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diff --git a/old/13549.txt b/old/13549.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1532ffa --- /dev/null +++ b/old/13549.txt @@ -0,0 +1,17497 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Art of War + +Author: Baron Henri de Jomini + +Release Date: September 28, 2004 [EBook #13549] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + + + + +Produced by Suzanne Shell, Stephen Schulze and the Online Distributed +Proofreaders Team + + + + + + + +THE + +ART OF WAR + +BY + +BARON DE JOMINI, + +GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA. + +A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps. + +TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH + +BY + +Capt. G.H. MENDELL, + +CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY, + +AND + +Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL, + +CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY. + + +Originally published in 1862 + + + + +PREFACE. + + +In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand +which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in +making a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too +rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and +on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case the +sense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy to +preserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators of +Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored to +render their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding to +his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms. + +To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is +not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To +those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more +interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass +of the American public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said +with entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent +judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this +or any other day. + +The translation now presented to the people has been made with the +earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As the +existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed +incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that +military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the +people. If by the present work the translators shall find they have +contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object, +they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it. + +To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is +recommended to begin at the article "Strategy," Chapter III., from that +point to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return to +Chapters I. and II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be +appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially +true of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is +quite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all +other recent writers on the military art. + +U.S. Military Academy, +West Point, N.Y. +January, 1862. + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +TRANSLATORS' PREFACE. + + +DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR. + + +CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR. + + ART. I.--Offensive Wars to Recover Rights. + + ART. II.--Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a + Military View. + + ART. III.--Wars of Expediency. + + ART. IV.--Wars with or without Allies. + + ART. V.--Wars of Intervention. + + ART. VI.--Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other + Causes. + + ART. VII.--Wars of Opinion. + + ART. VIII.--National Wars. + + ART. IX.--Civil and Religious Wars. + + ART. X.--Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time. + + +CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY. + + ART. XI.--Military Statistics and Geography. + + ART. XII.--Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a + War. + + ART. XIII.--The Military Institutions of States. + + ART. XIV.--The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations. + + ART. XV.--The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies. + + + +CHAPTER III. STRATEGY. +Definition of Strategy and Tactics. +THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. + + ART. XVI.--The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations. + + ART. XVII.--The Theater of Operations. + + ART. XVIII.--Bases of Operations. + + ART. XIX.--Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater + of War, and Objective Points of Operation. + + ART. XX.--Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, + and Strategic Positions. + + ART. XXI.--Zones and Lines of Operations. + + ART. XXII.--Strategic Lines of Maneuver. + + ART. XXIII.--Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases + or Strategic Reserves. + + ART. XXIV.--The Old and New Systems of War. + + ART. XXV.--Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations. + + ART. XXVI.--Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched + Lines.--Wars of Sieges. + + ART. XXVII.--Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts in their Relation to + Strategy. + + ART. XXVIII.--Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries. + + ART. XXIX.--Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions. + + Epitome of Strategy. + + +CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES. + + ART. XXX.--Positions and Defensive Battles. + + ART. XXXI.--Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle. + + ART. XXXII.--Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle. + + ART. XXXIII.--Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March. + + ART. XXXIV.--Surprises of Armies. + + ART. XXXV.--Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de + Main generally. + + +CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN +THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS. + + ART. XXXVI.--Diversions and Great Detachments. + + ART. XXXVII.--Passage of Rivers and other Streams. + + ART. XXXVIII.--Retreats and Pursuits. + + ART. XXXIX.--Cantonments and Winter Quarters. + + ART. XL.--Descents, or Maritime Expeditions. + + +CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES. + + ART. XLI.--A few Remarks on Logistics in general. + + ART. XLII.--Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate + Information of the Enemy's Movements. + + +CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE. + + ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle. + + ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry. + + ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry. + + ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery. + + ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together. + + +CONCLUSION. + +SUPPLEMENT. + +APPENDIX. + +SECOND APPENDIX. + +SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS. + + + +SUMMARY OF + +THE ART OF WAR. + + +DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR. + + +The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely +military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, +Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto +unrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_. +Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the +profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