front.
+
+7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
+maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
+
+8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
+
+9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
+
+10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
+army.
+
+11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
+as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
+
+12. Points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont,_ &c.
+
+13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.
+
+These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
+first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
+nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
+disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
+belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.
+
+The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
+formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
+the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
+and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
+execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.
+
+To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
+comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
+posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
+ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
+ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
+extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
+comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
+strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
+the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
+and the employment of the troops.
+
+It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
+and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
+the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
+pitched battles the above definition holds good.
+
+Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
+following objects:--
+
+1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.
+
+2. The offensive in a defensive battle.
+
+3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
+attack of the enemy's line.
+
+4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.
+
+5. Surprises of armies in the open field.
+
+6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.
+
+7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.
+
+8. _Coups de main_.
+
+All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
+skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
+any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
+regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.
+
+
+THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
+the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good
+combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:--
+
+1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
+upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
+communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
+one's own.
+
+2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
+one's forces.
+
+3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
+decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
+the first importance to overthrow.
+
+4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
+decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
+energy.
+
+This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
+objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the
+forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
+recognizing those points.
+
+This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
+enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
+necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article
+XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
+XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different
+combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
+there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
+problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
+strategy.
+
+The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
+zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
+operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
+line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the
+center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
+the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
+remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
+wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
+with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
+will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
+question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
+to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
+simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
+giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
+strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
+talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
+to carry out any combinations previously arranged.
+
+We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
+and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
+campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
+the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
+the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.
+
+
+
+
+OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVI.
+
+Of the System of Operations.
+
+
+War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
+shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
+by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
+great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
+attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense
+of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
+if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is
+confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
+_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
+always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
+assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
+diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and
+generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
+excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he
+feels that the independence of his country is threatened.
+
+In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
+side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
+which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
+the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
+favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
+country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
+generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
+in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
+a speedy termination of the contest.
+
+For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
+_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
+in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses
+upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
+initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
+desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
+strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
+fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
+where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
+him.
+
+Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
+positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
+taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
+his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.
+
+The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
+obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which
+account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
+about equally balanced.
+
+Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
+from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
+throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
+defensive before it ends.
+
+A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
+may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
+defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
+The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
+country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
+retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
+obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own
+army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
+seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
+contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
+detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
+his progress.
+
+An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
+inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
+artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
+obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
+extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
+the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
+his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
+he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
+the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
+the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
+may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
+advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
+prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
+the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
+the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.
+
+During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was
+the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
+the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
+his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
+opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course
+was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
+suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
+talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
+two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
+the progress of a defensive war.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVII.
+
+Of the Theater of Operations.
+
+
+The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
+may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
+to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
+When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
+hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between France and England
+since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
+and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
+other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria
+may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
+German States take part therein.
+
+Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
+theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
+strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
+second case each army will have its own independent theater of
+operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the
+territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
+defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
+maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
+danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
+action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
+If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
+operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
+general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
+object.
+
+Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
+or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:--
+
+1. Of a fixed base of operations.
+
+2. Of a principal objective point.
+
+3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.
+
+4. Of zones and lines of operations.
+
+5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.
+
+6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
+enemy.
+
+7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
+either for the offensive or defensive.
+
+8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
+point and the primary base.
+
+9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.
+
+For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
+with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
+starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
+Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
+traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
+operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
+concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
+zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.
+
+In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
+point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
+with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.
+
+It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
+_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
+move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
+of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
+maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
+excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
+of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.
+
+It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
+to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
+they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
+for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
+points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
+desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
+individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
+the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
+was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
+of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
+defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
+lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
+pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
+separately.
+
+Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
+strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary,
+these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
+that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.
+
+Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
+inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
+Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his
+foot."
+
+Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
+united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
+carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
+partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
+heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
+decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys.
+
+These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
+that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
+points that admit of discussion.
+
+The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
+the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
+examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
+remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
+general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
+passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
+these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
+a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVIII.
+
+Bases of Operations.
+
+
+A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
+obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
+takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
+it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.
+
+The base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not
+necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
+a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or
+Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.
+
+When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
+alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
+of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
+be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
+own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
+vast difference between those parts of the country without military
+positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
+other portions where these military resources are found; and these
+latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
+have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
+Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
+beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
+if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
+Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
+upon the Loire.
+
+These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
+first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
+necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
+base on Béfort or Besançon, on Mézičres or Sedan, as the Russian army
+after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
+established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
+These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
+decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
+country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
+himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
+held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.
+
+The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
+covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
+it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
+favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
+retired.
+
+A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
+sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
+should be a _tęte de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.
+
+All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
+have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
+that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
+the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
+almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
+affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
+two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
+apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
+unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.
+
+The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
+Operations:--
+
+     "The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
+     great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
+     consequently, upon the direction of the bases.
+
+     [Illustration: Fig. 1.]
+
+     "If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
+     or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
+     may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy
+     occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
+     obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
+     to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
+     theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
+     that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
+     p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
+     line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
+     the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
+     Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
+     the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
+     them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
+     faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
+     French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
+     operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
+     D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
+     of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
+     communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.
+
+     "The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
+     occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
+     and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
+     by the side A B. The result is well known.
+
+     "The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
+     such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
+     losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
+     bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
+     with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
+     Ulm, and Jena.
+
+     "When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
+     bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
+     closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
+     insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
+     an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
+     defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it.
+     The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
+     fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
+     impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
+     the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
+     war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
+     in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
+     the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
+     frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
+     it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
+     Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
+     control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
+     establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
+     since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
+     shortened side,--as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
+     with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
+     Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
+     Franconia."
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2.]
+
+The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
+opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
+French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense
+advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
+Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
+Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
+Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
+upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.
+
+If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
+be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
+the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
+operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
+and line of retreat.
+
+It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
+in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
+object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
+favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
+double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
+objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
+perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
+which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
+other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
+be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
+sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
+while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was
+done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
+degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
+thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
+perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
+left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
+enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
+extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
+him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
+having already rejoined him.
+
+In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
+forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
+and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
+extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians
+at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.
+
+If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
+being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
+well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
+partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
+Article XX.
+
+Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
+bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
+favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
+as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
+exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
+the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
+favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
+praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
+Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
+Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
+the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
+only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
+line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.
+
+Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
+secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
+many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
+except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
+supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
+notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
+have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
+thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
+the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
+the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
+its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
+base were established upon the coast.
+
+An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
+diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle,
+viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
+by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
+retreat._
+
+A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
+adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
+or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
+supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
+one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
+disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.
+
+However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
+may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
+your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
+of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
+We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
+given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
+which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
+(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
+
+Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon
+the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army
+covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and
+Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as
+its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
+would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer,
+or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
+terminated with the first campaign.
+
+Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
+frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or
+temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's
+country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they
+will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIX.
+
+Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
+Objective Points of Operations.
+
+
+Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this
+title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:
+these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value
+from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the
+hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against
+them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally,
+there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
+whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE
+strategic points.
+
+Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance,
+whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the
+presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical
+strategic point.
+
+A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily
+be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated
+operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such
+essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from
+the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by
+some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It
+would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not
+necessarily decisive points.
+
+Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from
+their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided
+as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
+belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which
+have value merely because they connect two strategic points.
+
+To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in
+their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates
+to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon
+which enterprises occur.
+
+Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective
+point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater
+of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all
+decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations.
+We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in
+our selection of the second.
+
+I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all
+those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the
+result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose
+geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor
+the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense
+are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy
+in importance the first rank among them.
+
+The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first
+are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
+consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the
+case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the
+Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the
+country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the
+Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if
+he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the
+Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be
+looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
+
+Those points the possession of which would give the control of the
+junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of
+communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. For
+instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the
+valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at the center of communications
+between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
+not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an
+extended camp with _tętes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly a
+strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
+communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
+both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if
+a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive
+point.
+
+All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are
+not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and
+government.
+
+In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of
+exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to
+any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the
+importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in
+1800.
+
+The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
+which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.
+
+When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army
+through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth
+or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was
+cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
+support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same
+position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and
+from the army of Mélas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
+him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since
+this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
+retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
+and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective
+point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Mélas by the
+Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence
+Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason
+of the march of Mélas upon Nice.
+
+It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
+maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
+operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting
+forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to
+the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of
+forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the
+case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although
+dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.
+
+If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
+decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be
+more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
+separately.
+
+The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,--
+
+1. The features of the ground.
+
+2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
+
+3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
+
+These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.
+
+
+OBJECTIVE POINTS.
+
+There are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of
+maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objective
+point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of
+operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support
+for ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, in
+contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance
+from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile
+masses.
+
+In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point.
+If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the
+hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy
+to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the
+objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the
+political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their
+respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the
+art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
+operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to
+occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital,
+the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
+of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
+would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For
+instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
+first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
+second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
+objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain
+possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being
+considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of
+the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first
+line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
+reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be
+to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
+forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the
+river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the
+first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,--which might be
+attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
+
+As to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate
+particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile
+forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The
+greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in
+some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most
+conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were
+satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of
+an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
+accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile
+army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no
+organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative
+advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
+concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
+promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
+position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his
+center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
+he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut
+his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
+forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
+campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
+best.
+
+When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
+and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
+in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
+not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
+of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
+Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
+advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
+are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
+the adjoining states.
+
+The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
+almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
+in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
+of operations.
+
+As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
+upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
+circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
+the two parties.
+
+In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
+be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such
+as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
+In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
+by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
+hostile army, as did Napoleon.
+
+The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
+only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they
+could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
+hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
+be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
+success.
+
+There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
+determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
+play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
+plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_.
+
+Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
+its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
+undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but
+often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great
+errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the
+Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
+operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their
+failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The
+expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799--likewise due to the
+views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
+Belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke
+Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,--a step quite contrary to the
+interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
+illustrations prove that political objective points should be
+subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
+attained.
+
+This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd
+to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given
+has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective
+points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or
+their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events
+of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will
+be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
+should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in
+other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great
+attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this
+kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a
+separate article.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a
+line cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive
+or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_
+points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
+expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
+attain.]
+
+[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
+English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing
+to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XX.
+
+Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
+Positions.
+
+
+There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble
+each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently
+confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts of
+operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic
+positions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction
+between them and to expose their relations to each other.
+
+
+FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.
+
+When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
+generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
+toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of the
+theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two
+or three marches is called the _front of operations_.
+
+The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
+confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.
+
+Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed
+by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the
+other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or
+two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes
+the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.
+
+When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
+the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will
+undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the
+strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line
+of defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
+Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French,
+and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This
+occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to
+confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not
+necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when
+its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic
+front, but it is never without a front of operations.
+
+The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
+different terms.
+
+At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations
+extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the
+line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at
+Löwenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His
+forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose
+strategic positions were interior and central and presented three
+different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
+of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
+the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
+strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
+his operations to these points.
+
+The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
+operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
+Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
+Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
+Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
+positions.
+
+The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
+and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
+operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
+to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
+far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
+direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
+account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
+that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
+parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
+front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
+means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
+thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
+base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
+
+The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
+points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
+the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
+from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
+to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
+Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
+obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
+ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
+be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
+that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
+should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
+upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the
+army the _tęte de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications
+were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line
+parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown
+back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
+remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena
+and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon
+Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby
+forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.
+
+The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the
+base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days'
+duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by
+important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive
+blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good
+pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.
+
+It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic
+front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every
+line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an
+example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In
+order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to
+present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the
+Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
+
+All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the
+same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require
+a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops
+into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries
+which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception,
+since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy
+could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double
+strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an
+offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always
+dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)
+
+Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national
+or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities.
+Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would
+have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country
+and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus,
+Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
+while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
+
+
+LINES OF DEFENSE.
+
+Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical
+lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of
+defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as
+the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which
+relate only to the temporary position of an army.
+
+The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
+well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as
+ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of
+the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the
+practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great
+obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in
+the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine,
+the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of
+defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.
+
+Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and
+every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary
+fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both
+strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress
+of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in
+search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently
+strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
+tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army
+from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
+artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other
+hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should
+fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many
+armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense,
+it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and
+receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In
+addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is
+difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be
+able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the
+outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
+Wurmser in Mantua.
+
+
+STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
+
+There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position
+may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for
+battle.
+
+Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended
+to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
+covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line
+of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
+distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli,
+Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in
+Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
+positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before
+the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar
+in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in
+face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic
+positions,--for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily
+positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are
+sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements,
+are of this class.
+
+This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
+points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
+observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
+positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position
+of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile
+operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large
+detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying
+strategic positions.
+
+The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts,
+lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a
+multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.
+
+In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with
+the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.
+
+In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of
+defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural
+or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of
+support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and
+are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of
+maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of
+operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months.
+In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.
+
+Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
+it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
+fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
+pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of
+Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
+of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
+of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
+support and endures throughout a campaign.
+
+The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
+short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
+it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
+extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
+prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
+point.
+
+The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
+be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
+make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
+short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
+should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
+unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
+a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
+of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
+operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same
+results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
+1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
+have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
+
+The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
+be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
+should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
+intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
+interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
+in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
+a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
+of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
+security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
+rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.
+
+An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
+selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
+concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy
+when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon
+prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of
+Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.
+
+When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
+careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
+called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal
+faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for
+all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an
+attack.
+
+Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point
+upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic
+front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able
+to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in
+rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so
+as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting
+a passage.
+
+For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation
+or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however
+brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of
+defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete
+the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with
+temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
+difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.]
+
+[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
+positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter
+devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXI.
+
+Zones and Lines of Operations.
+
+
+A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war,
+which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object,
+whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For
+example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the
+right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.
+
+A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of
+operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or
+of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein.
+Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_,
+depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number
+of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.
+
+It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a
+_line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road
+in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;
+but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the
+sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real
+line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
+the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would
+not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the
+communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole
+space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.
+
+The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the
+general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate
+the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army.
+Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic
+lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive
+points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
+front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to
+those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive
+points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
+temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines of
+communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different
+portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone
+of operations.
+
+For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand
+Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and
+another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden,
+Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the
+forces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic as
+an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading
+from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;
+the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
+Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte
+from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
+marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be
+said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal
+line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon
+which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned,
+and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.
+
+If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
+combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on
+each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities,
+it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided
+into different classes, according to their relations to the different
+positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field,
+and to the enterprises projected by the commander.
+
+_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a
+frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.
+
+_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies
+proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies
+which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in
+distance and for long intervals of time.[11]
+
+_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to
+oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the
+general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in
+a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose
+to them a greater force.[12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the opposite
+result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time
+on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.
+
+_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from
+widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance
+of or behind the base.
+
+_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point
+to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course,
+necessitate a subdivision of the army.
+
+There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_.
+
+The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
+adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
+confounded with the real _lines of operations_.
+
+_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each
+other mutual support,--as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
+secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
+was secondary to that of Barclay.
+
+_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the
+original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
+highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully
+recognized only by a great and active mind.
+
+There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of
+operations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a
+preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select
+a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the
+class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines
+of operations.
+
+These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
+me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than
+that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter
+has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has
+no lines of operations.
+
+The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
+armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of
+Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large
+depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest,
+and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted.
+These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
+will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different
+proposed enterprises.
+
+1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will
+extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both
+be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in
+the interval which separates them from it. Even if Mélas[13] had
+possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have
+been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
+occupied the line of the Po.
+
+2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated
+his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double
+exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided
+his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him
+to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to
+could unite.
+
+Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
+its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than
+when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of
+support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the
+establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of
+operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it
+has no line of operations.
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH
+REVOLUTION.
+
+At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
+Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included
+in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it
+being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed.
+The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three
+zones of operations,--the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue
+to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the
+interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the
+frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
+
+When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
+union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
+zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in
+Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not
+conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made.
+Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the
+concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion
+of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the
+King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him
+not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon
+France another form of government?
+
+When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the
+French were no longer able to invade. This _rôle_ was reserved for the
+allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.
+
+The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
+thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
+leagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a good
+defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was
+only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
+favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could
+only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the
+Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the
+rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the
+excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this
+plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.
+
+The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family
+reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might
+subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand,
+Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
+thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the
+Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
+displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them
+than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct
+on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the
+resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field,
+as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During
+the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for
+success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
+anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more
+serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the
+advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions,
+and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately.
+Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
+Grandpré,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
+(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons.
+
+The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with
+the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to
+guard every point.
+
+The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
+Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and
+how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin
+of armies.
+
+Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the
+strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of
+a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of
+rendering invasion upon every point feasible.
+
+I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
+abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater
+from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he
+was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this
+movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front,
+while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon
+the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely
+in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.
+
+The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
+direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
+Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
+to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves
+praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this
+enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the
+extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had
+been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized
+and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a
+few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
+armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of
+the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of
+the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?
+
+Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
+particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince,
+and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of
+the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars
+of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14]
+If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was
+France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had
+risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having
+beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
+Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the
+Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the
+Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army
+of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with
+its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It
+is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
+running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the
+duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army
+pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several
+victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on
+a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
+threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies
+of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
+and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon
+the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
+side and Landau on the other.
+
+It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in
+the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they
+should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while
+the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or
+aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this
+army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the
+Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and
+Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?
+
+In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a
+painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of
+this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to
+represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this,
+it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the
+armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and
+the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four
+corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
+divisions, which composed two armies.
+
+These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels,
+as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
+difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
+were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
+difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position
+of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank
+the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of
+the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to
+great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on
+the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate
+of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon
+the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.
+
+If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
+made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
+month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.
+
+The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
+was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
+battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
+Flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of Clairfayt, and upon the
+left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
+a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
+was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_
+were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
+known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
+Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
+before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
+invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
+central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
+to beat all his large detachments in detail.
+
+Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
+been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
+this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
+been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and
+forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
+diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
+between the sea and two fortresses?
+
+The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
+error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
+Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
+till the 3d of June,--more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
+opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
+the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
+its left,--that is, both upon the Meuse,--the state of affairs would
+have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
+of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
+different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
+center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained
+by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of
+three hundred miles in extent.
+
+In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
+theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,--which opened a new
+field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this
+campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
+Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
+alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in
+the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre
+and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought
+Pichegru back to Landau.
+
+In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
+1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The
+armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the
+extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794,
+they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the
+Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his
+forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then
+seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to
+steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the
+battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
+Moreau to retreat.
+
+Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is
+to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the
+battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic
+lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable
+army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits
+the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The
+lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons
+every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the
+first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
+upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and
+is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to
+keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these
+lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and
+Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back
+upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges
+of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to
+take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
+
+In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
+two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and
+the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the
+center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia,
+being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The three
+armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eighty
+leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he
+unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the
+army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern
+Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of
+following up their success on this central line, which cost them so
+dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the
+Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the
+other trifles at Manheim.
+
+In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves
+thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the
+Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force
+is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples
+returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic
+direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central
+position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
+and beats it, while some leagues from the other.
+
+In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
+changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
+operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
+of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the
+Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
+similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines,
+affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt
+an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate.
+By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts
+off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving
+its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which
+forms its secondary line.
+
+Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of
+the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
+armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
+Mélas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
+Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
+operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
+Mélas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
+may thus be seen that Mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on the
+contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
+communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.]
+
+The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
+importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
+operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
+defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his
+invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.
+
+By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
+campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
+to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
+principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines
+enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
+important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also
+satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
+this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
+fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
+
+
+MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
+
+From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
+that of many others, the following maxims result:--
+
+1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
+point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
+choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
+this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
+campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
+1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too
+much studied by military men.
+
+Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
+objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
+be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for
+this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first
+operation and the new phases it may develop.
+
+2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
+situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position
+of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case,
+however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the
+extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating
+would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the
+two extremities at the same time_.[15]
+
+It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide
+his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line
+will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible,
+the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the
+rear of his line of defense or front of operations.
+
+The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it
+affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that
+by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's
+force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of
+the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost
+without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the
+Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction
+of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
+Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the
+Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Mélas were still more
+brilliant.
+
+3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained,
+it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the
+assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this
+danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic
+direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to
+the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take
+advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a
+change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)
+
+The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important
+qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by
+these examples.
+
+If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
+Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
+protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the
+Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat
+than Mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points
+of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
+Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of
+regaining the Var or the Valais.
+
+In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had
+there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have
+been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the
+Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he
+placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof,
+which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians
+had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera
+and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the
+excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,--as well as the two roads
+which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.
+
+4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
+such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large
+coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon
+the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to
+have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the
+principal army.
+
+5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces
+on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more
+advantageous than a double one.
+
+6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either
+from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has
+been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of
+the army to each of his masses.
+
+7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to
+exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can
+be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate
+of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic
+plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the
+adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body
+of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with
+instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as
+much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
+back upon the principal army.
+
+8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of
+force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring
+against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,--since a
+single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from
+acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
+the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
+respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
+perform.
+
+9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
+maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
+sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
+numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
+space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
+Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not
+be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the
+opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however,
+may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as
+to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be
+viewed with comparative indifference.
+
+10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
+two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy,
+and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and
+supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the
+armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
+combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their
+junction.
+
+11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
+enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by
+a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to
+the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior,
+since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the
+pursued.
+
+
+12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
+operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
+important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
+disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an
+army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
+changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to
+meet unforeseen events.
+
+At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a
+line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would
+have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by
+Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the
+Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one
+of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the
+siege of Olmutz.
+
+In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
+which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
+fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to
+the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he
+possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the
+most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.
+
+13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
+character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on
+the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages
+to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like
+Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they
+naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the
+project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle
+become so important that every means should be taken to render them
+impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may
+be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
+figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the
+army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior
+lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G,
+which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the
+result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.
+
+[Illustration:
+                        Fig. 4.
+
+                                K
+                               /\
+                              /  \
+                             /    \
+                            /      \
+  F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G        /        \        A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B
+                          /          \
+                         /            \
+                        /              \
+                       /                \
+                      /                  \
+                     /                    \
+                    /                      \
+                   /                        \
+  H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I                          C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D
+]
+
+
+14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the
+direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being
+naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the
+greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the
+frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of
+the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and
+cutting him from his base.
+
+But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the
+line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the
+perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the
+figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it
+marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the
+strategic advantages of its base C D.
+
+The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
+establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army
+as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's
+own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.
+
+15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
+direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the
+principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the
+presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the
+choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the
+advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the
+first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
+certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
+purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
+Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by
+Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there
+the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to
+procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
+Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
+Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy
+was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led
+the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed
+because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
+separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only
+a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at
+Lowicz.
+
+When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances
+of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to
+select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the
+position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between
+Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the
+most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this
+question, which is both strategic and tactical.
+
+Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory
+is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the
+directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The
+point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the
+center or one of the flanks of the enemy.
+
+A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
+line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the
+dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not
+think of disturbing the bridges.
+
+If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
+concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the
+passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass
+it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the
+bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of
+rivers.
+
+16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be
+noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home
+and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will
+also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or
+the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of
+the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
+rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that
+unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other
+hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more
+dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could
+be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and
+interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
+own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
+authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even
+private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.
+
+Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
+assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert
+regions, particularly when the people are not united against the
+invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a
+thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about
+the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every
+thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the
+embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
+dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of
+Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and
+actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.
+
+17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much
+insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is
+that on each side of the line of operations the country should be
+cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:
+otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is
+everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the
+rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the
+people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by
+diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy
+could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
+compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of
+taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in
+recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not
+contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
+when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the
+Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the
+Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Mélas? Did not Eugene march by
+way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon
+the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES--WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.
+
+Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
+definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
+and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
+themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
+the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
+principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
+admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot
+disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
+principles.
+
+In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
+famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
+event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe
+in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional
+cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of
+opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from
+overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to
+establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in
+case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines
+of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and
+arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment.
+Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Blücher, Bernadotte, and
+Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior
+army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed
+its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not
+upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are
+doubly in my favor.
+
+Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
+Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
+Katzbach, and Dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely
+foreign to the principles in question.
+
+What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with
+the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain
+on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the
+decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of
+an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole
+army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies
+are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the
+army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.
+
+If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the
+allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have
+threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this
+error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive
+battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach
+his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for
+Blücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
+movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over
+torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet
+Blücher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed
+up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based
+upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line
+of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study
+of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he
+knew how to apply this system.
+
+There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
+injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in
+Saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the
+right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the
+frontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central
+position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them.
+When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
+Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile
+enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;
+but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of
+operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as
+much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in 1813,
+either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
+forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at
+Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of
+destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these
+officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
+Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can
+be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army
+which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere,
+shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
+with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who
+applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
+in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
+the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of
+these maxims.
+
+The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic
+question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions
+founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses
+its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with
+Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of
+the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer
+in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred
+thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of
+thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
+successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong
+against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and
+for several good reasons:--
+
+1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to
+bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of
+one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily
+resist a much larger force.
+
+2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand
+men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with
+one of the other armies.
+
+3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a
+quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind,
+that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts
+from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the
+impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to
+support such numbers.
+
+4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
+check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
+very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
+magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will
+probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the
+advantages gained by the principal army.
+
+I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric
+system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and
+to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
+principles.
+
+Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:
+all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric
+lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a
+given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately
+destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the
+maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of
+1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
+operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
+closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having
+pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric
+directions to disperse the defeated army.[19]
+
+On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
+they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be
+sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the
+efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately
+by a stronger enemy.
+
+Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
+most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
+principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
+and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base
+to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines
+and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union
+before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case
+with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.
+
+In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
+than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
+What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
+Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
+Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
+be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
+city,--one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Blücher and Wellington,
+taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and
+the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
+principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.
+
+Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not
+in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
+to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
+were applied by Cćsar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
+Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
+out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
+applications.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
+rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
+
+In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
+_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
+routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
+routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
+different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
+lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
+armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
+double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
+starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
+other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
+a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
+designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
+them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
+corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
+enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
+accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
+radii, but the operation was not double.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central
+positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are
+mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
+masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
+are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
+done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of
+double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
+theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
+all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]
+
+[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
+for Mélas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
+unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication
+by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to
+cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.]
+
+[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
+Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
+French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he
+had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that
+the capital was at his head-quarters.]
+
+[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively
+upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_,
+and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.]
+
+[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main
+body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended
+to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic
+positions, and not lines of operations.]
+
+[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of
+Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of
+operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;
+but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
+lines of operations.]
+
+[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
+combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
+Macdonald might have fought Blücher to advantage if he had better
+understood Napoleon's instructions.]
+
+[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
+concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect
+that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he
+employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for
+example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXII.
+
+Strategic Lines.
+
+
+Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
+differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to
+define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those
+strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of
+their position and their relation to the features of the country, like
+the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
+Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute
+examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this
+kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern
+Germany.
+
+The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by
+the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to
+another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its
+objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is
+crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those
+only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
+importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line
+of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which
+are temporary and change with the operations of the army.
+
+Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of
+maneuvers_.
+
+An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
+operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between
+the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and
+the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at
+most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior,
+directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic
+lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
+each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
+operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt,
+according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth
+and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm
+with Nuremberg or Mayence.
+
+It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of
+operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily
+applicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict a
+decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_,
+since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they
+are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if
+the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical
+superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes
+be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the
+forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much
+risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the
+important masses.
+
+Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against
+one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.
+
+The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
+for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply
+them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves
+mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of
+these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations
+exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
+to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;
+but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
+taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line
+of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.
+
+We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army
+was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne
+and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp,
+and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack
+by Napoleon on Flanders decided Blücher to receive battle parallel to
+the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
+uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good
+chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
+Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
+maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and
+seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Blücher had but three
+strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht,
+that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army
+near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
+application of interior strategic lines,--which Napoleon here, perhaps
+for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that
+the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a
+line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a
+_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because he
+exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he
+sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
+principles of war.
+
+A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
+Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right
+to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his
+primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in
+force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose
+intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
+beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing
+this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did
+nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
+feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe
+losses at Dennewitz were the result.
+
+Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
+combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
+from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo
+and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley
+of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
+moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
+There were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow
+valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser,
+or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the
+valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
+passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to
+hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis
+to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano.
+The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from
+Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a
+_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Blücher on Wavre.
+However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at
+the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at
+Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with
+Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
+great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back
+either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
+made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for
+even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
+interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him
+to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois
+from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian
+general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French
+army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
+scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten
+at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had
+advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
+have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon
+him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.
+
+I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time
+and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
+adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
+may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
+line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
+enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
+demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
+is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
+adopted under an urgent necessity.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIII.
+
+Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or
+Strategic Reserves.
+
+
+When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
+temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as
+his own frontiers. A river with _tętes de ponts_, and one or two large
+towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and
+to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
+excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a
+temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations
+leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a
+good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but,
+she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and
+became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of
+a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation,
+particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten
+in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its
+own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
+temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases,
+and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot
+expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a
+temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic
+reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits
+deserve notice.
+
+STRATEGIC RESERVES.
+
+
+Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
+who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
+skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
+always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
+when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army
+has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to
+provide one.
+
+The reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field,
+and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the
+latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of
+war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend
+not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and
+the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army
+takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of
+being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve
+between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active
+reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of
+menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to
+form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active
+service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
+instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central
+depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them
+the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and
+adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be
+formed capable of important service.
+
+Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even
+in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on
+the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
+neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
+alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
+Vienna.
+
+In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used
+them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
+Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
+the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
+decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with
+much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
+thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
+and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her
+interests.
+
+The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
+badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or
+Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
+Prince Hohenlohe and Blücher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.
+
+These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the
+country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the
+double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity,
+of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its
+flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.
+
+Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
+whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
+troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
+invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the
+scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the
+frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
+dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new
+levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under
+the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
+indispensable.
+
+The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
+reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line
+of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of
+a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to
+use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much
+as the withdrawal of his good troops.
+
+These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
+and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
+reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if
+there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up
+intrenched camps or _tętes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to
+increase the strength of their positions.
+
+All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to
+temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable
+if they possess such well-located pivots.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIV.
+
+The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches.
+
+
+_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of
+conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies
+at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other
+covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the
+other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war
+from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this
+revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less
+value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the
+French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
+It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this
+system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in
+fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents,
+provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were
+quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
+success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns,
+which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of
+the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they
+threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
+columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at
+first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
+methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack,
+to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased
+his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose
+an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
+poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried
+the positions.
+
+The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
+The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the
+Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
+Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the
+war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
+Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly
+from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
+different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.
+
+The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances,
+and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement
+of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to
+the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.
+
+In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed
+to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
+Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the
+Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of
+interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single
+march.
+
+Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,--either
+to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it
+better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders
+to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments,
+incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in
+overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when
+Napoleon made his _début_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning
+worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances,
+his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the
+Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His
+march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of
+overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
+from the Rhine.
+
+The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
+era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
+adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the
+capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less
+extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies
+of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was
+here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
+corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system
+of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy
+not to meet with his approval.
+
+It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to
+all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there
+can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the
+old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and
+camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as
+Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,--or with those of the three months
+which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till
+its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to
+the relative merits of the two systems.
+
+The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight,
+and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of
+conducting a war than this.
+
+It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his
+personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in
+urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a
+throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare
+to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very
+distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
+without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has
+marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will
+for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
+modified and improved.
+
+If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
+humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
+bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun,
+are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian
+hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not
+likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has
+been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a
+certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have
+a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and
+military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then
+the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as
+reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more
+formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more
+necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.
+
+If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead
+of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to
+acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political
+equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and
+perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale.
+Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men
+return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of
+Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
+then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
+so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an
+active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.
+
+The science of marches now includes more than details, like the
+following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of
+departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and
+the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part
+of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very
+important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations
+of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard
+to fall upon the communications of Mélas, those made in 1805 by
+Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians,
+the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that
+of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive
+operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account
+of their strategic relations.
+
+Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great
+principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;
+and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in
+Article XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of
+operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the
+enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena
+were the same maneuvers; and what was Blücher's march at Waterloo but an
+application of interior strategic lines?
+
+From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to
+throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the
+front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the
+principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The
+operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of
+Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.
+
+One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to
+so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest
+strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple
+object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease
+and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it
+is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of
+concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.
+
+This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the
+true test of a great general.
+
+There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which
+deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but
+nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term
+_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of
+battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate
+operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to
+ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in
+them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a
+strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by
+about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced
+guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there
+could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another.
+
+There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether
+inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations,
+of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as
+to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the
+famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on
+the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies.
+It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the
+author.
+
+The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was
+the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line
+affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank
+movement exposing this line would be a great fault.
+
+In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are
+still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a
+change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of
+the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders
+will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements.
+
+The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so
+was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of
+Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful
+issue is well known.
+
+A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a
+different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz,
+and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.
+
+Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a
+true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed
+by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its
+camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock
+Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick.
+
+In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line
+of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a
+right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were
+not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front
+of the line of battle.
+
+The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the
+lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and
+no less successful.
+
+In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not
+strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the
+greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to
+was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the
+battle.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXV.
+
+Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.
+
+
+The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the
+commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be
+supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's
+country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation
+between the commissariat and strategy.
+
+It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted
+their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to
+supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks,
+barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable
+bodies of men in that country. Cćsar said that war should support war,
+and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the
+countries he overran.
+
+The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds,
+and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals,
+Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived
+during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders
+would also be an interesting subject of research.
+
+In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies
+of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them
+large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or
+fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of
+the Ticino and Po.
+
+Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought
+on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were
+established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,
+restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon
+the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the
+number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
+camp.
+
+During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.
+The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in
+the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the
+country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the
+granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and
+Danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and
+does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but
+this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite
+impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be
+conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where
+every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This
+system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it
+on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.
+
+A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded
+country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the
+local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to
+make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their
+fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create
+provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary
+powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points
+most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband
+them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care
+to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them.
+The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the
+supplies to the points occupied by the troops.
+
+It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to
+undertake without having previously established these depots, as much
+depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of
+the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:--
+
+1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one
+hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from
+the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of
+country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any
+single operation.
+
+As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which
+time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be
+sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants
+of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain
+at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was
+besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if
+there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.
+
+2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies
+obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the
+wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a
+position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.
+
+3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be
+echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of
+communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the
+army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive
+supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should
+be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have
+the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations,
+which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two
+real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of
+the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it
+facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single
+point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the
+initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the
+offensive and gained some advantage.
+
+4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its
+most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to
+advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient
+provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its
+lines of depots.
+
+5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in
+their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it
+is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and
+without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under
+these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not
+impossible.
+
+6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but
+it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after
+the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid
+expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should
+consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the
+wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of
+roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,
+and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
+vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to
+take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the
+successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry
+with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.
+
+7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of
+supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply
+himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of
+a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications
+with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus
+exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the
+mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army
+advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its
+communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the
+progress of the army.
+
+8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base
+itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its
+ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic
+front opposed to the sea.
+
+9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations
+of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also
+free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise
+necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the
+most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case
+the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
+essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from
+the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior
+flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the
+sea.
+
+In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for
+transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a
+small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it
+sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as
+Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages
+of rivers are more substantial.
+
+10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be
+fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous
+countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of
+supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan
+leads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;
+and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased
+elsewhere.
+
+I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may
+appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in
+his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops
+were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy
+to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it
+would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the
+success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war
+differs from narrow theory.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVI.
+
+The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.--Wars of
+Sieges.
+
+
+Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;
+secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.
+
+The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate.
+It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great
+natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and
+these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here
+is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the
+Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of
+Erzgebirge, of the Böhmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and
+of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a
+good system of fortresses.
+
+Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best
+covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of
+Mont-Genčvre, and of Mont-Cenis,--the only ones considered
+practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of
+considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains
+of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these
+difficulties.
+
+These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage
+of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be
+carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other
+route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis
+I.,--which is so well described by Gaillard,--Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in
+the remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set
+his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man,
+and applied by him with great success.
+
+Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or
+as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so
+well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and
+communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be
+said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long
+as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real
+frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held
+points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of
+Mayence, Luxembourg, and the _tętes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel on
+the left bank.
+
+If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and
+Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they
+should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they
+permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.
+
+An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from
+Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by
+Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three
+fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some
+poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose
+curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most
+rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of
+"impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800,
+1805, and 1809.
+
+The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so
+formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or
+consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number
+of points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally
+applicable to all cases.
+
+When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to
+make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses,
+requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not
+prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build
+fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation
+of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the
+impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the
+movements of the army which is to repel him.
+
+If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the
+progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels
+the army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in its
+march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to
+the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and,
+finally, is a place of refuge in case of need.
+
+Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;
+and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.
+
+The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in
+the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the
+forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;
+the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege
+which it proposes to cover.
+
+As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same
+degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They
+are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the
+state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe
+in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses
+very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban,
+who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great
+number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point
+are as follow:--
+
+1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and
+should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be
+three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the
+third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would
+require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places.
+
+It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has
+not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon
+only a third of its frontiers, (from Besançon to Dunkirk,) and still has
+not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board
+convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has
+decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that
+there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition
+should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much
+crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence.
+Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from
+Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally
+distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,
+requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this
+is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the
+northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important
+element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is
+bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile,
+place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given
+is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of
+nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending
+from Königsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified
+upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical
+position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number
+of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.
+
+2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points
+already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their
+sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in
+order to increase the difficulty of blockading them.
+
+3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own
+defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those
+situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,
+and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of
+this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command
+three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for
+instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the
+fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable
+place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:
+so that works of this extent must be few in number.
+
+4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are
+preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the
+citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole
+power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and
+Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French
+armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being
+besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against
+France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front
+one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with
+impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points.
+
+5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps,
+and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized
+armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial
+obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the
+true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always
+be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of
+the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to
+pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be
+unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon
+the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of
+the nations.
+
+If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in
+the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty
+thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in
+the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only
+occur under exceptional circumstances.
+
+6. It may be concluded from what precedes,--1st, that, while fortified
+places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by
+dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d,
+that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line
+of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d,
+that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine,
+without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order
+to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army
+may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other
+places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the
+army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege
+are correspondingly diminished.
+
+7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly
+people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an
+enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the
+operations of an army in the field. The fort of Königstein in 1813 was
+as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured
+a _tęte de pont_ on the Elbe.
+
+In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value
+to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and
+not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley
+of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800.
+
+8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses
+as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to
+facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may
+be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots,
+hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any
+small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly
+serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken
+the active army.
+
+9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions
+are a positive misfortune for both the army and state.
+
+10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war,
+except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental
+army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen
+almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on
+Königsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the
+Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had
+supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of
+being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases.
+
+The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of
+two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without
+attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to
+watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other
+it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single
+commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When
+the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry
+on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either
+continue its march or take a position to cover the siege.
+
+Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole
+army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and
+contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as the
+siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen
+miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French,
+were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough
+to condemn this ridiculous system.
+
+Much as the recital of the immense labors of Cćsar in the investment of
+Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in
+our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary
+for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works
+commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the
+siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at
+Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.
+
+Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and
+pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If
+the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a
+strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might
+arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be
+spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching
+army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not.
+
+Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the
+operations of an army of observation.
+
+
+INTRENCHED LINES.
+
+Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to
+above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and
+is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is
+intended to protect a part of the frontiers.
+
+As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an
+army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of
+intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent
+closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be
+regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length
+and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance,
+those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front,
+supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed
+to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on
+every occasion when they were assailed.
+
+The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same
+part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and
+those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.
+
+The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although
+intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in
+question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well
+they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes
+their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned.
+To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and
+surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is
+manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another
+instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of
+their attack and defense.
+
+It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended
+lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be
+derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging
+force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
+such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles
+of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not
+have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.]
+
+[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the
+Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the
+Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to
+beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the
+circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the
+principles of war.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVII.
+
+The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Tętes de Ponts with Strategy.
+
+
+It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of
+ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,
+or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.
+Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and
+even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford
+an army.
+
+It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
+Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that
+such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in
+1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on
+the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
+Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country
+between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.
+
+The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
+established on strategic points which should also possess tactical
+advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,
+it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their
+defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.
+Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.
+
+The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
+decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because
+they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these
+camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure
+for an offensive operation, as _tętes de ponts_ to assure the crossing
+of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for
+a defeated army.
+
+However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult
+to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of
+Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can
+be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to
+abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden
+was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it
+was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an
+ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps
+within a few days for want of provisions.
+
+Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
+support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even
+when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in
+reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a
+_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to a
+fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of
+the camp nearest to the line of retreat.
+
+In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tęte de pont_
+on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city
+like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never
+be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
+collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,
+it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the
+open country.
+
+The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
+advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a
+French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost
+when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if
+it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a
+little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
+enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the
+intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.
+
+We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but
+several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover
+places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little
+sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place
+when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts
+and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and
+principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a
+temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively
+upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a
+camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply
+to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged
+the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not
+his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think
+so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the
+siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was
+necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by
+reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought
+rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.
+
+The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,
+indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had
+possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not
+been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in
+the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the
+place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a
+fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army
+to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object
+of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in
+Europe is upon such a site?
+
+So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it
+seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these
+camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the
+same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make
+a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to
+cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter.
+
+To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the
+bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal
+danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by
+passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the
+same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the
+other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take
+the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold
+for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy
+for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of
+the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at
+Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if
+Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would
+easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.
+
+Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified
+place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would
+fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently
+constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of the
+Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent
+works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its
+defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense
+advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the
+inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only
+very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to
+the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon
+at Essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions
+and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might
+not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the
+advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the
+same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
+attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were
+upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp
+of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security
+either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary
+fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make
+it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching
+from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein,
+which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult
+of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of
+a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed.
+
+Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke
+Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,--by masonry towers.
+As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in
+the _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know
+that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis
+appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
+improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that
+the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have
+the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being
+sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well
+flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
+camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines.
+If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by
+field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp
+preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous
+as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
+thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
+commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank,
+some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line
+is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six
+hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a
+palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with
+a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven
+twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those
+towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which forms
+a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should
+think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire.
+
+Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete
+bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,
+would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a
+quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an
+entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege,
+they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp
+to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large
+army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war
+like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the
+capital.
+
+To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to
+encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built
+seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the
+Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to
+have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the
+Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the
+first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even
+if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army,
+particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of
+Perlingsberg had been preserved.
+
+TĘTES DE PONTS.
+
+_Tętes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. The
+difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face
+of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works,
+which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if
+the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which
+may attend a rapid retreat across a large river.
+
+_Tętes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were
+_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also
+cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they
+will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these
+works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all
+fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the
+principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of
+_tętes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of
+detached and closed works, while _tętes de ponts_ usually consist of
+contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must
+be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally
+require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are
+detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.
+
+The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent
+part of this volume.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVIII.
+
+Strategic Operations in Mountains.
+
+
+A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under
+four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it
+may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or
+there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may
+debouch into large and rich plains.
+
+If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and
+Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries
+the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a
+difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome,
+is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once
+crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may
+be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and
+find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed
+is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of
+retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the
+Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this
+nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the
+Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole
+country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province,
+the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of
+mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and
+Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as
+marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary
+obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of
+the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of
+Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss
+for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,
+which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary
+there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though
+not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of
+fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its
+evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the
+Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The
+attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study
+of the most interesting character.
+
+When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,
+is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is
+secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies
+deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be
+otherwise if this be the whole field.
+
+It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave
+control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave
+control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and
+competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that
+the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in
+this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their
+arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on
+Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter
+should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace
+them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult
+for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force
+on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and
+Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand
+men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over
+the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to
+mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,--as
+Moreau did in 1800.
+
+Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only
+accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of
+operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The
+campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this
+branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out
+their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot
+do better than refer my readers to it.
+
+When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by
+the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of
+the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples,
+we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the
+transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of
+Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying
+the interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and
+Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is
+a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is
+a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided
+on the plains.
+
+I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this
+study.
+
+When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal
+theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely
+based upon maxims applicable in an open country.
+
+Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations
+of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In
+such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small
+number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced
+guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide
+means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate
+these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for
+the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small
+bodies of light troops.
+
+The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the
+larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in
+number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its
+forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct
+attacks to dislodge it.
+
+However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and
+difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the
+contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these
+centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of
+retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it
+would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two
+difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the
+whole army.
+
+If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be
+admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity
+of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made
+upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal
+marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points.
+In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the
+difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in
+1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the
+hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have
+been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal
+routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to
+Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads
+have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been
+entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from
+which there was but a single outlet.
+
+On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country
+concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to
+occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be
+easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very
+mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal
+routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the
+enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious
+inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not
+observed.
+
+Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in
+mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we
+attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying
+down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a
+single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five
+converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two
+or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be
+easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the
+construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned
+point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades
+of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the
+army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in
+position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously
+threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he
+debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of
+the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for
+rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to
+continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the
+general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the
+many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if
+there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which
+are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the
+defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a
+cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a
+better one.
+
+We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration
+of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's
+defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and
+Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had
+enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch,
+and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian
+army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend
+such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great
+valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward
+Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the
+trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of
+the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how
+abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the
+approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the
+Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would
+be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching
+force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the
+masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender
+the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an
+inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.
+
+After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it
+seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line
+of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,--a line shorter
+than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance
+to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into
+Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with
+the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove
+that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense
+in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense,
+because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be
+remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the
+offensive.
+
+General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on
+the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind
+of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he
+might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by
+demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active
+attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in
+mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it
+ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he
+sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even
+when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard.
+Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed
+to Wurmser and Alvinzi.
+
+As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading
+the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the
+Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to
+capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the
+presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
+general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the
+Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had
+been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary
+was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand
+men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand
+allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after
+four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory
+_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will
+is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons,
+need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not
+to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I
+say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations
+should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally,
+that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the
+great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great
+mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of
+defending the country?
+
+I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous
+countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a
+national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes
+with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every
+advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always
+necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or
+less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of
+Stanz and of the Tyrol.
+
+The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:
+it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are
+extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.
+
+In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make
+demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the
+enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which
+promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break
+through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the
+defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole
+line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of
+Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men
+on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing
+this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show
+that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous
+mountain-ranges can generally be forced.
+
+The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army
+which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between
+Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those
+_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him
+it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have
+already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and
+Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it
+inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral
+issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into
+these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army
+toward Turin or Carignano.
+
+When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and
+the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to
+regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a
+single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought
+to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In
+my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to
+confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the
+columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six
+roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;
+but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
+routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the
+enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the
+center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to
+divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.
+
+The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much
+greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be
+accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of
+battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous
+region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it
+would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
+and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the
+invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or
+three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,
+the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the
+junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
+driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.
+
+Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would
+be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with
+their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple
+number.
+
+To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
+localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,
+would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best
+school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by
+the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my
+History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of
+the Grisons by Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
+and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the
+passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this
+study.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIX.
+
+Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
+
+
+There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those
+which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The
+second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of
+country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
+The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea
+by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the
+seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes
+the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,
+but where a powerful state is attacked.
+
+As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the
+Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly
+be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of
+these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its
+base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the
+same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of
+defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
+arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the
+Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad
+fate of many of these great invasions.
+
+In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is
+merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own
+interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in
+the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of
+all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a
+principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General
+Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty
+thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the
+mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand
+men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus
+found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity
+of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his
+misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of
+about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
+hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The
+battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the
+Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became
+the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the
+opportunity of regaining its own country.
+
+The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the
+expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in
+Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander
+under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less
+disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
+communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in
+no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of
+the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
+abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
+allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political
+ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension
+which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have
+been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.
+
+History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
+across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with
+forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were
+necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to
+the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran
+empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery
+and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly
+since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
+together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining
+each other, no such events have taken place.
+
+Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
+Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of
+Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
+scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of
+Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;
+for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in
+Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the
+Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,
+besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no
+one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
+from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be
+imitated.
+
+Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
+invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the
+same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from
+these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of
+operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones
+applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,
+although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,
+although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His
+care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
+Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
+Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he
+had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself
+safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply
+on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.
+
+If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
+precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
+troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at
+Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was
+unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which
+that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do
+not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the
+conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;
+although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place
+immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised
+distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.
+Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to
+know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
+wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been
+possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having
+previously defeated the Russian army.
+
+It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
+Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_
+between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery
+of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the
+people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and
+sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have
+given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,
+he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and
+enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the
+greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.
+
+The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point
+for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never
+to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance
+of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a
+proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which
+may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of
+resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these
+operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the
+safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual
+bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to
+these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,
+seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and
+moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried
+too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can
+insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
+or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
+ruined nations and armies.
+
+Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been
+rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in
+date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the
+sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,
+has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,
+but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.
+
+It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now
+is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest
+of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
+Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
+fleet coasted the shore.
+
+Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that
+the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
+immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.
+Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress
+depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind
+of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare
+occurrence.
+
+The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
+operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are
+the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations
+of war.
+
+Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,
+are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking
+Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon
+the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the
+Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
+Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going
+as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable
+troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all
+be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be
+undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in
+view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.
+Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions
+as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in
+Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not
+be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of
+policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
+day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,
+and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
+strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
+co-operation cannot be obtained.
+
+
+EPITOME OF STRATEGY
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
+by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
+enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
+definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
+operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that
+we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating
+of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
+of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
+which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.
+
+By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
+be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
+a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.
+
+From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
+manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
+of operations is found in what follows:--
+
+1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
+reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
+accordance with Article XVIII.
+
+2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
+field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
+with the least risk to one's self.
+
+3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
+operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
+Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
+retreats parallel to the frontiers.
+
+On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
+of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
+extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
+successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
+upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
+by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
+presented in Article XXI.
+
+4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
+such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
+forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from
+affording each other mutual support.
+
+5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic
+positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important
+strategic points of the theater of war.
+
+6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
+activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may
+be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of
+the hostile army.
+
+The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
+army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the
+enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will
+be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive
+strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to
+the enemy can be given.
+
+However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
+course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
+attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and
+successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,
+thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and
+continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of
+gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.
+
+The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
+satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already
+mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in
+Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty
+battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and
+Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four
+victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been
+found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive
+strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the
+Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon
+the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the
+most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
+pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
+principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most
+decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.
+The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.
+
+It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be
+able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of
+war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own
+country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and
+of _tętes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great
+decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of
+the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines
+and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has
+afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and
+Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from
+the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by
+different fortified places projected or completed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
+
+
+Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great
+questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to
+the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,
+the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and
+fortune, gains victories.
+
+Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to
+battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in
+tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of
+the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that
+point the possession of which promises the most important results.
+
+Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
+features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have
+been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched
+battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that
+a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same
+character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.
+
+The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which
+are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the
+order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the
+plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,
+the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers
+subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the
+proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
+superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and
+the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as
+well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and
+their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting
+that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot
+result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few
+brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
+before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his
+position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the
+maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.
+As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage
+the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of
+it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and
+opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's
+design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the
+same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
+tactical combinations to accomplish it.
+
+There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those
+fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's
+attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in
+position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the
+collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in
+succession the different combinations they present.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXX.
+
+Positions and Defensive Battles.
+
+
+When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line
+of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this
+work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_
+and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. I
+will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by
+battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will
+take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will
+await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is
+the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical
+intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully
+explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an
+_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
+execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
+oblique order, the perpendicular order.
+
+This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
+distinction between two things which should by no means be
+confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that
+the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;
+because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will
+be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of
+battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
+troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
+maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
+offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the
+line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of
+troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a
+position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or
+any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.
+
+Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of
+positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a
+favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the
+purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be
+taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such
+as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls
+the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.
+
+There are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been
+discussed in Article XX., and the _tactical_. The latter, again, are
+subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied
+to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a
+word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have
+been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense are
+discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong,
+where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third
+and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the
+defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary
+according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance
+not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
+extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep
+and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary
+camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this
+kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of
+access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it,
+should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops
+forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles
+presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy
+than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in
+taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error
+if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was
+exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason,
+Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a
+good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach
+were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,
+rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
+battle-ground.
+
+The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are
+the following:--
+
+     1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
+     easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to
+     approach the line of battle.
+
+     2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.
+
+     3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of
+     troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point
+     deemed the proper one.
+
+     4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements.
+
+     5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.
+
+     6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or
+     artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon
+     their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or
+     at least some point of the front.
+
+     This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on
+     a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest
+     reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the
+     broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed
+     to afford perfect protection. This danger--about which there can be
+     no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy
+     defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable
+     obstacles.[23]
+
+     7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by
+     throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
+     crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may
+     cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
+     the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
+     the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
+     required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground
+     must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
+     details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
+     Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)
+
+
+     8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
+     flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other
+     points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack
+     upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most
+     advantageous for defense,--as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.
+     Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest
+     accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
+     insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack
+     Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.
+
+     When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
+     hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
+     order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
+     idle spectators of it.
+
+The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
+palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is
+to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_.
+Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been
+mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us
+to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
+Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road
+behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as
+Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that
+such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely
+open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure
+to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a
+portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,
+in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
+part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain.
+There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a
+forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are
+at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for
+retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press
+too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank
+movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest,
+as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if,
+as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for
+this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and
+give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads.
+
+When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying
+chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give
+rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the
+initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and
+striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon
+the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is
+often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by
+those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages
+are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller
+extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his
+movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once
+counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party
+advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising
+from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile
+line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always
+inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,
+farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or
+be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's
+batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a
+greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire
+either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of
+these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages
+resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.
+
+However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more
+manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.
+Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if
+attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by
+all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to
+take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest
+success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping
+strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give
+way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who
+indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall
+upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and
+transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
+movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength
+into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether
+impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general
+who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has
+the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously
+arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries
+placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
+dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and
+when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
+assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
+advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral
+effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed
+to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.
+
+A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success
+either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,--1st,
+that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know
+how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his
+_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able
+to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he
+should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would
+have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,
+that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are
+demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as
+by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I have
+modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is
+wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if
+we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of
+troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important
+maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of
+battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique
+system of battle_, &c.
+
+I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_
+on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary
+formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of
+battle_.]
+
+[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and
+the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
+famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube,
+in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that
+the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but,
+throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the
+difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not
+be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen
+the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost
+ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXI.
+
+Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.
+
+
+We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when
+assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic
+defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army
+receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the
+offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes
+numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive
+battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages
+of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the
+consideration of offensive movements.
+
+It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage
+over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the
+latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.
+
+As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack
+must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called
+_order of battle_.
+
+It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without
+a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely
+known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in
+every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than
+of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to
+make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should
+therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point.
+
+The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already
+stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different
+localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the
+arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's
+flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be
+attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically
+considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very
+difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least
+importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left
+of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province
+was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically
+considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be
+held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line
+of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the
+right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and
+throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all
+their _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. This
+course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the
+features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have
+diminished the obstacles in the future.
+
+The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:
+1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical
+key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which
+combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the
+difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic
+point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;
+4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends
+very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines
+of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the
+proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is
+the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there,
+it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this
+case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical
+superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon
+both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior
+numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the
+combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to
+obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points
+mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a
+point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.
+
+The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or
+to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin
+his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at
+some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank
+and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him
+in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line
+turned.
+
+To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make
+choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.
+
+At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple
+parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive
+crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order
+reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique
+reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on
+one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The
+order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the
+center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the
+center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5.[25]
+
+A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+
+____________________________|____________________________ B ]
+
+Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been
+stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to
+turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits
+of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the
+general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is
+manifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it
+requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against
+battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical
+skill is needed in such a battle.
+
+There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order,
+which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great
+strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's
+communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its
+own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has
+reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having
+effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts
+should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to
+open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the
+parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle
+cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must
+gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will
+then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to
+engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by
+fortune.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6.
+
+                                       |       |
+                                       |       |
+                     A                 |       |B
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT       |
+                                               |
+______________________|________________________|
+                      B
+]
+
+The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most
+usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an
+offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in
+the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very
+remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if
+properly attacked.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7.
+                          A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+
+                                             ____|___
+             ___________________|____________________
+                                B            ____|___
+]
+
+The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the
+center, (Fig. 8, page 190,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more
+favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in
+accordance with the general principles which have been laid down;
+although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the
+line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own
+safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 8.
+                         A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+                  ________|________
+                  _________________
+                B _________________
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 9.]
+
+The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a
+superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main
+strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it
+has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only
+kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double
+duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of
+being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged
+wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles
+of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern
+times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See
+Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 10.
+                       C   |
+                        \  |
+                         \ |
+                          \|
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT/|
+                         / |
+                        /  |
+                       /   |
+                      C    |
+                         B-|
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 11.
+
+|                            |
+|                            |
+| ___________A______________ |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|-B                        B-|
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+]
+
+The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and
+11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction
+along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle.
+Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions
+indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first
+position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army
+A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;
+and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the
+extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right
+or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take
+him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in
+Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would
+take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder
+of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and
+this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in
+Figures 9 and 16.
+
+The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be
+very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very
+decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to
+bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker
+army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior
+force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12.]
+
+The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the
+day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannć. This order may
+indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to
+it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him,
+and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order
+is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on
+the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their
+extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they
+had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely
+ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to
+fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_.]
+
+An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line
+with the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_.) If several writers may be
+believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the
+famous days of Crécy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than
+a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack,
+whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the
+advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the
+enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is
+content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon
+one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a
+concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an
+error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube
+behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of
+communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at
+pleasure.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 13.]
+
+The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an
+engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must
+be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a
+defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be
+passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may
+become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If
+an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single
+wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[26]
+
+
+The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because
+the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center
+or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six
+diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the
+same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and
+third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had
+just the result that might have been expected.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 14
+                    A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+_____                              _____
+    _____                      _____
+        _____              _____
+             _____  B  _____
+                 _______
+]
+The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as
+the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that,
+because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where
+the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as
+regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center
+and make at that point a threatening counter-attack.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 15
+                    A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+                 ___|___
+            ___|__     __|___
+         _____              _____
+    _____B                      B_____
+_____                                _____
+
+]
+
+The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special
+success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too
+extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the
+wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be
+probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental
+principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of
+success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the
+reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act
+either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost
+echelons, might readily repulse them.
+
+If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge
+or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also
+differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid
+mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of
+artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would
+render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been
+said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might
+be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the
+wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the
+flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result.
+A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be
+a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in
+this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to
+the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons
+of the center by the flank.
+
+This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the
+intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter
+xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain
+that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments,
+there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this
+formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point
+of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made
+upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.
+
+[Illustration Fig 16.]
+
+The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the
+same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an
+attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may
+even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The
+attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents
+the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank,
+as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is
+hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having
+to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and
+probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his
+victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at
+Borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the
+heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the
+famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout's
+corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at
+Bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but
+for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing
+intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
+arrangement having been made with that view.
+
+It should be observed that these different orders are not to be
+understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general
+who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon
+paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be
+likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now
+fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to
+form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures,
+because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected
+together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving
+ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns
+to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,--when armies
+bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility,
+when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given
+them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has
+been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally,
+when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of
+battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be
+laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures
+have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
+arrangements.
+
+If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
+influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of
+winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of
+battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of
+maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;
+for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
+render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous
+fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give
+good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is
+to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive
+maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is
+to result in victory.
+
+Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
+understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,
+excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective
+_coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with
+the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without
+speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the
+arrival of a corps at the appointed place.
+
+Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive
+maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers
+seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than
+those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to
+previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to
+decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the
+expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the
+moment when Blücher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
+nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and
+they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
+manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the
+allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,
+for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what
+he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.
+
+As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the
+co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army,
+with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank,
+it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends
+upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely
+seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.
+
+Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an
+order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin
+without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the
+collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from
+circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's
+position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be
+still expected to arrive on the field.
+
+From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
+reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that
+the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an
+engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases
+cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it
+is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
+lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the
+party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm
+will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to
+be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts
+to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack
+shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed
+against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
+Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
+resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
+unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is
+hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the
+different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.
+
+There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my
+assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being
+represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at
+Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward
+the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.
+At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At
+Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like
+Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up
+two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;
+and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the
+Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely
+unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive
+movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost
+perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break
+through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the
+center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack
+vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the
+two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center
+was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition,
+the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the
+enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself,
+the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved
+him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by
+strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with
+them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle.
+
+I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark
+out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be
+used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless
+bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so
+combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be
+similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations,
+whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to
+form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field;
+and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's
+line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy
+requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to
+this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or
+watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point
+the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he
+will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can
+impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the
+most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a
+battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)
+
+Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me
+that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in
+the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.
+
+The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern
+invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion I can by no means share; for
+the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it
+used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more
+remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo,
+the very order of which he thus denies the existence.
+
+If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid
+and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.
+Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I
+repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and
+when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it
+can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by
+the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of
+battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must
+be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another
+army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it
+while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of
+the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it
+will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far
+from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by
+echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.)
+
+As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied
+that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was
+a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders
+parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they
+would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of
+the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than
+another.
+
+Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical
+figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles
+in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended
+to:--
+
+     1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force
+     the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.
+
+     2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm
+     one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An
+     enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and
+     turning his position.
+
+     3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if
+     concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.
+
+     4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without
+     having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the
+     rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very
+     strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.
+
+     5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least
+     half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,
+     while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of
+     attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique
+     line.
+
+     6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
+     otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
+     strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.
+
+     7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the
+     attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be
+     such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,
+     and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to
+     fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least
+     expect to meet it.
+
+     8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method
+     to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order
+     of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of
+     the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset.
+     A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting
+     alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good
+     combination. In the practical use of this system many variations
+     must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the
+     _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers
+     and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c.
+
+     9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy
+     from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best
+     means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can
+     be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the
+     direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better
+     results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing
+     which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus
+     threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if
+     attacked by main force.
+
+     History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
+     especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
+     although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
+     the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
+     successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
+     skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them
+     when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these
+     turning movements with attacks by main force.
+
+     10. The combination of these two methods--that is to say, the
+     attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render
+     the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but,
+     in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in
+     presence of a contemptible enemy.
+
+     11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force
+     is the following:--Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and
+     well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by
+     vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus
+     gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front
+     by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.
+
+     But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the
+     first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that,
+     the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking
+     party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral
+     effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat
+     of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence
+     of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat
+     disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to
+     replace them by those of the second line, because they generally
+     follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within
+     musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to
+     substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the
+     moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in
+     repelling the attack.
+
+     These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the
+     troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance
+     of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks
+     and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually
+     be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to
+     insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
+     launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
+     proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
+     and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.
+
+     12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
+     "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the
+     means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in
+     strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second
+     line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of
+     masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the
+     decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is
+     presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of
+     battles."
+
+     In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
+     guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
+     compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
+     substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience
+     in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.
+
+     The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all
+     arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
+     always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of
+     the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
+     attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
+     This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties
+     is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put
+     forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to
+     wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to
+     make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous
+     attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous.
+
+     13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
+     effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
+     be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
+     marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
+     skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
+     object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
+     troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
+     will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
+     enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
+     of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
+     strong probability of his repulse.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
+other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
+defensive for the other.]
+
+[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
+orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
+represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
+figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
+ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
+attack, in squares, or checkerwise.]
+
+[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
+some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
+enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
+false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
+extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.]
+
+[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
+it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
+reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
+decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
+Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
+history.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXII.
+
+Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.
+
+
+We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
+an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
+be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
+détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
+so many plans seemingly well arranged.
+
+It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
+is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking
+place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
+as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_
+of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
+he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
+maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
+against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
+in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
+success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
+take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
+have been in the habit of moving in this manner.
+
+It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
+The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
+force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
+however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
+A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
+thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
+seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
+more daring.
+
+A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
+the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
+extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
+armies concerned in them.
+
+In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because
+the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
+between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part
+remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
+the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
+distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
+to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
+was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
+
+On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
+because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
+disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
+Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
+movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
+line was thus reformed.
+
+The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar
+with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
+wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the
+plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,--while their left was piled
+up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
+a wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
+speedily surrounded and captured.
+
+No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
+unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
+sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
+thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
+Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
+pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
+sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
+divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
+rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.
+
+We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
+surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
+in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
+the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off
+from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
+of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
+line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
+surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
+Tellnitz and Melnitz.
+
+Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
+Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
+Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing
+which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
+support.
+
+If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
+might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
+a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
+thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
+unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
+advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
+Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
+merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. With the Duke of
+York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
+successful.
+
+Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
+and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
+almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
+concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
+search in vain in military history for another example of a single
+brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
+and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
+the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
+probability, to lay down his arms.
+
+At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
+successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
+under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune
+assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
+been the result.
+
+So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
+no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
+it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
+order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
+himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
+but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
+enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
+regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
+or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
+the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
+outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
+opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
+enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
+Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications
+before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
+preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
+successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
+maneuver during the battle.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
+XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIII.
+
+Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
+
+
+The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
+rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.
+
+In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a
+position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as
+close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,--especially
+as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each
+intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision
+ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
+does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another
+which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the French at
+Rossbach.
+
+A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
+skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always
+possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander
+may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen,
+Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius
+endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations.
+
+There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no
+means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the
+very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the
+fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying
+them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided
+upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.
+
+Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
+and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause
+their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they
+are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be
+concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction
+considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in
+deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the
+deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
+badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced
+guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the
+troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach,
+Treatise on Grand Operations.)
+
+In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
+several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently,
+these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are
+unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
+the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
+suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
+enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIV.
+
+Of Surprises of Armies.
+
+
+I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief
+features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
+Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
+to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.
+
+Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
+than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
+heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
+an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
+and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
+because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War
+presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
+a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
+sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
+combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
+of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
+so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
+their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
+intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.
+
+As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
+prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
+one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's
+camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
+surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
+attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
+1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
+imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
+there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
+own negligence.
+
+It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
+fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of
+the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;
+and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
+give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
+forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
+occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
+it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
+renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.
+
+For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
+for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
+prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
+well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXV.
+
+Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
+Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General.
+
+
+There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
+are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be
+carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
+practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
+means of getting to the parapet.
+
+The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
+as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de
+main_.
+
+This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
+of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
+built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
+the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
+of these varieties.
+
+For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
+the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
+Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
+varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
+better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in
+fact, a _tęte de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
+the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
+have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
+Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
+as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
+by a number of desperate men.
+
+Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
+which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was
+suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple
+redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep
+giving it its sole strength.[29]
+
+At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
+but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at
+Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant
+parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep.
+In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were
+attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene
+assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
+only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right
+flank.
+
+The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few
+in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked
+a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if
+this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by
+no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp
+will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of
+all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack
+by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the
+following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:--
+
+     1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire,
+     which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the
+     defenders.
+
+     2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
+     fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
+     mount the parapet.
+
+     3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
+     skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
+     support.
+
+     4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
+     for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.
+
+     5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
+     duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of
+     attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of
+     cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground
+     permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing
+     more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
+     actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
+     gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
+     daring rashness.
+
+Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
+escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
+advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
+passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.
+
+Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
+none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
+camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions
+for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
+an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
+as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
+Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
+followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
+attacking Dresden in 1813.
+
+Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
+escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both
+preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in
+neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.
+
+Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
+interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
+because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
+impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
+The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
+in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
+and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
+lessons for study.
+
+This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
+familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
+it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
+bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
+was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
+to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
+was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
+we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
+owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
+great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the
+order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt
+for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied
+troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
+one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for
+forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever
+attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
+instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a
+better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade
+in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make
+openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make
+up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
+carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of
+the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the
+bodies of its defenders.
+
+But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation
+of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If
+they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by
+assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by
+strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last
+indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any
+reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one
+of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
+There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the
+defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that
+point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded
+simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the
+character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
+be pursued.
+
+The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
+It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief
+and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be
+quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away
+from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of
+moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this
+character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so
+gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand
+at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with
+an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.
+
+If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think
+of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces,
+the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
+advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
+This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the
+enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive
+return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A
+general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half
+conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them
+when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
+cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk
+and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of
+complaint.
+
+Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
+lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between
+the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of
+the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement
+succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which
+could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been
+suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment
+is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
+quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great
+importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means
+despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;
+because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack
+the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have
+supposed in his power.
+
+
+COUPS DE MAIN.
+
+These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
+capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake
+of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both
+these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
+successful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical
+operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the
+captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become
+necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
+in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these
+repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing
+such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack
+of intrenchments.
+
+I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these
+operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules
+are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and
+refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic,
+where they are mentioned.
+
+I have previously stated that important results may often follow from
+these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful
+attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises
+of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814,
+as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the
+different kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, others
+by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
+assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things
+which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_.
+
+As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer
+of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon
+the results of a great strategic operation.
+
+The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that
+of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the
+two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the
+Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally,
+the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
+provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the
+enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging
+in them may be exposed.
+
+Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with
+fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the
+same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be
+prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of
+soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
+intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by
+Prince Eugene.
+
+In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for
+what has been done once may be done again.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August
+25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
+third day, more than one hundred thousand.]
+
+[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength of
+a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
+importance, and vice aversá.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL
+AND PARTLY TACTICAL.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVI.
+
+Of Diversions and Great Detachments.
+
+
+The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important
+a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining
+their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest
+and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing
+is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and
+having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally
+certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately
+adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential
+qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many
+detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of
+attacking the main body during their absence.
+
+The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been
+carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many
+persons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly
+much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass;
+but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a
+complete or even considerable success. The essential point in this
+matter is to send out as few detachments as possible.
+
+There are several kinds of detachments.
+
+     1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of
+     operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater
+     or less importance.
+
+     2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to
+     cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard
+     a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if
+     threatened.
+
+     3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations,
+     in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some
+     combined operation.
+
+     4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect
+     of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an
+     important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign.
+
+I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a
+distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a
+theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly
+supposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but
+two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed
+cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the
+real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a
+detachment would receive strong support from the population among which
+it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than
+military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out of
+place here.
+
+The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian
+expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the
+end of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX.,)
+are well known.
+
+In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended
+an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined
+forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover,
+nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated
+points. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities
+of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover,
+Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, and
+Bernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of
+Ulm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no
+difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the
+failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation
+would have been proper.
+
+In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to
+La Vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the
+numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the
+Rhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been
+not only very useful, but decisive.
+
+
+It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of
+small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations
+of the main army.
+
+If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary
+objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is
+no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be,
+indispensable.
+
+These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are
+permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction
+opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a
+campaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of
+assisting in carrying out some special enterprise.
+
+Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an
+army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which
+mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when
+the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For
+example, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to
+leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the
+valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of
+operations. However successful it may be, a respectable force must
+always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of
+the river toward Routchouk.
+
+This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a
+double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps
+must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the
+main army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned
+where this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the
+double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army
+passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main
+column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong
+to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of
+communications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, which
+enables the Spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the
+road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To
+whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the
+other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction.
+
+All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge
+as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to
+give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them
+by opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable
+illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of
+1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the
+valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward
+the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk
+of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts
+of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that
+he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no
+particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon
+his communications.
+
+Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following
+reasons:--
+
+     1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations,
+     or else to cover your own.
+
+     2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body
+     of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
+     reinforcements.
+
+     3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing
+     army, while a blow is struck at the remainder.
+
+     4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions,
+     on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the
+     success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a
+     convoy of your own.
+
+     5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where
+     you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an
+     enterprise in another direction.
+
+     6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a
+     certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison
+     shut up within the ramparts.
+
+     7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications
+     of an enemy already retreating.
+
+However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as
+those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are
+always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be
+successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must,
+therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason
+than that they were not kept together.
+
+We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their
+success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill
+of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution.
+
+Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles
+XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous
+convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain
+the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.
+
+The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during
+the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of
+the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen
+in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
+detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
+times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching
+that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
+admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault
+was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it
+properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
+Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.
+
+Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are
+decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the
+enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is
+collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck.
+In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps
+making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main
+body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts.
+
+In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his
+march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was
+really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply
+shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau.
+
+In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of
+Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke
+Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another
+direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he
+withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide
+the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the
+result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being
+in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to
+facilitate their application.
+
+It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be
+laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of
+which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of
+making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of
+all the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the
+subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall
+thorn immediately when their duty is performed. The inconveniences
+necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving
+judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders:
+herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff.
+
+One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments
+sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by
+tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good
+positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict
+with too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity of
+motion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that it
+is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position
+it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order.
+
+It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of
+field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the
+army itself.
+
+Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments
+those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few
+examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may
+call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end
+of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of
+Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians
+rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential
+_point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in
+advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of
+failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had
+been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping.
+
+In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted by
+the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and
+destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would
+have had very important consequences if it had not failed.
+
+In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and,
+as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may
+be freely recommended.
+
+Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's
+operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few
+hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they
+may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small
+detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a
+great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his
+plans to fail by intercepting his couriers.
+
+For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full
+of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they
+can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a
+telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any
+dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and
+presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are
+qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness.
+For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter
+XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this
+work, on light cavalry.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVII.
+
+Passage of Rivers and Other Streams.
+
+
+The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place
+or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations
+belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large
+river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the
+Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest
+study.
+
+The art of building military bridges is a special branch of military
+science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not from
+this point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream,
+but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver.
+
+The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the
+point of passage may have an important connection with all the
+operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. The
+passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellent
+illustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skillful
+strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to
+take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
+off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had
+already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience
+to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. The
+tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the
+strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk
+attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same
+campaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high
+strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of
+the reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march
+by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino
+and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino,
+enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with
+twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at
+Piacenza, expecting to get before Mélas more certainly in that direction
+than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of
+the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar
+operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of
+the destruction of Mack's army.
+
+The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by
+recollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX.; and it is here
+only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in
+every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive
+points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the
+distribution of the hostile forces.
+
+If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical,
+no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles
+exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the
+new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement
+as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction.
+Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great
+influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another
+consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is
+that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and
+line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first
+marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon
+different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting
+a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.
+
+Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations
+influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will now
+proceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school in
+which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such
+operations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus--which is a
+small stream--a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned,
+the people of modern days can cite much greater.
+
+The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been greatly
+lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon has
+made famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube at
+Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details;
+and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. More
+recently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous
+passage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind
+previously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and
+at Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men
+provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the
+bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account of
+them should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russian
+army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with the
+two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local
+difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The
+passage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give
+historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the special
+narratives of these events. I will give several general rules to be
+observed.
+
+     1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of
+     passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In
+     addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be
+     made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the
+     enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to
+     make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not
+     to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the
+     real attempt is to be made.
+
+     2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as
+     possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging
+     the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and
+     these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods,
+     or other obstacles in the vicinity.
+
+     3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy
+     caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any
+     artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while
+     building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from
+     which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other.
+
+     4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives
+     great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for
+     constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying
+     into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for
+     collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge.
+
+     5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a
+     re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can
+     cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land
+     from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus
+     taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the
+     passage.
+
+     6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks,
+     that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on
+     both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the
+     banks are high and steep should be usually avoided.
+
+The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from
+those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract
+the efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have the
+course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without
+attempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the
+threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of
+his army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendôme at Cassano, and
+the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,--the last example being
+particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so
+decidedly successful as might have been expected.
+
+In Article XXI. attention was called to the influence that the passage
+of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction
+to the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may have
+with subsequent strategic movements.
+
+One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to
+cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without
+interfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the army
+is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed
+just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling;
+but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are
+about equal, the case is very different.
+
+If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or at
+Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thing
+to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first,
+before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in order
+to cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to
+cover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the
+cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the
+inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be
+insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be
+separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain
+absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the
+natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces.
+
+The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in
+which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he
+divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend
+with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and
+have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the
+enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point,
+the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find
+himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a
+victory.
+
+The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which
+will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all
+possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage,
+to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to
+beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of
+touching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may be
+used. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several
+corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with
+one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line
+of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be
+overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be
+formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly
+drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them
+from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges.
+But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the
+enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy
+may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that
+Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout its
+length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain
+protected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner that
+Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme
+right of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the
+Main. He was driven away because the French, having a double and
+exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men
+inactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan
+upon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages
+gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic
+front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that
+previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and
+the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of
+the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as
+well as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations,
+of which something has already been said in the article on lines of
+operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection
+with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion.
+
+It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is
+attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with
+Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in case
+of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus
+operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him,
+in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a
+condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at
+different points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrous
+results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to
+take advantage of this violation of principles.
+
+In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be
+diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points,
+which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two
+portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy
+from destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this
+rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of
+Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have
+achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon
+the Rhine.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVIII.
+
+Retreats and Pursuits.
+
+
+Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remark
+is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usual
+piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in
+retreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an army
+in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving
+order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard
+to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to
+attempt such an operation.
+
+What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight be
+continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under
+cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance,
+but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong
+opposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march be
+made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as
+possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of
+fighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper in
+certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the
+theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is
+certainly one of them.
+
+If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose
+yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced
+retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in
+darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your
+army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing
+properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in
+broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold
+it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is
+about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
+troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to
+blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing
+may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat
+commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not
+become a rout?
+
+When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide
+whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the
+enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause
+the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its
+salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that,
+in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to
+retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of
+sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check
+for several hours.
+
+Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which
+they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in
+order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his
+present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was
+thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the
+allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
+Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed
+to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was
+known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
+choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I
+was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde
+movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding
+the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.)
+
+A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point
+threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of
+retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an
+exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer
+its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost
+battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise.
+
+These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Their
+character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be
+passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are specially
+dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the
+retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of
+operations, they become painful and difficult.
+
+From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justly
+celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the French army
+in 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. That
+of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of
+the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
+more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed
+by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The
+retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it
+has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the
+siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well
+arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796,
+which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
+not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to
+Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
+Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were
+glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration.
+The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space of
+two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon
+and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
+admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances,
+but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by
+the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable
+fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although
+the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was
+also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
+Beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single
+man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
+covered themselves with glory.
+
+The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be
+traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the
+attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or
+inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances
+which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out
+of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make
+for their execution.
+
+A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
+magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order,
+and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist
+his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended
+position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from
+Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry
+and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and
+with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
+thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense
+number of light cavalry.
+
+There are five methods of arranging a retreat:--
+
+     The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.
+
+     The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps,
+     marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order
+     to avoid confusion, especially in the _matériel_.
+
+     The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads
+     nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.
+
+     The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads.
+
+     The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
+     roads.
+
+I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is
+taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well
+sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is
+common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the
+strategic relations of these operations.
+
+An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as
+soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it
+shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first
+method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and
+enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it
+is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder
+of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An
+army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the
+single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be
+occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure.
+
+When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having
+the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a
+great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but
+moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular
+direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal
+days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being
+chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the
+departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery
+may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march,
+the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a
+half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession with
+an interval of two hours between the departure of their several
+army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in
+ordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other
+calculations would doubtless be necessary.
+
+I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand
+or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The army
+may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each,
+encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each of
+these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may
+either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the
+road. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five
+A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference
+with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second
+mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the
+first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same
+time.
+
+When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least
+for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It is
+scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used
+when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best,
+because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and in
+hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early
+part of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics
+to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for
+armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.
+
+Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and
+great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or
+division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a
+little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and
+the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to
+arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army
+is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as
+much mischief as a rout.
+
+If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to
+relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt
+with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in
+battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns;
+and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space
+which has been lost.
+
+The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is
+excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they
+are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other
+wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it
+to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg
+toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind.
+
+The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is
+undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the
+retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite
+the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting
+this.
+
+The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of
+eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed so
+warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I could
+not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or
+as to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that he
+recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to
+separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object
+of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting
+his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. I
+found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten
+army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its
+forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy.
+
+Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, and
+that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat
+made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being
+directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of
+the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along
+the line of the frontier of the country.
+
+I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and
+in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have strongly
+recommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of the
+parallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which
+leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of
+moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly
+parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and
+its base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
+retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric
+retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the
+strategic front.
+
+However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was
+the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only with those retreats
+made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater
+extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks.
+
+By using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be
+given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. An
+army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally;
+because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical
+inferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I
+find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the
+ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am
+speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose an
+army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand.
+If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men,
+the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Can
+he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession
+all his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? _By concentration_.
+This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls
+of itself.
+
+I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leading
+divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonaparte
+collected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had only
+forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had
+only to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent
+retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser,
+after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two
+wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was the
+result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
+beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and
+destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.
+
+When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the
+French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric
+movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric
+retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of
+isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his
+own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the
+alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all
+the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it
+was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two
+hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.[31]
+
+There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
+only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
+defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
+within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
+sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
+army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
+but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
+according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
+absurd.
+
+There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
+a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
+frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
+parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
+line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
+his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
+or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
+In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
+Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.
+
+These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
+they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
+center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
+retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
+positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
+have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
+communications with the central portions of the state.
+
+Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army
+penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon
+Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either
+case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of
+operations would be at the mercy of their adversary.
+
+The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same
+advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.
+
+In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the
+nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is
+striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army
+penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the
+Saône, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or
+as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way
+of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
+occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very
+hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based
+upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all
+countries having double fronts of operations.[32]
+
+Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the
+directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube.
+Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions
+connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this
+frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This
+assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800,
+1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial
+on that ground, the question is still an open one.
+
+It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method
+depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of
+each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of
+Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it
+would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into
+the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this
+way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
+upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate
+division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the
+whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would
+be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy,
+beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application
+on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy
+approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations
+would be too contracted.
+
+In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against
+an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its
+employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the
+Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria
+were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the
+country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the
+direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a
+movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.
+
+When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a
+pursuit always follows.
+
+A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army
+in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and
+this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of
+supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then
+becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its
+difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy
+in conducting the pursuit.
+
+The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon
+the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of
+the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases
+of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:--
+
+     1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of
+     the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own
+     country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly
+     or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must,
+     however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might
+     then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely.
+
+     2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as
+     possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained;
+     because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously
+     followed up.
+
+     3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of
+     gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say;
+     for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a
+     country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have
+     been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers.
+
+Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the
+subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand
+combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical
+measures which may render them more easy of execution.
+
+One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
+familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be
+resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that
+the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops
+harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is
+at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special
+importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be
+furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the
+purpose of getting supplies by marauding.
+
+It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer
+of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in
+advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for
+occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so
+rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have
+considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the
+execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of
+thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to
+prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
+retreating columns.
+
+It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the
+distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would
+run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When,
+however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may
+increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to
+the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same
+degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy.
+If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
+may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its
+strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of
+the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance
+not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is
+made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time
+to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the
+Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and
+Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of
+the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of
+troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and
+spoils.
+
+Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of
+interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over
+it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when
+the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge,
+it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be
+taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that
+they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for
+the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard
+should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as
+far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
+permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much
+hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall
+have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
+main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the
+rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass
+through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the
+river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give
+him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
+rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the
+river, breaking the bridges after it.
+
+It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form
+on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps
+left to hold the enemy in check.
+
+The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the
+precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be
+taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be
+constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the
+construction of a regular _tęte de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will
+be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops.
+
+If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only
+pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is
+threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy
+in force.
+
+The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most
+remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more
+desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and
+skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve
+hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in
+front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
+by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the
+honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped
+its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise
+should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
+operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of
+Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a
+rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the
+capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the
+lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.
+
+The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be
+closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage,
+and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one
+which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place
+yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such
+a case is rare.
+
+If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by
+regular _tętes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the
+rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use
+every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the
+bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also
+fire-ships and mills,--a means the Austrians used in 1796 against
+Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
+the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same
+thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and
+brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.
+
+It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character
+unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be
+anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating
+bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
+concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army.
+Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the
+end, the cause of his ruin.]
+
+[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
+nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive,
+it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly
+upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the
+frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIX.
+
+Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter
+Quarters.
+
+
+So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my
+subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly.
+
+To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is
+generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there
+is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country
+where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia,
+or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of
+quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops
+have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the
+divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia,
+portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is
+more difficult to put an army into winter quarters.
+
+Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the
+end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan
+character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts.
+
+The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by
+Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of
+conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the
+other side to prevent its success.
+
+The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the
+following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and
+occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too
+extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and
+cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer
+line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by
+field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the
+troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by
+which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
+finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any
+point.
+
+In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments
+behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being
+hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered more
+than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite
+in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position
+until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
+expected to be the case everywhere.
+
+An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to
+have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries
+where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size
+of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country
+occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
+of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion.
+The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty
+thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with
+the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in
+check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is
+assembled.
+
+It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going
+into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems
+inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn
+from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an
+army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in
+quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice.
+
+In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a
+campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or
+waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will
+probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such
+positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order
+that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy
+to do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist
+readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be
+ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are
+by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to
+place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in
+case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may
+present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march
+from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same
+rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter
+quarters.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XL.
+
+Descents.
+
+
+These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the
+most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared
+enemy.
+
+Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in
+navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous
+three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred
+cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a
+numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until
+the debarkation of the army takes place.
+
+Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of
+war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and
+could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the
+number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests,
+the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much
+certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these
+reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern
+times.
+
+Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the
+Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,--the
+innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,--the great
+expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of
+Alexander into Asia Minor, those of Cćsar to England and Africa, that
+of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,--the Crusades,--the expeditions
+of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?
+
+Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II.
+was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on
+foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions
+were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of
+Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents
+of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St.
+Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp,
+Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for
+that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
+difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.
+
+The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the
+world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against
+second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation
+for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense
+trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c.
+
+We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast
+problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true
+that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred
+and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:
+unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left
+us entirely in the dark as to this grave question.
+
+It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the
+Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of
+being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to
+pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would
+become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war
+and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the
+fleet or oblige it to regain its ports?
+
+Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
+generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or
+at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their
+deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains
+of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and
+the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring
+to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
+between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the
+preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the
+present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of
+statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France
+from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the
+activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the
+careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
+possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
+English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
+had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
+moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
+so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
+the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
+that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
+preparation and vast means of transportation.
+
+Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
+expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
+evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
+cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
+second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
+3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
+position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
+diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
+engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
+point of the descent.
+
+It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
+About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive
+the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
+may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
+activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
+strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
+shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
+to the troops that have landed.
+
+A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the
+transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed
+in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great
+advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to
+great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats,
+tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness
+for the proper use of their arms?
+
+I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces
+too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to
+line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but
+the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be
+protected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving prompt
+notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable
+force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a
+firm foothold.
+
+The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and
+their prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep and
+present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be
+landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent
+becomes more difficult.
+
+Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents
+which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids a
+continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the
+enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a
+coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the
+shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies.
+For the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the
+possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land
+which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened
+by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be
+re-embarked without hurry and loss.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLI.
+
+A few Remarks on Logistics in General.
+
+
+Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a
+general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of
+war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate
+collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the
+different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations
+of the art?
+
+These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly
+convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and
+believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems
+already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good
+definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in
+answering these questions which seem so simple.
+
+In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other
+military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of
+staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and
+of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This
+was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_
+is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logěs_,
+(translated in German by _Quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it
+formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the
+marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was
+then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps,
+movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more
+extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
+transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points
+of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents
+for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
+assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of
+them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
+supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute
+details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the
+operations of a campaign.
+
+To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man
+should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If
+the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the Archduke
+Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard,
+and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete
+sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than
+the science of applying all possible military knowledge.
+
+It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is
+insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the
+real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to
+instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be
+accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the
+general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to
+publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties
+of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to
+the best methods of performing these duties.
+
+The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their
+government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted
+to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only
+work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public
+and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several
+generals--as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut--have prepared
+manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
+several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a
+complete manual on the subject.
+
+If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details
+of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff
+officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most
+important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics
+includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we
+retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and
+developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of
+ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.
+
+To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points
+that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and
+detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings
+resulting from such movements:--
+
+     1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the
+     army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
+     Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage
+     of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of
+     operations.
+
+     2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief
+     for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected
+     battles.
+
+     3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
+     measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be
+     used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
+     facilitate the operations of the army.
+
+     4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
+     procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as
+     possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.
+
+     5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements
+     ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different
+     columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner.
+     Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and
+     safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of
+     halts.
+
+     6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
+     flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions
+     for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the
+     performance of their duties.
+
+     7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or
+     their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing
+     up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as
+     their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to
+     engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the
+     character of the enemy.[33]
+
+     8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen
+     points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and
+     informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of
+     need.
+
+     9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,
+     munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in
+     their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the
+     movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking
+     precautions for order and security, both on the march and when
+     trains are halted and parked.
+
+     10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies.
+     Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of
+     the army, and regulating their use.
+
+     11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations
+     for their safety, good order, and police.
+
+     12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies,
+     as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached
+     bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding
+     in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and
+     convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also
+     for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its
+     base.
+
+     13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men,
+     movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their
+     safety.
+
+     14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
+     flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking
+     out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on
+     detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some
+     center of action, and forming strategic reserves.
+
+     15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
+     isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
+     between the army and its base of operations.
+
+     16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of
+     the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of
+     artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those
+     troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.
+
+     17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
+     order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard;
+     causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where
+     the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his
+     pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the
+     movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that
+     they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper
+     precautions to insure safety.
+
+     18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps;
+     indicating to each principal division of the army a place of
+     assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,
+     instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed.
+
+An examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer
+by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that
+these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff
+officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very
+purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention
+to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided
+with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
+Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and
+woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This
+want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have
+faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual
+interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
+hindering them in performing their duties.[34]
+
+
+It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the
+guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious
+duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff
+officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that I should be
+obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these
+details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these
+subjects.
+
+I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of
+the first articles enumerated above:--
+
+1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army
+to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are
+likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They
+should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that
+the _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses,
+carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully
+examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool
+trains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
+ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of
+_matériel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order.
+
+If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers,
+gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft
+should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will
+probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable
+points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those
+localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary
+establishment on the opposite bank.
+
+The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
+necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the
+proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction
+to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any
+thing relative to the projected enterprise.
+
+If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief
+engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of
+operations, when _tętes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be
+constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built
+between the first line of defense and the second base.
+
+2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to
+making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the
+general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of
+staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of
+knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating
+the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be
+the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
+commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the
+general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he
+can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief.
+
+I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the
+service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in
+issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general
+instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much
+the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps,
+who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same
+sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of
+school.
+
+The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to
+his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself,
+and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on
+the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the
+operations of the whole army.[35] I have good reasons for knowing that
+he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of
+mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands
+of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans.
+
+It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans
+secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his
+night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire.
+That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his whole
+army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of
+Napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of
+action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is
+going on around them?
+
+Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean
+may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the
+minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay,
+Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies
+and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more
+ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the
+enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases,
+to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to
+add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of
+the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing
+it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted
+verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it
+accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and
+concert of action would be secured.
+
+3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some
+enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and
+precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual
+precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue
+and to cover its movements thoroughly.
+
+There are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of
+the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or
+retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in
+late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had
+been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had
+roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each
+other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing
+roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when
+an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
+guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
+obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and
+secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of
+the army.
+
+In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and
+distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different
+distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and
+giving them instructions the following particulars must be
+considered:--1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of
+_matériel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles
+placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is
+important for the march to be concealed or open.
+
+Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging
+the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all
+those corps not marching with the column attached to the general
+head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the
+generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them
+understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
+then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the
+object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which
+they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what
+corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads
+to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves
+accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the
+enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[36]
+
+All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the
+chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in
+position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. To see that they
+march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but
+they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the
+appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their
+command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats,
+however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into
+divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated.
+
+Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its
+march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient
+also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each
+column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools
+for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of
+these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light
+trestle-bridge train will be found very useful.
+
+4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard,
+or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing
+may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves
+and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced
+guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that
+half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these
+circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the
+road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be
+made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the
+general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved
+in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the
+march of the center must be applied to that wing.
+
+Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of
+forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an
+accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his
+plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist
+the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed
+of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops of
+the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some
+horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and
+pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out
+of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch
+of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of
+irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular
+cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such
+service.
+
+5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes
+the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which
+may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers
+will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being
+established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number
+of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected
+as the site of the principal depot.
+
+The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to
+thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance
+apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen
+depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into
+three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander
+and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the
+arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the
+authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities
+for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees
+that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there
+should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the
+principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced
+within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and
+able general officers; for the security of the communications of the
+army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may sometimes
+become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good
+battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing
+continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to
+keep open the communications.
+
+6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to
+be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of
+march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires
+going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in
+silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous
+works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war.
+
+Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should
+be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of
+logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the
+French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of
+the army upon the campaign of 1815.
+
+In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such
+arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated,
+were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of
+the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue
+of the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a
+skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
+for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated
+in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
+instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually
+transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent
+opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was
+his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to
+a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight
+line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into
+account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched
+at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the
+supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
+he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and
+precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point
+to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches
+necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a
+certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in
+mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the
+hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
+enough to make any man famous.
+
+Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
+Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
+Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
+thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
+between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
+Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
+seemed so very complicated.
+
+In the same manner, in 1815, when Blücher had his army quietly in
+cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
+attending _fętes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
+France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
+with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
+but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
+Charleroi and Blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points
+of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
+plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
+leave Paris until the 12th.)
+
+The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
+calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
+logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
+I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
+came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
+recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and
+being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
+Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
+extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
+returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
+been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
+route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
+respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
+and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
+through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
+uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
+had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
+in a more retired position toward Ulm.
+
+The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun,
+Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as
+the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred
+thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the
+army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have
+five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a
+highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated.
+
+No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities having
+commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's arrival at Munich,
+this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a
+literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its
+obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon,
+but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal
+had had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt.
+
+Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the
+passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the
+speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point of
+being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one
+hundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleon
+succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the
+glorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon,
+that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his
+contemptible logistics.
+
+We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which
+preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before the
+battle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point of
+the island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that
+of Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful
+than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated
+the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains
+of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austrians
+and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fęte_.
+These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the
+4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the
+Danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst
+torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the
+bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before
+mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they
+covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time
+than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver
+for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had,
+it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;
+but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions
+is not at all diminished by it.
+
+Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten
+copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge
+of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing,
+whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the
+center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not
+been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene
+of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the
+enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few
+detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most
+remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that
+after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince
+of Wagram.
+
+The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;
+but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten
+copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of
+the troops?
+
+Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good
+logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this
+battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the
+midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it
+was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the
+banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These
+precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but
+they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well
+as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
+and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of
+the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness
+upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name,
+owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agree
+that Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures
+of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would
+be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was
+present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future
+unless by his direction.
+
+To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomes
+necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances.
+They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and
+statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its
+accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its
+resources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences
+of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state,
+these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are
+still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any
+country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed
+with. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of
+making these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of my
+readers to them.
+
+Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to
+gain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made by
+detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up in
+battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the
+reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be
+thrown out to break through his screen of posts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 33: I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are
+not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.]
+
+[Footnote 34: The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the
+administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the
+general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of
+course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high
+officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of
+the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise,
+confusion is inevitable.]
+
+[Footnote 35: I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram,
+and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated
+from his usual custom by issuing a general order.]
+
+[Footnote 36: Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no
+general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten.
+In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often
+indispensable.]
+
+[Footnote 37: It may be objected that in some wars, as where the
+population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to
+organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed
+to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most
+necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid
+was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the
+guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the
+line extended as far as Cadiz.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLII.
+
+Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information of
+the Movements of the Enemy.
+
+
+One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to
+order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's
+proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if
+he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of
+the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
+utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the
+chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice
+of war.
+
+From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply
+learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired
+that practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the
+direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a
+school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line
+of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of
+both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful,
+active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect
+riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the
+incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius.
+
+I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I had
+to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the
+man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy
+than for him who could make a grand display of theories,--things so
+difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once
+exemplified.
+
+There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations.
+The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in
+reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third,
+in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of
+probabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is
+also a fifth method,--that of signals. Although this is used rather for
+indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to
+his designs, it may be classed with the others.
+
+Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other
+agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for
+reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing
+beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that they
+should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining
+information; but I do say that their results are small and not to be
+depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is
+generally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will
+always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their
+questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and
+deserters.
+
+The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of
+operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is
+almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information
+they possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally be
+successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the
+general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for
+him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his
+own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receives
+from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those
+which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally
+to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed
+through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Gera
+toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are they
+going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the most
+skillful spy cannot learn.
+
+When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the
+enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be
+thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report
+accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into
+corps d'armée which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to
+learn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the
+hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who
+always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, for
+example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known when
+they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to
+conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of
+smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly.
+
+A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making
+reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfaction
+say that this means hardly ever failed me. Though fortune never placed
+me at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a
+hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils
+of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under
+consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of
+Europe; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in my
+hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. As
+I have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army can
+operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of
+operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that
+can possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and
+conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan
+which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the
+future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own
+observation.
+
+In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war with
+Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the
+operations which would take place.
+
+I made the three following hypotheses:--1st. The Prussians will await
+Napoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive as
+far as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or
+they will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontier
+of Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d.
+Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they will
+advance imprudently to Erfurt.
+
+I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the
+Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces,
+already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel and
+Mayence,--a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldier
+on the first of these roads since the Seven Years' War.
+
+These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask
+what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that the
+mass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should be
+thrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for the
+gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan
+they should adopt."
+
+If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line of
+retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. If
+they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof and
+Gera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way of
+Leipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack them
+by way of Gera and Hof.
+
+Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what
+mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certain
+of the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce,
+_a month before the war_, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did,
+and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at
+Jena and Naumburg!
+
+I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that
+were my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I have
+only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often
+arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without
+much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's
+movements.
+
+Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has been
+neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 the
+staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for
+such services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish the
+staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to
+send agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon's
+whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806,
+were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often suffered
+severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get
+information as to what was going on around them.
+
+The Russian army is better provided than any other for gathering
+information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and history
+confirms my assertion.
+
+The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of
+Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming
+and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as
+Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information
+furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf,
+Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
+through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
+intercepted near Châlons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed
+of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his
+whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns
+of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information
+decided Blücher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies,
+which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought
+to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.
+
+We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff
+saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left
+Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit
+this news,--which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of
+a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
+bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which
+decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon
+from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater
+facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous
+days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
+thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.
+
+Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good
+partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers.
+
+I will conclude this article with the following summary:--
+
+1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the
+enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
+reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable
+officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners.
+
+2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter
+how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be
+sifted from them.
+
+3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.
+
+4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods
+mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses
+of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative
+situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of
+the principles of the art.
+
+I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very
+unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,--as has so often happened
+to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should
+at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is
+going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each
+of these hypotheses.[38] It cannot be too much insisted upon that the
+real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these
+reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is
+always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of
+regulating one's conduct is neglected.
+
+In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to be
+gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds.
+Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all.
+Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact
+of his having established a telegraphic communication between the
+head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when the
+Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading
+Bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in
+twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred
+miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he
+had gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the
+telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact is
+sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value.
+
+It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphic
+arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could
+communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of
+battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters.
+Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was given
+up,--for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. These
+communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method
+could not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be
+reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by
+signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be
+necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of
+transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain of
+rapidity.[39] attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle of
+Fleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist
+to observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not
+aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again
+used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the
+victory: of this, however, I have great doubts.
+
+It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness
+to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful
+observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy
+of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining
+information. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with
+it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's
+movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection
+with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its
+use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of
+distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to
+which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very
+unreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatly
+embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was
+Grouchy or Blücher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but
+this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed.
+I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations
+when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic;
+and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the same
+point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was
+prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and the
+Elster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than
+in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at
+hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at
+pleasure.
+
+There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires
+kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of the
+telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an
+invasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have made
+use of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used to
+give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more
+rapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so
+as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's
+threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to
+meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of
+descents.
+
+Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by
+means of military instruments. This method of signals has been brought
+to greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of.
+While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of
+setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of
+the commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before the
+problem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for
+skirmishers. A movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly
+simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly
+from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of
+inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but two
+cases of it in thirteen campaigns.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 38: I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in
+war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove
+the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the
+surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the
+opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been
+anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of
+probability or possibility.]
+
+[Footnote 39: When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not
+known.--Translators.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE
+OF THE THREE ARMS.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLIII.
+
+Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
+
+
+Having explained in Article XXX. what is to be understood by the term
+_line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed,
+and how the different troops are to be distributed in it.
+
+Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and
+brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines,
+each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usually
+placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very
+unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. The army camped
+together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry
+wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns
+were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially
+applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on
+account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry
+had camped in a third line,--which was rare.
+
+This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary
+to give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in such
+direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." This
+monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better
+could have been devised as war was carried on in those days.
+
+The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns
+as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a
+simple impossibility.
+
+If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping
+and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were
+applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty
+thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would
+be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach.
+
+The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up
+the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the
+field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground.
+This change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme
+to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the
+Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and
+cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended,
+either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an
+absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of
+the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen
+marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from
+each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support
+than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four
+hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his
+forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced,
+and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could
+do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns.
+
+Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly
+by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and
+partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where
+the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the
+government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly
+increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger
+organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system
+and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional
+system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two
+or three divisions, which he placed under the command of
+lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the
+reserve of his army.[40]
+
+This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where
+he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had
+under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry,
+from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each
+corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an
+army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve,
+composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of
+light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry
+reserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized into
+corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the
+constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near
+perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such
+great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon
+imitated.
+
+Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have
+recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act
+independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because
+this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would
+certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two
+brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades
+on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot
+with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three
+brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in
+reserve,--a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in ten
+divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen
+divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this
+perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry
+by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to
+two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps
+is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a
+division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for
+that[41].
+
+What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon
+a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics;
+because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization
+in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out
+continually.
+
+The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed to
+leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. The
+center under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and the
+reserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidable
+battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those
+of the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte
+and Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left,
+were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danube
+at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five
+divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to
+the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was
+destroyed.
+
+It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Events
+are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau's
+campaign of 1800 proves that the original organization may sometimes be
+maintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it would
+seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center,
+and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strength
+of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes
+necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line
+in order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions are
+with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or
+give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the
+main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four
+great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four
+divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case there
+would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps
+should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to
+the center.
+
+With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line
+in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps
+may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and
+from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march
+of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak
+order of battle.
+
+These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of
+battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light
+cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more
+stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions.
+
+But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the
+units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the
+operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly
+varied. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the
+principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two
+or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have
+indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one
+behind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28
+inclusive.)
+
+_Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 17. Two Corps deployed, One behind the Other.]
+
+             First Corps.
+----- -----       ^      ----- -----
+2d Division.      |      1st Division.
+
+            Second Corps.
+----- -----       ^      ----- -----
+2d Division.      |      1st Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 18. Two Corps formed Side by Side.]
+
+Second Corps.     ^       First Corps.
+                  |
+----- -----       |       ----- -----
+1st Division.     |       1st Division.
+                  |
+----- -----       |       ----- -----
+2d Division.      |       2d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 19. Two Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.]
+
+
+               First Corps.
+
+----- ----- -----   ^   ----- ----- -----
+  2d Division.      |     1st Division.
+
+               Second Corps.
+
+----- ----- -----   ^   ----- ----- -----
+  2d Division.      |     1st Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 20. Two Corps Side by Side.]
+
+
+   Second Corps.    ^      First Corps.
+                    |
+----- ----- -----   |   ----- ----- -----
+   1st Division.    |     1st Division.
+                    |
+----- ----- -----   |   ----- ----- -----
+   2d Division.     |      2d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 21. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.]
+
+             First Corps.
+
+2d Division.             1st Division.
+----- -----              ----- -----
+   -----                    -----
+
+            Second Corps.
+
+2d Division.             1st Division.
+----- -----              ----- -----
+   -----                    -----
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 22. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each,
+placed Side by Side.]
+
+
+Second Corps.     ^      First Corps.
+                  |
+1st Division.     |      1st Division.
+ ----- -----      |       ----- -----
+    -----         |          -----
+                  |
+ 2d Division.     |       2d Division.
+ ----- -----      |       ----- -----
+    -----         |          -----
+
+_Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 23.]
+
+               First Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----   ^ ----  ----
+3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
+
+               Second Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----   ^ ----  ----
+3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 24.]
+
+        Second Corps.          ^               First Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----      |       ----  ----  ^ ----  ----
+2d Division. | 1st Division    |      2d Division. | 1st Division
+                               |
+        ----   ----            |               ----  ----
+        3d Division.           |              3d Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 25.]
+
+  2d Corps.  ^  1st Corps.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+1st Division.| 1st Division.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+2d Division. | 2d Division.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+3d Division. | 3d Division.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 26. Two Divisions in the 1st Line, and one in the
+2d Line.]
+
+          First Corps.
+
+               ^
+---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+ 2d Division.  | 1st Division.
+
+     ----    ----     ----
+         3d Division.
+
+
+          Second Corps.
+
+               ^
+---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+ 2d Division.  |  1st Division.
+
+     ----    ----      ----
+         3d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 27. Same Order with 3d Brigade as Reserve, and the
+2 Corps Side by Side.]
+
+        Second Corps.           ^           First Corps.
+                                |
+2d Division. ^  1st Division.   |   2d Division. ^  1st Division.
+ ----  ----  |   ----  ----     |    ----  ----  |   ----  ----
+    ----     |      ----        |       ----     |      ----
+                                |
+                                |
+      ---- ---- ----            |          ---- ---- ----
+        3d Division.            |           3d Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Shallower Formation: Twelve Brigades in the First Line,
+and Six in the Second Line._
+
+Fig. 28.]
+
+        Second Corps.            ^           First Corps.
+                                 |
+2d Division.   ^  1st Division.  |   2d Division. ^  1st Division.
+---- ---- ---- |  ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+                                 |
+     ----    ----      ----      |      ----     ----    ----
+         3d Division.            |           3d Division.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Note.--In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but
+these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in
+columns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached to
+the corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawn
+up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second.
+
+The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place
+two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly at
+Wagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be
+used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle;
+for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its
+reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under
+different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to
+support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for
+that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a
+colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable
+he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly
+needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line
+cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front
+was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own
+troops drawn up in rear.
+
+The table below[42] will show that the number of men in an army will
+have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that
+the subject is a complicated one.
+
+In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the
+case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to
+1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength
+from two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can
+be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of
+these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six
+for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that
+might require support. If this system be applied to an army of one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ
+divisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps.
+
+If nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the
+center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen
+divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one
+hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three
+battalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred and
+forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With
+regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and
+twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment
+contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men
+strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty
+thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men.
+These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must
+be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If an
+army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation
+by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was
+Napoleon's army of 1800.
+
+Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat
+permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out
+of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if
+it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the
+composition of corps and their positions.
+
+I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained
+while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. If
+the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the
+center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of
+three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing
+which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a
+corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce
+it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by
+a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy
+would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the
+line.
+
+But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that,
+whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the
+organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of
+Europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must
+be made upon that basis.
+
+The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in
+recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly it
+was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more
+reserves. In recent[43] conflicts in Europe, when the masses brought
+into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two
+lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines;
+and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of
+infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formation
+may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best
+for battle, as it is entirely too deep.
+
+The classical formation--if I may employ that term--is still two lines
+for the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and the
+strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but
+these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and
+the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of
+men to be simultaneously engaged.
+
+When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in
+front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the
+reserve;[44] but, as has been previously stated, this will not often
+happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each wing
+has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main
+or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading
+corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return
+to their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve
+is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent
+its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle
+by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding
+general.
+
+From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great
+changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of
+the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution,
+and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of
+Peter the Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from
+the stand-point of those days.
+
+One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of
+example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the
+cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an
+army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the
+center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the
+extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry
+to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference
+to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If
+the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the
+organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the
+center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If
+that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on
+the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing.
+These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be
+threatened.[45]
+
+The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as
+formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division
+remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organization
+of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous
+distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake
+to scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for the
+proper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise
+as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one
+hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support,
+as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into
+much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the
+following rules:--
+
+1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move
+freely in every direction.
+
+2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy
+caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from
+sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add--what
+every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are
+not those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping
+ground is better.
+
+3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is
+well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily
+thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to have
+horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible
+to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for
+self-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve;
+for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself
+when his line had been broken through between the center and the left.
+
+4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in
+front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to
+attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of
+checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns.
+
+5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not
+in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole
+line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must
+not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of
+the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the
+artillery to move to a wing or to the center.
+
+6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very
+powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make
+a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a
+degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate
+of the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say as
+to the employment of artillery in battles.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 40: Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing
+of three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under
+Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, the
+general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own
+immediate orders.]
+
+[Footnote 41: Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two
+brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while
+the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each
+may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But it
+then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have
+but two in a corps,--which would be a faulty arrangement, because the
+corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than
+the division.]
+
+[Footnote 42: Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,--in
+all, four principal subdivisions,--besides accidental detachments.
+
+Below are some of the different formations that may be given to
+infantry.
+
+1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:--
+
+     Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and
+     three divisions for detachments.................. 11 = 22 = 88 =
+     72,000
+
+     Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for
+     detachments................... 15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000
+
+     Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for
+     detachments....................... 16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000
+
+2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:--
+
+     Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each,
+     besides detachments,............................... 11 = 22 = 132
+     105,000
+
+     Four corps of three divisions each, besides
+     detachments................................ 15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000
+
+     Eight corps of two divisions each............ 16 = 32 = 192 =
+     154,000
+
+If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and
+engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known.
+
+It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred
+men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months'
+campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then each
+battalion should contain one thousand men.]
+
+[Footnote 43: The term _recent_ here refers to the later wars of
+Napoleon I.--Translators.]
+
+[Footnote 44: As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every
+day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour
+of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the
+line of battle.]
+
+[Footnote 45: This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon
+the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This is
+the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLIV.
+
+Formation and Employment of Infantry.
+
+
+Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it
+forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense
+of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general,
+the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory,
+it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and
+artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times
+be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial
+success.
+
+We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and
+the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided,
+is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of
+Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages
+of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep
+order. I will give my own opinion farther on.
+
+There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question
+now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank,
+armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of
+producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater
+resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the
+difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in
+three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the
+disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who
+had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material
+advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for
+it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops
+takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn
+their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase
+in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing
+upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much
+mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult
+to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:
+although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks
+cannot be kept properly closed.
+
+Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd
+that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He
+wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred
+and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask
+what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may
+penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.
+
+But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of
+deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of
+attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division
+and depending on its force and impetuosity?
+
+I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of
+the question in hand.
+
+There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an
+enemy:--l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or
+checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central
+divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares.
+
+The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers
+are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage
+of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up
+intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position.
+
+These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four:
+the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the
+half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on
+the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are
+partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed
+of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 29.[46]
+
+   Deployed order in two lines.
+----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
+----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
+
+]
+
+The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used
+to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These
+deployed lines may either be continuous, (Fig. 29,) or checkerwise, or
+in echelons.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 30.
+
+Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in
+the intervals.
+
+    -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...-----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----...-----...-----...-----...-----...-----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+
+]
+
+A more compact order is shown in Fig. 30, where each battalion is formed
+into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division.
+It is really a line of small columns
+
+In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[47] will
+have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way
+too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the
+artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed,
+whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two
+ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the
+other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of
+the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these
+skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.)
+Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides
+those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be,
+also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having
+really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred
+men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each
+battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[48] A battalion of
+eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four
+divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first
+alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bach
+battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a
+volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver
+four hundred.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 31.]
+
+While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we
+must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and
+that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to
+fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement
+is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous
+against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three
+ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry.
+The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly
+at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my
+chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave
+cavalry of Bessičres could make no impression upon these small masses.
+
+To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it
+is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would
+be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a
+charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. If to
+remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military
+men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as
+columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two
+ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry,
+only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if
+the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be
+difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is
+scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to
+employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that
+any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed
+lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns
+of attack.
+
+I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of
+forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be
+employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable
+than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would
+be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 32.]
+
+There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento
+and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions,
+one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in
+columns. (See Fig. 32.) This arrangement--which belongs also to the
+half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the
+first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him
+into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may
+debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in
+disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the
+leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line
+with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a
+half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means
+unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear
+that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
+battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the
+enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may be
+useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it.
+
+[Illustration: Fig 33.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig 34.]
+
+The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly the
+most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were
+sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six
+ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the
+destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are
+diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such
+masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated.
+Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great
+sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have
+been victorious had it not been for the successes of Davoust and
+Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line.
+
+When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly
+be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that
+if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in
+its progress. (See Fig. 33.) Under the protection of these battalions,
+which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to
+the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed
+to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will
+be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as was
+the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.
+
+Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority
+in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for the
+defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (See Figs. 35,
+36, 37.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 35.
+
+Division in battalion squares.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 36.
+
+The same division in long battalion squares.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 37.
+
+Squared of regiments of three battalions.]
+
+The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front
+and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. A
+regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling
+the center battalion half to the right and half to the left.
+
+In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because
+hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia,
+or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if the
+seat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular
+cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions
+usual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the
+Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia.
+
+However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions
+seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the
+superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for
+the enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to a
+battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and
+one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed
+battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; but
+there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the
+battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also,
+of being prepared to resist cavalry.
+
+Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each
+other. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with
+deployed lines.
+
+It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described
+is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness
+of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the
+offensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and
+_momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and also
+the power of delivering _as much fire as possible_.
+
+This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the
+bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in
+presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one
+round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand
+in five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been
+carried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a
+shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of _momentum_ and
+the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the
+English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera,
+Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo.
+
+We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the
+advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for
+when the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not
+at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they
+were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been
+repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had used
+columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the
+center? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of
+the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep
+order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a
+deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like Fig. 31,
+(page 293.) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I have
+seen them tried.
+
+Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to
+attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into action
+while firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose the
+attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while
+firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended
+position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired
+point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of
+sheep.
+
+What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If the
+deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive.
+2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for
+carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as
+much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy
+a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's
+fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by
+cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the second
+in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may be
+successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use
+his troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles XVI. and XXX.
+
+Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been
+made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more
+destructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer the
+shallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget the
+lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries,
+shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method
+of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some
+persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and
+breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack
+in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployed
+system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the
+attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with
+proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position,
+or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of
+companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy
+who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillful
+commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these
+arrangements, according to circumstances.
+
+Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical
+problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle;
+but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a
+single method is an impossibility.
+
+In the first place, the topography of different countries is very
+various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might be
+maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, the
+valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a
+division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, and
+their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the
+system of formation.
+
+Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instruction
+in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines
+so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which
+would be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies
+of the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that
+nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who think
+that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all
+countries.
+
+To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it
+seems to me, we ought to find out:--1. The best method of moving when in
+sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of coming
+to close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order.
+
+In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all
+cases to exercise the troops--1. In marching in columns of battalions
+doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when
+coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in
+continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in
+deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are
+more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front by
+the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares,
+either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these
+different methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by
+columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more
+expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best
+suited to all kinds of ground.
+
+Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of
+companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plain
+it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. It
+breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates
+to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all
+confusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger to
+which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by
+cavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and
+not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over
+the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. At the
+least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed
+instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whatever
+precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with
+well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have never
+seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where
+it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front.
+
+I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in
+checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same
+battalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, have
+never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkered
+order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. It
+may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it
+more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the
+leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form
+line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only
+between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget
+that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one,
+which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the
+marches of continuous lines.
+
+It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for
+making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods I
+have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-four
+battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center
+ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace
+toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then
+deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread
+out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and
+pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows
+the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through
+the intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when no
+enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the
+advantages of firing and of the column.
+
+Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of
+attacking in the half-deep order.
+
+The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others
+in column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32, page 295.) The
+deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would
+open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. The
+second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching
+half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line
+through the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons,
+mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig. 15 on that page.
+
+Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed
+lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the
+other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen.
+
+I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for I
+have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats of
+infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing
+to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly
+against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or
+repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved
+out to meet the advance. I have seen _męlées_ of infantry in defiles and
+in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision
+and thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing on
+a regular field of battle.
+
+In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and
+should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fire
+of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation;
+and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of
+tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every
+different nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper
+combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must,
+however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned.
+
+I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be
+attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops
+as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by
+withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all
+inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of
+the enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range,
+it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is
+then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers
+and troops on the defensive.
+
+It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a
+position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is
+assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must
+never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene,
+seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke
+through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were
+sacrificed in defending these posts.
+
+For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood,
+which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the
+troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the
+enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park of
+Hougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influence
+the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended,
+may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the
+possession of the woods was very important.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 46: In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of
+twelve battalions.]
+
+[Footnote 47: The word _division_ being used to designate four or five
+regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of
+confusion in its use.]
+
+[Footnote 48: In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from the
+third rank of each division,--which makes the column eight men in depth,
+instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying the
+skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the
+whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three
+divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there
+would be twelve ranks.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLV.
+
+Cavalry.
+
+
+The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course,
+somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole
+army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be
+so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper
+moments.
+
+The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied
+greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making their
+people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of
+horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the
+Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly
+inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was
+pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,--a weak
+brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same
+reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so
+much had ideas and means changed.
+
+As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country
+should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in
+mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.
+
+The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of
+motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we
+must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.
+
+Whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of
+war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of
+infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to
+render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the
+enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered
+infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient
+in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats
+extremely difficult.
+
+The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon
+the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's
+movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned
+here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its
+use.
+
+All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good
+order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be
+supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly
+for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great
+fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged
+to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for
+charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing
+infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others
+prove this.
+
+There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over
+infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they
+cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau,
+and so did the Austrian left at Dresden.
+
+Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way
+may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was
+made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against
+squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed.
+
+A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and
+enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry
+must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this
+character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of
+before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The
+beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic,
+October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo
+with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because
+unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince
+Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under
+such circumstances.
+
+General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it
+from the field of battle and return more free to act against his
+infantry.
+
+Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an
+enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the
+infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if
+successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is
+rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good;
+for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in
+rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is
+particularly fitted.
+
+In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by
+opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing
+line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It
+may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause
+the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success.
+This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at
+Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'armée
+may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined
+attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to
+finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat.
+
+It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it
+depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but
+four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a
+gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. In
+charges in line, the lance is very useful; in _męlées_, the saber is
+much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank,
+which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which
+finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is
+of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or
+when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous
+to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of
+cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy,
+and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack.
+There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on
+horseback and in rapid motion.
+
+I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good.
+It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the
+advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the
+contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every
+thing depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of the
+movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop.
+Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over
+the ground as rapidly as possible. In like manner, if the cavalry is
+armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the
+enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the
+cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since
+the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of
+good order: in a _męlée_ the lance is almost useless.
+
+If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop
+to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the
+trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its
+apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is
+estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his
+firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping
+in confusion.
+
+In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the
+small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where
+lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is
+much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any
+advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good
+squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers
+armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models
+for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.
+
+Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using
+cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an
+enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be
+completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry,
+it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in
+collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It
+is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a
+quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head.
+
+Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and
+organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes
+when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an
+enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a
+second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily
+handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become
+broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of
+lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge,
+penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory.
+
+The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of
+strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry,
+the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men
+of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances,
+believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of
+former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would
+certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they
+should not have lances like those of the light cavalry.
+
+Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called
+dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of
+mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in
+retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a
+soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This
+might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when
+fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought
+quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest
+inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of
+being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot
+resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with
+his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has
+more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make
+men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more
+reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave
+foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always
+depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other
+things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the
+commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and
+musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of
+victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted,
+will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these
+truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their
+adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case
+with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to
+fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like
+foot-soldiers.
+
+It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring
+soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties.
+
+The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or
+mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large
+number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while
+he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French
+dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment
+of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this
+concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the
+instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and
+that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions
+of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might
+result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on
+horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It
+thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have
+their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between
+the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the
+army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and
+then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.
+
+Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is
+applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:--
+
+1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry
+than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too
+much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed
+in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise
+formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements
+before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend
+themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full
+lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is
+checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is
+well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less
+than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full.
+It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be
+left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column
+upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of
+the troops which have been brought up.
+
+2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used,
+cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions.
+The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling
+on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only
+four squadrons, there can be but two lines.
+
+3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ like
+that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron
+distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge
+separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops
+engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be
+closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be
+passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be
+kept beyond cannon-range.
+
+4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a
+combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in
+echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form
+to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction.
+
+5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons
+against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front.
+Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and
+it may be better.
+
+6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the
+commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the
+formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would
+not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the
+other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and
+one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper
+reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in
+a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for
+a general to control the deployed regiments.
+
+By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to
+dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a
+general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to
+think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may
+then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as
+a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the
+line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be
+preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the
+others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three
+regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks
+of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is
+beaten back. (See Fig. 38.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.
+
+Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
+lines.]
+
+7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all
+encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must
+sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first
+charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy
+will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at
+length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that,
+with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will
+remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness
+to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also
+engaged.
+
+Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the
+proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.
+
+Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large
+cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very
+unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career
+the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a
+blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the
+attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian
+cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.
+
+In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never
+intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons,
+or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry,
+expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other,
+the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line
+breaks and turns.[49]
+
+With cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very
+important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and
+the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _męlée_ or
+in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the
+adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is
+adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the
+victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious
+formation.
+
+The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old
+disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get
+the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious
+encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to
+the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy
+by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several
+exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry
+seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry,
+I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does
+not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship,
+organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude
+it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to
+accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They
+acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst
+they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common
+object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
+Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.
+
+Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the
+best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that
+they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate
+of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack
+in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.
+
+From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry
+a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting,
+however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed
+with pistols, lances, and sabers.
+
+Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a
+numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great
+influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a
+feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can
+carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his
+communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his
+operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising
+_en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and
+rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty
+in his calculations.
+
+Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides
+for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation
+of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons,
+be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not
+possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on
+horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure
+supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off
+than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of
+her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she
+can bring into the field at very short notice.
+
+Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the
+Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:--
+
+"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to
+be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock
+of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in
+pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to
+the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of
+the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in
+danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few
+regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has
+not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or
+twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a
+country where the population is not hostile to them.
+
+"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a
+strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much
+unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's
+regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.
+
+"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out,
+may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered
+and move freely about from point to point."
+
+In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources
+possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia
+have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if
+for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those
+occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as
+forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on
+outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be
+more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the
+line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often
+restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where
+he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose
+excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 49: To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the
+battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry
+in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise.
+Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed
+checkered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success was
+his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirch
+and Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight
+squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had
+twice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But I
+cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which I
+have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry
+tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLVI.
+
+Employment of Artillery.
+
+
+Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and
+defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break
+an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the
+troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the
+strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it
+inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral
+effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of
+approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less
+important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched
+camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of
+fortification.
+
+I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as
+to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is
+difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the
+battle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can act
+independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At
+Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the
+gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check
+the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance.
+This was a special case, and should not be often imitated.
+
+I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules,
+observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service,
+(1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say
+little with reference to them.
+
+1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should
+concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be
+struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it
+assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry.
+
+2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive
+movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended
+for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an
+offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column
+without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may
+have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.
+
+3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be
+held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[50]
+For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence
+it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the
+best positions for the heavy calibers.
+
+4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the
+defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points
+where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of
+the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery
+should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the
+battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The
+distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these.
+
+5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the
+front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet
+firing: a converging fire is the best.
+
+6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in
+battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their
+batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries,
+in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may
+be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed
+against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.
+
+7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor
+to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can
+be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is
+produced.
+
+8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It
+is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank
+and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is
+inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it.
+The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few
+pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked
+them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he
+was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards
+upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far
+overbalancing the risks run.
+
+9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and
+especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be
+deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this.
+
+10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry,
+preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells,
+and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in
+such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and,
+when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind
+the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they
+should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller
+squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in
+frightening the horses.
+
+11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its
+fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon.
+The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the
+battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of
+the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by
+the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will
+cause its destruction.
+
+12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon
+conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in 1812 he
+invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed.
+These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible.
+Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this
+allowance will depend on circumstances.
+
+The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between
+wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery,
+whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A
+remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong
+artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The
+great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the
+Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With
+wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along
+the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and
+to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously
+captured. In three months he doubled the _matériel_ and _personnel_ of
+his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own
+frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war.
+
+13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage
+is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist
+and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of
+the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the
+different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with
+the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of
+the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful
+issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus
+massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding
+general.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 50: Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by
+mounting the men on the boxes.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLVII.
+
+Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.
+
+
+To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the
+combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by
+considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if
+I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed
+operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid
+down for each of the arms.
+
+Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject very
+extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they
+consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual
+minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the
+place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the
+subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the
+commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ
+them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after
+all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the
+attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in
+every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied,
+would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the
+object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the
+consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best
+works which do treat of them.
+
+I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms
+be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to
+the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they
+be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being
+taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the
+events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of
+war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability
+to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of
+the three arms, either single or combined.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+
+I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be
+regarded as fundamental in war. War in its _ensemble_ is not a science,
+but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed
+laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of
+war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as
+often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may
+become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a
+thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The
+passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the
+warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their
+commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and
+epochs,[51]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and
+metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results.
+
+Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as
+tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What
+military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are
+we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by
+inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their
+battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and
+Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena,
+or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When
+the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured
+victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their
+favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their
+occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their
+value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a
+theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the
+whole number of chances of success in its favor?
+
+The _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the
+fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect
+produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a
+hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly
+enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than
+the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same
+point.
+
+Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the
+greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the
+theater of war or of the zone of operations.
+
+Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they
+shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the
+art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point
+of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of
+fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which
+I use the term.
+
+A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed
+of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent
+strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in
+presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out,
+and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be
+able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his
+wits he will lose his army.
+
+The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and
+strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory
+that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately
+seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a
+decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor
+courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will
+undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations
+can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
+unavoidable defeat.
+
+No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is
+bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some
+occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling.
+Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence
+to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.
+
+These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound
+rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will
+lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with
+mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but
+it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which
+should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for
+these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding
+brave troops, means of almost certain success.
+
+The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains
+to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability
+consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however,
+leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim
+relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the
+greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and
+place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations
+which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to
+be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for
+the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the
+field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a
+strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a
+column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
+coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist
+of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear,
+or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the
+adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause
+of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is
+simply impossible.
+
+If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war,
+his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he
+may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents
+for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly
+proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most
+suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep
+constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to
+lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly
+endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective
+points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its
+subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance,
+depending upon its first successes.
+
+The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to
+neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting
+operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the
+war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of
+the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the
+purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places,
+covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.
+
+Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but
+no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain
+always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your
+lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well
+concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements
+which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful
+in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of
+your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally
+matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those
+stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and
+Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the
+chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.
+
+If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully
+studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great
+masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles
+nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of
+Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince
+Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning."
+
+Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual
+events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true
+school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great
+men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take
+rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 51: The well-known Spanish proverb, _He was brave on such a
+day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at
+Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at
+Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.]
+
+[Footnote 52: The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable
+of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who
+will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result
+of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.]
+
+
+
+
+SUPPLEMENT
+
+TO THE
+
+SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the
+military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a
+concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give
+it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the
+means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_.
+
+It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that
+in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy
+for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to
+which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of
+these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend
+them clearly and to apply them properly.
+
+I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of
+war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary
+intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity,
+many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly.
+Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing
+themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is
+just within their reach if they only would think so.
+
+Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he
+must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it
+to a successful termination_. The first of these talents may be a
+natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The
+second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal
+attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.
+
+It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government
+to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he
+may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations
+and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted
+to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity
+of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and
+having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the
+command of an army.
+
+If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive
+ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military
+combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have
+characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only
+brave soldiers without being at all improved by study.
+
+From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to
+several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of
+the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths.
+
+The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to
+choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the
+enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the
+importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he
+is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in
+Articles from XVIII. to XXII.
+
+The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the
+theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See Article
+XVII.) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two
+fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid
+movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against
+fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive
+direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of
+his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time
+his success would yield him no great advantages.
+
+The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these
+two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected
+or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also
+would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending
+out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every
+well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with
+central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than
+the enemy's.
+
+The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If
+you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's,
+you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of
+them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to
+observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty
+battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to
+take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior
+lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile
+line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these
+means is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following.)
+
+In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a
+strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a
+center and two extremities."_ A theater has usually three zones,--a
+right, a left, and a central.
+
+In choosing a zone of operations, select one,--1, that will furnish a
+safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by
+yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in
+mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the
+dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near
+the theater of war.
+
+One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the
+other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances.
+
+The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts
+must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are
+two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or
+geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense
+which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched
+camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in
+the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving
+attention to geographical points of any kind_. This was the favorite
+objective of Napoleon.[53]
+
+I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this
+point, (page 86;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the
+most important thing in a plan of operations_, I recommend the whole of
+Article XIX., (pages 84 and following.)
+
+The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one
+or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the
+fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the
+character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the
+enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his
+troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two geographical
+lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces
+along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by
+detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main
+body.
+
+The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in
+presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary
+strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy
+may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important
+consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations
+and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX.,
+(page 93.)
+
+The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that
+the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front
+remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more
+closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and
+more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will
+be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot
+concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving
+in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be
+able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious
+measure.
+
+But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position,
+that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point,
+is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each
+other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War;
+or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its
+sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the
+enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical
+inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the
+extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his
+masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.
+
+It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive
+points of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that the
+principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's,
+to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be
+adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points
+already known, and afterward upon secondary points.
+
+To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a
+sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See Plate
+III.)
+
+It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the
+frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.
+
+The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)
+
+Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
+
+The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin.
+(No. 3.)
+
+The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and
+was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong
+detachments. (No. 4.)
+
+Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)
+
+Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and
+Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)
+
+Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)
+
+The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)
+
+The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)
+
+General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No.
+10.)
+
+The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile
+corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise,
+Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,)
+composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern
+frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's
+line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood,
+(i, k, l, m.)
+
+This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near
+Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the
+Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of
+Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the
+Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges,
+and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser
+from the lines of Wissembourg.
+
+The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar
+operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the
+allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5,
+and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected
+three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at
+Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the
+Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North
+Sea, and would have obtained immense results.
+
+The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance
+that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the
+English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be
+cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for
+this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good
+reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The
+principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
+strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of
+retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of
+punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the
+English as he might have done.
+
+It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the
+whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had
+decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because,
+when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through,
+and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession,
+none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the
+French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
+had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
+fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski,
+assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him
+vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at
+Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.
+
+I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two
+important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses
+of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession
+and at decisive points.[54]
+
+Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and
+will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon
+their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say,
+the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the
+center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of
+importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater
+accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following
+them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every
+precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a
+dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up.
+Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose
+positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with
+_offensive returns_, (Art. XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the
+forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) the
+faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune
+moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as
+the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which
+will constitute him a skillful tactician.
+
+It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of
+battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here
+that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little
+value.
+
+It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which
+explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to
+what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall
+himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be
+prepared for any eventuality.
+
+I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments.
+These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may
+prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are,
+to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_,
+to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give
+them good instructions for avoiding disasters.
+
+I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military
+policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of
+this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but
+should be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however,
+invite special attention to Article XIV., relating to the command of
+armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most
+anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often
+depends the safety of the nation.
+
+We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of
+staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of
+tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action
+of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great
+captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant
+results.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 53: The objective may be in some degree
+_political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs
+of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.]
+
+[Footnote 54: The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing
+masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, but
+because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, he
+would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be would
+have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line of
+retreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillful
+operations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be
+convinced.]
+
+
+
+
+NOTE
+
+UPON
+
+THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.
+
+
+The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable
+practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance,
+never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or
+to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be
+procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable
+characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in
+practice the finest theories in the world.
+
+When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully
+impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against
+successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he
+recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon
+decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire
+to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I
+have already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary,
+indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained.
+There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in
+all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--_in every
+position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate
+by the right, by the left, or by the front_.
+
+To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take
+this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first
+care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the
+greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him
+in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three
+zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,)
+and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII. pointed out the manner of
+perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a
+zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty.
+
+When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with
+the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be
+established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations
+toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of
+operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains,
+then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can
+injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if
+he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have
+dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.
+
+Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the
+field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon
+the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and
+center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these
+three directions of striking.
+
+Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the
+theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the
+North Sea. (See Fig. 39.)
+
+Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical
+sections,--viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that
+between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the
+Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is
+nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the
+front of operations will have only three general directions to choose
+from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone,
+as it will always have one on the right and another on the left.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 39.]
+
+The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose
+base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If
+it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,)
+it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the
+Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg,
+might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and
+fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if
+seriously defeated.
+
+If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon
+the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified
+towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences
+still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
+toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this
+wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward
+Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but
+two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its
+way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.
+
+It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most
+disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient,
+although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone
+remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable
+advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward
+Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations
+of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon
+Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
+communications.
+
+When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone,
+they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the
+enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in
+view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the
+enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of
+his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to
+operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest
+effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
+gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you
+anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the
+contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of
+crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver
+by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered
+by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back
+upon the sea in case of a reverse.
+
+Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm,
+and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in
+those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the
+direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the
+line of retreat of Mélas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led
+by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat
+of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of
+retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera.
+
+In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the
+right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the
+center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left,
+leading to the line of communications of Mélas, by way of Saint-Bernard
+or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and
+the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to
+Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive
+direction was evidently that by the left.
+
+I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.
+
+The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the
+arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical
+considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for
+battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the
+base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but
+this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the
+ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement:
+these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a
+position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it,
+sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In
+such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon
+the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or
+destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing
+his way through your line.
+
+I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen
+in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's
+wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in
+1812.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 40.]
+
+The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A
+A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to
+cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's
+army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the
+French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been
+anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus
+fifteen hundred miles from its true base.
+
+There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by
+outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would
+have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.
+
+At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which
+was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the
+right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a
+few days later.
+
+In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is
+that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this
+line you must seize while protecting your own.
+
+When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and
+behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the
+center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the
+least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first
+consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total
+destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical
+strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with
+reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.
+
+Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the
+enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at
+Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been
+secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent
+the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing
+better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for
+maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who
+is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike
+most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most
+speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass
+of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
+that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be
+toward the right or the left.
+
+It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the
+presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the
+general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an
+exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the
+bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw
+the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of
+taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back
+upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in
+another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a
+very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of
+Wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be
+desired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII., (pages 224 and
+following.)
+
+A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that
+have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate
+_coup-d'oeil_. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who
+estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use,
+either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps,
+will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and
+even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will
+always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by
+constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which
+should regulate all the operations of war.
+
+Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime
+art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate
+thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of
+combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special
+talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the
+noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men
+co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well
+what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make
+such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point
+simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with
+arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special
+talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted
+that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best
+strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime
+characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the
+command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability,
+have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved
+imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other!
+Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny,
+Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen.
+
+I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said.
+To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me
+for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims
+laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to
+announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of
+passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight
+and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the
+impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence
+upon it." I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed
+history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most
+celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where
+these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.
+
+As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating
+mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only
+what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things
+into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have
+seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of
+reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived
+incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men
+intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most
+extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment
+and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended
+for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to
+facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by
+pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for
+having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really
+desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.
+
+Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:--
+
+"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is,
+that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly
+martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit
+faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels."
+
+[Blank Page]
+
+
+
+
+SECOND APPENDIX
+
+TO THE
+
+SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
+
+
+Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person
+did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in
+fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making
+war.
+
+I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of
+tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand
+combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the
+application of the principles which had led to the success of great
+generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Cćsar as well as of Frederick
+and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my
+opinion.
+
+The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not
+produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest
+between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and
+mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without
+precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
+which produced it cannot occur again.
+
+Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance
+to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot
+influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the
+tactics of battles.
+
+The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the
+murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate
+the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the
+tactics for infantry.
+
+I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to
+complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the
+Summary of the Art of War.
+
+The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is
+not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and
+particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)
+because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in
+loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more
+than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose at this epoch between
+the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is
+known to all military students.
+
+The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the
+infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle,
+was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.
+
+The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as
+the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of
+battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such
+as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small
+intrenchments.[56]
+
+
+The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic
+forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the
+system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the
+nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the
+Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendée--rendered
+this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to
+attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed
+regiments?
+
+In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as
+they were nearly always the assailants.
+
+In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the
+title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which
+I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns
+of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to
+the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance,
+preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by
+intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a
+battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.
+
+What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and
+Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
+marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to
+attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to
+publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some
+attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on
+account of what was said on tactics.
+
+The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops
+deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the
+murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds
+as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till
+after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore
+renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.
+
+In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest
+minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in
+the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange,
+without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances,
+national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had
+proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I
+never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the
+defense.
+
+I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was
+approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the
+Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles
+observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had
+published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808
+from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not
+thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at
+the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to
+form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr
+particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the
+cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke,
+they could not have done if they had been deployed.
+
+At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was
+formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible
+fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his
+army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown
+back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was
+satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this
+mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.
+
+The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently,
+not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of
+Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the
+controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to
+which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise.
+He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French
+upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a
+solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well
+supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these
+deep columns were very different from the small columns which I
+proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force,
+and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force
+than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of
+artillery.
+
+I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the
+Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He
+answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the
+English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line
+formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines.
+He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends
+upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act
+in the same manner under all circumstances."
+
+To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the
+campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the
+infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the
+most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.
+
+The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at
+Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns
+of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.
+
+If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it
+would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at
+least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line
+extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but
+several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed
+in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being
+deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.
+
+This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms
+of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four
+regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which
+is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on
+the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
+divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813
+should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it
+very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order,
+would have executed one of the following formations:--
+
+1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in
+four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to
+the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight
+battalions.[57]
+
+2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of
+battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the
+system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:--
+
+I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to
+the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is
+important that in every language there should be two different terms to
+express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions
+and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion.
+
+Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary
+already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I
+devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
+of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations
+relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which
+consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the
+central one, the other two being in column on the wings.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--
+
+1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.
+
+2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be
+as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was
+successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.
+
+3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in
+marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over
+an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
+order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the
+front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.
+
+I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as
+impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the
+attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for
+success.
+
+Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
+terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault
+upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the
+assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in
+good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from
+each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass
+as a whole.
+
+I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden,
+Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland,
+Katzbach, or Dennewitz.
+
+I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in
+deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally
+awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by
+maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was
+beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what
+fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of
+Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in
+position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?
+
+I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be
+necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my
+Summary of the Art of War was written.
+
+Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813
+from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its
+value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to
+make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this
+view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one
+behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in
+small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of
+two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four
+sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as
+skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small
+column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form
+four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small
+columns instead of three--
+
+[Illustration:
+
+3d Battalion. 2d Battalion. 1st Battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
+--- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------
+--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- ---
+--- --- --- --- ---]
+
+It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the
+enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty
+skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never
+present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion.
+Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and,
+indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria.
+
+The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight
+companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies,
+but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns,
+according to the number of companies.
+
+Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these
+formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions
+would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if
+driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in
+the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed,
+according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops.
+Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware
+whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and
+Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their
+camps of instruction.
+
+Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be
+considered:--
+
+"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring
+about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now
+recognized principles of tactics?"
+
+If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because
+the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten
+that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so
+that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side.
+
+What change will it make in tactics?
+
+Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be
+necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or
+three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns?
+
+Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will
+fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall
+retreat or be destroyed?
+
+What military man will reply in the affirmative?
+
+It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary,
+and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and
+he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of
+battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two
+companies. To attempt to prescribe by regulation under what
+circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd.
+
+If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the
+enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the
+shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to
+the attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would never
+accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a
+regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very
+deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep
+in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their
+destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in
+any respect their chances of success.
+
+If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt for
+infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization
+according with the formation for battle. I would then make each regiment
+of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalion
+should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the
+depth would be three divisions or six ranks.
+
+This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the
+battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each
+battalion, or on any other division.
+
+The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be
+so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the
+mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them
+upon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columns
+could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming
+of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in
+several respects to one of four or six divisions.
+
+In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two
+hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division
+in the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the center
+is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval
+separating the second and third companies. Hence the column must be
+simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Something
+analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by
+forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third
+respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than
+in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of
+the battalion in six companies or three divisions.
+
+By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight
+in all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made on
+the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each
+division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different
+companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his
+company under the command of another officer, and half of his own
+division would be made up of another company.
+
+Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as
+the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his
+own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than
+any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a
+decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it
+would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to
+run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French
+system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as
+many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each
+company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be
+two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an
+advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation
+between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater
+display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there,
+to command the division as a whole.
+
+It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important
+question at issue.
+
+Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper
+to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light
+of historical events.
+
+In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a
+mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence
+in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of
+instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred
+of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the
+enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and
+impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and
+Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity
+and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult
+to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and
+Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the
+inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the
+tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled
+the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire,
+while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were
+posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of
+these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out
+of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general
+discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the
+infantry with the bayonet.
+
+This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to
+Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of
+troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could
+be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable
+to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a
+gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field
+of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this
+plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau,
+could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own
+were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his
+losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his
+aid.
+
+Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible
+battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated
+that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of
+deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes,
+viz.:--
+
+1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack
+painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective,
+and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.
+
+2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the
+French, principally on the right wing.
+
+3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the
+infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each
+other, but they were in no case simultaneous.
+
+4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian
+army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the
+French.
+
+Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and
+the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry
+had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately
+after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been
+broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the
+Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to
+retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof
+of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in
+columns.
+
+From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions,
+viz.:--
+
+1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important
+change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be
+useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of
+columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or
+skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those
+armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them
+through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail
+sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which
+would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this
+plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the
+others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies
+be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of
+light infantry to each division.
+
+2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be
+excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an
+attack upon an enemy in position.
+
+3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a
+battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it
+will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the
+other.
+
+4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly,
+upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand
+tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great
+mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the
+battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action
+of the three arms.
+
+5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this
+subject in Chapters IV. and V.; and that it would be unreasonable to
+define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle.
+
+6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking
+the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking
+his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy,
+adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the
+spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character.
+
+Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: That
+war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned
+drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but
+also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical
+complications.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 55: It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron,
+instead of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops used
+wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is
+attributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to Prince
+Leopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt the iron
+ramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741) it had not been
+introduced into the Austrian service.
+
+Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-six
+years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindrical
+ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time
+necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time
+could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded
+once,--all other things being equal.--Translators.]
+
+[Footnote 56: Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be
+intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in
+order to facilitate their deployment.]
+
+[Footnote 57: We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if
+there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then
+consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while
+in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead
+of eight, the depth not being increased.]
+
+
+
+
+SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
+
+
+I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal
+maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents.
+
+The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliest
+mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persians
+conquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the most
+formidable power on both land and sea.
+
+About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of
+Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed the
+straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles and
+Sardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily.
+
+The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could not
+have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably
+situated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and her
+great extent of coast.
+
+The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the
+naval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Her
+fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, the
+terror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made grand
+descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their
+naval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a
+confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse,
+Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other,
+it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before the
+Romans.
+
+If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek
+historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousand
+vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account
+of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the same
+time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed
+three hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally
+defeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet
+of Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon,
+and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred and
+fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilybćum was
+founded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, with
+fifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This
+contest lasted one year and a half.
+
+Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men:
+his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persians
+had four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back to
+Greece.
+
+After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division
+of the empire, made no important naval expedition.
+
+Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by their
+fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand
+horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This was
+two hundred and eighty years before the Christian era.
+
+Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult to
+understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of the
+Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, by
+the Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginian
+fleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too
+late, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on
+Beneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was
+all that remained of his force.
+
+Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the
+ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire.
+
+The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating power
+in Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity.
+The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they
+improved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or
+vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years after
+found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large
+vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty
+combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. The
+Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand
+men and fifty vessels.
+
+The victory of Ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of
+Actium--was the first important step of the Romans toward universal
+empire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousand
+men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, the
+remainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as
+celebrated by his death as by his famous victory.
+
+The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, but
+was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same
+fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B.C. the Romans were defeated at
+Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred
+vessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilybćum, in the same
+year, was lost off Cape Pactyrus.
+
+Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at first
+resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicily
+and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm
+its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out with
+three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, and
+gained the battle in the Ćgates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost
+one hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the
+first Punic war.
+
+The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, was less
+maritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles to
+Cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the
+Carthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a
+force inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the
+battle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five
+hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the
+Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained the
+celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans the
+kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by a
+victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and
+Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.
+
+From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power
+by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. Paulus
+Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at the head of
+twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to
+submission.
+
+Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage.
+The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, an
+immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand
+foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the
+son of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the glory
+of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by
+destroying the bitter rival of his country.
+
+After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe,
+was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken by
+Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the small
+adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty
+thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three
+hundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commanded
+in Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty
+thousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece.
+
+Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand
+Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in succession two large
+armies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred
+thousand strong, was destroyed at Chćronea, and the second, of eighty
+thousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time,
+Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of
+Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared to
+transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear,
+made peace.
+
+In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena and
+Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step by
+step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the
+project of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to pass
+through Thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult
+to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his
+kingdom against fifty thousand Romans.
+
+Cćsar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels,
+transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transported
+thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to join
+him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of
+Pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of Cćsar
+as by the arrangements of his lieutenants.
+
+Afterward Cćsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; they
+did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments.
+
+The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was that
+of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand
+horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous
+transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty
+vessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land,
+but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one
+hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra's
+galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides
+the necessary rowers.
+
+Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels,
+carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths
+of the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm;
+and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks
+of the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea,
+when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days.
+
+When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates,
+maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of
+the North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave
+employment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. The
+eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which
+the possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while
+at the same time it afforded the means.
+
+The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events of
+interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landed
+in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated by
+Belisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled
+the Mediterranean for a time.
+
+At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, the
+Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operations
+are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in
+the mysteries of Odin.
+
+The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to
+Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the
+Danes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert.
+
+The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic,
+and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situated
+with respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coasts
+of France and England.
+
+If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of these
+vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of
+rowers. There were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers.
+The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of the
+Danes, who had long before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to
+infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small.
+
+However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported five
+thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show
+that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbe
+was superior to that of the Scandinavians.
+
+Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida and
+Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into seven
+kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) that
+they were again united under the authority of Egbert.
+
+The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712,
+the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik.
+They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and,
+far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous
+enemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and the
+Arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of
+the North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated
+Rodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several
+millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled in
+Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents,
+still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in
+history, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa and
+the Crusades in the East.
+
+A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable
+traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire now
+known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, of
+whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great
+expeditions.
+
+In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two
+thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and
+debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. They
+proceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to pay
+tribute.
+
+Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a fleet said to
+have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet,
+terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of
+Asia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and the
+expedition returned home.
+
+Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to
+the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. sent to renew the
+tribute and ask for peace, (943.)
+
+In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King of
+Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea,
+ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs,
+who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned
+into Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforced
+by the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople.
+The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his
+position. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his
+predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a
+respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him to
+retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians.
+The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from
+Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one
+of the most memorable sieges recorded in history.
+
+In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performed
+prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers.
+Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty.
+
+About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope of
+pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, to
+France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these pirates
+increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six
+years their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain and
+devastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted
+them sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the mouths of
+the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted that
+Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon;
+but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets is
+not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail.
+
+In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England,
+but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered into
+alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen on
+Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here,
+Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple
+saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing
+scourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition
+that he would marry his daughter and turn Christian,--an offer which was
+eagerly accepted.
+
+Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of
+Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed in
+considerable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, and
+assured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy.
+
+During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greater
+hostility toward England than to France, although they were much more
+assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs.
+Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in
+Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors,
+succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of
+the Danes.
+
+The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate than
+Ivar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace on
+condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark,
+leaving a part of his army behind him.
+
+Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxon
+power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his
+importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the
+Danes in the kingdom, (1002.) But Sweyn reappeared in the following
+year at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 three
+successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate
+England was ravaged anew.
+
+In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept over
+the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kings
+who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son,
+Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him,
+(Edmund Ironside.) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerable
+force, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern
+part of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdom
+resulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was
+finally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to
+conquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When
+he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to
+the usage of the times.
+
+Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to their
+Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to
+be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in
+1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settled
+in France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a
+cession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great
+and ambitious man.
+
+The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While William
+the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament against
+Harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from
+Northumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with the
+King of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred
+vessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely
+destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more
+formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William took
+advantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the
+Norwegians, to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Hume
+asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities
+reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy
+thousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battle
+near Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate
+rival soon reduced the country to submission.
+
+At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, Robert
+Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with a
+handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)
+
+Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic
+priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large
+forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land.
+
+At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred
+thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the
+attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermit
+succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with from
+fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the
+Saracens.
+
+An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of
+religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French,
+Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey of
+Bouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number,
+under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and
+Macedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of
+Normans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece on
+Gallipolis.
+
+This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of
+Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered to
+transport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles to
+Asia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the
+plains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors.
+Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem,
+where he founded a kingdom.
+
+All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics of
+Italy were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and in
+provisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus
+given to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous
+result of the Crusades.
+
+This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of great
+disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united
+to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christian
+camps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave
+Noureddin was threatening. Louis VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at
+the head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as their
+predecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the
+Greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests,
+plotted their destruction.
+
+Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for
+him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by
+the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on the
+banks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, and
+his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage
+of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia,
+on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The
+means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more than
+fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: the
+remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens.
+
+This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the
+climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were
+continually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by the
+Italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of
+Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliance
+between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and
+England to save the Holy Land.
+
+The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one hundred
+thousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of the
+formal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. He
+marched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He
+died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been
+pretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the
+Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six
+thousand men.
+
+At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion[58] and Philip Augustus more
+judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles and
+Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first seized Cyprus, and both
+landed in Syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the
+rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philip
+returned to France.
+
+Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.) Part of
+the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Count
+of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the
+intention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by
+the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon
+the pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac
+Angelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of
+those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of
+Conrad and Louis VII.
+
+Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of
+the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. They
+assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, and
+Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat:
+the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latins
+took possession of Constantinople after a more bloody assault than the
+first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of
+Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greeks
+took refuge at Nice and Trebizond.
+
+A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who,
+notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta,
+was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the
+Mussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrow
+escape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in
+being able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe.
+
+The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of
+Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits,
+encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm at
+Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked at
+Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The
+landgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put
+in at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the
+presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him because he was too
+slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with
+ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical
+thunders.
+
+Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may
+credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from
+Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and
+fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians and
+the Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, although
+washed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there
+collected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville's
+statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent
+into Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for,
+although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of
+Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousand
+fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated that
+the Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France.
+
+The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the
+same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later,(1270.) He
+disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besieged
+Tunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself
+was one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful
+reinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back
+the remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest
+which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This
+prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of
+the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater
+value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of Saint
+Louis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do with
+that project. This was the last effort. The Christians who were
+abandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and
+Ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at
+Cyprus and established themselves at Rhodes.
+
+The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in
+1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the European
+provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselves
+given the fatal blow.
+
+Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to have
+had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal
+and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be
+manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture of
+this capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of the
+Greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of
+maritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon
+Otranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of
+a more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade,
+the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city
+to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail
+to make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried by
+assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the
+head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a
+failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go to
+that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of
+Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death
+closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect.
+
+About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors on
+land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their country
+from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more
+extraordinary even than that of Venice.
+
+Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundred
+ships and forty thousand men.
+
+Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated,
+fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six
+thousand were cavalry.
+
+All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and
+including the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention of
+gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed by
+some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From that
+time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and
+this revolution took place--if I may use that expression--at the time
+when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of America
+and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of
+the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of
+colonial dependencies.
+
+I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards to
+America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India by
+doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influence
+upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of Gama,
+Albuquerque, and Cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies
+of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of
+fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view.
+
+The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this
+discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign
+of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which was
+conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers
+transported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced by
+the disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,)
+undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the
+wise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way
+when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight
+thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the
+skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. himself
+arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril.
+
+While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were not
+neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine
+maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the
+control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period
+the Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and
+the military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of
+their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes
+(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and
+forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the
+supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half.
+
+In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta,
+where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried
+over thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships.
+John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing
+them.
+
+A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and
+fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, where
+Nicosia was taken and Famagosta besieged. The horrible cruelties
+practiced by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress.
+Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor
+Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the
+heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by
+Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that had
+perished in the space of two years spent on the island.
+
+The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria,
+brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet at
+the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium,
+where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. The
+Turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred
+vessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.)
+This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a
+great check in their career of greatness. However, they made such
+vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea
+during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which such
+enormous losses were sustained.
+
+The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against Algiers did not
+deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of
+Morocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprived
+of his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the
+head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army
+cut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578.
+
+Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepanto
+on account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy and
+by the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his arms
+irresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincible
+Armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was
+composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including,
+according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels,
+armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and
+carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand
+sailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand
+men which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way
+of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failure
+of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the
+period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding
+name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels
+before it even came near the English coast.
+
+After this expedition comes in chronological order that of Gustavus
+Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from fifteen to
+eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine
+thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that
+it carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania received
+little opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a
+strong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of a
+very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other
+example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. of
+Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswick
+upon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five
+thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in
+proportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice
+was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage
+having broken through and been lost.
+
+After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turks
+recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-five
+thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gained
+possession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought of
+sending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spirit
+which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble
+souls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against
+the Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority
+and the possession of Canea. The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless,
+gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of
+it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself
+perished.
+
+In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiously
+at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two
+assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being
+made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them,
+expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward of
+his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with
+their dead bodies.
+
+Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men to
+Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already
+called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce.
+
+The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, and
+each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks to
+carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the
+Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of naval
+tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who
+adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every
+attempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of
+Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this
+protracted struggle.
+
+Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of
+the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this
+war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island,
+where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he
+conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.(1667.)
+
+In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously:
+their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the
+first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an
+Italian engineer.
+
+The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by
+mines. Never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual
+destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance
+enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice
+sent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds of
+French volunteers.
+
+The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their
+efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmen
+came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Duke
+of Beaufort and Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged
+these presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the
+sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end
+of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France.
+Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place
+which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a
+truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia had
+cost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred
+thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It
+is estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations
+perished in the glorious defense of the place.
+
+The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives examples of
+great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II.
+in Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although
+De Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying
+five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A
+grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men
+into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, De
+Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the
+remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through
+the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the
+island.
+
+At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russians
+undertook two expeditions very different in character.
+
+Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent upon
+Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred
+vessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted by
+the English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason
+the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The same
+prince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his
+troops at a Swedish port.
+
+Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians,
+and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722)
+upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventy
+vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to
+Agrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet his
+cavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand
+Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar
+then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with one
+of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the
+empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of
+the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire.
+
+The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary
+expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, which
+was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent.
+
+[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was joined by a
+portion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole amounted to nineteen
+ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and
+fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. The expedition besieged and
+captured Havana.--TRS.]
+
+The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteen
+thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the
+sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious
+action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on
+account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the
+Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding
+the city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand
+men placed _hors de combat_.
+
+The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts
+upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this power
+send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line,
+while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of
+sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with
+three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and
+St. Malo.
+
+This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but
+accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port.
+
+D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority
+in the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousand
+Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by
+another division, and assisted in investing the English army under
+Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thus
+secured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable
+rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display
+made in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand
+men more to India with Admiral Suffren.
+
+During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: the
+fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injured
+the French navy.
+
+Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men was
+scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were
+made. (1796.)
+
+At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting of
+twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four
+hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were
+followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed
+fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven into
+the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of
+intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an
+excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under
+similar circumstances.
+
+The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 to
+St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the
+ravages of yellow fever.
+
+Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given their
+attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of
+colonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenth
+century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve
+thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like
+France. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empire
+occurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and then
+of Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of
+troops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to
+the number of one hundred and fifty thousand.
+
+The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of forty
+thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the
+details of the operations is, however, quite interesting.
+
+In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected a
+descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of this
+expedition are well known.
+
+General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some successes at
+Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. That
+against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was
+terminated by a capitulation.
+
+In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousand
+men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the
+Danish fleet, which was his object.
+
+In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men.
+After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general rising
+of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The same
+army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under
+Moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a
+view of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there
+re-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected
+another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of
+thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avenged
+Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then
+beating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital.
+
+The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largest
+England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of not
+less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and
+thirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the
+incapacity of the leader.
+
+A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. of Sweden
+was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia on
+the ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to take
+possession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehension
+to the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf to
+Umeĺ, (March, 1809.)
+
+General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the
+neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchet
+off from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought
+best to re-embark.
+
+The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his return
+from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of
+_matériel_ landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army
+contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were
+disembarked at a friendly port.
+
+The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be
+regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital of
+the United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven or
+eight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a
+state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its
+capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled
+in history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary
+spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not
+risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their
+homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an
+English expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely
+defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders
+of General Jackson.
+
+If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes and
+the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been
+actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with
+powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and
+proportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred and
+fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of three
+thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the
+line[59].
+
+From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference
+there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between
+descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in
+width, and those in which the troops and _matériel_ are to be
+transported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reason
+why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the
+Bosporus.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:--
+
+In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composed
+of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and
+eighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war and
+transports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon.
+
+In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. The
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a short
+bombardment. A small force of about one thousand men, in three columns,
+took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight.
+
+In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast of
+Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the
+command of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed,
+including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and the
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the
+forces of the United States. This important post became the secondary
+base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the
+capture of the city of Mexico.
+
+In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia on
+the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other.
+Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of
+the Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An English
+fleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, on
+the 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command of
+Vice-Admiral Parseval Deschęnes, on the 19th of April. They effected a
+junction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet
+numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels.
+The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on one
+of the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the
+conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of
+ten thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General
+Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced.
+
+Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed;
+and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to
+give an idea of its magnitude:--
+
+September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and
+two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed of
+thirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, and
+seven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of
+landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and
+transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma,
+(September 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took
+possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: these
+were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the
+army in the Crimea were sent.
+
+November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numbered
+seventy-one thousand men.
+
+At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousand
+men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sent
+fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand were
+alive, present, and fit for duty.
+
+February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English,
+twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand.
+
+May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteen
+thousand Sardinians.
+
+In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was
+sent to Kertch.
+
+In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred and
+twenty thousand men.
+
+September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in the
+evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in battery
+more than eight hundred pieces of artillery.
+
+The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack
+of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were present
+and prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships.
+
+October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to
+Kinburn, which place was captured.
+
+Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the French
+emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred and
+ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and
+twenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria.
+
+The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only
+to French operations:-)
+
+The artillery _matériel_ at the disposal of the Army of the East
+comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages,
+two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine
+million pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand
+tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and
+seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand
+war-rockets.
+
+On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen
+batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of
+powder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions.
+
+Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineers
+executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty
+thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags.
+
+Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent.
+
+Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons.
+
+Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons.
+
+Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons.
+
+In all, about six hundred thousand tons.
+
+It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English,
+Sardinian, and Turkish armies.
+
+In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of forty
+thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of
+artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and
+twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous
+transports.
+
+In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China,
+whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This
+expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which
+ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and
+succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the
+most populous empire in the world.
+
+The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, and
+presented no remarkable features.
+
+Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United States
+sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coast
+of South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vessels
+and transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of Captain
+Dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and
+_matériel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the
+rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval
+forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, General
+Sherman being in command.
+
+England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in an
+expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were the
+capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: the
+Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will develop
+the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if,
+indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three
+of the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and
+tottering republic of Mexico.]
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 58: Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot and
+five thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded by
+land to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to transport
+his troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian ships, and with
+a force at least as large as that of Richard.]
+
+[Footnote 59: See the account of the expedition to the
+Crimea.--TRANSLATORS.]
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+A.
+
+Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384.
+
+Accidental lines, 103.
+
+Action, concert of, how secured, 259.
+
+Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152.
+
+Advanced guard, 261, 262.
+  attack of the enemy's, in retreats, 243.
+  in armies meeting unexpectedly, 208.
+  in battle, 288, 289.
+
+Advance, line of, how determined, 71.
+
+Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17.
+  of elevated points for observation, 276.
+
+Aggressive wars for conquest, 22.
+
+Agincourt, order of battle at, 192.
+
+Albis, position of, 181.
+
+Alcazar, battle of, 378.
+
+Alexander the Great, 173, 362.
+
+Alfred the Great, 369.
+
+Algiers, French descent on, in 1830, 386.
+  Spanish descent on, 382.
+
+Alise, investment of, by Cćsar, 153.
+
+Allies, at Bautzen, 187.
+  defeat of, at Zurich, 112.
+  error of, in 1793, 107, 108.
+  failure of diversion of, in 1805, 219.
+  in war, 18.
+  march of, upon Leipsic, 123.
+
+Alps, passage of, by Francis I., 168.
+
+American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383.
+
+Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384.
+
+Angoulęme, Duke of, expedition of, 28.
+
+Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233.
+
+Antwerp, English expedition to, 385.
+
+Archduke Charles, 294.
+  concentric retreat of, in 1796,238.
+  interior lines of, 136.
+  opinion of, as to small-column formation, 350.
+  opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, 162.
+  success of, 110, 111.
+
+Archduke Ferdinand, 53.
+
+Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379.
+
+Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47.
+  superior, importance of, 47, 48.
+
+Armies, auxiliary, 170.
+  central, observations on, 126.
+  command of, 52.
+  French, in the Revolution, 135.
+  how to act, 75.
+  in intrenchments, 154.
+  in peace, how preserved, 47.
+  large, fitness of central lines for, 125.
+  large, organization of, 286.
+  meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, 208.
+  morale of, 60, 178, 322.
+  movements of, points to be attended to in, 254-256.
+  of French Revolution, how subsisted, 142.
+  of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., how subsisted, 142.
+  of Napoleon, operations of, 136.
+  promotions in, 47.
+  standing, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
+  surprises of, 209.
+  two, on interior lines, 117.
+  two, on the same frontier, 116.
+  unexpected meeting of two, 207.
+
+Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308.
+
+Arms and organization of cavalry, 307, 308.
+
+Arms for irregular cavalry, 313.
+
+Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59.
+
+Army corps, system of, 279.
+
+Army, defensive, proper course for, 324.
+  defensive, when it has the advantage, 202.
+  head-quarters of, when the most important point, 107.
+  how perfected, 43.
+  importance of a good, 44.
+  number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, 285.
+
+Army of Boulogne, 280.
+  of four corps, 281.
+  of seven corps, 281.
+  offensive, proper course for, 324.
+  of invasion, line of defense important to, 99.
+  of the Rhine in 1800, 115.
+  permanent, necessary condition of, 49.
+  proportion of cavalry in, 304.
+  pursuing, has the advantage, 241.
+
+Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317.
+
+Artillery, concentration of fire of,
+  in offensive line of battle, 290.
+  employment of, 315-318.
+  heavy, in defensive line of battle, 290.
+  importance of, to infantry, 290.
+  matériel of the French army in the Crimea, 388.
+  Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316.
+  post of, in line of battle, 289.
+  proportion of, 318.
+  protection of infantry from the enemy's, 303.
+  rules for use of, in battle, 316-318.
+  use of, in the offensive, 316.
+  who should command, 318.
+
+Art of war, definition of, 13.
+  principal parts of, 66.
+
+Assailant, advantages of, 186.
+
+Assailant's best means of victory, 202.
+
+Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298.
+  of field-works, instances of well-arranged, 212.
+
+Athens, naval power of, 361.
+
+Attack, cavalry column of, 310.
+  close, formation for, 301.
+  column of, in two lines, 292.
+  columns of, 293, 356.
+  columns of, of single battalions, 298.
+  five methods of forming troops for, 292.
+  formation for, at Turin, 213.
+  in columns, order of, 194.
+  in front, 201.
+  in rear, 207.
+  of field-works, directions for, 211, 212.
+  of fortified places, 210.
+  of intrenched lines, 214.
+  on flank, 203.
+  on Sank, cavalry, 310.
+  when order in squares suitable for, 297.
+
+Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258.
+  in half-deep order, 302.
+
+Audenarde, battle of, 53.
+
+Augustus, armament of, 365.
+
+Aulic Council, 59.
+
+Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106.
+  force of, in the French Revolution, 106.
+  fortresses of, 149.
+  interest of, in the French Revolution, 105.
+  intervention of, in 1813, 21.
+
+Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112.
+  camp before Mayence, 157.
+  order at Essling and Fleurus, 200.
+
+Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246.
+  why victorious in 1753, 107.
+
+Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240.
+
+Authority of counselors, 53.
+
+
+B.
+
+Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275, 276.
+  how they might be useful, 275.
+  used at Fleurus, 275.
+
+Barbarossa, 373.
+
+Bard, fort of, 152, 167.
+  importance of defile of, 87.
+
+Base of operations, where to be established, 84.
+
+Bases of operations, definition of, 77
+  of operations, how to be chosen, 79, 80.
+  of operations, plurality of, 78.
+  on the sea, 83, 84.
+  temporary or eventual, 84.
+  temporary, when necessary, 132.
+  with two faces, 83.
+
+Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131.
+
+Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301.
+
+Battalion squares, 296.
+
+Batteries, 317.
+
+Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289.
+  calculation of distances in, 334.
+  classification of orders of, useful, 197.
+  combinations of, 187.
+  concave order of, 191.
+  convex order of, 192.
+  critical moment of, 203.
+  decisive moment of, 334.
+  defensive arrangements for, 201.
+
+Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186.
+  decisive point of, 187.
+  strategic point of, when important, 187.
+
+Battle-formation in small columns, 350.
+  influence of topography upon, 299.
+
+Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360.
+  influence of orders of, on result of engagements, 197.
+  line of, arrangement of cavalry in, 288.
+  line of, before the French Revolution, 277.
+  line of, definition of, 179.
+  line of, distribution of troops in, 287.
+  line of, post of artillery in, 289.
+  lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284.
+  oblique order of, 190.
+  of Agincourt, 192.
+  of Alcazar, 378.
+  of Audenarde, 53.
+  of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206.
+  of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317.
+  of Blenheim, 303.
+  of Cannć, 191.
+  of Crécy, 192.
+  of Ecnomos, 363.
+  of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
+  of Fossano, 168.
+  of Jena, 90, 198, 305.
+  of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305.
+  of Lepanto, 378.
+  of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342.
+  of Millesimo, 111.
+  of Mollwitz, 348.
+  of Prague, 189, 205.
+  of Ramillies, 312.
+  of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205.
+  of Torgau, 205.
+  of Turin, 53.
+  of Ulm, 53, 90.
+  of Ulm, won by strategy, 198.
+  of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295,
+               303-306, 354, 358, 359.
+  offensive, object of, 188.
+  offensive order of, 200.
+  order of, 186.
+  order of, at Leipsic, 193.
+  order of, definition of, 180.
+  orders of, 188.
+  parallel order of, 188.
+    reinforced, 189.
+    when suitable, 189.
+    with crotchet, 189.
+  perpendicular order of, 190.
+  position for, 341.
+  posting troops in line of, 277.
+  results of, depend on what, 178.
+  rules for use of artillery in, 316-318.
+
+Battle-order for cavalry, 312.
+
+Battle-orders, various, 349.
+
+Battles, 178.
+  defensive, 179.
+  elements of uncertainty regarding, 197.
+  great difficulty of tactics of, 196.
+  influence of musketry-fire in, 348.
+  offensive, 186.
+  of Napoleon, orders of, 198.
+  rules for scientific, 200.
+  success in, depends on maneuvering, 360.
+  three kinds of, 179.
+  what may interfere with success of, 196.
+
+Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317.
+  French at, 196.
+
+Bellegarde, 166.
+
+Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109.
+
+Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289.
+  base on Königsberg in 1807, 152.
+  position in 1807, 171.
+  mixed system at Eylau, 352.
+
+Beresina, passage of, 226, 245.
+
+Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212.
+
+Berthier at Leipsic, 267.
+
+Berthier's error at Wagram, 267.
+  error in campaign of 1809, 265.
+
+Blenheim, battle of, 303.
+
+Blücher, 53, 130.
+
+"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194.
+
+Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111.
+  expedition to Egypt, 383.
+
+Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Boulogne, army of, 280.
+  camp of, 279.
+
+Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345.
+
+Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., 245.
+  in retreats, 244.
+  means of destroying, 245.
+  protection of, after passage, 229.
+
+Bridge-trains, importance of, 121.
+
+Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154.
+
+Burgundy, Duke of, 53.
+
+
+C.
+
+Cćsar's investment of Alise, 153.
+  maritime expeditions, 365.
+
+Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137.
+  of 1793, 107.
+  of 1799, 111.
+  of 1800, 112.
+  of 1812, Napoleon's error in, 172.
+  of the Spaniards in Flanders, 171.
+  of the Swedes in Germany, 171.
+
+Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169.
+  in winter, 68.
+  of 1799 and 1800, 162.
+
+Camp at Kehl, 167.
+  intrenched, influence of, 155.
+  intrenched, on which side of a river, 157.
+  intrenched, on river, 156.
+  of Boulogne, 279.
+  of Drissa, 157.
+
+Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215.
+  fortified, 154.
+  intrenched, connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  intrenched, instances of, 210, 211.
+  intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156.
+  intrenched, Prussian system of, 158.
+  intrenched, use of, 156.
+  intrenched, where to be established, 155.
+  strategic square for, 99.
+
+Candia, siege of, 380, 381.
+  Turkish descent on, 379.
+
+Cannć, order of battle at, 191.
+
+Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247.
+
+Cantonments, 246.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  rules for establishing, 246.
+  selection of positions for, 247.
+
+Canute, 370.
+
+Capitals as strategic points, 87.
+
+Capital, when the center of power, 107.
+
+Capture of posts, means for, 216.
+  when important, 216.
+
+Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306.
+
+Carnot, 59.
+  operations of, 136.
+
+Carthage, destruction of, 364.
+
+Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361, 362.
+
+Cavalry, 303.
+  advantages of large corps of, 309.
+  arms and organization of, 307, 308.
+  arrangement of, in line of battle, 288.
+  at Ramillies, 312.
+  battle-order for, 312.
+  best formation of infantry against, 294.
+  charge at Hohenfriedberg, 305.
+  charge, general, 305.
+  charges, four kinds of, 306.
+  charges of the Turks, 307.
+  defensive armor for, 308.
+  divisions of five regiments, 311.
+  duties of, 304.
+  encounters of, against cavalry, 311.
+  flank charges of, 307.
+  formations of, 309-311.
+  importance of, in retreats, 243.
+  importance of, to infantry, 290.
+  influence of, in a war, 313, 314.
+  in the defensive, 306.
+  irregular, 313.
+  light, advantages of, 314.
+  militia as, 314, 315.
+  morale of, 312.
+  must be supported by infantry, 304.
+  proportion of, in an army, 304.
+  reserves, 288, 311.
+  when it should charge a line of infantry, 305.
+
+Center, when proper point of attack, 187.
+
+Central armies, 126.
+  line of Napoleon in Saxony, 124.
+  lines, application of, to large masses, 125.
+  position, when untenable, 331.
+
+Chćronea, 365.
+
+Charges, irregular cavalry, 313.
+
+Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, 377.
+  VIII., retreat of, to Naples, 233.
+  X. of Sweden, expedition of, 379.
+  XII. of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, 382.
+
+Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310.
+  order, infantry, 301.
+
+Chief of staff, 57, 253.
+
+China, English and French expedition to, 389.
+
+Choice of objective points, 90.
+
+Circumvallation, lines of, 152.
+
+Civil wars, 35.
+
+Clairfayt, victories of, 110.
+
+Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178.
+  opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, 166.
+
+Coalition against France in 1793, 37.
+  Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
+  Louis XIV., 36.
+
+Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251.
+
+Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158.
+  towers of, 159.
+
+Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193.
+
+Column of attack, cavalry, 310.
+  of attack in two lines, 292.
+
+Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356.
+  of attack of single battalions, 298.
+  of four divisions in three ranks, 294.
+
+Combinations of battle, 187.
+  strategic, 72.
+
+Combined use of the three arms, 203, 319, 320.
+
+Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55.
+  essential qualities for a, 55.
+  importance of, 54.
+
+Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66.
+  of artillery, duties of, 319.
+
+Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59.
+  of armies, 52.
+
+Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141.
+  of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., 142.
+  the, and strategy, 141.
+
+Committee of Public Safety, 136.
+
+Concave order of battle, 191.
+
+Concentration of artillery-fire, 290.
+  in retreat, advantages of, 238.
+
+Concentric lines, 102.
+  retreats, instances of, 238, 239.
+  system, 126.
+
+Concert of action, how secured, 259.
+  in action, importance of, 42.
+
+Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34.
+  wars for, instances of, 22.
+
+Conrad III., Crusade of, 372.
+
+Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368.
+  siege of, by the Crusaders, 373.
+  siege of, by Mohammed II., 375.
+
+Contempt for the enemy, 63.
+
+Contravallation, lines of, 152.
+
+Control of operations, 52.
+
+Convergent operations, 126.
+
+Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118.
+
+Continuous intrenched lines, 213.
+
+Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30.
+
+Convex order of battle, 192.
+
+Copenhagen, siege of, 384.
+
+Cordon system, 165.
+
+Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287.
+  organization of an army in four, 281.
+  organization of an army in seven, 281.
+  system of, 279.
+  two, one behind the other, 285.
+
+Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314.
+
+Council of war at seat of government, 59.
+
+Councils of war, value of, 58.
+
+Counselors, authority of, 53.
+
+Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345.
+
+Coups de main, 215.
+  instances of, 216, 223.
+
+Crécy, order of battle at, 192.
+
+Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389.
+
+Crimean War, 387.
+
+Critical moment of battles, 203.
+
+Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120.
+
+Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189.
+
+Crotchets, danger of, 182.
+
+Crusade of 1203, 373.
+
+Crusades, 25, 371-375.
+
+Cuirass, 47, 308.
+
+Cuirassiers, 308.
+
+Culm, 221.
+
+Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377.
+
+
+D.
+
+
+Danes, incursions of, 368, 369.
+
+Danger of two wars at once, 36.
+
+Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170.
+
+Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226.
+  valley of, key of Southern Germany, 162.
+
+Decisive direction, 328.
+  moment of battle, 334.
+  point at Bautzen, 187.
+  point, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187.
+  point of battle-field, 187.
+  point of battle-field, how determined, 88, 186.
+  points, 337.
+  points, defiles as, 87.
+  points of the theater of war, 85.
+
+Deep columns, 356.
+  at Waterloo, 359.
+  masses, 298, 302.
+  order, disadvantages of, 298.
+
+Defeat, 68.
+  of the French at Waterloo, causes of, 359.
+
+Defense, in mountainous countries, 163.
+  line of, important to an army of invasion, 99.
+  line of, should be short, 98.
+  of frontiers, 146.
+  of intrenched camps and lines, 215.
+  rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, 96.
+  second lines of, 147.
+  should not be passive, 185.
+  tactical, of Switzerland, 169.
+  maxims for frontier, 148, 149.
+
+Defensive armor for cavalry, 308.
+  army has the advantage, when, 202.
+  army, proper course for, 324.
+  arrangements for battle, 201.
+  battles, 179.
+  best formation of infantry for, 298.
+  cavalry in, 306.
+  characteristics of infantry formation for, 297.
+  in descents, duty of, 251.
+  line of battle, heavy artillery in, 290.
+
+Defensive movements, when advised, 124.
+  -offensive war, 74.
+  or offensive system, either may be employed, 185.
+  the, in a level country, 164.
+  war, 72, 73.
+
+Defiles as decisive points, 87.
+  as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  in retreats, 243.
+
+Definitive lines, 103.
+
+Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130.
+
+Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301.
+  lines in two ranks, 294.
+  lines, two, formation of infantry in, 292.
+
+Depots, establishment of, on march, 262.
+  command of, 263.
+  lines of, 263.
+  of supplies, 141.
+  of supplies, general maxims, 143.
+  secondary, 262, 263.
+
+Descents, 248.
+  cases where made, 250.
+  difficulties of, 250.
+  duty of defensive in, 251.
+  effect of modern inventions on, 248.
+  more extensive in ancient times, 248.
+  precautions after landing, 252.
+  rules for conducting, 251.
+
+D'Estaing's fleet, 383.
+
+Detached orders of Napoleon, 259.
+  works, importance of, 154.
+
+Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220.
+  four kinds of, 217.
+  great, 217, 219, 334.
+  great, instances of, 221, 222.
+  great, why made, 220, 221.
+  multiplication of, must be avoided,    221.
+  necessary when there is a double strategic front, 220.
+  of Napoleon in 1805, 222.
+  precise rules for, cannot be laid down, 222.
+  requisites in officers of, 224.
+  small, how useful, 224.
+
+Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219.
+
+Détours, 197, 204.
+
+Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269.
+
+Diplomacy in invasions, 24.
+
+Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116.
+  of lines of operations, 115.
+
+Discipline, importance of, 42.
+  importance of, in retreats, 242.
+
+Distances in battle, calculation of, 334.
+
+Distant expeditions, 169.
+  invasions across extensive territories, 171.
+  invasions, maxim for, 173.
+  invasions to aid an ally, 170.
+
+Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287.
+
+Divergent lines, 103.
+
+Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91.
+  to Holland in 1799, 91.
+
+Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106, 107.
+
+Dunkirk, expedition to, 91.
+
+Duties of cavalry, 304.
+  of staff officers, 254-256.
+
+Duty of a general, 324.
+  of statesmen in offensive wars, 17.
+
+Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222.
+
+Division, improper use of the term, 351.
+
+Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311.
+  defects of system of, 278.
+    remedied by Napoleon, 278.
+  formation by, when preferable, 286.
+  organization of, 279, 280.
+  system of, 278.
+
+Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273.
+
+Double line of operations, when applicable, 117.
+  when necessary, 116.
+  lines of operations, 102, 110.
+    when advantageous, 123.
+  lines to be avoided, 330.
+  passages of rivers, 230.
+  strategic front, 95.
+  wars, 36.
+  wars of Napoleon, 37.
+
+Dragoons, 308.
+  concentration of, by Emperor
+    Nicholas, 309.
+
+Drepanum, 363.
+
+Dresden, 305.
+  intrenched camp at, 155, 211.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  victory at, 124.
+
+Drissa, camp of, 155, 157.
+
+Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118.
+  operations, 126.
+  retreats, when admissible, 239.
+
+Diversions, 218.
+  instances of, 218.
+  when useful, 218.
+
+
+E.
+
+Eccentric lines, 237.
+  retreat. Bulow's use of the term,
+    237.
+
+Eccentric system, 126.
+
+Echelon, order of battle by, 193.
+
+Echelons, order in, 193.
+  squares in, 297.
+
+Ecnomos, victory of, 363.
+
+Edward III. of England, 376.
+
+Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374.
+
+Ehrenbreitstein, 158.
+
+Elchingen, Ney at, 182.
+
+Elective governments, weakness of, 46.
+
+Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276.
+
+Elongated squares, 296, 297.
+
+Employment of artillery, 315-318.
+
+Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311.
+
+Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67.
+  contempt for, 63.
+  how dislodged, 188.
+  how to drive from his position, 201, 202.
+  should not be paid to leave a country, 242.
+
+Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268.
+
+England controls the sea, 173.
+  invasion of, by Sweyn, 370.
+  projected invasion of, by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
+
+England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385.
+
+English and French expedition to China, 389.
+
+English, descents of, on France, 376.
+  expedition against Napoleon in 1815, 385.
+  expedition in 1762 against Havana, 382.
+  maritime expeditions, 384-390.
+  squares at Waterloo, 294.
+
+Enthusiasm, importance of, 41.
+  not military spirit, 62.
+
+Epaminondas, 190.
+
+Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172.
+
+Error of the allies in 1793, 107, 108.
+
+Errors in strategy, 91.
+
+Essential bases of military policy, 49.
+
+Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
+  Napoleon at, 158.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  order of battle at, 192, 193.
+
+Eugene at Turin, 153.
+  march of, 141.
+
+Eventual bases, 84.
+  lines of defense, 96.
+
+Expediency, wars of, 18.
+
+Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273.
+  to the Crimea, details of, 387-389.
+
+Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174.
+  distant, 169.
+  marine, in modern times, 249.
+  maritime, 361-390.
+  of the ancients, 248.
+  of the Middle Ages, 171.
+  partly on land, partly by sea, 173.
+
+Extended movements, when dangerous, 204.
+
+Exterior lines of operations, 102.
+
+Extermination, wars of, 34.
+
+Eylau, 305, 306, 318, 352.
+  French armament at, 47.
+  Napoleon's march on, 94.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  Russian artillery reserve at, 289.
+  Russian order at, 295.
+
+
+F.
+
+Famous retreats, instances of, 233.
+
+Field, strategic, of 1806, 113.
+
+Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212.
+  instances of well-arranged assaults on, 212.
+
+Final reserves, 203.
+
+Financial considerations, 50.
+
+Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359.
+
+Fire-signals, how used, 276.
+
+Flank attack, 203.
+  attack, cavalry, 310.
+  charges of cavalry, 307.
+  marches, 139, 140.
+  marches, where inadmissible, 140.
+  tactical maneuver by, 140.
+
+Flanks of companies, movement by, 300, 301.
+  protection of, in tactical positions, 182.
+
+Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174.
+
+Fleurus, 136, 193, 200.
+  balloons used at, 275.
+  order of battle at, 192.
+
+Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289.
+  in the offensive, 316.
+
+Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183.
+
+Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286.
+  for attack at Turin, 213.
+  for battle in small columns, 350.
+  for battle, Napoleon's system, 278, 279.
+  for battle often determined by size of army, 285.
+  for battle, Prussian and Austrian system, 354.
+  for close attack, 301.
+  of infantry for attack, five methods of, 292.
+    in two ranks, 356.
+  of troops for battle, 347-350.
+
+Formations of cavalry, 309-311.
+  of lines of battle for two infantry corps, 282-284.
+  various, for infantry, 285.
+
+Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158.
+
+Fortifications, remark upon, 151.
+
+Fortified camps, 154.
+  places, attack of, 210.
+  places on the sea-coast, importance of, 152.
+  places, when a misfortune, 152.
+
+Fortresses at Mayence, 150.
+  greatest advantages of, 150.
+  large, when preferable, 150.
+  number and position of, 149.
+  of France and Austria, 149.
+  on frontiers, 148.
+  relation of, to strategy, 148, 150.
+
+Forts in a mountainous country, 151.
+  purposes of, 146.
+
+Fossano, battle of, 168.
+
+Four-rank formation of infantry, 291.
+
+France adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
+  coalition against, in 1793, 37.
+  course and error of, in 1792, 105.
+  fortresses of, 149.
+  intention of, when declaring war in 1792, 105.
+  invasions of, by the English, 376.
+
+Francis I., passage of the Alps by, 168.
+
+Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
+  at Leuthen, 229.
+  at Prague, 205.
+  at Torgau, 206.
+  commissariat of, 142.
+  defensive-offensive operations of, 74.
+  maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141.
+  military genius of, 16.
+
+Frederick II., Crusade of, 374.
+
+French and English expedition to China, 389.
+
+French armies in the Revolution, 135.
+  armies, situation of, in 1800, 112.
+  at Bautzen, 196.
+  at Fleurus, why successful, 193.
+  at Waterloo, 196.
+  capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, 386.
+  causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, 359.
+  cavalry, 313.
+  columns at Waterloo, 351.
+  defeat of, at Stockach, 111.
+  descent on Algiers in 1830, 386.
+  errors in 1795, 136.
+  expedition to Syria, 390.
+  in Bohemia in 1742, 171.
+  invasions of 1766 and 1795, 120.
+
+French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383.
+  operations in Italy, 112.
+  operations of, at close of 1793, 331-333.
+  operations of, in 1794, 108.
+  order at Essling and Fleurus, 200.
+  order at Minden, 278.
+  plan in 1799, error of, 110.
+  Revolution, 26-28.
+  Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, 142.
+  Revolution, course of Austria in, 106.
+  Revolution, course of Prussia in, 105, 106.
+  Revolution, interest of Austria in, 105.
+  Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, 104.
+  Revolution, relation of Italy to, 104.
+  Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, 104.
+  Revolution, theater of operations in, 104.
+  Revolution, zones of operations in, 105.
+
+Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148, 149.
+  when a permanent line of defense, 96.
+
+Frontiers, defense of, 146.
+  disadvantage of fortresses on, 148.
+  how to be fortified, 152.
+  mountains as, 146.
+  rivers as, 147.
+
+Front of operations, 330, 338.
+  of operations, extent of, 98.
+  of operations, how varied, 93.
+  strategic, change of, 94.
+  strategic, not to be too extended, 98.
+
+Fronts of operations, 92.
+
+Fronts, strategic, 92.
+
+Fundamental principle of war, 66.
+  maxims of, 70.
+  principles for employment of troops, 328.
+
+
+G.
+
+Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
+
+General advanced guard, how composed, 262.
+  cavalry charge, 305.
+
+General, essential qualities of a, 55.
+  importance of a skillful, 43.
+  one of the greatest talents of, 74.
+  qualities of a skillful, 334.
+  what constitutes a, 327.
+
+General principle of war, manner of applying, 175.
+  staff, employment of, in time of peace, 49.
+  staff, usefulness of, 57.
+
+Genoa, panic at siege of, 64.
+
+Geography, military, 39.
+
+Geographical objective points, 88.
+
+Germanicus, expedition of, 366.
+
+Girondists, 26, 37.
+
+Gosa, French charge on, 305.
+
+Governments, elective, weakness of, 46.
+  should not be unprepared for war, 46.
+
+Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178.
+  principles of, 360.
+
+Great detachments, 217, 219, 334.
+  instances of, 221, 222.
+  why made, 220, 221.
+
+Grouchy, 127.
+
+Guard, advanced, 261, 262.
+  in battle, 288, 289.
+  in unexpected battles, 208.
+
+Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375.
+
+
+H.
+
+Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295.
+  attacks in, 302.
+
+Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236.
+
+Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236.
+
+Hannibal at Cannć, 191.
+  at Zama, 179.
+
+Harold, 370, 371.
+
+Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, 107.
+
+Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167.
+
+Hengist, 367.
+
+Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, 376.
+
+Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383.
+
+Hochkirch, 303.
+  surprise of, 209.
+
+Hohenfriedberg, 305.
+
+Hohenlinden, 183, 206.
+
+Holland, expedition to, 91.
+
+Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289.
+  in the offensive, 316.
+
+Houchard, 333.
+
+Hougoumont, 303.
+
+Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161.
+
+Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270.
+
+Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271.
+  how events justified them, 272.
+
+
+I.
+
+Igor, expeditions of, 368.
+
+Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268.
+
+Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, 299.
+  effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359.
+
+Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61.
+
+Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287.
+  best formation of, for assault, 298.
+  best formation of, for the defensive, 298.
+  cavalry must be supported by, 304.
+  checkerwise formation, 310.
+  formation of, in two deployed lines, 292.
+  formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, 299.
+  importance of, 290.
+  in three-rank formation, 293.
+  in what movements should be exercised, 300.
+  lines of battle for, 282-284.
+  mixed order, 295.
+  mounted, 308.
+  needs support of cavalry and artillery, 290.
+  protection of, from enemy's artillery, 303.
+  squares, 294, 296.
+  supports of artillery, 316, 317.
+  three-rank formation of, 291.
+  various formations for, 285.
+  when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, 305.
+
+Information from partisans, 270.
+  of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, 273, 274.
+  of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, 269.
+
+Initiative, advantages of, 184.
+
+Institutions, military, 43.
+
+Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114.
+
+Interior lines, observations on, 123.
+  of Archduke Charles, 136.
+  of operations, 102.
+  of operations, why preferable, 127.
+  should not be too much extended, 117.
+  two armies on, 117.
+
+Intervention, instances of, 20-22.
+  kinds of, 19.
+  reasons for, 19.
+  wars of, 19.
+  wars of, essentials in, 21.
+
+Intestine wars, 35.
+
+Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157.
+
+Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215.
+  connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  how differ from tętes deponts, 160.
+  influence of, 155.
+  instances of, 210, 211.
+  maxims on, 155, 156.
+  on river, 156.
+  Prussian system of. 158.
+  use of, 156.
+  where to be established, 155.
+
+Intrenched lines, 146, 153.
+  attack of, 214.
+  continuous, 213.
+
+Intrenched positions, 181.
+
+Intrenchments, armies in, 154
+
+Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142.
+
+Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72.
+  advantages of awaiting, 17.
+  army of, line of defense important to, 99.
+  control of the sea important in, 30.
+  difficult in national wars, 144.
+  how rendered feasible, 106.
+  of a mountainous country, 169.
+  of England contemplated by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
+  of Turkey by Russia, 23.
+  two kinds of, 22.
+  wars of, when advantageous, 17.
+
+Invasions, diplomacy in, 24.
+  distant, across extensive territories, 171.
+  distant, effect of standing armies on, 171.
+  distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, 171.
+  distant, maxim for, 173.
+  distant, to aid an ally, 170.
+  how to be carried on, 24.
+  neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, 174.
+  of neighboring states, 174.
+  of Spain, 23.
+  when excusable, 23.
+
+Investing a city, false system of, 152.
+  force, how strengthened, 153.
+
+Irregular cavalry, 313.
+  arms for, 313.
+
+Islamism, wars of, 25.
+
+Italy, operations of the French in, 111, 112.
+  parallel retreats in, 241.
+  relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
+
+Ivar, expedition of, 369.
+
+
+J.
+
+James II., expedition of, in Ireland, 381.
+
+Jemmapes, 342.
+
+Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198.
+  maneuvers at, 90.
+  Napoleon's march on, 94.
+  Ney's charge at, 305.
+
+Jourdan, 229.
+  at Stockach, 205.
+  balloons used by, at Fleurus, 275.
+
+Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
+
+Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233.
+
+
+K.
+
+Kagoul, panic at, 64.
+
+Katzbach, 124.
+
+Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211.
+
+Kolin, 303.
+
+Koudacheff's expedition, 273.
+
+Koutousoff, 170.
+
+Krasnoi, combination at, 342.
+
+Kray, 87.
+
+Kunnersdorf, 304.
+
+
+L.
+
+Lance, importance of, 47.
+  when best for cavalry, 307.
+  when useful, 306.
+
+Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345.
+
+League, wars of the, 25.
+
+Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87.
+  battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305.
+  march of the allies upon, 123.
+  march on, modified, 140. /
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  order of battle at, 193.
+
+Lepanto, battle of, 378.
+
+Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342.
+  maneuver of Frederick at, 140.
+
+Level country, defensive in, 164
+
+Light cavalry, advantages of, 314.
+
+Ligny, 195.
+
+Line of advance, how determined, 71.
+  of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, 288.
+  of battle before the French Revolution, 277.
+  of battle, definition of, 179.
+  of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, 290.
+  of battle, distribution of troops in, 287.
+  of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, 290.
+  of battle, posting troops in, 277.
+
+Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289.
+  of defense important to an army of invasion, 99.
+  of defense should be short, 98.
+  of operations, double, when necessary, 116.
+  of operations, how protected, 132.
+  of operations, single, when advantageous, 116.
+  of retreat, 261, 341-343.
+
+Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215.
+  and points, strategic, 85.
+  central, application of, to large masses, 125.
+  deployed, in two ranks, 294.
+  double, to be avoided, 330.
+  eccentric, 237.
+  interior, observations on, 123.
+  interior, two armies on, 117.
+  intrenched, 146, 153.
+  intrenched, attack of, 214.
+  of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284.
+  of circumvallation, 152.
+  of contravallation, 152.
+  of defense, second, 147.
+  of defense, eventual, 96.
+  of defense, permanent, 95.
+  of defense, strategical and tactical, 95.
+  of depots, 263.
+  of direction, importance of, illustrated, 116.
+  of maneuver, importance of, 114.
+  of operations, 100-103.
+  of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, 121.
+  of operations, best direction of, 115.
+  of operations, change of, 118.
+  of operations, converging and divergent, 118.
+  of operations, double, 110.
+  of operations, double, when advantageous, 123.
+  of operations, great art of directing, 120.
+  of operations, how established, 114.
+  of operations, how influenced, 119.
+  of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, 113.
+  of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, 122.
+  of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, 104.
+  of operations, maxims on, 114.
+  of operations, rivers as, 76.
+  of operations, selecting of, 80.
+
+Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, 115.
+  of Stollhofen, 154.
+  of Turin, 153.
+  of Turin, capture of, 213.
+  parallel, 200.
+  strategic, 128, 129.
+  strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, 131.
+
+Linz, towers of, 158.
+
+Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291.
+
+Logistics, 69, 252-268.
+  derivation of the term, 253.
+  faulty, instances of, 265-267.
+  illustration of importance of, 263-268.
+  of battle of Leipsic, 267.
+  principal points of, 254-256.
+
+Louis VII., Crusade of, 372.
+  IX., Crusade of, 374.
+  IX., expedition of, to Tunis, 375.
+  XIV., coalition against, 36.
+  XIV., commissariat of, 142.
+
+Louvois, 59.
+
+Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87.
+
+
+M.
+
+Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295, 296.
+  error at Katzbach, 124.
+
+Mack, 164, 170.
+  at Ulm, 53.
+
+Magnesia, victory of, 364.
+
+Malplaquet, 183.
+
+Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377.
+
+Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360.
+
+Maneuver line, 114, 115.
+  lines, 103.
+  lines of, their importance, 114.
+  objective points of, 88.
+  pivots of, 98.
+  tactical, by flank, 140.
+  turning, 179, 206.
+
+Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207.
+  at Ulm and Jena, 90.
+  for breaking through a line, 197.
+  must conform to strategic principles, 333.
+  objective points of, 89.
+  of Napoleon in 1814,118.
+  simplest, most likely to be successful, 196.
+  strategic lines of, 128.
+  sudden, generally better than predetermined, 196.
+  transversal, 163.
+
+Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204.
+
+Mantua, siege of, 111.
+  Wurmser at, 156.
+
+March, establishment of depots on, 262.
+
+Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258.
+  effects of systems of, 138.
+  flank, 139.
+  instructions to generals commanding corps in, 260, 261.
+  particulars to be considered in, 260.
+  system of, 135, 138.
+  rapid, 176.
+  rules for, 257-263.
+  transversal, in mountainous countries, 163.
+  two kinds of, 260.
+
+Marengo, French armament at, 47.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Maritime expeditions, 361-390.
+
+Marmont at Salamanca, 206.
+
+Marsin, 53.
+
+Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, 158.
+
+Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, 166.
+
+Massena's position of the Albis, 181.
+
+Matériel of war, 49.
+  should be inspected by staff officers, 257.
+
+Maurice of Saxony, 22.
+
+Maxim for distant invasions, 173.
+
+Maxims for frontier defenses, 148, 152.
+  of fundamental principle of war, 70.
+  on intrenched camps, 155, 156.
+  on lines of operations, 114-122.
+  on operations in mountainous countries, 163.
+  on strategic fronts, 98, 99.
+  on strategic operations, 90.
+  relative to supplies, 143-146.
+
+Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157.
+  fortresses at, 150.
+  intrenched camp at, 211.
+
+Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390.
+
+Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171.
+
+Military education important to a ruler, 49.
+  geography and statistics, importance
+  of a knowledge of, 40.
+  geography, Lloyd's essay on, 40.
+  institutions, 43.
+  institutions of Rome, 61.
+  instruments, signals by, 276.
+  operations influenced by a cabinet, 42.
+  policy, 38.
+  policy, essential bases of, 49.
+  sciences, study of. 49.
+  spirit, how encouraged, 61.
+  spirit, how maintained, 63.
+  spirit of nations, 60.
+  statistics and geography, 39.
+
+Militia as cavalry, 314, 315.
+
+Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111.
+
+Minden, French order at, 278.
+
+Mithridates, 364, 365.
+
+Mixed order, infantry formation, 295.
+  system of Benningsen at Eylau, 352.
+
+Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, 376.
+  marine expeditions, 249.
+
+Mohammed II., 375.
+
+Molitor, General, 167.
+
+Mollwitz, battle of, 348.
+
+Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125.
+
+Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367.
+
+Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322.
+  of cavalry, 312.
+
+Moreau at Engen, 203.
+  base of operations of, in 1800, 82.
+  retreat of, in 1796, 233.
+
+Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222.
+  passage of the Rhine in 1800, 224, 225.
+
+Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389.
+
+Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233.
+
+Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169.
+
+Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162.
+  countries, cavalry in, 304.
+  countries, defense in, 163.
+  countries, heights to be secured in, 167.
+  countries, strategic defense in, 164.
+  countries, strategic positions of, 76.
+  countries, the offensive in, 167.
+  countries, transversal marches in, 163.
+  country, character of a war in, 169.
+  country, forts in a, 151.
+  country, invasion of a, 169.
+
+Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  as frontiers, 146.
+  campaigns in, 169.
+  importance of, when secondary, 161, 162.
+  of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, 161.
+  strategic operations in, 160.
+
+Mounted infantry, 308.
+  militia, 315.
+
+Movement by flanks of companies, 300, 301.
+
+Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204.
+  in which infantry should be exercised, 300.
+  of armies, points to be attended to, 254-256.
+  of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, 273, 274.
+
+Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209.
+
+Murray's descent in 1813, 385.
+
+Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203.
+  influence of, in battles, 348.
+
+
+N.
+
+Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212.
+
+Naples, French army at, 112.
+
+Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218.
+  and Grouchy at Waterloo, 127,130.
+  at Austerlitz, 206.
+  at Essling, 158.
+  at Ligny, 195.
+  at Ratisbon, 274.
+  at Wagram, 195.
+  double wars of, 37.
+  English expedition against, in 1815, 385.
+  his own chief staff officer, 264.
+  operations of the armies of, 136.
+
+Napoleon's artillery, 318.
+  artillery at Wagram, 316.
+  base of operations in 1806, 80-82.
+  battles, orders of, 198.
+  bold maneuvers in 1814, 118.
+  campaign of 1800, 137.
+  cantonment on the Passarge, 247.
+  central lines in Saxony, 124.
+  central position in 1813, why disastrous, 123.
+  changes of line of operations, 118.
+  choice of objective points, 89.
+  concentric retreat in 1796, 238.
+  defense in Champagne in 1814, 125.
+  detachments in 1805, 222.
+  error after his victory at Dresden, 124.
+  error in the campaign of 1812, 172.
+  favorite objective, 330.
+  front of operations in 1796, 93.
+  front of operations in 1813, 93.
+  infantry, panic of, at Wagram, 64.
+  line of defense in 1813, 93.
+  logistics in 1806 and 1815, 264, 265.
+  march on Bassano, 131.
+
+Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94.
+  march on Jena in 1806, 94.
+  march on Naumburg in 1806, 94.
+  march to Königsberg, 20.
+  mode of issuing orders, 259.
+  motives and necessities, 22.
+  operations, comments on, 116.
+  order at the Tagliamento, 295.
+  passages of the Danube, 226, 266.
+  passage of the Saint-Bernard, 168.
+  passage of the Po in 1800, 225.
+  projected invasion of England, 249, 250, 386.
+  reserves, 133.
+  retreat from Smolensk, 235.
+  return from Egypt in 1800, 112.
+  rule for the passage of an army, 147.
+  strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131.
+  strategic positions, 97.
+  system of formation for battle, 278, 279.
+  system of marches, 137.
+  victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, 23.
+
+National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  wars, definition of, 29.
+  wars, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34.
+  wars, effect of the nature of the country in, 30.
+  wars, how prevented, 33, 34.
+  wars, how success attained in, 33.
+  wars, invasion difficult in, 144.
+  wars, military precepts for, 27.
+
+Nations, military spirit of, 60.
+
+Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14.
+
+Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94.
+
+Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376.
+
+Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, 174.
+
+Ney, 31, 168, 196.
+  at Bautzen, 317.
+  at Dennewitz, 130.
+  at Elchingen, 182.
+  at Jena, 305.
+
+Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, 309.
+
+
+O.
+
+Objective point, how held, 67.
+  point, manner of approach to, 67.
+  point of Napoleon in 1800, 87.
+  point, selection of, 66.
+  points, geographical, 88.
+  points, how chosen, 90.
+
+Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88.
+  points of maneuver, 88, 89.
+  points of operations, 85.
+  points, political, 91.
+
+Objectives of operations, 329, 330.
+
+Objects of war, 14.
+
+Oblique order, 199, 200.
+  order, antiquity of, 199.
+  order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, 198.
+  order of battle, 190.
+
+Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184.
+  army, proper course for, 324.
+  battle, object of, 188.
+  battles, 186.
+  characteristics of infantry formation for, 297.
+  line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, 290.
+  movements, when advised, 124.
+  or defensive system, either may be employed, 185.
+  order of battle, 200.
+  system to be followed in, 176.
+  the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, 184.
+  the, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  use of artillery in, 316.
+  war, 72, 73.
+  war, duty of staff officers in, 258.
+  war, reserves, how posted in, 133, 135.
+  wars, duty of statesmen in, 17.
+  wars, how conducted, 16.
+  wars to reclaim rights, 16.
+
+Oleg, expedition of, 867.
+
+Open positions, 181.
+
+Operations, base of, where to be established, 84.
+  bases of, definition of, 77.
+    how to be chosen, 79, 80.
+    plurality of, 78.
+  change of lines of, 118.
+  control of, 52.
+  divergent and convergent, 126, 127.
+  double lines of, 102, 110, 123.
+  exterior lines of, 102.
+  fronts of, 92, 330, 338.
+  in mountainous countries, maxims on, 163.
+  interior lines of, 102.
+  line of, how protected, 132.
+  lines of, 100, 120.
+  lines of, converging and divergent, 118.
+  lines of, how established, 114.
+  lines of, how influenced, 119.
+  lines of, maxims on, 114.
+  military, influenced by a cabinet, 42.
+  objective points of, 85.
+  objectives of, 329, 330.
+  of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177.
+  of the French at the close of 1793, 331-333.
+  pivots of, 98.
+  simple lines of, 101.
+  system of, 72.
+  system of, how to be judged, 125.
+  system of, necessary in war, 50.
+  theater of, 74, 75.
+  theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, 338-340.
+  theater of, how divided, 71.
+  zone of, 66.
+  zone of, how to select, 329.
+  zones of, 100, 338.
+
+Opinion, public, danger of, 55.
+  wars of, 25.
+
+Orchomenus, 365.
+
+Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301.
+  half-deep, attacks in, 302.
+  half-deep, infantry formation, 295.
+  importance of, 42.
+  in deep masses, infantry formation, 295, 296.
+  in echelons, 193.
+  in squares, when suitable for attack, 297.
+  mixed, infantry formation, 295,
+  oblique, 199, 200.
+  of attack in columns, 194.
+  of battle, 186.
+  of battle at Agincourt, 192.
+    at Cannć, 189.
+    at Crécy, 192.
+    at Essling, 192, 193.
+    at Fleurus, 192.
+    at Leipsic, 193.
+    at Mollwitz, 348.
+    at passage of a river, 192.
+    by echelon, 193.
+    convex, 192.
+    definition of, 180.
+    oblique, 190.
+    offensive, 200.
+    of the generals of the Republic, 349.
+  of infantry as skirmishers, 292.
+  shallow, infantry, 292.
+
+Orders, best mode of issuing, 259.
+  how issued by Napoleon, 259.
+  inaccurate transmission of, 196.
+  of battle, 188.
+  of battle, classification of, useful, 197.
+
+Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, 197.
+  of Napoleon's battles, 198.
+  should be clear, 258.
+  two methods of issuing, 258, 259.
+
+Organization and arms of cavalry, 307, 308.
+  by corps, likely to be permanent, 287.
+  of an army in four corps, 281.
+  in seven corps, 281.
+  of divisions, 279, 280.
+  of very large armies, 286.
+
+
+P.
+
+Panics, cause and remedy of, 65.
+  instances of, 64.
+  officers and troops to be warned against, 63.
+
+Parallel lines, 200.
+  order of battle, 188.
+  order of battle reinforced, 189.
+  order of battle, when suitable, 189.
+  order of battle with crotchet, 189.
+  retreat, 237.
+  retreats, countries adapted to, 240, 241.
+  retreats, when preferable, 239.
+
+Partisans, information from, 270.
+
+Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273.
+
+Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120.
+
+Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147.
+  of a river, best position for, 226.
+  of the Beresina, 226, 245.
+  of the Danube by Napoleon, 266.
+  of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
+  of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, 168.
+  of rivers, 224, 343.
+  of rivers, double, 230.
+  of rivers, famous modern, 226.
+  of rivers in retreats, 243, 244.
+  of rivers in retreats, rules for, 245.
+  of rivers, rules for, 227.
+  of rivers, rules for preventing, 228.
+
+Peninsular War, 32.
+
+Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43.
+
+Permanent lines of defense, 95.
+
+Perpendicular order of battle, 190.
+
+Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382.
+
+Peter the Hermit, 371.
+
+Peterwardein, panic at, 64.
+
+Philip II. of Spain, 378.
+
+Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109.
+
+Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306.
+
+Pivots of maneuver, 98.
+
+Pivots of operations, 98.
+
+Points, decisive, 337.
+  decisive and objective, 86.
+  decisive geographic, 87.
+  decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187.
+  decisive, of battle-field, now determined, 186.
+  decisive strategic, 86.
+  of operations, objective, 85.
+
+Political objective points, 91.
+  objective points subordinate to strategy, 91.
+  wars, 26.
+
+Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225.
+
+Portable telegraphs, 275.
+
+Port Mahon, assault of, 212.
+
+Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, 390.
+
+Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, 183.
+  for battle, 341.
+  how to drive an enemy from, 201, 202.
+  strong, essentials for, 181.
+  system of wars of, 135.
+  tactical, protection of flanks in, 182.
+
+Positions, 179.
+  for cantonments, selection of, 247.
+  intrenched, 181.
+  open, 181.
+  strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331.
+  tactical, 181.
+  tactical, rules for selecting, 181.
+  two kinds of, 180, 181.
+
+Post, capture of, when important, 216.
+
+Posting troops in line of battle, 277.
+
+Posts, means for capture of, 216.
+
+Prague, battle of, 189, 205.
+
+Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47.
+
+Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54.
+
+Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213.
+  of Coburg, error of, in 1794, 109.
+
+Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88.
+
+Principles of strategy, 331.
+  of strategy always the same, 17.
+
+Promotions in armies, 47.
+
+Protection by trees and brushwood, 303.
+
+Provisional lines, 103.
+
+Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106.
+  parallel retreat in, 241.
+  relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
+
+Prussian army at Waterloo, 129.
+  reserves in 1806, 134.
+  system of forming columns, 294.
+  system of intrenched camps, 158.
+
+Public opinion, danger of, 55.
+
+Punic wars, 363, 364.
+
+Pursuit, rules for, 242.
+
+Pursuits, 241.
+
+Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362.
+
+
+Q.
+
+Qualities of a skillful general, 334.
+
+
+R.
+
+Ramillies, 312.
+
+Ramrods, 348.
+
+Rapid marches, 176.
+
+Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Rear, attack in, 207.
+
+Rear-guard in retreat, 243.
+
+Rear-guards in retreat, 234.
+
+Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244.
+
+Reconnoissances, 268.
+  give but limited information, 269.
+  to gain information of the enemy's movements, 268.
+
+Religion, wars of, 35.
+
+Reports of prisoners, 269.
+
+Reserve, cavalry, 311.
+  final, 203.
+  horse-artillery, advantages of, 289.
+
+Reserves, cavalry, 288.
+  importance of, 133, 134.
+  in offensive war, how posted, 133, 135.
+  nature of, 133.
+  of Napoleon, 133.
+  Prussian, in 1806, 134.
+  strategic, 67, 133.
+
+Retreat along converging roads, 236
+  along diverging roads, 237.
+  along parallel roads, 236.
+  by several corps, 235.
+  difficulty of deciding method of, 231.
+  five methods of arranging, 234.
+  in single mass, when preferable, 234.
+  line of, 261, 341-343.
+  means of, to be considered in a defensive position, 183.
+  parallel, 237.
+  well effected, should be rewarded, 63.
+
+Retreats, 230.
+  at night, 231.
+  attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, 243.
+  bridges in, 244.
+  by diverging roads, danger of, 238.
+  cavalry in, 243.
+  circumstances influencing, 232, 233.
+  concentration in, 238.
+  concentric, instances of, 238, 239.
+  defiles in, 243.
+  divergent, when admissible, 239.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  firmness of Russians in, 64.
+  halts in, to relieve rear-guard, 236.
+  hours of departures and halts in, 236.
+  in daylight, 231.
+  instances of famous, 233.
+  measures to insure success of, 242, 243.
+  parallel, countries adapted to, 240, 241.
+  parallel, when preferable, 239.
+  passage of rivers in, 243, 244.
+  Prince de Ligne's remark on, 230.
+  rear-guard in, 234, 243.
+  should be slow, 232.
+  various kinds of, 231.
+
+Reverse fire, 317.
+
+Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226.
+
+Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377.
+
+Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373.
+
+Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382.
+
+River, best position for passage of, 226.
+  crossing of, in presence of an enemy, 120.
+  order of battle at passage of, 192.
+
+Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  as frontiers, 147.
+  as lines of operations, 76.
+  double passage of, 230.
+  famous modern passages of, 226.
+  passage of, 224, 343.
+  passage of, in retreats, 243, 244.
+    rules for, 245.
+  points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, 121.
+  rules for passage of, 227.
+  rules for preventing passage of, 228.
+
+Rivoli 179, 205.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Rocket-batteries, use of, 318.
+
+Rollo, 369.
+
+Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63.
+  nation, cause of the decline of, 60.
+
+Romans, naval expeditions of, 363.
+
+Rome, military institutions of, 61.
+
+Rossbach, 207.
+
+Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328.
+
+Rules for conducting descents, 251.
+  for fighting battles scientifically, 203.
+  for gaining information of enemy's movements, 273, 274.
+  for offensive or defensive operations, 185.
+  for passage of rivers, 227.
+  for passage of a river in retreat, 245.
+  for pursuit, 242.
+  for preventing passage of rivers, 228.
+  for use of artillery in battle, 316-318.
+  to be observed in selecting tactical positions, 181.
+
+Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64.
+  army, skirmishers in, 293.
+  base in 1828 and 1829, 84.
+  cavalry, 314.
+  expeditions in 1809, 385.
+  order at Eylau, 295.
+  retreat in 1812, 233.
+  system of forming columns, 294.
+
+Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369.
+
+
+S.
+
+Saber, when best for cavalry, 308.
+  when useful, 306.
+
+Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168.
+
+Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205.
+
+Saxons, expedition of, 367.
+
+Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124.
+
+Savoy, Duke of, 22.
+
+Scandinavians, 366.
+
+Science of marches, essential point in, 139.
+  of marches, includes what, 138.
+
+Sciences, military, study of, 49.
+
+Scipio, 364.
+
+Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83, 84.
+
+Sea, control of, held by England, 173.
+  control of, important in an invasion, 30.
+
+Secondary lines, 103.
+
+Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378.
+
+Sebastopol, 347.
+
+Secondary depots, 262, 263.
+
+Shallow order, 298.
+  order, infantry, 292.
+
+Shumla, camp of, 155.
+
+Siege, how covered, 153.
+  of Candia, 380, 381.
+  of Copenhagen, 384.
+  of Mantua, 111.
+
+Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  wars of, 146.
+
+Signaling by fires, 276.
+
+Signals by military instruments, 276.
+  simultaneous shouts as, 277.
+  system of, 274.
+
+Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114.
+  lines of operations, 101.
+
+Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277.
+
+Single line of operations, when preferable, 116.
+
+Sizeboli, capture of, 223.
+
+Skill, superiority in, 42.
+
+Skirmishers, 359, 360.
+
+Skirmishing-order, 292.
+
+Small detachments, how useful, 224.
+
+Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235.
+
+Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, 162.
+
+Sovereign as commander, 52.
+
+Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
+  and Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, 358.
+  invasions of, 23.
+  war in, in 1823, 27.
+
+Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379.
+  capture of Vera Cruz by, 390.
+  descent on Algiers, 382.
+  descent on Morocco in 1859, 389.
+
+Spies, 269.
+  best course for, 270.
+  difficulties in their way, 270.
+  use of, neglected in many modern armies, 270.
+  when especially useful, 270.
+
+Squares in echelons, 297.
+  infantry, 294, 296, 297.
+  in two ranks, 294.
+
+Staff, chief of, 253,
+  chief of, how selected, 57.
+  general, usefulness of, 57.
+  officers and general must act in concert, 257.
+  officers, duties of, should be defined, 253.
+  officers, duty of, in offensive war, 258.
+  officers should inspect matériel, 257.
+  officers, summary of duties of, 254-256.
+
+Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
+
+State, how rendered secure, 138.
+
+Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14.
+
+Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17.
+
+Statistics, military, 39.
+
+St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384.
+
+Stockach, 179, 205.
+  defeat of the French at, 111.
+
+Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164.
+
+Stollhofen, lines of, 152.
+
+Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95.
+
+Strategic combinations, 72.
+  combinations, when better than tactical, 179.
+  coup-d'oeil, 337-345.
+  field of 1806, 113.
+  front and line of defense may coincide, 92.
+  front, change of, 94.
+  front, double, 95.
+  front not to be too extended, 98.
+  front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, 94.
+  fronts, 92.
+  fronts, maxims on, 98.
+  lines, 128, 129.
+  lines and points, 85.
+  lines at Waterloo, 130.
+  lines of maneuvers, 128.
+  lines of Napoleon in 1796, 130, 131.
+  operations in mountains, 160.
+  operations, maxims on, 90.
+  point, Leipsic as a, 87.
+    Lyons as a, 87.
+  point of a battle-field, when important, 187.
+  points, capitals as, 87.
+  position, essential conditions for, 99.
+  positions, 66, 97, 330, 331.
+  positions of mountainous countries, 76.
+  positions of Napoleon, 97.
+  reserves, 67, 133.
+  square for camps, 99.
+
+Strategy, 322, 337.
+  advantage of the offensive in, 184.
+  and the commissariat, 141.
+  battles of Ulm and Jena won by, 198.
+  connection of intrenched camps with, 154.
+  connection of tętes de ponts with, 154.
+  definition of, 66.
+  directs movements, tactics executes them, 175.
+  errors in, 91.
+  how it should be studied, 337.
+  illustration of, by operations of 1793, 331-333.
+  illustrations of, 339-341.
+  in what it consists, 328.
+  objective points in, how determined, 88.
+  one great end of, 177.
+  points embraced by, 68.
+  political objective points subordinate to, 91.
+  principles of, 331.
+  principles of, always the same, 17.
+  province of, 178.
+  relation of fortresses to, 148, 150.
+  science of marches in, 138.
+  system of, developed in 1800, 137.
+  the art of, 69.
+
+Strong position, essentials for a, 181.
+
+Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337.
+
+Successful retreat, how to insure, 242, 243.
+
+Surprises of armies, 209.
+  difficulty of, 209.
+
+Suwaroff, 55, 170.
+
+Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166.
+
+Supplies, depots of, 141, 143.
+
+Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168.
+
+Svatoslav, expedition of, 308.
+
+Sweyn, 369, 370.
+
+Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162.
+  Massena in, in 1799, 165.
+  Suwaroff in, 166.
+  tactical defense of, 169.
+
+Syria, French expedition to, 390.
+
+System, concentric or eccentric, 126.
+  of corps, 279.
+  of divisions, 278.
+  of marches, 135.
+  of marches, effects of, 138.
+  of marches, includes what, 138.
+  of marches, relation of, to commissariat, 141.
+  of marches the result of circumstances, 135.
+  of operations, 72.
+  of operations, how to be judged, 125.
+  of signals, 274.
+  of strategy developed in 1800, 137.
+  of wars, change of, 135.
+  of wars of position, 135.
+
+Systems modified by forms of government, 45.
+
+
+T.
+
+Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178.
+  defense of Switzerland, 169.
+  operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, 184.
+  position, protection of flanks in, 182.
+
+Tactical positions, 181.
+  positions, rules for selecting, 181.
+
+Tactics, 322.
+  executes movements, strategy directs them, 175.
+  grand, 69, 70.
+  of battles, great difficulty of, 196.
+  of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, 358.
+
+Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295.
+
+Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209.
+
+Telegraphs, portable, 275.
+
+Temporary bases, 84.
+  bases, when necessary, 132.
+
+Tętes de ponts, 160.
+  connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  how differ from intrenched camps, 160.
+
+Theater of operations, 74, 75.
+  of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, 338-340.
+  of operations, how composed, 75.
+  of operations, how divided, 71.
+  of operations in the French Revolution, 104.
+  of war, border of the, 80, 81.
+  of war, decisive points of the, 85.
+  of war, definition of, 74.
+
+Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269.
+  use of, in war, 323.
+
+Thirty Years' War, 25.
+
+Three-rank formation of infantry, 291, 293.
+
+Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268.
+
+Torgau, battle of, 205.
+
+Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155.
+  intrenched camp at, 83.
+
+Towers, masonry, 158.
+  of Coblentz, 159.
+  of Linz, 158.
+
+Transversal maneuvers, 163.
+  marches in mountainous countries, 163.
+
+Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303.
+
+Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287.
+  employment of, 328.
+
+Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
+
+Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246.
+
+Turin, battle of, 53.
+  intrenched camp at, 211.
+  lines of, 153, 213.
+
+Turkey, invasion of, 23.
+
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84.
+  wars, squares in, 296, 297.
+
+Turks, cavalry charge of, 307.
+  naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380.
+
+Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206.
+  maneuver, rules for, 204.
+
+Two corps, one behind the other, 285.
+
+Two-rank formation, 346.
+
+Two wars at once, danger of, 36.
+
+
+U.
+
+Ulm, battle of, 53.
+  battle of, won by strategy, 198.
+  camp of, 154.
+  maneuvers at, 90.
+
+Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197.
+
+Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208.
+  meeting of two armies, 207.
+
+United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387.
+  English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, 385, 386.
+  expedition to Port Royal, 390.
+
+Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272.
+  of the three arms combined, 203.
+
+
+V.
+
+Vandals, 366.
+
+Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221.
+
+Venice, 379, 380.
+
+Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390.
+  taken by the French, 386.
+  taken by the United States, 387.
+
+Vessels, Roman, 363.
+  Scandinavian, 366.
+
+Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333.
+
+Victory, assailant's best means of, 202.
+  on what it depends, 309, 310.
+  when it may be expected, 360.
+
+Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303.
+
+Villars's infantry, panic among, 64.
+
+Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120.
+
+
+W.
+
+Wagram, 195, 206, 266, 317, 343, 350.
+  Macdonald's column at, 295, 296.
+  Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  panic at, 64.
+
+War an art, 321.
+  border of the theater of, 80, 81.
+  character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, 135.
+  circumstances which influence result of, 321.
+  council of, at seat of government, 59.
+  councils of, 58.
+  decisive points of the theater of, 85.
+  defensive-offensive, 74.
+  definition of the art of, 13.
+  fundamental principle of, 66, 70.
+  governments should not be unprepared for, 46.
+  how to be conducted, 15.
+  influence of cavalry in a, 313, 314.
+  influence of improvements in fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359.
+  manner of applying general principle of, 175.
+  matériel of, 49.
+  maxims of fundamental principles of, 70.
+  nature and extent of, how influenced, 14.
+  not an exact science, 344, 350.
+  objects of, 14.
+  of the Crimea, 387.
+  offensive and defensive, definition of, 72.
+  offensive, duty of staff officers in, 258.
+  operations of, how directed, 150.
+  principal parts of the art of, 66.
+  relation of statesmanship to, 14.
+  theater of, definition, 74.
+  use of theories in, 323.
+
+Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211.
+
+Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22.
+  change of system of, 135.
+  civil, 35.
+  defensive politically, offensive militarily, 17.
+  double, 36.
+  for conquest, instances of, 22.
+  intestine, 35.
+  natural character of, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  national, definition of, 29.
+  national, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34.
+  national, effect of nature of the country on, 30.
+  national, how prevented, 33, 34.
+  national, invasion difficult in, 144.
+  offensive, how conducted, 16.
+  offensive, to reclaim rights, 16.
+  of expediency, 18.
+    kinds of, 18.
+  of extermination, 34.
+  of intervention, 19.
+  of intervention, essentials in wars of, 21.
+  of intervention, military chances in, 20.
+  of invasion, when advantageous, 17.
+  of opinion, 25.
+  of opinion, character of, 26.
+  of opinion, instances of, 25.
+  of opinion, military precepts for, 27.
+  of position, system of, 135.
+  of religion, 35.
+  of sieges, 146.
+  political, 26.
+  political part of, how modified, 17.
+  Punic, 363, 364.
+  Turkish, squares in, 296, 297.
+  when most just, 16.
+  with or without allies, 18.
+
+Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354.
+  Blücher at, 130.
+  campaign of, 129, 130.
+  English squares at, 294
+  formations at, 351.
+  French at, 196.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  Ney at, 182,183.
+  strategic lines at, 130.
+  Wellington's position at, 181, 388.
+
+Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385.
+  and Blücher at Waterloo, 127, 130.
+  at Salamanca, 206.
+  at Torres-Vedras, 83.
+  defensive-offensive operations of, 74.
+
+Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181.
+
+Weyrother, 205, 206.
+
+William the Conqueror, 370, 371.
+
+Winkelried, column of, 194.
+
+Winter campaigns, 68.
+  quarters, countries adapted to, 246.
+  quarters, when dangerous, 247.
+  quarters, when strategic, 97.
+
+Woods, importance of possession of, 303.
+
+Wurmser at Mantua, 156.
+  eccentric retreat of, in 1796, 238.
+  error of, 111.
+
+
+X.
+
+Xerxes, 173.
+  army of, 362.
+
+
+Z.
+
+Zama, battle of, 364.
+
+Zimisces, 368.
+
+Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338.
+  of operations, how to select, 329.
+  of operations in 1813, 101.
+
+Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105.
+
+Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
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+Title: The Art of War
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+Author: Baron Henri de Jomini
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+Release Date: September 28, 2004 [EBook #13549]
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+
+Produced by Suzanne Shell, Stephen Schulze and the Online Distributed
+Proofreaders Team
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 4]</span><a name='Page_4'></a>
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 5]</span><a name='Page_5'></a>
+<h1>THE<br /><br />
+
+ART OF WAR</h1>
+
+<h3>BY</h3>
+
+<h2>BARON DE JOMINI,</h2>
+
+<p style='text-align: center;'>GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.</p>
+
+<p style='text-align: center;'>A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps.</p>
+
+<p style='text-align: center;'>TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH</p>
+
+<h3>BY</h3>
+
+<h2>Capt. G.H. MENDELL,</h2>
+
+<p style='text-align: center;'>CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY,</p>
+
+<h3>AND</h3>
+
+<h2>Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL,</h2>
+
+<p style='text-align: center;'>CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY.</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 6]</span><a name='Page_6'></a>
+<p style='text-align: center;'>Originally published in 1862
+</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 7]</span><a name='Page_7'></a><h2>PREFACE</h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand
+which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in
+making a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too
+rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and
+on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case the
+sense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy to
+preserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators of
+Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored to
+render their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding to
+his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms.</p>
+
+<p>To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is
+not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To
+those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more
+interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass
+of the American public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said
+with entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent
+judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this
+or any other day.</p>
+
+<p>The translation now presented to the people has been made with the
+earnest hope and the sincere expect<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 8]</span><a name='Page_8'></a>ation of its proving useful. As the
+existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed
+incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that
+military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the
+people. If by the present work the translators shall find they have
+contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object,
+they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it.</p>
+
+<p>To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is
+recommended to begin at the article &quot;Strategy,&quot; <a href='#CHAPTER_III'>Chapter III.</a>, from that
+point to read to the end of the <a href='#SECOND_APPENDIX'>Second Appendix</a>, and then to return to
+<a href='#CHAPTER_I'>Chapters I.</a> and <a href='#CHAPTER_II'>II.</a> It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be
+appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially
+true of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is
+quite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all
+other recent writers on the military art.</p>
+
+U.S. Military Academy,<br />
+West Point, N.Y.<br />
+January, 1862.<br />
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CONTENTS'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 9]</span><a name='Page_9'></a><h2>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><a href='#Page_7'><b>TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.</b></a><br />
+<a href='#CONTENTS'><b>CONTENTS.</b></a><br />
+<a href='#Page_13'><b>DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.</b></a><br /><br />
+ <a href='#CHAPTER_I'><b>CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_I'><b>ART. I.&mdash;Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_II'><b>ART. II.&mdash;Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a Military View.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_III'><b>ART. III.&mdash;Wars of Expediency.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_IV'><b>ART. IV.&mdash;Wars with or without Allies.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_V'><b>ART. V.&mdash;Wars of Intervention.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_VI'><b>ART. VI.&mdash;Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other Causes.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_VII'><b>ART. VII.&mdash;Wars of Opinion.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_VIII'><b>ART. VIII.&mdash;National Wars.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_IX'><b>ART. IX.&mdash;Civil and Religious Wars.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_X'><b>ART. X.&mdash;Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.</b></a><br />
+</div>
+<br />
+<a href='#CHAPTER_II'><b>CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XI'><b>ART. XI.&mdash;Military Statistics and Geography.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XII'><b>ART. XII.&mdash;Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a War.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XIII'><b>ART. XIII.&mdash;The Military Institutions of States.ART. XIII.&mdash;The Military Institutions of States.</b></a><br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 10]</span><a name='Page_10'></a>
+<a href='#ARTICLE_XIV'><b>ART. XIV.&mdash;The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XV'><b>ART. XV.&mdash;The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.</b></a><br />
+</div> <br />
+
+<a href='#CHAPTER_III'><b>CHAPTER III.&mdash;STRATEGY.<br />
+Definition of Strategy and Tactics.<br />
+THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XVI'><b>ART. XVI.&mdash;The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XVII'><b>ART. XVII.&mdash;The Theater of Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XVIII'><b>ART. XVIII.&mdash;Bases of Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'><b>ART. XIX.&mdash;Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operation.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XX'><b>ART. XX.&mdash;Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic Positions.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'><b>ART. XXI.&mdash;Zones and Lines of Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXII'><b>ART. XXII.&mdash;Strategic Lines of Maneuver.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIII'><b>ART. XXIII.&mdash;Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIV'><b>ART. XXIV.&mdash;The Old and New Systems of War.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXV'><b>ART. XXV.&mdash;Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVI'><b>ART. XXVI.&mdash;Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched Lines.&mdash;Wars of Sieges.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVII'><b>ART. XXVII.&mdash;Intrenched Camps and T&ecirc;tes de Ponts in their Relation to Strategy.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVIII'><b>ART. XXVIII.&mdash;Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIX'><b>ART. XXIX.&mdash;Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.</b></a><br />
+<a href='#EPITOME_OF_STRATEGY'><b>Epitome of Strategy.</b></a><br /></div>
+<br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 11]</span><a name='Page_11'></a>
+ <a href='#CHAPTER_IV'><b>CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XXX'><b>ART. XXX.&mdash;Positions and Defensive Battles.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXI'><b>ART. XXXI.&mdash;Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXII'><b>ART. XXXII.&mdash;Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXIII'><b>ART. XXXIII.&mdash;Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXIV'><b>ART. XXXIV.&mdash;Surprises of Armies.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXV'><b>ART. XXXV.&mdash;Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de Main generally.</b></a><br />
+</div><br />
+<a href='#CHAPTER_V'><b>CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN
+THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVI'><b>ART. XXXVI.&mdash;Diversions and Great Detachments.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVII'><b>ART. XXXVII.&mdash;Passage of Rivers and other Streams.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVIII'><b>ART. XXXVIII.&mdash;Retreats and Pursuits.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXIX'><b>ART. XXXIX.&mdash;Cantonments and Winter Quarters.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XL'><b>ART. XL.&mdash;Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.</b></a><br />
+</div><br />
+ <a href='#CHAPTER_VI'><b>CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XLI'><b>ART. XLI.&mdash;A few Remarks on Logistics in general.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XLII'><b>ART. XLII.&mdash;Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate Information of the Enemy's Movements.</b></a><br />
+</div><br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 12]</span><a name='Page_12'></a>
+ <a href='#CHAPTER_VII'><b>CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.</b></a><br />
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"> <a href='#ARTICLE_XLIII'><b>ART. XLIII&mdash;Posting Troops in Line of Battle.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XLIV'><b>ART. XLIV.&mdash;Formation and Employment of Infantry.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XLV'><b>ART. XLV.&mdash;-Formation and Employment of Cavalry.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XLVI'><b>ART. XLVI.&mdash;-Formation and Employment of Artillery.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#ARTICLE_XLVII'><b>ART. XLVII.&mdash;Employment of the Three Arms together.</b></a><br />
+</div> <a href='#CONCLUSION'><b>CONCLUSION.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#SUPPLEMENT'><b>SUPPLEMENT.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#NOTE'><b>APPENDIX.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#SECOND_APPENDIX'><b>SECOND APPENDIX.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#SKETCH_OF_THE_PRINCIPAL_MARITIME_EXPEDITIONS'><b>SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.</b></a><br />
+ <a href='#INDEX'><b>INDEX</b></a><br /></div>
+
+
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 13]</span><a name='Page_13'></a>
+
+<h2>SUMMARY</h2>
+
+<h3>OF</h3>
+<h2>THE ART OF WAR.</h2>
+<br />
+
+<h3>DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely
+military branches,&mdash;viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
+Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto
+unrecognized, might be termed <i>Diplomacy in its relation to War</i>.
+Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the
+profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be
+denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is
+indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all
+the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
+various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
+should have a place in a work like this.</p>
+
+<p>To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left:4em;">
+<p>1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.</p>
+
+<p>2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of
+war, either for defense or for invasion.</p>
+
+<p>3. Grand Tactics.</p>
+
+<p>4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.</p>
+
+<p>5. Engineering,&mdash;the attack and defense of fortifications.</p>
+
+<p>6. Minor Tactics.</p>
+</div>
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 14]</span><a name='Page_14'></a>It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
+branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of
+engineering.</p>
+
+<p>Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good
+infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a
+staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_I'></a><h2>CHAPTER I.</h2>
+
+<h3>STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.</h3><br />
+
+<p>Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
+concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
+determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the
+war.</p>
+
+<p>A government goes to war,&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;</p>
+
+<p>To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
+manufactures, or agriculture;</p>
+
+<p>To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
+safety of the government or the balance of power;</p>
+
+<p>To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;</p>
+
+<p>To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to
+defend them;</p>
+
+<p>To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of
+territory;</p>
+
+<p>To defend the threatened independence of the state;</p>
+
+<p>To avenge insulted honor; or,</p>
+
+<p>From a mania for conquest.</p>
+</div>
+<p>It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
+degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for
+the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to
+the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and
+there <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 15]</span><a name='Page_15'></a>may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
+conduct of a war, as,&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. A state may simply make war against another state.</p>
+
+<p>2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each
+other.</p>
+
+<p>3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.</p>
+
+<p>4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.</p>
+
+<p>5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning
+or after it has commenced.</p>
+
+<p>6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
+ally, or upon its own.</p>
+
+<p>7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant
+territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and
+adventurous.</p>
+
+<p>8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<p>9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.</p>
+</div>
+<p>War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the
+art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the
+operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances
+of the case.</p>
+
+<p>For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
+Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
+same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
+compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
+they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
+march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
+of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
+between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in
+nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
+circumstances and events.</p>
+
+<p>To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
+statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
+of armies. The name Military Policy is <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 16]</span><a name='Page_16'></a>given to them; for they belong
+exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the
+highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_I'></a><h2>ARTICLE I.</h2>
+
+<h3>Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to
+enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before
+action.</p>
+
+<p>The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
+which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with
+the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our
+times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
+though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
+reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
+Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
+settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
+general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
+all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
+legatee.</p>
+
+<p>Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
+old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
+doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
+he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
+and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
+such attempts can be justified.</p>
+
+<p>In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
+by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
+should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
+would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
+be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
+of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
+by the enemy, and the means being to threaten <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 17]</span><a name='Page_17'></a>him in the heart of his
+own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
+able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
+an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
+the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
+enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
+and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
+guarantees to other states.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_II'></a><h2>ARTICLE II.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
+View.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
+without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
+honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
+awaiting the attack on the frontiers.</p>
+
+<p>There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
+advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
+internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
+party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
+soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on
+the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers,
+and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely
+military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own
+territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial
+features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
+the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
+constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.</p>
+
+<p>These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;
+but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different
+with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of
+communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of
+states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to
+prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles
+which can <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 18]</span><a name='Page_18'></a>never be safely violated in the presence of an active and
+skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
+variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to
+execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.</p>
+
+<p>For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
+differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of
+Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and
+possess no steadiness under misfortunes.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_III'></a><h2>ARTICLE III.</h2>
+
+<h3>Wars of Expediency.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
+Succession, were wars of expediency.</p>
+
+<p>There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
+undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
+reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to
+prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a
+state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to
+form a coalition for that purpose.</p>
+
+<p>These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_IV'></a><h2>ARTICLE IV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Wars with or without Allies.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being
+equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker
+states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than
+either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops,
+but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening
+portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All
+history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
+neglected by any power, however formidable.</p>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 19]</span><a name='Page_19'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_V'></a><h2>ARTICLE V.</h2>
+
+<h3>Wars of Intervention.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a
+state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain.
+The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole
+weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when
+it can make decisive use of its resources.</p>
+
+<p>There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal
+affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the
+first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
+interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured
+in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful.
+While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland,
+Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere
+in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.</p>
+
+<p>Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
+perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
+right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it
+certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may
+reach the adjoining states.</p>
+
+<p>There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
+wars,&mdash;viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain
+the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the
+war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not
+to be obtained otherwise.</p>
+
+<p>History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect
+of these principles. &quot;A state begins to decline when it permits the
+immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become
+the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the
+proper time.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appear<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 20]</span><a name='Page_20'></a>ance of a new
+and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be
+decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference
+to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807
+Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of K&ouml;nigsberg,
+leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
+launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder,
+it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there
+is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the
+Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred
+thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field,
+and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the
+proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.</p>
+
+<p>There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
+interventions:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force
+specified by former treaties.</p>
+
+<p>2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending
+his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.</p>
+
+<p>3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of
+war,&mdash;which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against
+one.</p>
+
+<p>4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or
+interferes before the declaration of war.</p></div>
+
+<p>When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
+treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice
+in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and
+with an imposing force, the case is quite different.</p>
+
+<p>The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
+Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
+still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
+Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
+far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 21]</span><a name='Page_21'></a>of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
+maneuvering of their allies.</p>
+
+<p>Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
+operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
+this, to which we shall again refer in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIX'>Article XXIX.</a>, in discussing the
+military character of these expeditions.</p>
+
+<p>It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
+distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
+territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
+is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
+in a measure, an advantage to the state.</p>
+
+<p>In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
+both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
+allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
+finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
+the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
+number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
+struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.</p>
+
+<p>The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
+whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
+than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,
+but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813.
+Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking
+his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with
+two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
+regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany,
+which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention
+Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her
+favor,&mdash;a double result, combining the highest advantages.</p>
+
+<p>Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater
+was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible
+display of force, she at the same time <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 22]</span><a name='Page_22'></a>interfered in a contest already
+in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and
+at the time most opportune for her.</p>
+
+<p>This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
+monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence
+when they know how to profit by it.</p>
+
+<p>Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
+boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy,
+and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held
+France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and
+arrested the great conqueror in his career.</p>
+
+<p>In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
+to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the
+recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of
+Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized
+Prince Eugene.</p>
+
+<p>Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
+opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they
+could not add to the conviction of the reader.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_VI'></a><h2>ARTICLE VI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
+state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
+great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.</p>
+
+<p>Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,&mdash;as Alexander, C&aelig;sar,
+and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
+there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
+incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
+and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
+furnish bloody proofs of these truths.&mdash;The love of conquest, however,
+was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
+contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 23]</span><a name='Page_23'></a>to
+make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
+was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
+yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
+to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
+teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
+disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.</p>
+
+<p>A war of invasion without good reason&mdash;like that of Genghis Khan&mdash;is a
+crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
+induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.</p>
+
+<p>The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
+and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
+threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
+author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
+general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
+successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
+majority of the people whose territory was invaded.</p>
+
+<p>These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
+same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
+the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
+never to have been changed.</p>
+
+<p>Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
+than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
+spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the
+proper time.</p>
+
+<p>An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
+end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.</p>
+
+<p>An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
+likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as
+was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the
+Revolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was
+better prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was
+attacked by all Europe upon both land and sea.</p>
+
+<p>Although the circumstances were different, the Russian <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 24]</span><a name='Page_24'></a>invasion of
+Turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national
+resistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him
+to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were
+twice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and
+Turks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united
+people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element
+of religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was
+formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found,
+while in the interior all was weakness.</p>
+
+<p>When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the
+inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular
+feeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt.
+(These military points are treated of in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIX'>Article XXIX.</a>) But when the
+invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success
+will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to
+insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a
+state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops,
+and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations,
+depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must
+have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this
+possible.</p>
+
+<p>Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not
+powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may
+arrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805
+and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The
+invasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by
+Austria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a
+wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention.</p>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 25]</span><a name='Page_25'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_VII'></a><h2>ARTICLE VII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Wars of Opinion.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes
+confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.</p>
+
+<p>Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and,
+lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior
+without being intestine or civil.</p>
+
+<p>Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of
+intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party
+desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it
+desires to crush,&mdash;in both cases leading to intervention. Although
+originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most
+deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and
+become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.</p>
+
+<p>The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of
+the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is
+the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of
+dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire
+than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not
+sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman
+Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a
+crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of
+gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.</p>
+
+<p>The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for
+it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For
+instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France,
+had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may,
+however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the
+dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter
+enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 26]</span><a name='Page_26'></a>The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
+about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
+thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous
+declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly
+alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing
+the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing
+it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
+inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the
+human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it
+is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and
+for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a
+factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these
+storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to
+restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
+explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
+better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to
+try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.</p>
+
+<p>After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
+Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
+armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
+upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
+never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of
+Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to
+clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is
+probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the
+Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good,
+temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and
+the immemorial traditions of the French.</p>
+
+<p>In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not
+only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of
+an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party
+will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of
+another and op<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 27]</span><a name='Page_27'></a>posite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all
+the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
+supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the
+support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did
+one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do
+for the Coalition in 1793?</p>
+
+<p>History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the
+Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of
+attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the
+military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before
+deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what
+would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of
+destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the
+commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to
+France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with
+two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
+again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection
+of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to
+decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have
+depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem
+thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave
+one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say.
+Experiment alone could have determined it.</p>
+
+<p>The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
+wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
+should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
+reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of
+less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be
+made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
+constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
+independence or the integrity of its territory.</p>
+
+<p>The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of
+this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the
+conditions were slightly different; <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 28]</span><a name='Page_28'></a>for the French army of 1792 was
+made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de
+Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national
+war, and a civil war,&mdash;while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
+thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
+opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous
+difference in the results.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angoul&ecirc;me was well carried out.
+Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the
+above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there
+divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of
+strength of their enemies,&mdash;which they could safely do, since they were
+sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the
+instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of
+the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and
+the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps
+have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody
+one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
+similar to that of 1807.</p>
+
+<p>Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
+was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it
+behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from
+that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged
+with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
+Cadiz.</p>
+
+<p>If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship
+was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid
+order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its
+commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the
+counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of
+its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand
+blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep
+veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority
+for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
+nation remained divided in two hostile <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 29]</span><a name='Page_29'></a>camps, which it would not have
+been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew
+into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,&mdash;a striking lesson, by
+which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land,
+although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
+reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
+construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful
+conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated
+from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the
+general interests of the country,&mdash;a monarchy capable of rallying to its
+support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not
+less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who
+were in the best position to know it.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_VIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE VIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>National Wars.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of
+invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied
+to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of
+them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their
+independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its
+camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the
+sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.</p>
+
+<p>The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
+though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
+admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of
+humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be
+confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions
+of the state and directed by the government.</p>
+
+<p>This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
+rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters,
+affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them
+the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical
+people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 30]</span><a name='Page_30'></a>in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
+institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most
+dear.</p>
+
+<p>The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a
+national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and
+are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it,
+their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the
+facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all
+the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will
+be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.</p>
+
+<p>The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility
+of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always
+most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive
+forests.</p>
+
+<p>The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that
+of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
+Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally,
+the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the
+inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer
+time than those of the plains,&mdash;which is due as much to the difference
+in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of
+the countries.</p>
+
+<p>Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
+defense; and the Bocage of La Vend&eacute;e, so justly celebrated, proves that
+any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or
+canals, admits of a formidable defense.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as
+in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general
+conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest
+of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the
+English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary
+struggle of La Vend&eacute;e with the victorious Republic, those of Spain,
+Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the
+Morea against the Turks, and of Na<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 31]</span><a name='Page_31'></a>varre against the armies of Queen
+Christina, are still more striking illustrations.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by
+a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an
+army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly
+in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each
+individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the
+non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every
+means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which
+he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and
+multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step.</p>
+
+<p>These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is
+difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their
+connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the
+commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the
+slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best
+measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information
+of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to
+gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only
+in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his
+combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted
+movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is
+about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs
+of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is
+attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications,
+destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his
+depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must
+inevitably yield after a time.</p>
+
+<p>In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When
+Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of
+the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four
+brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish
+forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 32]</span><a name='Page_32'></a>de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo,
+Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the
+companies of the train&mdash;men and horses&mdash;disappeared, and we were never
+able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal
+escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had
+thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single
+division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the
+Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part
+of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind
+the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a
+league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when
+he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the
+regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard
+Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the
+marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
+this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
+information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them
+fall more readily into snares.</p>
+
+<p>No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a
+system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all
+the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at
+the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy
+wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of
+respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what
+force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the
+safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?</p>
+
+<p>The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the
+obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the
+occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What
+efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops
+of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for
+six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Span<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 33]</span><a name='Page_33'></a>iards and
+Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford,
+Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Casta&ntilde;os, Reding, and Ballasteros!</p>
+
+<p>If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will
+be most likely to insure it,&mdash;viz.: make a display of a mass of troops
+proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered,
+calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time
+and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and,
+particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the
+League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
+Valencia, of Hoche in La Vend&eacute;e, are models of their kind, which may be
+employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable
+order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the
+late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the
+success of their enterprises.</p>
+
+<p>The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars
+have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any
+other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being
+also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders.
+This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its
+consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the
+people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be
+convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of
+conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only
+to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests,
+should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how
+to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred
+thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with
+the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and
+without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole
+population&mdash;men, women, and children&mdash;of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne,
+and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled
+town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 34]</span><a name='Page_34'></a>pillage, and
+incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the
+Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces,
+who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of
+them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The
+difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor
+of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion
+without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of
+extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the
+people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will
+it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to
+organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their
+governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take
+in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?</p>
+
+<p>I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the
+cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French
+troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the
+better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to
+fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or
+arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands.
+To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good
+national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive
+in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system
+was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the
+whole of Germany in 1813.</p>
+
+<p>I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian
+philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of
+extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the
+defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good
+political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.</p>
+
+<p>As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized
+assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that
+my prejudices are in favor of the good <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 35]</span><a name='Page_35'></a>old times when the French and
+English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,&mdash;as at
+Fontenoy,&mdash;preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women,
+and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_IX'></a><h2>ARTICLE IX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally
+the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious
+sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the
+collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most
+deplorable.</p>
+
+<p>We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force
+against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would
+weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that
+it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in
+French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is
+difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis
+XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put
+upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are
+horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful
+when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the
+League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is
+difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time
+of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a
+state of brutality.</p>
+
+<p>To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon
+which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two
+parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to
+reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the
+intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with
+ambitious views.</p>
+
+<p>Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a
+political disease whose principles threaten <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 36]</span><a name='Page_36'></a>social order; and, although
+these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is
+possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in
+religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had
+no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to
+subject France to his influence, or to dismember it.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_X'></a><h2>ARTICLE X.</h2>
+
+<h3>Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at
+the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the
+necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.</p>
+
+<p>A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring
+states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally
+to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of
+the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations
+allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter
+into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it
+will be an ordinary war.</p>
+
+<p>Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon,
+sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests
+arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on
+the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from
+imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking
+alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish
+something like equality between the strength of the parties.</p>
+
+<p>The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his
+designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had
+alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only
+oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more
+equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 37]</span><a name='Page_37'></a>adding
+to the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the
+subsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different
+states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of
+Europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends.</p>
+
+<p>Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was
+almost impossible to avoid.</p>
+
+<p>France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of
+the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of
+the Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets
+they would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd
+calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France
+miraculously escaped.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has
+voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable
+wars,&mdash;with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case
+he expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of
+Turkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so
+that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been
+generally supposed.</p>
+
+<p>It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made
+against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary,
+and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in
+opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For
+instance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and
+Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with
+Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter
+contests belong to ordinary wars.</p>
+
+<p>It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if
+possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more
+prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them,
+until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule,
+however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the
+localities, the possibility <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 38]</span><a name='Page_38'></a>of finding allies to restore, in a measure,
+equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will
+influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
+noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_II'></a><h2>CHAPTER II.</h2>
+
+<h3>MILITARY POLICY.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
+the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
+political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
+there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
+war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
+include these under the head of <i>Military Policy</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
+projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
+and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
+assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
+without deviating from my intention,&mdash;which is, not to give a treatise
+on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
+fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
+their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
+or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
+and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
+of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
+operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
+force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
+statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
+resources and obstacles of every kind likely <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 39]</span><a name='Page_39'></a>to be met with, all of
+which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.</p>
+
+<p>There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
+should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and
+that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the
+arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points
+which ought to guide in this sort of combinations.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Military Statistics and Geography.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
+possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy
+with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
+topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all
+the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the
+examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in
+the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the
+country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his
+chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of
+cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day,
+despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical,
+diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two
+examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the
+Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and
+forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the
+declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with
+their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
+sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.</p>
+
+<p>The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the
+interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,&mdash;whereas there is no
+district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding
+it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 40]</span><a name='Page_40'></a>All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to
+the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was
+given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable
+barrier and the palladium of the empire,&mdash;an error which I, having lived
+in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply
+rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of
+which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and
+would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
+that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in
+the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities
+more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects
+of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old
+system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the
+empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
+multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a
+national defense.</p>
+
+<p>Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography
+and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in
+treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon
+them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not
+fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he
+represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
+Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
+with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and
+1809.</p>
+
+<p>But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the
+European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for
+instruction in them,&mdash;at least for the special staff school. Awaiting
+the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and
+unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and
+strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of
+topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the
+excellent charts published in all European countries within the last
+twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topo<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 41]</span><a name='Page_41'></a>graphy was
+in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
+works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian
+staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
+charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and
+Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise
+to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.</p>
+
+<p>Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
+vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
+navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by
+a state,&mdash;which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan
+operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
+subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
+enterprises.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
+enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts
+to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this
+point under the head of national wars.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his
+own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he
+endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike
+susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary
+with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has
+been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and
+of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and
+those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of
+their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
+miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
+different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who
+inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of
+electrifying an army and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 42]</span><a name='Page_42'></a>conducing to victory. Some dispute the
+advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in
+battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
+impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in
+maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it,
+disorder easily results.</p>
+
+<p>The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the
+armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to
+rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value
+of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared
+with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly
+organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against
+undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave
+may be its individuals.<a name='FNanchor_1_1'></a><a href='#Footnote_1_1'><sup>[1]</sup></a> Concert in action makes strength; order
+produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without
+discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would
+not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and
+nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt
+with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a
+Napoleon.</p>
+
+<p>The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences
+the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are
+tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match
+for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal.</p>
+
+<p>As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of
+victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals
+have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make
+a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the
+hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general
+had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
+cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 43]</span><a name='Page_43'></a>that account to
+deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This
+risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they
+are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to
+apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this
+truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this
+objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in
+providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
+course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
+battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
+accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.</p>
+
+<p>If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it
+will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of
+the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the
+most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately,
+this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank,
+age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as
+the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we
+will devote to it a separate article.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_1_1'></a><a href='#FNanchor_1_1'>[1]</a><div class='note'><p> Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of
+the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication,
+&amp;c., and may&mdash;as in the case of the French in 1812&mdash;make a retreat very
+disastrous.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Military Institutions.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is
+the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a
+general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with
+a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a
+great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be
+combined.</p>
+
+<p>Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. To have a good recruiting-system;</p>
+
+<p>2. A good organization;</p>
+
+<p>8. A well-organized system of national reserves;</p>
+
+<p>4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as
+well as those of a campaign;</p>
+
+<p>5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 44]</span><a name='Page_44'></a>subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the
+formalities of the service;</p>
+
+<p>6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;</p>
+
+<p>7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;</p>
+
+<p>8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
+defensive and offensive arms;</p>
+
+<p>9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
+organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical
+education of its officers;</p>
+
+<p>10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
+administration;</p>
+
+<p>11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the
+principal operations of war;</p>
+
+<p>12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.</p>
+</div>
+<p>To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
+equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of
+battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the
+troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and
+health of veterans.</p>
+
+<p>None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
+inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
+national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in
+fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has
+often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good
+army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and
+instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable
+of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate
+India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive
+love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
+an army capable of executing his great enterprises.</p>
+
+<p>A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
+culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
+standards and its country, instead <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 45]</span><a name='Page_45'></a>of by a different course preparing
+for it success. We are far from saying that a government should
+sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it
+ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the
+prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
+fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case&mdash;which is, unfortunately,
+of too frequent occurrence&mdash;the defect must be supplied by wise
+institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the
+general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of
+national reserves.</p>
+
+<p>There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
+executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
+Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
+Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
+operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle,
+it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form
+of government exercises a great influence in the development of the
+military strength of a nation and the value of its troops.</p>
+
+<p>When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected
+by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and
+penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive,
+whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a
+chief devoted to all the national interests.</p>
+
+<p>The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to
+this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most
+far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war,
+whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at
+some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist
+sudden aggressions.</p>
+
+<p>In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members
+of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus,
+Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the
+institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
+to fall into decay? <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 46]</span><a name='Page_46'></a>Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
+exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and
+their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to
+the more statesmanlike preparations for war?</p>
+
+<p>I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
+sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
+things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
+except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean
+that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in
+a short time,&mdash;that they should never be found unprepared. And the
+wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation
+as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system
+of military policy.</p>
+
+<p>If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
+governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are
+less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a
+formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these
+deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and
+have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength.
+Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list
+of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
+under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
+extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
+themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
+and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which
+overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here
+it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of
+power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the
+true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
+after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public
+Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the
+dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank
+of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that
+countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and
+militarily weaker than <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 47]</span><a name='Page_47'></a>pure monarchies, although in other respects they
+present decided advantages.</p>
+
+<p>It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in
+the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to
+degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies,
+and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly
+resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in
+preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from
+becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors
+useful for the defense of the country.</p>
+
+<p>The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
+possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
+permanent corps d'arm&eacute;e seems to be much preferable. In general terms,
+the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and
+if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable
+elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
+copied from it.</p>
+
+<p>As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service,
+and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the
+promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the
+remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On
+the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be
+suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the
+other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.</p>
+
+<p>The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:
+it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of
+success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau
+and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer
+to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
+cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the
+great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would
+not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a
+very different affair. How many <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 48]</span><a name='Page_48'></a>brave cavalry soldiers have been the
+victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a
+little more trouble to carry than a saber!</p>
+
+<p>The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the
+state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great
+advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the
+offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the
+attention of a provident government.</p>
+
+<p>The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
+revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone
+will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios
+and C&aelig;sars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the
+nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.</p>
+
+<p>The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful
+rapidity.<a name='FNanchor_2_2'></a><a href='#Footnote_2_2'><sup>[2]</sup></a> The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it
+is said the Austrians can now regulate,&mdash;the shrapnel howitzers, which
+throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,&mdash;the Perkins
+steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,&mdash;will
+multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau,
+Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the
+European races.</p>
+
+<p>If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
+inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the
+half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture
+with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be
+obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a
+battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 49]</span><a name='Page_49'></a>We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor,
+and horses also will require the same protection.</p>
+
+<p>While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is,
+however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which
+should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused
+by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.</p>
+
+<p>We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the
+military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The prince should receive an education both political and military.
+He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils
+than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the
+latter himself.</p>
+
+<p>2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his
+first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He
+must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the
+general most capable of directing his armies.</p>
+
+<p>3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
+footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by
+reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and
+discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;
+its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and
+superior if possible.</p>
+
+<p>4. The mat&eacute;riel of war should also be upon the best footing, and
+abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals.
+National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all
+improvements in this mat&eacute;riel made in other countries.</p>
+
+<p>5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
+encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
+military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
+securing for the army men of merit and genius.</p>
+
+<p>6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
+preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should
+be furnished with numerous historical <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 50]</span><a name='Page_50'></a>details of the past, and with all
+statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and
+papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
+of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently
+stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be
+simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret
+department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of
+the corps.</p>
+
+<p>7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
+and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their
+material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the
+strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should
+be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they
+acquit themselves with marked ability.</p>
+
+<p>8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
+entire plan of operations,&mdash;which is always impossible,&mdash;but a system of
+operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well
+as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the
+enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the
+war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the
+country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of
+the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and
+material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring
+into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable
+alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties
+during the war.</p>
+
+<p>10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the
+chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute
+to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great
+in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when
+armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last
+crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well
+organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,&mdash;at least
+for one or two campaigns. If England has proved <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 51]</span><a name='Page_51'></a>that money will procure
+soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and
+honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made
+to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the
+enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which
+cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its
+efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of
+the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that
+France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
+200,000,000 francs<a name='FNanchor_3_3'></a><a href='#Footnote_3_3'><sup>[3]</sup></a> in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while
+meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.</p>
+</div>
+<p>A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very
+badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the
+strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the
+scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy
+combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of
+well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts
+to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of
+sustaining a long war.</p>
+
+<p>A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
+a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron,
+and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This
+result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of
+the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing
+resources to an assailant.</p>
+
+<p>We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are
+not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our
+purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be
+for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and
+localities may make in these relations.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_2_2'></a><a href='#FNanchor_2_2'>[2]</a><div class='note'><p> It will be recollected that the author wrote this many
+years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
+attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which
+he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important
+improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less
+marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no
+civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for
+depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.&mdash;TRANSLATORS.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_3_3'></a><a href='#FNanchor_3_3'>[3]</a><div class='note'><p> There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall
+of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
+efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.</p></div>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 52]</span><a name='Page_52'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XIV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XIV.</h2>
+
+<h3>The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by
+the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain
+that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or
+Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of
+performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would
+be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.</p>
+
+<p>As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more
+fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince,
+(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will
+only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other
+respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who
+is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he
+is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much
+by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public
+resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
+accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be
+devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
+enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the
+execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and
+in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to
+induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and
+the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no
+military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
+influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good
+results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will
+present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience
+necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his
+judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and
+opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
+if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
+accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 53]</span><a name='Page_53'></a>on the
+contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his
+presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to
+great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its
+communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad
+results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at
+head-quarters!</p>
+
+<p>When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
+armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
+direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the
+Prussian government with Bl&uuml;cher,&mdash;viz.; he should be accompanied by two
+generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability,
+the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be
+harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army
+of Silesia in 1813.</p>
+
+<p>The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
+proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has
+frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred
+that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser,
+who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
+the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward
+with the Duke of Burgundy and Vend&ocirc;me at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
+think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is
+deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known
+that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity
+than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret
+authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and
+allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill
+and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.</p>
+
+<p>If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles,
+he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
+selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same
+titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of
+the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in
+execution; but <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 54]</span><a name='Page_54'></a>in no case will it be wise to invest either of these
+counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.</p>
+
+<p>We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in
+person, his most important duty will be to have the position of
+commander well filled,&mdash;which, unfortunately, is not always done.
+Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the
+more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
+Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the
+ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After
+Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of
+Turenne, Cond&eacute;, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont
+succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
+Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for
+mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough
+to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational
+nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an
+influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the
+prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
+But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be
+profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will
+be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a
+judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general
+requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
+military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be
+guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper
+influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is
+at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
+the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained
+a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not
+always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the
+government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there
+may not be a single general in Europe who has com<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 55]</span><a name='Page_55'></a>manded in chief. In
+this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better
+than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
+their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
+position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
+Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
+subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
+astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their
+appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by
+appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be
+deceived in his selections.</p>
+
+<p>One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
+realizing the beautiful fiction of F&eacute;n&eacute;lon in Telemachus, by finding a
+faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the
+prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his
+more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in
+reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their
+character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to
+personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
+rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all
+the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed
+so much luster upon the Russian arms.</p>
+
+<p>It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing
+could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a C&aelig;sar, when he was
+ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte
+at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two
+directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public
+sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises
+and the experience of events.</p>
+
+<p>The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
+follow:&mdash;First, <i>A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions</i>;
+Secondly, <i>A physical courage which takes no account of danger</i>. His
+scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned
+characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It
+is not necessary that he <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 56]</span><a name='Page_56'></a>should be a man of vast erudition. His
+knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
+perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
+in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is
+gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others
+instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit
+conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even
+pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
+merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are
+always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
+little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing
+that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the
+glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.</p>
+
+<p>The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to
+assign to the command a general of long experience in service with
+troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little
+experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war
+is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be
+able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment
+against an enemy. Peter the Great, Cond&eacute;, Frederick, and Napoleon are
+instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the
+staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will
+not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that
+he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural
+genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a
+general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of
+conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question
+does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
+negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of
+the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to
+a rational conclusion:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery,
+who has commanded a division or a corps d'arm&eacute;e, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 57]</span><a name='Page_57'></a>will, with equal
+chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one
+arm or special corps.</p>
+
+<p>2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war,
+will be equally fitted for the command.</p>
+
+<p>3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
+commander-in-chief.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the
+requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the
+principles of the art of war.</p>
+</div>
+<p>The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the
+formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may
+advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the
+operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of
+organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction
+into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.</p>
+
+<p>Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
+thought it would lead to the &quot;right shoulder forward&quot; of General
+Ruchel,<a name='FNanchor_4_4'></a><a href='#Footnote_4_4'><sup>[4]</sup></a> and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible
+rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step
+from the sublime to the ridiculous!</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and
+his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man
+of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice
+of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a
+general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit
+him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;
+for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
+fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The
+best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of
+several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.</p>
+
+<p>It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 58]</span><a name='Page_58'></a>that frequent
+councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
+weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if
+the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find
+in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of
+the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
+expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
+originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
+which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his
+own conception?</p>
+
+<p>I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and
+no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than
+myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is
+absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military
+officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
+accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount
+of dissent.</p>
+
+<p>What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
+proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
+maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
+them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
+difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting
+them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
+executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved
+failures?</p>
+
+<p>In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be
+useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case
+they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition,
+may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use
+every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only
+advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply
+consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this
+harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce
+unfortunate results.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 59]</span><a name='Page_59'></a>Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of
+organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by
+experience, is&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
+and of unshaken firmness in danger.</p>
+
+<p>2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
+faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
+harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
+the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Bl&uuml;cher,
+aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
+not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
+is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
+a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
+general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.</p></div>
+
+<p>Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
+influencing military operations&mdash;viz.: that of a council of war at the
+seat of government&mdash;deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
+from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
+from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
+saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
+repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
+fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
+individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
+war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
+duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
+but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
+opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
+decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
+connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
+operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
+campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
+battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
+determine the object of the campaign, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 60]</span><a name='Page_60'></a>the nature of the operations,
+whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
+these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
+levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
+it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
+ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
+limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
+to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
+the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
+unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
+responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
+who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
+directing the army,&mdash;a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
+scene of operations.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_4_4'></a><a href='#FNanchor_4_4'>[4]</a><div class='note'><p> General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
+save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
+order to form an oblique line.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XV.</h2>
+
+<h3>The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
+would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
+military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
+situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
+that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
+decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
+habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
+or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
+virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
+Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
+virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
+as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
+the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
+whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
+neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
+industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
+should always <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 61]</span><a name='Page_61'></a>be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
+strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
+heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
+whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
+death in the footsteps of the C&aelig;sars than to fatten upon the public
+miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
+Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
+tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
+estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
+health, or fortune to the defense of his country.</p>
+
+<p>The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
+with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
+to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
+in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
+government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
+qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
+institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
+worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
+contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
+against the employment of officers of the army in other public
+functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
+offices of administration.<a name='FNanchor_5_5'></a><a href='#Footnote_5_5'><sup>[5]</sup></a> It is true that many public employments
+demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
+abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
+prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
+of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
+retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
+it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
+lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
+in the theaters and public clubs?</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 62]</span><a name='Page_62'></a>It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
+the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
+military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
+to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
+early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
+bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
+that they were to die by their standards. Even the English&mdash;so jealous
+of their rights&mdash;contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
+the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
+twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
+in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
+advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
+where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
+the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
+military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
+employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
+spirit,&mdash;particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
+comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.</p>
+
+<p>However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
+government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
+order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
+the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
+insult and dependency.</p>
+
+<p>It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
+but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
+what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
+regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
+wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.</p>
+
+<p>The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
+different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
+the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
+temporary character,&mdash;of a political or religious nature, for instance,
+or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
+skill of the commander and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 63]</span><a name='Page_63'></a>resulting from military institutions, is
+more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
+object of the attention of every far-seeing government.<a name='FNanchor_6_6'></a><a href='#Footnote_6_6'><sup>[6]</sup></a> Courage
+should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
+respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
+rather than in external forms only.</p>
+
+<p>The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
+faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
+possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
+more honorable than enthusiasm in success,&mdash;since courage alone is
+necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
+difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
+opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
+with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.</p>
+
+<p>By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
+in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
+their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
+love for great exploits,&mdash;in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
+every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
+punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,&mdash;we may expect to maintain
+a high military spirit.</p>
+
+<p>Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
+formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
+the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
+heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
+lost.</p>
+
+<p>I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
+the enemy, lest the <i>morale</i> of the soldier should be shaken if he
+encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'
+troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
+contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.</p>
+
+<p>The officers and troops must be warned against those <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 64]</span><a name='Page_64'></a>sudden panics
+which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
+by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
+surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
+thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
+Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
+charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
+fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
+panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
+is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
+becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
+maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
+resource but in ignominious flight.</p>
+
+<p>Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
+and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
+it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
+been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
+which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
+pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
+of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
+the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
+more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
+hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
+days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
+vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.</p>
+
+<p>Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
+more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
+who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
+promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.</p>
+
+<p>In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
+The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
+degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
+soldiers, and the excellent dis<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 65]</span><a name='Page_65'></a>ciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
+of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
+the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
+precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
+contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
+most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
+slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
+or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
+rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
+momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
+offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
+the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
+powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
+obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
+There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
+for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
+soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
+when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
+them,&mdash;which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
+exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
+rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
+in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.</p>
+
+<p>It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
+trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
+are purely military.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_5_5'></a><a href='#FNanchor_5_5'>[5]</a><div class='note'><p> For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
+from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
+colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
+most venal deputies will not be those from military life.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_6_6'></a><a href='#FNanchor_6_6'>[6]</a><div class='note'><p> It is particularly important that this spirit should
+pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
+and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_III'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 66]</span><a name='Page_66'></a><h2>CHAPTER III.</h2>
+
+<h3>STRATEGY.</h3>
+
+<h3>DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
+consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
+Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
+We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
+In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
+when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
+importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
+necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
+ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
+and handling of a great army.</p>
+
+<p>We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
+commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
+character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
+and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
+consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.</p>
+
+<p>The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
+of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
+select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
+temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
+namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
+opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
+operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
+temporary positions which the corps d'arm&eacute;e will occupy <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 67]</span><a name='Page_67'></a>upon this front
+of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.</p>
+
+<p>When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
+resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
+him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
+lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
+degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
+confounded.</p>
+
+<p>To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
+lines of supply, depots, &amp;c. will be established.</p>
+
+<p>If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
+annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
+dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
+be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
+be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
+result.</p>
+
+<p>The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
+enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
+be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
+point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
+point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
+commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
+detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
+strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
+less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
+leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
+thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.</p>
+
+<p>If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
+it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
+important objective point.</p>
+
+<p>If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
+intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
+occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
+strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
+also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
+streams, it will <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 68]</span><a name='Page_68'></a>construct <i>t&ecirc;tes de pont</i>; and, if the bridges are
+within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
+means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
+strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.</p>
+
+<p>Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
+order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
+equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
+and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.</p>
+
+<p>When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
+field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
+is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
+campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
+differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
+activity and energy to attain prompt success.</p>
+
+<p>Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
+while discussing combinations which result from these operations.</p>
+
+<p>Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
+different combinations of which it admits.</p>
+
+<p>2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
+the most favorable direction for operations.</p>
+
+<p>3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.</p>
+
+<p>5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.</p>
+
+<p>6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
+strategic front.</p>
+
+<p>7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
+maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.</p>
+
+<p>8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.</p>
+
+<p>9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 69]</span><a name='Page_69'></a>10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
+army.</p>
+
+<p>11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
+as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.</p>
+
+<p>12. Points for intrenched camps, <i>t&eacute;tes de pont,</i> &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.</p>
+</div>
+<p>These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
+first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
+nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
+disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
+belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.</p>
+
+<p>The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
+formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
+the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
+and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
+execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.</p>
+
+<p>To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
+comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
+posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
+ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
+ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
+extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
+comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
+strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
+the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
+and the employment of the troops.</p>
+
+<p>It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
+and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
+the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
+pitched battles the above definition holds good.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 70]</span><a name='Page_70'></a>Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
+following objects:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.</p>
+
+<p>2. The offensive in a defensive battle.</p>
+
+<p>3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
+attack of the enemy's line.</p>
+
+<p>4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.</p>
+
+<p>5. Surprises of armies in the open field.</p>
+
+<p>6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.</p>
+
+<p>7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.</p>
+
+<p>8. <i>Coups de main</i>.</p>
+</div>
+<p>All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
+skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
+any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
+regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.</h3>
+
+<p>It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
+the operations of war,&mdash;a principle which must be followed in all good
+combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
+upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
+communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
+one's own.</p>
+
+<p>2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
+one's forces.</p>
+
+<p>3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
+decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
+the first importance to overthrow.</p>
+
+<p>4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
+decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
+energy.</p></div>
+
+<p>This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
+objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 71]</span><a name='Page_71'></a>mass of the
+forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
+recognizing those points.</p>
+
+<p>This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
+enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
+necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article
+XIX.</a> these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
+<a href='#ARTICLE_XVIII'>XVIII.</a> to <a href='#ARTICLE_XXII'>XXII.</a> will be discussed their relations to the different
+combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
+there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
+problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
+strategy.</p>
+
+<p>The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
+zones,&mdash;the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
+operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
+line of battle, has the same subdivisions,&mdash;two extremities and the
+center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
+the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
+remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
+wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
+with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
+will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
+question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
+to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
+simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
+giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
+strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
+talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
+to carry out any combinations previously arranged.</p>
+
+<p>We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
+and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
+campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
+the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
+the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='OF_STRATEGIC_COMBINATIONS'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 72]</span><a name='Page_72'></a><h2>OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.</h2>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XVI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XVI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of the System of Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
+shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
+by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
+great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
+attacked, it is an <i>invasion</i>; if a province only, or a line of defense
+of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
+if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is
+confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
+<i>initiative</i>. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
+always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
+assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
+diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the <i>morale</i> of his army, and
+generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
+excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,&mdash;particularly when he
+feels that the independence of his country is threatened.</p>
+
+<p>In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
+side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
+which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
+the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
+favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
+country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
+generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
+in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
+a speedy termination of the contest.</p>
+
+<p>For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
+<i>initiative</i>, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
+in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throw<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 73]</span><a name='Page_73'></a>ing the masses
+upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
+initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
+desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
+strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
+fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
+where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
+him.</p>
+
+<p>Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
+positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
+taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
+his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.</p>
+
+<p>The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
+obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which
+account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
+about equally balanced.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
+from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
+throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
+defensive before it ends.</p>
+
+<p>A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
+may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
+defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
+The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
+country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
+retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
+obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own
+army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
+seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
+contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
+detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
+his progress.</p>
+
+<p>An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
+inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
+artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
+obstacles in the way of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 74]</span><a name='Page_74'></a>the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
+extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
+the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
+his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
+he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
+the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
+the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
+may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
+advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
+prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
+the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
+the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.</p>
+
+<p>During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was
+the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
+the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
+his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
+opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course
+was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
+suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
+talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
+two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
+the progress of a defensive war.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XVII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XVII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of the Theater of Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
+may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
+to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
+When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
+hemispheres,&mdash;as has happened in contests between France and England
+since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
+and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
+other army. The theater of a con<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 75]</span><a name='Page_75'></a>tinental war between France and Austria
+may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
+German States take part therein.</p>
+
+<p>Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
+theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
+strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
+second case each army will have its own independent theater of
+operations. The <i>theater of operations</i> of an army embraces all the
+territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
+defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
+maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
+danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
+action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
+If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
+operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
+general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
+object.</p>
+
+<p>Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
+or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. Of a fixed base of operations.</p>
+
+<p>2. Of a principal objective point.</p>
+
+<p>3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.</p>
+
+<p>4. Of zones and lines of operations.</p>
+
+<p>5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.</p>
+
+<p>6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<p>7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
+either for the offensive or defensive.</p>
+
+<p>8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
+point and the primary base.</p>
+
+<p>9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.</p></div>
+
+<p>For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
+with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
+starting from Mayence, from the Upper <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 76]</span><a name='Page_76'></a>Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
+Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
+traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
+operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
+concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
+zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.</p>
+
+<p>In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
+point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
+with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.</p>
+
+<p>It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
+<i>par excellence.</i> Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
+move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
+of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
+maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
+excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
+of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.</p>
+
+<p>It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
+to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
+they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
+for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
+points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
+desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
+individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
+the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
+was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
+of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
+defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
+lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
+pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
+separately.</p>
+
+<p>Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
+strategic positions; others have maintained that, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 77]</span><a name='Page_77'></a>on the contrary,
+these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
+that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.</p>
+
+<p>Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
+inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
+Rhetian Alps, said that &quot;an army could pass wherever a man could put his
+foot.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
+united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
+carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
+partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
+heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
+decisive points,&mdash;the junctions of the large valleys.</p>
+
+<p>These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
+that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
+points that admit of discussion.</p>
+
+<p>The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
+the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
+examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
+remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
+general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
+passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
+these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
+a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XVIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XVIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Bases of Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
+obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
+takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
+it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.</p>
+
+<p>The base of operations is most generally that of supply,&mdash;though not
+necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
+a French army upon the Elbe might be sub<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 78]</span><a name='Page_78'></a>sisted from Westphalia or
+Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
+alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
+of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
+be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
+own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
+vast difference between those parts of the country without military
+positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
+other portions where these military resources are found; and these
+latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
+have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
+Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
+beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
+if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
+Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
+upon the Loire.</p>
+
+<p>These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
+first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
+necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
+base on B&eacute;fort or Besan&ccedil;on, on M&eacute;zi&egrave;res or Sedan, as the Russian army
+after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
+established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
+These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
+decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
+country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
+himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
+held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.</p>
+
+<p>The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
+covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
+it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
+favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
+retired.</p>
+
+<p>A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 79]</span><a name='Page_79'></a>of
+sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
+should be a <i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i> upon each of its unfordable streams.</p>
+
+<p>All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
+have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
+that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
+the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
+almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
+affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
+two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
+apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
+unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.</p>
+
+<p>The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
+Operations:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>&quot;The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
+     great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
+     consequently, upon the direction of the bases.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Fig_1'></a><h3>Fig. 1.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig01.png' width='400' height='341' alt='Fig. 1.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>     &quot;If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 80]</span><a name='Page_80'></a>faces more
+     or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
+     may hold one of these faces,&mdash;perhaps two,&mdash;while the enemy
+     occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
+     obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
+     to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
+     theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
+     that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in <a href='#Fig_1'>Fig. 1</a>,
+     <a href='#Page_79'>p. 79</a>. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
+     line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
+     the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
+     Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
+     the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
+     them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
+     faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
+     French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
+     operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
+     D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
+     of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
+     communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>     &quot;The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
+     occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
+     and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
+     by the side A B. The result is well known.</p>
+
+<p>     &quot;The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
+     such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
+     losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
+     bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
+     with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
+     Ulm, and Jena.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Fig_2'></a><h3>Fig. 2.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig02.png' width='400' height='291' alt='Fig. 2.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>     &quot;When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
+     bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
+     closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
+     insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
+     an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
+     defeat: hence it would be an <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 81]</span><a name='Page_81'></a>advantage to force the enemy upon it.
+     The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
+     fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
+     impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
+     the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
+     war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
+     in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
+     the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
+     frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
+     it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
+     Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
+     control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
+     establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
+     since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
+     shortened side,&mdash;as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
+     with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
+     Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
+     Franconia.&quot; </p></div>
+
+
+
+<p>The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
+opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
+French army which enabled the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 82]</span><a name='Page_82'></a>allies to neutralize the immense
+advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
+Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
+Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
+Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
+upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.</p>
+
+<p>If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
+be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
+the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
+operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
+and line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
+in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
+object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
+favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
+double lines of operations with equality of force. (<a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>Art. XXI.</a>) The
+objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
+perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
+which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
+other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
+be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
+sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
+while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,&mdash;as was
+done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
+degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
+thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
+perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
+left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
+enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
+extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
+him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
+having already rejoined him.</p>
+
+<p>In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
+forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
+and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
+extremity of the perpendicular base, and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 83]</span><a name='Page_83'></a>thus intercepted the Prussians
+at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
+being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
+well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
+partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
+<a href='#ARTICLE_XX'>Article XX.</a></p>
+
+<p>Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
+bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
+favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
+as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
+exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
+the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
+favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
+praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
+Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
+Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
+the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
+only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
+line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.</p>
+
+<p>Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
+secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
+many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
+except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
+supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
+notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
+have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
+thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
+the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
+the front farthest <i>from</i> the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
+its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
+base were established upon the coast.</p>
+
+<p>An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
+diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 84]</span><a name='Page_84'></a>same principle,
+viz.: <i>to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
+by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
+retreat.</i></p>
+
+<p>A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
+adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
+or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
+supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
+one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
+disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.</p>
+
+<p>However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
+may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
+your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
+of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
+We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
+given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
+which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
+(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.</p>
+
+<p>Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon
+the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army
+covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and
+Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as
+its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
+would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer,
+or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
+terminated with the first campaign.</p>
+
+<p>Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
+frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or
+temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's
+country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they
+will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIII'>Article XXIII.</a></p>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 85]</span><a name='Page_85'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XIX'></a><h2>ARTICLE XIX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
+Objective Points of Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this
+title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:
+these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value
+from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the
+hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against
+them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally,
+there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
+whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE
+strategic points.</p>
+
+<p>Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance,
+whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the
+presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical
+strategic point.</p>
+
+<p>A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily
+be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated
+operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such
+essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from
+the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by
+some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It
+would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not
+necessarily decisive points.</p>
+
+<p>Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from
+their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided
+as follows,&mdash;viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
+belong to the decisive points<a name='FNanchor_7_7'></a><a href='#Footnote_7_7'><sup>[7]</sup></a> of the theater of war, and those which
+have value merely because they connect two strategic points.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 86]</span><a name='Page_86'></a>To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in
+their relations to maneuvers,&mdash;confining ourselves here to what relates
+to the <i>decisive and objective points</i> of the zone of operations upon
+which enterprises occur.</p>
+
+<p>Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective
+point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater
+of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all
+decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations.
+We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in
+our selection of the second.</p>
+
+<p>I think the name of <i>decisive strategic point</i> should be given to all
+those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the
+result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose
+geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor
+the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense
+are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy
+in importance the first rank among them.</p>
+
+<p>The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first
+are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
+consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the
+case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the
+Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the
+country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the
+Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if
+he give battle parallel to that sea.<a name='FNanchor_8_8'></a><a href='#Footnote_8_8'><sup>[8]</sup></a> Similarly, the valley of the
+Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be
+looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.</p>
+
+<p>Those points the possession of which would give the control of the
+junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of
+communication in a country are also <i>decisive</i> <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 87]</span><a name='Page_87'></a><i>geographic points</i>. For
+instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the
+valleys of the Rhone and Sa&ocirc;ne, and is at the center of communications
+between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
+not be a <i>decisive</i> point unless well fortified or possessing an
+extended camp with <i>t&ecirc;tes de pont</i>. Leipsic is most certainly a
+strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
+communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
+both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,&mdash;if
+a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive
+point.</p>
+
+<p>All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are
+not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and
+government.</p>
+
+<p>In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of
+exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to
+any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the
+importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in
+1800.</p>
+
+<p>The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
+which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.</p>
+
+<p>When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army
+through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth
+or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was
+cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
+support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same
+position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and
+from the army of M&eacute;las in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
+him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since
+this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
+retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
+and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective
+point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of M&eacute;las by the
+Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence
+Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 88]</span><a name='Page_88'></a>decisive points only by reason
+of the march of M&eacute;las upon Nice.</p>
+
+<p>It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
+maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
+operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting
+forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to
+the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of
+forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the
+case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although
+dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.</p>
+
+<p>If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
+decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be
+more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
+separately.</p>
+
+<p>The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. The features of the ground.</p>
+
+<p>2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.</p>
+
+<p>3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.</p>
+</div>
+<p>These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>OBJECTIVE POINTS.</h3>
+
+<p>There are two classes of objective points,&mdash;objective <i>points of
+maneuver</i>, and <i>geographical objective points</i>. A geographical objective
+point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of
+operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support
+for ulterior enterprises. <i>Objective points of maneuver</i>, in
+contradistinction to <i>geographical objectives</i>, derive their importance
+from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile
+masses.</p>
+
+<p>In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point.
+If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the
+hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy
+to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the
+objective point. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 89]</span><a name='Page_89'></a>However, the geographical position of the capital, the
+political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their
+respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the
+art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
+operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to
+occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital,
+the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
+of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
+would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For
+instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
+first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
+second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
+objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain
+possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being
+considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of
+the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first
+line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
+reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be
+to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
+forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the
+river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the
+first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,&mdash;which might be
+attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.</p>
+
+<p>As to the objective points of <i>maneuvers</i>,&mdash;that is, those which relate
+particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile
+forces,&mdash;their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The
+greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in
+some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most
+conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were
+satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of
+an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
+accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile
+army,&mdash;since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no
+organized force to protect them. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 90]</span><a name='Page_90'></a>To detect at a glance the relative
+advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
+concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
+promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
+position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his
+center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
+he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut
+his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
+forces,&mdash;such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
+campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
+best.</p>
+
+<p>When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
+and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
+in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
+not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
+of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
+Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
+advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
+are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
+the adjoining states.</p>
+
+<p>The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
+almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
+in what will be stated in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>Article XXI.</a> in discussing the choice of lines
+of operations.</p>
+
+<p>As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
+upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
+circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
+the two parties.</p>
+
+<p>In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
+be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,&mdash;such
+as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
+In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
+by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
+hostile army, as did Napoleon.</p>
+
+<p>The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
+only object is the siege of Antwerp. For <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 91]</span><a name='Page_91'></a>very different reasons, they
+could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
+hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
+be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
+success.</p>
+
+<p>There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
+determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
+play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
+plans of cabinets. They may be called <i>political objective points</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
+its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
+undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but
+often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great
+errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the
+Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
+operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their
+failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The
+expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799&mdash;likewise due to the
+views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
+Belgium&mdash;was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke
+Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,&mdash;a step quite contrary to the
+interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
+illustrations prove that political objective points should be
+subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
+attained.</p>
+
+<p>This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd
+to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given
+has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective
+points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or
+their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events
+of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will
+be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
+should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in
+other words, by uniting all the strength <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 92]</span><a name='Page_92'></a>of the allies for great
+attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this
+kind are generally included in grand diversions,&mdash;to be treated of in a
+separate article.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_7_7'></a><a href='#FNanchor_7_7'>[7]</a><div class='note'><p> I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,&mdash;since a
+line cannot be a <i>point</i>, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive
+or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that <i>objective</i>
+points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
+expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
+attain.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_8_8'></a><a href='#FNanchor_8_8'>[8]</a><div class='note'><p> This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
+English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing
+to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XX'></a><h2>ARTICLE XX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
+Positions.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble
+each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently
+confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are <i>fronts of
+operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense</i>, and <i>strategic
+positions</i>. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction
+between them and to expose their relations to each other.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.</h3>
+
+<p>When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
+generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
+toward the enemy is called the <i>strategic front</i>. The portion of the
+theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two
+or three marches is called the <i>front of operations</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
+confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.</p>
+
+<p>Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed
+by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the
+other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or
+two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes
+the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.</p>
+
+<p>When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
+the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will
+undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the
+strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line
+of defense may <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 93]</span><a name='Page_93'></a>coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
+Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French,
+and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This
+occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to
+confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not
+necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when
+its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic
+front, but it is never without a front of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
+different terms.</p>
+
+<p>At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations
+extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the
+line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at
+L&ouml;wenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His
+forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose
+strategic positions were interior and central and presented three
+different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
+of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
+the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
+strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
+his operations to these points.</p>
+
+<p>The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
+operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
+Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
+Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
+Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
+positions.</p>
+
+<p>The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
+and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
+operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
+to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
+far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
+direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 94]</span><a name='Page_94'></a>account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
+that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
+parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
+front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
+means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
+thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
+base with two faces. (<a href='#ARTICLE_XVIII'>See Art. XVIII.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
+points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
+the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
+from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
+to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
+Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
+obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
+ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
+be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
+that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
+should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
+upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the
+army the <i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i> of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications
+were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line
+parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown
+back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
+remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena
+and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon
+Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby
+forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.</p>
+
+<p>The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the
+base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days'
+duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by
+important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive
+blows, or to procure for <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 95]</span><a name='Page_95'></a>the army a good line of defense and good
+pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.</p>
+
+<p>It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic
+front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every
+line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an
+example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In
+order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to
+present a double front,&mdash;in the first case, to face the valley of the
+Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.</p>
+
+<p>All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the
+same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require
+a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops
+into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries
+which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception,
+since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy
+could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double
+strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an
+offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always
+dangerous. (<a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVI'>See Article XXXVI.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national
+or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities.
+Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would
+have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country
+and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus,
+Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
+while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>LINES OF DEFENSE.</h3>
+
+<p>Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical
+lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of
+defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as
+the line of a fortified frontier; 2. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 96]</span><a name='Page_96'></a>Eventual lines of defense, which
+relate only to the temporary position of an army.</p>
+
+<p>The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
+well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as
+ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of
+the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the
+practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great
+obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in
+the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine,
+the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of
+defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.</p>
+
+<p>Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and
+every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary
+fortifications, may be regarded as <i>eventual lines of defense</i>, both
+strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress
+of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in
+search of a weaker point,&mdash;in which case the advantage is evidently
+strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
+tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army
+from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
+artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other
+hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should
+fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many
+armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense,
+it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and
+receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.<a name='FNanchor_9_9'></a><a href='#Footnote_9_9'><sup>[9]</sup></a> In
+addition to this, since a position naturally very strong<a name='FNanchor_10_10'></a><a href='#Footnote_10_10'><sup>[10]</sup></a> is
+difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be
+able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the
+outlets. This <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 97]</span><a name='Page_97'></a>happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
+Wurmser in Mantua.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>STRATEGIC POSITIONS.</h3>
+
+<p>There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position
+may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for
+battle.</p>
+
+<p>Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended
+to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
+covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line
+of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
+distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli,
+Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in
+Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
+positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before
+the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar
+in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in
+face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic
+positions,&mdash;for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily
+positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are
+sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements,
+are of this class.</p>
+
+<p>This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
+points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
+observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
+positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position
+of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile
+operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large
+detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying
+strategic positions.</p>
+
+<p>The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts,
+lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a
+multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 98]</span><a name='Page_98'></a>In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with
+the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.</p>
+
+<p>In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of
+defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural
+or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of
+support on the strategic front are called <i>pivots of operations</i>, and
+are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of
+maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of
+operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months.
+In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.</p>
+
+<p>Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
+it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
+fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
+pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of
+Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
+of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
+of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
+support and endures throughout a campaign.</p>
+
+<p>The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
+short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
+it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
+extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
+prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
+point.</p>
+
+<p>The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
+be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
+make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
+short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
+should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
+unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
+a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
+of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
+operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 99]</span><a name='Page_99'></a>have produced the same
+results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
+1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
+have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
+be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
+should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
+intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
+interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
+in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
+a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
+of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
+security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
+rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.</p>
+
+<p>An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
+selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
+concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy
+when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon
+prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of
+Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.</p>
+
+<p>When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
+careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
+called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal
+faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for
+all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an
+attack.</p>
+
+<p>Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point
+upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic
+front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able
+to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in
+rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so
+as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting
+a passage.</p>
+
+<p>For an army entering a country with the purpose either of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 100]</span><a name='Page_100'></a>subjugation
+or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however
+brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of
+defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete
+the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with
+temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (<a href='#ARTICLE_XXIII'>XXIII.</a>)</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_9_9'></a><a href='#FNanchor_9_9'>[9]</a><div class='note'><p> This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
+difference. They are treated of in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVII'>Article XXVII.</a></p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_10_10'></a><a href='#FNanchor_10_10'>[10]</a><div class='note'><p> It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
+positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter
+devoted to Grand Tactics, (<a href='#ARTICLE_XXX'>Article XXX.</a>)</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Zones and Lines of Operations.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war,
+which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object,
+whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For
+example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the
+right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.</p>
+
+<p>A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single <i>line of
+operations</i>, either on account of the configuration of the country, or
+of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein.
+Generally, however, a zone presents several <i>lines of operations</i>,
+depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number
+of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.</p>
+
+<p>It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a
+<i>line of operations</i>,&mdash;though doubtless it may happen that any good road
+in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;
+but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the
+sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real
+line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
+the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would
+not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the
+communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole
+space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.</p>
+
+<p>The term <i>zone of operations</i> is applied to a large fraction of the
+general theater of war; the term <i>lines of operations</i> will designate
+the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army.
+Whether it follow a single or several routes, the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 101]</span><a name='Page_101'></a>term <i>strategic
+lines</i> will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive
+points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
+front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to
+those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive
+points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
+temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. <i>Lines of
+communications</i> designate the practicable routes between the different
+portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone
+of operations.</p>
+
+<p>For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand
+Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and
+another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden,
+Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the
+forces. This zone had three <i>lines of operations</i> leading to Leipsic as
+an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading
+from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;
+the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
+Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte
+from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
+marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be
+said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal
+line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon
+which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned,
+and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.</p>
+
+<p>If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
+combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on
+each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities,
+it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided
+into different classes, according to their relations to the different
+positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field,
+and to the enterprises projected by the commander.</p>
+
+<p><i>Simple lines of operations</i> are those of an army acting from <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 102]</span><a name='Page_102'></a>a
+frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.</p>
+
+<p><i>Double lines of operations</i> are those of two independent armies
+proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies
+which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in
+distance and for long intervals of time.<a name='FNanchor_11_11'></a><a href='#Footnote_11_11'><sup>[11]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p><i>Interior lines of operations</i> are those adopted by one or two armies to
+oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the
+general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in
+a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose
+to them a greater force.<a name='FNanchor_12_12'></a><a href='#Footnote_12_12'><sup>[12]</sup></a> <i>Exterior lines</i> lead to the opposite
+result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time
+on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.</p>
+
+<p><i>Concentric lines of operations</i> are those which depart from
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 103]</span><a name='Page_103'></a>widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance
+of or behind the base.</p>
+
+<p><i>Divergent lines</i> are those by which an army would leave a given point
+to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course,
+necessitate a subdivision of the army.</p>
+
+<p>There are also <i>deep lines</i>, which are simply <i>long lines</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The term <i>maneuver-lines</i> I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
+adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
+confounded with the real <i>lines of operations</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>Secondary lines</i> are those of two armies acting so as to afford each
+other mutual support,&mdash;as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
+secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
+was secondary to that of Barclay.</p>
+
+<p><i>Accidental lines</i> are those brought about by events which change the
+original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
+highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully
+recognized only by a great and active mind.</p>
+
+<p>There may be, in addition, <i>provisional</i> and <i>definitive lines of
+operations</i>. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a
+preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select
+a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the
+class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines
+of operations.</p>
+
+<p>These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
+me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than
+that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter
+has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has
+no lines of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
+armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of
+Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large
+depots are immediately behind the river,&mdash;certainly the safest, nearest,
+and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted.
+These armies will <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 104]</span><a name='Page_104'></a>have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
+will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different
+proposed enterprises.</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will
+extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both
+be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in
+the interval which separates them from it. Even if M&eacute;las<a name='FNanchor_13_13'></a><a href='#Footnote_13_13'><sup>[13]</sup></a> had
+possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have
+been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
+occupied the line of the Po.</p>
+
+<p>2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated
+his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double
+exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided
+his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him
+to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to
+could unite.</p>
+</div>
+<p>Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
+its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than
+when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of
+support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the
+establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of
+operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it
+has no line of operations.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH
+REVOLUTION.</h3>
+
+<p>At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
+Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included
+in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it
+being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed.
+The real theater <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 105]</span><a name='Page_105'></a>extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three
+zones of operations,&mdash;the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue
+to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the
+interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the
+frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.</p>
+
+<p>When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
+union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
+zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in
+Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not
+conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made.
+Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the
+concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion
+of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the
+King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him
+not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon
+France another form of government?</p>
+
+<p>When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the
+French were no longer able to invade. This <i>r&ocirc;le</i> was reserved for the
+allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.</p>
+
+<p>The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
+thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
+leagues and divided into five corps d'arm&eacute;e, and could not make a good
+defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was
+only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
+favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could
+only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the
+Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the
+rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the
+excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this
+plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.</p>
+
+<p>The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family
+reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might
+subject her provinces. For some <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 106]</span><a name='Page_106'></a>reason, difficult to understand,
+Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
+thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the
+Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
+displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them
+than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct
+on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the
+resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field,
+as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During
+the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for
+success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
+anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more
+serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the
+advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions,
+and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately.
+Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
+Grandpr&eacute;,&mdash;that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
+(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Ch&acirc;lons.</p>
+
+<p>The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with
+the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to
+guard every point.</p>
+
+<p>The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
+Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and
+how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin
+of armies.</p>
+
+<p>Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the
+strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of
+a frontier to prevent invasion,&mdash;which was exactly the means of
+rendering invasion upon every point feasible.</p>
+
+<p>I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
+abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater
+from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he
+was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this
+movement, but at<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 107]</span><a name='Page_107'></a>tacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front,
+while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon
+the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely
+in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
+direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
+Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
+to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves
+praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this
+enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the
+extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had
+been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized
+and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a
+few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
+armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of
+the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of
+the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?</p>
+
+<p>Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
+particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince,
+and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of
+the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars
+of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.<a name='FNanchor_14_14'></a><a href='#Footnote_14_14'><sup>[14]</sup></a>
+If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was
+France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had
+risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having
+beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
+Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the
+Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 108]</span><a name='Page_108'></a>Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army
+of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with
+its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It
+is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
+running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the
+duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army
+pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several
+victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on
+a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
+threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies
+of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
+and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon
+the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
+side and Landau on the other.</p>
+
+<p>It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in
+the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they
+should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while
+the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or
+aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this
+army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the
+Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and
+Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?</p>
+
+<p>In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a
+painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of
+this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to
+represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this,
+it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the
+armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and
+the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four
+corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
+divisions, which composed two armies.</p>
+
+<p>These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 109]</span><a name='Page_109'></a>on Brussels,
+as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
+difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
+were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
+difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position
+of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank
+the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of
+the enemy,&mdash;a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to
+great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on
+the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate
+of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon
+the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.</p>
+
+<p>If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
+made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
+month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.</p>
+
+<p>The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
+was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
+battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
+Flanders was covered by the corps d'arm&eacute;e of Clairfayt, and upon the
+left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
+a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
+was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only <i>twelve battalions</i>
+were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
+known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
+Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
+before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
+invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
+central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
+to beat all his large detachments in detail.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
+been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
+this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
+been concentrated there one <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 110]</span><a name='Page_110'></a>hundred battalions and one hundred and
+forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
+diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
+between the sea and two fortresses?</p>
+
+<p>The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
+error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
+Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
+till the 3d of June,&mdash;more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
+opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
+the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
+its left,&mdash;that is, both upon the Meuse,&mdash;the state of affairs would
+have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
+of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
+different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
+center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained
+by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of
+three hundred miles in extent.</p>
+
+<p>In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
+theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,&mdash;which opened a new
+field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this
+campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
+Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
+alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in
+the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre
+and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought
+Pichegru back to Landau.</p>
+
+<p>In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
+1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The
+armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the
+extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794,
+they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the
+Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his
+forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then
+seized the instant when the Danube <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 111]</span><a name='Page_111'></a>covered the corps of Latour, to
+steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the
+battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
+Moreau to retreat.</p>
+
+<p>Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is
+to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the
+battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic
+lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable
+army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits
+the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The
+lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons
+every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the
+first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
+upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and
+is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to
+keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these
+lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and
+Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back
+upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges
+of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to
+take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.</p>
+
+<p>In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
+two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and
+the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the
+center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia,
+being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. <i>The three
+armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn</i>, eighty
+leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he
+unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the
+army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern
+Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of
+following up their success on this central line, which cost them so
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 112]</span><a name='Page_112'></a>dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the
+Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the
+other trifles at Manheim.</p>
+
+<p>In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves
+thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the
+Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force
+is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples
+returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic
+direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central
+position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
+and beats it, while some leagues from the other.</p>
+
+<p>In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
+changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
+operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
+of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the
+Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
+similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines,
+affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt
+an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate.
+By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts
+off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving
+its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which
+forms its secondary line.</p>
+
+<p><a href='#Fig_3'>Fig. 3</a> demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of
+the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
+armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
+M&eacute;las; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
+Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
+operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
+M&eacute;las; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
+may thus be seen that M&eacute;las is cut off from his base, and that, on the
+contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
+communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 113]</span><a name='Page_113'></a>
+<a name='Fig_3'></a><h3>Fig. 3.</h3>
+<h3>THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.</h3>
+<h4>To illustrate Maxim 3 on the direction of Lines of Operations.</h4>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig03.png' width='500' height='506' alt='Fig. 3.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 8em; margin-right: 8em;">
+<p>The French army moves from its base on the Main, concentrates in <i>g g</i>,
+behind the mountains of Franconia; then it executes a change of stratigic
+front (<i>h i</i>) in order to cut off the Prussians (<i>k k</i> from their base on
+the Elbe, still preserving its own communications (<i>h g e</i>).</p>
+
+<p>If the Prussians throw themselves between <i>k</i> and <i>e</i>, they open to the
+French their direct communications with the Rhine (<i>m m m</i>).</p></div>
+
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 114]</span><a name='Page_114'></a>
+The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
+importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
+operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
+defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his
+invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
+campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
+to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
+principle already alluded to,&mdash;viz.: that <i>simple and interior lines
+enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
+important point, a stronger force than the enemy</i>. The student may also
+satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
+this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
+fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.</p>
+<br />
+
+<h3>MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.</h3>
+
+<p>From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
+that of many others, the following maxims result:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
+point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
+choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
+this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
+campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
+1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,&mdash;maneuvers that cannot be too
+much studied by military men.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
+objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
+be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for
+this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first
+operation and the new phases it may develop.</p>
+
+<p>2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
+situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position
+of the hostile masses upon this stra<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 115]</span><a name='Page_115'></a>tegic field. <i>In every case,
+however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the
+extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating
+would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the
+two extremities at the same time</i>.<a name='FNanchor_15_15'></a><a href='#Footnote_15_15'><sup>[15]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide
+his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line
+will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible,
+the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the
+rear of his line of defense or front of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it
+affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that
+by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's
+force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of
+the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost
+without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the
+Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction
+of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
+Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the
+Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of M&eacute;las were still more
+brilliant.</p>
+
+<p>3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained,
+it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the
+assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this
+danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic
+direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to
+the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take
+advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a
+change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)</p>
+
+<p>The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 116]</span><a name='Page_116'></a>most important
+qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by
+these examples.</p>
+
+<p>If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
+Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
+protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the
+Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat
+than M&eacute;las from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points
+of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
+Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of
+regaining the Var or the Valais.</p>
+
+<p>In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had
+there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have
+been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the
+Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he
+placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof,
+which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians
+had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera
+and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,&mdash;the
+excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,&mdash;as well as the two roads
+which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.</p>
+
+<p>4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
+such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large
+coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon
+the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to
+have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the
+principal army.</p>
+
+<p>5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces
+on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more
+advantageous than a double one.</p>
+
+<p>6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either
+from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has
+been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of
+the army to each of his masses.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 117]</span><a name='Page_117'></a>7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to
+exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can
+be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate
+of the campaign.<a name='FNanchor_16_16'></a><a href='#Footnote_16_16'><sup>[16]</sup></a> Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic
+plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the
+adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body
+of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with
+instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as
+much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
+back upon the principal army.</p>
+
+<p>8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of
+force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring
+against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,&mdash;since a
+single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from
+acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
+the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
+respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
+perform.</p>
+
+<p>9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
+maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
+sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
+numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
+space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
+Napoleon at Leipsic.<a name='FNanchor_17_17'></a><a href='#Footnote_17_17'><sup>[17]</sup></a> The second is, that interior lines should not
+be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the
+opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however,
+may be in<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 118]</span><a name='Page_118'></a>curred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as
+to conclude the war,&mdash;when the fate of these secondary bodies would be
+viewed with comparative indifference.</p>
+
+<p>10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
+two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy,
+and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and
+supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the
+armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
+combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their
+junction.</p>
+
+<p>11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
+enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by
+a strategic movement,&mdash;in which case divergent operations would add to
+the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior,
+since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the
+pursued.</p>
+<br />
+
+<p>12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
+operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
+important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
+disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an
+army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
+changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to
+meet unforeseen events.</p>
+
+<p>At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a
+line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would
+have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by
+Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the
+Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one
+of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the
+siege of Olmutz.</p>
+
+<p>In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
+which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
+fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to
+the allies. If Mortier and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 119]</span><a name='Page_119'></a>Marmont could have joined him, and had he
+possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the
+most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.</p>
+
+<p>13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
+character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on
+the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages
+to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like
+Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they
+naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the
+project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle
+become so important that every means should be taken to render them
+impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may
+be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
+figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the
+army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior
+lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G,
+which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the
+result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_4'></a><h3>Fig. 4.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig04.png' width='500' height='192' alt='Fig. 4.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence
+the direction to be given to the lines of operations,
+these latter being naturally dependent upon the former. It
+has already been shown that the greatest advantage that can
+result from a choice of bases is when the frontieres allow it to
+be assumed parallel to the linee of operations of the enemy,
+<a name='Page_120'></a>thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and cutting
+him from his base.</p>
+
+<p>But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive
+point, the line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages
+of the perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen
+by referring to the figure on <a href='#Page_79'>page 79</a>. The army E, having
+the double base A C and C D, if it marched toward F, instead
+of to the right toward G H, woud lose all the strategic advantages
+of its base C D.</p>
+
+<p>The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
+establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army
+as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's
+own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.</p>
+
+<p>15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
+direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the
+principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the
+presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the
+choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the
+advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the
+first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
+certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
+purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
+Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by
+Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,&mdash;viz., that in neither case was there
+the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to
+procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
+Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
+Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy
+was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led
+the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed
+because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
+separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only
+a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at
+Lowicz.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 121]</span><a name='Page_121'></a>When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances
+of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to
+select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the
+position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between
+Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the
+most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this
+question, which is both strategic and tactical.</p>
+
+<p>Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory
+is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the
+directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The
+point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the
+center or one of the flanks of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
+line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the
+dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not
+think of disturbing the bridges.</p>
+
+<p>If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
+concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the
+passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass
+it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the
+bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of
+rivers.</p>
+
+<p>16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be
+noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home
+and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will
+also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or
+the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of
+the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
+rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that
+unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other
+hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more
+dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could
+be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and
+interest. An <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 122]</span><a name='Page_122'></a>army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
+own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
+authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even
+private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.</p>
+
+<p>Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
+assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert
+regions, particularly when the people are not united against the
+invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a
+thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about
+the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every
+thing else must be carried by the army,&mdash;thus infinitely increasing the
+embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
+dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of
+Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and
+actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.</p>
+
+<p>17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much
+insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is
+that on each side of the line of operations the country should be
+cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:
+otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is
+everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the
+rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the
+people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by
+diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy
+could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
+compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of
+taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in
+recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not
+contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
+when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the
+Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the
+Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of M&eacute;las? Did not Eugene march by
+way of Stra<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 123]</span><a name='Page_123'></a>della and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon
+the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<h3>OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES&mdash;WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.</h3>
+
+<p>Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
+definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
+and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
+themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
+the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
+principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
+admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot
+disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
+principles.</p>
+
+<p>In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
+famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
+event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe
+in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional
+cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of
+opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from
+overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to
+establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in
+case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines
+of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and
+arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment.
+Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Bl&uuml;cher, Bernadotte, and
+Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior
+army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed
+its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not
+upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are
+doubly in my favor.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
+Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
+Katzbach, and Dennewitz,&mdash;in a <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 124]</span><a name='Page_124'></a>word, to faults of execution, entirely
+foreign to the principles in question.</p>
+
+<p>What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with
+the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain
+on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the
+decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of
+an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole
+army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies
+are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the
+army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.</p>
+
+<p>If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the
+allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have
+threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this
+error may be added a fault quite as great,&mdash;that of fighting decisive
+battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach
+his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for
+Bl&uuml;cher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
+movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over
+torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet
+Bl&uuml;cher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed
+up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based
+upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line
+of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study
+of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he
+knew how to apply this system.</p>
+
+<p>There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
+injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in
+Saxony,&mdash;viz.: <i>that his front of operations was outflanked on the
+right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the
+frontiers of Bohemia</i>. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central
+position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them.
+When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
+Prussia, and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 125]</span><a name='Page_125'></a>France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile
+enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;
+but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of
+operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as
+much in favor of as against it,&mdash;which was by no means the case in 1813,
+either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
+forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at
+Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of
+destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these
+officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
+Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can
+be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army
+which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere,
+shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
+with being bodies of observation?<a name='FNanchor_18_18'></a><a href='#Footnote_18_18'><sup>[18]</sup></a> In this case it is the enemy who
+applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
+in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
+the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of
+these maxims.</p>
+
+<p>The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic
+question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions
+founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses
+its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with
+Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of
+the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer
+in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred
+thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of
+thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
+successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong
+against <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 126]</span><a name='Page_126'></a>three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and
+for several good reasons:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to
+bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of
+one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily
+resist a much larger force.</p>
+
+<p>2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand
+men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with
+one of the other armies.</p>
+
+<p>3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a
+quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> of every kind,
+that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts
+from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the
+impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to
+support such numbers.</p>
+
+<p>4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
+check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
+very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
+magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will
+probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the
+advantages gained by the principal army.</p>
+</div>
+<p>I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric
+system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and
+to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
+principles.</p>
+
+<p>Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:
+all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric
+lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a
+given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately
+destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the
+maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of
+1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
+operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
+closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 127]</span><a name='Page_127'></a>pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric
+directions to disperse the defeated army.<a name='FNanchor_19_19'></a><a href='#Footnote_19_19'><sup>[19]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
+they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be
+sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the
+efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately
+by a stronger enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
+most pernicious,&mdash;which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
+principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
+and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base
+to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines
+and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union
+before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case
+with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.</p>
+
+<p>In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
+than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
+What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
+Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
+Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
+be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
+city,&mdash;one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Bl&uuml;cher and Wellington,
+taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and
+the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
+principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.</p>
+
+<p>Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not
+in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
+to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
+were applied by C&aelig;sar, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 128]</span><a name='Page_128'></a>Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
+Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
+out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
+applications.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_11_11'></a><a href='#FNanchor_11_11'>[11]</a><div class='note'><p> This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
+rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
+</p><p>
+In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
+<i>maneuver-lines</i>, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
+routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
+routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
+different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
+lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
+armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
+double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
+starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
+other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
+a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
+designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
+them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
+corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
+enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
+accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
+radii, but the operation was not double.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_12_12'></a><a href='#FNanchor_12_12'>[12]</a><div class='note'><p> Some German writers have said that I confound central
+positions with the line of operations,&mdash;in which assertion they are
+mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
+masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
+are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
+done better to use the term <i>radii of operations</i> to express the idea of
+double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
+theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
+all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_13_13'></a><a href='#FNanchor_13_13'>[13]</a><div class='note'><p> This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
+for M&eacute;las, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
+unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication
+by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to
+cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_14_14'></a><a href='#FNanchor_14_14'>[14]</a><div class='note'><p> The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
+Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
+French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he
+had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that
+the capital was at his head-quarters.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_15_15'></a><a href='#FNanchor_15_15'>[15]</a><div class='note'><p> The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively
+upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their <i>morale</i>,
+and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_16_16'></a><a href='#FNanchor_16_16'>[16]</a><div class='note'><p> When the fractions of an army are separated from the main
+body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended
+to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic
+positions, and not lines of operations.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_17_17'></a><a href='#FNanchor_17_17'>[17]</a><div class='note'><p> In the movements immediately preceding the battle of
+Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of
+operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;
+but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
+lines of operations.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_18_18'></a><a href='#FNanchor_18_18'>[18]</a><div class='note'><p> I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
+combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
+Macdonald might have fought Bl&uuml;cher to advantage if he had better
+understood Napoleon's instructions.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_19_19'></a><a href='#FNanchor_19_19'>[19]</a><div class='note'><p> It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
+concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect
+that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he
+employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for
+example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Strategic Lines.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
+differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to
+define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those
+strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of
+their position and their relation to the features of the country, like
+the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
+Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute
+examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this
+kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The term <i>strategic</i> is also applied to all communications which lead by
+the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to
+another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its
+objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is
+crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those
+only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
+importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line
+of operations of a whole campaign, and these <i>strategic</i> lines, which
+are temporary and change with the operations of the army.</p>
+
+<p>Besides territorial strategic lines, there are <i>strategic lines of
+maneuvers</i>.</p>
+
+<p>An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
+operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between
+the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and
+the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at
+most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior,
+directions,&mdash;while it would have successively perhaps twenty <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 129]</span><a name='Page_129'></a>strategic
+lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
+each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
+operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt,
+according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth
+and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm
+with Nuremberg or Mayence.</p>
+
+<p>It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of
+operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily
+applicable to strategic lines. These may be <i>concentric</i>, to inflict a
+decisive blow, or <i>eccentric</i>, after victory. They are rarely <i>simple</i>,
+since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they
+are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be <i>interior</i> if
+the forces be equal, or <i>exterior</i> in the case of great numerical
+superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes
+be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the
+forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much
+risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the
+important masses.</p>
+
+<p>Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against
+one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
+for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply
+them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves
+mention,&mdash;viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of
+these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations
+exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
+to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;
+but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
+taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line
+of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.</p>
+
+<p>We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army
+was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne
+and Coblentz on Luxembourg <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 130]</span><a name='Page_130'></a>and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp,
+and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack
+by Napoleon on Flanders decided Bl&uuml;cher to receive battle parallel to
+the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
+uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good
+chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
+Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
+maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and
+seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Bl&uuml;cher had but three
+strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht,
+that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army
+near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
+application of interior strategic lines,&mdash;which Napoleon here, perhaps
+for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that
+the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a
+line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a
+<i>strategic line of maneuver</i>, and was interior. It was bold, because he
+exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he
+sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
+principles of war.</p>
+
+<p>A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
+Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right
+to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his
+primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in
+force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose
+intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
+beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing
+this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did
+nothing of this kind,&mdash;either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
+feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,&mdash;and the severe
+losses at Dennewitz were the result.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
+combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
+from the Apennines to Verona. When <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 131]</span><a name='Page_131'></a>he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo
+and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley
+of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
+moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
+There were but three courses open to him,&mdash;to remain in the narrow
+valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser,
+or the last,&mdash;which was sublime, but rash,&mdash;to follow him into the
+valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
+passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to
+hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis
+to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano.
+The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from
+Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a
+<i>strategic line of maneuver</i> still bolder than that of Bl&uuml;cher on Wavre.
+However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at
+the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at
+Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with
+Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
+great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back
+either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
+made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for
+even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
+interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him
+to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois
+from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian
+general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French
+army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
+scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten
+at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had
+advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
+have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon
+him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.</p>
+
+<p>I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 132]</span><a name='Page_132'></a>of time
+and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
+adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
+may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
+line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
+enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
+demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
+is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
+adopted under an urgent necessity.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or
+Strategic Reserves.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
+temporary bases,&mdash;which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as
+his own frontiers. A river with <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i>, and one or two large
+towns secure from a <i>coup de main</i> to cover the depots of the army and
+to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
+excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a
+temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations
+leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a
+good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but,
+she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and
+became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of
+a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation,
+particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten
+in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its
+own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
+temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases,
+and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot
+expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a
+temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic
+reserve,&mdash;which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits
+deserve notice.</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 133]</span><a name='Page_133'></a><h3>STRATEGIC RESERVES.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
+who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
+skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
+always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
+when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army
+has its own, and every corps d'arm&eacute;e or division should not fail to
+provide one.</p>
+
+<p>The reserves of an army are of two kinds,&mdash;those on the battle-field,
+and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the
+latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of
+war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend
+not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and
+the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army
+takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of
+being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve
+between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active
+reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of
+menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to
+form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active
+service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
+instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central
+depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them
+the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and
+adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be
+formed capable of important service.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even
+in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on
+the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
+neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
+alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
+Vienna.</p>
+
+<p>In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 134]</span><a name='Page_134'></a>Mortier used
+them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
+Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
+the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
+decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with
+much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
+thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
+and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her
+interests.</p>
+
+<p>The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
+badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or
+Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
+Prince Hohenlohe and Bl&uuml;cher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.</p>
+
+<p>These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the
+country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the
+double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity,
+of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its
+flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
+whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
+troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
+invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the
+scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the
+frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
+dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new
+levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under
+the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
+indispensable.</p>
+
+<p>The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
+reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line
+of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of
+a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to
+use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much
+as the withdrawal of his good troops.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 135]</span><a name='Page_135'></a>These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
+and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
+reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if
+there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up
+intrenched camps or <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> to protect the depots and to
+increase the strength of their positions.</p>
+
+<p>All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to
+temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable
+if they possess such well-located pivots.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXIV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXIV.</h2>
+
+<h3>The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p><i>By the system of positions</i> is understood the old manner of
+conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies
+at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other
+covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the
+other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war
+from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this
+revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less
+value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the
+French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
+It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this
+system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in
+fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents,
+provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were
+quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
+success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns,
+which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of
+the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they
+threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
+columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at
+first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
+methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack,
+to whom was at<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 136]</span><a name='Page_136'></a>tributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased
+his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose
+an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
+poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried
+the positions.</p>
+
+<p>The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
+The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the
+Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
+Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the
+war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
+Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly
+from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
+different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances,
+and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement
+of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to
+the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.</p>
+
+<p>In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed
+to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
+Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the
+Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of
+interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single
+march.</p>
+
+<p>Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,&mdash;either
+to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it
+better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders
+to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments,
+incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in
+overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when
+Napoleon made his <i>d&eacute;but</i> in Italy. His activity from the beginning
+worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances,
+his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the
+Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His
+march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of
+overcoming <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 137]</span><a name='Page_137'></a>the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
+from the Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
+era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
+adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the
+capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less
+extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies
+of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was
+here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
+corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system
+of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy
+not to meet with his approval.</p>
+
+<p>It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to
+all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there
+can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the
+old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and
+camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the <i>seven weeks'</i> war,&mdash;as
+Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,&mdash;or with those of the three months
+which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till
+its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to
+the relative merits of the two systems.</p>
+
+<p>The system of Napoleon was <i>to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight,
+and then to camp in quiet</i>. He told me that he knew no other method of
+conducting a war than this.</p>
+
+<p>It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his
+personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in
+urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a
+throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare
+to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very
+distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
+without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has
+marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will
+for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
+modified and improved.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 138]</span><a name='Page_138'></a>If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
+humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
+bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun,
+are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian
+hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not
+likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has
+been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,&mdash;viz.: that remoteness is not a
+certain safeguard against invasion,&mdash;that a state to be secure must have
+a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and
+military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then
+the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as
+reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more
+formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more
+necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.</p>
+
+<p>If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,&mdash;if nations, instead
+of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to
+acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political
+equilibrium,&mdash;then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and
+perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale.
+Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men
+return to a mixed system of war,&mdash;a mean between the rapid incursions of
+Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
+then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
+so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an
+active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.</p>
+
+<p>The science of marches now includes more than details, like the
+following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of
+departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and
+the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part
+of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very
+important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations
+of strategy. For instance, the march of Napo<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 139]</span><a name='Page_139'></a>leon by the Saint-Bernard
+to fall upon the communications of M&eacute;las, those made in 1805 by
+Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians,
+the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that
+of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive
+operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account
+of their strategic relations.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great
+principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;
+and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in
+<a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a> What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of
+operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the
+enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena
+were the same maneuvers; and what was Bl&uuml;cher's march at Waterloo but an
+application of interior strategic lines?</p>
+
+<p>From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to
+throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the
+front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the
+principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The
+operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of
+Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.</p>
+
+<p>One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to
+so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest
+strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple
+object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease
+and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it
+is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of
+concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.</p>
+
+<p>This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the
+true test of a great general.</p>
+
+<p>There is another kind of marches, designated as <i>flank marches</i>, which
+deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but
+nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term
+<i>flank marches</i> are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of
+battle in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 140]</span><a name='Page_140'></a>view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate
+operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to
+ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in
+them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a
+strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by
+about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced
+guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there
+could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another.</p>
+
+<p>There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether
+inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations,
+of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as
+to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the
+famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on
+the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies.
+It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the
+author.</p>
+
+<p>The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was
+the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line
+affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank
+movement exposing this line would be a great fault.</p>
+
+<p>In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are
+still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a
+change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of
+the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders
+will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements.</p>
+
+<p>The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so
+was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of
+Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful
+issue is well known.</p>
+
+<p>A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a
+different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz,
+and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 141]</span><a name='Page_141'></a>Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a
+true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed
+by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its
+camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock
+Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick.</p>
+
+<p>In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line
+of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a
+right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were
+not <i>flank marches</i>, because the flank of the column was the real front
+of the line of battle.</p>
+
+<p>The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the
+lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and
+no less successful.</p>
+
+<p>In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not
+strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the
+greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to
+was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the
+battle.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the
+commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be
+supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's
+country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation
+between the commissariat and strategy.</p>
+
+<p>It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted
+their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to
+supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks,
+barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable
+bodies of men in that country. C&aelig;sar said that war should support war,
+and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the
+countries he overran.</p>
+
+<p>The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 142]</span><a name='Page_142'></a>of all kinds,
+and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals,
+Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived
+during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders
+would also be an interesting subject of research.</p>
+
+<p>In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies
+of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them
+large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or
+fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of
+the Ticino and Po.</p>
+
+<p>Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought
+on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were
+established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,
+restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon
+the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the
+number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
+camp.</p>
+
+<p>During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.
+The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in
+the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the
+country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the
+granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and
+Danube, is easy,&mdash;particularly if it marches in a number of columns and
+does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but
+this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite
+impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be
+conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where
+every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This
+system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it
+on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded
+country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the
+local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to
+make them uniform and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 143]</span><a name='Page_143'></a>legal, while he himself should see to their
+fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create
+provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary
+powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points
+most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband
+them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care
+to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them.
+The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the
+supplies to the points occupied by the troops.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to
+undertake without having previously established these depots, as much
+depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of
+the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one
+hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from
+the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of
+country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any
+single operation.</p>
+
+<p>As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which
+time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be
+sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants
+of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain
+at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was
+besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if
+there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.</p>
+
+<p>2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies
+obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the
+wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a
+position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be
+echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of
+communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the
+army, and to extend as much as pos<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 144]</span><a name='Page_144'></a>sible the area from which successive
+supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should
+be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have
+the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations,
+which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two
+real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of
+the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it
+facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single
+point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the
+initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the
+offensive and gained some advantage.</p>
+
+<p>4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its
+most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to
+advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient
+provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its
+lines of depots.</p>
+
+<p>5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in
+their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it
+is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and
+without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under
+these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not
+impossible.</p>
+
+<p>6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but
+it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after
+the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid
+expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should
+consist of the most portable articles,&mdash;as biscuit, rice, &amp;c.: the
+wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of
+roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,
+and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
+vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to
+take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the
+successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry
+with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 145]</span><a name='Page_145'></a>7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of
+supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply
+himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of
+a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications
+with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus
+exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the
+mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army
+advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its
+communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the
+progress of the army.</p>
+
+<p>8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base
+itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its
+ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic
+front opposed to the sea.</p>
+
+<p>9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations
+of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also
+free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise
+necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the
+most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case
+the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
+essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from
+the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior
+flank upon the river,&mdash;which might be as dangerous as if it were the
+sea.</p>
+
+<p>In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for
+transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a
+small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it
+sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,&mdash;which is hazardous, as
+Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages
+of rivers are more substantial.</p>
+
+<p>10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be
+fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous
+countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of
+supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan
+leads to plunder. The <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 146]</span><a name='Page_146'></a>requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;
+and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased
+elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may
+appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in
+his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops
+were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy
+to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it
+would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the
+success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war
+differs from narrow theory.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXVI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXVI.</h2>
+
+<h3>The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.&mdash;Wars of
+Sieges.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;
+secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.</p>
+
+<p>The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate.
+It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great
+natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and
+these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here
+is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the
+Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of
+Erzgebirge, of the B&ouml;hmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and
+of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a
+good system of fortresses.</p>
+
+<p>Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best
+covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of
+Mont-Gen&egrave;vre, and of Mont-Cenis,&mdash;the only ones considered
+practicable,&mdash;were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of
+considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains
+of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these
+difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage
+of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be
+carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other
+route hitherto <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 147]</span><a name='Page_147'></a>deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis
+I.,&mdash;which is so well described by Gaillard,&mdash;Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in
+the remark of Napoleon, <i>that an army can pass wherever a titan can set
+his foot</i>,&mdash;a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man,
+and applied by him with great success.</p>
+
+<p>Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or
+as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so
+well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and
+communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be
+said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long
+as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real
+frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held
+points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of
+Mayence, Luxembourg, and the <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> of Manheim and Wesel on
+the left bank.</p>
+
+<p>If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and
+Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they
+should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they
+permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.</p>
+
+<p>An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from
+Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by
+Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three
+fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some
+poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose
+curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most
+rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of
+&quot;impregnable&quot; was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800,
+1805, and 1809.</p>
+
+<p>The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so
+formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or
+consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number
+of points. We propose to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 148]</span><a name='Page_148'></a>give a set of general maxims equally
+applicable to all cases.</p>
+
+<p>When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to
+make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses,
+requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not
+prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build
+fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation
+of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the
+impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the
+movements of the army which is to repel him.</p>
+
+<p>If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the
+progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels
+the army to detach a part of its force or to make <i>d&eacute;tours</i> in its
+march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to
+the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and,
+finally, is a place of refuge in case of need.</p>
+
+<p>Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;
+and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.</p>
+
+<p>The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in
+the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the
+forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;
+the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege
+which it proposes to cover.</p>
+
+<p>As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same
+degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They
+are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the
+state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe
+in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses
+very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban,
+who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great
+number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point
+are as follow:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 149]</span><a name='Page_149'></a>and
+should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.<a name='FNanchor_20_20'></a><a href='#Footnote_20_20'><sup>[20]</sup></a> There should be
+three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the
+third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would
+require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places.</p>
+
+<p>It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has
+not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon
+only a third of its frontiers, (from Besan&ccedil;on to Dunkirk,) and still has
+not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board
+convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has
+decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that
+there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition
+should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much
+crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence.
+Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from
+Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally
+distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,
+requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this
+is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the
+northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important
+element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is
+bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile,
+place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given
+is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of
+nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending
+from K&ouml;nigsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified
+upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical
+position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number
+of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 150]</span><a name='Page_150'></a>2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points
+already designated in <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a> As to their tactical qualities, their
+sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in
+order to increase the difficulty of blockading them.</p>
+
+<p>3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own
+defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those
+situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,
+and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of
+this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command
+three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for
+instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the
+fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable
+place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:
+so that works of this extent must be few in number.</p>
+
+<p>4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are
+preferable to small ones,&mdash;particularly when the assistance of the
+citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole
+power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and
+Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French
+armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being
+besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against
+France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front
+one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with
+impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points.</p>
+
+<p>5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps,
+and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized
+armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial
+obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the
+true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always
+be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of
+the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to
+pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 151]</span><a name='Page_151'></a>be
+unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon
+the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of
+the nations.</p>
+
+<p>If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in
+the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty
+thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in
+the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.<a name='FNanchor_21_21'></a><a href='#Footnote_21_21'><sup>[21]</sup></a> Such events only
+occur under exceptional circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>6. It may be concluded from what precedes,&mdash;1st, that, while fortified
+places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by
+dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d,
+that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line
+of these forts,&mdash;always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d,
+that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine,
+without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order
+to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army
+may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other
+places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the
+army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege
+are correspondingly diminished.</p>
+
+<p>7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly
+people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an
+enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the
+operations of an army in the field. The fort of K&ouml;nigstein in 1813 was
+as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured
+a <i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i> on the Elbe.</p>
+
+<p>In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value
+to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and
+not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 152]</span><a name='Page_152'></a>of Bard, in the valley
+of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800.</p>
+
+<p>8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses
+as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to
+facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may
+be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots,
+hospitals, &amp;c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any
+small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly
+serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken
+the active army.</p>
+
+<p>9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions
+are a positive misfortune for both the army and state.</p>
+
+<p>10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war,
+except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental
+army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen
+almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on
+K&ouml;nigsberg,&mdash;which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the
+Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had
+supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of
+being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases.</p>
+
+<p>The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of
+two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without
+attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to
+watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other
+it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'arm&eacute;e, under a single
+commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When
+the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry
+on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either
+continue its march or take a position to cover the siege.</p>
+
+<p>Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole
+army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and
+contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 153]</span><a name='Page_153'></a>expense as the
+siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen
+miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French,
+were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough
+to condemn this ridiculous system.</p>
+
+<p>Much as the recital of the immense labors of C&aelig;sar in the investment of
+Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in
+our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary
+for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works
+commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the
+siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at
+Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.</p>
+
+<p>Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and
+pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If
+the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a
+strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might
+arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be
+spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching
+army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not.</p>
+
+<p>Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the
+operations of an army of observation.</p></div>
+<br />
+
+<h3>INTRENCHED LINES.</h3>
+
+<p>Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to
+above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and
+is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is
+intended to protect a part of the frontiers.</p>
+
+<p>As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an
+army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of
+intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent
+closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be
+regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length
+and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance,
+those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 154]</span><a name='Page_154'></a>front,
+supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed
+to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on
+every occasion when they were assailed.</p>
+
+<p>The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same
+part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and
+those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.</p>
+
+<p>The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although
+intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in
+question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well
+they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes
+their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned.
+To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and
+surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is
+manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another
+instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of
+their attack and defense.</p>
+
+<p>It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended
+lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be
+derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging
+force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_20_20'></a><a href='#FNanchor_20_20'>[20]</a><div class='note'><p> The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
+such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles
+of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not
+have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_21_21'></a><a href='#FNanchor_21_21'>[21]</a><div class='note'><p> Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the
+Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the
+Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to
+beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the
+circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the
+principles of war.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXVII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXVII.</h2>
+
+<h3>The Connection of Intrenched Camps and T&ecirc;tes de Ponts with Strategy.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of
+ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,
+or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.
+Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and
+even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford
+an army.</p>
+
+<p>It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
+Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that
+such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in
+1800, enabled Kray to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 155]</span><a name='Page_155'></a>arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on
+the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
+Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country
+between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.</p>
+
+<p>The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
+established on strategic points which should also possess tactical
+advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,
+it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their
+defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.
+Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.</p>
+
+<p>The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
+decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because
+they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these
+camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure
+for an offensive operation, as <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> to assure the crossing
+of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for
+a defeated army.</p>
+
+<p>However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult
+to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of
+Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can
+be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to
+abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden
+was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it
+was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an
+ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps
+within a few days for want of provisions.</p>
+
+<p>Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
+support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even
+when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in
+reverse,&mdash;that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a
+<i>coup de main</i>. It is also important that they be established close to a
+fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of
+the camp nearest to the line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 156]</span><a name='Page_156'></a><i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i>
+on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city
+like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never
+be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
+collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,
+it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the
+open country.</p>
+
+<p>The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
+advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a
+French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost
+when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if
+it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a
+little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
+enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the
+intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but
+several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover
+places or to prevent sieges,&mdash;which appears to me to be a little
+sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place
+when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts
+and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and
+principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a
+temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively
+upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a
+camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply
+to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged
+the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not
+his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think
+so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the
+siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was
+necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by
+reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought
+rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 157]</span><a name='Page_157'></a>The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,
+indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had
+possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not
+been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in
+the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the
+place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a
+fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army
+to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object
+of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in
+Europe is upon such a site?</p>
+
+<p>So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it
+seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these
+camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the
+same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make
+a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to
+cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter.</p>
+
+<p>To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the
+bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal
+danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by
+passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the
+same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the
+other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take
+the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold
+for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy
+for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of
+the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at
+Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if
+Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would
+easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified
+place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would
+fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently
+constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 158]</span><a name='Page_158'></a>This system of the
+Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent
+works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its
+defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense
+advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the
+inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only
+very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to
+the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon
+at Essling,)&mdash;to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions
+and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might
+not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the
+advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the
+same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
+attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were
+upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp
+of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security
+either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary
+fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make
+it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching
+from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein,
+which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult
+of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of
+a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed.</p>
+
+<p>Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke
+Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,&mdash;by masonry towers.
+As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in
+the <i>Spectateur Militaire</i>, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know
+that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis
+appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
+improvements,&mdash;which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that
+the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have
+the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being
+sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well
+flanked and con<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 159]</span><a name='Page_159'></a>nected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
+camp,&mdash;always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines.
+If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by
+field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp
+preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous
+as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
+thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
+commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank,
+some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line
+is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six
+hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a
+palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with
+a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven
+twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those
+towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the <i>d&eacute;blais</i> of which forms
+a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should
+think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire.</p>
+
+<p>Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete
+bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,
+would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a
+quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an
+entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege,
+they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp
+to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large
+army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war
+like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the
+capital.</p>
+
+<p>To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to
+encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built
+seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the
+Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to
+have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the
+Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the
+first rank <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 160]</span><a name='Page_160'></a>and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even
+if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army,
+particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of
+Perlingsberg had been preserved.</p>
+
+<h3>T&Ecirc;TES DE PONTS.</h3>
+
+<p><i>T&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> are the most important of all field-works. The
+difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face
+of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works,
+which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if
+the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which
+may attend a rapid retreat across a large river.</p>
+
+<p><i>T&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> are doubly advantageous when they are as it were
+<i>keeps</i> for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also
+cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they
+will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these
+works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all
+fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the
+principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of
+<i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> is that the best intrenched camps are composed of
+detached and closed works, while <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> usually consist of
+contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must
+be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally
+require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are
+detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.</p>
+
+<p>The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent
+part of this volume.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXVIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXVIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Strategic Operations in Mountains.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under
+four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it
+may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or
+there may be a <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 161]</span><a name='Page_161'></a>line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may
+debouch into large and rich plains.</p>
+
+<p>If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and
+Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries
+the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a
+difficult defile to cross,&mdash;a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome,
+is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once
+crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may
+be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and
+find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed
+is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of
+retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the
+Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this
+nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the
+Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole
+country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province,
+the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of
+mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and
+Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as
+marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary
+obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of
+the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of
+Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss
+for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,
+which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary
+there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though
+not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of
+fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its
+evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the
+Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The
+attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study
+of the most interesting character.</p>
+
+<p>When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,
+is but a zone of operations, the importance of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 162]</span><a name='Page_162'></a>these mountains is
+secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies
+deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be
+otherwise if this be the whole field.</p>
+
+<p>It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave
+control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave
+control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and
+competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that
+the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in
+this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their
+arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on
+Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter
+should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace
+them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult
+for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force
+on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and
+Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand
+men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over
+the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to
+mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,&mdash;as
+Moreau did in 1800.</p>
+
+<p>Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only
+accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of
+operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The
+campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this
+branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out
+their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot
+do better than refer my readers to it.</p>
+
+<p>When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by
+the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of
+the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples,
+we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the
+transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of
+Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying
+the interesting campaigns of the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 163]</span><a name='Page_163'></a>Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and
+Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is
+a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is
+a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided
+on the plains.</p>
+
+<p>I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this
+study.</p>
+
+<p>When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal
+theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely
+based upon maxims applicable in an open country.</p>
+
+<p>Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations
+of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In
+such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small
+number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced
+guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide
+means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate
+these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for
+the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small
+bodies of light troops.</p>
+
+<p>The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the
+larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in
+number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its
+forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct
+attacks to dislodge it.</p>
+
+<p>However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and
+difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the
+contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these
+centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of
+retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it
+would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two
+difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the
+whole army.</p>
+
+<p>If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be
+admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity
+of covering all the outlets by which an <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 164]</span><a name='Page_164'></a>attack in force may be made
+upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal
+marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points.
+In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the
+difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in
+1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the
+hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have
+been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal
+routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to
+Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads
+have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been
+entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from
+which there was but a single outlet.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country
+concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to
+occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be
+easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very
+mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal
+routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the
+enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious
+inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not
+observed.</p>
+
+<p>Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in
+mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we
+attempt simply to give advice in such cases,&mdash;to say nothing of laying
+down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a
+single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five
+converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two
+or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be
+easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the
+construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned
+point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades
+of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the
+army should be <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 165]</span><a name='Page_165'></a>held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in
+position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously
+threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he
+debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of
+the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for
+rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to
+continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the
+general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the
+many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if
+there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which
+are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the
+defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a
+cordon of forts becomes dangerous,&mdash;while it is not easy to adopt a
+better one.</p>
+
+<p>We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration
+of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's
+defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and
+Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had
+enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch,
+and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian
+army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend
+such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great
+valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward
+Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the
+trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of
+the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how
+abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the
+approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the
+Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would
+be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching
+force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the
+masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender
+the keys of the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 166]</span><a name='Page_166'></a>country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an
+inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.</p>
+
+<p>After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it
+seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line
+of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,&mdash;a line shorter
+than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance
+to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into
+Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with
+the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove
+that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense
+in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense,
+because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be
+remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the
+offensive.</p>
+
+<p>General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on
+the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind
+of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he
+might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by
+demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active
+attack,&mdash;which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in
+mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it
+ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he
+sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even
+when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard.
+Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed
+to Wurmser and Alvinzi.</p>
+
+<p>As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading
+the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the
+Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to
+capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the
+presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
+general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the
+Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had
+been, and extricated himself with equal ability. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 167]</span><a name='Page_167'></a>Not less extraordinary
+was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand
+men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand
+allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after
+four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory
+<i>in details</i>, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will
+is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons,
+need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not
+to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I
+say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations
+should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally,
+that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the
+great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great
+mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of
+defending the country?</p>
+
+<p>I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous
+countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a
+national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes
+with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every
+advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always
+necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or
+less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of
+Stanz and of the Tyrol.</p>
+
+<p>The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:
+it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are
+extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.</p>
+
+<p>In the first case there is little more to be done than this,&mdash;viz.: make
+demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the
+enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which
+promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break
+through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the
+defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole
+line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 168]</span><a name='Page_168'></a>the capture of
+Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men
+on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing
+this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show
+that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous
+mountain-ranges can generally be forced.</p>
+
+<p>The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army
+which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between
+Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those
+<i>insurmountable</i> obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him
+it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have
+already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and
+Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it
+inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral
+issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into
+these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army
+toward Turin or Carignano.</p>
+
+<p>When we consider the <i>tactical</i> difficulties of this kind of war, and
+the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to
+regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a
+single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought
+to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In
+my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to
+confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the
+columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six
+roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;
+but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
+routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the
+enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the
+center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to
+divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.</p>
+
+<p>The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 169]</span><a name='Page_169'></a>is a much
+greater and more difficult task than where a d&eacute;nouement may be
+accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of
+battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous
+region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it
+would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
+and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the
+invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or
+three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,
+the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the
+junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
+driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.</p>
+
+<p>Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would
+be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with
+their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple
+number.</p>
+
+<p>To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
+localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,
+would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best
+school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by
+the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my
+History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of
+the Grisons by S&eacute;gur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
+and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the
+passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this
+study.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXIX'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXIX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those
+which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The
+second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of
+country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
+The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea
+by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 170]</span><a name='Page_170'></a>seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes
+the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,
+but where a powerful state is attacked.</p>
+
+<p>As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the
+Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly
+be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of
+these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its
+base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the
+same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of
+defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
+arsenals;&mdash;while in the other case its resources would be upon the
+Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad
+fate of many of these great invasions.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is
+merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own
+interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in
+the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of
+all the armies,&mdash;particularly if he belong to the state which is not a
+principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General
+Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty
+thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the
+mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand
+men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus
+found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity
+of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his
+misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of
+about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
+hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The
+battle of Austerlitz&mdash;due to a fault of Weyrother&mdash;endangered the
+Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became
+the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the
+opportunity of regaining its own country.</p>
+
+<p>The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the
+expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 171]</span><a name='Page_171'></a>Bergen in
+Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander
+under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less
+disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
+communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in
+no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of
+the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
+abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
+allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political
+ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension
+which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have
+been cited in <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a>, on political objective points.</p>
+
+<p>History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
+across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with
+forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were
+necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to
+the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran
+empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery
+and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly
+since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
+together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining
+each other, no such events have taken place.</p>
+
+<p>Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
+Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of
+Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
+scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of
+Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;
+for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in
+Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the
+Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,
+besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no
+one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
+from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be
+imitated.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 172]</span><a name='Page_172'></a>Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
+invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the
+same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from
+these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of
+operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones
+applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,
+although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,
+although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His
+care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
+Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
+Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he
+had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself
+safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply
+on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.</p>
+
+<p>If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
+precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
+troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at
+Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was
+unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which
+that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do
+not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the
+conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;
+although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place
+immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised
+distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.
+Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to
+know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
+wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been
+possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having
+previously defeated the Russian army.</p>
+
+<p>It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
+Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a <i>d&eacute;nouement</i>
+between Wilna and the Dwina. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 173]</span><a name='Page_173'></a>Although he fully appreciated the bravery
+of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the
+people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and
+sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have
+given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,
+he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and
+enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the
+greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.</p>
+
+<p>The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point
+for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is &quot;never
+to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance
+of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a
+proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which
+may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of
+resuming the offensive.&quot; As to the precautions to be observed in these
+operations, the reader is referred to Articles <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>XXI.</a> and <a href='#ARTICLE_XXII'>XXII.</a>, on the
+safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual
+bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to
+these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,
+seasons, and countries,&mdash;in short, accuracy in calculation and
+moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried
+too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can
+insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
+or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
+ruined nations and armies.</p>
+
+<p>Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been
+rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in
+date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the
+sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,
+has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,
+but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.</p>
+
+<p>It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now
+is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest
+of Greece, followed by four <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 174]</span><a name='Page_174'></a>thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
+Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
+fleet coasted the shore.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that
+the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
+immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.
+Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress
+depends upon the winds,&mdash;which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind
+of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare
+occurrence.</p>
+
+<p>The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
+operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are
+the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations
+of war.</p>
+
+<p>Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,
+are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking
+Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon
+the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the
+Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
+Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going
+as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable
+troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all
+be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be
+undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in
+view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.
+Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions
+as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in
+<a href='#ARTICLE_VI'>Article VI.</a>, there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not
+be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of
+policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
+day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,
+and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
+strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
+co-operation cannot be obtained.</p>
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 175]</span><a name='Page_175'></a><a name='EPITOME_OF_STRATEGY'></a><h2>EPITOME OF STRATEGY</h2>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
+by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
+enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
+definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
+operations in war, <i>strategy</i> fixes the direction of movements, and that
+we depend upon <i>tactics</i> for their execution. Therefore, before treating
+of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
+of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
+which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.</p>
+
+<p>By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
+be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
+a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.</p>
+
+<p>From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
+manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
+of operations is found in what follows:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
+reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
+accordance with <a href='#ARTICLE_XVIII'>Article XVIII.</a></p>
+
+<p>2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
+field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
+with the least risk to one's self.</p>
+
+<p>3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
+operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
+Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
+retreats parallel to the frontiers.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 176]</span><a name='Page_176'></a>On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
+of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
+extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
+successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
+upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
+by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
+presented in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>Article XXI.</a></p>
+
+<p>4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
+such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
+forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from
+affording each other mutual support.</p>
+
+<p>5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic
+positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important
+strategic points of the theater of war.</p>
+
+<p>6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
+activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may
+be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of
+the hostile army.</p>
+
+<p>The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
+army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the
+enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will
+be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive
+strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to
+the enemy can be given.</p>
+
+<p>However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
+course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
+attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and
+successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,
+thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and
+continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of
+gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.</p></div>
+
+<p>The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
+satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 177]</span><a name='Page_177'></a>1793, already
+mentioned in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIV'>Article XXIV.</a>, and the details of which may be found in
+Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty
+battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and
+Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four
+victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been
+found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive
+strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the
+Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon
+the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the
+most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
+pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
+principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most
+decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.
+The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.</p>
+
+<p>It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be
+able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of
+war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own
+country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and
+of <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i>, and by the opening of communications in the great
+decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of
+the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines
+and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has
+afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and
+Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from
+the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by
+different fortified places projected or completed.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_IV'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 178]</span><a name='Page_178'></a><h2>CHAPTER IV.</h2>
+
+<h3>GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great
+questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to
+the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,
+the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and
+fortune, gains victories.</p>
+
+<p>Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to
+battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in
+tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of
+the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that
+point the possession of which promises the most important results.</p>
+
+<p>Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
+features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have
+been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched
+battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that
+a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same
+character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.</p>
+
+<p>The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which
+are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the
+order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the
+plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,
+the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers
+subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the
+proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
+superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and
+the manner of handling these arms; but it is the <i>morale</i> of armies, as
+well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and
+their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting
+that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot
+result <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 179]</span><a name='Page_179'></a>in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few
+brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
+before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his
+position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the
+maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.
+As is evident from <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXII'>Article XXXII.</a>, I by no means intend to discourage
+the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of
+it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and
+opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's
+design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the
+same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
+tactical combinations to accomplish it.</p>
+
+<p>There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those
+fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's
+attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in
+position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the
+collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in
+succession the different combinations they present.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXX'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Positions and Defensive Battles.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line
+of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this
+work, it will appear that I make a distinction between <i>lines of battle</i>
+and <i>orders of battle</i>,&mdash;things which have been constantly confounded. I
+will designate as a <i>line of battle</i> the position occupied by
+battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will
+take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will
+await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is
+the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical
+intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully
+explained in <a href='#ARTICLE_XLIII'>Article XLIII.</a> On the contrary, I will designate as an
+<i>order of </i><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 180]</span><a name='Page_180'></a><i>battle</i> an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
+execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
+oblique order, the perpendicular order.</p>
+
+<p>This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
+distinction between two things which should by no means be
+confounded.<a name='FNanchor_22_22'></a><a href='#Footnote_22_22'><sup>[22]</sup></a> From the nature of the two things, it is evident that
+the <i>line of battle</i> belongs especially to defensive arrangements;
+because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will
+be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of
+battle. <i>Order of battle</i>, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
+troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
+maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
+offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the
+line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of
+troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a
+position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or
+any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.</p>
+
+<p>Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of
+positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a
+favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the
+purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be
+taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such
+as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls
+the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.</p>
+
+<p>There are two kinds of positions,&mdash;the <i>strategic</i>, which has <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 181]</span><a name='Page_181'></a>been
+discussed in <a href='#ARTICLE_XX'>Article XX.</a>, and the <i>tactical</i>. The latter, again, are
+subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied
+to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,&mdash;in a
+word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have
+been treated in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVII'>Article XXVII.</a>, and their attack and defense are
+discussed in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXV'>Article XXXV.</a> Secondly, we have positions naturally strong,
+where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third
+and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the
+defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary
+according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance
+not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
+extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep
+and difficult of access,&mdash;quite suitable places, probably, for temporary
+camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this
+kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of
+access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it,
+should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops
+forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles
+presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy
+than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in
+taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error
+if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was
+exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason,
+Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a
+good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach
+were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,
+rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
+battle-ground.</p>
+
+<p>The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are
+the following:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
+     easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to
+     approach the line of battle.</p>
+
+<p>     2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.</p>
+
+<p>     3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the move<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 182]</span><a name='Page_182'></a>ments of
+     troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point
+     deemed the proper one.</p>
+
+<p>     4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements.</p>
+
+<p>     5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>     6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or
+     artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon
+     their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or
+     at least some point of the front.</p>
+
+<p>     This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on
+     a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest
+     reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the
+     broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed
+     to afford perfect protection. This danger&mdash;about which there can be
+     no doubt&mdash;gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy
+     defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable
+     obstacles.<a name='FNanchor_23_23'></a><a href='#Footnote_23_23'><sup>[23]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>     7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by
+     throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
+     crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may
+     cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
+     the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
+     the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
+     required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground
+     must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
+     details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
+     Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)</p>
+<br />
+
+<p>     8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
+     flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 183]</span><a name='Page_183'></a>on other
+     points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack
+     upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most
+     advantageous for defense,&mdash;as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.
+     Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest
+     accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
+     insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack
+     Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.</p>
+
+<p>     When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
+     hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
+     order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
+     idle spectators of it. </p></div>
+
+<p>The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
+palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is
+to <i>know</i> how to take the offensive at a proper time, and <i>to take it</i>.
+Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been
+mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us
+to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
+Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road
+behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as
+Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that
+such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely
+open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure
+to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a
+portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,
+in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
+part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain.
+There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a
+forest,&mdash;this statement being made upon the supposition that there are
+at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for
+retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press
+too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank
+movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest,
+as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if,
+as at Waterloo, the forest formed a con<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 184]</span><a name='Page_184'></a>cave line behind the center; for
+this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and
+give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads.</p>
+
+<p>When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying
+chances which the two systems, the <i>defensive</i> and the <i>offensive</i>, give
+rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the
+initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and
+striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon
+the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is
+often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by
+those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages
+are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller
+extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his
+movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once
+counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party
+advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising
+from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile
+line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always
+inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,
+farm-houses, villages, &amp;c., which must either be taken possession of or
+be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's
+batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a
+greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire
+either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of
+these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages
+resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.</p>
+
+<p>However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more
+manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.
+Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if
+attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by
+all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to
+take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 185]</span><a name='Page_185'></a>success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping
+strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give
+way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who
+indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall
+upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and
+transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
+movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength
+into the action at the most important point,&mdash;a thing altogether
+impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general
+who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has
+the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously
+arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries
+placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
+dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and
+when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
+assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
+advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral
+effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed
+to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.</p>
+
+<p>A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success
+either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,&mdash;1st,
+that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know
+how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his
+<i>coup-d'oeil</i> be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able
+to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he
+should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would
+have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,
+that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are
+demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as
+by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_22_22'></a><a href='#FNanchor_22_22'>[22]</a><div class='note'><p> It is from no desire to make innovations that I have
+modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is
+wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if
+we continue to apply the term <i>order of battle</i> to the disposition of
+troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important
+maneuvers by the terms <i>oblique order of battle</i>, <i>concave order of
+battle</i>, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms <i>oblique
+system of battle</i>, &amp;c.
+</p><p>
+I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The <i>order of battle</i>
+on paper may take the name <i>plan of organization</i>, and the ordinary
+formation of troops upon the ground will then be called <i>line of
+battle</i>.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_23_23'></a><a href='#FNanchor_23_23'>[23]</a><div class='note'><p> The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and
+the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
+famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube,
+in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that
+the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but,
+throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the
+difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not
+be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen
+the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost
+ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.</p></div>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 186]</span><a name='Page_186'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when
+assaulting another in position.<a name='FNanchor_24_24'></a><a href='#Footnote_24_24'><sup>[24]</sup></a> An army reduced to the strategic
+defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army
+receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the
+offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes
+numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive
+battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages
+of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the
+consideration of offensive movements.</p>
+
+<p>It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage
+over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the
+latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack
+must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called
+<i>order of battle</i>.</p>
+
+<p>It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without
+a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely
+known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in
+every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than
+of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to
+make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should
+therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point.</p>
+
+<p>The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already
+stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different
+localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the
+arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's
+flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be
+attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically
+considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 187]</span><a name='Page_187'></a>difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least
+importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left
+of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province
+was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically
+considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be
+held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line
+of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the
+right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and
+throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all
+their <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> and a great part of the personnel of their army. This
+course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the
+features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have
+diminished the obstacles in the future.</p>
+
+<p>The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:
+1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical
+key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which
+combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the
+difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic
+point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;
+4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends
+very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines
+of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the
+proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is
+the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there,
+it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this
+case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical
+superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon
+both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior
+numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the
+combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to
+obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points
+mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,&mdash;a
+point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 188]</span><a name='Page_188'></a>The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or
+to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin
+his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at
+some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank
+and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him
+in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line
+turned.</p>
+
+<p>To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make
+choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.</p>
+
+<p>At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple
+parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive
+crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order
+reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique
+reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on
+one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The
+order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the
+center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the
+center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_5'></a><a name='FNanchor_25_25'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 5.<a href='#Footnote_25_25'><sup>[25]</sup></a></h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig05.png' width='350' height='120' alt='Fig. 5.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been
+stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to
+turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits
+of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the
+general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is
+manifest that the parallel order (<a href='#Fig_5'>Fig. 5</a>) is worst of all, for it
+requires no skill to fight one line against another, batta<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 189]</span><a name='Page_189'></a>lion against
+battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical
+skill is needed in such a battle.</p>
+
+<p>There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order,
+which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great
+strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's
+communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its
+own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has
+reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having
+effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts
+should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to
+open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the
+parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle
+cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must
+gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will
+then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to
+engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by
+fortune.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_6'></a><h3>Fig. 6.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig06.png' width='300' height='166' alt='Fig. 6.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (<a href='#Fig_6'>Fig. 6</a>) is most
+usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an
+offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in
+the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very
+remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if
+properly attacked.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_7'></a><h3>Fig. 7.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig07.png' width='300' height='117' alt='Fig. 7.' title=''>
+</center><br />
+
+<p>The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (<a href='#Fig_7'>Fig. 7</a>,) or upon the
+center, (<a href='#Fig_8'>Fig. 8</a>,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more
+favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in
+accordance with the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 190]</span><a name='Page_190'></a>general principles which have been laid down;
+although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the
+line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own
+safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_8'></a><h3>Fig. 8.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig08.png' width='300' height='94' alt='Fig. 8.' title=''>
+</center><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_9'></a><h3>Fig. 9.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig09.png' width='300' height='107' alt='Fig. 9.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The oblique order (<a href='#Fig_9'>Fig. 9</a>) is the best for an inferior force attacking a
+superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main
+strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it
+has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only
+kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double
+duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of
+being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged
+wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles
+of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern
+times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See
+Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.)</p>
+
+<div style="width: 300; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: 1em; padding-right: 1em;  float: left; clear: left;">
+<center>
+<a name='Fig_10'></a><b>Fig. 10.</b>
+</center>
+<img src='images/fig10.png' width='300' height='268' alt='Fig. 10.' title=''>
+</div>
+
+<div style="width: 300; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: 1em; padding-left: 1em; float: right; clear: right;">
+<center>
+<a name='Fig_11'></a><b>Fig. 11.</b>
+</center>
+<img src='images/fig11.png' width='300' height='277' alt='Fig. 11.' title=''><br />
+</div>
+<p>The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and
+11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction
+along which the primary tactical move<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 191]</span><a name='Page_191'></a>ments might be made in a battle.
+Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions
+indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first
+position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army
+A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;
+and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the
+extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right
+or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take
+him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in
+<a href='#Fig_10'>Fig. 10</a>. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would
+take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder
+of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and
+this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in
+<a href='#Fig_9'>Figures 9</a> and <a href='#Fig_16'>16</a>.</p>
+
+<p>The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be
+very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very
+decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to
+bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker
+army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior
+force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_12'></a><h3>Fig. 12.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig12.png' width='300' height='169' alt='Fig. 12.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The order concave in the center (<a href='#Fig_12'>Fig. 12</a>) has found advocates since the
+day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cann&aelig;. This order may
+indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to
+it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him,
+and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order
+is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on
+the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their
+extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they
+had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 192]</span><a name='Page_192'></a>ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to
+fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.</p>
+<a name='Fig_12b'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 12 <i>bis</i>.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig12b.png' width='300' height='114' alt='Fig. 12, bis.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line
+with the center retired, (<a href='#Fig_12b'>Fig. 12, <i>bis</i>.</a>) If several writers may be
+believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the
+famous days of Cr&eacute;cy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than
+a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack,
+whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the
+advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the
+enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is
+content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon
+one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a
+concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an
+error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube
+behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of
+communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at
+pleasure.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_13'></a><h3>Fig. 13.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig13.png' width='300' height='170' alt='Fig. 13.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The convex order with the center salient (<a href='#Fig_13'>Fig. 13</a>) answers for an
+engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must
+be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a
+defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be
+passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may
+become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If
+an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single
+wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.<a name='FNanchor_26_26'></a><a href='#Footnote_26_26'><sup>[26]</sup></a></p>
+<br />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 193]</span><a name='Page_193'></a>The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because
+the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center
+or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six
+diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the
+same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and
+third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had
+just the result that might have been expected.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_14'></a><h3>Fig. 14.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig14.png' width='300' height='158' alt='Fig. 14' title=''>
+</center><br />
+
+<p>The order by echelon upon the two wings <a href='#Fig_14'>Fig. 14</a> is of the same nature as
+the perpendicular order, (<a href='#Fig_11'>Fig. 11</a>,) being, however, better than that,
+because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where
+the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as
+regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center
+and make at that point a threatening counter-attack.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_15'></a><h3>Fig. 15.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig15.png' width='300' height='159' alt='Fig. 15' title=''>
+</center><br />
+
+<p>The order by echelon on the center (<a href='#Fig_15'>Fig. 15</a>) may be used with special
+success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too
+extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the
+wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be
+probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental
+principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of
+success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the
+reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act
+either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost
+echelons, might readily repulse them.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 194]</span><a name='Page_194'></a>If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge
+or <i>boar's head</i> of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also
+differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid
+mass,&mdash;an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of
+artillery,&mdash;it would have a large open space in the middle, which would
+render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been
+said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might
+be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the
+wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the
+flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result.
+A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be
+a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in
+this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to
+the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons
+of the center by the flank.</p>
+
+<p>This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the
+intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter
+xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain
+that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments,
+there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this
+formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point
+of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made
+upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_16'></a><h3>Fig. 16.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig16.png' width='300' height='96' alt='Fig 16.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the
+same time (<a href='#Fig_16'>Fig. 16</a>) is better than the preceding, especially in an
+attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may
+even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The
+attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents
+the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank,
+as <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 195]</span><a name='Page_195'></a>was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is
+hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having
+to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and
+probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his
+victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at
+Borodino,&mdash;where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the
+heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the
+famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout's
+corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at
+Bautzen,&mdash;where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but
+for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing
+intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
+arrangement having been made with that view.</p>
+
+<p>It should be observed that these different orders are not to be
+understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general
+who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon
+paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be
+likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now
+fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to
+form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures,
+because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected
+together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving
+ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns
+to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,&mdash;when armies
+bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility,
+when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given
+them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has
+been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,&mdash;finally,
+when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of
+battle,&mdash;under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be
+laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 196]</span><a name='Page_196'></a>figures
+have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
+arrangements.</p>
+
+<p>If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
+influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of
+winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of
+battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of
+maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;
+for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
+render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous
+fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give
+good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is
+to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive
+maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is
+to result in victory.</p>
+
+<p>Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
+understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,
+excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective
+<i>coup-d'oeil militaire</i>,&mdash;every thing of this kind may interfere with
+the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without
+speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the
+arrival of a corps at the appointed place.</p>
+
+<p>Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive
+maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers
+seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than
+those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to
+previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to
+decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the
+expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the
+moment when Bl&uuml;cher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
+nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and
+they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
+manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the
+allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,
+for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 197]</span><a name='Page_197'></a>executed better what
+he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.</p>
+
+<p>As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the
+co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army,
+with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank,
+it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends
+upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely
+seen. This subject will be considered in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXII'>Art. XXXII.</a></p>
+
+<p>Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an
+order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin
+without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the
+collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from
+circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's
+position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be
+still expected to arrive on the field.</p>
+
+<p>From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
+reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that
+the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an
+engagement,&mdash;an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases
+cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it
+is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
+lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the
+party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm
+will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to
+be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts
+to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack
+shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed
+against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
+Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
+resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
+unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,&mdash;which will, it is
+hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the
+different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 198]</span><a name='Page_198'></a>There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my
+assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being
+represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at
+Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward
+the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.
+At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At
+Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like
+<a href='#Fig_11'>Fig. 11</a>. At Wagram his order was altogether like <a href='#Fig_16'>Fig. 16</a>, bringing up
+two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;
+and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the
+Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely
+unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive
+movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost
+perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break
+through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the
+center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack
+vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the
+two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center
+was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition,
+the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the
+enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself,
+the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved
+him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by
+strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with
+them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle.</p>
+
+<p>I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark
+out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be
+used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless
+bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so
+combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be
+similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations,
+whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to
+form a sound conclusion as to the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 199]</span><a name='Page_199'></a>important point of the battle-field;
+and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's
+line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy
+requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to
+this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or
+watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point
+the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he
+will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can
+impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the
+most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a
+battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (<a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Art. XIX.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me
+that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in
+the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.</p>
+
+<p>The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern
+invention, a theorist's fancy,&mdash;an opinion I can by no means share; for
+the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it
+used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more
+remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo,
+the very order of which he thus denies the existence.</p>
+
+<p>If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid
+and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.
+Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I
+repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and
+when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it
+can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by
+the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of
+battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must
+be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another
+army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it
+while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of
+the line <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 200]</span><a name='Page_200'></a>must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it
+will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far
+from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by
+echelons on one wing, (<a href='#Fig_14'>Fig. 14</a>.)</p>
+
+<p>As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied
+that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was
+a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders
+parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they
+would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of
+the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than
+another.</p>
+
+<p>Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical
+figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles
+in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended
+to:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force
+     the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.</p>
+
+<p>     2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm
+     one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An
+     enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and
+     turning his position.</p>
+
+<p>     3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if
+     concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.</p>
+
+<p>     4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without
+     having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the
+     rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very
+     strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.</p>
+
+<p>     5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least
+     half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,
+     while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of
+     attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique
+     line.</p>
+
+<p>     6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
+     otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
+     strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.</p>
+
+<p>     <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 201]</span><a name='Page_201'></a>7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the
+     attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be
+     such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,
+     and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to
+     fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least
+     expect to meet it.</p>
+
+<p>     8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method
+     to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order
+     of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of
+     the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset.
+     A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting
+     alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good
+     combination. In the practical use of this system many variations
+     must arise from differences in the <i>coup-d'oeil</i> of commanders, the
+     <i>morale</i> of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers
+     and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>     9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy
+     from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best
+     means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can
+     be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the
+     direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better
+     results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing
+     which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus
+     threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if
+     attacked by main force.</p>
+
+<p>     History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
+     especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
+     although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
+     the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
+     successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
+     skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them
+     when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these
+     turning movements with attacks by main force.</p>
+
+<p>     10. The combination of these two methods&mdash;that is to say, the
+     attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver&mdash;will render
+     the victory more certain than the use of either sepa<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 202]</span><a name='Page_202'></a>rately; but,
+     in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in
+     presence of a contemptible enemy.</p>
+
+<p>     11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force
+     is the following:&mdash;Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and
+     well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by
+     vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus
+     gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front
+     by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>     But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the
+     first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that,
+     the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking
+     party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral
+     effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat
+     of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence
+     of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat
+     disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to
+     replace them by those of the second line, because they generally
+     follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within
+     musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to
+     substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the
+     moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in
+     repelling the attack.</p>
+
+<p>     These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the
+     troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance
+     of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks
+     and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually
+     be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to
+     insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
+     launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
+     proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
+     and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.</p>
+
+<p>     12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
+     &quot;that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the
+     means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in
+     strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second
+     line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of
+     masses of cavalry and of batteries, to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 203]</span><a name='Page_203'></a>assist in striking the
+     decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is
+     presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of
+     battles.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>     In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
+     guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
+     compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
+     substitute for that intuitive <i>coup-d'oeil</i> imparted by experience
+     in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.</p>
+
+<p>     The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all
+     arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
+     always held in hand,<a name='FNanchor_27_27'></a><a href='#Footnote_27_27'><sup>[27]</sup></a> will, therefore, at the critical moment of
+     the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
+     attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
+     This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties
+     is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put
+     forth,&mdash;on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to
+     wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to
+     make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous
+     attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous.</p>
+
+<p>     13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
+     effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
+     be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
+     marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
+     skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
+     object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
+     troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
+     will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
+     enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
+     of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
+     strong probability of his repulse. </p></div>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_24_24'></a><a href='#FNanchor_24_24'>[24]</a><div class='note'><p> In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
+other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
+defensive for the other.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_25_25'></a><a href='#FNanchor_25_25'>[25]</a><div class='note'><p> The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
+orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
+represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
+figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
+ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
+attack, in squares, or checkerwise.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_26_26'></a><a href='#FNanchor_26_26'>[26]</a><div class='note'><p> An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
+some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
+enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
+false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
+extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_27_27'></a><a href='#FNanchor_27_27'>[27]</a><div class='note'><p> The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
+it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
+reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
+decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
+Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
+history.</p></div>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 204]</span><a name='Page_204'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
+an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
+be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
+d&eacute;tours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
+so many plans seemingly well arranged.</p>
+
+<p>It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
+is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking
+place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
+as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain <i>coup-d'oeil</i>
+of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
+he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
+maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
+against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
+in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
+success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
+take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
+have been in the habit of moving in this manner.</p>
+
+<p>It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
+The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
+force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
+however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
+A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
+thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
+seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
+more daring.</p>
+
+<p>A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
+the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
+extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
+armies concerned in them.</p>
+
+<p>In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 205]</span><a name='Page_205'></a>Prague because
+the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
+between their right and the remainder of their army,&mdash;the latter part
+remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
+the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
+distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
+to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
+was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
+because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
+disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
+Marshal Daun.<a name='FNanchor_28_28'></a><a href='#Footnote_28_28'><sup>[28]</sup></a> Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
+movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
+line was thus reformed.</p>
+
+<p>The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar
+with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
+wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the
+plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,&mdash;while their left was piled
+up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
+a wide <i>d&eacute;tour</i> to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
+speedily surrounded and captured.</p>
+
+<p>No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
+unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
+sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
+thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
+Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
+pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
+sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
+divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
+rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.</p>
+
+<p>We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 206]</span><a name='Page_206'></a>who had desired to
+surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
+in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
+the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off
+from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
+of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
+line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
+surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
+Tellnitz and Melnitz.</p>
+
+<p>Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
+Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
+Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,&mdash;seeing
+which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
+support.</p>
+
+<p>If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
+might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
+a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
+thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
+unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
+advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
+Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
+merit was a rapid and practiced tactical <i>coup-d'oeil</i>. With the Duke of
+York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
+successful.</p>
+
+<p>Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
+and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
+almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
+concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
+search in vain in military history for another example of a single
+brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
+and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
+the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
+probability, to lay down his arms.</p>
+
+<p>At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
+successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
+under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Berna<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 207]</span><a name='Page_207'></a>dotte had not rendered opportune
+assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
+been the result.</p>
+
+<p>So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
+no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
+it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
+order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
+himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
+but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
+enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
+regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
+or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
+the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
+outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
+opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
+enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
+Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications
+before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
+preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
+successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
+maneuver during the battle.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_28_28'></a><a href='#FNanchor_28_28'>[28]</a><div class='note'><p> For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
+XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
+rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.</p>
+
+<p>In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a
+position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as
+close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,&mdash;especially
+as war is now carried on,&mdash;that two armies approach each other, each
+intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision
+ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
+does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another
+which has prepared a surprise for it,&mdash;as happened to the French at
+Rossbach.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 208]</span><a name='Page_208'></a>A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
+skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always
+possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander
+may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen,
+Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius
+endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations.</p>
+
+<p>There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no
+means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the
+very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the
+fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying
+them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided
+upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.</p>
+
+<p>Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
+and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause
+their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they
+are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be
+concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction
+considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in
+deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the
+deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
+badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced
+guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the
+troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach,
+Treatise on Grand Operations.)</p>
+
+<p>In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
+several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently,
+these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are
+unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
+the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
+suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
+enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.</p>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 209]</span><a name='Page_209'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXIV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXIV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Surprises of Armies.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,&mdash;the chief
+features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
+Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
+to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.</p>
+
+<p>Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
+than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
+heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
+an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
+and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
+because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War
+presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
+a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
+sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
+combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
+of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
+so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
+their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
+intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.</p>
+
+<p>As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
+prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
+one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's
+camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
+surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
+attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
+1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
+imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
+there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
+own negligence.</p>
+
+<p>It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
+fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 210]</span><a name='Page_210'></a>moment when nothing of
+the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;
+and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
+give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
+forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
+occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
+it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
+renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.</p>
+
+<p>For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
+for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
+prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
+well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
+Lines.&mdash;Of Coups de Main in General.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
+are regarded as secure against <i>coups de main</i>, but may nevertheless be
+carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
+practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
+means of getting to the parapet.</p>
+
+<p>The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
+as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of <i>coups de
+main</i>.</p>
+
+<p>This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
+of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
+built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
+the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
+of these varieties.</p>
+
+<p>For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
+the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
+Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
+varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
+better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 211]</span><a name='Page_211'></a>was, in
+fact, a <i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i> nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
+the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
+have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
+Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
+as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
+by a number of desperate men.</p>
+
+<p>Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
+which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was
+suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple
+redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep
+giving it its sole strength.<a name='FNanchor_29_29'></a><a href='#Footnote_29_29'><sup>[29]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
+but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at
+Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant
+parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep.
+In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were
+attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene
+assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
+only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right
+flank.</p>
+
+<p>The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few
+in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked
+a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if
+this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by
+no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp
+will permit itself to be surprised,&mdash;especially as the regulations of
+all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack
+by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the
+following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire,<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 212]</span><a name='Page_212'></a>
+     which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the
+     defenders.</p>
+
+<p>     2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
+     fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
+     mount the parapet.</p>
+
+<p>     3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
+     skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
+     support.</p>
+
+<p>     4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
+     for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.</p>
+
+<p>     5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
+     duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of
+     attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of
+     cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground
+     permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing
+     more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
+     actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
+     gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
+     daring rashness. </p></div>
+
+<p>Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
+escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
+advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
+passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.</p>
+
+<p>Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
+none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
+camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions
+for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
+an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
+as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
+Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
+followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
+attacking Dresden in 1813.</p>
+
+<p>Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
+escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,&mdash;both
+preceded by sieges, but still brilliant <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 213]</span><a name='Page_213'></a><i>coups de main</i>, since in
+neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.</p>
+
+<p>Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
+interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
+because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
+impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
+The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
+in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
+and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
+lessons for study.</p>
+
+<p>This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
+familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
+it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
+bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
+was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
+to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
+was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
+we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
+owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
+great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the
+order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt
+for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied
+troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
+one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for
+forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever
+attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
+instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a
+better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade
+in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make
+openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make
+up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
+carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 214]</span><a name='Page_214'></a>the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the
+bodies of its defenders.</p>
+
+<p>But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation
+of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If
+they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by
+assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by
+strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last
+indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any
+reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one
+of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
+There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the
+defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that
+point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded
+simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the
+character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
+be pursued.</p>
+
+<p>The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
+It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief
+and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be
+quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away
+from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of
+moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this
+character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so
+gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand
+at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with
+an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.</p>
+
+<p>If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think
+of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces,
+the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
+advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
+This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the
+enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive
+return upon the assailant, no matter how advan<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 215]</span><a name='Page_215'></a>tageous it might seem. A
+general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half
+conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them
+when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
+cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk
+and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of
+complaint.</p>
+
+<p>Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
+lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between
+the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of
+the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement
+succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which
+could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been
+suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment
+is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
+quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great
+importance,&mdash;that the troops be made to understand they must by no means
+despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;
+because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack
+the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have
+supposed in his power.</p>
+
+<h3>COUPS DE MAIN.</h3>
+
+<p>These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
+capture of posts of different strength or importance.<a name='FNanchor_30_30'></a><a href='#Footnote_30_30'><sup>[30]</sup></a> They partake
+of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both
+these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
+successful issue. Although <i>coups de main</i> seem to be entirely tactical
+operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the
+captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become
+necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
+in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVI'>Article XXXVI.</a>, when speaking of de<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 216]</span><a name='Page_216'></a>tachments. However tiresome these
+repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing
+such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack
+of intrenchments.</p>
+
+<p>I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these
+operations; for their name, <i>coups de main</i>, implies that ordinary rules
+are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and
+refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic,
+where they are mentioned.</p>
+
+<p>I have previously stated that important results may often follow from
+these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful
+attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises
+of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814,
+as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the
+different kinds of <i>coup de main</i>. Some are effected by surprise, others
+by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
+assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things
+which have an influence upon the successful issue of <i>coups de main</i>.</p>
+
+<p>As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer
+of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon
+the results of a great strategic operation.</p>
+
+<p>The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that
+of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the
+two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the
+Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally,
+the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
+provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;&mdash;such are the
+enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging
+in them may be exposed.</p>
+
+<p>Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with
+fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the
+same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be
+prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of
+soldiers, to help <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 217]</span><a name='Page_217'></a>them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
+intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by
+Prince Eugene.</p>
+
+<p>In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for
+what has been done once may be done again.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_29_29'></a><a href='#FNanchor_29_29'>[29]</a><div class='note'><p> The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August
+25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
+third day, more than one hundred thousand.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_30_30'></a><a href='#FNanchor_30_30'>[30]</a><div class='note'><p> The distinction between the importance and the strength of
+a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
+importance, and vice avers&aacute;.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_V'></a><h2>CHAPTER V.</h2>
+
+<h3>OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL
+AND PARTLY TACTICAL.</h3>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXVI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXVI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Diversions and Great Detachments.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important
+a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining
+their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest
+and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing
+is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and
+having a good <i>ensemble</i> of operations with the main body, it is equally
+certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately
+adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential
+qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many
+detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of
+attacking the main body during their absence.</p>
+
+<p>The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been
+carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many
+persons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly
+much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass;
+but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a
+complete or even considerable success. The essential point in this
+matter is to send out as few detachments as possible.</p>
+
+<p>There are several kinds of detachments.</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 218]</span><a name='Page_218'></a>
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of
+     operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater
+     or less importance.</p>
+
+<p>     2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to
+     cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard
+     a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if
+     threatened.</p>
+
+<p>     3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations,
+     in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some
+     combined operation.</p>
+
+<p>     4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect
+     of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an
+     important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign. </p></div>
+
+<p>I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a
+distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a
+theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly
+supposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but
+two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed
+cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the
+real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a
+detachment would receive strong support from the population among which
+it was sent,&mdash;the latter case belonging rather to political than
+military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out of
+place here.</p>
+
+<p>The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian
+expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the
+end of the last century, (which have been referred to in <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a>,)
+are well known.</p>
+
+<p>In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended
+an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined
+forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover,
+nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated
+points. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities
+of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover,
+Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Mas<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 219]</span><a name='Page_219'></a>sena in the Frioul, and
+Bernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of
+Ulm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no
+difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the
+failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation
+would have been proper.</p>
+
+<p>In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to
+La Vend&eacute;e, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the
+numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the
+Rhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been
+not only very useful, but decisive.</p>
+<br />
+
+<p>It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of
+small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations
+of the main army.</p>
+
+<p>If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary
+objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is
+no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be,
+indispensable.</p>
+
+<p>These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are
+permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction
+opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a
+campaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of
+assisting in carrying out some special enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an
+army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which
+mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when
+the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For
+example, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to
+leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the
+valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of
+operations. However successful it may be, a respectable force must
+always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of
+the river toward Routchouk.</p>
+
+<p>This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 220]</span><a name='Page_220'></a>to have a
+double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps
+must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the
+main army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned
+where this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the
+double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army
+passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main
+column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong
+to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of
+communications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, which
+enables the Spaniards to establish a double front,&mdash;one covering the
+road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To
+whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the
+other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction.</p>
+
+<p>All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge
+as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to
+give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them
+by opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable
+illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of
+1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the
+valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward
+the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk
+of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts
+of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that
+he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no
+particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon
+his communications.</p>
+
+<p>Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following
+reasons:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations,
+     or else to cover your own.</p>
+
+<p>     2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body
+     of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
+     reinforcements.</p>
+
+<p>     <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 221]</span><a name='Page_221'></a>3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing
+     army, while a blow is struck at the remainder.</p>
+
+<p>     4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions,
+     on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the
+     success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a
+     convoy of your own.</p>
+
+<p>     5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where
+     you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an
+     enterprise in another direction.</p>
+
+<p>     6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a
+     certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison
+     shut up within the ramparts.</p>
+
+<p>     7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications
+     of an enemy already retreating. </p></div>
+
+<p>However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as
+those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are
+always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be
+successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must,
+therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason
+than that they were not kept together.</p>
+
+<p>We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their
+success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill
+of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution.</p>
+
+<p>Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles
+XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous
+convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain
+the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.</p>
+
+<p>The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during
+the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of
+the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen
+in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
+detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
+times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching
+that a corps must not be <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 222]</span><a name='Page_222'></a>thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
+admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault
+was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it
+properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
+Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.</p>
+
+<p>Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are
+decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the
+enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is
+collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck.
+In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps
+making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main
+body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts.</p>
+
+<p>In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his
+march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was
+really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply
+shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau.</p>
+
+<p>In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of
+Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke
+Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another
+direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he
+withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide
+the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the
+result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being
+in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to
+facilitate their application.</p>
+
+<p>It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be
+laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of
+which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of
+making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of
+all the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the
+subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall
+thorn immediately when their duty is per<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 223]</span><a name='Page_223'></a>formed. The inconveniences
+necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving
+judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders:
+herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff.</p>
+
+<p>One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments
+sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by
+tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good
+positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict
+with too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity of
+motion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that it
+is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position
+it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order.</p>
+
+<p>It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of
+field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the
+army itself.</p>
+
+<p>Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments
+those intended for <i>coups de main</i>, it is proper to mention a few
+examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may
+call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end
+of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of
+Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians
+rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential
+<i>point d'appui</i> beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in
+advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of
+failure, no one was compromised,&mdash;not even the small corps which had
+been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping.</p>
+
+<p>In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the <i>coup de main</i> attempted by
+the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and
+destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would
+have had very important consequences if it had not failed.</p>
+
+<p>In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and,
+as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may
+be freely recommended.</p>
+
+<p>Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 224]</span><a name='Page_224'></a>enemy's
+operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few
+hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they
+may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small
+detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a
+great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his
+plans to fail by intercepting his couriers.</p>
+
+<p>For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full
+of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they
+can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a
+telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any
+dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and
+presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are
+qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness.
+For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter
+XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to <a href='#ARTICLE_XLV'>Article XLV.</a> of this
+work, on light cavalry.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXVII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXVII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Passage of Rivers and Other Streams.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place
+or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations
+belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large
+river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the
+Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &amp;c, is an operation worthy the closest
+study.</p>
+
+<p>The art of building military bridges is a special branch of military
+science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not from
+this point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream,
+but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver.</p>
+
+<p>The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the
+point of passage may have an important connection with all the
+operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. The
+passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellent
+illustration of the truth of this <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 225]</span><a name='Page_225'></a>remark. Napoleon, a more skillful
+strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to
+take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
+off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had
+already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience
+to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. The
+tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the
+strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk
+attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same
+campaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high
+strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of
+the reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march
+by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino
+and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino,
+enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with
+twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at
+Piacenza, expecting to get before M&eacute;las more certainly in that direction
+than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of
+the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar
+operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of
+the destruction of Mack's army.</p>
+
+<p>The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by
+recollecting the principles laid down in <a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a>; and it is here
+only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in
+every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive
+points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the
+distribution of the hostile forces.</p>
+
+<p>If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical,
+no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles
+exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the
+new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement
+as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction.
+Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great
+influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 226]</span><a name='Page_226'></a>consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is
+that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and
+line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first
+marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon
+different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting
+a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.</p>
+
+<p>Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations
+influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will now
+proceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school in
+which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such
+operations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus&mdash;which is a
+small stream&mdash;a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned,
+the people of modern days can cite much greater.</p>
+
+<p>The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been greatly
+lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon has
+made famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube at
+Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details;
+and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. More
+recently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous
+passage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind
+previously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and
+at Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men
+provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the
+bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account of
+them should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russian
+army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with the
+two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local
+difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The
+passage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give
+historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the special
+narratives of these events. I will give several general rules to be
+observed.</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of
+     <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 227]</span><a name='Page_227'></a>passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In
+     addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be
+     made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the
+     enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to
+     make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not
+     to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the
+     real attempt is to be made.</p>
+
+<p>     2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as
+     possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging
+     the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and
+     these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods,
+     or other obstacles in the vicinity.</p>
+
+<p>     3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy
+     caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any
+     artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while
+     building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from
+     which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other.</p>
+
+<p>     4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives
+     great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for
+     constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying
+     into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for
+     collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge.</p>
+
+<p>     5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a
+     re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can
+     cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land
+     from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus
+     taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the
+     passage.</p>
+
+<p>     6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks,
+     that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on
+     both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the
+     banks are high and steep should be usually avoided. </p></div>
+
+<p>The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from
+those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract
+the efforts of the assailants. The important <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 228]</span><a name='Page_228'></a>thing is to have the
+course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without
+attempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the
+threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of
+his army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vend&ocirc;me at Cassano, and
+the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,&mdash;the last example being
+particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so
+decidedly successful as might have been expected.</p>
+
+<p>In <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>Article XXI.</a> attention was called to the influence that the passage
+of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction
+to the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may have
+with subsequent strategic movements.</p>
+
+<p>One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to
+cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without
+interfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the army
+is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed
+just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling;
+but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are
+about equal, the case is very different.</p>
+
+<p>If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or at
+Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thing
+to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,&mdash;first,
+before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in order
+to cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to
+cover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the
+cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the
+inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be
+insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be
+separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain
+absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the
+natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces.</p>
+
+<p>The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in
+which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he
+divides his army to protect his bridges <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 229]</span><a name='Page_229'></a>he may be obliged to contend
+with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and
+have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the
+enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point,
+the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find
+himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a
+victory.</p>
+
+<p>The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which
+will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all
+possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage,
+to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to
+beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of
+touching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may be
+used. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several
+corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with
+one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line
+of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be
+overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be
+formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly
+drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them
+from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges.
+But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the
+enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy
+may be beaten throughout its whole extent,&mdash;in the same manner that
+Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout its
+length,&mdash;the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain
+protected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner that
+Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme
+right of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the
+Main. He was driven away because the French, having a double and
+exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men
+inactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan
+upon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages
+gained by passing a river upon <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 230]</span><a name='Page_230'></a>one extremity of the enemy's strategic
+front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that
+previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and
+the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of
+the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as
+well as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations,
+of which something has already been said in the article on lines of
+operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection
+with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion.</p>
+
+<p>It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is
+attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with
+Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in case
+of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus
+operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him,
+in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a
+condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at
+different points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrous
+results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to
+take advantage of this violation of principles.</p>
+
+<p>In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be
+diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points,
+which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two
+portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy
+from destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this
+rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of
+Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have
+achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon
+the Rhine.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXVIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXVIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Retreats and Pursuits.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remark
+is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usual
+piquant style, that he could not conceive <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 231]</span><a name='Page_231'></a>how an army ever succeeded in
+retreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an army
+in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving
+order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard
+to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to
+attempt such an operation.</p>
+
+<p>What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight be
+continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under
+cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance,
+but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong
+opposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march be
+made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as
+possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of
+fighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper in
+certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the
+theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is
+certainly one of them.</p>
+
+<p>If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose
+yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced
+retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in
+darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your
+army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing
+properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in
+broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold
+it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is
+about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
+troops, you may lose their confidence,&mdash;as they are always inclined to
+blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing
+may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat
+commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not
+become a rout?</p>
+
+<p>When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide
+whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the
+enemy as possible,&mdash;since this hurried movement might sometimes cause
+the destruction of the army, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 232]</span><a name='Page_232'></a>and might, in other circumstances, be its
+salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that,
+in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to
+retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of
+sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check
+for several hours.</p>
+
+<p>Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which
+they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in
+order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his
+present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was
+thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the
+allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
+Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed
+to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was
+known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
+choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I
+was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde
+movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding
+the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.)</p>
+
+<p>A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point
+threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of
+retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an
+exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer
+its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost
+battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Their
+character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be
+passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are specially
+dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the
+retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of
+operations, they become painful and difficult.</p>
+
+<p>From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justly
+celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 233]</span><a name='Page_233'></a>befell the French army
+in 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. That
+of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of
+the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
+more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed
+by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The
+retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it
+has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the
+siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well
+arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796,
+which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
+not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to
+Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
+Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were
+glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration.
+The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow&mdash;a space of
+two hundred and forty leagues,&mdash;in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon
+and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
+admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances,
+but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by
+the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable
+fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although
+the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was
+also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
+Beresina,&mdash;because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single
+man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
+covered themselves with glory.</p>
+
+<p>The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be
+traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the
+attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or
+inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances
+which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out
+of consider<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 234]</span><a name='Page_234'></a>ation the skillful arrangements which the generals may make
+for their execution.</p>
+
+<p>A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
+magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order,
+and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist
+his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended
+position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from
+Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry
+and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and
+with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
+thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense
+number of light cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>There are five methods of arranging a retreat:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.</p>
+
+<p>     The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps,
+     marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order
+     to avoid confusion, especially in the <i>mat&eacute;riel</i>.</p>
+
+<p>     The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads
+     nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.</p>
+
+<p>     The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads.</p>
+
+<p>     The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
+     roads. </p></div>
+
+<p>I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is
+taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well
+sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is
+common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the
+strategic relations of these operations.</p>
+
+<p>An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as
+soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it
+shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first
+method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and
+enables it to be in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 235]</span><a name='Page_235'></a>readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it
+is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder
+of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An
+army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the
+single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be
+occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure.</p>
+
+<p>When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having
+the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a
+great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but
+moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular
+direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal
+days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being
+chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the
+departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery
+may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march,
+the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a
+half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession with
+an interval of two hours between the departure of their several
+army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in
+ordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other
+calculations would doubtless be necessary.</p>
+
+<p>I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand
+or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The army
+may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each,
+encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each of
+these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may
+either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the
+road. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five
+A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference
+with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second
+mass being at the same hours of the day about four <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 236]</span><a name='Page_236'></a>leagues behind the
+first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same
+time.</p>
+
+<p>When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least
+for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It is
+scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used
+when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best,
+because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and in
+hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early
+part of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics
+to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for
+armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.</p>
+
+<p>Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and
+great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or
+division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a
+little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and
+the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to
+arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army
+is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as
+much mischief as a rout.</p>
+
+<p>If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to
+relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt
+with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in
+battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns;
+and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space
+which has been lost.</p>
+
+<p>The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is
+excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they
+are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other
+wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it
+to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg
+toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind.</p>
+
+<p>The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is
+undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 237]</span><a name='Page_237'></a>each other when the
+retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite
+the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting
+this.</p>
+
+<p>The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of
+eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed so
+warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I could
+not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or
+as to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that he
+recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to
+separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object
+of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting
+his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. I
+found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten
+army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its
+forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, and
+that by the term <i>eccentric retreat</i> he did not understand a retreat
+made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being
+directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of
+the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along
+the line of the frontier of the country.</p>
+
+<p>I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and
+in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have strongly
+recommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of the
+parallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which
+leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of
+moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly
+parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and
+its base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
+retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric
+retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the
+strategic front.</p>
+
+<p>However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was
+the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 238]</span><a name='Page_238'></a>with those retreats
+made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater
+extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks.</p>
+
+<p>By using these high-sounding words <i>flanks</i>, an air of importance may be
+given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. An
+army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally;
+because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical
+inferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I
+find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the
+ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am
+speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose an
+army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand.
+If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men,
+the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Can
+he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession
+all his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? <i>By concentration</i>.
+This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls
+of itself.</p>
+
+<p>I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leading
+divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonaparte
+collected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had only
+forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had
+only to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent
+retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser,
+after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two
+wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was the
+result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
+beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and
+destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.</p>
+
+<p>When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the
+French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric
+movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric
+retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of
+isolated divi<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 239]</span><a name='Page_239'></a>sions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his
+own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the
+alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all
+the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it
+was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two
+hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.<a name='FNanchor_31_31'></a><a href='#Footnote_31_31'><sup>[31]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
+only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
+defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
+within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
+sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
+army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
+but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
+according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
+absurd.</p>
+
+<p>There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
+a retreat,&mdash;to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
+frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
+parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
+line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
+his retreat,&mdash;either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
+or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
+In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
+Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.</p>
+
+<p>These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
+they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
+center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
+retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
+positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 240]</span><a name='Page_240'></a>have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
+communications with the central portions of the state.</p>
+
+<p>Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army
+penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon
+Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either
+case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of
+operations would be at the mercy of their adversary.</p>
+
+<p>The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same
+advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.</p>
+
+<p>In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the
+nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is
+striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army
+penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the
+Sa&ocirc;ne, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or
+as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way
+of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
+occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very
+hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based
+upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all
+countries having double fronts of operations.<a name='FNanchor_32_32'></a><a href='#Footnote_32_32'><sup>[32]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the
+directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube.
+Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions
+connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this
+frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This
+assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800,
+1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial
+on that ground, the question is still an open one.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 241]</span><a name='Page_241'></a>It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method
+depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of
+each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of
+Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it
+would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into
+the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this
+way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
+upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate
+division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the
+whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would
+be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy,
+beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application
+on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy
+approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations
+would be too contracted.</p>
+
+<p>In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against
+an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its
+employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the
+Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria
+were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the
+country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the
+direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a
+movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.</p>
+
+<p>When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a
+pursuit always follows.</p>
+
+<p>A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army
+in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and
+this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of
+supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then
+becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its
+difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy
+in conducting the pursuit.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 242]</span><a name='Page_242'></a>The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon
+the character of the commanders and upon the <i>physique</i> and <i>morale</i> of
+the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases
+of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of
+     the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own
+     country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly
+     or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must,
+     however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might
+     then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely.</p>
+
+<p>     2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as
+     possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained;
+     because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously
+     followed up.</p>
+
+<p>     3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of
+     gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say;
+     for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a
+     country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have
+     been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers. </p></div>
+
+<p>Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the
+subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand
+combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical
+measures which may render them more easy of execution.</p>
+
+<p>One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
+familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be
+resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that
+the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops
+harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is
+at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special
+importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be
+furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the
+purpose of getting supplies by marauding.</p>
+
+<p>It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 243]</span><a name='Page_243'></a>an officer
+of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in
+advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for
+occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so
+rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have
+considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the
+execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of
+thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to
+prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
+retreating columns.</p>
+
+<p>It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the
+distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would
+run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When,
+however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may
+increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to
+the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same
+degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy.
+If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
+may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its
+strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of
+the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance
+not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is
+made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time
+to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the
+Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and
+Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of
+the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of
+troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and
+spoils.</p>
+
+<p>Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of
+interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over
+it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when
+the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge,
+it is a <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 244]</span><a name='Page_244'></a>maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be
+taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that
+they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for
+the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard
+should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,&mdash;as
+far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
+permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much
+hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall
+have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
+main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the
+rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass
+through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the
+river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give
+him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
+rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the
+river, breaking the bridges after it.</p>
+
+<p>It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form
+on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps
+left to hold the enemy in check.</p>
+
+<p>The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the
+precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be
+taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be
+constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the
+construction of a regular <i>t&ecirc;te de pont</i>, a few well-armed redoubts will
+be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops.</p>
+
+<p>If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only
+pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is
+threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy
+in force.</p>
+
+<p>The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most
+remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more
+desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and
+skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve
+hundred miles <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 245]</span><a name='Page_245'></a>from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in
+front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
+by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the
+honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped
+its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise
+should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
+operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of
+Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a
+rendezvous arranged in peace,&mdash;a plan which came near effecting the
+capture of their formidable adversary,&mdash;or the wonderful firmness of the
+lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.</p>
+
+<p>The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be
+closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage,
+and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one
+which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place
+yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such
+a case is rare.</p>
+
+<p>If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by
+regular <i>t&ecirc;tes de font</i>, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the
+rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use
+every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the
+bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also
+fire-ships and mills,&mdash;a means the Austrians used in 1796 against
+Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
+the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same
+thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and
+brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.</p>
+
+<p>It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character
+unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be
+anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating
+bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_31_31'></a><a href='#FNanchor_31_31'>[31]</a><div class='note'><p> Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
+concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army.
+Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the
+end, the cause of his ruin.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_32_32'></a><a href='#FNanchor_32_32'>[32]</a><div class='note'><p> In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
+nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive,
+it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly
+upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the
+frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.</p></div>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 246]</span><a name='Page_246'></a>
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XXXIX'></a><h2>ARTICLE XXXIX.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter
+Quarters.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my
+subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly.</p>
+
+<p>To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is
+generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there
+is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country
+where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia,
+or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of
+quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops
+have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the
+divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia,
+portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is
+more difficult to put an army into winter quarters.</p>
+
+<p>Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the
+end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan
+character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts.</p>
+
+<p>The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by
+Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of
+conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the
+other side to prevent its success.</p>
+
+<p>The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the
+following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and
+occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too
+extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and
+cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer
+line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by
+field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the
+troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by
+which an enemy may approach constantly <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 247]</span><a name='Page_247'></a>patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
+finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any
+point.</p>
+
+<p>In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments
+behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being
+hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &amp;c. The army numbered more
+than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite
+in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position
+until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
+expected to be the case everywhere.</p>
+
+<p>An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to
+have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries
+where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size
+of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country
+occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
+of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion.
+The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty
+thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with
+the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in
+check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is
+assembled.</p>
+
+<p>It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going
+into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems
+inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn
+from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an
+army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in
+quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice.</p>
+
+<p>In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a
+campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or
+waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will
+probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such
+positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order
+that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy
+to do. An army should occupy space enough to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 248]</span><a name='Page_248'></a>enable it to subsist
+readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be
+ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are
+by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to
+place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in
+case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may
+present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march
+from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same
+rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter
+quarters.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XL'></a><h2>ARTICLE XL.</h2>
+
+<h3>Descents.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the
+most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared
+enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in
+navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous
+three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred
+cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a
+numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until
+the debarkation of the army takes place.</p>
+
+<p>Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of
+war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and
+could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the
+number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests,
+the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much
+certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these
+reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern
+times.</p>
+
+<p>Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the
+Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,&mdash;the
+innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,&mdash;the great
+expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of
+Alexander into Asia <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 249]</span><a name='Page_249'></a>Minor, those of C&aelig;sar to England and Africa, that
+of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,&mdash;the Crusades,&mdash;the expeditions
+of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?</p>
+
+<p>Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II.
+was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on
+foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions
+were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of
+Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents
+of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St.
+Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp,
+Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for
+that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
+difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.</p>
+
+<p>The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the
+world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against
+second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation
+for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense
+trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast
+problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true
+that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred
+and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:
+unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left
+us entirely in the dark as to this grave question.</p>
+
+<p>It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the
+Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of
+being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to
+pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would
+become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war
+and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the
+fleet or oblige it to regain its ports?</p>
+
+<p>Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 250]</span><a name='Page_250'></a>generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or
+at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their
+deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains
+of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and
+the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring
+to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
+between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the
+preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the
+present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of
+statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France
+from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the
+activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the
+careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
+possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
+English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
+had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
+moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
+so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
+the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
+that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
+preparation and vast means of transportation.</p>
+
+<p>Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
+expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
+evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
+cases:&mdash;1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
+second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
+3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
+position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
+diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
+engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
+point of the descent.</p>
+
+<p>It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
+About the only recommendations I can make are the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 251]</span><a name='Page_251'></a>following. Deceive
+the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
+may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
+activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
+strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
+shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
+to the troops that have landed.</p>
+
+<p>A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the
+transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed
+in boats and rafts,&mdash;which takes time and gives the enemy great
+advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to
+great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats,
+tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness
+for the proper use of their arms?</p>
+
+<p>I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces
+too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to
+line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but
+the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be
+protected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving prompt
+notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable
+force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a
+firm foothold.</p>
+
+<p>The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and
+their prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep and
+present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be
+landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent
+becomes more difficult.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents
+which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids a
+continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the
+enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a
+coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the
+shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies.
+For the same reason, its first care should be to make <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 252]</span><a name='Page_252'></a>sure of the
+possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land
+which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened
+by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be
+re-embarked without hurry and loss.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_VI'></a><h2>CHAPTER VI.</h2>
+
+<h3>LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.</h3>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLI.</h2>
+
+<h3>A few Remarks on Logistics in General.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a
+general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of
+war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate
+collectively the different branches of staff duty,&mdash;that is to say, the
+different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations
+of the art?</p>
+
+<p>These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly
+convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and
+believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems
+already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good
+definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in
+answering these questions which seem so simple.</p>
+
+<p>In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other
+military writers, and called by the name of <i>logistics</i> the details of
+staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and
+of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This
+was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word <i>logistics</i>
+is derived, as we know, from the title of the <i>major g&eacute;n&eacute;ral des log&igrave;s</i>,
+(translated in German by <i>Quartiermeister</i>,) an officer whose duty it
+formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 253]</span><a name='Page_253'></a>marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was
+then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps,
+movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more
+extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
+transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points
+of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents
+for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
+assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of
+them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
+supervise their execution both in their <i>ensemble</i> and in their minute
+details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the
+operations of a campaign.</p>
+
+<p>To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man
+should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If
+the term <i>logistics</i> includes all this, the two works of the Archduke
+Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard,
+and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete
+sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than
+the science of applying all possible military knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>It appears from what has been said that the old term <i>logistics</i> is
+insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the
+real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to
+instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be
+accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the
+general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to
+publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties
+of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to
+the best methods of performing these duties.</p>
+
+<p>The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their
+government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted
+to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only
+work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public
+and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several
+gene<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 254]</span><a name='Page_254'></a>rals&mdash;as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut&mdash;have prepared
+manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
+several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a
+complete manual on the subject.</p>
+
+<p>If it is agreed that the old <i>logistics</i> had reference only to details
+of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff
+officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most
+important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics
+includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we
+retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and
+developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of
+ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.</p>
+
+<p>To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points
+that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and
+detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings
+resulting from such movements:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div class='blkquot'><p>1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the
+     army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
+     Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage
+     of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of
+     operations.</p>
+
+<p>     2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief
+     for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected
+     battles.</p>
+
+<p>     3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
+     measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be
+     used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
+     facilitate the operations of the army.</p>
+
+<p>     4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
+     procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as
+     possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>     5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements
+     ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different
+     columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner.
+     Ascertaining certainly that the means <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 255]</span><a name='Page_255'></a>requisite for the ease and
+     safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of
+     halts.</p>
+
+<p>     6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
+     flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions
+     for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the
+     performance of their duties.</p>
+
+<p>     7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or
+     their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing
+     up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as
+     their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to
+     engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the
+     character of the enemy.<a name='FNanchor_33_33'></a><a href='#Footnote_33_33'><sup>[33]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>     8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen
+     points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and
+     informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of
+     need.</p>
+
+<p>     9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,
+     munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in
+     their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the
+     movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking
+     precautions for order and security, both on the march and when
+     trains are halted and parked.</p>
+
+<p>     10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies.
+     Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of
+     the army, and regulating their use.</p>
+
+<p>     11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations
+     for their safety, good order, and police.</p>
+
+<p>     12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies,
+     as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached
+     bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding
+     in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and
+     convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also
+     for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its
+     base. </p></div>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 256]</span><a name='Page_256'></a>
+<div class='blkquot'><p>13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men,
+     movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their
+     safety.</p>
+
+<p>     14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
+     flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking
+     out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on
+     detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some
+     center of action, and forming strategic reserves.</p>
+
+<p>     15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
+     isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
+     between the army and its base of operations.</p>
+
+<p>     16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of
+     the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of
+     artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those
+     troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.</p>
+
+<p>     17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
+     order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard;
+     causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where
+     the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his
+     pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the
+     movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that
+     they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper
+     precautions to insure safety.</p>
+
+<p>     18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps;
+     indicating to each principal division of the army a place of
+     assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,
+     instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed. </p></div>
+
+<p>An examination of this long list&mdash;which might easily be made much longer
+by entering into greater detail&mdash;will lead every reader to remark that
+these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff
+officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very
+purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention
+to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be pro<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 257]</span><a name='Page_257'></a>vided
+with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
+Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and
+woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This
+want of harmony is often seen,&mdash;first, because generals are men and have
+faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual
+interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
+hindering them in performing their duties.<a name='FNanchor_34_34'></a><a href='#Footnote_34_34'><sup>[34]</sup></a></p>
+<br />
+
+<p>It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the
+guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious
+duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff
+officers with different names and rounds of duties,&mdash;so that I should be
+obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these
+details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these
+subjects.</p>
+
+<p>I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of
+the first articles enumerated above:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army
+to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are
+likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They
+should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that
+the <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses,
+carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &amp;c. should be carefully
+examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool
+trains, <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
+ambulances,&mdash;in a word, every thing which conies under the head of
+<i>mat&eacute;riel</i>,&mdash;should be carefully examined and placed in good order.</p>
+
+<p>If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers,
+gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft
+should be collected at the points and <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 258]</span><a name='Page_258'></a>at the bank where they will
+probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable
+points both for embarkations and for landings,&mdash;preferring those
+localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary
+establishment on the opposite bank.</p>
+
+<p>The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
+necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the
+proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction
+to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any
+thing relative to the projected enterprise.</p>
+
+<p>If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief
+engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of
+operations, when <i>t&ecirc;tes de ponts</i> or intrenched camps are to be
+constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built
+between the first line of defense and the second base.</p>
+
+<p>2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to
+making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the
+general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of
+staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of
+knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating
+the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be
+the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
+commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the
+general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he
+can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief.</p>
+
+<p>I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the
+service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in
+issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general
+instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much
+the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps,
+who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same
+sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of
+school.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 259]</span><a name='Page_259'></a>The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to
+his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself,
+and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on
+the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the
+operations of the whole army.<a name='FNanchor_35_35'></a><a href='#Footnote_35_35'><sup>[35]</sup></a> I have good reasons for knowing that
+he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of
+mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands
+of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans.</p>
+
+<p>It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans
+secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his
+night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire.
+That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his whole
+army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of
+Napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of
+action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is
+going on around them?</p>
+
+<p>Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean
+may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the
+minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay,
+Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies
+and reforming again in line of battle,&mdash;a piece of nonsense all the more
+ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the
+enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases,
+to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to
+add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of
+the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing
+it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted
+verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it
+accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and
+concert of action would be secured.</p>
+
+<p>3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 260]</span><a name='Page_260'></a>undertake some
+enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and
+precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual
+precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue
+and to cover its movements thoroughly.</p>
+
+<p>There are two kinds of marches,&mdash;those which are made out of sight of
+the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or
+retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in
+late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had
+been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had
+roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each
+other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing
+roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when
+an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
+guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
+obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &amp;c., if necessary, and
+secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of
+the army.</p>
+
+<p>In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and
+distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different
+distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and
+giving them instructions the following particulars must be
+considered:&mdash;1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of
+<i>mat&eacute;riel</i> in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles
+placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is
+important for the march to be concealed or open.</p>
+
+<p>Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging
+the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all
+those corps not marching with the column attached to the general
+head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the
+generals commanding those corps,&mdash;being careful, however, to let them
+understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
+then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the
+object to be attained, the route to be pursued <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 261]</span><a name='Page_261'></a>and the hour at which
+they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what
+corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads
+to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves
+accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the
+enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.<a name='FNanchor_36_36'></a><a href='#Footnote_36_36'><sup>[36]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the
+chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in
+position are mere pedantry,&mdash;more hurtful than useful. To see that they
+march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but
+they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the
+appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their
+command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats,
+however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into
+divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated.</p>
+
+<p>Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its
+march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient
+also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each
+column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools
+for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of
+these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light
+trestle-bridge train will be found very useful.</p>
+
+<p>4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard,
+or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing
+may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves
+and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced
+guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that
+half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these
+circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the
+road. It happens sometimes, however, when <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 262]</span><a name='Page_262'></a>the important stroke is to be
+made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the
+general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved
+in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the
+march of the center must be applied to that wing.</p>
+
+<p>Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of
+forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an
+accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his
+plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist
+the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed
+of light troops of all arms, containing some of the <i>&eacute;lite</i> troops of
+the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some
+horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &amp;c., with light trestles and
+pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out
+of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch
+of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of
+irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular
+cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such
+service.</p>
+
+<p>5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes
+the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which
+may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers
+will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being
+established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number
+of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected
+as the site of the principal depot.</p>
+
+<p>The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to
+thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance
+apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen
+depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into
+three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander
+and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the
+arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the
+authorities of the country, (if they <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 263]</span><a name='Page_263'></a>remain;) they furnish facilities
+for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees
+that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there
+should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the
+principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced
+within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and
+able general officers; for the security of the communications of the
+army often depends on their operations.<a name='FNanchor_37_37'></a><a href='#Footnote_37_37'><sup>[37]</sup></a> These commands may sometimes
+become strategic reserves, as was explained in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXIII'>Art. XXIII.</a>; a few good
+battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing
+continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to
+keep open the communications.</p>
+
+<p>6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to
+be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of
+march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires
+going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in
+silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous
+works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war.</p>
+
+<p>Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should
+be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of
+logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the
+French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of
+the army upon the campaign of 1815.</p>
+
+<p>In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such
+arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated,
+were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of
+the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue
+of the cam<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 264]</span><a name='Page_264'></a>paign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a
+skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
+for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated
+in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
+instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually
+transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent
+opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was
+his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to
+a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight
+line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into
+account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched
+at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the
+supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
+he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and
+precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point
+to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches
+necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a
+certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in
+mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the
+hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
+enough to make any man famous.</p>
+
+<p>Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
+Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
+Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
+thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
+between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
+Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
+seemed so very complicated.</p>
+
+<p>In the same manner, in 1815, when Bl&uuml;cher had his army quietly in
+cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
+attending <i>f&ecirc;tes</i> in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
+France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
+with diplomatic <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 265]</span><a name='Page_265'></a>ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
+but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
+Charleroi and Bl&uuml;cher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points
+of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
+plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
+leave Paris until the 12th.)</p>
+
+<p>The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
+calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
+logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
+I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
+came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
+recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and
+being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
+Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
+extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
+returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
+been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
+route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
+respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
+and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
+through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
+uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
+had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
+in a more retired position toward Ulm.</p>
+
+<p>The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun,
+Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as
+the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred
+thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the
+army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have
+five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,&mdash;which was a
+highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated.</p>
+
+<p>No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities having
+commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's ar<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 266]</span><a name='Page_266'></a>rival at Munich,
+this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a
+literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its
+obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon,
+but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal
+had had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the
+passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the
+speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point of
+being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one
+hundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleon
+succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the
+glorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckm&uuml;hl, and Ratisbon,
+that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his
+contemptible logistics.</p>
+
+<p>We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which
+preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before the
+battle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point of
+the island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that
+of Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful
+than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated
+the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains
+of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austrians
+and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military <i>f&ecirc;te</i>.
+These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the
+4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the
+Danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst
+torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the
+bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before
+mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they
+covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time
+than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver
+for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had,
+it is <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 267]</span><a name='Page_267'></a>true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;
+but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions
+is not at all diminished by it.</p>
+
+<p>Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten
+copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge
+of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing,
+whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the
+center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not
+been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene
+of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the
+enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few
+detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most
+remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that
+after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince
+of Wagram.</p>
+
+<p>The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;
+but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten
+copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of
+the troops?</p>
+
+<p>Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good
+logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this
+battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the
+midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it
+was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the
+banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These
+precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but
+they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well
+as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
+and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of
+the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness
+upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name,
+owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agree
+that Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures
+of an offensive <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 268]</span><a name='Page_268'></a>campaign, had then never seriously thought what would
+be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was
+present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future
+unless by his direction.</p></div>
+
+<p>To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomes
+necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances.
+They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and
+statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its
+accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &amp;c., and to learn its
+resources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences
+of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state,
+these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are
+still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any
+country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed
+with. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of
+making these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of my
+readers to them.</p>
+
+<p>Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to
+gain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made by
+detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up in
+battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the
+reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be
+thrown out to break through his screen of posts.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_33_33'></a><a href='#FNanchor_33_33'>[33]</a><div class='note'><p> I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are
+not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_34_34'></a><a href='#FNanchor_34_34'>[34]</a><div class='note'><p> The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the
+administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the
+general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of
+course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high
+officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of
+the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise,
+confusion is inevitable.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_35_35'></a><a href='#FNanchor_35_35'>[35]</a><div class='note'><p> I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram,
+and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated
+from his usual custom by issuing a general order.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_36_36'></a><a href='#FNanchor_36_36'>[36]</a><div class='note'><p> Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no
+general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten.
+In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often
+indispensable.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_37_37'></a><a href='#FNanchor_37_37'>[37]</a><div class='note'><p> It may be objected that in some wars, as where the
+population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to
+organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed
+to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most
+necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid
+was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the
+guerrillas,&mdash;although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the
+line extended as far as Cadiz.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information of
+the Movements of the Enemy.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to
+order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's
+proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if
+he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of
+the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
+utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 269]</span><a name='Page_269'></a>one of the
+chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice
+of war.</p>
+
+<p>From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply
+learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired
+that practical <i>coup-d'oeil</i> which is imparted by long experience in the
+direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a
+school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line
+of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of
+both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful,
+active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect
+riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the
+incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius.</p>
+
+<p>I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I had
+to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the
+man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy
+than for him who could make a grand display of theories,&mdash;things so
+difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once
+exemplified.</p>
+
+<p>There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations.
+The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in
+reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third,
+in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of
+probabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is
+also a fifth method,&mdash;that of signals. Although this is used rather for
+indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to
+his designs, it may be classed with the others.</p>
+
+<p>Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other
+agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for
+reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing
+beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that they
+should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining
+information; but I do say that their results are small and not to be
+depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is
+gene<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 270]</span><a name='Page_270'></a>rally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will
+always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their
+questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and
+deserters.</p>
+
+<p>The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of
+operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is
+almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information
+they possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally be
+successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the
+general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for
+him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his
+own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receives
+from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those
+which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally
+to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed
+through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Gera
+toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are they
+going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the most
+skillful spy cannot learn.</p>
+
+<p>When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the
+enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be
+thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report
+accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into
+corps d'arm&eacute;e which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to
+learn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the
+hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who
+always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, for
+example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known when
+they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to
+conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of
+smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly.</p>
+
+<p>A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making
+reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfaction
+say that this means hardly ever <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 271]</span><a name='Page_271'></a>failed me. Though fortune never placed
+me at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a
+hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils
+of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under
+consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of
+Europe; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in my
+hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. As
+I have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army can
+operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of
+operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that
+can possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and
+conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan
+which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the
+future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own
+observation.</p>
+
+<p>In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war with
+Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the
+operations which would take place.</p>
+
+<p>I made the three following hypotheses:&mdash;1st. The Prussians will await
+Napoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive as
+far as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or
+they will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontier
+of Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d.
+Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they will
+advance imprudently to Erfurt.</p>
+
+<p>I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the
+Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces,
+already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel and
+Mayence,&mdash;a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldier
+on the first of these roads since the Seven Years' War.</p>
+
+<p>These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask
+what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply &quot;that the
+mass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should be
+thrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for the
+gordian knot <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 272]</span><a name='Page_272'></a>of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan
+they should adopt.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line of
+retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. If
+they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof and
+Gera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way of
+Leipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack them
+by way of Gera and Hof.</p>
+
+<p>Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what
+mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certain
+of the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce,
+<i>a month before the war</i>, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did,
+and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at
+Jena and Naumburg!</p>
+
+<p>I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that
+were my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I have
+only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often
+arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without
+much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's
+movements.</p>
+
+<p>Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has been
+neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 the
+staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for
+such services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish the
+staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to
+send agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon's
+whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806,
+were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often suffered
+severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get
+information as to what was going on around them.</p>
+
+<p>The Russian army is better provided than any other for gathering
+information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and history
+confirms my assertion.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 273]</span><a name='Page_273'></a>The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of
+Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming
+and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as
+Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information
+furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf,
+Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
+through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
+intercepted near Ch&acirc;lons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed
+of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his
+whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns
+of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information
+decided Bl&uuml;cher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies,
+which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought
+to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.</p>
+
+<p>We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff
+saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left
+Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit
+this news,&mdash;which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of
+a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
+bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which
+decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon
+from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater
+facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous
+days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
+thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.</p>
+
+<p>Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good
+partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers.</p>
+
+<p>I will conclude this article with the following summary:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the
+enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
+reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable
+officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 274]</span><a name='Page_274'></a>2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter
+how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be
+sifted from them.</p>
+
+<p>3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.</p>
+
+<p>4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods
+mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses
+of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative
+situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of
+the principles of the art.</p>
+</div>
+<p>I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very
+unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,&mdash;as has so often happened
+to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should
+at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is
+going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each
+of these hypotheses.<a name='FNanchor_38_38'></a><a href='#Footnote_38_38'><sup>[38]</sup></a> It cannot be too much insisted upon that the
+real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these
+reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is
+always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of
+regulating one's conduct is neglected.</p>
+
+<p>In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to be
+gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds.
+Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all.
+Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact
+of his having established a telegraphic communication between the
+head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when the
+Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading
+Bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in
+twenty-four hours, of what was passing <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 275]</span><a name='Page_275'></a>at a distance of seven hundred
+miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he
+had gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the
+telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact is
+sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value.</p>
+
+<p>It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphic
+arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could
+communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of
+battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters.
+Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was given
+up,&mdash;for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. These
+communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method
+could not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be
+reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by
+signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be
+necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of
+transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain of
+rapidity.<a name='FNanchor_39_39'></a><a href='#Footnote_39_39'><sup>[39]</sup></a> attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle of
+Fleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist
+to observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not
+aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again
+used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the
+victory: of this, however, I have great doubts.</p>
+
+<p>It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness
+to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful
+observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy
+of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining
+information. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with
+it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's
+movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection
+with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its
+use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 276]</span><a name='Page_276'></a>and the difficulty of
+distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to
+which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very
+unreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatly
+embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was
+Grouchy or Bl&uuml;cher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but
+this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed.
+I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations
+when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic;
+and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the same
+point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was
+prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and the
+Elster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than
+in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at
+hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at
+pleasure.</p>
+
+<p>There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires
+kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of the
+telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an
+invasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have made
+use of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used to
+give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more
+rapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so
+as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's
+threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to
+meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of
+descents.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by
+means of military instruments. This method of signals has been brought
+to greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of.
+While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of
+setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of
+the commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before the
+problem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for
+skirmishers. A move<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 277]</span><a name='Page_277'></a>ment of a long line of troops may be made nearly
+simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly
+from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of
+inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but two
+cases of it in thirteen campaigns.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_38_38'></a><a href='#FNanchor_38_38'>[38]</a><div class='note'><p> I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in
+war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove
+the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the
+surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the
+opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been
+anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of
+probability or possibility.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_39_39'></a><a href='#FNanchor_39_39'>[39]</a><div class='note'><p> When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not
+known.&mdash;Translators.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CHAPTER_VII'></a><h2>CHAPTER VII.</h2>
+
+<h3>OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE
+OF THE THREE ARMS.</h3>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLIII'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>Posting Troops in Line of Battle.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Having explained in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXX'>Article XXX.</a> what is to be understood by the term
+<i>line of battle</i>, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed,
+and how the different troops are to be distributed in it.</p>
+
+<p>Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and
+brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines,
+each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usually
+placed upon the wings, and the artillery&mdash;which at this period was very
+unwieldy&mdash;was distributed along the front of each line. The army camped
+together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry
+wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns
+were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially
+applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on
+account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry
+had camped in a third line,&mdash;which was rare.</p>
+
+<p>This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary
+to give such orders as the following:&mdash;&quot;The army will move in such
+direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left.&quot; This
+monotonous but simple forma<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 278]</span><a name='Page_278'></a>tion was seldom deviated from; and no better
+could have been devised as war was carried on in those days.</p>
+
+<p>The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns
+as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,&mdash;a
+simple impossibility.</p>
+
+<p>If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping
+and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were
+applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty
+thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would
+be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach.</p>
+
+<p>The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up
+the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the
+field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground.
+This change was a real improvement,&mdash;although they went from one extreme
+to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the
+Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and
+cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended,
+either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an
+absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of
+the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen
+marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from
+each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support
+than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four
+hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his
+forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced,
+and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could
+do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns.</p>
+
+<p>Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly
+by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and
+partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where
+the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the
+government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly
+increas<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 279]</span><a name='Page_279'></a>ing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger
+organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system
+and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional
+system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two
+or three divisions, which he placed under the command of
+lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the
+reserve of his army.<a name='FNanchor_40_40'></a><a href='#Footnote_40_40'><sup>[40]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where
+he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had
+under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry,
+from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each
+corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an
+army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve,
+composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of
+light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry
+reserve. At a later period&mdash;1812&mdash;the cavalry was also organized into
+corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the
+constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near
+perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such
+great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon
+imitated.</p>
+
+<p>Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have
+recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act
+independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because
+this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would
+certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two
+brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades
+on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot
+with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three
+brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in
+reserve,&mdash;a manifest advantage. But, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 280]</span><a name='Page_280'></a>if thirty brigades formed in ten
+divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen
+divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this
+perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry
+by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to
+two,&mdash;which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps
+is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a
+division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for
+that<a name='FNanchor_41_41'></a><a href='#Footnote_41_41'><sup>[41]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<p>What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon
+a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics;
+because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization
+in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out
+continually.</p>
+
+<p>The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed to
+leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. The
+center under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and the
+reserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidable
+battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those
+of the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte
+and Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left,
+were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danube
+at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five
+divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to
+the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was
+destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Events
+are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau's
+campaign of 1800 proves that the original organ<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 281]</span><a name='Page_281'></a>ization may sometimes be
+maintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it would
+seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,&mdash;two wings, a center,
+and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strength
+of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes
+necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line
+in order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions are
+with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or
+give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the
+main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four
+great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four
+divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case there
+would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps
+should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to
+the center.</p>
+
+<p>With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line
+in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps
+may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and
+from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march
+of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak
+order of battle.</p>
+
+<p>These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of
+battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light
+cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more
+stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions.</p>
+
+<p>But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the
+units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the
+operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly
+varied. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the
+principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two
+or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have
+indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one
+behind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28
+inclusive.)</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 282]</span><a name='Page_282'></a><h3><i>Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry.</i></h3>
+
+<a name='Fig_17'></a>
+<a name='Fig_18'></a>
+<a name='Fig_19'></a>
+<a name='Fig_20'></a>
+<a name='Fig_21'></a>
+<a name='Fig_22'></a>
+
+
+<table align='center' border='0' cellpadding='2' cellspacing='0' summary=''>
+<tr><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 17.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 18.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 19.</h3></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='center'><img src='images/fig17.png' width='223' height='150' alt='Fig. 17. Two Corps deployed, One behind the Other.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig18.png' width='246' height='150' alt='Fig. 18. Two Corps formed Side by Side.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig19.png' width='276' height='150' alt='Fig. 19. Two Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.' title=''></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 20.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 21.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 22.</h3></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='center'><img src='images/fig20.png' width='287' height='150' alt='Fig. 20. Two Corps Side by Side.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig21.png' width='254' height='150' alt='Fig. 21. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig22.png' width='255' height='150' alt='Fig. 22. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each,
+placed Side by Side.' title=''></td></tr></table>
+
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 283]</span><a name='Page_283'></a><br /><br /><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_23'></a>
+<a name='Fig_24'></a>
+<a name='Fig_25'></a>
+
+<h3><i>Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each.</i></h3>
+
+<table align='center' border='0' cellpadding='2' cellspacing='0' summary=''>
+<tr><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 23.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 24.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 25.</h3></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='center'><img src='images/fig23.png' width='303' height='150' alt='Fig. 23.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig24.png' width='403' height='150' alt='Fig. 24.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig25.png' width='201' height='150' alt='Fig. 25.' title=''></td></tr></table>
+
+<br /><br /><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_26'></a>
+<a name='Fig_27'></a>
+
+<h3><i>Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each.</i></h3>
+
+<table align='center' border='0' cellpadding='2' cellspacing='0' summary=''>
+<tr><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 26.</h3></td><td align='center'><h3>Fig. 27.</h3></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='center'><img src='images/fig26.png' width='339' height='200' alt='Fig. 26. Two Divisions in the 1st Line, and one in the 2d Line.' title=''></td>
+<td align='center'><img src='images/fig27.png' width='463' height='200' alt='Fig. 27. Same Order with 3d Brigade as Reserve, and the 2 Corps Side by Side.' title=''></td></tr>
+</table>
+
+<br /><br /><br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 284]</span><a name='Page_284'></a>
+
+<a name='Fig_28'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 28.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig28.png' width='800' height='145' alt='Shallower Formation: Twelve Brigades in the First Line,
+and Six in the Second Line.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<blockquote><p>Note.&mdash;In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but
+these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in
+columns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached to
+the corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawn
+up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second.</p></blockquote>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 285]</span><a name='Page_285'></a>The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place
+two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly at
+Wagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be
+used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle;
+for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its
+reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under
+different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to
+support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for
+that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a
+colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable
+he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly
+needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line
+cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front
+was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own
+troops drawn up in rear.</p>
+
+<p>The table below<a name='FNanchor_42_42'></a><a href='#Footnote_42_42'><sup>[42]</sup></a> will show that the number of men in an army will
+have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that
+the subject is a complicated one.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 286]</span><a name='Page_286'></a>In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the
+case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to
+1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength
+from two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can
+be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of
+these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six
+for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that
+might require support. If this system be applied to an army of one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ
+divisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps.</p>
+
+<p>If nine divisions form the main body,&mdash;that is, the wings and the
+center,&mdash;and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen
+divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,&mdash;which would make one
+hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three
+battalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred and
+forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With
+regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and
+twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment
+contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men
+strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty
+thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men.
+These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must
+be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If an
+army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation
+by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was
+Napoleon's army of 1800.</p>
+
+<p>Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat
+permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out
+of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if
+it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the
+composition of corps and their positions.</p>
+
+<p>I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 287]</span><a name='Page_287'></a>may be gained
+while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. If
+the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the
+center,&mdash;that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of
+three,&mdash;and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing
+which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a
+corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce
+it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by
+a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy
+would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the
+line.</p>
+
+<p>But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that,
+whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the
+organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of
+Europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must
+be made upon that basis.</p>
+
+<p>The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in
+recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly it
+was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more
+reserves. In recent<a name='FNanchor_43_43'></a><a href='#Footnote_43_43'><sup>[43]</sup></a> conflicts in Europe, when the masses brought
+into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two
+lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines;
+and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of
+infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formation
+may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best
+for battle, as it is entirely too deep.</p>
+
+<p>The classical formation&mdash;if I may employ that term&mdash;is still two lines
+for the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and the
+strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but
+these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and
+the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of
+men to be simultaneously engaged.</p>
+
+<p>When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in
+front of the line of battle or be carried to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 288]</span><a name='Page_288'></a>the rear to strengthen the
+reserve;<a name='FNanchor_44_44'></a><a href='#Footnote_44_44'><sup>[44]</sup></a> but, as has been previously stated, this will not often
+happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each wing
+has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main
+or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading
+corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return
+to their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve
+is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent
+its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle
+by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding
+general.</p>
+
+<p>From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great
+changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of
+the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution,
+and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of
+Peter the Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from
+the stand-point of those days.</p>
+
+<p>One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of
+example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the
+cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an
+army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the
+center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the
+extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry
+to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference
+to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If
+the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the
+organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the
+center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If
+that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on
+the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 289]</span><a name='Page_289'></a>wing.
+These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be
+threatened.<a name='FNanchor_45_45'></a><a href='#Footnote_45_45'><sup>[45]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as
+formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division
+remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organization
+of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous
+distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake
+to scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for the
+proper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise
+as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one
+hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support,
+as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into
+much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the
+following rules:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move
+freely in every direction.</p>
+
+<p>2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy
+caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from
+sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add&mdash;what
+every young officer should know already&mdash;that too elevated positions are
+not those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping
+ground is better.</p>
+
+<p>3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is
+well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily
+thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to have
+horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible
+to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for
+self-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve;
+for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself
+when his line had been broken through between the center and the left.</p>
+
+<p>4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 290]</span><a name='Page_290'></a>batteries in
+front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to
+attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of
+checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns.</p>
+
+<p>5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not
+in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole
+line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must
+not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of
+the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the
+artillery to move to a wing or to the center.</p>
+
+<p>6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very
+powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make
+a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a
+degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate
+of the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say as
+to the employment of artillery in battles.</p></div>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_40_40'></a><a href='#FNanchor_40_40'>[40]</a><div class='note'><p> Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing
+of three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under
+Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, the
+general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own
+immediate orders.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_41_41'></a><a href='#FNanchor_41_41'>[41]</a><div class='note'><p> Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two
+brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while
+the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each
+may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But it
+then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have
+but two in a corps,&mdash;which would be a faulty arrangement, because the
+corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than
+the division.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_42_42'></a><a href='#FNanchor_42_42'>[42]</a><div class='note'><p> Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,&mdash;in
+all, four principal subdivisions,&mdash;besides accidental detachments.
+</p><p>
+Below are some of the different formations that may be given to
+infantry.
+</p><p>
+1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<table align='center' border='0' cellpadding='2' cellspacing='0' summary=''>
+<tr><td align='left'>Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and three divisions for detachments</td><td align='center'>11 = 22 = 88 = 72,000</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='left'>Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for detachments</td><td align='center'>15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='left'>Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for detachments</td><td align='center'>16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000</td></tr></table>
+
+
+<p>2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<table align='center' border='0' cellpadding='2' cellspacing='0' summary=''>
+<tr><td align='left'>Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, besides detachments</td><td align='center'>11 = 22 = 132 = 105,000</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='left'>Four corps of three divisions each, besides detachments</td><td align='center'>15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000</td></tr>
+
+<tr><td align='left'>Eight corps of two divisions each</td><td align='center'>16 = 32 = 192 = 154,000</td></tr></table>
+
+
+<p>If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and
+engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known.
+</p><p>
+It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred
+men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months'
+campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then each
+battalion should contain one thousand men.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_43_43'></a><a href='#FNanchor_43_43'>[43]</a><div class='note'><p> The term <i>recent</i> here refers to the later wars of
+Napoleon I.&mdash;Translators.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_44_44'></a><a href='#FNanchor_44_44'>[44]</a><div class='note'><p> As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every
+day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour
+of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the
+line of battle.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_45_45'></a><a href='#FNanchor_45_45'>[45]</a><div class='note'><p> This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon
+the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This is
+the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLIV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLIV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Formation and Employment of Infantry.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it
+forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense
+of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general,
+the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory,
+it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and
+artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times
+be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial
+success.</p>
+
+<p>We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and
+the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided,
+is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of
+Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages
+of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep
+order. I will give my own opinion farther on.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 291]</span><a name='Page_291'></a>There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question
+now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank,
+armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of
+producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater
+resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the
+difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in
+three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the
+disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who
+had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material
+advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for
+it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops
+takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn
+their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase
+in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing
+upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much
+mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult
+to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:
+although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks
+cannot be kept properly closed.</p>
+
+<p>Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd
+that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He
+wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred
+and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask
+what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may
+penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.</p>
+
+<p>But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of
+deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of
+attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division
+and depending on its force and impetuosity?</p>
+
+<p>I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of
+the question in hand.</p>
+
+<p>There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 292]</span><a name='Page_292'></a>attack an
+enemy:&mdash;l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or
+checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central
+divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares.</p>
+
+<p>The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers
+are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage
+of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up
+intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position.</p>
+
+<p>These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four:
+the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the
+half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on
+the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are
+partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed
+of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other.</p>
+<br />
+
+<a name='FNanchor_46_46'></a>
+<a name='Fig_29'></a>
+<h3>FIG. 29. <a href='#Footnote_46_46'><sup>[46]</sup></a>
+<br />Deployed in order of two lines.</h3>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig29.png' width='500' height='37' alt='Fig. 29.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+
+<p>The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used
+to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These
+deployed lines may either be continuous, (<a href='#Fig_29'>Fig. 29</a>,) or checkerwise, or
+in echelons.</p>
+<a name='Fig_30'></a>
+
+<h3>Fig. 30.<br />
+Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in
+the intervals.</h3>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig30.png' width='500' height='101' alt='Fig. 30.
+
+Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in
+the intervals.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>A more compact order is shown in <a href='#Fig_30'>Fig. 30</a>, where each battalion is formed
+into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division.
+It is really a line of small columns</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 293]</span><a name='Page_293'></a>In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions<a name='FNanchor_47_47'></a><a href='#Footnote_47_47'><sup>[47]</sup></a> will
+have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way
+too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the
+artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed,
+whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two
+ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the
+other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of
+the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these
+skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (<a href='#Fig_31'>See Fig. 31</a>.)
+Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides
+those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be,
+also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having
+really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred
+men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each
+battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.<a name='FNanchor_48_48'></a><a href='#Footnote_48_48'><sup>[48]</sup></a> A battalion of
+eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four
+divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first
+alone&mdash;and only two ranks of that&mdash;discharge their pieces. Bach
+battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a
+volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in <a href='#Fig_31'>Fig. 31</a> it would deliver
+four hundred.</p>
+
+<a name='Fig_31'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 31.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig31.png' width='500' height='105' alt='Fig. 31.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 294]</span><a name='Page_294'></a>While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we
+must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and
+that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to
+fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement
+is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous
+against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three
+ranks&mdash;forming a kind of solid square&mdash;would be better against cavalry.
+The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly
+at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my
+chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave
+cavalry of Bessi&egrave;res could make no impression upon these small masses.</p>
+
+<p>To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it
+is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would
+be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a
+charge than the three-rank formation,&mdash;particularly on the flanks. If to
+remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military
+men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as
+columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two
+ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry,
+only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if
+the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be
+difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is
+scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to
+employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that
+any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed
+lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns
+of attack.</p>
+
+<p>I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of
+forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be
+employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable
+than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would
+be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation.</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 295]</span><a name='Page_295'></a>
+<a name='Fig_32'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 32.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig32.png' width='400' height='59' alt='Fig. 32.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento
+and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions,
+one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in
+columns. (<a href='#Fig_32'>See Fig. 32.</a>) This arrangement&mdash;which belongs also to the
+half-deep order&mdash;is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the
+first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him
+into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may
+debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in
+disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the
+leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line
+with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a
+half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,&mdash;a by no means
+unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear
+that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
+battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the
+enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may be
+useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it.</p><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_33'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 33.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig33.png' width='225' height='205' alt='Fig 33.' title=''>
+</center>
+<br />
+<a name='Fig_34'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 34.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig34.png' width='409' height='137' alt='Fig 34.' title=''>
+</center><br />
+
+<p>The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly the
+most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were
+sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six
+ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the
+destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are
+diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such
+masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated.
+Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great
+sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have
+been vic<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 296]</span><a name='Page_296'></a>torious had it not been for the successes of Davoust and
+Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line.</p>
+
+<p>When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly
+be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that
+if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in
+its progress. (<a href='#Fig_33'>See Fig. 33.</a>) Under the protection of these battalions,
+which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to
+the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed
+to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will
+be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as was
+the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.</p>
+
+<p>Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority
+in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for the
+defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (<a href='#Fig_35'>See Figs. 35,
+36, 37.</a>)</p><br /><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_35'></a>
+<a name='Fig_36'></a>
+<a name='Fig_37'></a>
+
+<h3>Fig. 35.<br /> Division in battalion squares.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig35.png' width='500' height='102' alt='Fig. 35. Division in battalion squares.' title=''>
+</center>
+<br /><br />
+<h3>Fig. 36.<br />The same division in long battalion squares.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig36.png' width='500' height='86' alt='Fig. 36. The same division in long battalion squares.' title=''>
+</center>
+<br /><br />
+<h3>Fig. 37.<br />Squared of regiments of three battalions.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig37.png' width='200' height='88' alt='Fig. 37. Squared of regiments of three battalions.' title=''>
+</center>
+<br /><br />
+<p>The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front
+and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. A
+regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling
+the center battalion half to the right and half to the left.</p>
+
+<p>In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because
+hostilities were carried on in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 297]</span><a name='Page_297'></a>the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia,
+or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if the
+seat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular
+cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions
+usual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the
+Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia.</p>
+
+<p>However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions
+seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the
+superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for
+the enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to a
+battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and
+one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed
+battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; but
+there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the
+battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also,
+of being prepared to resist cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each
+other. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with
+deployed lines.</p>
+
+<p>It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described
+is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness
+of which every one will assent,&mdash;that a formation suitable for the
+offensive must possess the characteristics of <i>solidity, mobility</i>, and
+<i>momentum</i>, whilst for the defensive <i>solidity</i> is requisite, and also
+the power of delivering <i>as much fire as possible</i>.</p>
+
+<p>This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the
+bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in
+presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one
+round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand
+in five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been
+carried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a
+shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of <i>momentum</i> and
+the moral effect it produces; but <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 298]</span><a name='Page_298'></a>under the cool and deadly fire of the
+English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera,
+Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo.</p>
+
+<p>We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the
+advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for
+when the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not
+at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they
+were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been
+repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had used
+columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the
+center? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of
+the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep
+order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a
+deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like <a href='#Fig_31'>Fig. 31</a>,
+(<a href='#Page_293'>page 293.</a>) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I have
+seen them tried.</p>
+
+<p>Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to
+attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into action
+while firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose the
+attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while
+firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended
+position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired
+point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of
+sheep.</p>
+
+<p>What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If the
+deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive.
+2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for
+carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as
+much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy
+a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's
+fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by
+cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the second
+in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may be
+successful <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 299]</span><a name='Page_299'></a>in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use
+his troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles <a href='#ARTICLE_XVI'>XVI.</a> and <a href='#ARTICLE_XXX'>XXX.</a></p>
+
+<p>Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been
+made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more
+destructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer the
+shallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget the
+lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries,
+shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method
+of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some
+persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and
+breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack
+in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployed
+system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the
+attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with
+proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position,
+or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of
+companies,&mdash;all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy
+who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillful
+commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these
+arrangements, according to circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical
+problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle;
+but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a
+single method is an impossibility.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, the topography of different countries is very
+various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might be
+maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, the
+valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a
+division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, and
+their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the
+system of formation.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instruction
+in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 300]</span><a name='Page_300'></a>in movements in long lines
+so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which
+would be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies
+of the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that
+nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who think
+that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all
+countries.</p>
+
+<p>To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it
+seems to me, we ought to find out:&mdash;1. The best method of moving when in
+sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of coming
+to close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order.</p>
+
+<p>In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all
+cases to exercise the troops&mdash;1. In marching in columns of battalions
+doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when
+coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in
+continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in
+deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,&mdash;as these broken lines are
+more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front by
+the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares,
+either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these
+different methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by
+columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,&mdash;a more
+expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best
+suited to all kinds of ground.</p>
+
+<p>Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of
+companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plain
+it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. It
+breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates
+to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all
+confusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger to
+which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by
+cavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and
+not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over
+the first part of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 301]</span><a name='Page_301'></a>the large interval separating the two armies. At the
+least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed
+instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whatever
+precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with
+well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have never
+seen it tried in presence of an enemy,&mdash;but frequently at drills, where
+it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front.</p>
+
+<p>I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in
+checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same
+battalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, have
+never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkered
+order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. It
+may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it
+more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the
+leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form
+line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only
+between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget
+that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one,
+which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the
+marches of continuous lines.</p>
+
+<p>It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for
+making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods I
+have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-four
+battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center
+ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace
+toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then
+deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread
+out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and
+pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows
+the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through
+the intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when no
+enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the
+advantages of firing and of the column.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 302]</span><a name='Page_302'></a>Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of
+attacking in the half-deep order.</p>
+
+<p>The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others
+in column on the wings of those deployed, (<a href='#Fig_32'>Fig. 32,</a>) <a href='#Page_295'>page 295.</a> The
+deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would
+open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. The
+second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching
+half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line
+through the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons,
+mentioned on <a href='#Page_193'>page 193</a>, and shown in <a href='#Fig_15'>Fig. 15</a> on that page.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed
+lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the
+other party takes to its heels,&mdash;a case not likely to happen.</p>
+
+<p>I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for I
+have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats of
+infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing
+to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly
+against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or
+repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved
+out to meet the advance. I have seen <i>m&ecirc;l&eacute;es</i> of infantry in defiles and
+in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision
+and thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing on
+a regular field of battle.</p>
+
+<p>In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and
+should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fire
+of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation;
+and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of
+tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every
+different nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper
+combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must,
+however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 303]</span><a name='Page_303'></a>I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be
+attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops
+as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by
+withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all
+inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of
+the enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range,
+it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is
+then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers
+and troops on the defensive.</p>
+
+<p>It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a
+position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is
+assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must
+never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene,
+seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke
+through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were
+sacrificed in defending these posts.</p>
+
+<p>For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood,
+which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the
+troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the
+enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park of
+Hougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influence
+the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended,
+may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the
+possession of the woods was very important.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_46_46'></a><a href='#FNanchor_46_46'>[46]</a><div class='note'><p> In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of
+twelve battalions.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_47_47'></a><a href='#FNanchor_47_47'>[47]</a><div class='note'><p> The word <i>division</i> being used to designate four or five
+regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of
+confusion in its use.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_48_48'></a><a href='#FNanchor_48_48'>[48]</a><div class='note'><p> In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from the
+third rank of each division,&mdash;which makes the column eight men in depth,
+instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying the
+skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the
+whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three
+divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there
+would be twelve ranks.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLV'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLV.</h2>
+
+<h3>Cavalry.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course,
+somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole
+army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be
+so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper
+moments.</p>
+
+<p>The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied
+greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 304]</span><a name='Page_304'></a>nations making their
+people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of
+horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the
+Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly
+inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was
+pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,&mdash;a weak
+brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same
+reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,&mdash;so
+much had ideas and means changed.</p>
+
+<p>As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country
+should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in
+mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.</p>
+
+<p>The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of
+motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we
+must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever may be its importance in the <i>ensemble</i> of the operations of
+war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of
+infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to
+render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the
+enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered
+infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient
+in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats
+extremely difficult.</p>
+
+<p>The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon
+the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's
+movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned
+here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its
+use.</p>
+
+<p>All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good
+order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be
+supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly
+for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great
+fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged
+to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 305]</span><a name='Page_305'></a>for
+charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing
+infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others
+prove this.</p>
+
+<p>There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over
+infantry,&mdash;when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they
+cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau,
+and so did the Austrian left at Dresden.</p>
+
+<p>Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way
+may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was
+made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against
+squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed.</p>
+
+<p>A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and
+enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry
+must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this
+character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of
+before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The
+beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic,
+October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo
+with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because
+unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince
+Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under
+such circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it
+from the field of battle and return more free to act against his
+infantry.</p>
+
+<p>Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an
+enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the
+infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if
+successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is
+rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good;
+for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in
+rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is
+particularly fitted.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 306]</span><a name='Page_306'></a>In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by
+opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing
+line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It
+may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause
+the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success.
+This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at
+Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'arm&eacute;e
+may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined
+attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to
+finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat.</p>
+
+<p>It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it
+depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but
+four methods of charging,&mdash;in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a
+gallop, and in open order,&mdash;all of which may be successfully used. In
+charges in line, the lance is very useful; in <i>m&ecirc;l&eacute;es</i>, the saber is
+much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank,
+which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which
+finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is
+of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or
+when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous
+to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of
+cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy,
+and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack.
+There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on
+horseback and in rapid motion.</p>
+
+<p>I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good.
+It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the
+advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the
+contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every
+thing depends, in such a case, upon the <i>ensemble</i> and good order of the
+movement,&mdash;things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop.
+Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over
+the ground as rapidly as possible. In <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 307]</span><a name='Page_307'></a>like manner, if the cavalry is
+armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the
+enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the
+cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since
+the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of
+good order: in a <i>m&ecirc;l&eacute;e</i> the lance is almost useless.</p>
+
+<p>If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop
+to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the
+trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its
+apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is
+estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his
+firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping
+in confusion.</p>
+
+<p>In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the
+small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where
+lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is
+much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any
+advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good
+squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers
+armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models
+for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using
+cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an
+enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be
+completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry,
+it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in
+collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It
+is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a
+quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head.</p>
+
+<p>Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and
+organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes
+when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an
+enemy who cannot reach <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 308]</span><a name='Page_308'></a>them; but it is a very good plan to have a
+second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily
+handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become
+broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of
+lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge,
+penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory.</p>
+
+<p>The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of
+strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry,
+the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men
+of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances,
+believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of
+former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would
+certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they
+should not have lances like those of the light cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called
+dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of
+mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in
+retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a
+soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This
+might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when
+fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought
+quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest
+inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of
+being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot
+resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with
+his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has
+more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make
+men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more
+reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave
+foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always
+depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other
+things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 309]</span><a name='Page_309'></a>of the
+commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and
+musketry fire, rain,&mdash;mud, even,&mdash;have been the causes of repulses or of
+victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted,
+will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these
+truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their
+adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case
+with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to
+fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like
+foot-soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring
+soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties.</p>
+
+<p>The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or
+mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large
+number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while
+he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French
+dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment
+of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this
+concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the
+instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and
+that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions
+of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might
+result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on
+horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It
+thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have
+their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between
+the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the
+army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and
+then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.</p>
+
+<p>Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is
+applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry
+than full lines; whilst for infantry lines <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 310]</span><a name='Page_310'></a>drawn up checkerwise are too
+much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed
+in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise
+formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements
+before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend
+themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full
+lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is
+checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is
+well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less
+than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full.
+It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be
+left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column
+upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of
+the troops which have been brought up.</p>
+
+<p>2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used,
+cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions.
+The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling
+on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only
+four squadrons, there can be but two lines.</p>
+
+<p>3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed <i>en masse</i> like
+that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron
+distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge
+separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops
+engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be
+closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be
+passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be
+kept beyond cannon-range.</p>
+
+<p>4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a
+combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in
+echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form
+to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction.</p>
+
+<p>5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons
+against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is at<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 311]</span><a name='Page_311'></a>tacked in front.
+Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and
+it may be better.</p>
+
+<p>6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the
+commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the
+formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would
+not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the
+other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and
+one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper
+reserve behind it,&mdash;an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in
+a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for
+a general to control the deployed regiments.</p>
+
+<p>By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to
+dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a
+general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to
+think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may
+then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as
+a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the
+line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be
+preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the
+others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three
+regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks
+of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is
+beaten back. (<a href='#Fig_38'>See Fig. 38.</a>)</p><br />
+
+<a name='Fig_38'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.<br /><br />
+Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
+lines.</h3>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig38.png' width='300' height='96' alt='Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.
+
+Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
+lines.' title=''>
+</center><br /><br />
+
+<p>7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all
+encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must
+sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first
+charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy
+will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at
+length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that,
+with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 312]</span><a name='Page_312'></a>the victory will
+remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness
+to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also
+engaged.</p>
+
+<p>Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the
+proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large
+cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very
+unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career
+the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a
+blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the
+attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian
+cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.</p>
+
+<p>In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never
+intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons,
+or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry,
+expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other,
+the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line
+breaks and turns.<a name='FNanchor_49_49'></a><a href='#Footnote_49_49'><sup>[49]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>With cavalry still more than with infantry the <i>morale</i> is very
+important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and
+the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the <i>m&ecirc;l&eacute;e</i> or
+in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the
+adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is
+adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 313]</span><a name='Page_313'></a>victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious
+formation.</p>
+
+<p>The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old
+disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get
+the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious
+encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to
+the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy
+by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several
+exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry
+seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry,
+I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does
+not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship,
+organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude
+it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to
+accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They
+acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst
+they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common
+object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
+Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.</p>
+
+<p>Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the
+best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that
+they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate
+of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack
+in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.</p>
+
+<p>From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry
+a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting,
+however, to provide, for skirmishing, &amp;c., an irregular cavalry armed
+with pistols, lances, and sabers.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a
+numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great
+influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a
+feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can
+carry off his convoys, it can encircle <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 314]</span><a name='Page_314'></a>his army, make his
+communications very perilous, and destroy the <i>ensemble</i> of his
+operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising
+<i>en masse</i> of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and
+rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty
+in his calculations.</p>
+
+<p>Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides
+for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation
+of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons,
+be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not
+possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on
+horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure
+supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off
+than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of
+her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she
+can bring into the field at very short notice.</p></div>
+
+<p>Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the
+Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&quot;The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are
+not to be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the
+shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are
+terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable
+obstacle to the execution of a general's designs,&mdash;because he can
+never be sure of the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys
+are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had
+only a few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real
+value has not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen
+thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully
+recognized,&mdash;especially in a country where the population is not
+hostile to them.</p>
+
+<p>&quot;When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a
+strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much
+unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's
+regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.</p>
+
+<p>&quot;<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 315]</span><a name='Page_315'></a>Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out,
+may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered
+and move freely about from point to point.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources
+possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia
+have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if
+for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those
+occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as
+forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on
+outposts, &amp;c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be
+more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the
+line,&mdash;because the fear of compromising a body of these last often
+restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where
+he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose
+excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_49_49'></a><a href='#FNanchor_49_49'>[49]</a><div class='note'><p> To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the
+battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry
+in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise.
+Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed
+checkered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success was
+his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirch
+and Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight
+squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had
+twice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But I
+cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which I
+have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry
+tactics,&mdash;a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLVI'></a><h2>ARTICLE XLVI.</h2>
+
+<h3>Employment of Artillery.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and
+defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break
+an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the
+troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the
+strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it
+inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral
+effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of
+approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less
+important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched
+camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of
+fortification.</p>
+
+<p>I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as
+to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is
+difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the
+battle itself. It will not be right to say that <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 316]</span><a name='Page_316'></a>artillery can act
+independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At
+Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the
+gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check
+the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance.
+This was a special case, and should not be often imitated.</p>
+
+<p>I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules,
+observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service,
+(1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say
+little with reference to them.</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should
+concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be
+struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it
+assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive
+movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended
+for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an
+offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column
+without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may
+have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.</p>
+
+<p>3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be
+held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.<a name='FNanchor_50_50'></a><a href='#Footnote_50_50'><sup>[50]</sup></a>
+For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence
+it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the
+best positions for the heavy calibers.</p>
+
+<p>4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the
+defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points
+where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of
+the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery
+should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 317]</span><a name='Page_317'></a>the
+battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The
+distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these.</p>
+
+<p>5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the
+front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet
+firing: a converging fire is the best.</p>
+
+<p>6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in
+battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their
+batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries,
+in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may
+be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed
+against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor
+to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can
+be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is
+produced.</p>
+
+<p>8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It
+is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank
+and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is
+inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it.
+The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few
+pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked
+them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he
+was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards
+upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far
+overbalancing the risks run.</p>
+
+<p>9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and
+especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be
+deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this.</p>
+
+<p>10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry,
+preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells,
+and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in
+such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and,
+when necessary, the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 318]</span><a name='Page_318'></a>cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind
+the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they
+should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller
+squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in
+frightening the horses.</p>
+
+<p>11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its
+fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon.
+The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the
+battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of
+the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by
+the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will
+cause its destruction.</p>
+
+<p>12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon
+conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,&mdash;whilst in 1812 he
+invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed.
+These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible.
+Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this
+allowance will depend on circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between
+wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery,
+whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A
+remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong
+artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The
+great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the
+Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With
+wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along
+the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and
+to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously
+captured. In three months he doubled the <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> and <i>personnel</i> of
+his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own
+frontiers,&mdash;a feat without a parallel in the annals of war.</p>
+
+<p>13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage
+is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist
+and tactician. This chief should be <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 319]</span><a name='Page_319'></a>authorized to dispose not only of
+the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the
+different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with
+the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of
+the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful
+issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus
+massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding
+general.</p></div>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_50_50'></a><a href='#FNanchor_50_50'>[50]</a><div class='note'><p> Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by
+mounting the men on the boxes.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='ARTICLE_XLVII'></a><h2><b>ARTICLE XLVII.</b></h2>
+
+<h3>Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the
+combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by
+considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if
+I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed
+operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid
+down for each of the arms.</p>
+
+<p>Several authors&mdash;chiefly German&mdash;have treated this subject very
+extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they
+consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual
+minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the
+place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the
+subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the
+commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ
+them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after
+all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the
+attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in
+every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied,
+would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the
+object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the
+consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best
+works which do treat of them.</p>
+
+<p>I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms
+be posted in conformity with the character of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 320]</span><a name='Page_320'></a>the ground, according to
+the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they
+be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being
+taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the
+events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of
+war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability
+to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of
+the three arms, either single or combined.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='CONCLUSION'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 321]</span><a name='Page_321'></a><h2>CONCLUSION.</h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be
+regarded as fundamental in war. War in its <i>ensemble</i> is not a science,
+but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed
+laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of
+war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as
+often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may
+become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a
+thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The
+passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the
+warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their
+commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and
+epochs,<a name='FNanchor_51_51'></a><a href='#Footnote_51_51'><sup>[51]</sup></a>&mdash;in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and
+metaphysics of war,&mdash;will have a permanent influence on its results.</p>
+
+<p>Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as
+tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What
+military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are
+we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by
+inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their
+battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and
+Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena,
+or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When
+the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured
+victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their
+favor the great probability of leading to <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 322]</span><a name='Page_322'></a>success, shall their
+occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their
+value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a
+theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the
+whole number of chances of success in its favor?</p>
+
+<p>The <i>morale</i> of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the
+fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect
+produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a
+hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly
+enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than
+the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same
+point.</p>
+
+<p>Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the
+greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the
+theater of war or of the zone of operations.</p>
+
+<p>Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they
+shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the
+art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point
+of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of
+fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which
+I use the term.</p>
+
+<p>A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed
+of military <i>coup-d'oeil</i>, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent
+strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in
+presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out,
+and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be
+able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his
+wits he will lose his army.</p>
+
+<p>The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and
+strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory
+that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately
+seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a
+decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor
+courage, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 323]</span><a name='Page_323'></a>and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,<a name='FNanchor_52_52'></a><a href='#Footnote_52_52'><sup>[52]</sup></a> he will
+undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations
+can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
+unavoidable defeat.</p>
+
+<p>No system of tactics can lead to victory when the <i>morale</i> of an army is
+bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some
+occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling.
+Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence
+to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.</p>
+
+<p>These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound
+rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will
+lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with
+mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but
+it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which
+should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for
+these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding
+brave troops, means of almost certain success.</p>
+
+<p>The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains
+to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability
+consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however,
+leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim
+relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the
+greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and
+place. In <a href='#CHAPTER_III'>Chapter III.</a> I have specified all the strategic combinations
+which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to
+be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for
+the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the
+field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a
+strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a
+column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 324]</span><a name='Page_324'></a>coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist
+of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear,
+or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the
+adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause
+of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is
+simply impossible.</p>
+
+<p>If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war,
+his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he
+may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents
+for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly
+proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most
+suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep
+constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to
+lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly
+endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective
+points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its
+subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance,
+depending upon its first successes.</p>
+
+<p>The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to
+neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting
+operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the
+war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of
+the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the
+purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places,
+covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &amp;c.</p>
+
+<p>Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but
+no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain
+always,&mdash;the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your
+lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well
+concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements
+which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful
+in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of
+your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 325]</span><a name='Page_325'></a>about equally
+matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those
+stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and
+Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the
+chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.</p>
+
+<p>If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully
+studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great
+masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles
+nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of
+Frederick, that &quot;a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince
+Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual
+events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true
+school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great
+men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take
+rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.</p>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_51_51'></a><a href='#FNanchor_51_51'>[51]</a><div class='note'><p> The well-known Spanish proverb, <i>He was brave on such a
+day</i>, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at
+Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at
+Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_52_52'></a><a href='#FNanchor_52_52'>[52]</a><div class='note'><p> The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable
+of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who
+will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result
+of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.</p></div>
+
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 326]</span><a name='Page_326'></a>
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='SUPPLEMENT'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 327]</span><a name='Page_327'></a><h2><b>SUPPLEMENT</b></h2>
+
+<h4>TO THE</h4>
+
+<h3>SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the
+military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a
+concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give
+it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the
+means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic <i>coup-d'oeil</i>.</p>
+
+<p>It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that
+in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy
+for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to
+which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of
+these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend
+them clearly and to apply them properly.</p>
+
+<p>I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of
+war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary
+intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity,
+many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly.
+Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing
+themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is
+just within their reach if they only would think so.</p>
+
+<p>Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: <i>he
+must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it
+to a successful termination</i>. The first of these talents may be a
+natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The
+second depends more <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 328]</span><a name='Page_328'></a>on individual character, is rather a personal
+attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.</p>
+
+<p>It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government
+to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he
+may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations
+and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted
+to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity
+of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and
+having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the
+command of an army.</p>
+
+<p>If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive
+ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military
+combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have
+characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only
+brave soldiers without being at all improved by study.</p>
+
+<p>From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to
+several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of
+the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths.</p>
+
+<p>The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to
+choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the
+enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the
+importance of decisive points,&mdash;which is not a difficult matter when he
+is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in
+Articles from <a href='#ARTICLE_XVIII'>XVIII.</a> to <a href='#ARTICLE_XXII'>XXII.</a></p>
+
+<p>The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the
+theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (<a href='#ARTICLE_XVII'>See Article
+XVII.</a>) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two
+fundamental principles: the first being, <i>to obtain by free and rapid
+movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against
+fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive
+direction</i>,&mdash;that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of
+his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time
+his success would yield him no great advantages.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 329]</span><a name='Page_329'></a>The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these
+two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected
+or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also
+would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending
+out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every
+well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with
+central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than
+the enemy's.</p>
+
+<p>The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If
+you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's,
+you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of
+them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to
+observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty
+battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to
+take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior
+lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile
+line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these
+means is to be preferred. (See <a href='#Page_114'>pages 114</a> and following.)</p>
+
+<p>In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember <i>&quot;that a
+strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a
+center and two extremities.&quot;</i> A theater has usually three zones,&mdash;a
+right, a left, and a central.</p>
+
+<p>In choosing a zone of operations, select one,&mdash;1, that will furnish a
+safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by
+yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in
+mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the
+dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near
+the theater of war.</p>
+
+<p>One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the
+other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts
+must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are
+two very different kinds: some, that are <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 330]</span><a name='Page_330'></a>called <i>territorial or
+geographical objectives</i>, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense
+which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched
+camp to be captured; <i>the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in
+the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving
+attention to geographical points of any kind</i>. This was the favorite
+objective of Napoleon.<a name='FNanchor_53_53'></a><a href='#Footnote_53_53'><sup>[53]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this
+point, (<a href='#Page_86'>page 86</a>;) <i>and, as the choice of the objective is by far the
+most important thing in a plan of operations</i>, I recommend the whole of
+<a href='#ARTICLE_XIX'>Article XIX.</a>, (<a href='#Page_84'>pages 84 and following.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one
+or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the
+fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the
+character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the
+enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his
+troops. <a href='#ARTICLE_XXI'>Article XXI.</a> treats this subject fully. If two geographical
+lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces
+along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by
+detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main
+body.</p>
+
+<p>The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in
+presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary
+strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy
+may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important
+consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations
+and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in <a href='#ARTICLE_XX'>Article XX.</a>,
+(<a href='#Page_93'>page 93.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that
+the front be less extensive than the enemy's,&mdash;especially if the front
+remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more
+closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and
+more easily <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 331]</span><a name='Page_331'></a>than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will
+be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot
+concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving
+in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be
+able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious
+measure.</p>
+
+<p>But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position,
+that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point,
+is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each
+other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War;
+or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its
+sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the
+enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical
+inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the
+extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his
+masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.</p>
+
+<p>It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive
+points of a theater of war, requires two things:&mdash;1st, that the
+principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's,
+to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be
+adopted,&mdash;that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points
+already known, and afterward upon secondary points.</p>
+
+<p>To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a
+sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (<a href='#map_3'>See Plate
+III.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the
+frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.</p>
+
+<p>The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)</p>
+
+<p>The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin.
+(No. 3.)</p>
+
+<p>The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and
+was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong
+detachments. (No. 4.)</p>
+
+<p>Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 332]</span><a name='Page_332'></a>Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and
+Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)</p>
+
+<p>Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)</p>
+
+<p>The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)</p>
+
+<p>The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)</p>
+
+<p>General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No.
+10.)</p>
+
+<p>The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile
+corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise,
+Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,)
+composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern
+frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's
+line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood,
+(i, k, l, m.)</p>
+
+<p>This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near
+Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the
+Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of
+Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the
+Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges,
+and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser
+from the lines of Wissembourg.</p>
+
+<p>The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar
+operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the
+allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5,
+and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected
+three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at
+Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the
+Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North
+Sea, and would have obtained immense results.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance
+that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the
+English. Besides this, York's corps, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 333]</span><a name='Page_333'></a>encamped on the downs, might be
+cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for
+this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good
+reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The
+principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
+strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of
+retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of
+punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the
+English as he might have done.</p>
+
+<p>It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the
+whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had
+decisive results, <i>because the attacks were made in front</i>, and because,
+when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through,
+and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession,
+none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the
+French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
+had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
+fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski,
+assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him
+vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at
+Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.</p>
+
+<p>I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two
+important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses
+of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession
+and at decisive points.<a name='FNanchor_54_54'></a><a href='#Footnote_54_54'><sup>[54]</sup></a></p>
+
+<p>Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and
+will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon
+their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say,
+the great <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 334]</span><a name='Page_334'></a>part of the force must be moved against one wing or the
+center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of
+importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater
+accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following
+them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every
+precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a
+dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up.
+Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose
+positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with
+<i>offensive returns</i>, (<a href='#ARTICLE_XXX'>Art. XXX.</a>;) the simultaneous employment of the
+forces in striking the decisive blow, (<a href='#Page_202'>see pages from 202 to 204;</a>) the
+faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune
+moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as
+the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which
+will constitute him a skillful tactician.</p>
+
+<p>It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of
+battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here
+that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little
+value.</p>
+
+<p>It is important, also, to consider attentively <a href='#ARTICLE_XLII'>Article XLII.</a>, which
+explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to
+what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall
+himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be
+prepared for any eventuality.</p>
+
+<p>I must also call attention to <a href='#ARTICLE_XXVIII'>Article XXVIII.</a>, upon great detachments.
+These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may
+prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are,
+to make as few detachments as possible, <i>to have them readily movable</i>,
+to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give
+them good instructions for avoiding disasters.</p>
+
+<p>I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military
+policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of
+this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but
+should be thoroughly understood by <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 335]</span><a name='Page_335'></a>military men. I will, however,
+invite special attention to <a href='#ARTICLE_XIV'>Article XIV.</a>, relating to the command of
+armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,&mdash;a subject worthy the most
+anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often
+depends the safety of the nation.</p>
+
+<p>We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of
+staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of
+tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action
+of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great
+captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant
+results. </p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 336]</span><a name='Page_336'></a>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_53_53'></a><a href='#FNanchor_53_53'>[53]</a><div class='note'><p> The objective may be in some degree
+<i>political</i>,&mdash;especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs
+of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_54_54'></a><a href='#FNanchor_54_54'>[54]</a><div class='note'><p> The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing
+masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, but
+because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, he
+would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be would
+have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line of
+retreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillful
+operations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be
+convinced.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='NOTE'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 337]</span><a name='Page_337'></a><h2>NOTE</h2>
+
+<h3>UPON</h3>
+
+<h3>THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable
+practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance,
+never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or
+to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be
+procured a rapid and certain strategic <i>coup-d'oeil</i>,&mdash;the most valuable
+characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in
+practice the finest theories in the world.</p>
+
+<p>When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully
+impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against
+successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he
+recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon
+decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire
+to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I
+have already, in <a href='#CHAPTER_III'>Chapter III</a>., <a href='#Page_70'>page 70</a>, of the preceding Summary,
+indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained.
+There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in
+all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:&mdash;<i>in every
+position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate
+by the right, by the left, or by the front</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 338]</span><a name='Page_338'></a>To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take
+this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first
+care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the
+greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him
+in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three
+zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,)
+and as I have in Articles from <a href='#ARTICLE_XVII'>XVII.</a> to <a href='#ARTICLE_XXII'>XXII.</a> pointed out the manner of
+perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a
+zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with
+the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be
+established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations
+toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of
+operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains,
+then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can
+injure the enemy most,&mdash;for this will always be the best, especially if
+he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have
+dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the
+field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon
+the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and
+center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these
+three directions of striking.</p>
+
+<p>Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the
+theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the
+North Sea. (<a href='#Fig_39'>See Fig. 39.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical
+sections,&mdash;viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that
+between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the
+Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,&mdash;it is
+nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the
+front of operations will have only three general directions to choose
+from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone,
+as <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 339]</span><a name='Page_339'></a>it will always have one on the right and another on the left.</p>
+<a name='Fig_39'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 39.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig39.png' width='500' height='562' alt='Fig. 39.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose
+base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If
+it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,)
+it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the
+Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg,
+might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and
+fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if
+seriously defeated.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 340]</span><a name='Page_340'></a>If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon
+the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified
+towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences
+still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
+toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this
+wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward
+Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,&mdash;where there would remain but
+two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its
+way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.</p>
+
+<p>It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most
+disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient,
+although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone
+remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable
+advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward
+Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations
+of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon
+Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
+communications.</p>
+
+<p>When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone,
+they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the
+enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in
+view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the
+enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of
+his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to
+operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest
+effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
+gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you
+anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the
+contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of
+crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver
+by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered
+by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back
+upon the sea in case of a reverse.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 341]</span><a name='Page_341'></a>Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm,
+and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in
+those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the
+direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the
+line of retreat of M&eacute;las; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led
+by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat
+of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of
+retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera.</p>
+
+<p>In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the
+right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the
+center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left,
+leading to the line of communications of M&eacute;las, by way of Saint-Bernard
+or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and
+the right might have been very dangerous,&mdash;as, in fact, it proved to
+Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive
+direction was evidently that by the left.</p>
+
+<p>I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.</p>
+
+<p>The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the
+arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical
+considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for
+battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the
+base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but
+this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the
+ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement:
+these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a
+position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it,
+sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In
+such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon
+the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or
+destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing
+his way through your line.</p>
+
+<p>I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 342]</span><a name='Page_342'></a>Leuthen
+in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's
+wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in
+1812.</p>
+<a name='Fig_40'></a>
+<h3>Fig. 40.</h3>
+<center>
+<img src='images/fig40.png' width='400' height='121' alt='Fig. 40.' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A
+A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to
+cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's
+army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the
+French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been
+anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus
+fifteen hundred miles from its true base.</p>
+
+<p>There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by
+outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would
+have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.</p>
+
+<p>At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which
+was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the
+right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a
+few days later.</p>
+
+<p>In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is
+that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this
+line you must seize while protecting your own.</p>
+
+<p>When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and
+behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the
+center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the
+least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first
+consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total
+destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical
+strength, the <i>morale</i> of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 343]</span><a name='Page_343'></a>the two armies, and other circumstances, with
+reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the
+enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at
+Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been
+secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent
+the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing
+better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for
+maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who
+is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike
+most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most
+speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass
+of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
+that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be
+toward the right or the left.</p>
+
+<p>It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the
+presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the
+general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an
+exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the
+bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw
+the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of
+taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back
+upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in
+another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a
+very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of
+Wagram is an excellent example in point,&mdash;as good, indeed, as could be
+desired. I have treated this subject in <a href='#ARTICLE_XXXVII'>Article XXXVII.</a>, (<a href='#Page_224'>pages 224 and
+following.</a>)</p>
+
+<p>A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that
+have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate
+<i>coup-d'oeil</i>. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who
+estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use,
+either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps,
+will seldom be in <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 344]</span><a name='Page_344'></a>doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and
+even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will
+always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by
+constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which
+should regulate all the operations of war.</p>
+
+<p>Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime
+art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate
+thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of
+combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special
+talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the
+noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men
+co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well
+what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make
+such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point
+simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with
+arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special
+talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted
+that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best
+strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime
+characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the
+command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability,
+have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved
+imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other!
+Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny,
+Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen.</p>
+
+<p>I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said.
+To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me
+for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims
+laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to
+announce:&mdash;&quot;<i>that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of
+passion</i>; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight
+and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the
+impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 345]</span><a name='Page_345'></a>upon it.&quot; I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed
+history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most
+celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where
+these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.</p>
+
+<p>As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating
+mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only
+what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things
+into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have
+seen many generals&mdash;marshals, even&mdash;attain a certain degree of
+reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived
+incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men
+intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most
+extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment
+and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended
+for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to
+facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by
+pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for
+having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really
+desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&quot;The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is,
+that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly
+martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit
+faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels.&quot;</p>
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 346]</span><a name='Page_346'></a>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='SECOND_APPENDIX'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 347]</span><a name='Page_347'></a><h2>SECOND APPENDIX</h2>
+
+<h3>TO THE</h3>
+
+<h3>SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.</h3>
+
+<h3>ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.</h3>
+<br />
+
+<p>Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person
+did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in
+fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making
+war.</p>
+
+<p>I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of
+tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand
+combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the
+application of the principles which had led to the success of great
+generals in all ages,&mdash;of Alexander and C&aelig;sar as well as of Frederick
+and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my
+opinion.</p>
+
+<p>The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not
+produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest
+between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and
+mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without
+precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
+which produced it cannot occur again.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance
+to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot
+influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the
+tactics of battles.</p>
+
+<p>The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the
+murderous effect of the new fire-arms, natu<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 348]</span><a name='Page_348'></a>rally led me to investigate
+the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the
+tactics for infantry.</p>
+
+<p>I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to
+complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the
+Summary of the Art of War.</p>
+
+<p>The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is
+not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and
+particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)
+because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in
+loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more
+than their enemies.<a name='FNanchor_55_55'></a><a href='#Footnote_55_55'><sup>[55]</sup></a> The discussion which arose at this epoch between
+the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is
+known to all military students.</p>
+
+<p>The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the
+infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle,
+was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.</p>
+
+<p>The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as
+the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of
+battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,&mdash;such
+as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small
+intrenchments.<a name='FNanchor_56_56'></a><a href='#Footnote_56_56'><sup>[56]</sup></a></p>
+<br />
+
+<p>The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic
+forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 349]</span><a name='Page_349'></a>to employ in battle the
+system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the
+nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations&mdash;the
+Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vend&eacute;e&mdash;rendered
+this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to
+attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed
+regiments?</p>
+
+<p>In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as
+they were nearly always the assailants.</p>
+
+<p>In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the
+title of &quot;Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War,&quot; in which
+I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns
+of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to
+the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance,
+preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by
+intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a
+battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.</p>
+
+<p>What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and
+Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
+marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to
+attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to
+publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some
+attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on
+account of what was said on tactics.</p>
+
+<p>The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops
+deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the
+murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds
+as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till
+after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore
+renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.</p>
+
+<p>In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest
+minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in
+the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange,
+without taking into considera<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 350]</span><a name='Page_350'></a>tion localities, moral circumstances,
+national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had
+proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I
+never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the
+defense.</p>
+
+<p>I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was
+approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the
+Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles
+observed &quot;that he was under great obligations for the summary I had
+published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808
+from Silesia.&quot; At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not
+thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at
+the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to
+form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr
+particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the
+cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke,
+they could not have done if they had been deployed.</p>
+
+<p>At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was
+formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible
+fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his
+army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown
+back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was
+satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this
+mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.</p>
+
+<p>The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently,
+not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of
+Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the
+controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to
+which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise.
+He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French
+upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a
+solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well
+supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these
+deep columns were very different from <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 351]</span><a name='Page_351'></a>the small columns which I
+proposed,&mdash;a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force,
+and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force
+than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of
+artillery.</p>
+
+<p>I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the
+Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He
+answered, &quot;Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the
+English.&quot; I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line
+formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines.
+He replied, &quot;They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends
+upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act
+in the same manner under all circumstances.&quot;</p>
+
+<p>To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the
+campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the
+infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the
+most suitable,&mdash;which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.</p>
+
+<p>The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at
+Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns
+of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.</p>
+
+<p>If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it
+would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at
+least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line
+extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but
+several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed
+in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being
+deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.</p>
+
+<p>This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms
+of the French. We give the same name of <i>division</i> to masses of four
+regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,&mdash;which
+is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on
+the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
+divi<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 352]</span><a name='Page_352'></a>sions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813
+should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it
+very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order,
+would have executed one of the following formations:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in
+four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to
+the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight
+battalions.<a name='FNanchor_57_57'></a><a href='#Footnote_57_57'><sup>[57]</sup></a></p>
+</div>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/352a.png' width='250' height='124' alt='' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of
+battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the
+system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:&mdash;</p>
+</div>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/352b.png' width='500' height='43' alt='' title=''>
+</center>
+
+
+<p>I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to
+the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is
+important that in every language there should be two different terms to
+express two such different things as a <i>division</i> of twelve battalions
+and a <i>division</i> of a quarter of a battalion.</p>
+
+<p>Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary
+already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I
+devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
+of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations
+relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which
+consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by de<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 353]</span><a name='Page_353'></a>ploying the
+central one, the other two being in column on the wings.</p>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/353.png' width='450' height='56' alt='' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;">
+<p>1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.</p>
+
+<p>2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be
+as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was
+successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.</p>
+
+<p>3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in
+marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over
+an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
+order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the
+front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.</p></div>
+
+<p>I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as
+impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the
+attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for
+success.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
+terms:&mdash;&quot;Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault
+upon the enemy.&quot; I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the
+assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in
+good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from
+each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass
+as a whole.</p>
+
+<p>I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden,
+Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland,
+Katzbach, or Dennewitz.</p>
+
+<p>I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in
+deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally
+awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by
+maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was
+beaten while <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 354]</span><a name='Page_354'></a>descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what
+fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of
+Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in
+position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?</p>
+
+<p>I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be
+necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my
+Summary of the Art of War was written.</p>
+
+<p>Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813
+from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its
+value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to
+make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this
+view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one
+behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in
+small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of
+two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four
+sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as
+skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small
+column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form
+four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small
+columns instead of three&mdash;</p>
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/354.png' width='500' height='69' alt='' title=''>
+</center>
+
+<p>It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the
+enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty
+skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never
+present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion.
+Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and,
+indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria.</p>
+
+<p>The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight
+companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies,
+but by divisions of two companies,&mdash;<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 355]</span><a name='Page_355'></a>that is, in three or four columns,
+according to the number of companies.</p>
+
+<p>Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these
+formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions
+would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if
+driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in
+the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed,
+according to circumstances, localities, and the <i>morale</i> of the troops.
+Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware
+whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and
+Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their
+camps of instruction.</p>
+
+<p>Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be
+considered:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>&quot;Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring
+about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now
+recognized principles of tactics?&quot;</p>
+
+<p>If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because
+the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten
+that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so
+that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side.</p>
+
+<p>What change will it make in tactics?</p>
+
+<p>Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be
+necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or
+three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns?</p>
+
+<p>Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will
+fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall
+retreat or be destroyed?</p>
+
+<p>What military man will reply in the affirmative?</p>
+
+<p>It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary,
+and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and
+he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of
+battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two
+companies. To attempt <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 356]</span><a name='Page_356'></a>to prescribe by regulation under what
+circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd.</p>
+
+<p>If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the
+enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the
+shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to
+the attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would never
+accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a
+regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very
+deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep
+in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their
+destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in
+any respect their chances of success.</p>
+
+<p>If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt for
+infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization
+according with the formation for battle. I would then make each regiment
+of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalion
+should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the
+depth would be three divisions or six ranks.</p>
+
+<p>This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the
+battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each
+battalion, or on any other division.</p>
+
+<p>The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be
+so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the
+mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them
+upon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columns
+could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming
+of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in
+several respects to one of four or six divisions.</p>
+
+<p>In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two
+hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division
+in the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the center
+is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval
+separating the second and third companies. Hence the column must be
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 357]</span><a name='Page_357'></a>simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Something
+analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by
+forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third
+respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than
+in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of
+the battalion in six companies or three divisions.</p>
+
+<p>By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight
+in all, the formation of <i>double column on the center</i> might be made on
+the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each
+division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different
+companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his
+company under the command of another officer, and half of his own
+division would be made up of another company.</p>
+
+<p>Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as
+the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his
+own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than
+any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a
+decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it
+would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to
+run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French
+system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as
+many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each
+company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be
+two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an
+advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation
+between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater
+display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there,
+to command the division as a whole.</p>
+
+<p>It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important
+question at issue.</p>
+
+<p>Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper
+to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light
+of historical events.</p>
+
+<p>In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 358]</span><a name='Page_358'></a>his command a
+mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence
+in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of
+instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred
+of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the
+enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and
+impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and
+Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity
+and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult
+to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and
+Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the
+inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the
+tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled
+the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire,
+while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were
+posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of
+these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out
+of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general
+discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the
+infantry with the bayonet.</p>
+
+<p>This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to
+Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of
+troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could
+be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable
+to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a
+gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field
+of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this
+plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau,
+could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own
+were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his
+losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his
+aid.</p>
+
+<p>Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible
+battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 359]</span><a name='Page_359'></a>I demonstrated
+that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of
+deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes,
+viz.:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack
+painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective,
+and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.</p>
+
+<p>2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the
+French, principally on the right wing.</p>
+
+<p>3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the
+infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each
+other, but they were in no case simultaneous.</p>
+
+<p>4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian
+army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the
+French.</p></div>
+
+<p>Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and
+the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry
+had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately
+after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been
+broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the
+Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to
+retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof
+of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in
+columns.</p>
+
+<p>From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions,
+viz.:&mdash;</p>
+
+<div style="margin-left: 4em;"><p>1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important
+change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be
+useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of
+columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or
+skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those
+armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them
+through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail
+sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which
+would be practicable when <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 360]</span><a name='Page_360'></a>the troops are accustomed to firing: by this
+plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the
+others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies
+be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of
+light infantry to each division.</p>
+
+<p>2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be
+excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an
+attack upon an enemy in position.</p>
+
+<p>3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a
+battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it
+will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the
+other.</p>
+
+<p>4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly,
+upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand
+tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great
+mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the
+battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action
+of the three arms.</p>
+
+<p>5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this
+subject in <a href='#CHAPTER_IV'>Chapters IV.</a> and <a href='#CHAPTER_V'>V.</a>; and that it would be unreasonable to
+define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle.</p>
+
+<p>6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking
+the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking
+his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy,
+adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the
+spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: That
+war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned
+drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but
+also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical
+complications.</p></div>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_55_55'></a><a href='#FNanchor_55_55'>[55]</a><div class='note'><p> It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron,
+instead of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops used
+wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is
+attributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to Prince
+Leopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt the iron
+ramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741) it had not been
+introduced into the Austrian service.
+</p><p>
+Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-six
+years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindrical
+ramrod consisted in this,&mdash;that the soldier in loading saved the time
+necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time
+could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded
+once,&mdash;all other things being equal.&mdash;Translators.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_56_56'></a><a href='#FNanchor_56_56'>[56]</a><div class='note'><p> Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be
+intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in
+order to facilitate their deployment.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_57_57'></a><a href='#FNanchor_57_57'>[57]</a><div class='note'><p> We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if
+there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then
+consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while
+in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead
+of eight, the depth not being increased.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='SKETCH_OF_THE_PRINCIPAL_MARITIME_EXPEDITIONS'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 361]</span><a name='Page_361'></a><h2>SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.</h2>
+<br />
+
+<p>I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal
+maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents.</p>
+
+<p>The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliest
+mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persians
+conquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the most
+formidable power on both land and sea.</p>
+
+<p>About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of
+Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed the
+straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles and
+Sardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily.</p>
+
+<p>The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could not
+have been expected,&mdash;although no country was ever more favorably
+situated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and her
+great extent of coast.</p>
+
+<p>The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the
+naval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Her
+fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, the
+terror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made grand
+descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their
+naval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a
+confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse,
+Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 362]</span><a name='Page_362'></a>fighting among each other,
+it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before the
+Romans.</p>
+
+<p>If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek
+historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousand
+vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account
+of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the same
+time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed
+three hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally
+defeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet
+of Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon,
+and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred and
+fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilyb&aelig;um was
+founded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, with
+fifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This
+contest lasted one year and a half.</p>
+
+<p>Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men:
+his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persians
+had four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back to
+Greece.</p>
+
+<p>After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division
+of the empire, made no important naval expedition.</p>
+
+<p>Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by their
+fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand
+horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This was
+two hundred and eighty years before the Christian era.</p>
+
+<p>Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult to
+understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of the
+Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, by
+the Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginian
+fleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too
+late, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on
+Beneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was
+all that remained of his force.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 363]</span><a name='Page_363'></a>Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the
+ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire.</p>
+
+<p>The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating power
+in Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity.
+The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they
+improved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or
+vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years after
+found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large
+vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty
+combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. The
+Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand
+men and fifty vessels.</p>
+
+<p>The victory of Ecnomos&mdash;perhaps more extraordinary than that of
+Actium&mdash;was the first important step of the Romans toward universal
+empire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousand
+men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, the
+remainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as
+celebrated by his death as by his famous victory.</p>
+
+<p>The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, but
+was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same
+fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B.C. the Romans were defeated at
+Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred
+vessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilyb&aelig;um, in the same
+year, was lost off Cape Pactyrus.</p>
+
+<p>Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at first
+resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicily
+and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm
+its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out with
+three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, and
+gained the battle in the &AElig;gates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost
+one hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the
+first Punic war.</p>
+
+<p>The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 364]</span><a name='Page_364'></a>was less
+maritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles to
+Cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the
+Carthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a
+force inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the
+battle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five
+hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the
+Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained the
+celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans the
+kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by a
+victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and
+Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.</p>
+
+<p>From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power
+by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. Paulus
+Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at the head of
+twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to
+submission.</p>
+
+<p>Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage.
+The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, an
+immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand
+foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the
+son of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the glory
+of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by
+destroying the bitter rival of his country.</p>
+
+<p>After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe,
+was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken by
+Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the small
+adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty
+thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three
+hundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commanded
+in Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty
+thousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece.</p>
+
+<p>Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand
+Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 365]</span><a name='Page_365'></a>in succession two large
+armies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred
+thousand strong, was destroyed at Ch&aelig;ronea, and the second, of eighty
+thousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time,
+Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of
+Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared to
+transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear,
+made peace.</p>
+
+<p>In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena and
+Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step by
+step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the
+project of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to pass
+through Thrace to assume the offensive,&mdash;a policy which it is difficult
+to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his
+kingdom against fifty thousand Romans.</p>
+
+<p>C&aelig;sar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels,
+transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transported
+thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to join
+him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of
+Pompey,&mdash;in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of C&aelig;sar
+as by the arrangements of his lieutenants.</p>
+
+<p>Afterward C&aelig;sar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; they
+did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments.</p>
+
+<p>The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was that
+of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand
+horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous
+transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty
+vessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land,
+but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one
+hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra's
+galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides
+the necessary rowers.</p>
+
+<p>Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels,
+carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 366]</span><a name='Page_366'></a>Rhine to the mouths
+of the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm;
+and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks
+of the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea,
+when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days.</p>
+
+<p>When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates,
+maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of
+the North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave
+employment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. The
+eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which
+the possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while
+at the same time it afforded the means.</p>
+
+<p>The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events of
+interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landed
+in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated by
+Belisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled
+the Mediterranean for a time.</p>
+
+<p>At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, the
+Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operations
+are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in
+the mysteries of Odin.</p>
+
+<p>The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to
+Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the
+Danes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert.</p>
+
+<p>The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic,
+and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situated
+with respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coasts
+of France and England.</p>
+
+<p>If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of these
+vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of
+rowers. There were also <i>snekars</i>, with twenty banks or forty rowers.
+The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of the
+Danes, who had long <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 367]</span><a name='Page_367'></a>before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to
+infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small.</p>
+
+<p>However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported five
+thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,&mdash;which would go to show
+that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbe
+was superior to that of the Scandinavians.</p>
+
+<p>Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida and
+Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into seven
+kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) that
+they were again united under the authority of Egbert.</p>
+
+<p>The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712,
+the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik.
+They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and,
+far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous
+enemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and the
+Arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of
+the North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated
+Rodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several
+millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled in
+Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents,
+still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in
+history, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa and
+the Crusades in the East.</p>
+
+<p>A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable
+traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire now
+known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, of
+whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great
+expeditions.</p>
+
+<p>In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two
+thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and
+debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. They
+proceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to pay
+tribute.</p>
+
+<p>Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 368]</span><a name='Page_368'></a>fleet said to
+have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet,
+terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of
+Asia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and the
+expedition returned home.</p>
+
+<p>Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to
+the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. sent to renew the
+tribute and ask for peace, (943.)</p>
+
+<p>In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King of
+Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea,
+ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs,
+who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned
+into Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforced
+by the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople.
+The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his
+position. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his
+predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a
+respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him to
+retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians.
+The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from
+Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one
+of the most memorable sieges recorded in history.</p>
+
+<p>In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performed
+prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers.
+Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty.</p>
+
+<p>About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope of
+pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, to
+France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these pirates
+increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six
+years their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain and
+devastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted
+them sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 369]</span><a name='Page_369'></a>mouths of
+the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted that
+Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon;
+but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets is
+not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail.</p>
+
+<p>In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England,
+but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered into
+alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen on
+Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here,
+Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple
+saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing
+scourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition
+that he would marry his daughter and turn Christian,&mdash;an offer which was
+eagerly accepted.</p>
+
+<p>Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of
+Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed in
+considerable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, and
+assured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy.</p>
+
+<p>During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greater
+hostility toward England than to France, although they were much more
+assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs.
+Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in
+Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors,
+succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of
+the Danes.</p>
+
+<p>The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate than
+Ivar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace on
+condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark,
+leaving a part of his army behind him.</p>
+
+<p>Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxon
+power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his
+importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the
+Danes in the kingdom, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 370]</span><a name='Page_370'></a>(1002.) But Sweyn reappeared in the following
+year at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 three
+successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate
+England was ravaged anew.</p>
+
+<p>In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept over
+the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kings
+who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son,
+Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him,
+(Edmund Ironside.) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerable
+force, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern
+part of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdom
+resulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was
+finally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to
+conquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When
+he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to
+the usage of the times.</p>
+
+<p>Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to their
+Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to
+be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in
+1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settled
+in France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a
+cession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great
+and ambitious man.</p>
+
+<p>The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While William
+the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament against
+Harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from
+Northumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with the
+King of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred
+vessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely
+destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more
+formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William took
+advantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the
+Norwegians, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 371]</span><a name='Page_371'></a>to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Hume
+asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities
+reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy
+thousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battle
+near Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate
+rival soon reduced the country to submission.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, Robert
+Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with a
+handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)</p>
+
+<p>Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic
+priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large
+forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land.</p>
+
+<p>At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred
+thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the
+attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermit
+succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with from
+fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the
+Saracens.</p>
+
+<p>An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of
+religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French,
+Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey of
+Bouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number,
+under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and
+Macedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of
+Normans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece on
+Gallipolis.</p>
+
+<p>This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of
+Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered to
+transport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles to
+Asia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the
+plains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors.
+Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem,
+where he founded a kingdom.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 372]</span><a name='Page_372'></a>All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics of
+Italy were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and in
+provisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus
+given to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous
+result of the Crusades.</p>
+
+<p>This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of great
+disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united
+to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christian
+camps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave
+Noureddin was threatening. Louis VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at
+the head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as their
+predecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the
+Greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests,
+plotted their destruction.</p>
+
+<p>Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for
+him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by
+the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on the
+banks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, and
+his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage
+of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia,
+on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The
+means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more than
+fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: the
+remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens.</p>
+
+<p>This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the
+climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were
+continually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by the
+Italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of
+Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliance
+between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and
+England to save the Holy Land.</p>
+
+<p>The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 373]</span><a name='Page_373'></a>hundred
+thousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of the
+formal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. He
+marched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He
+died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been
+pretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the
+Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six
+thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion<a name='FNanchor_58_58'></a><a href='#Footnote_58_58'><sup>[58]</sup></a> and Philip Augustus more
+judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles and
+Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first seized Cyprus, and both
+landed in Syria,&mdash;where they would probably have triumphed but for the
+rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philip
+returned to France.</p>
+
+<p>Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.) Part of
+the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Count
+of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the
+intention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by
+the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon
+the pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac
+Angelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of
+those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of
+Conrad and Louis VII.</p>
+
+<p>Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of
+the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. They
+assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, and
+Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat:
+the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latins
+took possession of Constantinople after a more bloody <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 374]</span><a name='Page_374'></a>assault than the
+first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of
+Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greeks
+took refuge at Nice and Trebizond.</p>
+
+<p>A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who,
+notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta,
+was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the
+Mussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrow
+escape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in
+being able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe.</p>
+
+<p>The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of
+Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits,
+encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm at
+Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked at
+Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The
+landgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put
+in at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the
+presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him because he was too
+slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with
+ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical
+thunders.</p>
+
+<p>Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may
+credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from
+Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and
+fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians and
+the Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, although
+washed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there
+collected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville's
+statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent
+into Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for,
+although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of
+Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousand
+fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 375]</span><a name='Page_375'></a>that
+the Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France.</p>
+
+<p>The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the
+same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later, (1270.) He
+disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besieged
+Tunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself
+was one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful
+reinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back
+the remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest
+which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This
+prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of
+the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater
+value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of Saint
+Louis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do with
+that project. This was the last effort. The Christians who were
+abandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and
+Ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at
+Cyprus and established themselves at Rhodes.</p>
+
+<p>The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in
+1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the European
+provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselves
+given the fatal blow.</p>
+
+<p>Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to have
+had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal
+and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be
+manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture of
+this capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of the
+Greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of
+maritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon
+Otranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of
+a more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade,
+the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city
+to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hun<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 376]</span><a name='Page_376'></a>dred sail
+to make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried by
+assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the
+head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a
+failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go to
+that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of
+Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death
+closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect.</p>
+
+<p>About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors on
+land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their country
+from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more
+extraordinary even than that of Venice.</p>
+
+<p>Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundred
+ships and forty thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated,
+fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six
+thousand were cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and
+including the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention of
+gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed by
+some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From that
+time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and
+this revolution took place&mdash;if I may use that expression&mdash;at the time
+when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of America
+and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of
+the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of
+colonial dependencies.</p>
+
+<p>I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards to
+America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India by
+doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influence
+upon the commerce of the world,&mdash;notwithstanding the genius of Gama,
+Albuquerque, and Cortez,&mdash;these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies
+of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 377]</span><a name='Page_377'></a>nothing of
+fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view.</p>
+
+<p>The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this
+discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign
+of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which was
+conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers
+transported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced by
+the disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,)
+undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the
+wise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way
+when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight
+thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the
+skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. himself
+arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril.</p>
+
+<p>While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were not
+neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine
+maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the
+control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period
+the Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and
+the military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of
+their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes
+(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and
+forty thousand men,&mdash;which was still formidable even upon the
+supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half.</p>
+
+<p>In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta,
+where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried
+over thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships.
+John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing
+them.</p>
+
+<p>A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and
+fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, where
+Nicosia was taken and Famagosta <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 378]</span><a name='Page_378'></a>besieged. The horrible cruelties
+practiced by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress.
+Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor
+Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the
+heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by
+Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that had
+perished in the space of two years spent on the island.</p>
+
+<p>The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria,
+brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet at
+the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium,
+where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. The
+Turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred
+vessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.)
+This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a
+great check in their career of greatness. However, they made such
+vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea
+during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which such
+enormous losses were sustained.</p>
+
+<p>The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against Algiers did not
+deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of
+Morocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprived
+of his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the
+head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army
+cut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578.</p>
+
+<p>Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepanto
+on account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy and
+by the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his arms
+irresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincible
+Armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was
+composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including,
+according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels,
+armed with two thousand six hundred <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 379]</span><a name='Page_379'></a>and thirty bronze cannon, and
+carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand
+sailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand
+men which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way
+of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failure
+of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the
+period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding
+name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels
+before it even came near the English coast.</p>
+
+<p>After this expedition comes in chronological order that of Gustavus
+Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from fifteen to
+eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine
+thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that
+it carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania received
+little opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a
+strong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of a
+very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other
+example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. of
+Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswick
+upon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five
+thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in
+proportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice
+was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage
+having broken through and been lost.</p>
+
+<p>After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turks
+recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-five
+thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gained
+possession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought of
+sending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spirit
+which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble
+souls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against
+the Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority
+and the possession of Canea. <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 380]</span><a name='Page_380'></a>The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless,
+gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of
+it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself
+perished.</p>
+
+<p>In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiously
+at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two
+assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being
+made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them,
+expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward of
+his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with
+their dead bodies.</p>
+
+<p>Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men to
+Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already
+called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce.</p>
+
+<p>The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, and
+each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks to
+carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the
+Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of naval
+tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who
+adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every
+attempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of
+Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this
+protracted struggle.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of
+the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this
+war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island,
+where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he
+conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.(1667.)</p>
+
+<p>In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously:
+their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the
+first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an
+Italian engineer.</p>
+
+<p>The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by
+mines. Never had there been seen such furious <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 381]</span><a name='Page_381'></a>zeal exhibited in mutual
+destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance
+enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice
+sent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds of
+French volunteers.</p>
+
+<p>The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their
+efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmen
+came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Duke
+of Beaufort and Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged
+these presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the
+sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end
+of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France.
+Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place
+which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a
+truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia had
+cost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred
+thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It
+is estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations
+perished in the glorious defense of the place.</p>
+
+<p>The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives examples of
+great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II.
+in Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although
+De Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying
+five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A
+grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men
+into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, De
+Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the
+remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through
+the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the
+island.</p>
+
+<p>At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russians
+undertook two expeditions very different in character.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 382]</span><a name='Page_382'></a>Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent upon
+Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred
+vessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted by
+the English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason
+the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The same
+prince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his
+troops at a Swedish port.</p>
+
+<p>Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians,
+and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722)
+upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventy
+vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to
+Agrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet his
+cavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand
+Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar
+then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with one
+of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the
+empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of
+the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire.</p>
+
+<p>The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary
+expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, which
+was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent.</p>
+
+<p>[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was joined by a
+portion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole amounted to nineteen
+ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and
+fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. The expedition besieged and
+captured Havana.&mdash;TRS.]</p>
+
+<p>The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteen
+thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the
+sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious
+action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on
+account of the murderous fire which the troops received from <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 383]</span><a name='Page_383'></a>the
+Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding
+the city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand
+men placed <i>hors de combat</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts
+upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this power
+send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line,
+while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of
+sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with
+three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and
+St. Malo.</p>
+
+<p>This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but
+accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port.</p>
+
+<p>D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority
+in the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousand
+Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by
+another division, and assisted in investing the English army under
+Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thus
+secured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable
+rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display
+made in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand
+men more to India with Admiral Suffren.</p>
+
+<p>During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: the
+fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injured
+the French navy.</p>
+
+<p>Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men was
+scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were
+made. (1796.)</p>
+
+<p>At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting of
+twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four
+hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were
+followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed
+fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven into
+the sea, <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 384]</span><a name='Page_384'></a>notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of
+intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an
+excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under
+similar circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 to
+St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the
+ravages of yellow fever.</p>
+
+<p>Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given their
+attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of
+colonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenth
+century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve
+thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like
+France. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empire
+occurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and then
+of Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of
+troops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to
+the number of one hundred and fifty thousand.</p>
+
+<p>The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of forty
+thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the
+details of the operations is, however, quite interesting.</p>
+
+<p>In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected a
+descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of this
+expedition are well known.</p>
+
+<p>General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some successes at
+Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. That
+against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was
+terminated by a capitulation.</p>
+
+<p>In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousand
+men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the
+Danish fleet, which was his object.</p>
+
+<p>In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men.
+After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general rising
+of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The same
+army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under
+Moore's <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 385]</span><a name='Page_385'></a>command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a
+view of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there
+re-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected
+another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of
+thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avenged
+Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then
+beating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital.</p>
+
+<p>The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largest
+England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of not
+less than seventy thousand men in all,&mdash;forty thousand land-forces and
+thirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the
+incapacity of the leader.</p>
+
+<p>A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. of Sweden
+was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia on
+the ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to take
+possession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehension
+to the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf to
+Ume&aring;, (March, 1809.)</p>
+
+<p>General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the
+neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchet
+off from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought
+best to re-embark.</p>
+
+<p>The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his return
+from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of
+<i>mat&eacute;riel</i> landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army
+contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were
+disembarked at a friendly port.</p>
+
+<p>The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be
+regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital of
+the United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven or
+eight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a
+state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its
+capital, and destroying all the public buildings,&mdash;results <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 386]</span><a name='Page_386'></a>unparalleled
+in history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary
+spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not
+risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their
+homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an
+English expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely
+defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders
+of General Jackson.</p>
+
+<p>If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes and
+the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been
+actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with
+powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and
+proportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred and
+fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of three
+thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the
+line<a name='FNanchor_59_59'></a><a href='#Footnote_59_59'><sup>[59]</sup></a>.</p>
+
+<p>From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference
+there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between
+descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in
+width, and those in which the troops and <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> are to be
+transported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reason
+why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the
+Bosporus.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:&mdash;</p>
+<div style="margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;">
+<p>In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composed
+of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and
+eighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war and
+transports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon.</p>
+
+<p>In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. The
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a short
+bombardment. A small force of about one thou<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 387]</span><a name='Page_387'></a>sand men, in three columns,
+took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight.</p>
+
+<p>In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast of
+Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the
+command of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed,
+including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and the
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the
+forces of the United States. This important post became the secondary
+base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the
+capture of the city of Mexico.</p>
+
+<p>In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia on
+the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other.
+Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of
+the Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An English
+fleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, on
+the 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command of
+Vice-Admiral Parseval Desch&ecirc;nes, on the 19th of April. They effected a
+junction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet
+numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels.
+The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on one
+of the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the
+conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of
+ten thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General
+Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced.</p>
+
+<p>Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed;
+and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to
+give an idea of its magnitude:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and
+two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed of
+thirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, and
+seven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of
+landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and
+transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma,
+(Septem<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 388]</span><a name='Page_388'></a>ber 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took
+possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: these
+were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the
+army in the Crimea were sent.</p>
+
+<p>November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numbered
+seventy-one thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousand
+men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sent
+fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand were
+alive, present, and fit for duty.</p>
+
+<p>February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English,
+twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand.</p>
+
+<p>May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteen
+thousand Sardinians.</p>
+
+<p>In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was
+sent to Kertch.</p>
+
+<p>In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred and
+twenty thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in the
+evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in battery
+more than eight hundred pieces of artillery.</p>
+
+<p>The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack
+of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were present
+and prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships.</p>
+
+<p>October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to
+Kinburn, which place was captured.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the French
+emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred and
+ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and
+twenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria.</p>
+
+<p>The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only
+to French operations:-)</p>
+
+<p>The artillery <i>mat&eacute;riel</i> at the disposal of the Army of the <span class='pagenum'>[Pg 389]</span><a name='Page_389'></a>East
+comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages,
+two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine
+million pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand
+tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and
+seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand
+war-rockets.</p>
+
+<p>On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen
+batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of
+powder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions.</p>
+
+<p>Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineers
+executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty
+thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags.</p>
+
+<p>Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent.</p>
+
+<p>Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons.</p>
+
+<p>Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons.</p>
+
+<p>Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &amp;c, eight thousand tons.</p>
+
+<p>In all, about six hundred thousand tons.</p>
+
+<p>It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English,
+Sardinian, and Turkish armies.</p>
+
+<p>In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of forty
+thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of
+artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and
+twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous
+transports.</p>
+
+<p>In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China,
+whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This
+expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which
+ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and
+succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the
+most populous empire in the world.</p>
+
+<p><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 390]</span><a name='Page_390'></a>The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, and
+presented no remarkable features.</p>
+
+<p>Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United States
+sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coast
+of South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vessels
+and transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of Captain
+Dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and
+<i>mat&eacute;riel</i> were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the
+rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval
+forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, General
+Sherman being in command.</p>
+
+<p>England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in an
+expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were the
+capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: the
+Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will develop
+the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if,
+indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three
+of the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and
+tottering republic of Mexico.]</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><b>FOOTNOTES:</b></p>
+
+<a name='Footnote_58_58'></a><a href='#FNanchor_58_58'>[58]</a><div class='note'><p> Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot and
+five thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded by
+land to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to transport
+his troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian ships, and with
+a force at least as large as that of Richard.</p></div>
+
+<a name='Footnote_59_59'></a><a href='#FNanchor_59_59'>[59]</a><div class='note'><p> See the account of the expedition to the
+Crimea.&mdash;TRANSLATORS.</p></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style='width: 65%;' />
+<a name='INDEX'></a><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 391]</span><a name='Page_391'></a><h2><b>INDEX</b></h2>
+
+<b>A.</b><br />
+<br />
+Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Accidental lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Action, concert of, how secured, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Active armies and sieges, relation between, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Advanced guard, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>attack of the enemy's, in retreats, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in armies meeting unexpectedly, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in battle, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Advance, line of, how determined, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Advantages of awaiting invasion, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of elevated points for observation, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Aggressive wars for conquest, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Agincourt, order of battle at, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Albis, position of, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Alcazar, battle of, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Alexander the Great, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>, <a href='#Page_362'>362</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Alfred the Great, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Algiers, French descent on, in 1830>, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Spanish descent on, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Alise, investment of, by C&aelig;sar, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Allies, at Bautzen, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defeat of, at Zurich, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error of, in 1793, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>failure of diversion of, in 1805, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in war, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march of, upon Leipsic, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Alps, passage of, by Francis I., <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.<br />
+<br />
+American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, <a href='#Page_383'>383</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Angoul&ecirc;me, Duke of, expedition of, <a href='#Page_28'>28</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Antony, retreat of, from Media, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Antwerp, English expedition to, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Archduke Charles, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concentric retreat of, in 1796, <a href='#Page_238'>238.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>interior lines of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>opinion of, as to small-column formation, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>success of, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Archduke Ferdinand, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Armada, Spanish, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>superior, importance of, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_48'>48</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Armies, auxiliary, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>central, observations on, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>command of, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>French, in the Revolution, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to act, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in intrenchments, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in peace, how preserved, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>large, fitness of central lines for, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>large, organization of, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>morale of, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>movements of, points to be attended to in, <a href='#Page_254'>254-256</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of French Revolution, how subsisted, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., how subsisted, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon, operations of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>promotions in, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>standing, effect of, on distant invasions, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>surprises of, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two, on interior lines, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two, on the same frontier, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>unexpected meeting of two, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Armor, defensive, for cavalry, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Arms and organization of cavalry, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Arms for irregular cavalry, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Army, best means of organizing the command of, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Army corps, system of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Army, defensive, proper course for, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive, when it has the advantage, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>head-quarters of, when the most important point, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how perfected, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of a good, <a href='#Page_44'>44</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Army of Boulogne, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 392]</span><a name='Page_392'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of four corps, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of seven corps, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, proper course for, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of invasion, line of defense important to, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Rhine in 1800, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>permanent, necessary condition of, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>proportion of cavalry in, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>pursuing, has the advantage, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Artillerists, directions for, in battle, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Artillery, concentration of fire of,<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in offensive line of battle, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>employment of, <a href='#Page_315'>315-318</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>heavy, in defensive line of battle, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, to infantry, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mat&eacute;riel of the French army in the Crimea, <a href='#Page_388'>388</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's, at Wagrani, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>post of, in line of battle, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>proportion of, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>protection of infantry from the enemy's, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for use of, in battle, <a href='#Page_316'>316-318</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of, in the offensive, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>who should command, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Art of war, definition of, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principal parts of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Assailant, advantages of, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Assailant's best means of victory, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Assault, beat formation of infantry for, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of field-works, instances of well-arranged, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Athens, naval power of, <a href='#Page_361'>361</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Attack, cavalry column of, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>close, formation for, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>column of, in two lines, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>columns of, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_356'>356</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>columns of, of single battalions, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>five methods of forming troops for, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formation for, at Turin, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in columns, order of, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in front, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in rear, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of field-works, directions for, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of fortified places, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of intrenched lines, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on flank, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on Sank, cavalry, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when order in squares suitable for, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Attacks and marches, arrangements of, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in half-deep order, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Audenarde, battle of, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Augustus, armament of, <a href='#Page_365'>365</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Aulic Council, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Austerlitz, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>force of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fortresses of, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>interest of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intervention of, in 1813, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>camp before Mayence, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order at Essling and Fleurus, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>why victorious in 1753, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Authority of counselors, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>B.</b><br />
+<br />
+Balloons, difficulties in use of, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how they might be useful, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>used at Fleurus, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Barbarossa, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Bard, fort of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of defile of, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Base of operations, where to be established, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Bases of operations, definition of, 77<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how to be chosen, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, plurality of, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on the sea, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>temporary or eventual, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>temporary, when necessary, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>with two faces, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Bassano, Napoleon's march on, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Battalion squares, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Batteries, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Battle, advanced guard in, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>calculation of distances in, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>classification of orders of, useful, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>combinations of, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concave order of, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>convex order of, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>critical moment of, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive moment of, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive arrangements for, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive point of, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic point of, when important, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Battle-formation in small columns, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of topography upon, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>.</span><br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 393]</span><a name='Page_393'></a>
+<br />
+Battle, formation of troops for, <a href='#Page_347'>347-360</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of orders of, on result of engagements, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, arrangement of cavalry in, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, before the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, definition of, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, distribution of troops in, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, post of artillery in, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, <a href='#Page_282'>282-284</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>oblique order of, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Agincourt, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Alcazar, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Audenarde, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Austerlitz, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Bautzen, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Blenheim, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Cann&aelig;, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Cr&eacute;cy, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Ecnomos, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Essling, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Fossano, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Jena, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Leipsic, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Lepanto, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Leuthen, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Millesimo, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Mollwitz, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Prague, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Ramillies, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Rivoli, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Torgau, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Turin, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Ulm, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Ulm, won by strategy, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Waterloo, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>,
+<a href='#Page_303'>303-306</a>, <a href='#Page_354'>354</a>, <a href='#Page_358'>358</a>, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, object of, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive order of, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of, at Leipsic, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of, definition of, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>orders of, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel order of, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>reinforced, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>when suitable, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>with crotchet, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>perpendicular order of, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>position for, <a href='#Page_341'>341</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>posting troops in line of, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>results of, depend on what, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for use of artillery in, <a href='#Page_316'>316-318</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Battle-order for cavalry, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Battle-orders, various, <a href='#Page_349'>349</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Battles, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>elements of uncertainty regarding, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>great difficulty of tactics of, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of musketry-fire in, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon, orders of, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for scientific, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>success in, depends on maneuvering, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>three kinds of, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>what may interfere with success of, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Bautzen, battle of, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>French at, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Bellegarde, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>base on K&ouml;nigsberg in 1807, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>position in 1807, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mixed system at Eylau, <a href='#Page_352'>352</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Beresina, passage of, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Berthier at Leipsic, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Berthier's error at Wagram, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error in campaign of 1809, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Blenheim, battle of, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Bl&uuml;cher, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.<br />
+<br />
+&quot;Boar's head&quot; of the ancients, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Bonaparte's career in Italy, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expedition to Egypt, <a href='#Page_383'>383</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Boulogne, army of, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>camp of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Bravery, first requisite for a leader, <a href='#Page_345'>345</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &amp;c., <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in retreats, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>means of destroying, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>protection of, after passage, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Bridge-trains, importance of, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Buntzelwitz, camp of, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Burgundy, Duke of, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>C.</b><br />
+<br />
+C&aelig;sar's investment of Alise, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maritime expeditions, <a href='#Page_365'>365</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1793, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1799, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1800, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1812, Napoleon's error in, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Spaniards in Flanders, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Swedes in Germany, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Campaigns in mountains, instances of, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 394]</span><a name='Page_394'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in winter, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1799 and 1800, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Camp at Kehl, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, influence of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, on which side of a river, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, on river, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Boulogne, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Drissa, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fortified, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, connection of, with strategy, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, instances of, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, maxims on, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, Prussian system of, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, use of, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, where to be established, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic square for, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Candia, siege of, <a href='#Page_380'>380</a>, <a href='#Page_381'>381</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Turkish descent on, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Cann&aelig;, order of battle at, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cantonments, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>duty of staff officers in, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for establishing, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>selection of positions for, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Canute, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Capitals as strategic points, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Capital, when the center of power, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Capture of posts, means for, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when important, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Carbine, in cavalry-charges, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Carnot, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Carthage, destruction of, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Carthaginians, expeditions of, <a href='#Page_361'>361</a>, <a href='#Page_362'>362</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cavalry, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>advantages of large corps of, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>arms and organization of, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>arrangement of, in line of battle, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Ramillies, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battle-order for, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>best formation of infantry against, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>charge at Hohenfriedberg, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>charge, general, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>charges, four kinds of, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>charges of the Turks, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive armor for, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>divisions of five regiments, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>duties of, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>encounters of, against cavalry, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>flank charges of, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formations of, <a href='#Page_309'>309-311</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, in retreats, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, to infantry, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of, in a war, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in the defensive, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>irregular, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>light, advantages of, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>militia as, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>morale of, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>must be supported by infantry, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>proportion of, in an army, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>reserves, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when it should charge a line of infantry, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Center, when proper point of attack, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Central armies, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of Napoleon in Saxony, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines, application of, to large masses, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>position, when untenable, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Ch&aelig;ronea, <a href='#Page_365'>365</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Charges, irregular cavalry, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>VIII., retreat of, to Naples, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>X. of Sweden, expedition of, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>XII. of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Checkerwise formation of cavalry, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order, infantry, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Chief of staff, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>.<br />
+<br />
+China, English and French expedition to, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Choice of objective points, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Circumvallation, lines of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Civil wars, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Clairfayt, victories of, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Coalition against France in 1793, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Frederick the Great, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Louis XIV., <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Coasts, influence of, on descents, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Coblentz, fortification of, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>towers of, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Coburg, Prince of, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Column of attack, cavalry, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of attack in two lines, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Columns of attack, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_356'>356</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of attack of single battalions, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of four divisions in three ranks, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Combinations of battle, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Combined use of the three arms, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a>, <a href='#Page_320'>320</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Commander, difficulty of selecting, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>essential qualities for a, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Commander, first care of, on taking the field, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 395]</span><a name='Page_395'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of artillery, duties of, <a href='#Page_319'>319</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Command of an army, best means of organizing, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of armies, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>the, and strategy, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Committee of Public Safety, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Concave order of battle, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Concentration of artillery-fire, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in retreat, advantages of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Concentric lines, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreats, instances of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Concert of action, how secured, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in action, importance of, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, <a href='#Page_31'>31-34</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars for, instances of, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Conrad III., Crusade of, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>siege of, by the Crusaders, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>siege of, by Mohammed II., <a href='#Page_375'>375</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Contempt for the enemy, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Contravallation, lines of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Control of operations, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Convergent operations, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Continuous intrenched lines, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Convex order of battle, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Copenhagen, siege of, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cordon system, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>organization of an army in four, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>organization of an army in seven, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two, one behind the other, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Cossacks, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Council of war at seat of government, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Councils of war, value of, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Counselors, authority of, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Coup-d'oeil, strategic, <a href='#Page_337'>337-345</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Coups de main, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Cr&eacute;cy, order of battle at, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, <a href='#Page_387'>387-389</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crimean War, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Critical moment of battles, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crotchets, danger of, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crusade of 1203, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Crusades, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>, <a href='#Page_371'>371-375</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cuirass, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cuirassiers, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Culm, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>D.</b><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+Danes, incursions of, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Danger of two wars at once, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Dangers of auxiliary armies, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Danube, Napoleon's passage of, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>valley of, key of Southern Germany, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Decisive direction, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>moment of battle, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point at Bautzen, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point, how affected by arrangement of forces, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point of battle-field, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point of battle-field, how determined, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, defiles as, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points of the theater of war, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Deep columns, <a href='#Page_356'>356</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>masses, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order, disadvantages of, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Defeat, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the French at Waterloo, causes of, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Defense, in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, important to an army of invasion, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, should be short, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of frontiers, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of intrenched camps and lines, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>second lines of, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should not be passive, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical, of Switzerland, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maxims for frontier, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Defensive armor for cavalry, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army has the advantage, when, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army, proper course for, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>arrangements for battle, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battles, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>best formation of infantry for, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry in, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>characteristics of infantry formation for, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in descents, duty of, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of battle, heavy artillery in, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Defensive movements, when advised, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 396]</span><a name='Page_396'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>-offensive war, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>or offensive system, either may be employed, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>the, in a level country, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>war, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Defiles as decisive points, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>as eventual lines of defense, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in retreats, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Definitive lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Dennewitz, Ney's error at, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines in two ranks, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines, two, formation of infantry in, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Depots, establishment of, on march, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>command of, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of supplies, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of supplies, general maxims, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>secondary, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Descents, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cases where made, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>difficulties of, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>duty of defensive in, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>effect of modern inventions on, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>more extensive in ancient times, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>precautions after landing, <a href='#Page_252'>252</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for conducting, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+D'Estaing's fleet, <a href='#Page_383'>383</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Detached orders of Napoleon, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>works, importance of, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>four kinds of, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>great, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>great, instances of, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>great, why made, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>multiplication of, must be avoided,&nbsp; &nbsp; <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>necessary when there is a double strategic front, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon in 1805, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>precise rules for, cannot be laid down, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>requisites in officers of, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>small, how useful, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>.<br />
+<br />
+D&eacute;tours, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Difficulty of applying theories in war, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Diplomacy in invasions, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of lines of operations, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Discipline, importance of, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, in retreats, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Distances in battle, calculation of, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Distant expeditions, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions across extensive territories, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions, maxim for, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions to aid an ally, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Distribution of troops in line of battle, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Divergent lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>to Holland in 1799, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Dunkirk, expedition to, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Duties of cavalry, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of staff officers, <a href='#Page_254'>254-256.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Duty of a general, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of statesmen in offensive wars, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Division, improper use of the term, <a href='#Page_351'>351</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defects of system of, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>remedied by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formation by, when preferable, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>organization of, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Double line of operations, when applicable, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when necessary, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of operations, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>when advantageous, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines to be avoided, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passages of rivers, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic front, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of Napoleon, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Dragoons, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concentration of, by Emperor</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>Nicholas, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Drepanum, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Dresden, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched camp at, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>victory at, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Drissa, camp of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Divergent lines, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreats, when admissible, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Diversions, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when useful, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>E.</b><br />
+<br />
+Eccentric lines, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreat. Bulow's use of the term,</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>237.</span><br />
+<br />
+Eccentric system, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 397]</span><a name='Page_397'></a>
+<br />
+Echelon, order of battle by, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Echelons, order in, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>squares in, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Ecnomos, victory of, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Edward III. of England, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, <a href='#Page_374'>374</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ehrenbreitstein, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Elchingen, Ney at, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Elective governments, weakness of, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Elongated squares, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Employment of artillery, <a href='#Page_315'>315-318.</a><br />
+<br />
+Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>contempt for, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how dislodged, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to drive from his position, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should not be paid to leave a country, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>.<br />
+<br />
+England controls the sea, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasion of, by Sweyn, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>projected invasion of, by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+England's attack on Washington in 1814, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.<br />
+<br />
+English and French expedition to China, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>.<br />
+<br />
+English, descents of, on France, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expedition against Napoleon in 1815, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expedition in 1762 against Havana, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maritime expeditions, <a href='#Page_384'>384-390.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>squares at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Enthusiasm, importance of, <a href='#Page_41'>41</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>not military spirit, <a href='#Page_62'>62</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Epaminondas, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Error of the allies in 1793, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Errors in strategy, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Essential bases of military policy, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Essling, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon at, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle at, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Eugene at Turin, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march of, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Eventual bases, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of defense, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Expediency, wars of, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>to the Crimea, details of, <a href='#Page_387'>387-389.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>marine, in modern times, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maritime, <a href='#Page_361'>361-390.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the ancients, <a href='#Page_248'>248</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Middle Ages, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>partly on land, partly by sea, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Extended movements, when dangerous, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Exterior lines of operations, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Extermination, wars of, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Eylau, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a>, <a href='#Page_352'>352</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>French armament at, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's march on, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Russian artillery reserve at, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Russian order at, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>F.</b><br />
+<br />
+Famous retreats, instances of, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Field, strategic, of 1806, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Field-works, directions for attack of, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of well-arranged assaults on, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Final reserves, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Financial considerations, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, <a href='#Page_347'>347</a>, <a href='#Page_355'>355</a>, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fire-signals, how used, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Flank attack, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>attack, cavalry, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>charges of cavalry, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>marches, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>marches, where inadmissible, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical maneuver by, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Flanks of companies, movement by, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>protection of, in tactical positions, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fleurus, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>balloons used at, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle at, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Foot-artillery in line of battle, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in the offensive, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Forests, advantages of, in retreats, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Formation by divisions, when preferable, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for attack at Turin, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for battle in small columns, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for battle, Napoleon's system, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for battle often determined by size of army, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for battle, Prussian and Austrian system, <a href='#Page_354'>354</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for close attack, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of infantry for attack, five methods of, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>in two ranks, <a href='#Page_356'>356</a>.</span><br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 398]</span><a name='Page_398'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of troops for battle, <a href='#Page_347'>347-350.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Formations of cavalry, <a href='#Page_309'>309-311.</a><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of lines of battle for two infantry corps, <a href='#Page_282'>282-284.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>various, for infantry, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Fortification of Coblentz, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fortifications, remark upon, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fortified camps, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>places, attack of, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>places on the sea-coast, importance of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>places, when a misfortune, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Fortresses at Mayence, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>greatest advantages of, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>large, when preferable, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>number and position of, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of France and Austria, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on frontiers, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relation of, to strategy, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Forts in a mountainous country, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>purposes of, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Fossano, battle of, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Four-rank formation of infantry, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>.<br />
+<br />
+France adapted to parallel retreats, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>coalition against, in 1793, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>course and error of, in 1792, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fortresses of, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intention of, when declaring war in 1792, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions of, by the English, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Francis I., passage of the Alps by, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Frederick the Great, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Leuthen, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Prague, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Torgau, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>commissariat of, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive-offensive operations of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maneuver of, at Leuthen, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>military genius of, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Frederick II., Crusade of, <a href='#Page_374'>374</a>.<br />
+<br />
+French and English expedition to China, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>.<br />
+<br />
+French armies in the Revolution, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>armies, situation of, in 1800, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Bautzen, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Fleurus, why successful, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>columns at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_351'>351</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defeat of, at Stockach, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>descent on Algiers in 1830, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>errors in 1795, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expedition to Syria, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in Bohemia in 1742, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions of 1766 and 1795, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, <a href='#Page_383'>383</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations in Italy, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations of, at close of 1793, <a href='#Page_331'>331-333.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations of, in 1794, <a href='#Page_108'>108</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order at Essling and Fleurus, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order at Minden, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>plan in 1799, error of, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, <a href='#Page_26'>26-28</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, course of Austria in, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, course of Prussia in, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, interest of Austria in, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, relation of Italy to, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, theater of operations in, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Revolution, zones of operations in, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Frontier defenses, maxims for, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_149'>149</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when a permanent line of defense, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Frontiers, defense of, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>disadvantage of fortresses on, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to be fortified, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mountains as, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rivers as, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Front of operations, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>, <a href='#Page_338'>338</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, extent of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how varied, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, change of, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, not to be too extended, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Fronts of operations, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fronts, strategic, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Fundamental principle of war, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maxims of, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principles for employment of troops, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>G.</b><br />
+<br />
+Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.<br />
+<br />
+General advanced guard, how composed, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry charge, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+General, essential qualities of a, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of a skillful, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>one of the greatest talents of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>qualities of a skillful, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>what constitutes a, <a href='#Page_327'>327</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+General principle of war, manner of applying, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 399]</span><a name='Page_399'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>staff, employment of, in time of peace, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>staff, usefulness of, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Genoa, panic at siege of, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Geography, military, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Geographical objective points, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Germanicus, expedition of, <a href='#Page_366'>366</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Girondists, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Gosa, French charge on, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Governments, elective, weakness of, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should not be unprepared for war, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Grand tactics, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principles of, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Great detachments, <a href='#Page_217'>217</a>, <a href='#Page_219'>219</a>, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>why made, <a href='#Page_220'>220</a>, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Grouchy, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Guard, advanced, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in battle, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in unexpected battles, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, <a href='#Page_375'>375</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>H.</b><br />
+<br />
+Half-deep order, infantry-formation, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>attacks in, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hannibal at Cann&aelig;, <a href='#Page_191'>191</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Zama, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Harold, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a>, <a href='#Page_371'>371</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, <a href='#Page_107'>107</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hengist, <a href='#Page_367'>367</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hoche's expedition to Ireland, <a href='#Page_383'>383</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hochkirch, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>surprise of, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Hohenfriedberg, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hohenlinden, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Holland, expedition to, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Horse-artillery in line of battle, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in the offensive, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Houchard, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hougoumont, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Hypotheses of the author in 1806, <a href='#Page_271'>271</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how events justified them, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>I.</b><br />
+<br />
+Igor, expeditions of, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Illustrations of importance of logistics, <a href='#Page_263'>263-268.</a><br />
+<br />
+Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>effects of, on war, <a href='#Page_347'>347</a>, <a href='#Page_355'>355</a>, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>best formation of, for assault, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>best formation of, for the defensive, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry must be supported by, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>checkerwise formation, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formation of, in two deployed lines, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, <a href='#Page_299'>299</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in three-rank formation, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in what movements should be exercised, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of battle for, <a href='#Page_282'>282-284.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mixed order, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mounted, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>needs support of cavalry and artillery, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>protection of, from enemy's artillery, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>squares, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>supports of artillery, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>three-rank formation of, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>various formations for, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Information from partisans, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Initiative, advantages of, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Institutions, military, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Interior and simple lines, advantage of, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Interior lines, observations on, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Archduke Charles, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, why preferable, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should not be too much extended, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two armies on, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Intervention, instances of, <a href='#Page_20'>20-22</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>kinds of, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>reasons for, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of, essentials in, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Intestine wars, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 400]</span><a name='Page_400'></a>
+<br />
+Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>connection of, with strategy, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how differ from t&ecirc;tes deponts, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maxims on, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on river, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Prussian system of. <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>where to be established, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Intrenched lines, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>attack of, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>continuous, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Intrenched positions, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Intrenchments, armies in, 154<br />
+<br />
+Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>advantages of awaiting, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army of, line of defense important to, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>control of the sea important in, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>difficult in national wars, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how rendered feasible, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of a mountainous country, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of England contemplated by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Turkey by Russia, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two kinds of, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Invasions, diplomacy in, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, across extensive territories, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, effect of standing armies on, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, maxim for, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>distant, to aid an ally, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to be carried on, <a href='#Page_24'>24</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of neighboring states, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Spain, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when excusable, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Investing a city, false system of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>force, how strengthened, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Irregular cavalry, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>arms for, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Islamism, wars of, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Italy, operations of the French in, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel retreats in, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relation of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Ivar, expedition of, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>J.</b><br />
+<br />
+James II., expedition of, in Ireland, <a href='#Page_381'>381</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Jemmapes, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Jena, battle of, won by strategy, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maneuvers at, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's march on, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Ney's charge at, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Jourdan, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Stockach, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>balloons used by, at Fleurus, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>K.</b><br />
+<br />
+Kagoul, panic at, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Katzbach, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Kehl, intrenchments at, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>, <a href='#Page_210'>210</a>, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Kolin, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Koudacheff's expedition, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Koutousoff, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Krasnoi, combination at, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Kray, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Kunnersdorf, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>L.</b><br />
+<br />
+Lance, importance of, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when best for cavalry, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when useful, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Lender, bravery the first requisite for, <a href='#Page_345'>345</a>.<br />
+<br />
+League, wars of the, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battle of, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march of the allies upon, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march on, modified, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle at, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Lepanto, battle of, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Leuthen, battle of, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>, <a href='#Page_229'>229</a>, <a href='#Page_342'>342</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maneuver of Frederick at, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Level country, defensive in, 164<br />
+<br />
+Light cavalry, advantages of, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ligny, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Line of advance, how determined, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle before the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, definition of, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, distribution of troops in, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, posting troops in, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Line of battle, post of artillery in, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 401]</span><a name='Page_401'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense important to an army of invasion, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense should be short, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, double, when necessary, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how protected, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, single, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of retreat, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>, <a href='#Page_341'>341-343.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, <a href='#Page_215'>215</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>and points, strategic, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>central, application of, to large masses, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>deployed, in two ranks, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>double, to be avoided, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>eccentric, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>interior, observations on, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>interior, two armies on, <a href='#Page_117'>117</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, attack of, <a href='#Page_214'>214</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, <a href='#Page_282'>282-284.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of circumvallation, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of contravallation, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense, second, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense, eventual, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense, permanent, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of defense, strategical and tactical, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of depots, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of direction, importance of, illustrated, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of maneuver, importance of, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, <a href='#Page_100'>100-103</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, best direction of, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, change of, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, converging and divergent, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, double, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, double, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, great art of directing, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how established, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how influenced, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, <a href='#Page_122'>122</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, maxims on, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, rivers as, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, selecting of, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Stollhofen, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Turin, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Turin, capture of, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Linz, towers of, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Logistics, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_252'>252-268</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>derivation of the term, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>faulty, instances of, <a href='#Page_265'>265-267.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>illustration of importance of, <a href='#Page_263'>263-268.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle of Leipsic, <a href='#Page_267'>267</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principal points of, <a href='#Page_254'>254-256.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Louis VII., Crusade of, <a href='#Page_372'>372</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>IX., Crusade of, <a href='#Page_374'>374</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>IX., expedition of, to Tunis, <a href='#Page_375'>375</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>XIV., coalition against, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>XIV., commissariat of, <a href='#Page_142'>142</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Louvois, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>M.</b><br />
+<br />
+Macdonald's column at Wagram, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error at Katzbach, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Mack, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Ulm, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Magnesia, victory of, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Malplaquet, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Maneuver line, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>, <a href='#Page_115'>115</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, their importance, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objective points of, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>pivots of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical, by flank, <a href='#Page_140'>140</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>turning, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Maneuvers, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Ulm and Jena, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for breaking through a line, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>must conform to strategic principles, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objective points of, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon in 1814,118.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>simplest, most likely to be successful, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic lines of, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>sudden, generally better than predetermined, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>transversal, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Maneuvers, turning, rules for, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 402]</span><a name='Page_402'></a>
+<br />
+Mantua, siege of, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Wurmser at, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+March, establishment of depots on, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Marches and attacks, arrangements of, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>effects of systems of, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>flank, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instructions to generals commanding corps in, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>particulars to be considered in, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rapid, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for, <a href='#Page_257'>257-263.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>transversal, in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two kinds of, <a href='#Page_260'>260</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Marengo, French armament at, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Maritime expeditions, <a href='#Page_361'>361-390.</a><br />
+<br />
+Marmont at Salamanca, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Marsin, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Massena's position of the Albis, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mat&eacute;riel of war, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should be inspected by staff officers, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Maurice of Saxony, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Maxim for distant invasions, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Maxims for frontier defenses, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of fundamental principle of war, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on intrenched camps, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on lines of operations, <a href='#Page_114'>114-122.</a></span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on operations in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on strategic fronts, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on strategic operations, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relative to supplies, <a href='#Page_143'>143-146.</a></span><br />
+<br />
+Mayence, Austrian camp before, <a href='#Page_157'>157</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fortresses at, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched camp at, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Middle Ages, expeditions of the, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Military education important to a ruler, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>geography and statistics, importance</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of a knowledge of, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>geography, Lloyd's essay on, <a href='#Page_40'>40</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>institutions, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>institutions of Rome, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instruments, signals by, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations influenced by a cabinet, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>policy, <a href='#Page_38'>38</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>policy, essential bases of, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>sciences, study of. <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>spirit, how encouraged, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>spirit, how maintained, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>spirit of nations, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>statistics and geography, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Militia as cavalry, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Millesimo, effect of the battle of, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Minden, French order at, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mithridates, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>, <a href='#Page_365'>365</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mixed order, infantry formation, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of Benningsen at Eylau, <a href='#Page_352'>352</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>marine expeditions, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Mohammed II., <a href='#Page_375'>375</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Molitor, General, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mollwitz, battle of, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Moors, invasion of Europe by, <a href='#Page_367'>367</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Morale of armies, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of cavalry, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Moreau at Engen, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>base of operations of, in 1800, <a href='#Page_82'>82</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreat of, in 1796, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of the Rhine in 1800, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Moscow, retreat of the French from, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mountain-campaigns, instances of, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, cavalry in, <a href='#Page_304'>304</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, defense in, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, heights to be secured in, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, strategic defense in, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, strategic positions of, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, the offensive in, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>countries, transversal marches in, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>country, character of a war in, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>country, forts in a, <a href='#Page_151'>151</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>country, invasion of a, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Mountains as eventual lines of defense, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>as frontiers, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>campaigns in, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, when secondary, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, <a href='#Page_161'>161</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic operations in, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Mounted infantry, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>militia, <a href='#Page_315'>315</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Movement by flanks of companies, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 403]</span><a name='Page_403'></a>
+<br />
+Movements, extended, when dangerous, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in which infantry should be exercised, <a href='#Page_300'>300</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of armies, points to be attended to, <a href='#Page_254'>254-256</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Murray's descent in 1813, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Musketry-fire better for defensive, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of, in battles, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>N.</b><br />
+<br />
+Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Naples, French army at, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Napoleon, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>, <a href='#Page_218'>218</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>and Grouchy at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>,130.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Austerlitz, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Essling, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Ligny, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Ratisbon, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Wagram, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>double wars of, <a href='#Page_37'>37</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>English expedition against, in 1815, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>his own chief staff officer, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations of the armies of, <a href='#Page_136'>136</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Napoleon's artillery, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>artillery at Wagram, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>base of operations in 1806, <a href='#Page_80'>80-82</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battles, orders of, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>bold maneuvers in 1814, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>campaign of 1800, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cantonment on the Passarge, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>central lines in Saxony, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>central position in 1813, why disastrous, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>changes of line of operations, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>choice of objective points, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concentric retreat in 1796, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defense in Champagne in 1814, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>detachments in 1805, <a href='#Page_222'>222</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error after his victory at Dresden, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error in the campaign of 1812, <a href='#Page_172'>172</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>favorite objective, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front of operations in 1796, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front of operations in 1813, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>infantry, panic of, at Wagram, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of defense in 1813, <a href='#Page_93'>93</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>logistics in 1806 and 1815, <a href='#Page_264'>264</a>, <a href='#Page_265'>265</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march on Bassano, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Napoleon's march on Eylau, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march on Jena in 1806, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march on Naumburg in 1806, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>march to K&ouml;nigsberg, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mode of issuing orders, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>motives and necessities, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations, comments on, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order at the Tagliamento, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passages of the Danube, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of the Saint-Bernard, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of the Po in 1800, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>projected invasion of England, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_250'>250</a>, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>reserves, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreat from Smolensk, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>return from Egypt in 1800, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rule for the passage of an army, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic lines in 1796, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic positions, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of formation for battle, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of marches, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, definition of, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, difficulties of conquest in, <a href='#Page_31'>31-34</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, effect of the nature of the country in, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, how prevented, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, how success attained in, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, invasion difficult in, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, military precepts for, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Nations, military spirit of, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Nature and extent of war, how influenced, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, <a href='#Page_376'>376</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, <a href='#Page_174'>174</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ney, <a href='#Page_31'>31</a>, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Bautzen, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Dennewitz, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Elchingen, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Jena, <a href='#Page_305'>305</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>O.</b><br />
+<br />
+Objective point, how held, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point, manner of approach to, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point of Napoleon in 1800, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point, selection of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, geographical, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, how chosen, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Objective points in strategy, how determined, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 404]</span><a name='Page_404'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points of maneuver, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>, <a href='#Page_89'>89</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points of operations, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, political, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Objectives of operations, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Objects of war, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Oblique order, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order, antiquity of, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army, proper course for, <a href='#Page_324'>324</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battle, object of, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battles, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>characteristics of infantry formation for, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, <a href='#Page_290'>290</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>movements, when advised, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>or defensive system, either may be employed, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system to be followed in, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>the, in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of artillery in, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>war, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>, <a href='#Page_73'>73</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>war, duty of staff officers in, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>war, reserves, how posted in, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, duty of statesmen in, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, how conducted, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars to reclaim rights, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Oleg, expedition of, <a href='#Page_367'>367.</a><br />
+<br />
+Open positions, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Operations, base of, where to be established, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>bases of, definition of, <a href='#Page_77'>77</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>how to be chosen, <a href='#Page_79'>79</a>, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>plurality of, <a href='#Page_78'>78</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>change of lines of, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>control of, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>divergent and convergent, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>double lines of, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>, <a href='#Page_110'>110</a>, <a href='#Page_123'>123</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>exterior lines of, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fronts of, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>, <a href='#Page_338'>338</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in mountainous countries, maxims on, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>interior lines of, <a href='#Page_102'>102</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, how protected, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, converging and divergent, <a href='#Page_118'>118</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, how established, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, how influenced, <a href='#Page_119'>119</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, maxims on, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>military, influenced by a cabinet, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objective points of, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objectives of, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of 1809 and 1814, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the French at the close of 1793, <a href='#Page_331'>331-333</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>pivots of, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>simple lines of, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, how to be judged, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, necessary in war, <a href='#Page_50'>50</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>theater of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, <a href='#Page_338'>338-340</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>theater of, how divided, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>zone of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>zone of, how to select, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>zones of, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_338'>338</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Opinion, public, danger of, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Orchomenus, <a href='#Page_365'>365</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, <a href='#Page_301'>301</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>half-deep, attacks in, <a href='#Page_302'>302</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>half-deep, infantry formation, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in deep masses, infantry formation, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in echelons, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in squares, when suitable for attack, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mixed, infantry formation, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>,</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>oblique, <a href='#Page_199'>199</a>, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of attack in columns, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle at Agincourt, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Cann&aelig;, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Cr&eacute;cy, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Essling, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Fleurus, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Leipsic, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at Mollwitz, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>at passage of a river, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>by echelon, <a href='#Page_193'>193</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>convex, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>definition of, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>oblique, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>offensive, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>of the generals of the Republic, <a href='#Page_349'>349</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of infantry as skirmishers, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>shallow, infantry, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Orders, best mode of issuing, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how issued by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>inaccurate transmission of, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battle, classification of, useful, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 405]</span><a name='Page_405'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon's battles, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should be clear, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two methods of issuing, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>, <a href='#Page_259'>259</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Organization and arms of cavalry, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>by corps, likely to be permanent, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of an army in four corps, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in seven corps, <a href='#Page_281'>281</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of divisions, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>, <a href='#Page_280'>280</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of very large armies, <a href='#Page_286'>286</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>P.</b><br />
+<br />
+Panics, cause and remedy of, <a href='#Page_65'>65</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers and troops to be warned against, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Parallel lines, <a href='#Page_200'>200</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle, <a href='#Page_188'>188</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle reinforced, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle, when suitable, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle with crotchet, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreat, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreats, countries adapted to, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreats, when preferable, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Partisans, information from, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of a river, best position for, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Beresina, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Danube by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Rhine in 1795, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_343'>343</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers, double, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers, famous modern, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers in retreats, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers in retreats, rules for, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers, rules for, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of rivers, rules for preventing, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Peninsular War, <a href='#Page_32'>32</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Perfect army, essential conditions of, <a href='#Page_43'>43</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Permanent lines of defense, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Perpendicular order of battle, <a href='#Page_190'>190</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Peter the Hermit, <a href='#Page_371'>371</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Peterwardein, panic at, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Philip II. of Spain, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pivots of maneuver, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pivots of operations, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Points, decisive, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive and objective, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive geographic, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive, of battle-field, now determined, <a href='#Page_186'>186</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive strategic, <a href='#Page_86'>86</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, objective, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Political objective points, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objective points subordinate to strategy, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, <a href='#Page_225'>225</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Portable telegraphs, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Port Mahon, assault of, <a href='#Page_212'>212</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for battle, <a href='#Page_341'>341</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to drive an enemy from, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strong, essentials for, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of wars of, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical, protection of flanks in, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Positions, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for cantonments, selection of, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>open, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical, rules for selecting, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>two kinds of, <a href='#Page_180'>180</a>, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Post, capture of, when important, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Posting troops in line of battle, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Posts, means for capture of, <a href='#Page_216'>216</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Prague, battle of, <a href='#Page_189'>189</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Preservation of armies in time of peace, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Prince Eugene, <a href='#Page_54'>54</a>, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Coburg, error of, in 1794, <a href='#Page_109'>109</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Principle of decisive points of maneuver, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Principles of strategy, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of strategy always the same, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Promotions in armies, <a href='#Page_47'>47</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Protection by trees and brushwood, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Provisional lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>, <a href='#Page_106'>106</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel retreat in, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relation of, in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Prussian army at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>reserves in 1806, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of forming columns, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of intrenched camps, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 406]</span><a name='Page_406'></a>
+<br />
+Public opinion, danger of, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Punic wars, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pursuit, rules for, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pursuits, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, <a href='#Page_362'>362</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>Q.</b><br />
+<br />
+Qualities of a skillful general, <a href='#Page_334'>334</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>R.</b><br />
+<br />
+Ramillies, <a href='#Page_312'>312</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ramrods, <a href='#Page_348'>348</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rapid marches, <a href='#Page_176'>176</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ratisbon, Napoleon at, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Rear, attack in, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rear-guard in retreat, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rear-guards in retreat, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Reconnoissances, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>give but limited information, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>to gain information of the enemy's movements, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Religion, wars of, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Reports of prisoners, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Reserve, cavalry, <a href='#Page_311'>311</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>final, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>horse-artillery, advantages of, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Reserves, cavalry, <a href='#Page_288'>288</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>importance of, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in offensive war, how posted, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>nature of, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Napoleon, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Prussian, in 1806, <a href='#Page_134'>134</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Retreat along converging roads, 236<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>along diverging roads, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>along parallel roads, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>by several corps, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>difficulty of deciding method of, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>five methods of arranging, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in single mass, when preferable, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>line of, <a href='#Page_261'>261</a>, <a href='#Page_341'>341-343</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>means of, to be considered in a defensive position, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel, <a href='#Page_237'>237</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>well effected, should be rewarded, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Retreats, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at night, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>bridges in, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>by diverging roads, danger of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry in, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>circumstances influencing, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concentration in, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>concentric, instances of, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defiles in, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>divergent, when admissible, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>duty of staff officers in, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>firmness of Russians in, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>halts in, to relieve rear-guard, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>hours of departures and halts in, <a href='#Page_236'>236</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in daylight, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>instances of famous, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>measures to insure success of, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel, countries adapted to, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>, <a href='#Page_241'>241</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>parallel, when preferable, <a href='#Page_239'>239</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of rivers in, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Prince de Ligne's remark on, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rear-guard in, <a href='#Page_234'>234</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>should be slow, <a href='#Page_232'>232</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>various kinds of, <a href='#Page_231'>231</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Reverse fire, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rhine, passages of, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Richard Coeur-de-Lion, <a href='#Page_373'>373</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.<br />
+<br />
+River, best position for passage of, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>crossing of, in presence of an enemy, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order of battle at passage of, <a href='#Page_192'>192</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Rivers as eventual lines of defense, <a href='#Page_96'>96</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>as frontiers, <a href='#Page_147'>147</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>as lines of operations, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>double passage of, <a href='#Page_230'>230</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>famous modern passages of, <a href='#Page_226'>226</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>, <a href='#Page_343'>343</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>passage of, in retreats, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>, <a href='#Page_244'>244</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>rules for, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, <a href='#Page_121'>121</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for passage of, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>rules for preventing passage of, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Rivoli <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Rocket-batteries, use of, <a href='#Page_318'>318</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rollo, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, <a href='#Page_63'>63</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>nation, cause of the decline of, <a href='#Page_60'>60</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Romans, naval expeditions of, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rome, military institutions of, <a href='#Page_61'>61</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Rossbach, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 407]</span><a name='Page_407'></a>
+<br />
+Rules for conducting descents, <a href='#Page_251'>251</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for fighting battles scientifically, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for gaining information of enemy's movements, <a href='#Page_273'>273</a>, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for offensive or defensive operations, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for passage of rivers, <a href='#Page_227'>227</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for passage of a river in retreat, <a href='#Page_245'>245</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for pursuit, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for preventing passage of rivers, <a href='#Page_228'>228</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for use of artillery in battle, <a href='#Page_316'>316-318</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>to be observed in selecting tactical positions, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army, skirmishers in, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>base in 1828 and 1829, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>cavalry, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expeditions in 1809, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order at Eylau, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>retreat in 1812, <a href='#Page_233'>233</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of forming columns, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Russians, early maritime expeditions of, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>S.</b><br />
+<br />
+Saber, when best for cavalry, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when useful, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Saint-Cyr at Stockach, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Saxons, expedition of, <a href='#Page_367'>367</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, <a href='#Page_124'>124</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Savoy, Duke of, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Scandinavians, <a href='#Page_366'>366</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Science of marches, essential point in, <a href='#Page_139'>139</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches, includes what, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Sciences, military, study of, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Scipio, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sea-coast as a base of operations, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sea, control of, held by England, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>control of, important in an invasion, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Secondary lines, <a href='#Page_103'>103</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sebastopol, <a href='#Page_347'>347</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Secondary depots, <a href='#Page_262'>262</a>, <a href='#Page_263'>263</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Shallow order, <a href='#Page_298'>298</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>order, infantry, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Shumla, camp of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Siege, how covered, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Candia, <a href='#Page_380'>380</a>, <a href='#Page_381'>381</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Copenhagen, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Mantua, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Sieges and active armies, relations between, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>duty of staff officers in, <a href='#Page_256'>256</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars of, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Signaling by fires, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Signals by military instruments, <a href='#Page_276'>276</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>simultaneous shouts as, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Simple and interior lines, advantage of, <a href='#Page_114'>114</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of operations, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Simultaneous shouts as signals, <a href='#Page_277'>277</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Single line of operations, when preferable, <a href='#Page_116'>116</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sizeboli, capture of, <a href='#Page_223'>223</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Skill, superiority in, <a href='#Page_42'>42</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Skirmishers, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Skirmishing-order, <a href='#Page_292'>292</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Small detachments, how useful, <a href='#Page_224'>224</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, <a href='#Page_235'>235</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sovereign as commander, <a href='#Page_52'>52</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Spain adapted to parallel retreats, <a href='#Page_240'>240</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>and Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, <a href='#Page_358'>358</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>invasions of, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>war in, in 1823, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Spanish Armada, <a href='#Page_249'>249</a>, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>capture of Vera Cruz by, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>descent on Algiers, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>descent on Morocco in 1859, <a href='#Page_389'>389</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Spies, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>best course for, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>difficulties in their way, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of, neglected in many modern armies, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when especially useful, <a href='#Page_270'>270</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Squares in echelons, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>infantry, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in two ranks, <a href='#Page_294'>294</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Staff, chief of, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>,<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>chief of, how selected, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>general, usefulness of, <a href='#Page_57'>57</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers and general must act in concert, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers, duties of, should be defined, <a href='#Page_253'>253</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers, duty of, in offensive war, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers should inspect mat&eacute;riel, <a href='#Page_257'>257</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>officers, summary of duties of, <a href='#Page_254'>254-256</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, <a href='#Page_171'>171</a>.<br />
+<br />
+State, how rendered secure, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Statesmanship, relation of, to war, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Statistics, military, <a href='#Page_39'>39</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 408]</span><a name='Page_408'></a>
+<br />
+St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Stockach, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defeat of the French at, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Strategic defense in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_164'>164</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Stollhofen, lines of, <a href='#Page_152'>152</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Strategical and tactical lines of defense, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Strategic combinations, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>combinations, when better than tactical, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>coup-d'oeil, <a href='#Page_337'>337-345</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>field of 1806, <a href='#Page_113'>113</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front and line of defense may coincide, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front, change of, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front, double, <a href='#Page_95'>95</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front not to be too extended, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, <a href='#Page_94'>94</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fronts, <a href='#Page_92'>92</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fronts, maxims on, <a href='#Page_98'>98</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines and points, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of maneuvers, <a href='#Page_128'>128</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of Napoleon in 1796, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>, <a href='#Page_131'>131</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations in mountains, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations, maxims on, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point, Leipsic as a, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>Lyons as a, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>point of a battle-field, when important, <a href='#Page_187'>187</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points, capitals as, <a href='#Page_87'>87</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>position, essential conditions for, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>positions, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>, <a href='#Page_330'>330</a>, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>positions of mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_76'>76</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>positions of Napoleon, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>reserves, <a href='#Page_67'>67</a>, <a href='#Page_133'>133</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>square for camps, <a href='#Page_99'>99</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Strategy, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a>, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>advantage of the offensive in, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>and the commissariat, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battles of Ulm and Jena won by, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>connection of intrenched camps with, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>connection of t&ecirc;tes de ponts with, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>definition of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>directs movements, tactics executes them, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>errors in, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how it should be studied, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>illustration of, by operations of 1793, <a href='#Page_331'>331-333</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>illustrations of, <a href='#Page_339'>339-341</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>in what it consists, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objective points in, how determined, <a href='#Page_88'>88</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>one great end of, <a href='#Page_177'>177</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>points embraced by, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>political objective points subordinate to, <a href='#Page_91'>91</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principles of, <a href='#Page_331'>331</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principles of, always the same, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>province of, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relation of fortresses to, <a href='#Page_148'>148</a>, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>science of marches in, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>system of, developed in 1800, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>the art of, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Strong position, essentials for a, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Study of strategy, how made profitable, <a href='#Page_337'>337</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Successful retreat, how to insure, <a href='#Page_242'>242</a>, <a href='#Page_243'>243</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Surprises of armies, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>difficulty of, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Suwaroff, <a href='#Page_55'>55</a>, <a href='#Page_170'>170</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Supplies, depots of, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>, <a href='#Page_143'>143</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, <a href='#Page_168'>168</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Svatoslav, expedition of, <a href='#Page_308'>308</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Sweyn, <a href='#Page_369'>369</a>, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, <a href='#Page_162'>162</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Massena in, in 1799, <a href='#Page_165'>165</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Suwaroff in, <a href='#Page_166'>166</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>tactical defense of, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Syria, French expedition to, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.<br />
+<br />
+System, concentric or eccentric, <a href='#Page_126'>126</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of corps, <a href='#Page_279'>279</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of divisions, <a href='#Page_278'>278</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches, effects of, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches, includes what, <a href='#Page_138'>138</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches, relation of, to commissariat, <a href='#Page_141'>141</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of marches the result of circumstances, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how to be judged, <a href='#Page_125'>125</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of signals, <a href='#Page_274'>274</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of strategy developed in 1800, <a href='#Page_137'>137</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of wars, change of, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of wars of position, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Systems modified by forms of government, <a href='#Page_45'>45</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>T.</b><br />
+<br />
+Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, <a href='#Page_178'>178</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defense of Switzerland, <a href='#Page_169'>169</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, <a href='#Page_184'>184</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>position, protection of flanks in, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Tactical positions, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 409]</span><a name='Page_409'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>positions, rules for selecting, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Tactics, <a href='#Page_322'>322</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>executes movements, strategy directs them, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>grand, <a href='#Page_69'>69</a>, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of battles, great difficulty of, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, <a href='#Page_358'>358</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, <a href='#Page_209'>209</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Telegraphs, portable, <a href='#Page_275'>275</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Temporary bases, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>bases, when necessary, <a href='#Page_132'>132</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+T&ecirc;tes de ponts, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>connection of, with strategy, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how differ from intrenched camps, <a href='#Page_160'>160</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Theater of operations, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, <a href='#Page_338'>338-340</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how composed, <a href='#Page_75'>75</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how divided, <a href='#Page_71'>71</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_104'>104</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of war, border of the, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of war, decisive points of the, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of war, definition of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, <a href='#Page_269'>269</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of, in war, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Thirty Years' War, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Three-rank formation of infantry, <a href='#Page_291'>291</a>, <a href='#Page_293'>293</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, <a href='#Page_268'>268</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Torgau, battle of, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Torres-Vedras, camp of, <a href='#Page_155'>155</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched camp at, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Towers, masonry, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Coblentz, <a href='#Page_159'>159</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of Linz, <a href='#Page_158'>158</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Transversal maneuvers, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>marches in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_163'>163</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, <a href='#Page_287'>287</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>employment of, <a href='#Page_328'>328</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Trot, when best for cavalry charge, <a href='#Page_306'>306</a>, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Turin, battle of, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intrenched camp at, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>lines of, <a href='#Page_153'>153</a>, <a href='#Page_213'>213</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Turkey, invasion of, <a href='#Page_23'>23</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, <a href='#Page_84'>84</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>wars, squares in, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Turks, cavalry charge of, <a href='#Page_307'>307</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>naval expeditions of, <a href='#Page_377'>377</a>, <a href='#Page_378'>378</a>, <a href='#Page_380'>380</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Turning maneuvers, <a href='#Page_179'>179</a>, <a href='#Page_201'>201</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maneuver, rules for, <a href='#Page_204'>204</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Two corps, one behind the other, <a href='#Page_285'>285</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Two-rank formation, <a href='#Page_346'>346</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Two wars at once, danger of, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>U.</b><br />
+<br />
+Ulm, battle of, <a href='#Page_53'>53</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>battle of, won by strategy, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>camp of, <a href='#Page_154'>154</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maneuvers at, <a href='#Page_90'>90</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, <a href='#Page_197'>197</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, <a href='#Page_208'>208</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>meeting of two armies, <a href='#Page_207'>207</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>expedition to Port Royal, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, <a href='#Page_272'>272</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the three arms combined, <a href='#Page_203'>203</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>V.</b><br />
+<br />
+Vandals, <a href='#Page_366'>366</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, <a href='#Page_221'>221</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Venice, <a href='#Page_379'>379</a>, <a href='#Page_380'>380</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, <a href='#Page_390'>390</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>taken by the French, <a href='#Page_386'>386</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>taken by the United States, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Vessels, Roman, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Scandinavian, <a href='#Page_366'>366</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, <a href='#Page_333'>333</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Victory, assailant's best means of, <a href='#Page_202'>202</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>on what it depends, <a href='#Page_309'>309</a>, <a href='#Page_310'>310</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when it may be expected, <a href='#Page_360'>360</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Villages, importance of, on front of a position, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Villars's infantry, panic among, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, <a href='#Page_120'>120</a>.<br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>W.</b><br />
+<br />
+Wagram, <a href='#Page_195'>195</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_266'>266</a>, <a href='#Page_317'>317</a>, <a href='#Page_343'>343</a>, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Macdonald's column at, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's artillery at, <a href='#Page_289'>289</a>, <a href='#Page_316'>316</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>panic at, <a href='#Page_64'>64</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+War an art, <a href='#Page_321'>321</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>border of the theater of, <a href='#Page_80'>80</a>, <a href='#Page_81'>81</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>circumstances which influence result of, <a href='#Page_321'>321</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>council of, at seat of government, <a href='#Page_59'>59</a>.</span><br /><span class='pagenum'>[Pg 410]</span><a name='Page_410'></a>
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>councils of, <a href='#Page_58'>58</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>decisive points of the theater of, <a href='#Page_85'>85</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive-offensive, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>definition of the art of, <a href='#Page_13'>13</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>fundamental principle of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>governments should not be unprepared for, <a href='#Page_46'>46</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>how to be conducted, <a href='#Page_15'>15</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of cavalry in a, <a href='#Page_313'>313</a>, <a href='#Page_314'>314</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>influence of improvements in fire-arms on, <a href='#Page_347'>347</a>, <a href='#Page_355'>355</a>, <a href='#Page_359'>359</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>manner of applying general principle of, <a href='#Page_175'>175</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>mat&eacute;riel of, <a href='#Page_49'>49</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>maxims of fundamental principles of, <a href='#Page_70'>70</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>nature and extent of, how influenced, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>not an exact science, <a href='#Page_344'>344</a>, <a href='#Page_350'>350</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>objects of, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of the Crimea, <a href='#Page_387'>387</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive and defensive, definition of, <a href='#Page_72'>72</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, duty of staff officers in, <a href='#Page_258'>258</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>operations of, how directed, <a href='#Page_150'>150</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>principal parts of the art of, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>relation of statesmanship to, <a href='#Page_14'>14</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>theater of, definition, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>use of theories in, <a href='#Page_323'>323</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Warsaw, intrenchments at, <a href='#Page_211'>211</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Wars, aggressive, for conquest, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>change of system of, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>civil, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive politically, offensive militarily, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>double, <a href='#Page_36'>36</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>for conquest, instances of, <a href='#Page_22'>22</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>intestine, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>natural character of, in mountainous countries, <a href='#Page_167'>167</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>national, definition of, <a href='#Page_29'>29</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>national, difficulties of conquest in, <a href='#Page_31'>31-34</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>national, effect of nature of the country on, <a href='#Page_30'>30</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>national, how prevented, <a href='#Page_33'>33</a>, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>national, invasion difficult in, <a href='#Page_144'>144</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, how conducted, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>offensive, to reclaim rights, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of expediency, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 2em;'>kinds of, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of extermination, <a href='#Page_34'>34</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of intervention, <a href='#Page_19'>19</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of intervention, essentials in wars of, <a href='#Page_21'>21</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of intervention, military chances in, <a href='#Page_20'>20</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of invasion, when advantageous, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of opinion, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of opinion, character of, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of opinion, instances of, <a href='#Page_25'>25</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of opinion, military precepts for, <a href='#Page_27'>27</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of position, system of, <a href='#Page_135'>135</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of religion, <a href='#Page_35'>35</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of sieges, <a href='#Page_146'>146</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>political, <a href='#Page_26'>26</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>political part of, how modified, <a href='#Page_17'>17</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Punic, <a href='#Page_363'>363</a>, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Turkish, squares in, <a href='#Page_296'>296</a>, <a href='#Page_297'>297</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>when most just, <a href='#Page_16'>16</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>with or without allies, <a href='#Page_18'>18</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Waterloo, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_183'>183</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>, <a href='#Page_295'>295</a>, <a href='#Page_303'>303-306,</a> <a href='#Page_354'>354</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Bl&uuml;cher at, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>campaign of, <a href='#Page_129'>129</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>English squares at, 294</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>formations at, <a href='#Page_351'>351</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>French at, <a href='#Page_196'>196</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Napoleon's order of battle at, <a href='#Page_198'>198</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Ney at, <a href='#Page_182'>182</a>,183.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>strategic lines at, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>Wellington's position at, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page_388'>388</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Wellington, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>, <a href='#Page_185'>185</a>, <a href='#Page_353'>353</a>, <a href='#Page_357'>357</a>, <a href='#Page_358'>358</a>, <a href='#Page_381'>381</a>, <a href='#Page_382'>382</a>, <a href='#Page_384'>384</a>, <a href='#Page_385'>385</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>and Bl&uuml;cher at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_127'>127</a>, <a href='#Page_130'>130</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Salamanca, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>at Torres-Vedras, <a href='#Page_83'>83</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>defensive-offensive operations of, <a href='#Page_74'>74</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Wellington's position at Waterloo, <a href='#Page_181'>181</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Weyrother, <a href='#Page_205'>205</a>, <a href='#Page_206'>206</a>.<br />
+<br />
+William the Conqueror, <a href='#Page_370'>370</a>, <a href='#Page_371'>371</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Winkelried, column of, <a href='#Page_194'>194</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Winter campaigns, <a href='#Page_68'>68</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>quarters, countries adapted to, <a href='#Page_246'>246</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>quarters, when dangerous, <a href='#Page_247'>247</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>quarters, when strategic, <a href='#Page_97'>97</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Woods, importance of possession of, <a href='#Page_303'>303</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Wurmser at Mantua, <a href='#Page_156'>156</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>eccentric retreat of, in 1796, <a href='#Page_238'>238</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>error of, <a href='#Page_111'>111</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>X.</b><br />
+<br />
+Xerxes, <a href='#Page_173'>173</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>army of, <a href='#Page_362'>362</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+<br />
+<b>Z.</b><br />
+<br />
+Zama, battle of, <a href='#Page_364'>364</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Zimisces, <a href='#Page_368'>368</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Zone of operations, <a href='#Page_66'>66</a>, <a href='#Page_100'>100</a>, <a href='#Page_338'>338</a>.<br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations, how to select, <a href='#Page_329'>329</a>.</span><br />
+<span style='margin-left: 1em;'>of operations in 1813, <a href='#Page_101'>101</a>.</span><br />
+<br />
+Zones of operations in the French Revolution, <a href='#Page_105'>105</a>.<br />
+<br />
+Zurich, defeat of the allies at, <a href='#Page_112'>112</a>.<br />
+<br />
+
+<span class='pagenum'>[Pg 411]</span><a name='Page_411'></a><br /><br />
+<span class='pagenum'>[Map 1]</span><a name='map_1'></a>
+<center>
+<img src='images/map1.png' width='1000' height='864' alt='' title=''>
+</center><br /><a name='map_2'></a>
+<h3><i>Map of portions of Germany, Switzerland &amp; Italy.</i></h3>
+<span class='pagenum'>[Map 2]</span><br />
+<center>
+<img src='images/map2.png' width='1000' height='904' alt='' title=''>
+</center><br /><a name='map_3'></a>
+<span class='pagenum'>[Map 3]</span><br />
+
+<center>
+<img src='images/map3.png' width='1000' height='924' alt='' title=''>
+</center><br /><br />
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Art of War
+
+Author: Baron Henri de Jomini
+
+Release Date: September 28, 2004 [EBook #13549]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Suzanne Shell, Stephen Schulze and the Online Distributed
+Proofreaders Team
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE
+
+ART OF WAR
+
+BY
+
+BARON DE JOMINI,
+
+GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.
+
+A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps.
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
+
+BY
+
+Capt. G.H. MENDELL,
+
+CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY,
+
+AND
+
+Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL,
+
+CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY.
+
+
+Originally published in 1862
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand
+which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in
+making a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too
+rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and
+on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case the
+sense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy to
+preserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators of
+Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored to
+render their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding to
+his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms.
+
+To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is
+not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To
+those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more
+interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass
+of the American public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said
+with entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent
+judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this
+or any other day.
+
+The translation now presented to the people has been made with the
+earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As the
+existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed
+incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that
+military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the
+people. If by the present work the translators shall find they have
+contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object,
+they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it.
+
+To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is
+recommended to begin at the article "Strategy," Chapter III., from that
+point to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return to
+Chapters I. and II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be
+appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially
+true of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is
+quite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all
+other recent writers on the military art.
+
+U.S. Military Academy,
+West Point, N.Y.
+January, 1862.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.
+
+  ART. I.--Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.
+
+  ART. II.--Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a
+            Military View.
+
+  ART. III.--Wars of Expediency.
+
+  ART. IV.--Wars with or without Allies.
+
+  ART. V.--Wars of Intervention.
+
+  ART. VI.--Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other
+            Causes.
+
+  ART. VII.--Wars of Opinion.
+
+  ART. VIII.--National Wars.
+
+  ART. IX.--Civil and Religious Wars.
+
+  ART. X.--Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.
+
+
+CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY.
+
+  ART. XI.--Military Statistics and Geography.
+
+  ART. XII.--Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a
+             War.
+
+  ART. XIII.--The Military Institutions of States.
+
+  ART. XIV.--The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations.
+
+  ART. XV.--The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III. STRATEGY.
+Definition of Strategy and Tactics.
+THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+  ART. XVI.--The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.
+
+  ART. XVII.--The Theater of Operations.
+
+  ART. XVIII.--Bases of Operations.
+
+  ART. XIX.--Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater
+             of War, and Objective Points of Operation.
+
+  ART. XX.--Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense,
+            and Strategic Positions.
+
+  ART. XXI.--Zones and Lines of Operations.
+
+  ART. XXII.--Strategic Lines of Maneuver.
+
+  ART. XXIII.--Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases
+               or Strategic Reserves.
+
+  ART. XXIV.--The Old and New Systems of War.
+
+  ART. XXV.--Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.
+
+  ART. XXVI.--Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched
+              Lines.--Wars of Sieges.
+
+  ART. XXVII.--Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts in their Relation to
+               Strategy.
+
+  ART. XXVIII.--Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.
+
+  ART. XXIX.--Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
+
+  Epitome of Strategy.
+
+
+CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
+
+  ART. XXX.--Positions and Defensive Battles.
+
+  ART. XXXI.--Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.
+
+  ART. XXXII.--Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.
+
+  ART. XXXIII.--Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
+
+  ART. XXXIV.--Surprises of Armies.
+
+  ART. XXXV.--Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de
+              Main generally.
+
+
+CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN
+THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.
+
+  ART. XXXVI.--Diversions and Great Detachments.
+
+  ART. XXXVII.--Passage of Rivers and other Streams.
+
+  ART. XXXVIII.--Retreats and Pursuits.
+
+  ART. XXXIX.--Cantonments and Winter Quarters.
+
+  ART. XL.--Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.
+
+
+CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
+
+  ART. XLI.--A few Remarks on Logistics in general.
+
+  ART. XLII.--Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate
+              Information of the Enemy's Movements.
+
+
+CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
+
+  ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
+
+  ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry.
+
+  ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry.
+
+  ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery.
+
+  ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together.
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+SUPPLEMENT.
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+SECOND APPENDIX.
+
+SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
+
+
+
+SUMMARY OF
+
+THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely
+military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
+Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto
+unrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_.
+Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the
+profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be
+denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is
+indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all
+the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
+various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
+should have a place in a work like this.
+
+To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--
+
+1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
+
+2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of
+war, either for defense or for invasion.
+
+3. Grand Tactics.
+
+4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
+
+5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications.
+
+6. Minor Tactics.
+
+It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
+branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of
+engineering.
+
+Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good
+infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a
+staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.
+
+
+Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
+concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
+determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the
+war.
+
+A government goes to war,--
+
+To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
+
+To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
+manufactures, or agriculture;
+
+To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
+safety of the government or the balance of power;
+
+To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;
+
+To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to
+defend them;
+
+To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of
+territory;
+
+To defend the threatened independence of the state;
+
+To avenge insulted honor; or,
+
+From a mania for conquest.
+
+It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
+degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for
+the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to
+the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and
+there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
+conduct of a war, as,--
+
+1. A state may simply make war against another state.
+
+2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each
+other.
+
+3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.
+
+4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.
+
+5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning
+or after it has commenced.
+
+6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
+ally, or upon its own.
+
+7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant
+territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and
+adventurous.
+
+8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the
+enemy.
+
+9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.
+
+War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the
+art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the
+operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances
+of the case.
+
+For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
+Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
+same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
+compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
+they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
+march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
+of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
+between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in
+nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
+circumstances and events.
+
+To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
+statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
+of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong
+exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the
+highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE I.
+
+Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.
+
+
+When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to
+enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before
+action.
+
+The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
+which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with
+the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our
+times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
+though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
+reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
+Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
+settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
+general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
+all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
+legatee.
+
+Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
+old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
+doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
+he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
+and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
+such attempts can be justified.
+
+In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
+by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
+should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
+would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
+be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
+of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
+by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his
+own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
+able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
+an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
+the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
+enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
+and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
+guarantees to other states.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE II.
+
+Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
+View.
+
+
+A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
+without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
+honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
+awaiting the attack on the frontiers.
+
+There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
+advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
+internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
+party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
+soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on
+the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers,
+and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely
+military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own
+territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial
+features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
+the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
+constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.
+
+These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;
+but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different
+with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of
+communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of
+states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to
+prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles
+which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and
+skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
+variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to
+execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.
+
+For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
+differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of
+Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and
+possess no steadiness under misfortunes.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE III.
+
+Wars of Expediency.
+
+
+The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
+Succession, were wars of expediency.
+
+There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
+undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
+reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to
+prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a
+state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to
+form a coalition for that purpose.
+
+These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE IV.
+
+Of Wars with or without Allies.
+
+
+Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being
+equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker
+states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than
+either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops,
+but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening
+portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All
+history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
+neglected by any power, however formidable.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE V.
+
+Wars of Intervention.
+
+
+To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a
+state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain.
+The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole
+weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when
+it can make decisive use of its resources.
+
+There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal
+affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.
+
+Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the
+first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
+interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured
+in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful.
+While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland,
+Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere
+in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.
+
+Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
+perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
+right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it
+certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may
+reach the adjoining states.
+
+There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
+wars,--viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain
+the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the
+war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not
+to be obtained otherwise.
+
+History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect
+of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the
+immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become
+the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the
+proper time."
+
+In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new
+and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be
+decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference
+to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807
+Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Koenigsberg,
+leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
+launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder,
+it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there
+is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the
+Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred
+thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field,
+and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the
+proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.
+
+There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
+interventions:--
+
+1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force
+specified by former treaties.
+
+2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending
+his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.
+
+3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of
+war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against
+one.
+
+4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or
+interferes before the declaration of war.
+
+When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
+treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice
+in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and
+with an imposing force, the case is quite different.
+
+The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
+Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
+still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
+Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
+far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
+of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
+maneuvering of their allies.
+
+Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
+operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
+this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the
+military character of these expeditions.
+
+It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
+distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
+territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
+is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
+in a measure, an advantage to the state.
+
+In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
+both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
+allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
+finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
+the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
+number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
+struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.
+
+The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
+whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
+than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,
+but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813.
+Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking
+his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with
+two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
+regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany,
+which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention
+Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her
+favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages.
+
+Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater
+was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible
+display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already
+in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and
+at the time most opportune for her.
+
+This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
+monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence
+when they know how to profit by it.
+
+Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
+boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy,
+and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held
+France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and
+arrested the great conqueror in his career.
+
+In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
+to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the
+recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of
+Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized
+Prince Eugene.
+
+Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
+opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they
+could not add to the conviction of the reader.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VI.
+
+Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.
+
+
+There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
+state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
+great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
+
+Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Caesar,
+and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
+there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
+incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
+and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
+furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however,
+was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
+contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to
+make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
+was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
+yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
+to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
+teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
+disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.
+
+A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a
+crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
+induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.
+
+The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
+and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
+threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
+author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
+general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
+successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
+majority of the people whose territory was invaded.
+
+These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
+same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
+the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
+never to have been changed.
+
+Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
+than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
+spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the
+proper time.
+
+An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the
+end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome.
+
+An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and
+likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as
+was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the
+Revolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was
+better prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was
+attacked by all Europe upon both land and sea.
+
+Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of
+Turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national
+resistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him
+to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were
+twice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and
+Turks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united
+people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element
+of religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was
+formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found,
+while in the interior all was weakness.
+
+When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the
+inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular
+feeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt.
+(These military points are treated of in Article XXIX.) But when the
+invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success
+will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to
+insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a
+state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops,
+and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations,
+depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must
+have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this
+possible.
+
+Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not
+powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may
+arrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805
+and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The
+invasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by
+Austria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a
+wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VII.
+
+Wars of Opinion.
+
+
+Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes
+confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice.
+
+Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and,
+lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior
+without being intestine or civil.
+
+Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of
+intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party
+desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it
+desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. Although
+originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most
+deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and
+become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.
+
+The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of
+the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is
+the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of
+dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire
+than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not
+sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman
+Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a
+crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of
+gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher.
+
+The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for
+it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For
+instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France,
+had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may,
+however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the
+dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter
+enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.
+
+The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are
+about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics
+thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous
+declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly
+alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing
+the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing
+it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are
+inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the
+human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it
+is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and
+for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a
+factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these
+storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to
+restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the
+explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far
+better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to
+try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt.
+
+After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the
+Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign
+armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands
+upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would
+never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of
+Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to
+clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is
+probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the
+Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good,
+temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and
+the immemorial traditions of the French.
+
+In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not
+only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of
+an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party
+will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of
+another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all
+the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is
+supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the
+support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did
+one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do
+for the Coalition in 1793?
+
+History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the
+Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of
+attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the
+military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before
+deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what
+would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of
+destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the
+commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to
+France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with
+two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
+again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection
+of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to
+decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have
+depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem
+thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave
+one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say.
+Experiment alone could have determined it.
+
+The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
+wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
+should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
+reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of
+less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be
+made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
+constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
+independence or the integrity of its territory.
+
+The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of
+this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the
+conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was
+made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de
+Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national
+war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
+thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
+opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous
+difference in the results.
+
+Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angouleme was well carried out.
+Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the
+above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there
+divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of
+strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were
+sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the
+instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of
+the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and
+the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps
+have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody
+one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
+similar to that of 1807.
+
+Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
+was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it
+behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from
+that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged
+with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
+Cadiz.
+
+If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship
+was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid
+order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its
+commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the
+counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of
+its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand
+blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep
+veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority
+for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
+nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have
+been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew
+into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,--a striking lesson, by
+which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land,
+although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
+reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
+construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful
+conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated
+from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the
+general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its
+support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not
+less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who
+were in the best position to know it.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE VIII.
+
+National Wars.
+
+
+National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of
+invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied
+to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of
+them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their
+independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its
+camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the
+sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured.
+
+The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and,
+though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our
+admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of
+humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be
+confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions
+of the state and directed by the government.
+
+This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may
+rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters,
+affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them
+the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical
+people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic
+in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
+institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most
+dear.
+
+The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a
+national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and
+are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it,
+their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the
+facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all
+the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will
+be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea.
+
+The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility
+of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always
+most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive
+forests.
+
+The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that
+of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the
+Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally,
+the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the
+inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer
+time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference
+in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of
+the countries.
+
+Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of
+defense; and the Bocage of La Vendee, so justly celebrated, proves that
+any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or
+canals, admits of a formidable defense.
+
+The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as
+in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general
+conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest
+of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the
+English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary
+struggle of La Vendee with the victorious Republic, those of Spain,
+Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the
+Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of Queen
+Christina, are still more striking illustrations.
+
+The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by
+a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an
+army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly
+in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each
+individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the
+non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every
+means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which
+he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and
+multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step.
+
+These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is
+difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their
+connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the
+commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the
+slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best
+measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information
+of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to
+gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only
+in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his
+combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted
+movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is
+about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs
+of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is
+attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications,
+destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his
+depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must
+inevitably yield after a time.
+
+In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When
+Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of
+the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four
+brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish
+forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago
+de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo,
+Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the
+companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never
+able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal
+escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had
+thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single
+division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the
+Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part
+of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind
+the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a
+league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when
+he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the
+regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard
+Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the
+marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
+this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
+information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them
+fall more readily into snares.
+
+No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a
+system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all
+the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at
+the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy
+wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of
+respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what
+force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the
+safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies?
+
+The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the
+obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the
+occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What
+efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops
+of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for
+six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and
+Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford,
+Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castanos, Reding, and Ballasteros!
+
+If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will
+be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops
+proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered,
+calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time
+and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and,
+particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the
+League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and
+Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendee, are models of their kind, which may be
+employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable
+order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the
+late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the
+success of their enterprises.
+
+The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars
+have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any
+other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being
+also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders.
+This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its
+consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the
+people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be
+convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of
+conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only
+to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests,
+should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how
+to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred
+thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with
+the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and
+without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole
+population--men, women, and children--of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne,
+and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled
+town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and
+incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the
+Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces,
+who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of
+them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The
+difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor
+of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion
+without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of
+extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the
+people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will
+it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to
+organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their
+governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take
+in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?
+
+I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the
+cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French
+troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the
+better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to
+fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or
+arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands.
+To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good
+national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive
+in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system
+was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the
+whole of Germany in 1813.
+
+I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian
+philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of
+extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the
+defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good
+political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence.
+
+As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized
+assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that
+my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and
+English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at
+Fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women,
+and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE IX.
+
+Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion.
+
+
+Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally
+the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious
+sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the
+collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most
+deplorable.
+
+We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force
+against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would
+weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that
+it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in
+French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is
+difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis
+XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put
+upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are
+horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful
+when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the
+League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is
+difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time
+of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a
+state of brutality.
+
+To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon
+which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two
+parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to
+reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the
+intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with
+ambitious views.
+
+Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a
+political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although
+these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is
+possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in
+religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had
+no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to
+subject France to his influence, or to dismember it.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE X.
+
+Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once.
+
+
+The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at
+the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the
+necessity of demonstrating its wisdom.
+
+A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring
+states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally
+to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of
+the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations
+allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter
+into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it
+will be an ordinary war.
+
+Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon,
+sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests
+arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on
+the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from
+imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking
+alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish
+something like equality between the strength of the parties.
+
+The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his
+designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had
+alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only
+oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more
+equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding
+to the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the
+subsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different
+states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of
+Europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends.
+
+Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was
+almost impossible to avoid.
+
+France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of
+the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of
+the Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets
+they would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd
+calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France
+miraculously escaped.
+
+Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has
+voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable
+wars,--with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case
+he expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of
+Turkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so
+that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been
+generally supposed.
+
+It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made
+against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary,
+and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in
+opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For
+instance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and
+Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with
+Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter
+contests belong to ordinary wars.
+
+It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if
+possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more
+prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them,
+until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule,
+however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the
+localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure,
+equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will
+influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
+noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+MILITARY POLICY.
+
+
+We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
+the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
+political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
+there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
+war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
+include these under the head of _Military Policy_.
+
+Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
+projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
+and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
+assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
+without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise
+on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
+operations.
+
+Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
+fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
+their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
+or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
+and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
+of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
+operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
+force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
+statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
+resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of
+which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
+
+There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
+should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and
+that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the
+arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points
+which ought to guide in this sort of combinations.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XI.
+
+Military Statistics and Geography.
+
+
+By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge
+possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy
+with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the
+topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all
+the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the
+examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in
+the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the
+country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his
+chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of
+cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day,
+despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical,
+diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two
+examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the
+Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and
+forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the
+declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with
+their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the
+sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
+
+The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the
+interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no
+district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding
+it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march.
+
+All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to
+the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was
+given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable
+barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which I, having lived
+in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply
+rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of
+which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and
+would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved
+that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in
+the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities
+more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects
+of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old
+system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the
+empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere
+multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a
+national defense.
+
+Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography
+and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in
+treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon
+them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not
+fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he
+represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
+Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed
+with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and
+1809.
+
+But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the
+European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for
+instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. Awaiting
+the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and
+unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and
+strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of
+topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the
+excellent charts published in all European countries within the last
+twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography was
+in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the
+works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian
+staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The
+charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and
+Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise
+to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors.
+
+Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but
+vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and
+navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by
+a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan
+operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
+subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military
+enterprises.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XII.
+
+Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War.
+
+
+As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful
+enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts
+to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this
+point under the head of national wars.
+
+On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his
+own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he
+endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike
+susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary
+with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has
+been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and
+of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and
+those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of
+their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the
+miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very
+different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who
+inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of
+electrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute the
+advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in
+battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm
+impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in
+maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it,
+disorder easily results.
+
+The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the
+armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to
+rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value
+of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared
+with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly
+organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against
+undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave
+may be its individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order
+produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without
+discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would
+not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and
+nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt
+with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a
+Napoleon.
+
+The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences
+the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are
+tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match
+for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal.
+
+As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of
+victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals
+have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make
+a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the
+hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general
+had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
+cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to
+deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This
+risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they
+are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to
+apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this
+truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this
+objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in
+providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
+course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of
+battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to
+accident, it would not invalidate my assertion.
+
+If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it
+will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of
+the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the
+most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately,
+this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank,
+age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as
+the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we
+will devote to it a separate article.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of
+the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication,
+&c., and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat very
+disastrous.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIII.
+
+Military Institutions.
+
+
+One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is
+the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a
+general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with
+a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a
+great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be
+combined.
+
+Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:--
+
+1. To have a good recruiting-system;
+
+2. A good organization;
+
+8. A well-organized system of national reserves;
+
+4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as
+well as those of a campaign;
+
+5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of
+subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the
+formalities of the service;
+
+6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
+
+7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
+
+8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to
+defensive and offensive arms;
+
+9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an
+organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical
+education of its officers;
+
+10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general
+administration;
+
+11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the
+principal operations of war;
+
+12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.
+
+To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and
+equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of
+battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the
+troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and
+health of veterans.
+
+None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave
+inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without
+national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in
+fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has
+often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good
+army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and
+instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable
+of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate
+India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive
+love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great
+an army capable of executing his great enterprises.
+
+A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus
+culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its
+standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing
+for it success. We are far from saying that a government should
+sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it
+ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the
+prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to
+fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case--which is, unfortunately,
+of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise
+institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the
+general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of
+national reserves.
+
+There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the
+executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the
+Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of
+Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of
+operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle,
+it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form
+of government exercises a great influence in the development of the
+military strength of a nation and the value of its troops.
+
+When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected
+by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and
+penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive,
+whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a
+chief devoted to all the national interests.
+
+The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to
+this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most
+far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war,
+whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at
+some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist
+sudden aggressions.
+
+In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members
+of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus,
+Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the
+institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army
+to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an
+exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and
+their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to
+the more statesmanlike preparations for war?
+
+I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the
+sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of
+things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible,
+except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean
+that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in
+a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. And the
+wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation
+as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system
+of military policy.
+
+If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms,
+governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are
+less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a
+formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these
+deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and
+have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength.
+Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list
+of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
+under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the
+extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and
+themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures
+and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which
+overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here
+it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of
+power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the
+true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
+after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public
+Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the
+dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank
+of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that
+countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and
+militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they
+present decided advantages.
+
+It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in
+the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to
+degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies,
+and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly
+resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in
+preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from
+becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors
+useful for the defense of the country.
+
+The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst
+possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and
+permanent corps d'armee seems to be much preferable. In general terms,
+the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and
+if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable
+elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
+copied from it.
+
+As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service,
+and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the
+promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the
+remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On
+the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be
+suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the
+other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services.
+
+The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war:
+it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of
+success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau
+and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer
+to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the
+cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the
+great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would
+not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a
+very different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been the
+victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a
+little more trouble to carry than a saber!
+
+The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the
+state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great
+advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the
+offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the
+attention of a provident government.
+
+The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great
+revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone
+will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios
+and Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the
+nature of the arms and the organization of the troops.
+
+The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful
+rapidity.[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it
+is said the Austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which
+throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the Perkins
+steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will
+multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau,
+Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the
+European races.
+
+If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these
+inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the
+half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture
+with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be
+obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a
+battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy.
+
+We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor,
+and horses also will require the same protection.
+
+While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is,
+however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which
+should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused
+by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics.
+
+We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the
+military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government.
+
+1. The prince should receive an education both political and military.
+He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils
+than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the
+latter himself.
+
+2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his
+first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He
+must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the
+general most capable of directing his armies.
+
+3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable
+footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by
+reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and
+discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization;
+its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and
+superior if possible.
+
+4. The materiel of war should also be upon the best footing, and
+abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals.
+National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all
+improvements in this materiel made in other countries.
+
+5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be
+encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific
+military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of
+securing for the army men of merit and genius.
+
+6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors
+preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should
+be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all
+statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and
+papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief
+of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently
+stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be
+simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret
+department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of
+the corps.
+
+7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography
+and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their
+material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the
+strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should
+be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they
+acquit themselves with marked ability.
+
+8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an
+entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of
+operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well
+as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the
+enterprise.
+
+9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the
+war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the
+country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of
+the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and
+material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring
+into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable
+alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties
+during the war.
+
+10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the
+chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute
+to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great
+in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when
+armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last
+crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well
+organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least
+for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure
+soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and
+honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made
+to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the
+enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which
+cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its
+efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of
+the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that
+France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
+200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while
+meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies.
+
+A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very
+badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the
+strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the
+scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy
+combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of
+well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts
+to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of
+sustaining a long war.
+
+A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which
+a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron,
+and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This
+result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of
+the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing
+resources to an assailant.
+
+We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are
+not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our
+purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be
+for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and
+localities may make in these relations.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this many
+years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been
+attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which
+he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important
+improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less
+marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no
+civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for
+depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--TRANSLATORS.]
+
+[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall
+of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous
+efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIV.
+
+The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations.
+
+
+Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by
+the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain
+that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or
+Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of
+performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would
+be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country.
+
+As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more
+fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince,
+(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will
+only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other
+respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who
+is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he
+is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much
+by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public
+resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful
+accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be
+devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his
+enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the
+execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and
+in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to
+induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and
+the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no
+military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
+influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good
+results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will
+present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience
+necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his
+judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and
+opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even
+if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
+accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the
+contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his
+presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to
+great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its
+communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad
+results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at
+head-quarters!
+
+When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his
+armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme
+direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the
+Prussian government with Bluecher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two
+generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability,
+the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be
+harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army
+of Silesia in 1813.
+
+The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it
+proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has
+frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred
+that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser,
+who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
+the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward
+with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome at the battle of Audenarde, and, I
+think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is
+deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known
+that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity
+than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret
+authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and
+allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill
+and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor.
+
+If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles,
+he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full
+selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same
+titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of
+the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in
+execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these
+counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation.
+
+We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in
+person, his most important duty will be to have the position of
+commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done.
+Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the
+more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince
+Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the
+ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After
+Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of
+Turenne, Conde, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont
+succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the
+Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for
+mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough
+to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational
+nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an
+influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the
+prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services.
+But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be
+profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will
+be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a
+judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general
+requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a
+military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be
+guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper
+influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is
+at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
+the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained
+a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not
+always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the
+government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there
+may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In
+this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better
+than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
+their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
+position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it?
+Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their
+subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not
+astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their
+appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by
+appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be
+deceived in his selections.
+
+One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in
+realizing the beautiful fiction of Fenelon in Telemachus, by finding a
+faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the
+prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his
+more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in
+reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their
+character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to
+personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was
+rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all
+the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed
+so much luster upon the Russian arms.
+
+It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing
+could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Caesar, when he was
+ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte
+at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two
+directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public
+sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises
+and the experience of events.
+
+The most essential qualities for a general will always be as
+follow:--First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_;
+Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. His
+scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned
+characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It
+is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His
+knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be
+perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
+in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is
+gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others
+instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit
+conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even
+pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to
+merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are
+always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
+little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing
+that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the
+glory of its success, even when least entitled to it.
+
+The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to
+assign to the command a general of long experience in service with
+troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little
+experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war
+is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be
+able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment
+against an enemy. Peter the Great, Conde, Frederick, and Napoleon are
+instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the
+staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will
+not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that
+he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural
+genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a
+general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of
+conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question
+does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or
+negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of
+the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to
+a rational conclusion:--
+
+1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery,
+who has commanded a division or a corps d'armee, will, with equal
+chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one
+arm or special corps.
+
+2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war,
+will be equally fitted for the command.
+
+3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a
+commander-in-chief.
+
+Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the
+requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the
+principles of the art of war.
+
+The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the
+formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may
+advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the
+operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of
+organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction
+into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.
+
+Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never
+thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General
+Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible
+rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step
+from the sublime to the ridiculous!
+
+Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and
+his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man
+of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice
+of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a
+general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit
+him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous;
+for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or
+fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The
+best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of
+several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.
+
+It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent
+councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more
+weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if
+the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find
+in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of
+the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be
+expected from operations conducted by others than those who have
+originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation
+which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his
+own conception?
+
+I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and
+no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than
+myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is
+absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military
+officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
+accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount
+of dissent.
+
+What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon
+proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the
+maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded
+them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand
+difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting
+them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been
+executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved
+failures?
+
+In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be
+useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case
+they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition,
+may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use
+every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only
+advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply
+consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this
+harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce
+unfortunate results.
+
+Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of
+organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by
+experience, is--
+
+1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
+and of unshaken firmness in danger.
+
+2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
+faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
+harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
+the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Bluecher,
+aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
+not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
+is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
+a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
+general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.
+
+Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
+influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the
+seat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
+from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
+from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
+saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
+repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
+fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
+individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
+war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
+duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
+but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
+opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
+decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
+connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
+operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
+campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
+battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
+determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations,
+whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
+these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
+levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
+it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
+ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
+limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
+to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
+the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
+unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
+responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
+who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
+directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
+scene of operations.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
+save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
+order to form an oblique line.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XV.
+
+The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.
+
+
+The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
+would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
+military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
+situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
+that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
+decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
+habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
+or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
+virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
+Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
+virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
+as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
+the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
+whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
+neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
+industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
+should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
+strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
+heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
+whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
+death in the footsteps of the Caesars than to fatten upon the public
+miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
+Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
+tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
+estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
+health, or fortune to the defense of his country.
+
+The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
+with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
+to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
+in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
+government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
+qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
+institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
+worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
+contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
+against the employment of officers of the army in other public
+functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
+offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments
+demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
+abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
+prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
+of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
+retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
+it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
+lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
+in the theaters and public clubs?
+
+It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
+the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
+military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
+to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
+early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
+bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
+that they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealous
+of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
+the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
+twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
+in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
+advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
+where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
+the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
+military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
+employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
+spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
+comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.
+
+However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
+government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
+order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
+the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
+insult and dependency.
+
+It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
+but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
+what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
+regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
+wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.
+
+The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
+different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
+the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
+temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance,
+or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
+skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is
+more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
+object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage
+should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
+respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
+rather than in external forms only.
+
+The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
+faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
+possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
+more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is
+necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
+difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
+opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
+with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.
+
+By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
+in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
+their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
+love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
+every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
+punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain
+a high military spirit.
+
+Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
+formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
+the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
+heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
+lost.
+
+I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
+the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he
+encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'
+troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
+contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.
+
+The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics
+which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
+by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
+surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
+thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
+Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
+charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
+fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
+panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
+is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
+becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
+maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
+resource but in ignominious flight.
+
+Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
+and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
+it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
+been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
+which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
+pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
+of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
+the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
+more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
+hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
+days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
+vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.
+
+Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
+more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
+who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
+promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.
+
+In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
+The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
+degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
+soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
+of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
+the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
+precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
+contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
+most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
+slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
+or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
+rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
+momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
+offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
+the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
+powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
+obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
+There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
+for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
+soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
+when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
+them,--which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
+exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
+rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
+in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.
+
+It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
+trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
+are purely military.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
+from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
+colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
+most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]
+
+[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should
+pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
+and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+STRATEGY.
+
+DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+
+The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
+consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
+Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
+We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
+In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
+when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
+importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
+necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
+ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
+and handling of a great army.
+
+We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
+commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
+character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
+and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
+consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.
+
+The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
+of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
+select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
+temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
+namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
+opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
+operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
+temporary positions which the corps d'armee will occupy upon this front
+of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.
+
+When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
+resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
+him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
+lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
+degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
+confounded.
+
+To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
+lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.
+
+If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
+annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
+dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
+be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
+be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
+result.
+
+The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
+enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
+be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
+point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
+point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
+commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
+detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
+strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
+less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
+leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
+thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.
+
+If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
+it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
+important objective point.
+
+If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
+intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
+occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
+strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
+also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
+streams, it will construct _tetes de pont_; and, if the bridges are
+within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
+means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
+strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.
+
+Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
+order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
+equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
+and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.
+
+When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
+field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
+is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
+campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
+differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
+activity and energy to attain prompt success.
+
+Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
+while discussing combinations which result from these operations.
+
+Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:--
+
+1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
+different combinations of which it admits.
+
+2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
+the most favorable direction for operations.
+
+3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
+operations.
+
+4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
+
+5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
+
+6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
+strategic front.
+
+7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
+maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
+
+8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
+
+9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
+
+10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
+army.
+
+11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
+as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
+
+12. Points for intrenched camps, _tetes de pont,_ &c.
+
+13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.
+
+These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
+first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
+nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
+disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
+belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.
+
+The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
+formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
+the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
+and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
+execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.
+
+To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
+comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
+posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
+ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
+ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
+extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
+comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
+strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
+the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
+and the employment of the troops.
+
+It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
+and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
+the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
+pitched battles the above definition holds good.
+
+Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
+following objects:--
+
+1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.
+
+2. The offensive in a defensive battle.
+
+3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
+attack of the enemy's line.
+
+4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.
+
+5. Surprises of armies in the open field.
+
+6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.
+
+7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.
+
+8. _Coups de main_.
+
+All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
+skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
+any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
+regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.
+
+
+THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
+
+It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
+the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good
+combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:--
+
+1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
+upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
+communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
+one's own.
+
+2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
+one's forces.
+
+3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
+decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
+the first importance to overthrow.
+
+4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
+decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
+energy.
+
+This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
+objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the
+forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
+recognizing those points.
+
+This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
+enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
+necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article
+XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
+XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different
+combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
+there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
+problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
+strategy.
+
+The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
+zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
+operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
+line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the
+center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
+the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
+remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
+wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
+with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
+will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
+question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
+to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
+simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
+giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
+strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
+talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
+to carry out any combinations previously arranged.
+
+We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
+and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
+campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
+the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
+the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.
+
+
+
+
+OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVI.
+
+Of the System of Operations.
+
+
+War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
+shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
+by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
+great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
+attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense
+of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
+if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is
+confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
+_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
+always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
+assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
+diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and
+generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
+excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he
+feels that the independence of his country is threatened.
+
+In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
+side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
+which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
+the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
+favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
+country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
+generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
+in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
+a speedy termination of the contest.
+
+For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
+_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
+in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses
+upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
+initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
+desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
+strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
+fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
+where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
+him.
+
+Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
+positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
+taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
+his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.
+
+The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
+obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which
+account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
+about equally balanced.
+
+Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
+from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
+throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
+defensive before it ends.
+
+A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
+may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
+defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
+The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
+country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
+retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
+obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own
+army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
+seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
+contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
+detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
+his progress.
+
+An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
+inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
+artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
+obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
+extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
+the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
+his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
+he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
+the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
+the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
+may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
+advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
+prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
+the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
+the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.
+
+During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was
+the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
+the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
+his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
+opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course
+was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
+suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
+talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
+two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
+the progress of a defensive war.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVII.
+
+Of the Theater of Operations.
+
+
+The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
+may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
+to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
+When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
+hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between France and England
+since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
+and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
+other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria
+may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
+German States take part therein.
+
+Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
+theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
+strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
+second case each army will have its own independent theater of
+operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the
+territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
+defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
+maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
+danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
+action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
+If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
+operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
+general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
+object.
+
+Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
+or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:--
+
+1. Of a fixed base of operations.
+
+2. Of a principal objective point.
+
+3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.
+
+4. Of zones and lines of operations.
+
+5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.
+
+6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
+enemy.
+
+7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
+either for the offensive or defensive.
+
+8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
+point and the primary base.
+
+9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.
+
+For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
+with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
+starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
+Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
+traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
+operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
+concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
+zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.
+
+In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
+point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
+with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.
+
+It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
+_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
+move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
+of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
+maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
+excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
+of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.
+
+It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
+to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
+they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
+for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
+points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
+desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
+individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
+the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
+was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
+of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
+defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
+lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
+pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
+separately.
+
+Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
+strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary,
+these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
+that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.
+
+Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
+inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
+Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his
+foot."
+
+Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
+united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
+carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
+partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
+heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
+decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys.
+
+These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
+that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
+points that admit of discussion.
+
+The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
+the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
+examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
+remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
+general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
+passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
+these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
+a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XVIII.
+
+Bases of Operations.
+
+
+A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
+obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
+takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
+it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.
+
+The base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not
+necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
+a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or
+Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.
+
+When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
+alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
+of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
+be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
+own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
+vast difference between those parts of the country without military
+positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
+other portions where these military resources are found; and these
+latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
+have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
+Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
+beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
+if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
+Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
+upon the Loire.
+
+These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
+first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
+necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
+base on Befort or Besancon, on Mezieres or Sedan, as the Russian army
+after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
+established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
+These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
+decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
+country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
+himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
+held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.
+
+The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
+covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
+it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
+favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
+retired.
+
+A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
+sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
+should be a _tete de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.
+
+All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
+have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
+that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
+the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
+almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
+affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
+two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
+apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
+unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.
+
+The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
+Operations:--
+
+     "The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
+     great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
+     consequently, upon the direction of the bases.
+
+     [Illustration: Fig. 1.]
+
+     "If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
+     or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
+     may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy
+     occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
+     obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
+     to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
+     theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
+     that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
+     p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
+     line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
+     the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
+     Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
+     the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
+     them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
+     faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
+     French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
+     operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
+     D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
+     of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
+     communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.
+
+     "The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
+     occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
+     and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
+     by the side A B. The result is well known.
+
+     "The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
+     such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
+     losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
+     bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
+     with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
+     Ulm, and Jena.
+
+     "When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
+     bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
+     closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
+     insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
+     an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
+     defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it.
+     The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
+     fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
+     impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
+     the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
+     war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
+     in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
+     the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
+     frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
+     it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
+     Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
+     control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
+     establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
+     since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
+     shortened side,--as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
+     with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
+     Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
+     Franconia."
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 2.]
+
+The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
+opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
+French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense
+advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
+Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
+Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
+Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
+upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.
+
+If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
+be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
+the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
+operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
+and line of retreat.
+
+It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
+in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
+object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
+favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
+double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
+objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
+perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
+which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
+other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
+be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
+sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
+while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was
+done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
+degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
+thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
+perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
+left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
+enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
+extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
+him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
+having already rejoined him.
+
+In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
+forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
+and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
+extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians
+at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.
+
+If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
+being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
+well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
+partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
+Article XX.
+
+Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
+bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
+favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
+as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
+exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
+the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
+favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
+praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
+Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
+Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
+the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
+only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
+line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.
+
+Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
+secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
+many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
+except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
+supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
+notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
+have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
+thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
+the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
+the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
+its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
+base were established upon the coast.
+
+An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
+diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle,
+viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
+by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
+retreat._
+
+A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
+adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
+or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
+supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
+one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
+disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.
+
+However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
+may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
+your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
+of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
+We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
+given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
+which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
+(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.
+
+Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon
+the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army
+covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and
+Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as
+its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
+would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer,
+or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have
+terminated with the first campaign.
+
+Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own
+frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or
+temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's
+country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they
+will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XIX.
+
+Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
+Objective Points of Operations.
+
+
+Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this
+title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance:
+these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value
+from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the
+hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against
+them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally,
+there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others
+whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE
+strategic points.
+
+Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance,
+whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the
+presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical
+strategic point.
+
+A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily
+be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated
+operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such
+essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from
+the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by
+some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It
+would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not
+necessarily decisive points.
+
+Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from
+their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided
+as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance
+belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which
+have value merely because they connect two strategic points.
+
+To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in
+their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates
+to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon
+which enterprises occur.
+
+Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective
+point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater
+of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all
+decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations.
+We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in
+our selection of the second.
+
+I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all
+those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the
+result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose
+geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor
+the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense
+are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy
+in importance the first rank among them.
+
+The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first
+are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a
+consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the
+case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the
+Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the
+country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the
+Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if
+he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the
+Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be
+looked upon as the key of Southern Germany.
+
+Those points the possession of which would give the control of the
+junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of
+communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. For
+instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the
+valleys of the Rhone and Saone, and is at the center of communications
+between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
+not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an
+extended camp with _tetes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly a
+strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
+communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy
+both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if
+a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive
+point.
+
+All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are
+not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and
+government.
+
+In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of
+exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to
+any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the
+importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in
+1800.
+
+The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver,
+which result from the positions of the troops on both sides.
+
+When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army
+through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth
+or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was
+cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to
+support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same
+position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and
+from the army of Melas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon
+him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since
+this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
+retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
+and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective
+point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Melas by the
+Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence
+Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason
+of the march of Melas upon Nice.
+
+It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of
+maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent
+operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting
+forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to
+the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of
+forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the
+case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although
+dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet.
+
+If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the
+decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be
+more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed
+separately.
+
+The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,--
+
+1. The features of the ground.
+
+2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
+
+3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
+
+These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles.
+
+
+OBJECTIVE POINTS.
+
+There are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of
+maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objective
+point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of
+operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support
+for ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, in
+contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance
+from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile
+masses.
+
+In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point.
+If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the
+hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy
+to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the
+objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the
+political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their
+respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the
+art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
+operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to
+occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital,
+the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line
+of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which
+would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For
+instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the
+first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the
+second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the
+objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain
+possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being
+considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of
+the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first
+line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army
+reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be
+to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
+forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the
+river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the
+first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,--which might be
+attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
+
+As to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate
+particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile
+forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The
+greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in
+some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most
+conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were
+satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of
+an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of
+accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile
+army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no
+organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative
+advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to
+concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best
+promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate
+position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his
+center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
+he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut
+his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his
+forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
+campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very
+best.
+
+When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances
+and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as
+in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is
+not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances
+of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle.
+Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real
+advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they
+are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of
+the adjoining states.
+
+The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are
+almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and
+in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines
+of operations.
+
+As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend
+upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other
+circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of
+the two parties.
+
+In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may
+be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such
+as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory.
+In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success
+by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the
+hostile army, as did Napoleon.
+
+The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose
+only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they
+could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five
+hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to
+be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by
+success.
+
+There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are
+determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they
+play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and
+plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_.
+
+Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in
+its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are
+undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but
+often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great
+errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the
+Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the
+operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their
+failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The
+expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799--likewise due to the
+views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
+Belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke
+Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,--a step quite contrary to the
+interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These
+illustrations prove that political objective points should be
+subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been
+attained.
+
+This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd
+to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given
+has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective
+points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or
+their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events
+of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will
+be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk
+should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in
+other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great
+attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this
+kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a
+separate article.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a
+line cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive
+or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_
+points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of
+expression used to designate the object which an army desires to
+attain.]
+
+[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
+English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing
+to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XX.
+
+Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic
+Positions.
+
+
+There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble
+each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently
+confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts of
+operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic
+positions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction
+between them and to expose their relations to each other.
+
+
+FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS.
+
+When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they
+generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied
+toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of the
+theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two
+or three marches is called the _front of operations_.
+
+The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to
+confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other.
+
+Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed
+by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the
+other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or
+two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes
+the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision.
+
+When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of
+the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will
+undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the
+strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line
+of defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the
+Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French,
+and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This
+occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to
+confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not
+necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when
+its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic
+front, but it is never without a front of operations.
+
+The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the
+different terms.
+
+At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations
+extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the
+line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at
+Loewenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His
+forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose
+strategic positions were interior and central and presented three
+different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line
+of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to
+the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the
+strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended
+his operations to these points.
+
+The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of
+operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the
+Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between
+Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between
+Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his
+positions.
+
+The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies,
+and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of
+operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought
+to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend
+far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this
+direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on
+account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens
+that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and
+parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic
+front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this
+means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained,
+thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a
+base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.)
+
+The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these
+points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made
+the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew,
+from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka,
+to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the
+Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be
+obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It
+ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always
+be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words,
+that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and
+should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein
+upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the
+army the _tete de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications
+were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line
+parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown
+back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very
+remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena
+and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon
+Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby
+forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm.
+
+The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the
+base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days'
+duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by
+important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive
+blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good
+pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.
+
+It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic
+front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every
+line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an
+example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In
+order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to
+present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the
+Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.
+
+All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the
+same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require
+a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops
+into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries
+which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception,
+since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy
+could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double
+strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an
+offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always
+dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)
+
+Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national
+or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities.
+Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would
+have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country
+and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus,
+Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
+while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.
+
+
+LINES OF DEFENSE.
+
+Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical
+lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of
+defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as
+the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which
+relate only to the temporary position of an army.
+
+The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a
+well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as
+ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of
+the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the
+practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great
+obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in
+the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine,
+the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of
+defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.
+
+Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and
+every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary
+fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both
+strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress
+of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in
+search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently
+strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident
+tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army
+from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
+artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other
+hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should
+fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many
+armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense,
+it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and
+receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In
+addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is
+difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be
+able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the
+outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to
+Wurmser in Mantua.
+
+
+STRATEGIC POSITIONS.
+
+There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position
+may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for
+battle.
+
+Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended
+to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be
+covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line
+of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable
+distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli,
+Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in
+Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The
+positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before
+the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar
+in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in
+face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic
+positions,--for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily
+positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are
+sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements,
+are of this class.
+
+This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several
+points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of
+observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the
+positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position
+of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile
+operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large
+detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying
+strategic positions.
+
+The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts,
+lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a
+multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.
+
+In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with
+the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.
+
+In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of
+defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural
+or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of
+support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and
+are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of
+maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of
+operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months.
+In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.
+
+Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which
+it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the
+fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the
+pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of
+Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line
+of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point
+of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of
+support and endures throughout a campaign.
+
+The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as
+short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if
+it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the
+extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the
+prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous
+point.
+
+The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it
+be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to
+make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a
+short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither
+should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is
+unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not
+a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results
+of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful
+operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same
+results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in
+1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could
+have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
+
+The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should
+be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army
+should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the
+intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or
+interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front
+in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to
+a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part
+of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of
+security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible
+rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.
+
+An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making
+selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there
+concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy
+when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon
+prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of
+Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.
+
+When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be
+careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be
+called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal
+faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for
+all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an
+attack.
+
+Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point
+upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic
+front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able
+to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in
+rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so
+as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting
+a passage.
+
+For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation
+or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however
+brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of
+defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete
+the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with
+temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great
+difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.]
+
+[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of
+positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter
+devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXI.
+
+Zones and Lines of Operations.
+
+
+A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war,
+which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object,
+whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For
+example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the
+right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.
+
+A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of
+operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or
+of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein.
+Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_,
+depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number
+of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.
+
+It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a
+_line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road
+in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line;
+but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the
+sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real
+line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to
+the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would
+not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the
+communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole
+space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.
+
+The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the
+general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate
+the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army.
+Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic
+lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive
+points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the
+front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to
+those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive
+points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a
+temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines of
+communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different
+portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone
+of operations.
+
+For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand
+Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and
+another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden,
+Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the
+forces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic as
+an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading
+from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic;
+the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by
+Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte
+from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
+marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be
+said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal
+line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon
+which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned,
+and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.
+
+If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive
+combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on
+each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities,
+it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided
+into different classes, according to their relations to the different
+positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field,
+and to the enterprises projected by the commander.
+
+_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a
+frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.
+
+_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies
+proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies
+which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in
+distance and for long intervals of time.[11]
+
+_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to
+oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the
+general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in
+a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose
+to them a greater force.[12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the opposite
+result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time
+on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.
+
+_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from
+widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance
+of or behind the base.
+
+_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point
+to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course,
+necessitate a subdivision of the army.
+
+There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_.
+
+The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, often
+adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be
+confounded with the real _lines of operations_.
+
+_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each
+other mutual support,--as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was
+secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration
+was secondary to that of Barclay.
+
+_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the
+original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the
+highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully
+recognized only by a great and active mind.
+
+There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of
+operations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a
+preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select
+a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the
+class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines
+of operations.
+
+These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded
+me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than
+that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter
+has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has
+no lines of operations.
+
+The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two
+armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of
+Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large
+depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest,
+and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted.
+These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they
+will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different
+proposed enterprises.
+
+1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will
+extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both
+be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in
+the interval which separates them from it. Even if Melas[13] had
+possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have
+been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy
+occupied the line of the Po.
+
+2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated
+his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double
+exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided
+his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him
+to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to
+could unite.
+
+Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on
+its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than
+when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of
+support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the
+establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of
+operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it
+has no line of operations.
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH
+REVOLUTION.
+
+At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and
+Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included
+in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it
+being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed.
+The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three
+zones of operations,--the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue
+to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the
+interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the
+frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
+
+When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a
+union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the
+zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in
+Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not
+conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made.
+Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the
+concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion
+of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the
+King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him
+not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon
+France another form of government?
+
+When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the
+French were no longer able to invade. This _role_ was reserved for the
+allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.
+
+The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen
+thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty
+leagues and divided into five corps d'armee, and could not make a good
+defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was
+only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in
+favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could
+only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the
+Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the
+rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the
+excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this
+plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.
+
+The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family
+reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might
+subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand,
+Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five
+thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the
+Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
+displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them
+than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct
+on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the
+resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field,
+as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During
+the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for
+success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had
+anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more
+serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the
+advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions,
+and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately.
+Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
+Grandpre,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
+(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Chalons.
+
+The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with
+the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to
+guard every point.
+
+The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and
+Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and
+how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin
+of armies.
+
+Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the
+strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of
+a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of
+rendering invasion upon every point feasible.
+
+I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly
+abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater
+from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he
+was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this
+movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front,
+while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon
+the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely
+in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.
+
+The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty
+direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered
+Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations
+to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves
+praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this
+enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the
+extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had
+been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized
+and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a
+few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new
+armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of
+the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of
+the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?
+
+Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are
+particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince,
+and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of
+the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars
+of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14]
+If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was
+France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had
+risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having
+beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and
+Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the
+Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the
+Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army
+of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with
+its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It
+is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or
+running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the
+duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army
+pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several
+victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on
+a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they
+threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies
+of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
+and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon
+the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one
+side and Landau on the other.
+
+It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in
+the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they
+should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while
+the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or
+aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this
+army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the
+Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and
+Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?
+
+In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a
+painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of
+this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to
+represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this,
+it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the
+armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and
+the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four
+corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four
+divisions, which composed two armies.
+
+These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels,
+as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only
+difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders
+were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this
+difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position
+of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank
+the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of
+the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to
+great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on
+the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate
+of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon
+the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.
+
+If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have
+made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a
+month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.
+
+The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive
+was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six
+battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank
+Flanders was covered by the corps d'armee of Clairfayt, and upon the
+left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of
+a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis
+was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_
+were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were
+known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to
+Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army
+before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay
+invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his
+central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and
+to beat all his large detachments in detail.
+
+Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having
+been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing
+this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have
+been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and
+forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous
+diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up
+between the sea and two fortresses?
+
+The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical
+error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on
+Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi
+till the 3d of June,--more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid
+opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If
+the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by
+its left,--that is, both upon the Meuse,--the state of affairs would
+have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line
+of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the
+different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the
+center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained
+by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of
+three hundred miles in extent.
+
+In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal
+theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,--which opened a new
+field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this
+campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
+Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
+alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in
+the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre
+and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought
+Pichegru back to Landau.
+
+In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of
+1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The
+armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the
+extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794,
+they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the
+Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his
+forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then
+seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to
+steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the
+battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of
+Moreau to retreat.
+
+Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is
+to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the
+battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic
+lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable
+army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits
+the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The
+lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons
+every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the
+first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back
+upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and
+is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to
+keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these
+lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and
+Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back
+upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges
+of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to
+take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
+
+In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed
+two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and
+the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the
+center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia,
+being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The three
+armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eighty
+leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he
+unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the
+army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern
+Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of
+following up their success on this central line, which cost them so
+dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the
+Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the
+other trifles at Manheim.
+
+In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves
+thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the
+Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force
+is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples
+returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic
+direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central
+position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
+and beats it, while some leagues from the other.
+
+In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again
+changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of
+operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks
+of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the
+Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no
+similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines,
+affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt
+an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate.
+By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts
+off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving
+its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which
+forms its secondary line.
+
+Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of
+the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the
+armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and
+Melas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the
+Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of
+operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of
+Melas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It
+may thus be seen that Melas is cut off from his base, and that, on the
+contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his
+communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.]
+
+The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the
+importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military
+operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of
+defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his
+invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.
+
+By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted
+campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led
+to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental
+principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines
+enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the
+important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also
+satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to
+this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits
+fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
+
+
+MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.
+
+From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from
+that of many others, the following maxims result:--
+
+1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive
+point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the
+choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining
+this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a
+campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in
+1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too
+much studied by military men.
+
+Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The
+objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to
+be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for
+this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first
+operation and the new phases it may develop.
+
+2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical
+situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position
+of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case,
+however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the
+extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating
+would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the
+two extremities at the same time_.[15]
+
+It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide
+his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line
+will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible,
+the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the
+rear of his line of defense or front of operations.
+
+The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it
+affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that
+by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's
+force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of
+the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost
+without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the
+Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction
+of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and
+Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the
+Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Melas were still more
+brilliant.
+
+3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained,
+it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the
+assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this
+danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic
+direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to
+the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take
+advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a
+change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)
+
+The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important
+qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by
+these examples.
+
+If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon
+Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously
+protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the
+Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat
+than Melas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points
+of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and
+Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of
+regaining the Var or the Valais.
+
+In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had
+there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have
+been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the
+Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he
+placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof,
+which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians
+had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera
+and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the
+excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,--as well as the two roads
+which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.
+
+4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier:
+such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large
+coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon
+the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to
+have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the
+principal army.
+
+5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces
+on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more
+advantageous than a double one.
+
+6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either
+from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has
+been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of
+the army to each of his masses.
+
+7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to
+exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can
+be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate
+of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic
+plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the
+adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body
+of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with
+instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as
+much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling
+back upon the principal army.
+
+8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of
+force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring
+against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,--since a
+single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from
+acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
+the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
+respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to
+perform.
+
+9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other
+maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and
+sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in
+numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted
+space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to
+Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not
+be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the
+opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however,
+may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as
+to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be
+viewed with comparative indifference.
+
+10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than
+two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy,
+and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and
+supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the
+armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
+combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their
+junction.
+
+11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the
+enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by
+a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to
+the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior,
+since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the
+pursued.
+
+
+12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of
+operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and
+important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great
+disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an
+army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these
+changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to
+meet unforeseen events.
+
+At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a
+line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would
+have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by
+Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the
+Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one
+of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the
+siege of Olmutz.
+
+In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one
+which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the
+fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to
+the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he
+possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the
+most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.
+
+13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical
+character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on
+the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages
+to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like
+Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they
+naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the
+project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle
+become so important that every means should be taken to render them
+impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may
+be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following
+figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the
+army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior
+lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G,
+which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the
+result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.
+
+[Illustration:
+                        Fig. 4.
+
+                                K
+                               /\
+                              /  \
+                             /    \
+                            /      \
+  F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G        /        \        A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B
+                          /          \
+                         /            \
+                        /              \
+                       /                \
+                      /                  \
+                     /                    \
+                    /                      \
+                   /                        \
+  H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I                          C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D
+]
+
+
+14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the
+direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being
+naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the
+greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the
+frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of
+the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and
+cutting him from his base.
+
+But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the
+line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the
+perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the
+figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it
+marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the
+strategic advantages of its base C D.
+
+The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to
+establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army
+as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's
+own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.
+
+15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the
+direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the
+principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the
+presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the
+choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the
+advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the
+first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most
+certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this
+purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near
+Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by
+Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there
+the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to
+procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in
+Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of
+Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy
+was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led
+the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed
+because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies
+separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only
+a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at
+Lowicz.
+
+When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances
+of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to
+select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the
+position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between
+Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the
+most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this
+question, which is both strategic and tactical.
+
+Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory
+is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the
+directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The
+point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the
+center or one of the flanks of the enemy.
+
+A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended
+line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the
+dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not
+think of disturbing the bridges.
+
+If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
+concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the
+passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass
+it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the
+bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of
+rivers.
+
+16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be
+noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home
+and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will
+also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or
+the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of
+the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
+rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that
+unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other
+hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more
+dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could
+be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and
+interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
+own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants,
+authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even
+private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.
+
+Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the
+assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert
+regions, particularly when the people are not united against the
+invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a
+thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about
+the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every
+thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the
+embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and
+dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of
+Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and
+actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.
+
+17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much
+insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is
+that on each side of the line of operations the country should be
+cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line:
+otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is
+everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the
+rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the
+people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by
+diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy
+could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a
+compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of
+taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in
+recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not
+contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
+when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the
+Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the
+Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Melas? Did not Eugene march by
+way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon
+the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES--WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.
+
+Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon
+definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood;
+and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon
+themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether
+the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these
+principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even
+admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot
+disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural
+principles.
+
+In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the
+famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable
+event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe
+in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional
+cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of
+opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from
+overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to
+establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in
+case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines
+of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and
+arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment.
+Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Bluecher, Bernadotte, and
+Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior
+army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed
+its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not
+upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are
+doubly in my favor.
+
+Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the
+Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm,
+Katzbach, and Dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely
+foreign to the principles in question.
+
+What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with
+the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain
+on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the
+decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of
+an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole
+army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies
+are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the
+army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.
+
+If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the
+allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have
+threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this
+error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive
+battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach
+his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for
+Bluecher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold
+movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over
+torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet
+Bluecher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed
+up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based
+upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line
+of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study
+of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he
+knew how to apply this system.
+
+There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the
+injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in
+Saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the
+right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the
+frontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central
+position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them.
+When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
+Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile
+enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807;
+but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of
+operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as
+much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in 1813,
+either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective
+forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at
+Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of
+destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these
+officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
+Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can
+be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army
+which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere,
+shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented
+with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who
+applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover,
+in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from
+the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of
+these maxims.
+
+The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic
+question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions
+founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses
+its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with
+Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of
+the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer
+in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred
+thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of
+thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them
+successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong
+against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and
+for several good reasons:--
+
+1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to
+bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of
+one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily
+resist a much larger force.
+
+2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand
+men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with
+one of the other armies.
+
+3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a
+quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _materiel_ of every kind,
+that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts
+from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the
+impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to
+support such numbers.
+
+4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in
+check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be
+very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such
+magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will
+probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the
+advantages gained by the principal army.
+
+I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric
+system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and
+to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of
+principles.
+
+Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad:
+all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric
+lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a
+given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately
+destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the
+maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of
+1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the
+operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by
+closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having
+pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric
+directions to disperse the defeated army.[19]
+
+On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When
+they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be
+sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the
+efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately
+by a stronger enemy.
+
+Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be
+most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the
+principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles
+and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base
+to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines
+and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union
+before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case
+with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.
+
+In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated
+than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger.
+What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and
+Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake
+Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels
+be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this
+city,--one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Bluecher and Wellington,
+taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and
+the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable
+principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.
+
+Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not
+in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim
+to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and
+were applied by Caesar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by
+Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them
+out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various
+applications.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given
+rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.
+
+In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of
+_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great
+routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three
+routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
+different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three
+lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two
+armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a
+double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
+starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six
+other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have
+a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to
+designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set
+them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single
+corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal
+enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an
+accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or
+radii, but the operation was not double.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central
+positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are
+mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two
+masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these
+are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have
+done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of
+double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the
+theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after
+all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]
+
+[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct;
+for Melas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was
+unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication
+by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to
+cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.]
+
+[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of
+Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the
+French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he
+had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that
+the capital was at his head-quarters.]
+
+[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively
+upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_,
+and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.]
+
+[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main
+body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended
+to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic
+positions, and not lines of operations.]
+
+[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of
+Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of
+operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions;
+but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of
+lines of operations.]
+
+[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a
+combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but
+Macdonald might have fought Bluecher to advantage if he had better
+understood Napoleon's instructions.]
+
+[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of
+concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect
+that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he
+employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for
+example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXII.
+
+Strategic Lines.
+
+
+Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which
+differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to
+define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those
+strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of
+their position and their relation to the features of the country, like
+the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
+Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute
+examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this
+kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern
+Germany.
+
+The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by
+the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to
+another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its
+objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is
+crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those
+only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real
+importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line
+of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which
+are temporary and change with the operations of the army.
+
+Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of
+maneuvers_.
+
+An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of
+operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between
+the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and
+the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at
+most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior,
+directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic
+lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for
+each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it
+operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt,
+according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth
+and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm
+with Nuremberg or Mayence.
+
+It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of
+operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily
+applicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict a
+decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_,
+since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they
+are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if
+the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical
+superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes
+be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the
+forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much
+risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the
+important masses.
+
+Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against
+one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.
+
+The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good
+for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply
+them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves
+mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of
+these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations
+exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
+to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success;
+but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been
+taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line
+of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.
+
+We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army
+was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne
+and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp,
+and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack
+by Napoleon on Flanders decided Bluecher to receive battle parallel to
+the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no
+uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good
+chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in
+Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful
+maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and
+seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Bluecher had but three
+strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht,
+that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army
+near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the
+application of interior strategic lines,--which Napoleon here, perhaps
+for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that
+the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a
+line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a
+_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because he
+exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he
+sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the
+principles of war.
+
+A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving
+Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right
+to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his
+primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in
+force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose
+intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
+beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing
+this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did
+nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the
+feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe
+losses at Dennewitz were the result.
+
+Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different
+combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended
+from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo
+and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley
+of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had
+moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse.
+There were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow
+valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser,
+or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the
+valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two
+passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to
+hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis
+to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano.
+The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from
+Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a
+_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Bluecher on Wavre.
+However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at
+the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at
+Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with
+Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in
+great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back
+either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
+made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for
+even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have
+interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him
+to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois
+from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian
+general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French
+army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
+scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten
+at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had
+advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
+have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon
+him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.
+
+I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time
+and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many
+adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it
+may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its
+line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the
+enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by
+demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what
+is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be
+adopted under an urgent necessity.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIII.
+
+Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or
+Strategic Reserves.
+
+
+When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or
+temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as
+his own frontiers. A river with _tetes de ponts_, and one or two large
+towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and
+to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an
+excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a
+temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations
+leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a
+good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but,
+she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and
+became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of
+a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation,
+particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten
+in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its
+own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant
+temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases,
+and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot
+expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a
+temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic
+reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits
+deserve notice.
+
+STRATEGIC RESERVES.
+
+
+Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive,
+who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of
+skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government
+always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them
+when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army
+has its own, and every corps d'armee or division should not fail to
+provide one.
+
+The reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field,
+and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the
+latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of
+war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend
+not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and
+the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army
+takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of
+being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve
+between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active
+reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of
+menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to
+form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active
+service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be
+instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central
+depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them
+the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and
+adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be
+formed capable of important service.
+
+Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even
+in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on
+the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the
+neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part
+alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
+Vienna.
+
+In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used
+them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at
+Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between
+the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon
+decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with
+much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty
+thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English
+and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her
+interests.
+
+The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was
+badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or
+Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving
+Prince Hohenlohe and Bluecher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.
+
+These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the
+country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the
+double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity,
+of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its
+flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.
+
+Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and
+whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the
+troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant
+invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the
+scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the
+frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
+dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new
+levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under
+the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be
+indispensable.
+
+The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these
+reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line
+of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of
+a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to
+use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much
+as the withdrawal of his good troops.
+
+These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base
+and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been
+reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if
+there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up
+intrenched camps or _tetes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to
+increase the strength of their positions.
+
+All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to
+temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable
+if they possess such well-located pivots.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIV.
+
+The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches.
+
+
+_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of
+conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies
+at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other
+covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the
+other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war
+from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this
+revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less
+value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the
+French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them.
+It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this
+system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in
+fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents,
+provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were
+quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
+success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns,
+which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of
+the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they
+threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the
+columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at
+first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
+methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack,
+to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased
+his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose
+an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the
+poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried
+the positions.
+
+The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more.
+The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the
+Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad.
+Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the
+war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
+Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly
+from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these
+different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France.
+
+The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances,
+and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement
+of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to
+the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium.
+
+In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed
+to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by
+Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the
+Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of
+interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single
+march.
+
+Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,--either
+to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it
+better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders
+to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments,
+incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in
+overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when
+Napoleon made his _debut_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning
+worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances,
+his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the
+Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His
+march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of
+overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
+from the Rhine.
+
+The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new
+era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He
+adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the
+capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less
+extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies
+of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was
+here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely
+corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system
+of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy
+not to meet with his approval.
+
+It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to
+all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there
+can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the
+old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and
+camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as
+Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,--or with those of the three months
+which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till
+its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to
+the relative merits of the two systems.
+
+The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight,
+and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of
+conducting a war than this.
+
+It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his
+personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in
+urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a
+throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare
+to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very
+distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
+without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has
+marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will
+for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much
+modified and improved.
+
+If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches,
+humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and
+bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun,
+are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian
+hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not
+likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has
+been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a
+certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have
+a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and
+military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then
+the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as
+reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more
+formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more
+necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results.
+
+If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead
+of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to
+acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political
+equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and
+perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale.
+Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men
+return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of
+Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
+then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced
+so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an
+active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion.
+
+The science of marches now includes more than details, like the
+following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of
+departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and
+the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part
+of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very
+important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations
+of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard
+to fall upon the communications of Melas, those made in 1805 by
+Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians,
+the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that
+of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive
+operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account
+of their strategic relations.
+
+Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great
+principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point;
+and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in
+Article XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of
+operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the
+enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena
+were the same maneuvers; and what was Bluecher's march at Waterloo but an
+application of interior strategic lines?
+
+From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to
+throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the
+front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the
+principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The
+operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of
+Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind.
+
+One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to
+so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest
+strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple
+object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease
+and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it
+is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of
+concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow.
+
+This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the
+true test of a great general.
+
+There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which
+deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but
+nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term
+_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of
+battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate
+operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to
+ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in
+them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a
+strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by
+about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced
+guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there
+could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another.
+
+There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether
+inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations,
+of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as
+to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the
+famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on
+the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies.
+It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the
+author.
+
+The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was
+the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line
+affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank
+movement exposing this line would be a great fault.
+
+In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are
+still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a
+change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of
+the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders
+will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements.
+
+The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so
+was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of
+Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful
+issue is well known.
+
+A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a
+different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz,
+and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin.
+
+Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a
+true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed
+by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its
+camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock
+Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick.
+
+In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line
+of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a
+right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were
+not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front
+of the line of battle.
+
+The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the
+lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and
+no less successful.
+
+In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not
+strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the
+greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to
+was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the
+battle.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXV.
+
+Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches.
+
+
+The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the
+commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be
+supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's
+country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation
+between the commissariat and strategy.
+
+It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted
+their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to
+supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks,
+barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable
+bodies of men in that country. Caesar said that war should support war,
+and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the
+countries he overran.
+
+The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds,
+and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals,
+Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived
+during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders
+would also be an interesting subject of research.
+
+In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies
+of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them
+large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or
+fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of
+the Ticino and Po.
+
+Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought
+on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were
+established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations,
+restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon
+the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the
+number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
+camp.
+
+During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity.
+The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in
+the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the
+country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the
+granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and
+Danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and
+does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but
+this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite
+impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be
+conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where
+every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This
+system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it
+on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable.
+
+A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded
+country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the
+local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to
+make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their
+fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create
+provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary
+powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points
+most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband
+them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care
+to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them.
+The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the
+supplies to the points occupied by the troops.
+
+It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to
+undertake without having previously established these depots, as much
+depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of
+the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:--
+
+1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one
+hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from
+the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of
+country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any
+single operation.
+
+As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which
+time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be
+sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants
+of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain
+at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was
+besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if
+there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed.
+
+2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies
+obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the
+wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a
+position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise.
+
+3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be
+echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of
+communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the
+army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive
+supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should
+be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have
+the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations,
+which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two
+real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of
+the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it
+facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single
+point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the
+initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the
+offensive and gained some advantage.
+
+4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its
+most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to
+advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient
+provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its
+lines of depots.
+
+5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in
+their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it
+is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and
+without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under
+these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not
+impossible.
+
+6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but
+it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after
+the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid
+expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should
+consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the
+wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of
+roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country,
+and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
+vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to
+take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the
+successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry
+with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour.
+
+7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of
+supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply
+himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of
+a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications
+with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus
+exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the
+mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army
+advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its
+communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the
+progress of the army.
+
+8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base
+itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its
+ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic
+front opposed to the sea.
+
+9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations
+of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also
+free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise
+necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the
+most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case
+the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
+essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from
+the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior
+flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the
+sea.
+
+In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for
+transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a
+small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it
+sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as
+Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages
+of rivers are more substantial.
+
+10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be
+fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous
+countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of
+supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan
+leads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated;
+and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased
+elsewhere.
+
+I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may
+appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in
+his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops
+were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy
+to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it
+would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the
+success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war
+differs from narrow theory.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVI.
+
+The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.--Wars of
+Sieges.
+
+
+Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers;
+secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign.
+
+The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate.
+It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great
+natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and
+these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here
+is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the
+Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of
+Erzgebirge, of the Boehmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and
+of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a
+good system of fortresses.
+
+Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best
+covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of
+Mont-Genevre, and of Mont-Cenis,--the only ones considered
+practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of
+considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains
+of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these
+difficulties.
+
+These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage
+of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be
+carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other
+route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis
+I.,--which is so well described by Gaillard,--Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in
+the remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set
+his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man,
+and applied by him with great success.
+
+Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or
+as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so
+well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and
+communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be
+said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long
+as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real
+frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held
+points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of
+Mayence, Luxembourg, and the _tetes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel on
+the left bank.
+
+If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and
+Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they
+should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they
+permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations.
+
+An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from
+Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by
+Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three
+fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some
+poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose
+curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most
+rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of
+"impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800,
+1805, and 1809.
+
+The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so
+formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or
+consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number
+of points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally
+applicable to all cases.
+
+When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to
+make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses,
+requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not
+prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build
+fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation
+of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the
+impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the
+movements of the army which is to repel him.
+
+If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the
+progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels
+the army to detach a part of its force or to make _detours_ in its
+march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to
+the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and,
+finally, is a place of refuge in case of need.
+
+Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations;
+and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy.
+
+The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in
+the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the
+forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege;
+the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege
+which it proposes to cover.
+
+As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same
+degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They
+are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the
+state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe
+in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses
+very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban,
+who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great
+number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point
+are as follow:--
+
+1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and
+should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be
+three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the
+third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would
+require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places.
+
+It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has
+not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon
+only a third of its frontiers, (from Besancon to Dunkirk,) and still has
+not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board
+convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has
+decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that
+there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition
+should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much
+crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence.
+Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from
+Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally
+distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts,
+requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this
+is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the
+northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important
+element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is
+bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile,
+place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given
+is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of
+nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending
+from Koenigsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified
+upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical
+position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number
+of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.
+
+2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points
+already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their
+sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in
+order to increase the difficulty of blockading them.
+
+3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own
+defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those
+situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz,
+and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of
+this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command
+three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for
+instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the
+fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable
+place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men:
+so that works of this extent must be few in number.
+
+4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are
+preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the
+citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole
+power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and
+Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French
+armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being
+besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against
+France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front
+one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with
+impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points.
+
+5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps,
+and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized
+armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial
+obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the
+true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always
+be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of
+the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to
+pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be
+unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon
+the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of
+the nations.
+
+If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in
+the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty
+thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in
+the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only
+occur under exceptional circumstances.
+
+6. It may be concluded from what precedes,--1st, that, while fortified
+places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by
+dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d,
+that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line
+of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d,
+that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine,
+without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order
+to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army
+may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other
+places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the
+army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege
+are correspondingly diminished.
+
+7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly
+people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an
+enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the
+operations of an army in the field. The fort of Koenigstein in 1813 was
+as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured
+a _tete de pont_ on the Elbe.
+
+In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value
+to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and
+not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley
+of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800.
+
+8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses
+as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to
+facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may
+be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots,
+hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any
+small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly
+serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken
+the active army.
+
+9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions
+are a positive misfortune for both the army and state.
+
+10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war,
+except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental
+army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen
+almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on
+Koenigsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the
+Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had
+supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of
+being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases.
+
+The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of
+two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without
+attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to
+watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other
+it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armee, under a single
+commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When
+the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry
+on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either
+continue its march or take a position to cover the siege.
+
+Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole
+army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and
+contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as the
+siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen
+miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French,
+were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough
+to condemn this ridiculous system.
+
+Much as the recital of the immense labors of Caesar in the investment of
+Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in
+our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary
+for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works
+commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the
+siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at
+Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.
+
+Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and
+pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If
+the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a
+strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might
+arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be
+spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching
+army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not.
+
+Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the
+operations of an army of observation.
+
+
+INTRENCHED LINES.
+
+Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to
+above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and
+is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is
+intended to protect a part of the frontiers.
+
+As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an
+army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of
+intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent
+closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be
+regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length
+and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance,
+those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front,
+supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed
+to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on
+every occasion when they were assailed.
+
+The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same
+part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and
+those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate.
+
+The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although
+intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in
+question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well
+they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes
+their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned.
+To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and
+surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is
+manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another
+instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of
+their attack and defense.
+
+It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended
+lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be
+derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging
+force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of
+such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles
+of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not
+have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.]
+
+[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the
+Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the
+Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to
+beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the
+circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the
+principles of war.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVII.
+
+The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts with Strategy.
+
+
+It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of
+ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards,
+or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts.
+Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and
+even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford
+an army.
+
+It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved
+Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that
+such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in
+1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on
+the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of
+Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country
+between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla.
+
+The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be
+established on strategic points which should also possess tactical
+advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812,
+it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their
+defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow.
+Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days.
+
+The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great
+decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because
+they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these
+camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure
+for an offensive operation, as _tetes de ponts_ to assure the crossing
+of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for
+a defeated army.
+
+However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult
+to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of
+Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can
+be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to
+abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden
+was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it
+was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an
+ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps
+within a few days for want of provisions.
+
+Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary
+support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even
+when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in
+reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a
+_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to a
+fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of
+the camp nearest to the line of retreat.
+
+In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tete de pont_
+on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city
+like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never
+be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of
+collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy,
+it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the
+open country.
+
+The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly
+advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a
+French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost
+when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if
+it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a
+little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
+enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the
+intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine.
+
+We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but
+several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover
+places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little
+sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place
+when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts
+and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and
+principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a
+temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively
+upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a
+camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply
+to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged
+the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not
+his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think
+so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the
+siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was
+necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by
+reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought
+rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender.
+
+The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would,
+indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had
+possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not
+been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in
+the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the
+place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a
+fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army
+to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object
+of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in
+Europe is upon such a site?
+
+So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it
+seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these
+camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the
+same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make
+a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to
+cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter.
+
+To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the
+bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal
+danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by
+passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the
+same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the
+other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take
+the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold
+for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy
+for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of
+the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at
+Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if
+Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would
+easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine.
+
+Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified
+place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would
+fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently
+constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of the
+Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent
+works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its
+defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense
+advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the
+inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only
+very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to
+the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon
+at Essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions
+and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might
+not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the
+advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the
+same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
+attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were
+upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp
+of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security
+either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary
+fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make
+it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching
+from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein,
+which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult
+of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of
+a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed.
+
+Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke
+Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,--by masonry towers.
+As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in
+the _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know
+that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis
+appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
+improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that
+the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have
+the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being
+sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well
+flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
+camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines.
+If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by
+field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp
+preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous
+as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
+thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort
+commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank,
+some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line
+is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six
+hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a
+palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with
+a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven
+twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those
+towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _deblais_ of which forms
+a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should
+think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire.
+
+Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete
+bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank,
+would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a
+quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an
+entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege,
+they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp
+to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large
+army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war
+like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the
+capital.
+
+To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to
+encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built
+seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the
+Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to
+have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the
+Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the
+first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even
+if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army,
+particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of
+Perlingsberg had been preserved.
+
+TETES DE PONTS.
+
+_Tetes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. The
+difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face
+of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works,
+which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if
+the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which
+may attend a rapid retreat across a large river.
+
+_Tetes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were
+_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also
+cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they
+will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these
+works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all
+fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the
+principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of
+_tetes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of
+detached and closed works, while _tetes de ponts_ usually consist of
+contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must
+be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally
+require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are
+detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them.
+
+The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent
+part of this volume.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXVIII.
+
+Strategic Operations in Mountains.
+
+
+A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under
+four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it
+may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or
+there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may
+debouch into large and rich plains.
+
+If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and
+Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries
+the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a
+difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome,
+is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once
+crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may
+be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and
+find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed
+is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of
+retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the
+Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this
+nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the
+Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole
+country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province,
+the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of
+mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and
+Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as
+marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary
+obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of
+the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of
+Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss
+for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads,
+which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary
+there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though
+not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of
+fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its
+evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the
+Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The
+attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study
+of the most interesting character.
+
+When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland,
+is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is
+secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies
+deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be
+otherwise if this be the whole field.
+
+It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave
+control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave
+control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and
+competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that
+the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in
+this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their
+arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on
+Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter
+should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace
+them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult
+for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force
+on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and
+Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand
+men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over
+the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to
+mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,--as
+Moreau did in 1800.
+
+Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only
+accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of
+operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The
+campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this
+branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out
+their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot
+do better than refer my readers to it.
+
+When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by
+the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of
+the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples,
+we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the
+transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of
+Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying
+the interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and
+Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is
+a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is
+a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided
+on the plains.
+
+I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this
+study.
+
+When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal
+theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely
+based upon maxims applicable in an open country.
+
+Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations
+of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In
+such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small
+number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced
+guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide
+means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate
+these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for
+the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small
+bodies of light troops.
+
+The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the
+larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in
+number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its
+forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct
+attacks to dislodge it.
+
+However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and
+difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the
+contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these
+centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of
+retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it
+would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two
+difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the
+whole army.
+
+If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be
+admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity
+of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made
+upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal
+marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points.
+In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the
+difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in
+1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the
+hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have
+been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal
+routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to
+Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads
+have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been
+entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from
+which there was but a single outlet.
+
+On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country
+concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to
+occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be
+easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very
+mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal
+routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the
+enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious
+inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not
+observed.
+
+Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in
+mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we
+attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying
+down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a
+single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five
+converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two
+or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be
+easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the
+construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned
+point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades
+of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the
+army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in
+position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously
+threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he
+debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of
+the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for
+rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to
+continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the
+general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the
+many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if
+there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which
+are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the
+defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a
+cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a
+better one.
+
+We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration
+of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's
+defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and
+Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had
+enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch,
+and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian
+army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend
+such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great
+valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward
+Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the
+trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of
+the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how
+abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the
+approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the
+Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would
+be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching
+force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the
+masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender
+the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an
+inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.
+
+After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it
+seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line
+of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,--a line shorter
+than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance
+to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into
+Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with
+the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove
+that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense
+in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense,
+because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be
+remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the
+offensive.
+
+General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on
+the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind
+of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he
+might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by
+demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active
+attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in
+mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it
+ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he
+sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even
+when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard.
+Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed
+to Wurmser and Alvinzi.
+
+As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading
+the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the
+Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to
+capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the
+presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
+general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the
+Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had
+been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary
+was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand
+men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand
+allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after
+four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory
+_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will
+is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons,
+need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not
+to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I
+say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations
+should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally,
+that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the
+great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great
+mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of
+defending the country?
+
+I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous
+countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a
+national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes
+with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every
+advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always
+necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or
+less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of
+Stanz and of the Tyrol.
+
+The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case:
+it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are
+extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.
+
+In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make
+demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the
+enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which
+promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break
+through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the
+defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole
+line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of
+Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men
+on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing
+this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show
+that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous
+mountain-ranges can generally be forced.
+
+The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army
+which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between
+Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those
+_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him
+it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have
+already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and
+Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it
+inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral
+issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into
+these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army
+toward Turin or Carignano.
+
+When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and
+the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to
+regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a
+single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought
+to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In
+my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to
+confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the
+columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six
+roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;
+but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
+routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the
+enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the
+Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the
+center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to
+divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.
+
+The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much
+greater and more difficult task than where a denouement may be
+accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of
+battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous
+region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it
+would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
+and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the
+invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or
+three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,
+the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the
+junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
+driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.
+
+Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would
+be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with
+their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple
+number.
+
+To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
+localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,
+would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best
+school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by
+the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my
+History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of
+the Grisons by Segur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
+and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the
+passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this
+study.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXIX.
+
+Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.
+
+
+There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those
+which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The
+second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of
+country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
+The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea
+by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the
+seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes
+the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,
+but where a powerful state is attacked.
+
+As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the
+Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly
+be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of
+these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its
+base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the
+same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of
+defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
+arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the
+Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad
+fate of many of these great invasions.
+
+In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is
+merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own
+interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in
+the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of
+all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a
+principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General
+Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty
+thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the
+mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand
+men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus
+found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity
+of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his
+misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of
+about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
+hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The
+battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the
+Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became
+the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the
+opportunity of regaining its own country.
+
+The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the
+expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in
+Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander
+under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less
+disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
+communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in
+no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of
+the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
+abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
+allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political
+ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension
+which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have
+been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.
+
+History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
+across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with
+forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were
+necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to
+the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran
+empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery
+and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly
+since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
+together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining
+each other, no such events have taken place.
+
+Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
+Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of
+Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
+scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of
+Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;
+for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in
+Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the
+Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,
+besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no
+one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
+from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be
+imitated.
+
+Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
+invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the
+same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from
+these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of
+operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones
+applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,
+although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,
+although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His
+care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
+Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
+Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he
+had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself
+safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply
+on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.
+
+If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
+precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
+troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at
+Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was
+unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which
+that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do
+not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the
+conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;
+although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place
+immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised
+distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.
+Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to
+know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
+wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been
+possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having
+previously defeated the Russian army.
+
+It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
+Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _denouement_
+between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery
+of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the
+people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and
+sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have
+given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,
+he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and
+enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the
+greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.
+
+The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point
+for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never
+to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance
+of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a
+proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which
+may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of
+resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these
+operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the
+safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual
+bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to
+these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,
+seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and
+moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried
+too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can
+insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
+or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
+ruined nations and armies.
+
+Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been
+rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in
+date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the
+sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,
+has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,
+but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.
+
+It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now
+is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest
+of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
+Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
+fleet coasted the shore.
+
+Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that
+the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
+immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.
+Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress
+depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind
+of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare
+occurrence.
+
+The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
+operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are
+the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations
+of war.
+
+Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,
+are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking
+Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon
+the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the
+Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
+Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going
+as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable
+troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all
+be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be
+undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in
+view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.
+Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions
+as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in
+Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not
+be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of
+policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
+day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,
+and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
+strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
+co-operation cannot be obtained.
+
+
+EPITOME OF STRATEGY
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
+by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
+enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
+definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
+operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that
+we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating
+of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
+of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
+which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.
+
+By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
+be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
+a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.
+
+From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
+manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
+of operations is found in what follows:--
+
+1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
+reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
+accordance with Article XVIII.
+
+2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
+field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
+with the least risk to one's self.
+
+3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
+operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
+Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
+retreats parallel to the frontiers.
+
+On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
+of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
+extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
+successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
+upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
+by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
+presented in Article XXI.
+
+4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
+such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
+forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from
+affording each other mutual support.
+
+5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic
+positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important
+strategic points of the theater of war.
+
+6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
+activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may
+be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of
+the hostile army.
+
+The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
+army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the
+enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will
+be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive
+strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to
+the enemy can be given.
+
+However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
+course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
+attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and
+successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,
+thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and
+continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of
+gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.
+
+The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
+satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already
+mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in
+Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty
+battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and
+Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four
+victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been
+found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive
+strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the
+Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon
+the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the
+most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
+pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
+principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most
+decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.
+The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.
+
+It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be
+able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of
+war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own
+country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and
+of _tetes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great
+decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of
+the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines
+and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has
+afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and
+Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from
+the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by
+different fortified places projected or completed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.
+
+
+Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great
+questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to
+the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,
+the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and
+fortune, gains victories.
+
+Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to
+battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in
+tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of
+the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that
+point the possession of which promises the most important results.
+
+Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
+features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have
+been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched
+battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that
+a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same
+character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.
+
+The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which
+are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the
+order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the
+plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,
+the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers
+subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the
+proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
+superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and
+the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as
+well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and
+their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting
+that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot
+result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few
+brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
+before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his
+position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the
+maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.
+As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage
+the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of
+it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and
+opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's
+design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the
+same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
+tactical combinations to accomplish it.
+
+There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those
+fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's
+attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in
+position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the
+collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in
+succession the different combinations they present.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXX.
+
+Positions and Defensive Battles.
+
+
+When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line
+of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this
+work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_
+and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. I
+will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by
+battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will
+take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will
+await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is
+the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical
+intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully
+explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an
+_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
+execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
+oblique order, the perpendicular order.
+
+This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
+distinction between two things which should by no means be
+confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that
+the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;
+because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will
+be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of
+battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
+troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
+maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
+offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the
+line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of
+troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a
+position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or
+any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.
+
+Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of
+positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a
+favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the
+purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be
+taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such
+as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls
+the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.
+
+There are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been
+discussed in Article XX., and the _tactical_. The latter, again, are
+subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied
+to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a
+word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have
+been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense are
+discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong,
+where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third
+and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the
+defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary
+according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance
+not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too
+extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep
+and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary
+camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this
+kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of
+access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it,
+should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops
+forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles
+presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy
+than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in
+taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error
+if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was
+exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason,
+Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a
+good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach
+were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover,
+rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
+battle-ground.
+
+The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are
+the following:--
+
+     1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it
+     easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to
+     approach the line of battle.
+
+     2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense.
+
+     3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of
+     troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point
+     deemed the proper one.
+
+     4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements.
+
+     5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat.
+
+     6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or
+     artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon
+     their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or
+     at least some point of the front.
+
+     This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on
+     a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest
+     reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the
+     broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed
+     to afford perfect protection. This danger--about which there can be
+     no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy
+     defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable
+     obstacles.[23]
+
+     7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by
+     throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a
+     crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may
+     cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of
+     the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind
+     the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the
+     required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground
+     must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full
+     details on this point are given in the description of the battle of
+     Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.)
+
+
+     8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the
+     flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other
+     points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack
+     upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most
+     advantageous for defense,--as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo.
+     Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest
+     accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the
+     insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack
+     Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered.
+
+     When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to
+     hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in
+     order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining
+     idle spectators of it.
+
+The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but
+palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is
+to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_.
+Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been
+mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us
+to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo.
+Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road
+behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as
+Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that
+such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely
+open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure
+to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a
+portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would,
+in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great
+part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain.
+There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a
+forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are
+at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for
+retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press
+too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank
+movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest,
+as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if,
+as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for
+this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and
+give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads.
+
+When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying
+chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give
+rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the
+initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and
+striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon
+the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is
+often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by
+those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages
+are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller
+extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his
+movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once
+counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party
+advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising
+from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile
+line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always
+inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges,
+farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or
+be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's
+batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a
+greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire
+either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of
+these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages
+resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages.
+
+However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more
+manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history.
+Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if
+attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by
+all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to
+take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest
+success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping
+strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give
+way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who
+indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall
+upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and
+transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward
+movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength
+into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether
+impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general
+who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has
+the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously
+arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries
+placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very
+dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and
+when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly
+assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
+advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral
+effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed
+to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops.
+
+A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success
+either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,--1st,
+that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know
+how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his
+_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able
+to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he
+should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would
+have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th,
+that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are
+demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as
+by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I have
+modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is
+wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if
+we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of
+troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important
+maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of
+battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique
+system of battle_, &c.
+
+I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_
+on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary
+formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of
+battle_.]
+
+[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and
+the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
+famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube,
+in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that
+the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but,
+throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the
+difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not
+be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen
+the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost
+ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXI.
+
+Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle.
+
+
+We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when
+assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic
+defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army
+receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the
+offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes
+numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive
+battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages
+of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the
+consideration of offensive movements.
+
+It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage
+over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the
+latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty.
+
+As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack
+must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called
+_order of battle_.
+
+It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without
+a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely
+known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in
+every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than
+of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to
+make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should
+therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point.
+
+The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already
+stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different
+localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the
+arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's
+flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be
+attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically
+considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very
+difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least
+importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left
+of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province
+was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically
+considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be
+held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line
+of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the
+right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and
+throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all
+their _materiel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. This
+course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the
+features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have
+diminished the obstacles in the future.
+
+The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated:
+1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical
+key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which
+combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the
+difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic
+point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point;
+4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends
+very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines
+of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the
+proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is
+the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there,
+it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this
+case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical
+superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon
+both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior
+numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the
+combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to
+obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points
+mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a
+point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned.
+
+The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or
+to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin
+his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at
+some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank
+and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him
+in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line
+turned.
+
+To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make
+choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used.
+
+At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple
+parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive
+crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order
+reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique
+reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on
+one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The
+order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the
+center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the
+center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 5.[25]
+
+A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+
+____________________________|____________________________ B ]
+
+Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been
+stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to
+turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits
+of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the
+general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is
+manifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it
+requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against
+battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical
+skill is needed in such a battle.
+
+There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order,
+which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great
+strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's
+communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its
+own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has
+reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having
+effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts
+should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to
+open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the
+parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle
+cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must
+gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will
+then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to
+engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by
+fortune.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 6.
+
+                                       |       |
+                                       |       |
+                     A                 |       |B
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT       |
+                                               |
+______________________|________________________|
+                      B
+]
+
+The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most
+usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an
+offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in
+the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very
+remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if
+properly attacked.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 7.
+                          A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+
+                                             ____|___
+             ___________________|____________________
+                                B            ____|___
+]
+
+The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the
+center, (Fig. 8, page 190,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more
+favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in
+accordance with the general principles which have been laid down;
+although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the
+line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own
+safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 8.
+                         A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+                  ________|________
+                  _________________
+                B _________________
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 9.]
+
+The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a
+superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main
+strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it
+has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only
+kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double
+duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of
+being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged
+wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles
+of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern
+times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See
+Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 10.
+                       C   |
+                        \  |
+                         \ |
+                          \|
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT/|
+                         / |
+                        /  |
+                       /   |
+                      C    |
+                         B-|
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+                           |
+
+]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 11.
+
+|                            |
+|                            |
+| ___________A______________ |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|-B                        B-|
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+|                            |
+]
+
+The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and
+11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction
+along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle.
+Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions
+indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first
+position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army
+A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line;
+and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the
+extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right
+or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take
+him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in
+Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would
+take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder
+of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and
+this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in
+Figures 9 and 16.
+
+The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be
+very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very
+decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to
+bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker
+army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior
+force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12.]
+
+The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the
+day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannae. This order may
+indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to
+it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him,
+and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order
+is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on
+the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their
+extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they
+had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely
+ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to
+fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_.]
+
+An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line
+with the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_.) If several writers may be
+believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the
+famous days of Crecy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than
+a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack,
+whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the
+advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the
+enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is
+content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon
+one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a
+concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an
+error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube
+behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of
+communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at
+pleasure.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 13.]
+
+The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an
+engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must
+be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a
+defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be
+passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may
+become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If
+an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single
+wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[26]
+
+
+The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because
+the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center
+or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six
+diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the
+same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and
+third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had
+just the result that might have been expected.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 14
+                    A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+_____                              _____
+    _____                      _____
+        _____              _____
+             _____  B  _____
+                 _______
+]
+The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as
+the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that,
+because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where
+the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as
+regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center
+and make at that point a threatening counter-attack.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 15
+                    A
+TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
+
+                 ___|___
+            ___|__     __|___
+         _____              _____
+    _____B                      B_____
+_____                                _____
+
+]
+
+The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special
+success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too
+extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the
+wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be
+probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental
+principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of
+success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the
+reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act
+either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost
+echelons, might readily repulse them.
+
+If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge
+or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also
+differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid
+mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of
+artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would
+render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been
+said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might
+be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the
+wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the
+flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result.
+A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be
+a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in
+this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to
+the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons
+of the center by the flank.
+
+This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the
+intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter
+xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain
+that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments,
+there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this
+formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point
+of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made
+upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack.
+
+[Illustration Fig 16.]
+
+The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the
+same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an
+attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may
+even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The
+attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents
+the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank,
+as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is
+hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having
+to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and
+probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his
+victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at
+Borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the
+heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the
+famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout's
+corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at
+Bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but
+for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing
+intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every
+arrangement having been made with that view.
+
+It should be observed that these different orders are not to be
+understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general
+who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon
+paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be
+likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now
+fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to
+form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures,
+because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected
+together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving
+ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns
+to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,--when armies
+bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility,
+when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given
+them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has
+been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally,
+when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of
+battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be
+laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures
+have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate
+arrangements.
+
+If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the
+influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of
+winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of
+battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of
+maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different;
+for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
+render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous
+fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give
+good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is
+to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive
+maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is
+to result in victory.
+
+Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be
+understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief,
+excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective
+_coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with
+the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without
+speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the
+arrival of a corps at the appointed place.
+
+Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive
+maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers
+seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than
+those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to
+previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to
+decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the
+expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the
+moment when Bluecher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont,
+nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and
+they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
+manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the
+allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them,
+for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what
+he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one.
+
+As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the
+co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army,
+with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank,
+it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends
+upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely
+seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII.
+
+Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an
+order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin
+without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the
+collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from
+circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's
+position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be
+still expected to arrive on the field.
+
+From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to
+reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that
+the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an
+engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases
+cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it
+is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy
+lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the
+party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm
+will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to
+be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts
+to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack
+shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed
+against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once.
+Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a
+resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in
+unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is
+hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the
+different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless.
+
+There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my
+assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being
+represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at
+Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward
+the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy.
+At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At
+Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like
+Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up
+two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing;
+and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the
+Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely
+unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive
+movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost
+perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break
+through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the
+center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack
+vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the
+two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center
+was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition,
+the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the
+enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself,
+the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved
+him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by
+strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with
+them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle.
+
+I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark
+out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be
+used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless
+bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so
+combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be
+similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations,
+whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to
+form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field;
+and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's
+line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy
+requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to
+this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or
+watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point
+the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he
+will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can
+impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the
+most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a
+battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.)
+
+Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me
+that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in
+the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon.
+
+The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern
+invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion I can by no means share; for
+the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it
+used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more
+remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo,
+the very order of which he thus denies the existence.
+
+If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid
+and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school.
+Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I
+repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and
+when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it
+can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by
+the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of
+battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must
+be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another
+army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it
+while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of
+the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it
+will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far
+from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by
+echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.)
+
+As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied
+that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was
+a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders
+parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they
+would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of
+the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than
+another.
+
+Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical
+figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles
+in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended
+to:--
+
+     1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force
+     the enemy from his position by all reasonable means.
+
+     2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm
+     one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An
+     enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and
+     turning his position.
+
+     3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if
+     concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault.
+
+     4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without
+     having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the
+     rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very
+     strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points.
+
+     5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least
+     half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing,
+     while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of
+     attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique
+     line.
+
+     6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or
+     otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
+     strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.
+
+     7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the
+     attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be
+     such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position,
+     and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to
+     fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least
+     expect to meet it.
+
+     8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method
+     to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order
+     of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of
+     the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset.
+     A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting
+     alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good
+     combination. In the practical use of this system many variations
+     must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the
+     _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers
+     and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c.
+
+     9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy
+     from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best
+     means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can
+     be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the
+     direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better
+     results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing
+     which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus
+     threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if
+     attacked by main force.
+
+     History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
+     especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
+     although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and
+     the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
+     successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a
+     skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them
+     when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these
+     turning movements with attacks by main force.
+
+     10. The combination of these two methods--that is to say, the
+     attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render
+     the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but,
+     in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in
+     presence of a contemptible enemy.
+
+     11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force
+     is the following:--Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and
+     well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by
+     vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus
+     gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front
+     by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry.
+
+     But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the
+     first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that,
+     the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking
+     party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral
+     effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat
+     of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence
+     of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat
+     disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to
+     replace them by those of the second line, because they generally
+     follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within
+     musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to
+     substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the
+     moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in
+     repelling the attack.
+
+     These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the
+     troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance
+     of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks
+     and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually
+     be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to
+     insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be
+     launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the
+     proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable,
+     and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first.
+
+     12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth:
+     "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the
+     means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in
+     strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second
+     line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of
+     masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the
+     decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is
+     presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of
+     battles."
+
+     In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain
+     guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never
+     compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient
+     substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience
+     in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness.
+
+     The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all
+     arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be
+     always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of
+     the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
+     attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention.
+     This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties
+     is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put
+     forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to
+     wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to
+     make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous
+     attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous.
+
+     13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more
+     effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to
+     be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and
+     marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as
+     skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The
+     object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the
+     troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry
+     will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the
+     enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part
+     of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a
+     strong probability of his repulse.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the
+other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and
+defensive for the other.]
+
+[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve
+orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are
+represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the
+figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle
+ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of
+attack, in squares, or checkerwise.]
+
+[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in
+some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the
+enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a
+false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one
+extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.]
+
+[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when
+it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final
+reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau
+decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
+Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of
+history.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXII.
+
+Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles.
+
+
+We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn
+an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may
+be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide
+detours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of
+so many plans seemingly well arranged.
+
+It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which
+is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking
+place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless,
+as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_
+of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which
+he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many
+maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded
+against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous
+in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire
+success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to
+take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself
+have been in the habit of moving in this manner.
+
+It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject.
+The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the
+force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful,
+however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies.
+A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any
+thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and
+seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be
+more daring.
+
+A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of
+the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these
+extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the
+armies concerned in them.
+
+In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because
+the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards
+between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part
+remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was
+the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter
+distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had
+to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick
+was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.
+
+On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau,
+because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and
+disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of
+Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric
+movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose
+line was thus reformed.
+
+The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar
+with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother
+wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the
+plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,--while their left was piled
+up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making
+a wide _detour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
+speedily surrounded and captured.
+
+No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the
+unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of
+sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight
+thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst
+Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to
+pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of
+sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these
+divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their
+rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle.
+
+We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to
+surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz,
+in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of
+the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off
+from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement
+of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their
+line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and
+surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes
+Tellnitz and Melnitz.
+
+Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to
+Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to
+Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing
+which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no
+support.
+
+If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he
+might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case
+a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty
+thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be
+unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
+advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way,
+Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief
+merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. With the Duke of
+York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been
+successful.
+
+Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo
+and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was
+almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare
+concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will
+search in vain in military history for another example of a single
+brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies,
+and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in
+the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all
+probability, to lay down his arms.
+
+At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the
+successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center
+under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune
+assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have
+been the result.
+
+So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that
+no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for
+it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an
+order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find
+himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
+but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his
+enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to
+regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers
+or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were
+the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
+outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and
+opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the
+enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center.
+Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications
+before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army
+preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be
+successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
+maneuver during the battle.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and
+XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIII.
+
+Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.
+
+
+The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives
+rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war.
+
+In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a
+position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as
+close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,--especially
+as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each
+intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision
+ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it
+does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another
+which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the French at
+Rossbach.
+
+A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
+skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always
+possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander
+may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen,
+Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius
+endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations.
+
+There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no
+means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the
+very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the
+fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying
+them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided
+upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms.
+
+Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage,
+and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause
+their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they
+are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be
+concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction
+considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in
+deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the
+deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a
+badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced
+guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the
+troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach,
+Treatise on Grand Operations.)
+
+In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon
+several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently,
+these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are
+unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then
+the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best
+suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
+enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him.
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIV.
+
+Of Surprises of Armies.
+
+
+I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief
+features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light
+Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself
+to an examination of the surprise of whole armies.
+
+Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected
+than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are
+heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to
+an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten
+and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known
+because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War
+presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that
+a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are
+sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the
+combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity
+of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it
+so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from
+their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
+intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.
+
+As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march,
+prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan
+one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's
+camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a
+surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected
+attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in
+1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his
+imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but
+there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his
+own negligence.
+
+It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to
+fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of
+the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place;
+and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can
+give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his
+forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events
+occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although
+it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which
+renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought.
+
+For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities
+for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to
+prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any
+well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXV.
+
+Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or
+Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General.
+
+
+There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses,
+are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be
+carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether
+practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other
+means of getting to the parapet.
+
+The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations
+as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de
+main_.
+
+This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength
+of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are
+built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with
+the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all
+of these varieties.
+
+For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw,
+the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch,
+Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with
+varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were
+better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in
+fact, a _tete de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for
+the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would
+have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At
+Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had
+as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended
+by a number of desperate men.
+
+Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of
+which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was
+suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple
+redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep
+giving it its sole strength.[29]
+
+At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation;
+but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at
+Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant
+parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep.
+In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were
+attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene
+assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front,
+only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right
+flank.
+
+The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few
+in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked
+a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if
+this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by
+no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp
+will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of
+all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack
+by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the
+following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:--
+
+     1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire,
+     which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the
+     defenders.
+
+     2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as
+     fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and
+     mount the parapet.
+
+     3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken,
+     skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their
+     support.
+
+     4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover
+     for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible.
+
+     5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their
+     duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of
+     attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of
+     cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground
+     permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing
+     more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as
+     actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the
+     gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most
+     daring rashness.
+
+Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for
+escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great
+advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the
+passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets.
+
+Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read,
+none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched
+camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions
+for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is
+an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited
+as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal
+Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be
+followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for
+attacking Dresden in 1813.
+
+Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or
+escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both
+preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in
+neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault.
+
+Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better
+interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried,
+because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost
+impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point.
+The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described
+in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,)
+and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent
+lessons for study.
+
+This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so
+familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of
+it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was
+bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan
+was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza
+to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio,
+was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When
+we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors
+owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no
+great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the
+order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt
+for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied
+troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
+one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for
+forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever
+attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of
+instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a
+better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade
+in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make
+openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make
+up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to
+carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of
+the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the
+bodies of its defenders.
+
+But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation
+of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If
+they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by
+assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by
+strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last
+indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any
+reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one
+of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored.
+There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the
+defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that
+point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded
+simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the
+character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
+be pursued.
+
+The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps.
+It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief
+and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be
+quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away
+from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of
+moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this
+character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so
+gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand
+at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with
+an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees.
+
+If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think
+of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces,
+the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns
+advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them.
+This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the
+enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive
+return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A
+general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half
+conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them
+when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
+cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk
+and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of
+complaint.
+
+Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and
+lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between
+the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of
+the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement
+succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which
+could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been
+suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment
+is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are
+quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great
+importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means
+despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point;
+because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack
+the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have
+supposed in his power.
+
+
+COUPS DE MAIN.
+
+These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the
+capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake
+of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both
+these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a
+successful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical
+operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the
+captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become
+necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
+in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these
+repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing
+such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack
+of intrenchments.
+
+I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these
+operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules
+are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and
+refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic,
+where they are mentioned.
+
+I have previously stated that important results may often follow from
+these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful
+attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises
+of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814,
+as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the
+different kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, others
+by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the
+assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things
+which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_.
+
+As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer
+of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon
+the results of a great strategic operation.
+
+The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that
+of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the
+two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the
+Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally,
+the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
+provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the
+enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging
+in them may be exposed.
+
+Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with
+fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the
+same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be
+prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of
+soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the
+intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by
+Prince Eugene.
+
+In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for
+what has been done once may be done again.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August
+25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the
+third day, more than one hundred thousand.]
+
+[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength of
+a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little
+importance, and vice aversa.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL
+AND PARTLY TACTICAL.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVI.
+
+Of Diversions and Great Detachments.
+
+
+The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important
+a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining
+their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest
+and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing
+is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and
+having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally
+certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately
+adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential
+qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many
+detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of
+attacking the main body during their absence.
+
+The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been
+carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many
+persons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly
+much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass;
+but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a
+complete or even considerable success. The essential point in this
+matter is to send out as few detachments as possible.
+
+There are several kinds of detachments.
+
+     1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of
+     operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater
+     or less importance.
+
+     2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to
+     cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard
+     a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if
+     threatened.
+
+     3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations,
+     in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some
+     combined operation.
+
+     4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect
+     of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an
+     important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign.
+
+I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a
+distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a
+theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly
+supposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but
+two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed
+cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the
+real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a
+detachment would receive strong support from the population among which
+it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than
+military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out of
+place here.
+
+The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian
+expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the
+end of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX.,)
+are well known.
+
+In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended
+an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined
+forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover,
+nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated
+points. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities
+of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover,
+Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, and
+Bernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of
+Ulm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no
+difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the
+failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation
+would have been proper.
+
+In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to
+La Vendee, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the
+numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the
+Rhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been
+not only very useful, but decisive.
+
+
+It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of
+small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations
+of the main army.
+
+If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary
+objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is
+no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be,
+indispensable.
+
+These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are
+permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction
+opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a
+campaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of
+assisting in carrying out some special enterprise.
+
+Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an
+army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which
+mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when
+the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For
+example, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to
+leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the
+valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of
+operations. However successful it may be, a respectable force must
+always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of
+the river toward Routchouk.
+
+This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a
+double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps
+must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the
+main army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned
+where this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the
+double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army
+passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main
+column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong
+to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of
+communications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, which
+enables the Spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the
+road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To
+whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the
+other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction.
+
+All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge
+as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to
+give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them
+by opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable
+illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of
+1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the
+valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward
+the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk
+of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts
+of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that
+he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no
+particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon
+his communications.
+
+Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following
+reasons:--
+
+     1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations,
+     or else to cover your own.
+
+     2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body
+     of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own
+     reinforcements.
+
+     3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing
+     army, while a blow is struck at the remainder.
+
+     4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions,
+     on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the
+     success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a
+     convoy of your own.
+
+     5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where
+     you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an
+     enterprise in another direction.
+
+     6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a
+     certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison
+     shut up within the ramparts.
+
+     7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications
+     of an enemy already retreating.
+
+However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as
+those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are
+always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be
+successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must,
+therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason
+than that they were not kept together.
+
+We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their
+success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill
+of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution.
+
+Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles
+XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous
+convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain
+the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale.
+
+The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during
+the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of
+the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen
+in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
+detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own
+times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching
+that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must
+admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault
+was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it
+properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
+Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.
+
+Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are
+decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the
+enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is
+collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck.
+In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps
+making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main
+body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts.
+
+In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his
+march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was
+really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply
+shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau.
+
+In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of
+Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke
+Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another
+direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he
+withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide
+the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the
+result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being
+in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to
+facilitate their application.
+
+It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be
+laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of
+which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of
+making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of
+all the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the
+subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall
+thorn immediately when their duty is performed. The inconveniences
+necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving
+judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders:
+herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff.
+
+One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments
+sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by
+tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good
+positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict
+with too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity of
+motion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that it
+is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position
+it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order.
+
+It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of
+field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the
+army itself.
+
+Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments
+those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few
+examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may
+call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end
+of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of
+Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians
+rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential
+_point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in
+advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of
+failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had
+been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping.
+
+In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted by
+the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and
+destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would
+have had very important consequences if it had not failed.
+
+In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and,
+as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may
+be freely recommended.
+
+Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's
+operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few
+hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they
+may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small
+detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a
+great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his
+plans to fail by intercepting his couriers.
+
+For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full
+of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they
+can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a
+telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any
+dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and
+presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are
+qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness.
+For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter
+XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this
+work, on light cavalry.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVII.
+
+Passage of Rivers and Other Streams.
+
+
+The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place
+or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations
+belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large
+river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the
+Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest
+study.
+
+The art of building military bridges is a special branch of military
+science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not from
+this point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream,
+but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver.
+
+The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the
+point of passage may have an important connection with all the
+operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. The
+passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellent
+illustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skillful
+strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to
+take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
+off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had
+already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience
+to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. The
+tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the
+strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk
+attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same
+campaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high
+strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of
+the reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march
+by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino
+and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino,
+enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with
+twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at
+Piacenza, expecting to get before Melas more certainly in that direction
+than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of
+the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar
+operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of
+the destruction of Mack's army.
+
+The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by
+recollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX.; and it is here
+only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in
+every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive
+points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the
+distribution of the hostile forces.
+
+If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical,
+no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles
+exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the
+new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement
+as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction.
+Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great
+influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another
+consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is
+that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and
+line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first
+marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon
+different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting
+a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.
+
+Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations
+influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will now
+proceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school in
+which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such
+operations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus--which is a
+small stream--a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned,
+the people of modern days can cite much greater.
+
+The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been greatly
+lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon has
+made famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube at
+Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details;
+and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. More
+recently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous
+passage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind
+previously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and
+at Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men
+provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the
+bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account of
+them should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russian
+army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with the
+two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local
+difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The
+passage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give
+historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the special
+narratives of these events. I will give several general rules to be
+observed.
+
+     1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of
+     passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In
+     addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be
+     made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the
+     enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to
+     make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not
+     to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the
+     real attempt is to be made.
+
+     2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as
+     possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging
+     the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and
+     these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods,
+     or other obstacles in the vicinity.
+
+     3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy
+     caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any
+     artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while
+     building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from
+     which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other.
+
+     4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives
+     great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for
+     constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying
+     into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for
+     collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge.
+
+     5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a
+     re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can
+     cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land
+     from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus
+     taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the
+     passage.
+
+     6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks,
+     that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on
+     both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the
+     banks are high and steep should be usually avoided.
+
+The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from
+those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract
+the efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have the
+course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without
+attempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the
+threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of
+his army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendome at Cassano, and
+the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,--the last example being
+particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so
+decidedly successful as might have been expected.
+
+In Article XXI. attention was called to the influence that the passage
+of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction
+to the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may have
+with subsequent strategic movements.
+
+One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to
+cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without
+interfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the army
+is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed
+just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling;
+but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are
+about equal, the case is very different.
+
+If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or at
+Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thing
+to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first,
+before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in order
+to cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to
+cover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the
+cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the
+inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be
+insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be
+separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain
+absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the
+natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces.
+
+The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in
+which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he
+divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend
+with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and
+have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the
+enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point,
+the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find
+himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a
+victory.
+
+The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which
+will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all
+possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage,
+to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to
+beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of
+touching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may be
+used. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several
+corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with
+one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line
+of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be
+overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be
+formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly
+drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them
+from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges.
+But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the
+enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy
+may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that
+Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout its
+length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain
+protected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner that
+Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme
+right of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the
+Main. He was driven away because the French, having a double and
+exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men
+inactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan
+upon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages
+gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic
+front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that
+previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and
+the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of
+the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as
+well as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations,
+of which something has already been said in the article on lines of
+operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection
+with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion.
+
+It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is
+attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with
+Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in case
+of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus
+operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him,
+in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a
+condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at
+different points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrous
+results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to
+take advantage of this violation of principles.
+
+In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be
+diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points,
+which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two
+portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy
+from destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this
+rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of
+Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have
+achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon
+the Rhine.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXVIII.
+
+Retreats and Pursuits.
+
+
+Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remark
+is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usual
+piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in
+retreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an army
+in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving
+order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard
+to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to
+attempt such an operation.
+
+What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight be
+continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under
+cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance,
+but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong
+opposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march be
+made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as
+possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of
+fighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper in
+certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the
+theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is
+certainly one of them.
+
+If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose
+yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced
+retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in
+darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your
+army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing
+properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in
+broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold
+it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is
+about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
+troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to
+blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing
+may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat
+commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not
+become a rout?
+
+When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide
+whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the
+enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause
+the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its
+salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that,
+in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to
+retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of
+sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check
+for several hours.
+
+Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which
+they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in
+order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his
+present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was
+thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the
+allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
+Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed
+to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was
+known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
+choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I
+was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde
+movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding
+the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.)
+
+A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point
+threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of
+retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an
+exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer
+its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost
+battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise.
+
+These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Their
+character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be
+passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are specially
+dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the
+retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of
+operations, they become painful and difficult.
+
+From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justly
+celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the French army
+in 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. That
+of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of
+the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
+more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed
+by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The
+retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it
+has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the
+siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well
+arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796,
+which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
+not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to
+Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the
+Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were
+glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration.
+The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space of
+two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon
+and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly
+admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances,
+but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by
+the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable
+fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although
+the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was
+also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the
+Beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single
+man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
+covered themselves with glory.
+
+The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be
+traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the
+attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or
+inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances
+which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out
+of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make
+for their execution.
+
+A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
+magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order,
+and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist
+his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended
+position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from
+Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry
+and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and
+with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every
+thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense
+number of light cavalry.
+
+There are five methods of arranging a retreat:--
+
+     The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road.
+
+     The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps,
+     marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order
+     to avoid confusion, especially in the _materiel_.
+
+     The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads
+     nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival.
+
+     The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads.
+
+     The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging
+     roads.
+
+I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is
+taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well
+sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is
+common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the
+strategic relations of these operations.
+
+An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as
+soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it
+shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first
+method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and
+enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it
+is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder
+of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An
+army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the
+single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be
+occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure.
+
+When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having
+the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a
+great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but
+moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular
+direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal
+days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being
+chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the
+departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery
+may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march,
+the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a
+half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession with
+an interval of two hours between the departure of their several
+army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in
+ordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other
+calculations would doubtless be necessary.
+
+I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand
+or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The army
+may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each,
+encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each of
+these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may
+either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the
+road. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five
+A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference
+with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second
+mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the
+first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same
+time.
+
+When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least
+for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It is
+scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used
+when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best,
+because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and in
+hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early
+part of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics
+to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for
+armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.
+
+Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and
+great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or
+division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a
+little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and
+the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to
+arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army
+is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as
+much mischief as a rout.
+
+If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to
+relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt
+with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in
+battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns;
+and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space
+which has been lost.
+
+The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is
+excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they
+are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other
+wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it
+to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg
+toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind.
+
+The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is
+undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the
+retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite
+the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting
+this.
+
+The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of
+eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed so
+warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I could
+not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or
+as to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that he
+recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to
+separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object
+of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting
+his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. I
+found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten
+army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its
+forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy.
+
+Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, and
+that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat
+made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being
+directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of
+the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along
+the line of the frontier of the country.
+
+I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and
+in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have strongly
+recommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of the
+parallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which
+leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of
+moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly
+parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and
+its base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
+retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric
+retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the
+strategic front.
+
+However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was
+the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only with those retreats
+made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater
+extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks.
+
+By using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be
+given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. An
+army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally;
+because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical
+inferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I
+find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the
+ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am
+speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose an
+army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand.
+If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men,
+the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Can
+he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession
+all his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? _By concentration_.
+This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls
+of itself.
+
+I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leading
+divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonaparte
+collected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had only
+forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had
+only to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent
+retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser,
+after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two
+wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was the
+result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was
+beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and
+destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua.
+
+When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the
+French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric
+movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric
+retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of
+isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his
+own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the
+alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all
+the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it
+was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two
+hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.[31]
+
+There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
+only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
+defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
+within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
+sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
+army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
+but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
+according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
+absurd.
+
+There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
+a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
+frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
+parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
+line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
+his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
+or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
+In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
+Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.
+
+These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
+they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
+center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
+retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
+positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
+have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
+communications with the central portions of the state.
+
+Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army
+penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon
+Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either
+case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of
+operations would be at the mercy of their adversary.
+
+The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same
+advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.
+
+In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the
+nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is
+striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army
+penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the
+Saone, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or
+as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way
+of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
+occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very
+hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based
+upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all
+countries having double fronts of operations.[32]
+
+Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the
+directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube.
+Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions
+connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this
+frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This
+assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800,
+1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial
+on that ground, the question is still an open one.
+
+It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method
+depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of
+each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of
+Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it
+would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into
+the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this
+way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
+upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate
+division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the
+whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would
+be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy,
+beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application
+on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy
+approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations
+would be too contracted.
+
+In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against
+an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its
+employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the
+Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria
+were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the
+country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the
+direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a
+movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.
+
+When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a
+pursuit always follows.
+
+A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army
+in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and
+this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of
+supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then
+becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its
+difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy
+in conducting the pursuit.
+
+The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon
+the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of
+the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases
+of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:--
+
+     1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of
+     the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own
+     country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly
+     or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must,
+     however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might
+     then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely.
+
+     2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as
+     possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained;
+     because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously
+     followed up.
+
+     3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of
+     gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say;
+     for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a
+     country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have
+     been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers.
+
+Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the
+subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand
+combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical
+measures which may render them more easy of execution.
+
+One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
+familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be
+resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that
+the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops
+harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is
+at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special
+importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be
+furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the
+purpose of getting supplies by marauding.
+
+It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer
+of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in
+advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for
+occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so
+rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have
+considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the
+execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of
+thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to
+prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
+retreating columns.
+
+It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the
+distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would
+run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When,
+however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may
+increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to
+the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same
+degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy.
+If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
+may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its
+strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of
+the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance
+not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is
+made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time
+to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the
+Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and
+Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of
+the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of
+troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and
+spoils.
+
+Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of
+interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over
+it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when
+the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge,
+it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be
+taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that
+they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for
+the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard
+should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as
+far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
+permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much
+hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall
+have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
+main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the
+rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass
+through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the
+river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give
+him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
+rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the
+river, breaking the bridges after it.
+
+It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form
+on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps
+left to hold the enemy in check.
+
+The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the
+precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be
+taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be
+constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the
+construction of a regular _tete de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will
+be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops.
+
+If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only
+pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is
+threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy
+in force.
+
+The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most
+remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more
+desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and
+skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve
+hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in
+front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
+by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the
+honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped
+its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise
+should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
+operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of
+Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a
+rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the
+capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the
+lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.
+
+The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be
+closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage,
+and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one
+which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place
+yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such
+a case is rare.
+
+If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by
+regular _tetes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the
+rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use
+every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the
+bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also
+fire-ships and mills,--a means the Austrians used in 1796 against
+Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
+the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same
+thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and
+brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.
+
+It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character
+unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be
+anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating
+bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
+concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army.
+Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the
+end, the cause of his ruin.]
+
+[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
+nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive,
+it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly
+upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the
+frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.]
+
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XXXIX.
+
+Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter
+Quarters.
+
+
+So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my
+subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly.
+
+To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is
+generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there
+is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country
+where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia,
+or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of
+quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops
+have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the
+divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia,
+portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is
+more difficult to put an army into winter quarters.
+
+Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the
+end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan
+character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts.
+
+The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by
+Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of
+conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the
+other side to prevent its success.
+
+The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the
+following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and
+occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too
+extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and
+cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer
+line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by
+field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the
+troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by
+which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
+finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any
+point.
+
+In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments
+behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being
+hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered more
+than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite
+in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position
+until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
+expected to be the case everywhere.
+
+An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to
+have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries
+where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size
+of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country
+occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
+of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion.
+The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty
+thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with
+the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in
+check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is
+assembled.
+
+It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going
+into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems
+inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn
+from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an
+army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in
+quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice.
+
+In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a
+campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or
+waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will
+probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such
+positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order
+that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy
+to do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist
+readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be
+ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are
+by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to
+place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in
+case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may
+present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march
+from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same
+rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter
+quarters.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XL.
+
+Descents.
+
+
+These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the
+most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared
+enemy.
+
+Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in
+navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous
+three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred
+cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a
+numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until
+the debarkation of the army takes place.
+
+Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of
+war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and
+could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the
+number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests,
+the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much
+certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these
+reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern
+times.
+
+Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the
+Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,--the
+innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,--the great
+expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of
+Alexander into Asia Minor, those of Caesar to England and Africa, that
+of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,--the Crusades,--the expeditions
+of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?
+
+Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II.
+was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on
+foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions
+were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of
+Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents
+of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St.
+Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp,
+Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for
+that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
+difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.
+
+The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the
+world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against
+second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation
+for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense
+trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c.
+
+We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast
+problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true
+that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred
+and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:
+unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left
+us entirely in the dark as to this grave question.
+
+It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the
+Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of
+being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to
+pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would
+become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war
+and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the
+fleet or oblige it to regain its ports?
+
+Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
+generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or
+at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their
+deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains
+of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and
+the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring
+to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
+between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the
+preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the
+present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of
+statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France
+from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the
+activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the
+careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
+possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
+English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
+had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
+moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
+so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
+the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
+that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
+preparation and vast means of transportation.
+
+Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
+expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
+evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
+cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
+second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
+3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
+position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
+diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
+engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
+point of the descent.
+
+It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
+About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive
+the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
+may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
+activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
+strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
+shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
+to the troops that have landed.
+
+A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the
+transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed
+in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great
+advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to
+great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats,
+tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness
+for the proper use of their arms?
+
+I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces
+too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to
+line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but
+the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be
+protected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving prompt
+notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable
+force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a
+firm foothold.
+
+The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and
+their prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep and
+present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be
+landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent
+becomes more difficult.
+
+Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents
+which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids a
+continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the
+enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a
+coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the
+shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies.
+For the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the
+possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land
+which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened
+by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be
+re-embarked without hurry and loss.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLI.
+
+A few Remarks on Logistics in General.
+
+
+Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a
+general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of
+war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate
+collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the
+different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations
+of the art?
+
+These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly
+convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and
+believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems
+already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good
+definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in
+answering these questions which seem so simple.
+
+In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other
+military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of
+staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and
+of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This
+was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_
+is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major general des logis_,
+(translated in German by _Quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it
+formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the
+marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was
+then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps,
+movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more
+extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
+transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points
+of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents
+for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the
+assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of
+them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
+supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute
+details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the
+operations of a campaign.
+
+To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man
+should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If
+the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the Archduke
+Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard,
+and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete
+sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than
+the science of applying all possible military knowledge.
+
+It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is
+insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the
+real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to
+instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be
+accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the
+general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to
+publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties
+of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to
+the best methods of performing these duties.
+
+The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their
+government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted
+to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only
+work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public
+and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several
+generals--as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut--have prepared
+manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
+several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a
+complete manual on the subject.
+
+If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details
+of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff
+officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most
+important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics
+includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we
+retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and
+developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of
+ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief.
+
+To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points
+that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and
+detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings
+resulting from such movements:--
+
+     1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the
+     army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign.
+     Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage
+     of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of
+     operations.
+
+     2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief
+     for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected
+     battles.
+
+     3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the
+     measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be
+     used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to
+     facilitate the operations of the army.
+
+     4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and
+     procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as
+     possible of the positions and movements of the enemy.
+
+     5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements
+     ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different
+     columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner.
+     Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and
+     safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of
+     halts.
+
+     6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards,
+     flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions
+     for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the
+     performance of their duties.
+
+     7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or
+     their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing
+     up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as
+     their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to
+     engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the
+     character of the enemy.[33]
+
+     8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen
+     points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and
+     informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of
+     need.
+
+     9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,
+     munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in
+     their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the
+     movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking
+     precautions for order and security, both on the march and when
+     trains are halted and parked.
+
+     10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies.
+     Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of
+     the army, and regulating their use.
+
+     11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations
+     for their safety, good order, and police.
+
+     12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies,
+     as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached
+     bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding
+     in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and
+     convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also
+     for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its
+     base.
+
+     13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men,
+     movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their
+     safety.
+
+     14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
+     flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking
+     out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on
+     detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some
+     center of action, and forming strategic reserves.
+
+     15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up
+     isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction
+     between the army and its base of operations.
+
+     16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of
+     the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of
+     artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those
+     troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults.
+
+     17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving
+     order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard;
+     causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where
+     the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his
+     pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the
+     movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that
+     they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper
+     precautions to insure safety.
+
+     18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps;
+     indicating to each principal division of the army a place of
+     assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders,
+     instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed.
+
+An examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer
+by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that
+these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff
+officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very
+purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention
+to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided
+with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
+Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and
+woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This
+want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have
+faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual
+interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
+hindering them in performing their duties.[34]
+
+
+It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the
+guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious
+duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff
+officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that I should be
+obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these
+details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these
+subjects.
+
+I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of
+the first articles enumerated above:--
+
+1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army
+to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are
+likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They
+should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that
+the _materiel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses,
+carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully
+examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool
+trains, _materiel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
+ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of
+_materiel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order.
+
+If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers,
+gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft
+should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will
+probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable
+points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those
+localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary
+establishment on the opposite bank.
+
+The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
+necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the
+proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction
+to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any
+thing relative to the projected enterprise.
+
+If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief
+engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of
+operations, when _tetes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be
+constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built
+between the first line of defense and the second base.
+
+2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to
+making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the
+general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of
+staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of
+knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating
+the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be
+the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a
+commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the
+general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he
+can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief.
+
+I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the
+service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in
+issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general
+instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much
+the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps,
+who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same
+sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of
+school.
+
+The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to
+his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself,
+and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on
+the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the
+operations of the whole army.[35] I have good reasons for knowing that
+he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of
+mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands
+of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans.
+
+It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans
+secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his
+night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire.
+That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his whole
+army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of
+Napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of
+action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is
+going on around them?
+
+Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean
+may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the
+minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay,
+Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies
+and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more
+ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the
+enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases,
+to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to
+add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of
+the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing
+it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted
+verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it
+accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and
+concert of action would be secured.
+
+3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some
+enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and
+precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual
+precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue
+and to cover its movements thoroughly.
+
+There are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of
+the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or
+retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in
+late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had
+been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had
+roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each
+other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing
+roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when
+an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced
+guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove
+obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and
+secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of
+the army.
+
+In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and
+distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different
+distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and
+giving them instructions the following particulars must be
+considered:--1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of
+_materiel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles
+placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is
+important for the march to be concealed or open.
+
+Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging
+the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all
+those corps not marching with the column attached to the general
+head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the
+generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them
+understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
+then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the
+object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which
+they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what
+corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads
+to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves
+accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the
+enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[36]
+
+All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the
+chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in
+position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. To see that they
+march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but
+they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the
+appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their
+command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats,
+however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into
+divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated.
+
+Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its
+march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient
+also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each
+column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools
+for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of
+these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light
+trestle-bridge train will be found very useful.
+
+4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard,
+or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing
+may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves
+and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced
+guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that
+half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these
+circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the
+road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be
+made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the
+general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved
+in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the
+march of the center must be applied to that wing.
+
+Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of
+forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an
+accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his
+plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist
+the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed
+of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _elite_ troops of
+the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some
+horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and
+pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out
+of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch
+of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of
+irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular
+cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such
+service.
+
+5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes
+the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which
+may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers
+will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being
+established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number
+of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected
+as the site of the principal depot.
+
+The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to
+thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance
+apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen
+depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into
+three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander
+and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the
+arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the
+authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities
+for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees
+that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there
+should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the
+principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced
+within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and
+able general officers; for the security of the communications of the
+army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may sometimes
+become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good
+battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing
+continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to
+keep open the communications.
+
+6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to
+be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of
+march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires
+going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in
+silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous
+works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war.
+
+Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should
+be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of
+logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the
+French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of
+the army upon the campaign of 1815.
+
+In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such
+arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated,
+were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of
+the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue
+of the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a
+skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
+for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated
+in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those
+instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually
+transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent
+opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was
+his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to
+a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight
+line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into
+account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched
+at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the
+supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors,
+he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and
+precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point
+to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches
+necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a
+certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in
+mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the
+hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone
+enough to make any man famous.
+
+Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia,
+Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and
+Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all
+thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously
+between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in
+Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which
+seemed so very complicated.
+
+In the same manner, in 1815, when Bluecher had his army quietly in
+cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was
+attending _fetes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of
+France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed
+with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been
+but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon
+Charleroi and Bluecher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points
+of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the
+plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not
+leave Paris until the 12th.)
+
+The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic
+calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of
+logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures,
+I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics
+came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been
+recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and
+being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into
+Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was
+extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was
+returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had
+been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg
+route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their
+respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances,
+and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break
+through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly
+uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war
+had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it
+in a more retired position toward Ulm.
+
+The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun,
+Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as
+the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred
+thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the
+army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have
+five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a
+highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated.
+
+No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities having
+commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's arrival at Munich,
+this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a
+literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its
+obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon,
+but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal
+had had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt.
+
+Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the
+passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the
+speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point of
+being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one
+hundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleon
+succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the
+glorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmuehl, and Ratisbon,
+that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his
+contemptible logistics.
+
+We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which
+preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before the
+battle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point of
+the island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that
+of Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful
+than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated
+the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains
+of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austrians
+and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fete_.
+These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the
+4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the
+Danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst
+torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the
+bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before
+mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they
+covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time
+than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver
+for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had,
+it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage;
+but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions
+is not at all diminished by it.
+
+Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten
+copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge
+of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing,
+whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the
+center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not
+been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene
+of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the
+enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few
+detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most
+remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that
+after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince
+of Wagram.
+
+The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree;
+but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten
+copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of
+the troops?
+
+Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good
+logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this
+battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the
+midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it
+was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the
+banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These
+precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but
+they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well
+as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder
+and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of
+the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness
+upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name,
+owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agree
+that Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures
+of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would
+be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was
+present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future
+unless by his direction.
+
+To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomes
+necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances.
+They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and
+statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its
+accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its
+resources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences
+of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state,
+these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are
+still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any
+country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed
+with. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of
+making these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of my
+readers to them.
+
+Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to
+gain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made by
+detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up in
+battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the
+reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be
+thrown out to break through his screen of posts.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 33: I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are
+not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.]
+
+[Footnote 34: The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the
+administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the
+general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of
+course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high
+officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of
+the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise,
+confusion is inevitable.]
+
+[Footnote 35: I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram,
+and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated
+from his usual custom by issuing a general order.]
+
+[Footnote 36: Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no
+general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten.
+In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often
+indispensable.]
+
+[Footnote 37: It may be objected that in some wars, as where the
+population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to
+organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed
+to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most
+necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid
+was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the
+guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the
+line extended as far as Cadiz.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLII.
+
+Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information of
+the Movements of the Enemy.
+
+
+One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to
+order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's
+proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if
+he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of
+the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
+utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the
+chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice
+of war.
+
+From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply
+learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired
+that practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the
+direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a
+school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line
+of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of
+both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful,
+active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect
+riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the
+incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius.
+
+I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I had
+to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the
+man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy
+than for him who could make a grand display of theories,--things so
+difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once
+exemplified.
+
+There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations.
+The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in
+reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third,
+in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of
+probabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is
+also a fifth method,--that of signals. Although this is used rather for
+indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to
+his designs, it may be classed with the others.
+
+Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other
+agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for
+reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing
+beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that they
+should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining
+information; but I do say that their results are small and not to be
+depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is
+generally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will
+always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their
+questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and
+deserters.
+
+The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of
+operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is
+almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information
+they possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally be
+successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the
+general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for
+him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his
+own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receives
+from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those
+which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally
+to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed
+through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Gera
+toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are they
+going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the most
+skillful spy cannot learn.
+
+When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the
+enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be
+thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report
+accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into
+corps d'armee which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to
+learn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the
+hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who
+always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, for
+example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known when
+they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to
+conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of
+smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly.
+
+A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making
+reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfaction
+say that this means hardly ever failed me. Though fortune never placed
+me at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a
+hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils
+of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under
+consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of
+Europe; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in my
+hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. As
+I have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army can
+operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of
+operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that
+can possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and
+conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan
+which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the
+future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own
+observation.
+
+In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war with
+Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the
+operations which would take place.
+
+I made the three following hypotheses:--1st. The Prussians will await
+Napoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive as
+far as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or
+they will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontier
+of Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d.
+Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they will
+advance imprudently to Erfurt.
+
+I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the
+Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces,
+already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel and
+Mayence,--a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldier
+on the first of these roads since the Seven Years' War.
+
+These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask
+what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that the
+mass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should be
+thrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for the
+gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan
+they should adopt."
+
+If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line of
+retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. If
+they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof and
+Gera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way of
+Leipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack them
+by way of Gera and Hof.
+
+Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what
+mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certain
+of the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce,
+_a month before the war_, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did,
+and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at
+Jena and Naumburg!
+
+I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that
+were my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I have
+only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often
+arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without
+much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's
+movements.
+
+Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has been
+neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 the
+staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for
+such services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish the
+staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to
+send agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon's
+whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806,
+were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often suffered
+severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get
+information as to what was going on around them.
+
+The Russian army is better provided than any other for gathering
+information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and history
+confirms my assertion.
+
+The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of
+Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming
+and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as
+Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information
+furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf,
+Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was
+through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa,
+intercepted near Chalons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed
+of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his
+whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns
+of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information
+decided Bluecher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies,
+which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought
+to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne.
+
+We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff
+saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left
+Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit
+this news,--which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of
+a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French
+bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which
+decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon
+from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater
+facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous
+days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would
+thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented.
+
+Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good
+partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers.
+
+I will conclude this article with the following summary:--
+
+1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the
+enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of
+reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable
+officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners.
+
+2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter
+how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be
+sifted from them.
+
+3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means.
+
+4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods
+mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses
+of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative
+situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of
+the principles of the art.
+
+I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very
+unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,--as has so often happened
+to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should
+at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is
+going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each
+of these hypotheses.[38] It cannot be too much insisted upon that the
+real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these
+reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is
+always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of
+regulating one's conduct is neglected.
+
+In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to be
+gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds.
+Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all.
+Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact
+of his having established a telegraphic communication between the
+head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when the
+Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading
+Bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in
+twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred
+miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he
+had gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the
+telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact is
+sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value.
+
+It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphic
+arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could
+communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of
+battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters.
+Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was given
+up,--for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. These
+communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method
+could not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be
+reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by
+signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be
+necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of
+transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain of
+rapidity.[39] attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle of
+Fleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist
+to observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not
+aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again
+used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the
+victory: of this, however, I have great doubts.
+
+It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness
+to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful
+observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy
+of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining
+information. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with
+it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's
+movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection
+with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its
+use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of
+distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to
+which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very
+unreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatly
+embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was
+Grouchy or Bluecher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but
+this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed.
+I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations
+when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic;
+and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the same
+point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was
+prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and the
+Elster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than
+in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at
+hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at
+pleasure.
+
+There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires
+kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of the
+telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an
+invasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have made
+use of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used to
+give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more
+rapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so
+as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's
+threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to
+meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of
+descents.
+
+Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by
+means of military instruments. This method of signals has been brought
+to greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of.
+While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of
+setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of
+the commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before the
+problem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for
+skirmishers. A movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly
+simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly
+from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of
+inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but two
+cases of it in thirteen campaigns.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 38: I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in
+war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove
+the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the
+surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the
+opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been
+anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of
+probability or possibility.]
+
+[Footnote 39: When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not
+known.--Translators.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE
+OF THE THREE ARMS.
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLIII.
+
+Posting Troops in Line of Battle.
+
+
+Having explained in Article XXX. what is to be understood by the term
+_line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed,
+and how the different troops are to be distributed in it.
+
+Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and
+brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines,
+each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usually
+placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very
+unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. The army camped
+together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry
+wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns
+were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially
+applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on
+account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry
+had camped in a third line,--which was rare.
+
+This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary
+to give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in such
+direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." This
+monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better
+could have been devised as war was carried on in those days.
+
+The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns
+as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a
+simple impossibility.
+
+If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping
+and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were
+applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty
+thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would
+be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach.
+
+The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up
+the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the
+field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground.
+This change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme
+to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the
+Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and
+cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended,
+either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an
+absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of
+the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen
+marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from
+each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support
+than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four
+hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his
+forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced,
+and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could
+do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns.
+
+Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly
+by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and
+partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where
+the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the
+government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly
+increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger
+organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system
+and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional
+system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two
+or three divisions, which he placed under the command of
+lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the
+reserve of his army.[40]
+
+This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where
+he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had
+under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry,
+from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each
+corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an
+army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve,
+composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of
+light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry
+reserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized into
+corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the
+constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near
+perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such
+great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon
+imitated.
+
+Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have
+recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act
+independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because
+this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would
+certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two
+brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades
+on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot
+with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three
+brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in
+reserve,--a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in ten
+divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen
+divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this
+perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry
+by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to
+two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps
+is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a
+division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for
+that[41].
+
+What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon
+a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics;
+because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization
+in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out
+continually.
+
+The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed to
+leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. The
+center under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and the
+reserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidable
+battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those
+of the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte
+and Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left,
+were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danube
+at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five
+divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to
+the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was
+destroyed.
+
+It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Events
+are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau's
+campaign of 1800 proves that the original organization may sometimes be
+maintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it would
+seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center,
+and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strength
+of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes
+necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line
+in order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions are
+with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or
+give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the
+main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four
+great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four
+divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case there
+would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps
+should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to
+the center.
+
+With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line
+in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps
+may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and
+from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march
+of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak
+order of battle.
+
+These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of
+battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light
+cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more
+stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions.
+
+But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the
+units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the
+operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly
+varied. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the
+principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two
+or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have
+indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one
+behind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28
+inclusive.)
+
+_Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 17. Two Corps deployed, One behind the Other.]
+
+             First Corps.
+----- -----       ^      ----- -----
+2d Division.      |      1st Division.
+
+            Second Corps.
+----- -----       ^      ----- -----
+2d Division.      |      1st Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 18. Two Corps formed Side by Side.]
+
+Second Corps.     ^       First Corps.
+                  |
+----- -----       |       ----- -----
+1st Division.     |       1st Division.
+                  |
+----- -----       |       ----- -----
+2d Division.      |       2d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 19. Two Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.]
+
+
+               First Corps.
+
+----- ----- -----   ^   ----- ----- -----
+  2d Division.      |     1st Division.
+
+               Second Corps.
+
+----- ----- -----   ^   ----- ----- -----
+  2d Division.      |     1st Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 20. Two Corps Side by Side.]
+
+
+   Second Corps.    ^      First Corps.
+                    |
+----- ----- -----   |   ----- ----- -----
+   1st Division.    |     1st Division.
+                    |
+----- ----- -----   |   ----- ----- -----
+   2d Division.     |      2d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 21. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.]
+
+             First Corps.
+
+2d Division.             1st Division.
+----- -----              ----- -----
+   -----                    -----
+
+            Second Corps.
+
+2d Division.             1st Division.
+----- -----              ----- -----
+   -----                    -----
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 22. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each,
+placed Side by Side.]
+
+
+Second Corps.     ^      First Corps.
+                  |
+1st Division.     |      1st Division.
+ ----- -----      |       ----- -----
+    -----         |          -----
+                  |
+ 2d Division.     |       2d Division.
+ ----- -----      |       ----- -----
+    -----         |          -----
+
+_Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 23.]
+
+               First Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----   ^ ----  ----
+3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
+
+               Second Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----   ^ ----  ----
+3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 24.]
+
+        Second Corps.          ^               First Corps.
+ ----  ----  ^ ----  ----      |       ----  ----  ^ ----  ----
+2d Division. | 1st Division    |      2d Division. | 1st Division
+                               |
+        ----   ----            |               ----  ----
+        3d Division.           |              3d Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 25.]
+
+  2d Corps.  ^  1st Corps.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+1st Division.| 1st Division.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+2d Division. | 2d Division.
+             |
+ ----  ----  |  ----  ----
+3d Division. | 3d Division.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each._
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 26. Two Divisions in the 1st Line, and one in the
+2d Line.]
+
+          First Corps.
+
+               ^
+---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+ 2d Division.  | 1st Division.
+
+     ----    ----     ----
+         3d Division.
+
+
+          Second Corps.
+
+               ^
+---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+ 2d Division.  |  1st Division.
+
+     ----    ----      ----
+         3d Division.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 27. Same Order with 3d Brigade as Reserve, and the
+2 Corps Side by Side.]
+
+        Second Corps.           ^           First Corps.
+                                |
+2d Division. ^  1st Division.   |   2d Division. ^  1st Division.
+ ----  ----  |   ----  ----     |    ----  ----  |   ----  ----
+    ----     |      ----        |       ----     |      ----
+                                |
+                                |
+      ---- ---- ----            |          ---- ---- ----
+        3d Division.            |           3d Division.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Shallower Formation: Twelve Brigades in the First Line,
+and Six in the Second Line._
+
+Fig. 28.]
+
+        Second Corps.            ^           First Corps.
+                                 |
+2d Division.   ^  1st Division.  |   2d Division. ^  1st Division.
+---- ---- ---- |  ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ----
+                                 |
+     ----    ----      ----      |      ----     ----    ----
+         3d Division.            |           3d Division.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+Note.--In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but
+these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in
+columns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached to
+the corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawn
+up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second.
+
+The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place
+two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly at
+Wagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be
+used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle;
+for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its
+reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under
+different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to
+support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for
+that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a
+colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable
+he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly
+needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line
+cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front
+was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own
+troops drawn up in rear.
+
+The table below[42] will show that the number of men in an army will
+have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that
+the subject is a complicated one.
+
+In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the
+case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to
+1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength
+from two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can
+be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of
+these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six
+for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that
+might require support. If this system be applied to an army of one
+hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ
+divisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps.
+
+If nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the
+center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen
+divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one
+hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three
+battalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred and
+forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With
+regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and
+twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment
+contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men
+strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty
+thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men.
+These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must
+be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If an
+army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation
+by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was
+Napoleon's army of 1800.
+
+Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat
+permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out
+of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if
+it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the
+composition of corps and their positions.
+
+I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained
+while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. If
+the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the
+center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of
+three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing
+which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a
+corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce
+it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by
+a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy
+would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the
+line.
+
+But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that,
+whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the
+organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of
+Europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must
+be made upon that basis.
+
+The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in
+recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly it
+was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more
+reserves. In recent[43] conflicts in Europe, when the masses brought
+into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two
+lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines;
+and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of
+infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formation
+may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best
+for battle, as it is entirely too deep.
+
+The classical formation--if I may employ that term--is still two lines
+for the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and the
+strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but
+these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and
+the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of
+men to be simultaneously engaged.
+
+When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in
+front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the
+reserve;[44] but, as has been previously stated, this will not often
+happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each wing
+has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main
+or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading
+corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return
+to their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve
+is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent
+its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle
+by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding
+general.
+
+From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great
+changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of
+the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution,
+and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of
+Peter the Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from
+the stand-point of those days.
+
+One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of
+example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the
+cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an
+army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the
+center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the
+extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry
+to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference
+to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If
+the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the
+organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the
+center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If
+that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on
+the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing.
+These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be
+threatened.[45]
+
+The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as
+formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division
+remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organization
+of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous
+distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake
+to scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for the
+proper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise
+as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one
+hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support,
+as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into
+much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the
+following rules:--
+
+1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move
+freely in every direction.
+
+2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy
+caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from
+sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add--what
+every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are
+not those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping
+ground is better.
+
+3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is
+well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily
+thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to have
+horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible
+to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for
+self-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve;
+for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself
+when his line had been broken through between the center and the left.
+
+4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in
+front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to
+attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of
+checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns.
+
+5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not
+in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole
+line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must
+not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of
+the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the
+artillery to move to a wing or to the center.
+
+6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very
+powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make
+a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a
+degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate
+of the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say as
+to the employment of artillery in battles.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 40: Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing
+of three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under
+Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, the
+general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own
+immediate orders.]
+
+[Footnote 41: Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two
+brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while
+the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each
+may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But it
+then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have
+but two in a corps,--which would be a faulty arrangement, because the
+corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than
+the division.]
+
+[Footnote 42: Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,--in
+all, four principal subdivisions,--besides accidental detachments.
+
+Below are some of the different formations that may be given to
+infantry.
+
+1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:--
+
+     Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and
+     three divisions for detachments.................. 11 = 22 = 88 =
+     72,000
+
+     Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for
+     detachments................... 15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000
+
+     Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for
+     detachments....................... 16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000
+
+2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:--
+
+     Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each,
+     besides detachments,............................... 11 = 22 = 132
+     105,000
+
+     Four corps of three divisions each, besides
+     detachments................................ 15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000
+
+     Eight corps of two divisions each............ 16 = 32 = 192 =
+     154,000
+
+If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and
+engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known.
+
+It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred
+men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months'
+campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then each
+battalion should contain one thousand men.]
+
+[Footnote 43: The term _recent_ here refers to the later wars of
+Napoleon I.--Translators.]
+
+[Footnote 44: As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every
+day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour
+of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the
+line of battle.]
+
+[Footnote 45: This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon
+the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This is
+the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLIV.
+
+Formation and Employment of Infantry.
+
+
+Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it
+forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense
+of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general,
+the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory,
+it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and
+artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times
+be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial
+success.
+
+We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and
+the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided,
+is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of
+Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages
+of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep
+order. I will give my own opinion farther on.
+
+There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question
+now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank,
+armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of
+producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater
+resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the
+difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in
+three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the
+disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who
+had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material
+advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for
+it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops
+takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn
+their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase
+in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing
+upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much
+mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult
+to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:
+although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks
+cannot be kept properly closed.
+
+Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd
+that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He
+wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred
+and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask
+what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may
+penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind.
+
+But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of
+deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of
+attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division
+and depending on its force and impetuosity?
+
+I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of
+the question in hand.
+
+There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an
+enemy:--l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or
+checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central
+divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares.
+
+The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers
+are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage
+of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up
+intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position.
+
+These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four:
+the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the
+half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on
+the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are
+partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed
+of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other.
+
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 29.[46]
+
+   Deployed order in two lines.
+----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
+----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
+
+]
+
+The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used
+to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These
+deployed lines may either be continuous, (Fig. 29,) or checkerwise, or
+in echelons.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 30.
+
+Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in
+the intervals.
+
+    -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...-----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+    -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----...-----...-----...-----...-----...-----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+-----   -----   -----   -----   -----   -----
+
+]
+
+A more compact order is shown in Fig. 30, where each battalion is formed
+into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division.
+It is really a line of small columns
+
+In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[47] will
+have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way
+too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the
+artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed,
+whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two
+ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the
+other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of
+the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these
+skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.)
+Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides
+those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be,
+also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having
+really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred
+men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each
+battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[48] A battalion of
+eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four
+divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first
+alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bach
+battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a
+volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver
+four hundred.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 31.]
+
+While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we
+must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and
+that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to
+fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement
+is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous
+against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three
+ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry.
+The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly
+at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my
+chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave
+cavalry of Bessieres could make no impression upon these small masses.
+
+To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it
+is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would
+be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a
+charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. If to
+remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military
+men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as
+columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two
+ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry,
+only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if
+the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be
+difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is
+scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to
+employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that
+any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed
+lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns
+of attack.
+
+I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of
+forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be
+employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable
+than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would
+be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 32.]
+
+There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento
+and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions,
+one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in
+columns. (See Fig. 32.) This arrangement--which belongs also to the
+half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the
+first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him
+into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may
+debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in
+disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the
+leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line
+with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a
+half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means
+unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear
+that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
+battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the
+enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may be
+useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it.
+
+[Illustration: Fig 33.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig 34.]
+
+The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly the
+most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were
+sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six
+ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the
+destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are
+diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such
+masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated.
+Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great
+sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have
+been victorious had it not been for the successes of Davoust and
+Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line.
+
+When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly
+be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that
+if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in
+its progress. (See Fig. 33.) Under the protection of these battalions,
+which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to
+the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed
+to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will
+be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as was
+the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.
+
+Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority
+in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for the
+defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (See Figs. 35,
+36, 37.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 35.
+
+Division in battalion squares.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 36.
+
+The same division in long battalion squares.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 37.
+
+Squared of regiments of three battalions.]
+
+The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front
+and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. A
+regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling
+the center battalion half to the right and half to the left.
+
+In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because
+hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia,
+or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if the
+seat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular
+cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions
+usual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the
+Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia.
+
+However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions
+seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the
+superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for
+the enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to a
+battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and
+one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed
+battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; but
+there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the
+battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also,
+of being prepared to resist cavalry.
+
+Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each
+other. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with
+deployed lines.
+
+It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described
+is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness
+of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the
+offensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and
+_momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and also
+the power of delivering _as much fire as possible_.
+
+This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the
+bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in
+presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one
+round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand
+in five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been
+carried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a
+shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of _momentum_ and
+the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the
+English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera,
+Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo.
+
+We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the
+advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for
+when the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not
+at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they
+were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been
+repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had used
+columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the
+center? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of
+the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep
+order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a
+deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like Fig. 31,
+(page 293.) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I have
+seen them tried.
+
+Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to
+attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into action
+while firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose the
+attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while
+firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended
+position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired
+point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of
+sheep.
+
+What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If the
+deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive.
+2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for
+carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as
+much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy
+a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's
+fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by
+cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the second
+in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may be
+successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use
+his troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles XVI. and XXX.
+
+Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been
+made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more
+destructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer the
+shallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget the
+lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries,
+shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method
+of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some
+persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and
+breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack
+in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployed
+system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the
+attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with
+proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position,
+or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of
+companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy
+who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillful
+commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these
+arrangements, according to circumstances.
+
+Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical
+problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle;
+but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a
+single method is an impossibility.
+
+In the first place, the topography of different countries is very
+various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might be
+maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, the
+valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a
+division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, and
+their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the
+system of formation.
+
+Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instruction
+in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines
+so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which
+would be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies
+of the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that
+nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who think
+that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all
+countries.
+
+To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it
+seems to me, we ought to find out:--1. The best method of moving when in
+sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of coming
+to close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order.
+
+In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all
+cases to exercise the troops--1. In marching in columns of battalions
+doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when
+coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in
+continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in
+deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are
+more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front by
+the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares,
+either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these
+different methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by
+columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more
+expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best
+suited to all kinds of ground.
+
+Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of
+companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plain
+it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. It
+breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates
+to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all
+confusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger to
+which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by
+cavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and
+not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over
+the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. At the
+least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed
+instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whatever
+precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with
+well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have never
+seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where
+it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front.
+
+I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in
+checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same
+battalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, have
+never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkered
+order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. It
+may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it
+more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the
+leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form
+line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only
+between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget
+that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one,
+which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the
+marches of continuous lines.
+
+It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for
+making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods I
+have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-four
+battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center
+ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace
+toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then
+deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread
+out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and
+pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows
+the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through
+the intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when no
+enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the
+advantages of firing and of the column.
+
+Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of
+attacking in the half-deep order.
+
+The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others
+in column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32, page 295.) The
+deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would
+open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. The
+second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching
+half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line
+through the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons,
+mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig. 15 on that page.
+
+Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed
+lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the
+other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen.
+
+I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for I
+have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats of
+infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing
+to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly
+against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or
+repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved
+out to meet the advance. I have seen _melees_ of infantry in defiles and
+in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision
+and thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing on
+a regular field of battle.
+
+In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and
+should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fire
+of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation;
+and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of
+tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every
+different nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper
+combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must,
+however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned.
+
+I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be
+attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops
+as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by
+withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all
+inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of
+the enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range,
+it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is
+then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers
+and troops on the defensive.
+
+It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a
+position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is
+assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must
+never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene,
+seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke
+through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were
+sacrificed in defending these posts.
+
+For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood,
+which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the
+troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the
+enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park of
+Hougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influence
+the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended,
+may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the
+possession of the woods was very important.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 46: In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of
+twelve battalions.]
+
+[Footnote 47: The word _division_ being used to designate four or five
+regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of
+confusion in its use.]
+
+[Footnote 48: In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from the
+third rank of each division,--which makes the column eight men in depth,
+instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying the
+skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the
+whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three
+divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there
+would be twelve ranks.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLV.
+
+Cavalry.
+
+
+The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course,
+somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole
+army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be
+so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper
+moments.
+
+The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied
+greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making their
+people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of
+horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the
+Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly
+inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was
+pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,--a weak
+brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same
+reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so
+much had ideas and means changed.
+
+As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country
+should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in
+mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice.
+
+The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of
+motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we
+must be careful lest a false application be made of this last.
+
+Whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of
+war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of
+infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to
+render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the
+enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered
+infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient
+in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats
+extremely difficult.
+
+The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon
+the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's
+movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned
+here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its
+use.
+
+All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good
+order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be
+supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly
+for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great
+fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged
+to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for
+charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing
+infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others
+prove this.
+
+There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over
+infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they
+cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau,
+and so did the Austrian left at Dresden.
+
+Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way
+may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was
+made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against
+squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed.
+
+A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and
+enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry
+must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this
+character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of
+before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The
+beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic,
+October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo
+with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because
+unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince
+Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under
+such circumstances.
+
+General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it
+from the field of battle and return more free to act against his
+infantry.
+
+Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an
+enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the
+infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if
+successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is
+rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good;
+for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in
+rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is
+particularly fitted.
+
+In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by
+opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing
+line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It
+may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause
+the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success.
+This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at
+Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'armee
+may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined
+attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to
+finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat.
+
+It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it
+depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but
+four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a
+gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. In
+charges in line, the lance is very useful; in _melees_, the saber is
+much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank,
+which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which
+finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is
+of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or
+when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous
+to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of
+cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy,
+and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack.
+There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on
+horseback and in rapid motion.
+
+I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good.
+It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the
+advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the
+contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every
+thing depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of the
+movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop.
+Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over
+the ground as rapidly as possible. In like manner, if the cavalry is
+armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the
+enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the
+cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since
+the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of
+good order: in a _melee_ the lance is almost useless.
+
+If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop
+to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the
+trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its
+apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is
+estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his
+firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping
+in confusion.
+
+In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the
+small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where
+lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is
+much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any
+advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good
+squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers
+armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models
+for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks.
+
+Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using
+cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an
+enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be
+completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry,
+it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in
+collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It
+is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a
+quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head.
+
+Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and
+organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes
+when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an
+enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a
+second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily
+handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become
+broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of
+lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge,
+penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory.
+
+The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of
+strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry,
+the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men
+of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances,
+believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of
+former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would
+certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they
+should not have lances like those of the light cavalry.
+
+Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called
+dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of
+mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in
+retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a
+soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This
+might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when
+fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought
+quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest
+inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of
+being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot
+resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with
+his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has
+more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make
+men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more
+reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave
+foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always
+depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other
+things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the
+commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and
+musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of
+victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted,
+will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these
+truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their
+adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case
+with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to
+fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like
+foot-soldiers.
+
+It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring
+soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties.
+
+The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or
+mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large
+number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while
+he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French
+dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment
+of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this
+concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the
+instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and
+that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions
+of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might
+result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on
+horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It
+thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have
+their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between
+the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the
+army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and
+then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.
+
+Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is
+applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:--
+
+1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry
+than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too
+much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed
+in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise
+formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements
+before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend
+themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full
+lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is
+checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is
+well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less
+than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full.
+It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be
+left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column
+upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of
+the troops which have been brought up.
+
+2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used,
+cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions.
+The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling
+on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only
+four squadrons, there can be but two lines.
+
+3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ like
+that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron
+distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge
+separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops
+engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be
+closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be
+passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be
+kept beyond cannon-range.
+
+4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a
+combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in
+echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form
+to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction.
+
+5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons
+against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front.
+Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and
+it may be better.
+
+6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the
+commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the
+formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would
+not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the
+other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and
+one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper
+reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in
+a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for
+a general to control the deployed regiments.
+
+By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to
+dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a
+general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to
+think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may
+then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as
+a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the
+line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be
+preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the
+others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three
+regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks
+of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is
+beaten back. (See Fig. 38.)
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.
+
+Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
+lines.]
+
+7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all
+encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must
+sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first
+charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy
+will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at
+length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that,
+with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will
+remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness
+to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also
+engaged.
+
+Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the
+proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.
+
+Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large
+cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very
+unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career
+the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a
+blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the
+attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian
+cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.
+
+In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never
+intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons,
+or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry,
+expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other,
+the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line
+breaks and turns.[49]
+
+With cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very
+important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and
+the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _melee_ or
+in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the
+adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is
+adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the
+victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious
+formation.
+
+The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old
+disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get
+the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious
+encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to
+the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy
+by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several
+exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry
+seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry,
+I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does
+not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship,
+organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude
+it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to
+accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They
+acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst
+they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common
+object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
+Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.
+
+Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the
+best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that
+they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate
+of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack
+in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.
+
+From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry
+a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting,
+however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed
+with pistols, lances, and sabers.
+
+Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a
+numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great
+influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a
+feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can
+carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his
+communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his
+operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising
+_en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and
+rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty
+in his calculations.
+
+Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides
+for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation
+of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons,
+be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not
+possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on
+horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure
+supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off
+than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of
+her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she
+can bring into the field at very short notice.
+
+Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the
+Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:--
+
+"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to
+be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock
+of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in
+pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to
+the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of
+the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in
+danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few
+regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has
+not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or
+twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a
+country where the population is not hostile to them.
+
+"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a
+strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much
+unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's
+regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.
+
+"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out,
+may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered
+and move freely about from point to point."
+
+In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources
+possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia
+have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if
+for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those
+occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as
+forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on
+outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be
+more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the
+line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often
+restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where
+he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose
+excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 49: To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the
+battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry
+in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise.
+Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed
+checkered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success was
+his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirch
+and Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight
+squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had
+twice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But I
+cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which I
+have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry
+tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLVI.
+
+Employment of Artillery.
+
+
+Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and
+defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break
+an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the
+troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the
+strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it
+inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral
+effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of
+approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less
+important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched
+camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of
+fortification.
+
+I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as
+to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is
+difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the
+battle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can act
+independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At
+Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the
+gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check
+the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance.
+This was a special case, and should not be often imitated.
+
+I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules,
+observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service,
+(1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say
+little with reference to them.
+
+1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should
+concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be
+struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it
+assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry.
+
+2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive
+movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended
+for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an
+offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column
+without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may
+have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.
+
+3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be
+held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[50]
+For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence
+it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the
+best positions for the heavy calibers.
+
+4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the
+defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points
+where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of
+the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery
+should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the
+battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The
+distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these.
+
+5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the
+front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet
+firing: a converging fire is the best.
+
+6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in
+battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their
+batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries,
+in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may
+be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed
+against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.
+
+7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor
+to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can
+be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is
+produced.
+
+8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It
+is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank
+and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is
+inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it.
+The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few
+pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked
+them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he
+was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards
+upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far
+overbalancing the risks run.
+
+9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and
+especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be
+deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this.
+
+10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry,
+preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells,
+and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in
+such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and,
+when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind
+the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they
+should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller
+squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in
+frightening the horses.
+
+11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its
+fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon.
+The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the
+battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of
+the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by
+the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will
+cause its destruction.
+
+12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon
+conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in 1812 he
+invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed.
+These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible.
+Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this
+allowance will depend on circumstances.
+
+The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between
+wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery,
+whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A
+remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong
+artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The
+great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the
+Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With
+wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along
+the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and
+to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously
+captured. In three months he doubled the _materiel_ and _personnel_ of
+his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own
+frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war.
+
+13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage
+is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist
+and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of
+the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the
+different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with
+the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of
+the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful
+issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus
+massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding
+general.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 50: Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by
+mounting the men on the boxes.]
+
+
+
+
+ARTICLE XLVII.
+
+Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.
+
+
+To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the
+combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by
+considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if
+I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed
+operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid
+down for each of the arms.
+
+Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject very
+extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they
+consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual
+minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the
+place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the
+subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the
+commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ
+them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after
+all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the
+attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in
+every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied,
+would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the
+object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the
+consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best
+works which do treat of them.
+
+I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms
+be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to
+the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they
+be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being
+taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the
+events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of
+war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability
+to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of
+the three arms, either single or combined.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+
+I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be
+regarded as fundamental in war. War in its _ensemble_ is not a science,
+but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed
+laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of
+war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as
+often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may
+become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a
+thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The
+passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the
+warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their
+commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and
+epochs,[51]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and
+metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results.
+
+Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as
+tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What
+military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are
+we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by
+inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their
+battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and
+Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena,
+or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When
+the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured
+victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their
+favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their
+occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their
+value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a
+theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the
+whole number of chances of success in its favor?
+
+The _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the
+fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect
+produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a
+hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly
+enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than
+the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same
+point.
+
+Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the
+greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the
+theater of war or of the zone of operations.
+
+Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they
+shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the
+art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point
+of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of
+fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which
+I use the term.
+
+A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed
+of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent
+strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in
+presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out,
+and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be
+able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his
+wits he will lose his army.
+
+The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and
+strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory
+that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately
+seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a
+decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor
+courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will
+undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations
+can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
+unavoidable defeat.
+
+No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is
+bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some
+occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling.
+Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence
+to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.
+
+These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound
+rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will
+lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with
+mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but
+it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which
+should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for
+these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding
+brave troops, means of almost certain success.
+
+The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains
+to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability
+consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however,
+leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim
+relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the
+greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and
+place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations
+which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to
+be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for
+the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the
+field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a
+strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a
+column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
+coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist
+of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear,
+or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the
+adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause
+of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is
+simply impossible.
+
+If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war,
+his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he
+may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents
+for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly
+proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most
+suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep
+constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to
+lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly
+endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective
+points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its
+subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance,
+depending upon its first successes.
+
+The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to
+neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting
+operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the
+war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of
+the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the
+purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places,
+covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.
+
+Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but
+no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain
+always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your
+lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well
+concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements
+which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful
+in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of
+your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally
+matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those
+stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and
+Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the
+chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.
+
+If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully
+studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great
+masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles
+nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of
+Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince
+Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning."
+
+Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual
+events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true
+school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great
+men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take
+rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 51: The well-known Spanish proverb, _He was brave on such a
+day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at
+Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at
+Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.]
+
+[Footnote 52: The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable
+of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who
+will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result
+of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.]
+
+
+
+
+SUPPLEMENT
+
+TO THE
+
+SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+
+My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the
+military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a
+concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give
+it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the
+means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_.
+
+It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that
+in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy
+for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to
+which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of
+these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend
+them clearly and to apply them properly.
+
+I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of
+war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary
+intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity,
+many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly.
+Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing
+themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is
+just within their reach if they only would think so.
+
+Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he
+must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it
+to a successful termination_. The first of these talents may be a
+natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The
+second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal
+attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.
+
+It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government
+to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he
+may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations
+and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted
+to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity
+of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and
+having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the
+command of an army.
+
+If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive
+ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military
+combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have
+characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only
+brave soldiers without being at all improved by study.
+
+From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to
+several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of
+the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths.
+
+The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to
+choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the
+enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the
+importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he
+is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in
+Articles from XVIII. to XXII.
+
+The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the
+theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See Article
+XVII.) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two
+fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid
+movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against
+fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive
+direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of
+his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time
+his success would yield him no great advantages.
+
+The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these
+two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected
+or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also
+would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending
+out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every
+well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with
+central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than
+the enemy's.
+
+The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If
+you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's,
+you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of
+them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to
+observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty
+battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to
+take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior
+lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile
+line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these
+means is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following.)
+
+In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a
+strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a
+center and two extremities."_ A theater has usually three zones,--a
+right, a left, and a central.
+
+In choosing a zone of operations, select one,--1, that will furnish a
+safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by
+yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in
+mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the
+dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near
+the theater of war.
+
+One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the
+other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances.
+
+The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts
+must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are
+two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or
+geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense
+which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched
+camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in
+the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving
+attention to geographical points of any kind_. This was the favorite
+objective of Napoleon.[53]
+
+I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this
+point, (page 86;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the
+most important thing in a plan of operations_, I recommend the whole of
+Article XIX., (pages 84 and following.)
+
+The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one
+or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the
+fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the
+character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the
+enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his
+troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two geographical
+lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces
+along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by
+detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main
+body.
+
+The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in
+presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary
+strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy
+may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important
+consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations
+and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX.,
+(page 93.)
+
+The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that
+the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front
+remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more
+closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and
+more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will
+be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot
+concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving
+in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be
+able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious
+measure.
+
+But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position,
+that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point,
+is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each
+other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War;
+or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its
+sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the
+enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical
+inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the
+extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his
+masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.
+
+It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive
+points of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that the
+principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's,
+to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be
+adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points
+already known, and afterward upon secondary points.
+
+To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a
+sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See Plate
+III.)
+
+It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the
+frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.
+
+The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)
+
+Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
+
+The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin.
+(No. 3.)
+
+The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and
+was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong
+detachments. (No. 4.)
+
+Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)
+
+Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and
+Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)
+
+Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)
+
+The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)
+
+The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)
+
+General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No.
+10.)
+
+The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile
+corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise,
+Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,)
+composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern
+frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's
+line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood,
+(i, k, l, m.)
+
+This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near
+Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the
+Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of
+Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the
+Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges,
+and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser
+from the lines of Wissembourg.
+
+The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar
+operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the
+allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5,
+and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected
+three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at
+Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the
+Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North
+Sea, and would have obtained immense results.
+
+The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance
+that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the
+English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be
+cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for
+this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good
+reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The
+principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
+strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of
+retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of
+punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the
+English as he might have done.
+
+It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the
+whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had
+decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because,
+when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through,
+and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession,
+none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the
+French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
+had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
+fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski,
+assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him
+vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at
+Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.
+
+I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two
+important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses
+of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession
+and at decisive points.[54]
+
+Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and
+will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon
+their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say,
+the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the
+center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of
+importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater
+accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following
+them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every
+precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a
+dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up.
+Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose
+positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with
+_offensive returns_, (Art. XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the
+forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) the
+faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune
+moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as
+the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which
+will constitute him a skillful tactician.
+
+It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of
+battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here
+that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little
+value.
+
+It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which
+explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to
+what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall
+himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be
+prepared for any eventuality.
+
+I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments.
+These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may
+prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are,
+to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_,
+to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give
+them good instructions for avoiding disasters.
+
+I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military
+policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of
+this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but
+should be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however,
+invite special attention to Article XIV., relating to the command of
+armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most
+anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often
+depends the safety of the nation.
+
+We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of
+staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of
+tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action
+of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great
+captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant
+results.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 53: The objective may be in some degree
+_political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs
+of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.]
+
+[Footnote 54: The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing
+masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, but
+because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, he
+would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be would
+have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line of
+retreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillful
+operations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be
+convinced.]
+
+
+
+
+NOTE
+
+UPON
+
+THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.
+
+
+The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable
+practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance,
+never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or
+to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be
+procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable
+characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in
+practice the finest theories in the world.
+
+When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully
+impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against
+successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he
+recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon
+decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire
+to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I
+have already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary,
+indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained.
+There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in
+all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--_in every
+position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate
+by the right, by the left, or by the front_.
+
+To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take
+this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first
+care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the
+greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him
+in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three
+zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,)
+and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII. pointed out the manner of
+perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a
+zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty.
+
+When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with
+the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be
+established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations
+toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of
+operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains,
+then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can
+injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if
+he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have
+dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.
+
+Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the
+field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon
+the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and
+center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these
+three directions of striking.
+
+Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the
+theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the
+North Sea. (See Fig. 39.)
+
+Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical
+sections,--viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that
+between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the
+Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is
+nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the
+front of operations will have only three general directions to choose
+from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone,
+as it will always have one on the right and another on the left.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 39.]
+
+The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose
+base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If
+it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,)
+it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the
+Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg,
+might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and
+fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if
+seriously defeated.
+
+If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon
+the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified
+towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences
+still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
+toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this
+wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward
+Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but
+two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its
+way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.
+
+It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most
+disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient,
+although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone
+remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable
+advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward
+Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations
+of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon
+Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
+communications.
+
+When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone,
+they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the
+enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in
+view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the
+enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of
+his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to
+operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest
+effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
+gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you
+anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the
+contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of
+crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver
+by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered
+by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back
+upon the sea in case of a reverse.
+
+Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm,
+and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in
+those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the
+direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the
+line of retreat of Melas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led
+by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat
+of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of
+retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera.
+
+In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the
+right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the
+center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left,
+leading to the line of communications of Melas, by way of Saint-Bernard
+or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and
+the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to
+Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive
+direction was evidently that by the left.
+
+I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.
+
+The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the
+arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical
+considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for
+battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the
+base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but
+this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the
+ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement:
+these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a
+position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it,
+sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In
+such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon
+the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or
+destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing
+his way through your line.
+
+I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen
+in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's
+wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in
+1812.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. 40.]
+
+The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A
+A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to
+cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's
+army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the
+French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been
+anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus
+fifteen hundred miles from its true base.
+
+There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by
+outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would
+have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.
+
+At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which
+was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the
+right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a
+few days later.
+
+In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is
+that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this
+line you must seize while protecting your own.
+
+When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and
+behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the
+center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the
+least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first
+consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total
+destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical
+strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with
+reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.
+
+Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the
+enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at
+Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been
+secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent
+the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing
+better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for
+maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who
+is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike
+most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most
+speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass
+of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
+that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be
+toward the right or the left.
+
+It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the
+presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the
+general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an
+exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the
+bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw
+the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of
+taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back
+upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in
+another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a
+very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of
+Wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be
+desired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII., (pages 224 and
+following.)
+
+A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that
+have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate
+_coup-d'oeil_. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who
+estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use,
+either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps,
+will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and
+even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will
+always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by
+constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which
+should regulate all the operations of war.
+
+Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime
+art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate
+thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of
+combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special
+talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the
+noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men
+co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well
+what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make
+such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point
+simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with
+arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special
+talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted
+that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best
+strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime
+characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the
+command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability,
+have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved
+imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other!
+Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny,
+Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen.
+
+I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said.
+To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me
+for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims
+laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to
+announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of
+passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight
+and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the
+impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence
+upon it." I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed
+history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most
+celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where
+these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.
+
+As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating
+mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only
+what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things
+into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have
+seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of
+reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived
+incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men
+intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most
+extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment
+and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended
+for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to
+facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by
+pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for
+having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really
+desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.
+
+Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:--
+
+"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is,
+that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly
+martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit
+faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels."
+
+[Blank Page]
+
+
+
+
+SECOND APPENDIX
+
+TO THE
+
+SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.
+
+ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.
+
+
+Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person
+did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in
+fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making
+war.
+
+I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of
+tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand
+combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the
+application of the principles which had led to the success of great
+generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Caesar as well as of Frederick
+and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my
+opinion.
+
+The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not
+produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest
+between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and
+mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without
+precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
+which produced it cannot occur again.
+
+Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance
+to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot
+influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the
+tactics of battles.
+
+The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the
+murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate
+the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the
+tactics for infantry.
+
+I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to
+complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the
+Summary of the Art of War.
+
+The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is
+not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and
+particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)
+because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in
+loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more
+than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose at this epoch between
+the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is
+known to all military students.
+
+The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the
+infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle,
+was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.
+
+The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as
+the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of
+battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such
+as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small
+intrenchments.[56]
+
+
+The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic
+forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the
+system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the
+nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the
+Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendee--rendered
+this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to
+attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed
+regiments?
+
+In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as
+they were nearly always the assailants.
+
+In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the
+title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which
+I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns
+of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to
+the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance,
+preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by
+intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a
+battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.
+
+What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and
+Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
+marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to
+attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to
+publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some
+attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on
+account of what was said on tactics.
+
+The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops
+deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the
+murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds
+as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till
+after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore
+renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.
+
+In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest
+minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in
+the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange,
+without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances,
+national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had
+proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I
+never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the
+defense.
+
+I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was
+approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the
+Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles
+observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had
+published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808
+from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not
+thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at
+the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to
+form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr
+particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the
+cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke,
+they could not have done if they had been deployed.
+
+At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was
+formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible
+fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his
+army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown
+back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was
+satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this
+mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.
+
+The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently,
+not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of
+Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the
+controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to
+which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise.
+He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French
+upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a
+solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well
+supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these
+deep columns were very different from the small columns which I
+proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force,
+and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force
+than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of
+artillery.
+
+I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the
+Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He
+answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the
+English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line
+formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines.
+He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends
+upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act
+in the same manner under all circumstances."
+
+To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the
+campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the
+infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the
+most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.
+
+The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at
+Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns
+of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.
+
+If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it
+would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at
+least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line
+extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but
+several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed
+in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being
+deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.
+
+This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms
+of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four
+regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which
+is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on
+the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
+divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813
+should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it
+very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order,
+would have executed one of the following formations:--
+
+1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in
+four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to
+the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight
+battalions.[57]
+
+2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of
+battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the
+system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:--
+
+I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to
+the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is
+important that in every language there should be two different terms to
+express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions
+and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion.
+
+Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary
+already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I
+devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
+of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations
+relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which
+consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the
+central one, the other two being in column on the wings.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--
+
+1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.
+
+2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be
+as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was
+successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.
+
+3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in
+marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over
+an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
+order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the
+front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.
+
+I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as
+impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the
+attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for
+success.
+
+Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
+terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault
+upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the
+assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in
+good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from
+each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass
+as a whole.
+
+I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden,
+Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland,
+Katzbach, or Dennewitz.
+
+I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in
+deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally
+awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by
+maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was
+beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what
+fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of
+Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in
+position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?
+
+I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be
+necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my
+Summary of the Art of War was written.
+
+Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813
+from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its
+value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to
+make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this
+view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one
+behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in
+small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of
+two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four
+sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as
+skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small
+column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form
+four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small
+columns instead of three--
+
+[Illustration:
+
+3d Battalion. 2d Battalion. 1st Battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
+--- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------
+--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- ---
+--- --- --- --- ---]
+
+It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the
+enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty
+skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never
+present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion.
+Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and,
+indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria.
+
+The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight
+companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies,
+but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns,
+according to the number of companies.
+
+Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these
+formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions
+would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if
+driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in
+the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed,
+according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops.
+Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware
+whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and
+Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their
+camps of instruction.
+
+Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be
+considered:--
+
+"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring
+about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now
+recognized principles of tactics?"
+
+If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because
+the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten
+that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so
+that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side.
+
+What change will it make in tactics?
+
+Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be
+necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or
+three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns?
+
+Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will
+fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall
+retreat or be destroyed?
+
+What military man will reply in the affirmative?
+
+It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary,
+and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and
+he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of
+battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two
+companies. To attempt to prescribe by regulation under what
+circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd.
+
+If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the
+enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the
+shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to
+the attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would never
+accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a
+regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very
+deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep
+in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their
+destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in
+any respect their chances of success.
+
+If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt for
+infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization
+according with the formation for battle. I would then make each regiment
+of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalion
+should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the
+depth would be three divisions or six ranks.
+
+This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the
+battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each
+battalion, or on any other division.
+
+The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be
+so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the
+mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them
+upon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columns
+could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming
+of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in
+several respects to one of four or six divisions.
+
+In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two
+hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division
+in the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the center
+is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval
+separating the second and third companies. Hence the column must be
+simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Something
+analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by
+forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third
+respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than
+in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of
+the battalion in six companies or three divisions.
+
+By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight
+in all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made on
+the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each
+division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different
+companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his
+company under the command of another officer, and half of his own
+division would be made up of another company.
+
+Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as
+the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his
+own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than
+any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a
+decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it
+would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to
+run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French
+system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as
+many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each
+company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be
+two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an
+advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation
+between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater
+display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there,
+to command the division as a whole.
+
+It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important
+question at issue.
+
+Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper
+to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light
+of historical events.
+
+In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a
+mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence
+in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of
+instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred
+of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the
+enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and
+impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and
+Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity
+and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult
+to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and
+Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the
+inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the
+tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled
+the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire,
+while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were
+posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of
+these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out
+of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general
+discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the
+infantry with the bayonet.
+
+This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to
+Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of
+troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could
+be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable
+to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a
+gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field
+of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this
+plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau,
+could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own
+were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his
+losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his
+aid.
+
+Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible
+battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated
+that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of
+deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes,
+viz.:--
+
+1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack
+painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective,
+and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery.
+
+2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the
+French, principally on the right wing.
+
+3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the
+infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each
+other, but they were in no case simultaneous.
+
+4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian
+army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the
+French.
+
+Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and
+the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry
+had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately
+after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been
+broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the
+Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to
+retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof
+of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in
+columns.
+
+From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions,
+viz.:--
+
+1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important
+change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be
+useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of
+columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or
+skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those
+armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them
+through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail
+sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which
+would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this
+plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the
+others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies
+be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of
+light infantry to each division.
+
+2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be
+excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an
+attack upon an enemy in position.
+
+3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a
+battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it
+will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the
+other.
+
+4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly,
+upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand
+tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great
+mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the
+battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action
+of the three arms.
+
+5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this
+subject in Chapters IV. and V.; and that it would be unreasonable to
+define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle.
+
+6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking
+the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking
+his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy,
+adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the
+spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character.
+
+Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: That
+war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned
+drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but
+also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical
+complications.
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 55: It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron,
+instead of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops used
+wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is
+attributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to Prince
+Leopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt the iron
+ramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741) it had not been
+introduced into the Austrian service.
+
+Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-six
+years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindrical
+ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time
+necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time
+could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded
+once,--all other things being equal.--Translators.]
+
+[Footnote 56: Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be
+intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in
+order to facilitate their deployment.]
+
+[Footnote 57: We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if
+there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then
+consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while
+in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead
+of eight, the depth not being increased.]
+
+
+
+
+SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.
+
+
+I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal
+maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents.
+
+The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliest
+mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persians
+conquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the most
+formidable power on both land and sea.
+
+About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of
+Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed the
+straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles and
+Sardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily.
+
+The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could not
+have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably
+situated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and her
+great extent of coast.
+
+The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the
+naval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Her
+fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, the
+terror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made grand
+descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their
+naval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a
+confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse,
+Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other,
+it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before the
+Romans.
+
+If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek
+historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousand
+vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account
+of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the same
+time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed
+three hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally
+defeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet
+of Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon,
+and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred and
+fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilybaeum was
+founded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, with
+fifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This
+contest lasted one year and a half.
+
+Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men:
+his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persians
+had four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back to
+Greece.
+
+After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division
+of the empire, made no important naval expedition.
+
+Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by their
+fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand
+horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This was
+two hundred and eighty years before the Christian era.
+
+Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult to
+understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of the
+Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, by
+the Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginian
+fleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too
+late, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on
+Beneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was
+all that remained of his force.
+
+Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the
+ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire.
+
+The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating power
+in Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity.
+The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they
+improved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or
+vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years after
+found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large
+vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty
+combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. The
+Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand
+men and fifty vessels.
+
+The victory of Ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of
+Actium--was the first important step of the Romans toward universal
+empire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousand
+men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, the
+remainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as
+celebrated by his death as by his famous victory.
+
+The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, but
+was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same
+fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B.C. the Romans were defeated at
+Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred
+vessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilybaeum, in the same
+year, was lost off Cape Pactyrus.
+
+Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at first
+resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicily
+and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm
+its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out with
+three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, and
+gained the battle in the AEgates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost
+one hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the
+first Punic war.
+
+The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, was less
+maritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles to
+Cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the
+Carthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a
+force inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the
+battle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five
+hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the
+Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained the
+celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans the
+kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by a
+victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and
+Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.
+
+From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power
+by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. Paulus
+Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at the head of
+twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to
+submission.
+
+Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage.
+The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, an
+immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand
+foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the
+son of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the glory
+of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by
+destroying the bitter rival of his country.
+
+After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe,
+was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken by
+Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the small
+adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty
+thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three
+hundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commanded
+in Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty
+thousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece.
+
+Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand
+Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in succession two large
+armies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred
+thousand strong, was destroyed at Chaeronea, and the second, of eighty
+thousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time,
+Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of
+Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared to
+transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear,
+made peace.
+
+In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena and
+Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step by
+step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the
+project of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to pass
+through Thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult
+to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his
+kingdom against fifty thousand Romans.
+
+Caesar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels,
+transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transported
+thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to join
+him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of
+Pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of Caesar
+as by the arrangements of his lieutenants.
+
+Afterward Caesar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; they
+did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments.
+
+The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was that
+of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand
+horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous
+transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty
+vessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land,
+but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one
+hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra's
+galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides
+the necessary rowers.
+
+Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels,
+carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths
+of the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm;
+and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks
+of the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea,
+when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days.
+
+When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates,
+maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of
+the North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave
+employment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. The
+eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which
+the possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while
+at the same time it afforded the means.
+
+The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events of
+interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landed
+in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated by
+Belisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled
+the Mediterranean for a time.
+
+At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, the
+Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operations
+are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in
+the mysteries of Odin.
+
+The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to
+Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the
+Danes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert.
+
+The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic,
+and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situated
+with respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coasts
+of France and England.
+
+If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of these
+vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of
+rowers. There were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers.
+The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of the
+Danes, who had long before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to
+infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small.
+
+However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported five
+thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show
+that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbe
+was superior to that of the Scandinavians.
+
+Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida and
+Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into seven
+kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) that
+they were again united under the authority of Egbert.
+
+The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712,
+the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik.
+They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and,
+far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous
+enemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and the
+Arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of
+the North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated
+Rodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several
+millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled in
+Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents,
+still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in
+history, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa and
+the Crusades in the East.
+
+A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable
+traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire now
+known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, of
+whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great
+expeditions.
+
+In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two
+thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and
+debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. They
+proceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to pay
+tribute.
+
+Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a fleet said to
+have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet,
+terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of
+Asia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and the
+expedition returned home.
+
+Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to
+the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. sent to renew the
+tribute and ask for peace, (943.)
+
+In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King of
+Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea,
+ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs,
+who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned
+into Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforced
+by the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople.
+The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his
+position. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his
+predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a
+respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him to
+retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians.
+The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from
+Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one
+of the most memorable sieges recorded in history.
+
+In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performed
+prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers.
+Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty.
+
+About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope of
+pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, to
+France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these pirates
+increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six
+years their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain and
+devastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted
+them sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the mouths of
+the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted that
+Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon;
+but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets is
+not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail.
+
+In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England,
+but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered into
+alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen on
+Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here,
+Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple
+saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing
+scourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition
+that he would marry his daughter and turn Christian,--an offer which was
+eagerly accepted.
+
+Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of
+Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed in
+considerable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, and
+assured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy.
+
+During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greater
+hostility toward England than to France, although they were much more
+assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs.
+Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in
+Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors,
+succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of
+the Danes.
+
+The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate than
+Ivar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace on
+condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark,
+leaving a part of his army behind him.
+
+Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxon
+power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his
+importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the
+Danes in the kingdom, (1002.) But Sweyn reappeared in the following
+year at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 three
+successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate
+England was ravaged anew.
+
+In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept over
+the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kings
+who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son,
+Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him,
+(Edmund Ironside.) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerable
+force, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern
+part of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdom
+resulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was
+finally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to
+conquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When
+he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to
+the usage of the times.
+
+Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to their
+Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to
+be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in
+1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settled
+in France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a
+cession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great
+and ambitious man.
+
+The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While William
+the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament against
+Harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from
+Northumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with the
+King of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred
+vessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely
+destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more
+formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William took
+advantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the
+Norwegians, to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Hume
+asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities
+reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy
+thousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battle
+near Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate
+rival soon reduced the country to submission.
+
+At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, Robert
+Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with a
+handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)
+
+Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic
+priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large
+forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land.
+
+At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred
+thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the
+attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermit
+succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with from
+fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the
+Saracens.
+
+An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of
+religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French,
+Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey of
+Bouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number,
+under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and
+Macedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of
+Normans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece on
+Gallipolis.
+
+This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of
+Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered to
+transport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles to
+Asia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the
+plains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors.
+Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem,
+where he founded a kingdom.
+
+All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics of
+Italy were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and in
+provisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus
+given to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous
+result of the Crusades.
+
+This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of great
+disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united
+to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christian
+camps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave
+Noureddin was threatening. Louis VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at
+the head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as their
+predecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the
+Greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests,
+plotted their destruction.
+
+Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for
+him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by
+the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on the
+banks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, and
+his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage
+of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia,
+on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The
+means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more than
+fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: the
+remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens.
+
+This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the
+climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were
+continually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by the
+Italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of
+Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliance
+between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and
+England to save the Holy Land.
+
+The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one hundred
+thousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of the
+formal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. He
+marched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He
+died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been
+pretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the
+Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six
+thousand men.
+
+At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion[58] and Philip Augustus more
+judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles and
+Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first seized Cyprus, and both
+landed in Syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the
+rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philip
+returned to France.
+
+Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.) Part of
+the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Count
+of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the
+intention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by
+the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon
+the pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac
+Angelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of
+those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of
+Conrad and Louis VII.
+
+Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of
+the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. They
+assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, and
+Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat:
+the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latins
+took possession of Constantinople after a more bloody assault than the
+first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of
+Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greeks
+took refuge at Nice and Trebizond.
+
+A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who,
+notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta,
+was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the
+Mussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrow
+escape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in
+being able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe.
+
+The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of
+Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits,
+encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm at
+Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked at
+Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The
+landgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put
+in at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the
+presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him because he was too
+slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with
+ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical
+thunders.
+
+Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may
+credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from
+Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and
+fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians and
+the Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, although
+washed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there
+collected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville's
+statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent
+into Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for,
+although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of
+Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousand
+fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated that
+the Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France.
+
+The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the
+same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later,(1270.) He
+disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besieged
+Tunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself
+was one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful
+reinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back
+the remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest
+which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This
+prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of
+the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater
+value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of Saint
+Louis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do with
+that project. This was the last effort. The Christians who were
+abandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and
+Ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at
+Cyprus and established themselves at Rhodes.
+
+The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in
+1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the European
+provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselves
+given the fatal blow.
+
+Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to have
+had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal
+and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be
+manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture of
+this capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of the
+Greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of
+maritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon
+Otranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of
+a more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade,
+the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city
+to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail
+to make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried by
+assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the
+head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a
+failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go to
+that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of
+Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death
+closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect.
+
+About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors on
+land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their country
+from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more
+extraordinary even than that of Venice.
+
+Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundred
+ships and forty thousand men.
+
+Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated,
+fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six
+thousand were cavalry.
+
+All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and
+including the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention of
+gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed by
+some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From that
+time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and
+this revolution took place--if I may use that expression--at the time
+when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of America
+and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of
+the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of
+colonial dependencies.
+
+I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards to
+America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India by
+doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influence
+upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of Gama,
+Albuquerque, and Cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies
+of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of
+fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view.
+
+The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this
+discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign
+of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which was
+conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers
+transported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced by
+the disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,)
+undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the
+wise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way
+when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight
+thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the
+skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. himself
+arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril.
+
+While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were not
+neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine
+maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the
+control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period
+the Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and
+the military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of
+their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes
+(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and
+forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the
+supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half.
+
+In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta,
+where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried
+over thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships.
+John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing
+them.
+
+A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and
+fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, where
+Nicosia was taken and Famagosta besieged. The horrible cruelties
+practiced by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress.
+Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor
+Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the
+heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by
+Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that had
+perished in the space of two years spent on the island.
+
+The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria,
+brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet at
+the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium,
+where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. The
+Turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred
+vessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.)
+This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a
+great check in their career of greatness. However, they made such
+vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea
+during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which such
+enormous losses were sustained.
+
+The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against Algiers did not
+deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of
+Morocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprived
+of his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the
+head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army
+cut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578.
+
+Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepanto
+on account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy and
+by the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his arms
+irresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincible
+Armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was
+composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including,
+according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels,
+armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and
+carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand
+sailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand
+men which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way
+of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failure
+of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the
+period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding
+name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels
+before it even came near the English coast.
+
+After this expedition comes in chronological order that of Gustavus
+Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from fifteen to
+eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine
+thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that
+it carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania received
+little opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a
+strong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of a
+very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other
+example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. of
+Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswick
+upon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five
+thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in
+proportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice
+was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage
+having broken through and been lost.
+
+After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turks
+recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-five
+thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gained
+possession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought of
+sending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spirit
+which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble
+souls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against
+the Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority
+and the possession of Canea. The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless,
+gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of
+it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself
+perished.
+
+In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiously
+at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two
+assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being
+made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them,
+expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward of
+his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with
+their dead bodies.
+
+Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men to
+Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already
+called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce.
+
+The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, and
+each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks to
+carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the
+Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of naval
+tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who
+adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every
+attempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of
+Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this
+protracted struggle.
+
+Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of
+the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this
+war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island,
+where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he
+conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.(1667.)
+
+In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously:
+their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the
+first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an
+Italian engineer.
+
+The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by
+mines. Never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual
+destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance
+enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice
+sent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds of
+French volunteers.
+
+The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their
+efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmen
+came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Duke
+of Beaufort and Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged
+these presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the
+sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end
+of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France.
+Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place
+which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a
+truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia had
+cost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred
+thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It
+is estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations
+perished in the glorious defense of the place.
+
+The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives examples of
+great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II.
+in Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although
+De Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying
+five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A
+grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men
+into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, De
+Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the
+remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through
+the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the
+island.
+
+At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russians
+undertook two expeditions very different in character.
+
+Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent upon
+Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred
+vessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted by
+the English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason
+the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The same
+prince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his
+troops at a Swedish port.
+
+Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians,
+and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722)
+upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventy
+vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to
+Agrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet his
+cavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand
+Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar
+then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with one
+of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the
+empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of
+the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire.
+
+The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary
+expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, which
+was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent.
+
+[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was joined by a
+portion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole amounted to nineteen
+ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and
+fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. The expedition besieged and
+captured Havana.--TRS.]
+
+The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteen
+thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the
+sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious
+action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on
+account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the
+Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding
+the city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand
+men placed _hors de combat_.
+
+The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts
+upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this power
+send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line,
+while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of
+sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with
+three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and
+St. Malo.
+
+This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but
+accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port.
+
+D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority
+in the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousand
+Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by
+another division, and assisted in investing the English army under
+Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thus
+secured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable
+rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display
+made in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand
+men more to India with Admiral Suffren.
+
+During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: the
+fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injured
+the French navy.
+
+Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men was
+scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were
+made. (1796.)
+
+At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting of
+twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four
+hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were
+followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed
+fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven into
+the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of
+intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an
+excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under
+similar circumstances.
+
+The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 to
+St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the
+ravages of yellow fever.
+
+Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given their
+attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of
+colonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenth
+century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve
+thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like
+France. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empire
+occurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and then
+of Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of
+troops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to
+the number of one hundred and fifty thousand.
+
+The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of forty
+thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the
+details of the operations is, however, quite interesting.
+
+In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected a
+descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of this
+expedition are well known.
+
+General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some successes at
+Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. That
+against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was
+terminated by a capitulation.
+
+In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousand
+men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the
+Danish fleet, which was his object.
+
+In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men.
+After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general rising
+of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The same
+army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under
+Moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a
+view of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there
+re-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected
+another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of
+thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avenged
+Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then
+beating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital.
+
+The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largest
+England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of not
+less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and
+thirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the
+incapacity of the leader.
+
+A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. of Sweden
+was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia on
+the ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to take
+possession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehension
+to the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf to
+Umea, (March, 1809.)
+
+General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the
+neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchet
+off from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought
+best to re-embark.
+
+The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his return
+from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of
+_materiel_ landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army
+contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were
+disembarked at a friendly port.
+
+The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be
+regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital of
+the United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven or
+eight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a
+state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its
+capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled
+in history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary
+spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not
+risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their
+homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an
+English expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely
+defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders
+of General Jackson.
+
+If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes and
+the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been
+actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with
+powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and
+proportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred and
+fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of three
+thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the
+line[59].
+
+From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference
+there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between
+descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in
+width, and those in which the troops and _materiel_ are to be
+transported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reason
+why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the
+Bosporus.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:--
+
+In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composed
+of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and
+eighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war and
+transports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon.
+
+In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. The
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a short
+bombardment. A small force of about one thousand men, in three columns,
+took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight.
+
+In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast of
+Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the
+command of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed,
+including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and the
+castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the
+forces of the United States. This important post became the secondary
+base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the
+capture of the city of Mexico.
+
+In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia on
+the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other.
+Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of
+the Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An English
+fleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, on
+the 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command of
+Vice-Admiral Parseval Deschenes, on the 19th of April. They effected a
+junction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet
+numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels.
+The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on one
+of the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the
+conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of
+ten thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General
+Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced.
+
+Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed;
+and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to
+give an idea of its magnitude:--
+
+September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and
+two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed of
+thirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, and
+seven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of
+landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and
+transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma,
+(September 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took
+possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: these
+were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the
+army in the Crimea were sent.
+
+November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numbered
+seventy-one thousand men.
+
+At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousand
+men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sent
+fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand were
+alive, present, and fit for duty.
+
+February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English,
+twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand.
+
+May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteen
+thousand Sardinians.
+
+In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was
+sent to Kertch.
+
+In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred and
+twenty thousand men.
+
+September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in the
+evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in battery
+more than eight hundred pieces of artillery.
+
+The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack
+of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were present
+and prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships.
+
+October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to
+Kinburn, which place was captured.
+
+Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the French
+emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred and
+ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and
+twenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria.
+
+The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only
+to French operations:-)
+
+The artillery _materiel_ at the disposal of the Army of the East
+comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages,
+two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine
+million pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand
+tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and
+seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand
+war-rockets.
+
+On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen
+batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of
+powder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions.
+
+Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineers
+executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty
+thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags.
+
+Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent.
+
+Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons.
+
+Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons.
+
+Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons.
+
+In all, about six hundred thousand tons.
+
+It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English,
+Sardinian, and Turkish armies.
+
+In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of forty
+thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of
+artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and
+twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous
+transports.
+
+In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China,
+whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This
+expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which
+ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and
+succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the
+most populous empire in the world.
+
+The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, and
+presented no remarkable features.
+
+Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United States
+sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coast
+of South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vessels
+and transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of Captain
+Dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and
+_materiel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the
+rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval
+forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, General
+Sherman being in command.
+
+England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in an
+expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were the
+capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: the
+Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will develop
+the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if,
+indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three
+of the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and
+tottering republic of Mexico.]
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 58: Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot and
+five thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded by
+land to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to transport
+his troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian ships, and with
+a force at least as large as that of Richard.]
+
+[Footnote 59: See the account of the expedition to the
+Crimea.--TRANSLATORS.]
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+A.
+
+Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384.
+
+Accidental lines, 103.
+
+Action, concert of, how secured, 259.
+
+Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152.
+
+Advanced guard, 261, 262.
+  attack of the enemy's, in retreats, 243.
+  in armies meeting unexpectedly, 208.
+  in battle, 288, 289.
+
+Advance, line of, how determined, 71.
+
+Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17.
+  of elevated points for observation, 276.
+
+Aggressive wars for conquest, 22.
+
+Agincourt, order of battle at, 192.
+
+Albis, position of, 181.
+
+Alcazar, battle of, 378.
+
+Alexander the Great, 173, 362.
+
+Alfred the Great, 369.
+
+Algiers, French descent on, in 1830, 386.
+  Spanish descent on, 382.
+
+Alise, investment of, by Caesar, 153.
+
+Allies, at Bautzen, 187.
+  defeat of, at Zurich, 112.
+  error of, in 1793, 107, 108.
+  failure of diversion of, in 1805, 219.
+  in war, 18.
+  march of, upon Leipsic, 123.
+
+Alps, passage of, by Francis I., 168.
+
+American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383.
+
+Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384.
+
+Angouleme, Duke of, expedition of, 28.
+
+Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233.
+
+Antwerp, English expedition to, 385.
+
+Archduke Charles, 294.
+  concentric retreat of, in 1796,238.
+  interior lines of, 136.
+  opinion of, as to small-column formation, 350.
+  opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, 162.
+  success of, 110, 111.
+
+Archduke Ferdinand, 53.
+
+Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379.
+
+Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47.
+  superior, importance of, 47, 48.
+
+Armies, auxiliary, 170.
+  central, observations on, 126.
+  command of, 52.
+  French, in the Revolution, 135.
+  how to act, 75.
+  in intrenchments, 154.
+  in peace, how preserved, 47.
+  large, fitness of central lines for, 125.
+  large, organization of, 286.
+  meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, 208.
+  morale of, 60, 178, 322.
+  movements of, points to be attended to in, 254-256.
+  of French Revolution, how subsisted, 142.
+  of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., how subsisted, 142.
+  of Napoleon, operations of, 136.
+  promotions in, 47.
+  standing, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
+  surprises of, 209.
+  two, on interior lines, 117.
+  two, on the same frontier, 116.
+  unexpected meeting of two, 207.
+
+Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308.
+
+Arms and organization of cavalry, 307, 308.
+
+Arms for irregular cavalry, 313.
+
+Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59.
+
+Army corps, system of, 279.
+
+Army, defensive, proper course for, 324.
+  defensive, when it has the advantage, 202.
+  head-quarters of, when the most important point, 107.
+  how perfected, 43.
+  importance of a good, 44.
+  number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, 285.
+
+Army of Boulogne, 280.
+  of four corps, 281.
+  of seven corps, 281.
+  offensive, proper course for, 324.
+  of invasion, line of defense important to, 99.
+  of the Rhine in 1800, 115.
+  permanent, necessary condition of, 49.
+  proportion of cavalry in, 304.
+  pursuing, has the advantage, 241.
+
+Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317.
+
+Artillery, concentration of fire of,
+  in offensive line of battle, 290.
+  employment of, 315-318.
+  heavy, in defensive line of battle, 290.
+  importance of, to infantry, 290.
+  materiel of the French army in the Crimea, 388.
+  Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316.
+  post of, in line of battle, 289.
+  proportion of, 318.
+  protection of infantry from the enemy's, 303.
+  rules for use of, in battle, 316-318.
+  use of, in the offensive, 316.
+  who should command, 318.
+
+Art of war, definition of, 13.
+  principal parts of, 66.
+
+Assailant, advantages of, 186.
+
+Assailant's best means of victory, 202.
+
+Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298.
+  of field-works, instances of well-arranged, 212.
+
+Athens, naval power of, 361.
+
+Attack, cavalry column of, 310.
+  close, formation for, 301.
+  column of, in two lines, 292.
+  columns of, 293, 356.
+  columns of, of single battalions, 298.
+  five methods of forming troops for, 292.
+  formation for, at Turin, 213.
+  in columns, order of, 194.
+  in front, 201.
+  in rear, 207.
+  of field-works, directions for, 211, 212.
+  of fortified places, 210.
+  of intrenched lines, 214.
+  on flank, 203.
+  on Sank, cavalry, 310.
+  when order in squares suitable for, 297.
+
+Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258.
+  in half-deep order, 302.
+
+Audenarde, battle of, 53.
+
+Augustus, armament of, 365.
+
+Aulic Council, 59.
+
+Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106.
+  force of, in the French Revolution, 106.
+  fortresses of, 149.
+  interest of, in the French Revolution, 105.
+  intervention of, in 1813, 21.
+
+Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112.
+  camp before Mayence, 157.
+  order at Essling and Fleurus, 200.
+
+Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246.
+  why victorious in 1753, 107.
+
+Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240.
+
+Authority of counselors, 53.
+
+
+B.
+
+Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275, 276.
+  how they might be useful, 275.
+  used at Fleurus, 275.
+
+Barbarossa, 373.
+
+Bard, fort of, 152, 167.
+  importance of defile of, 87.
+
+Base of operations, where to be established, 84.
+
+Bases of operations, definition of, 77
+  of operations, how to be chosen, 79, 80.
+  of operations, plurality of, 78.
+  on the sea, 83, 84.
+  temporary or eventual, 84.
+  temporary, when necessary, 132.
+  with two faces, 83.
+
+Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131.
+
+Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301.
+
+Battalion squares, 296.
+
+Batteries, 317.
+
+Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289.
+  calculation of distances in, 334.
+  classification of orders of, useful, 197.
+  combinations of, 187.
+  concave order of, 191.
+  convex order of, 192.
+  critical moment of, 203.
+  decisive moment of, 334.
+  defensive arrangements for, 201.
+
+Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186.
+  decisive point of, 187.
+  strategic point of, when important, 187.
+
+Battle-formation in small columns, 350.
+  influence of topography upon, 299.
+
+Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360.
+  influence of orders of, on result of engagements, 197.
+  line of, arrangement of cavalry in, 288.
+  line of, before the French Revolution, 277.
+  line of, definition of, 179.
+  line of, distribution of troops in, 287.
+  line of, post of artillery in, 289.
+  lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284.
+  oblique order of, 190.
+  of Agincourt, 192.
+  of Alcazar, 378.
+  of Audenarde, 53.
+  of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206.
+  of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317.
+  of Blenheim, 303.
+  of Cannae, 191.
+  of Crecy, 192.
+  of Ecnomos, 363.
+  of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
+  of Fossano, 168.
+  of Jena, 90, 198, 305.
+  of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305.
+  of Lepanto, 378.
+  of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342.
+  of Millesimo, 111.
+  of Mollwitz, 348.
+  of Prague, 189, 205.
+  of Ramillies, 312.
+  of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205.
+  of Torgau, 205.
+  of Turin, 53.
+  of Ulm, 53, 90.
+  of Ulm, won by strategy, 198.
+  of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295,
+               303-306, 354, 358, 359.
+  offensive, object of, 188.
+  offensive order of, 200.
+  order of, 186.
+  order of, at Leipsic, 193.
+  order of, definition of, 180.
+  orders of, 188.
+  parallel order of, 188.
+    reinforced, 189.
+    when suitable, 189.
+    with crotchet, 189.
+  perpendicular order of, 190.
+  position for, 341.
+  posting troops in line of, 277.
+  results of, depend on what, 178.
+  rules for use of artillery in, 316-318.
+
+Battle-order for cavalry, 312.
+
+Battle-orders, various, 349.
+
+Battles, 178.
+  defensive, 179.
+  elements of uncertainty regarding, 197.
+  great difficulty of tactics of, 196.
+  influence of musketry-fire in, 348.
+  offensive, 186.
+  of Napoleon, orders of, 198.
+  rules for scientific, 200.
+  success in, depends on maneuvering, 360.
+  three kinds of, 179.
+  what may interfere with success of, 196.
+
+Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317.
+  French at, 196.
+
+Bellegarde, 166.
+
+Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109.
+
+Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289.
+  base on Koenigsberg in 1807, 152.
+  position in 1807, 171.
+  mixed system at Eylau, 352.
+
+Beresina, passage of, 226, 245.
+
+Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212.
+
+Berthier at Leipsic, 267.
+
+Berthier's error at Wagram, 267.
+  error in campaign of 1809, 265.
+
+Blenheim, battle of, 303.
+
+Bluecher, 53, 130.
+
+"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194.
+
+Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111.
+  expedition to Egypt, 383.
+
+Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Boulogne, army of, 280.
+  camp of, 279.
+
+Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345.
+
+Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., 245.
+  in retreats, 244.
+  means of destroying, 245.
+  protection of, after passage, 229.
+
+Bridge-trains, importance of, 121.
+
+Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154.
+
+Burgundy, Duke of, 53.
+
+
+C.
+
+Caesar's investment of Alise, 153.
+  maritime expeditions, 365.
+
+Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137.
+  of 1793, 107.
+  of 1799, 111.
+  of 1800, 112.
+  of 1812, Napoleon's error in, 172.
+  of the Spaniards in Flanders, 171.
+  of the Swedes in Germany, 171.
+
+Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169.
+  in winter, 68.
+  of 1799 and 1800, 162.
+
+Camp at Kehl, 167.
+  intrenched, influence of, 155.
+  intrenched, on which side of a river, 157.
+  intrenched, on river, 156.
+  of Boulogne, 279.
+  of Drissa, 157.
+
+Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215.
+  fortified, 154.
+  intrenched, connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  intrenched, instances of, 210, 211.
+  intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156.
+  intrenched, Prussian system of, 158.
+  intrenched, use of, 156.
+  intrenched, where to be established, 155.
+  strategic square for, 99.
+
+Candia, siege of, 380, 381.
+  Turkish descent on, 379.
+
+Cannae, order of battle at, 191.
+
+Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247.
+
+Cantonments, 246.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  rules for establishing, 246.
+  selection of positions for, 247.
+
+Canute, 370.
+
+Capitals as strategic points, 87.
+
+Capital, when the center of power, 107.
+
+Capture of posts, means for, 216.
+  when important, 216.
+
+Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306.
+
+Carnot, 59.
+  operations of, 136.
+
+Carthage, destruction of, 364.
+
+Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361, 362.
+
+Cavalry, 303.
+  advantages of large corps of, 309.
+  arms and organization of, 307, 308.
+  arrangement of, in line of battle, 288.
+  at Ramillies, 312.
+  battle-order for, 312.
+  best formation of infantry against, 294.
+  charge at Hohenfriedberg, 305.
+  charge, general, 305.
+  charges, four kinds of, 306.
+  charges of the Turks, 307.
+  defensive armor for, 308.
+  divisions of five regiments, 311.
+  duties of, 304.
+  encounters of, against cavalry, 311.
+  flank charges of, 307.
+  formations of, 309-311.
+  importance of, in retreats, 243.
+  importance of, to infantry, 290.
+  influence of, in a war, 313, 314.
+  in the defensive, 306.
+  irregular, 313.
+  light, advantages of, 314.
+  militia as, 314, 315.
+  morale of, 312.
+  must be supported by infantry, 304.
+  proportion of, in an army, 304.
+  reserves, 288, 311.
+  when it should charge a line of infantry, 305.
+
+Center, when proper point of attack, 187.
+
+Central armies, 126.
+  line of Napoleon in Saxony, 124.
+  lines, application of, to large masses, 125.
+  position, when untenable, 331.
+
+Chaeronea, 365.
+
+Charges, irregular cavalry, 313.
+
+Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, 377.
+  VIII., retreat of, to Naples, 233.
+  X. of Sweden, expedition of, 379.
+  XII. of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, 382.
+
+Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310.
+  order, infantry, 301.
+
+Chief of staff, 57, 253.
+
+China, English and French expedition to, 389.
+
+Choice of objective points, 90.
+
+Circumvallation, lines of, 152.
+
+Civil wars, 35.
+
+Clairfayt, victories of, 110.
+
+Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178.
+  opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, 166.
+
+Coalition against France in 1793, 37.
+  Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
+  Louis XIV., 36.
+
+Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251.
+
+Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158.
+  towers of, 159.
+
+Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193.
+
+Column of attack, cavalry, 310.
+  of attack in two lines, 292.
+
+Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356.
+  of attack of single battalions, 298.
+  of four divisions in three ranks, 294.
+
+Combinations of battle, 187.
+  strategic, 72.
+
+Combined use of the three arms, 203, 319, 320.
+
+Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55.
+  essential qualities for a, 55.
+  importance of, 54.
+
+Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66.
+  of artillery, duties of, 319.
+
+Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59.
+  of armies, 52.
+
+Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141.
+  of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., 142.
+  the, and strategy, 141.
+
+Committee of Public Safety, 136.
+
+Concave order of battle, 191.
+
+Concentration of artillery-fire, 290.
+  in retreat, advantages of, 238.
+
+Concentric lines, 102.
+  retreats, instances of, 238, 239.
+  system, 126.
+
+Concert of action, how secured, 259.
+  in action, importance of, 42.
+
+Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34.
+  wars for, instances of, 22.
+
+Conrad III., Crusade of, 372.
+
+Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368.
+  siege of, by the Crusaders, 373.
+  siege of, by Mohammed II., 375.
+
+Contempt for the enemy, 63.
+
+Contravallation, lines of, 152.
+
+Control of operations, 52.
+
+Convergent operations, 126.
+
+Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118.
+
+Continuous intrenched lines, 213.
+
+Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30.
+
+Convex order of battle, 192.
+
+Copenhagen, siege of, 384.
+
+Cordon system, 165.
+
+Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287.
+  organization of an army in four, 281.
+  organization of an army in seven, 281.
+  system of, 279.
+  two, one behind the other, 285.
+
+Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314.
+
+Council of war at seat of government, 59.
+
+Councils of war, value of, 58.
+
+Counselors, authority of, 53.
+
+Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345.
+
+Coups de main, 215.
+  instances of, 216, 223.
+
+Crecy, order of battle at, 192.
+
+Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389.
+
+Crimean War, 387.
+
+Critical moment of battles, 203.
+
+Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120.
+
+Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189.
+
+Crotchets, danger of, 182.
+
+Crusade of 1203, 373.
+
+Crusades, 25, 371-375.
+
+Cuirass, 47, 308.
+
+Cuirassiers, 308.
+
+Culm, 221.
+
+Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377.
+
+
+D.
+
+
+Danes, incursions of, 368, 369.
+
+Danger of two wars at once, 36.
+
+Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170.
+
+Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226.
+  valley of, key of Southern Germany, 162.
+
+Decisive direction, 328.
+  moment of battle, 334.
+  point at Bautzen, 187.
+  point, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187.
+  point of battle-field, 187.
+  point of battle-field, how determined, 88, 186.
+  points, 337.
+  points, defiles as, 87.
+  points of the theater of war, 85.
+
+Deep columns, 356.
+  at Waterloo, 359.
+  masses, 298, 302.
+  order, disadvantages of, 298.
+
+Defeat, 68.
+  of the French at Waterloo, causes of, 359.
+
+Defense, in mountainous countries, 163.
+  line of, important to an army of invasion, 99.
+  line of, should be short, 98.
+  of frontiers, 146.
+  of intrenched camps and lines, 215.
+  rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, 96.
+  second lines of, 147.
+  should not be passive, 185.
+  tactical, of Switzerland, 169.
+  maxims for frontier, 148, 149.
+
+Defensive armor for cavalry, 308.
+  army has the advantage, when, 202.
+  army, proper course for, 324.
+  arrangements for battle, 201.
+  battles, 179.
+  best formation of infantry for, 298.
+  cavalry in, 306.
+  characteristics of infantry formation for, 297.
+  in descents, duty of, 251.
+  line of battle, heavy artillery in, 290.
+
+Defensive movements, when advised, 124.
+  -offensive war, 74.
+  or offensive system, either may be employed, 185.
+  the, in a level country, 164.
+  war, 72, 73.
+
+Defiles as decisive points, 87.
+  as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  in retreats, 243.
+
+Definitive lines, 103.
+
+Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130.
+
+Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301.
+  lines in two ranks, 294.
+  lines, two, formation of infantry in, 292.
+
+Depots, establishment of, on march, 262.
+  command of, 263.
+  lines of, 263.
+  of supplies, 141.
+  of supplies, general maxims, 143.
+  secondary, 262, 263.
+
+Descents, 248.
+  cases where made, 250.
+  difficulties of, 250.
+  duty of defensive in, 251.
+  effect of modern inventions on, 248.
+  more extensive in ancient times, 248.
+  precautions after landing, 252.
+  rules for conducting, 251.
+
+D'Estaing's fleet, 383.
+
+Detached orders of Napoleon, 259.
+  works, importance of, 154.
+
+Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220.
+  four kinds of, 217.
+  great, 217, 219, 334.
+  great, instances of, 221, 222.
+  great, why made, 220, 221.
+  multiplication of, must be avoided,    221.
+  necessary when there is a double strategic front, 220.
+  of Napoleon in 1805, 222.
+  precise rules for, cannot be laid down, 222.
+  requisites in officers of, 224.
+  small, how useful, 224.
+
+Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219.
+
+Detours, 197, 204.
+
+Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269.
+
+Diplomacy in invasions, 24.
+
+Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116.
+  of lines of operations, 115.
+
+Discipline, importance of, 42.
+  importance of, in retreats, 242.
+
+Distances in battle, calculation of, 334.
+
+Distant expeditions, 169.
+  invasions across extensive territories, 171.
+  invasions, maxim for, 173.
+  invasions to aid an ally, 170.
+
+Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287.
+
+Divergent lines, 103.
+
+Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91.
+  to Holland in 1799, 91.
+
+Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106, 107.
+
+Dunkirk, expedition to, 91.
+
+Duties of cavalry, 304.
+  of staff officers, 254-256.
+
+Duty of a general, 324.
+  of statesmen in offensive wars, 17.
+
+Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222.
+
+Division, improper use of the term, 351.
+
+Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311.
+  defects of system of, 278.
+    remedied by Napoleon, 278.
+  formation by, when preferable, 286.
+  organization of, 279, 280.
+  system of, 278.
+
+Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273.
+
+Double line of operations, when applicable, 117.
+  when necessary, 116.
+  lines of operations, 102, 110.
+    when advantageous, 123.
+  lines to be avoided, 330.
+  passages of rivers, 230.
+  strategic front, 95.
+  wars, 36.
+  wars of Napoleon, 37.
+
+Dragoons, 308.
+  concentration of, by Emperor
+    Nicholas, 309.
+
+Drepanum, 363.
+
+Dresden, 305.
+  intrenched camp at, 155, 211.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  victory at, 124.
+
+Drissa, camp of, 155, 157.
+
+Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118.
+  operations, 126.
+  retreats, when admissible, 239.
+
+Diversions, 218.
+  instances of, 218.
+  when useful, 218.
+
+
+E.
+
+Eccentric lines, 237.
+  retreat. Bulow's use of the term,
+    237.
+
+Eccentric system, 126.
+
+Echelon, order of battle by, 193.
+
+Echelons, order in, 193.
+  squares in, 297.
+
+Ecnomos, victory of, 363.
+
+Edward III. of England, 376.
+
+Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374.
+
+Ehrenbreitstein, 158.
+
+Elchingen, Ney at, 182.
+
+Elective governments, weakness of, 46.
+
+Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276.
+
+Elongated squares, 296, 297.
+
+Employment of artillery, 315-318.
+
+Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311.
+
+Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67.
+  contempt for, 63.
+  how dislodged, 188.
+  how to drive from his position, 201, 202.
+  should not be paid to leave a country, 242.
+
+Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268.
+
+England controls the sea, 173.
+  invasion of, by Sweyn, 370.
+  projected invasion of, by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
+
+England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385.
+
+English and French expedition to China, 389.
+
+English, descents of, on France, 376.
+  expedition against Napoleon in 1815, 385.
+  expedition in 1762 against Havana, 382.
+  maritime expeditions, 384-390.
+  squares at Waterloo, 294.
+
+Enthusiasm, importance of, 41.
+  not military spirit, 62.
+
+Epaminondas, 190.
+
+Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172.
+
+Error of the allies in 1793, 107, 108.
+
+Errors in strategy, 91.
+
+Essential bases of military policy, 49.
+
+Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350.
+  Napoleon at, 158.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  order of battle at, 192, 193.
+
+Eugene at Turin, 153.
+  march of, 141.
+
+Eventual bases, 84.
+  lines of defense, 96.
+
+Expediency, wars of, 18.
+
+Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273.
+  to the Crimea, details of, 387-389.
+
+Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174.
+  distant, 169.
+  marine, in modern times, 249.
+  maritime, 361-390.
+  of the ancients, 248.
+  of the Middle Ages, 171.
+  partly on land, partly by sea, 173.
+
+Extended movements, when dangerous, 204.
+
+Exterior lines of operations, 102.
+
+Extermination, wars of, 34.
+
+Eylau, 305, 306, 318, 352.
+  French armament at, 47.
+  Napoleon's march on, 94.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  Russian artillery reserve at, 289.
+  Russian order at, 295.
+
+
+F.
+
+Famous retreats, instances of, 233.
+
+Field, strategic, of 1806, 113.
+
+Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212.
+  instances of well-arranged assaults on, 212.
+
+Final reserves, 203.
+
+Financial considerations, 50.
+
+Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359.
+
+Fire-signals, how used, 276.
+
+Flank attack, 203.
+  attack, cavalry, 310.
+  charges of cavalry, 307.
+  marches, 139, 140.
+  marches, where inadmissible, 140.
+  tactical maneuver by, 140.
+
+Flanks of companies, movement by, 300, 301.
+  protection of, in tactical positions, 182.
+
+Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174.
+
+Fleurus, 136, 193, 200.
+  balloons used at, 275.
+  order of battle at, 192.
+
+Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289.
+  in the offensive, 316.
+
+Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183.
+
+Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286.
+  for attack at Turin, 213.
+  for battle in small columns, 350.
+  for battle, Napoleon's system, 278, 279.
+  for battle often determined by size of army, 285.
+  for battle, Prussian and Austrian system, 354.
+  for close attack, 301.
+  of infantry for attack, five methods of, 292.
+    in two ranks, 356.
+  of troops for battle, 347-350.
+
+Formations of cavalry, 309-311.
+  of lines of battle for two infantry corps, 282-284.
+  various, for infantry, 285.
+
+Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158.
+
+Fortifications, remark upon, 151.
+
+Fortified camps, 154.
+  places, attack of, 210.
+  places on the sea-coast, importance of, 152.
+  places, when a misfortune, 152.
+
+Fortresses at Mayence, 150.
+  greatest advantages of, 150.
+  large, when preferable, 150.
+  number and position of, 149.
+  of France and Austria, 149.
+  on frontiers, 148.
+  relation of, to strategy, 148, 150.
+
+Forts in a mountainous country, 151.
+  purposes of, 146.
+
+Fossano, battle of, 168.
+
+Four-rank formation of infantry, 291.
+
+France adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
+  coalition against, in 1793, 37.
+  course and error of, in 1792, 105.
+  fortresses of, 149.
+  intention of, when declaring war in 1792, 105.
+  invasions of, by the English, 376.
+
+Francis I., passage of the Alps by, 168.
+
+Frederick the Great, 36, 37.
+  at Leuthen, 229.
+  at Prague, 205.
+  at Torgau, 206.
+  commissariat of, 142.
+  defensive-offensive operations of, 74.
+  maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141.
+  military genius of, 16.
+
+Frederick II., Crusade of, 374.
+
+French and English expedition to China, 389.
+
+French armies in the Revolution, 135.
+  armies, situation of, in 1800, 112.
+  at Bautzen, 196.
+  at Fleurus, why successful, 193.
+  at Waterloo, 196.
+  capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, 386.
+  causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, 359.
+  cavalry, 313.
+  columns at Waterloo, 351.
+  defeat of, at Stockach, 111.
+  descent on Algiers in 1830, 386.
+  errors in 1795, 136.
+  expedition to Syria, 390.
+  in Bohemia in 1742, 171.
+  invasions of 1766 and 1795, 120.
+
+French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383.
+  operations in Italy, 112.
+  operations of, at close of 1793, 331-333.
+  operations of, in 1794, 108.
+  order at Essling and Fleurus, 200.
+  order at Minden, 278.
+  plan in 1799, error of, 110.
+  Revolution, 26-28.
+  Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, 142.
+  Revolution, course of Austria in, 106.
+  Revolution, course of Prussia in, 105, 106.
+  Revolution, interest of Austria in, 105.
+  Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, 104.
+  Revolution, relation of Italy to, 104.
+  Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, 104.
+  Revolution, theater of operations in, 104.
+  Revolution, zones of operations in, 105.
+
+Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148, 149.
+  when a permanent line of defense, 96.
+
+Frontiers, defense of, 146.
+  disadvantage of fortresses on, 148.
+  how to be fortified, 152.
+  mountains as, 146.
+  rivers as, 147.
+
+Front of operations, 330, 338.
+  of operations, extent of, 98.
+  of operations, how varied, 93.
+  strategic, change of, 94.
+  strategic, not to be too extended, 98.
+
+Fronts of operations, 92.
+
+Fronts, strategic, 92.
+
+Fundamental principle of war, 66.
+  maxims of, 70.
+  principles for employment of troops, 328.
+
+
+G.
+
+Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
+
+General advanced guard, how composed, 262.
+  cavalry charge, 305.
+
+General, essential qualities of a, 55.
+  importance of a skillful, 43.
+  one of the greatest talents of, 74.
+  qualities of a skillful, 334.
+  what constitutes a, 327.
+
+General principle of war, manner of applying, 175.
+  staff, employment of, in time of peace, 49.
+  staff, usefulness of, 57.
+
+Genoa, panic at siege of, 64.
+
+Geography, military, 39.
+
+Geographical objective points, 88.
+
+Germanicus, expedition of, 366.
+
+Girondists, 26, 37.
+
+Gosa, French charge on, 305.
+
+Governments, elective, weakness of, 46.
+  should not be unprepared for war, 46.
+
+Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178.
+  principles of, 360.
+
+Great detachments, 217, 219, 334.
+  instances of, 221, 222.
+  why made, 220, 221.
+
+Grouchy, 127.
+
+Guard, advanced, 261, 262.
+  in battle, 288, 289.
+  in unexpected battles, 208.
+
+Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375.
+
+
+H.
+
+Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295.
+  attacks in, 302.
+
+Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236.
+
+Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236.
+
+Hannibal at Cannae, 191.
+  at Zama, 179.
+
+Harold, 370, 371.
+
+Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, 107.
+
+Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167.
+
+Hengist, 367.
+
+Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, 376.
+
+Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383.
+
+Hochkirch, 303.
+  surprise of, 209.
+
+Hohenfriedberg, 305.
+
+Hohenlinden, 183, 206.
+
+Holland, expedition to, 91.
+
+Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289.
+  in the offensive, 316.
+
+Houchard, 333.
+
+Hougoumont, 303.
+
+Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161.
+
+Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270.
+
+Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271.
+  how events justified them, 272.
+
+
+I.
+
+Igor, expeditions of, 368.
+
+Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268.
+
+Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, 299.
+  effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359.
+
+Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61.
+
+Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287.
+  best formation of, for assault, 298.
+  best formation of, for the defensive, 298.
+  cavalry must be supported by, 304.
+  checkerwise formation, 310.
+  formation of, in two deployed lines, 292.
+  formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, 299.
+  importance of, 290.
+  in three-rank formation, 293.
+  in what movements should be exercised, 300.
+  lines of battle for, 282-284.
+  mixed order, 295.
+  mounted, 308.
+  needs support of cavalry and artillery, 290.
+  protection of, from enemy's artillery, 303.
+  squares, 294, 296.
+  supports of artillery, 316, 317.
+  three-rank formation of, 291.
+  various formations for, 285.
+  when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, 305.
+
+Information from partisans, 270.
+  of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, 273, 274.
+  of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, 269.
+
+Initiative, advantages of, 184.
+
+Institutions, military, 43.
+
+Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114.
+
+Interior lines, observations on, 123.
+  of Archduke Charles, 136.
+  of operations, 102.
+  of operations, why preferable, 127.
+  should not be too much extended, 117.
+  two armies on, 117.
+
+Intervention, instances of, 20-22.
+  kinds of, 19.
+  reasons for, 19.
+  wars of, 19.
+  wars of, essentials in, 21.
+
+Intestine wars, 35.
+
+Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157.
+
+Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215.
+  connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  how differ from tetes deponts, 160.
+  influence of, 155.
+  instances of, 210, 211.
+  maxims on, 155, 156.
+  on river, 156.
+  Prussian system of. 158.
+  use of, 156.
+  where to be established, 155.
+
+Intrenched lines, 146, 153.
+  attack of, 214.
+  continuous, 213.
+
+Intrenched positions, 181.
+
+Intrenchments, armies in, 154
+
+Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142.
+
+Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72.
+  advantages of awaiting, 17.
+  army of, line of defense important to, 99.
+  control of the sea important in, 30.
+  difficult in national wars, 144.
+  how rendered feasible, 106.
+  of a mountainous country, 169.
+  of England contemplated by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386.
+  of Turkey by Russia, 23.
+  two kinds of, 22.
+  wars of, when advantageous, 17.
+
+Invasions, diplomacy in, 24.
+  distant, across extensive territories, 171.
+  distant, effect of standing armies on, 171.
+  distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, 171.
+  distant, maxim for, 173.
+  distant, to aid an ally, 170.
+  how to be carried on, 24.
+  neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, 174.
+  of neighboring states, 174.
+  of Spain, 23.
+  when excusable, 23.
+
+Investing a city, false system of, 152.
+  force, how strengthened, 153.
+
+Irregular cavalry, 313.
+  arms for, 313.
+
+Islamism, wars of, 25.
+
+Italy, operations of the French in, 111, 112.
+  parallel retreats in, 241.
+  relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
+
+Ivar, expedition of, 369.
+
+
+J.
+
+James II., expedition of, in Ireland, 381.
+
+Jemmapes, 342.
+
+Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198.
+  maneuvers at, 90.
+  Napoleon's march on, 94.
+  Ney's charge at, 305.
+
+Jourdan, 229.
+  at Stockach, 205.
+  balloons used by, at Fleurus, 275.
+
+Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
+
+Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233.
+
+
+K.
+
+Kagoul, panic at, 64.
+
+Katzbach, 124.
+
+Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211.
+
+Kolin, 303.
+
+Koudacheff's expedition, 273.
+
+Koutousoff, 170.
+
+Krasnoi, combination at, 342.
+
+Kray, 87.
+
+Kunnersdorf, 304.
+
+
+L.
+
+Lance, importance of, 47.
+  when best for cavalry, 307.
+  when useful, 306.
+
+Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345.
+
+League, wars of the, 25.
+
+Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87.
+  battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305.
+  march of the allies upon, 123.
+  march on, modified, 140. /
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  order of battle at, 193.
+
+Lepanto, battle of, 378.
+
+Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342.
+  maneuver of Frederick at, 140.
+
+Level country, defensive in, 164
+
+Light cavalry, advantages of, 314.
+
+Ligny, 195.
+
+Line of advance, how determined, 71.
+  of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, 288.
+  of battle before the French Revolution, 277.
+  of battle, definition of, 179.
+  of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, 290.
+  of battle, distribution of troops in, 287.
+  of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, 290.
+  of battle, posting troops in, 277.
+
+Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289.
+  of defense important to an army of invasion, 99.
+  of defense should be short, 98.
+  of operations, double, when necessary, 116.
+  of operations, how protected, 132.
+  of operations, single, when advantageous, 116.
+  of retreat, 261, 341-343.
+
+Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215.
+  and points, strategic, 85.
+  central, application of, to large masses, 125.
+  deployed, in two ranks, 294.
+  double, to be avoided, 330.
+  eccentric, 237.
+  interior, observations on, 123.
+  interior, two armies on, 117.
+  intrenched, 146, 153.
+  intrenched, attack of, 214.
+  of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284.
+  of circumvallation, 152.
+  of contravallation, 152.
+  of defense, second, 147.
+  of defense, eventual, 96.
+  of defense, permanent, 95.
+  of defense, strategical and tactical, 95.
+  of depots, 263.
+  of direction, importance of, illustrated, 116.
+  of maneuver, importance of, 114.
+  of operations, 100-103.
+  of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, 121.
+  of operations, best direction of, 115.
+  of operations, change of, 118.
+  of operations, converging and divergent, 118.
+  of operations, double, 110.
+  of operations, double, when advantageous, 123.
+  of operations, great art of directing, 120.
+  of operations, how established, 114.
+  of operations, how influenced, 119.
+  of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, 113.
+  of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, 122.
+  of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, 104.
+  of operations, maxims on, 114.
+  of operations, rivers as, 76.
+  of operations, selecting of, 80.
+
+Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, 115.
+  of Stollhofen, 154.
+  of Turin, 153.
+  of Turin, capture of, 213.
+  parallel, 200.
+  strategic, 128, 129.
+  strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, 131.
+
+Linz, towers of, 158.
+
+Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291.
+
+Logistics, 69, 252-268.
+  derivation of the term, 253.
+  faulty, instances of, 265-267.
+  illustration of importance of, 263-268.
+  of battle of Leipsic, 267.
+  principal points of, 254-256.
+
+Louis VII., Crusade of, 372.
+  IX., Crusade of, 374.
+  IX., expedition of, to Tunis, 375.
+  XIV., coalition against, 36.
+  XIV., commissariat of, 142.
+
+Louvois, 59.
+
+Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87.
+
+
+M.
+
+Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295, 296.
+  error at Katzbach, 124.
+
+Mack, 164, 170.
+  at Ulm, 53.
+
+Magnesia, victory of, 364.
+
+Malplaquet, 183.
+
+Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377.
+
+Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360.
+
+Maneuver line, 114, 115.
+  lines, 103.
+  lines of, their importance, 114.
+  objective points of, 88.
+  pivots of, 98.
+  tactical, by flank, 140.
+  turning, 179, 206.
+
+Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207.
+  at Ulm and Jena, 90.
+  for breaking through a line, 197.
+  must conform to strategic principles, 333.
+  objective points of, 89.
+  of Napoleon in 1814,118.
+  simplest, most likely to be successful, 196.
+  strategic lines of, 128.
+  sudden, generally better than predetermined, 196.
+  transversal, 163.
+
+Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204.
+
+Mantua, siege of, 111.
+  Wurmser at, 156.
+
+March, establishment of depots on, 262.
+
+Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258.
+  effects of systems of, 138.
+  flank, 139.
+  instructions to generals commanding corps in, 260, 261.
+  particulars to be considered in, 260.
+  system of, 135, 138.
+  rapid, 176.
+  rules for, 257-263.
+  transversal, in mountainous countries, 163.
+  two kinds of, 260.
+
+Marengo, French armament at, 47.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Maritime expeditions, 361-390.
+
+Marmont at Salamanca, 206.
+
+Marsin, 53.
+
+Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, 158.
+
+Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, 166.
+
+Massena's position of the Albis, 181.
+
+Materiel of war, 49.
+  should be inspected by staff officers, 257.
+
+Maurice of Saxony, 22.
+
+Maxim for distant invasions, 173.
+
+Maxims for frontier defenses, 148, 152.
+  of fundamental principle of war, 70.
+  on intrenched camps, 155, 156.
+  on lines of operations, 114-122.
+  on operations in mountainous countries, 163.
+  on strategic fronts, 98, 99.
+  on strategic operations, 90.
+  relative to supplies, 143-146.
+
+Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157.
+  fortresses at, 150.
+  intrenched camp at, 211.
+
+Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390.
+
+Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171.
+
+Military education important to a ruler, 49.
+  geography and statistics, importance
+  of a knowledge of, 40.
+  geography, Lloyd's essay on, 40.
+  institutions, 43.
+  institutions of Rome, 61.
+  instruments, signals by, 276.
+  operations influenced by a cabinet, 42.
+  policy, 38.
+  policy, essential bases of, 49.
+  sciences, study of. 49.
+  spirit, how encouraged, 61.
+  spirit, how maintained, 63.
+  spirit of nations, 60.
+  statistics and geography, 39.
+
+Militia as cavalry, 314, 315.
+
+Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111.
+
+Minden, French order at, 278.
+
+Mithridates, 364, 365.
+
+Mixed order, infantry formation, 295.
+  system of Benningsen at Eylau, 352.
+
+Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, 376.
+  marine expeditions, 249.
+
+Mohammed II., 375.
+
+Molitor, General, 167.
+
+Mollwitz, battle of, 348.
+
+Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125.
+
+Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367.
+
+Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322.
+  of cavalry, 312.
+
+Moreau at Engen, 203.
+  base of operations of, in 1800, 82.
+  retreat of, in 1796, 233.
+
+Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222.
+  passage of the Rhine in 1800, 224, 225.
+
+Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389.
+
+Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233.
+
+Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169.
+
+Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162.
+  countries, cavalry in, 304.
+  countries, defense in, 163.
+  countries, heights to be secured in, 167.
+  countries, strategic defense in, 164.
+  countries, strategic positions of, 76.
+  countries, the offensive in, 167.
+  countries, transversal marches in, 163.
+  country, character of a war in, 169.
+  country, forts in a, 151.
+  country, invasion of a, 169.
+
+Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  as frontiers, 146.
+  campaigns in, 169.
+  importance of, when secondary, 161, 162.
+  of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, 161.
+  strategic operations in, 160.
+
+Mounted infantry, 308.
+  militia, 315.
+
+Movement by flanks of companies, 300, 301.
+
+Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204.
+  in which infantry should be exercised, 300.
+  of armies, points to be attended to, 254-256.
+  of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, 273, 274.
+
+Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209.
+
+Murray's descent in 1813, 385.
+
+Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203.
+  influence of, in battles, 348.
+
+
+N.
+
+Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212.
+
+Naples, French army at, 112.
+
+Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218.
+  and Grouchy at Waterloo, 127,130.
+  at Austerlitz, 206.
+  at Essling, 158.
+  at Ligny, 195.
+  at Ratisbon, 274.
+  at Wagram, 195.
+  double wars of, 37.
+  English expedition against, in 1815, 385.
+  his own chief staff officer, 264.
+  operations of the armies of, 136.
+
+Napoleon's artillery, 318.
+  artillery at Wagram, 316.
+  base of operations in 1806, 80-82.
+  battles, orders of, 198.
+  bold maneuvers in 1814, 118.
+  campaign of 1800, 137.
+  cantonment on the Passarge, 247.
+  central lines in Saxony, 124.
+  central position in 1813, why disastrous, 123.
+  changes of line of operations, 118.
+  choice of objective points, 89.
+  concentric retreat in 1796, 238.
+  defense in Champagne in 1814, 125.
+  detachments in 1805, 222.
+  error after his victory at Dresden, 124.
+  error in the campaign of 1812, 172.
+  favorite objective, 330.
+  front of operations in 1796, 93.
+  front of operations in 1813, 93.
+  infantry, panic of, at Wagram, 64.
+  line of defense in 1813, 93.
+  logistics in 1806 and 1815, 264, 265.
+  march on Bassano, 131.
+
+Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94.
+  march on Jena in 1806, 94.
+  march on Naumburg in 1806, 94.
+  march to Koenigsberg, 20.
+  mode of issuing orders, 259.
+  motives and necessities, 22.
+  operations, comments on, 116.
+  order at the Tagliamento, 295.
+  passages of the Danube, 226, 266.
+  passage of the Saint-Bernard, 168.
+  passage of the Po in 1800, 225.
+  projected invasion of England, 249, 250, 386.
+  reserves, 133.
+  retreat from Smolensk, 235.
+  return from Egypt in 1800, 112.
+  rule for the passage of an army, 147.
+  strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131.
+  strategic positions, 97.
+  system of formation for battle, 278, 279.
+  system of marches, 137.
+  victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, 23.
+
+National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  wars, definition of, 29.
+  wars, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34.
+  wars, effect of the nature of the country in, 30.
+  wars, how prevented, 33, 34.
+  wars, how success attained in, 33.
+  wars, invasion difficult in, 144.
+  wars, military precepts for, 27.
+
+Nations, military spirit of, 60.
+
+Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14.
+
+Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94.
+
+Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376.
+
+Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, 174.
+
+Ney, 31, 168, 196.
+  at Bautzen, 317.
+  at Dennewitz, 130.
+  at Elchingen, 182.
+  at Jena, 305.
+
+Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, 309.
+
+
+O.
+
+Objective point, how held, 67.
+  point, manner of approach to, 67.
+  point of Napoleon in 1800, 87.
+  point, selection of, 66.
+  points, geographical, 88.
+  points, how chosen, 90.
+
+Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88.
+  points of maneuver, 88, 89.
+  points of operations, 85.
+  points, political, 91.
+
+Objectives of operations, 329, 330.
+
+Objects of war, 14.
+
+Oblique order, 199, 200.
+  order, antiquity of, 199.
+  order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, 198.
+  order of battle, 190.
+
+Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184.
+  army, proper course for, 324.
+  battle, object of, 188.
+  battles, 186.
+  characteristics of infantry formation for, 297.
+  line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, 290.
+  movements, when advised, 124.
+  or defensive system, either may be employed, 185.
+  order of battle, 200.
+  system to be followed in, 176.
+  the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, 184.
+  the, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  use of artillery in, 316.
+  war, 72, 73.
+  war, duty of staff officers in, 258.
+  war, reserves, how posted in, 133, 135.
+  wars, duty of statesmen in, 17.
+  wars, how conducted, 16.
+  wars to reclaim rights, 16.
+
+Oleg, expedition of, 867.
+
+Open positions, 181.
+
+Operations, base of, where to be established, 84.
+  bases of, definition of, 77.
+    how to be chosen, 79, 80.
+    plurality of, 78.
+  change of lines of, 118.
+  control of, 52.
+  divergent and convergent, 126, 127.
+  double lines of, 102, 110, 123.
+  exterior lines of, 102.
+  fronts of, 92, 330, 338.
+  in mountainous countries, maxims on, 163.
+  interior lines of, 102.
+  line of, how protected, 132.
+  lines of, 100, 120.
+  lines of, converging and divergent, 118.
+  lines of, how established, 114.
+  lines of, how influenced, 119.
+  lines of, maxims on, 114.
+  military, influenced by a cabinet, 42.
+  objective points of, 85.
+  objectives of, 329, 330.
+  of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177.
+  of the French at the close of 1793, 331-333.
+  pivots of, 98.
+  simple lines of, 101.
+  system of, 72.
+  system of, how to be judged, 125.
+  system of, necessary in war, 50.
+  theater of, 74, 75.
+  theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, 338-340.
+  theater of, how divided, 71.
+  zone of, 66.
+  zone of, how to select, 329.
+  zones of, 100, 338.
+
+Opinion, public, danger of, 55.
+  wars of, 25.
+
+Orchomenus, 365.
+
+Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301.
+  half-deep, attacks in, 302.
+  half-deep, infantry formation, 295.
+  importance of, 42.
+  in deep masses, infantry formation, 295, 296.
+  in echelons, 193.
+  in squares, when suitable for attack, 297.
+  mixed, infantry formation, 295,
+  oblique, 199, 200.
+  of attack in columns, 194.
+  of battle, 186.
+  of battle at Agincourt, 192.
+    at Cannae, 189.
+    at Crecy, 192.
+    at Essling, 192, 193.
+    at Fleurus, 192.
+    at Leipsic, 193.
+    at Mollwitz, 348.
+    at passage of a river, 192.
+    by echelon, 193.
+    convex, 192.
+    definition of, 180.
+    oblique, 190.
+    offensive, 200.
+    of the generals of the Republic, 349.
+  of infantry as skirmishers, 292.
+  shallow, infantry, 292.
+
+Orders, best mode of issuing, 259.
+  how issued by Napoleon, 259.
+  inaccurate transmission of, 196.
+  of battle, 188.
+  of battle, classification of, useful, 197.
+
+Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, 197.
+  of Napoleon's battles, 198.
+  should be clear, 258.
+  two methods of issuing, 258, 259.
+
+Organization and arms of cavalry, 307, 308.
+  by corps, likely to be permanent, 287.
+  of an army in four corps, 281.
+  in seven corps, 281.
+  of divisions, 279, 280.
+  of very large armies, 286.
+
+
+P.
+
+Panics, cause and remedy of, 65.
+  instances of, 64.
+  officers and troops to be warned against, 63.
+
+Parallel lines, 200.
+  order of battle, 188.
+  order of battle reinforced, 189.
+  order of battle, when suitable, 189.
+  order of battle with crotchet, 189.
+  retreat, 237.
+  retreats, countries adapted to, 240, 241.
+  retreats, when preferable, 239.
+
+Partisans, information from, 270.
+
+Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273.
+
+Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120.
+
+Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147.
+  of a river, best position for, 226.
+  of the Beresina, 226, 245.
+  of the Danube by Napoleon, 266.
+  of the Rhine in 1795, 120.
+  of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, 168.
+  of rivers, 224, 343.
+  of rivers, double, 230.
+  of rivers, famous modern, 226.
+  of rivers in retreats, 243, 244.
+  of rivers in retreats, rules for, 245.
+  of rivers, rules for, 227.
+  of rivers, rules for preventing, 228.
+
+Peninsular War, 32.
+
+Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43.
+
+Permanent lines of defense, 95.
+
+Perpendicular order of battle, 190.
+
+Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382.
+
+Peter the Hermit, 371.
+
+Peterwardein, panic at, 64.
+
+Philip II. of Spain, 378.
+
+Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109.
+
+Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306.
+
+Pivots of maneuver, 98.
+
+Pivots of operations, 98.
+
+Points, decisive, 337.
+  decisive and objective, 86.
+  decisive geographic, 87.
+  decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187.
+  decisive, of battle-field, now determined, 186.
+  decisive strategic, 86.
+  of operations, objective, 85.
+
+Political objective points, 91.
+  objective points subordinate to strategy, 91.
+  wars, 26.
+
+Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225.
+
+Portable telegraphs, 275.
+
+Port Mahon, assault of, 212.
+
+Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, 390.
+
+Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, 183.
+  for battle, 341.
+  how to drive an enemy from, 201, 202.
+  strong, essentials for, 181.
+  system of wars of, 135.
+  tactical, protection of flanks in, 182.
+
+Positions, 179.
+  for cantonments, selection of, 247.
+  intrenched, 181.
+  open, 181.
+  strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331.
+  tactical, 181.
+  tactical, rules for selecting, 181.
+  two kinds of, 180, 181.
+
+Post, capture of, when important, 216.
+
+Posting troops in line of battle, 277.
+
+Posts, means for capture of, 216.
+
+Prague, battle of, 189, 205.
+
+Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47.
+
+Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54.
+
+Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213.
+  of Coburg, error of, in 1794, 109.
+
+Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88.
+
+Principles of strategy, 331.
+  of strategy always the same, 17.
+
+Promotions in armies, 47.
+
+Protection by trees and brushwood, 303.
+
+Provisional lines, 103.
+
+Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106.
+  parallel retreat in, 241.
+  relation of, in the French Revolution, 104.
+
+Prussian army at Waterloo, 129.
+  reserves in 1806, 134.
+  system of forming columns, 294.
+  system of intrenched camps, 158.
+
+Public opinion, danger of, 55.
+
+Punic wars, 363, 364.
+
+Pursuit, rules for, 242.
+
+Pursuits, 241.
+
+Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362.
+
+
+Q.
+
+Qualities of a skillful general, 334.
+
+
+R.
+
+Ramillies, 312.
+
+Ramrods, 348.
+
+Rapid marches, 176.
+
+Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Rear, attack in, 207.
+
+Rear-guard in retreat, 243.
+
+Rear-guards in retreat, 234.
+
+Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244.
+
+Reconnoissances, 268.
+  give but limited information, 269.
+  to gain information of the enemy's movements, 268.
+
+Religion, wars of, 35.
+
+Reports of prisoners, 269.
+
+Reserve, cavalry, 311.
+  final, 203.
+  horse-artillery, advantages of, 289.
+
+Reserves, cavalry, 288.
+  importance of, 133, 134.
+  in offensive war, how posted, 133, 135.
+  nature of, 133.
+  of Napoleon, 133.
+  Prussian, in 1806, 134.
+  strategic, 67, 133.
+
+Retreat along converging roads, 236
+  along diverging roads, 237.
+  along parallel roads, 236.
+  by several corps, 235.
+  difficulty of deciding method of, 231.
+  five methods of arranging, 234.
+  in single mass, when preferable, 234.
+  line of, 261, 341-343.
+  means of, to be considered in a defensive position, 183.
+  parallel, 237.
+  well effected, should be rewarded, 63.
+
+Retreats, 230.
+  at night, 231.
+  attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, 243.
+  bridges in, 244.
+  by diverging roads, danger of, 238.
+  cavalry in, 243.
+  circumstances influencing, 232, 233.
+  concentration in, 238.
+  concentric, instances of, 238, 239.
+  defiles in, 243.
+  divergent, when admissible, 239.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  firmness of Russians in, 64.
+  halts in, to relieve rear-guard, 236.
+  hours of departures and halts in, 236.
+  in daylight, 231.
+  instances of famous, 233.
+  measures to insure success of, 242, 243.
+  parallel, countries adapted to, 240, 241.
+  parallel, when preferable, 239.
+  passage of rivers in, 243, 244.
+  Prince de Ligne's remark on, 230.
+  rear-guard in, 234, 243.
+  should be slow, 232.
+  various kinds of, 231.
+
+Reverse fire, 317.
+
+Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226.
+
+Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377.
+
+Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373.
+
+Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382.
+
+River, best position for passage of, 226.
+  crossing of, in presence of an enemy, 120.
+  order of battle at passage of, 192.
+
+Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96.
+  as frontiers, 147.
+  as lines of operations, 76.
+  double passage of, 230.
+  famous modern passages of, 226.
+  passage of, 224, 343.
+  passage of, in retreats, 243, 244.
+    rules for, 245.
+  points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, 121.
+  rules for passage of, 227.
+  rules for preventing passage of, 228.
+
+Rivoli 179, 205.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+
+Rocket-batteries, use of, 318.
+
+Rollo, 369.
+
+Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63.
+  nation, cause of the decline of, 60.
+
+Romans, naval expeditions of, 363.
+
+Rome, military institutions of, 61.
+
+Rossbach, 207.
+
+Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328.
+
+Rules for conducting descents, 251.
+  for fighting battles scientifically, 203.
+  for gaining information of enemy's movements, 273, 274.
+  for offensive or defensive operations, 185.
+  for passage of rivers, 227.
+  for passage of a river in retreat, 245.
+  for pursuit, 242.
+  for preventing passage of rivers, 228.
+  for use of artillery in battle, 316-318.
+  to be observed in selecting tactical positions, 181.
+
+Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64.
+  army, skirmishers in, 293.
+  base in 1828 and 1829, 84.
+  cavalry, 314.
+  expeditions in 1809, 385.
+  order at Eylau, 295.
+  retreat in 1812, 233.
+  system of forming columns, 294.
+
+Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369.
+
+
+S.
+
+Saber, when best for cavalry, 308.
+  when useful, 306.
+
+Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168.
+
+Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205.
+
+Saxons, expedition of, 367.
+
+Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124.
+
+Savoy, Duke of, 22.
+
+Scandinavians, 366.
+
+Science of marches, essential point in, 139.
+  of marches, includes what, 138.
+
+Sciences, military, study of, 49.
+
+Scipio, 364.
+
+Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83, 84.
+
+Sea, control of, held by England, 173.
+  control of, important in an invasion, 30.
+
+Secondary lines, 103.
+
+Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378.
+
+Sebastopol, 347.
+
+Secondary depots, 262, 263.
+
+Shallow order, 298.
+  order, infantry, 292.
+
+Shumla, camp of, 155.
+
+Siege, how covered, 153.
+  of Candia, 380, 381.
+  of Copenhagen, 384.
+  of Mantua, 111.
+
+Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112.
+  duty of staff officers in, 256.
+  wars of, 146.
+
+Signaling by fires, 276.
+
+Signals by military instruments, 276.
+  simultaneous shouts as, 277.
+  system of, 274.
+
+Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114.
+  lines of operations, 101.
+
+Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277.
+
+Single line of operations, when preferable, 116.
+
+Sizeboli, capture of, 223.
+
+Skill, superiority in, 42.
+
+Skirmishers, 359, 360.
+
+Skirmishing-order, 292.
+
+Small detachments, how useful, 224.
+
+Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235.
+
+Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, 162.
+
+Sovereign as commander, 52.
+
+Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240.
+  and Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, 358.
+  invasions of, 23.
+  war in, in 1823, 27.
+
+Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379.
+  capture of Vera Cruz by, 390.
+  descent on Algiers, 382.
+  descent on Morocco in 1859, 389.
+
+Spies, 269.
+  best course for, 270.
+  difficulties in their way, 270.
+  use of, neglected in many modern armies, 270.
+  when especially useful, 270.
+
+Squares in echelons, 297.
+  infantry, 294, 296, 297.
+  in two ranks, 294.
+
+Staff, chief of, 253,
+  chief of, how selected, 57.
+  general, usefulness of, 57.
+  officers and general must act in concert, 257.
+  officers, duties of, should be defined, 253.
+  officers, duty of, in offensive war, 258.
+  officers should inspect materiel, 257.
+  officers, summary of duties of, 254-256.
+
+Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171.
+
+State, how rendered secure, 138.
+
+Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14.
+
+Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17.
+
+Statistics, military, 39.
+
+St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384.
+
+Stockach, 179, 205.
+  defeat of the French at, 111.
+
+Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164.
+
+Stollhofen, lines of, 152.
+
+Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95.
+
+Strategic combinations, 72.
+  combinations, when better than tactical, 179.
+  coup-d'oeil, 337-345.
+  field of 1806, 113.
+  front and line of defense may coincide, 92.
+  front, change of, 94.
+  front, double, 95.
+  front not to be too extended, 98.
+  front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, 94.
+  fronts, 92.
+  fronts, maxims on, 98.
+  lines, 128, 129.
+  lines and points, 85.
+  lines at Waterloo, 130.
+  lines of maneuvers, 128.
+  lines of Napoleon in 1796, 130, 131.
+  operations in mountains, 160.
+  operations, maxims on, 90.
+  point, Leipsic as a, 87.
+    Lyons as a, 87.
+  point of a battle-field, when important, 187.
+  points, capitals as, 87.
+  position, essential conditions for, 99.
+  positions, 66, 97, 330, 331.
+  positions of mountainous countries, 76.
+  positions of Napoleon, 97.
+  reserves, 67, 133.
+  square for camps, 99.
+
+Strategy, 322, 337.
+  advantage of the offensive in, 184.
+  and the commissariat, 141.
+  battles of Ulm and Jena won by, 198.
+  connection of intrenched camps with, 154.
+  connection of tetes de ponts with, 154.
+  definition of, 66.
+  directs movements, tactics executes them, 175.
+  errors in, 91.
+  how it should be studied, 337.
+  illustration of, by operations of 1793, 331-333.
+  illustrations of, 339-341.
+  in what it consists, 328.
+  objective points in, how determined, 88.
+  one great end of, 177.
+  points embraced by, 68.
+  political objective points subordinate to, 91.
+  principles of, 331.
+  principles of, always the same, 17.
+  province of, 178.
+  relation of fortresses to, 148, 150.
+  science of marches in, 138.
+  system of, developed in 1800, 137.
+  the art of, 69.
+
+Strong position, essentials for a, 181.
+
+Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337.
+
+Successful retreat, how to insure, 242, 243.
+
+Surprises of armies, 209.
+  difficulty of, 209.
+
+Suwaroff, 55, 170.
+
+Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166.
+
+Supplies, depots of, 141, 143.
+
+Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168.
+
+Svatoslav, expedition of, 308.
+
+Sweyn, 369, 370.
+
+Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162.
+  Massena in, in 1799, 165.
+  Suwaroff in, 166.
+  tactical defense of, 169.
+
+Syria, French expedition to, 390.
+
+System, concentric or eccentric, 126.
+  of corps, 279.
+  of divisions, 278.
+  of marches, 135.
+  of marches, effects of, 138.
+  of marches, includes what, 138.
+  of marches, relation of, to commissariat, 141.
+  of marches the result of circumstances, 135.
+  of operations, 72.
+  of operations, how to be judged, 125.
+  of signals, 274.
+  of strategy developed in 1800, 137.
+  of wars, change of, 135.
+  of wars of position, 135.
+
+Systems modified by forms of government, 45.
+
+
+T.
+
+Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178.
+  defense of Switzerland, 169.
+  operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, 184.
+  position, protection of flanks in, 182.
+
+Tactical positions, 181.
+  positions, rules for selecting, 181.
+
+Tactics, 322.
+  executes movements, strategy directs them, 175.
+  grand, 69, 70.
+  of battles, great difficulty of, 196.
+  of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, 358.
+
+Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295.
+
+Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209.
+
+Telegraphs, portable, 275.
+
+Temporary bases, 84.
+  bases, when necessary, 132.
+
+Tetes de ponts, 160.
+  connection of, with strategy, 154.
+  how differ from intrenched camps, 160.
+
+Theater of operations, 74, 75.
+  of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, 338-340.
+  of operations, how composed, 75.
+  of operations, how divided, 71.
+  of operations in the French Revolution, 104.
+  of war, border of the, 80, 81.
+  of war, decisive points of the, 85.
+  of war, definition of, 74.
+
+Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269.
+  use of, in war, 323.
+
+Thirty Years' War, 25.
+
+Three-rank formation of infantry, 291, 293.
+
+Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268.
+
+Torgau, battle of, 205.
+
+Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155.
+  intrenched camp at, 83.
+
+Towers, masonry, 158.
+  of Coblentz, 159.
+  of Linz, 158.
+
+Transversal maneuvers, 163.
+  marches in mountainous countries, 163.
+
+Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303.
+
+Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287.
+  employment of, 328.
+
+Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307.
+
+Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246.
+
+Turin, battle of, 53.
+  intrenched camp at, 211.
+  lines of, 153, 213.
+
+Turkey, invasion of, 23.
+
+Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84.
+  wars, squares in, 296, 297.
+
+Turks, cavalry charge of, 307.
+  naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380.
+
+Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206.
+  maneuver, rules for, 204.
+
+Two corps, one behind the other, 285.
+
+Two-rank formation, 346.
+
+Two wars at once, danger of, 36.
+
+
+U.
+
+Ulm, battle of, 53.
+  battle of, won by strategy, 198.
+  camp of, 154.
+  maneuvers at, 90.
+
+Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197.
+
+Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208.
+  meeting of two armies, 207.
+
+United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387.
+  English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, 385, 386.
+  expedition to Port Royal, 390.
+
+Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272.
+  of the three arms combined, 203.
+
+
+V.
+
+Vandals, 366.
+
+Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221.
+
+Venice, 379, 380.
+
+Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390.
+  taken by the French, 386.
+  taken by the United States, 387.
+
+Vessels, Roman, 363.
+  Scandinavian, 366.
+
+Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333.
+
+Victory, assailant's best means of, 202.
+  on what it depends, 309, 310.
+  when it may be expected, 360.
+
+Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303.
+
+Villars's infantry, panic among, 64.
+
+Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120.
+
+
+W.
+
+Wagram, 195, 206, 266, 317, 343, 350.
+  Macdonald's column at, 295, 296.
+  Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  panic at, 64.
+
+War an art, 321.
+  border of the theater of, 80, 81.
+  character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, 135.
+  circumstances which influence result of, 321.
+  council of, at seat of government, 59.
+  councils of, 58.
+  decisive points of the theater of, 85.
+  defensive-offensive, 74.
+  definition of the art of, 13.
+  fundamental principle of, 66, 70.
+  governments should not be unprepared for, 46.
+  how to be conducted, 15.
+  influence of cavalry in a, 313, 314.
+  influence of improvements in fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359.
+  manner of applying general principle of, 175.
+  materiel of, 49.
+  maxims of fundamental principles of, 70.
+  nature and extent of, how influenced, 14.
+  not an exact science, 344, 350.
+  objects of, 14.
+  of the Crimea, 387.
+  offensive and defensive, definition of, 72.
+  offensive, duty of staff officers in, 258.
+  operations of, how directed, 150.
+  principal parts of the art of, 66.
+  relation of statesmanship to, 14.
+  theater of, definition, 74.
+  use of theories in, 323.
+
+Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211.
+
+Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22.
+  change of system of, 135.
+  civil, 35.
+  defensive politically, offensive militarily, 17.
+  double, 36.
+  for conquest, instances of, 22.
+  intestine, 35.
+  natural character of, in mountainous countries, 167.
+  national, definition of, 29.
+  national, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34.
+  national, effect of nature of the country on, 30.
+  national, how prevented, 33, 34.
+  national, invasion difficult in, 144.
+  offensive, how conducted, 16.
+  offensive, to reclaim rights, 16.
+  of expediency, 18.
+    kinds of, 18.
+  of extermination, 34.
+  of intervention, 19.
+  of intervention, essentials in wars of, 21.
+  of intervention, military chances in, 20.
+  of invasion, when advantageous, 17.
+  of opinion, 25.
+  of opinion, character of, 26.
+  of opinion, instances of, 25.
+  of opinion, military precepts for, 27.
+  of position, system of, 135.
+  of religion, 35.
+  of sieges, 146.
+  political, 26.
+  political part of, how modified, 17.
+  Punic, 363, 364.
+  Turkish, squares in, 296, 297.
+  when most just, 16.
+  with or without allies, 18.
+
+Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354.
+  Bluecher at, 130.
+  campaign of, 129, 130.
+  English squares at, 294
+  formations at, 351.
+  French at, 196.
+  Napoleon's order of battle at, 198.
+  Ney at, 182,183.
+  strategic lines at, 130.
+  Wellington's position at, 181, 388.
+
+Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385.
+  and Bluecher at Waterloo, 127, 130.
+  at Salamanca, 206.
+  at Torres-Vedras, 83.
+  defensive-offensive operations of, 74.
+
+Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181.
+
+Weyrother, 205, 206.
+
+William the Conqueror, 370, 371.
+
+Winkelried, column of, 194.
+
+Winter campaigns, 68.
+  quarters, countries adapted to, 246.
+  quarters, when dangerous, 247.
+  quarters, when strategic, 97.
+
+Woods, importance of possession of, 303.
+
+Wurmser at Mantua, 156.
+  eccentric retreat of, in 1796, 238.
+  error of, 111.
+
+
+X.
+
+Xerxes, 173.
+  army of, 362.
+
+
+Z.
+
+Zama, battle of, 364.
+
+Zimisces, 368.
+
+Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338.
+  of operations, how to select, 329.
+  of operations in 1813, 101.
+
+Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105.
+
+Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini
+
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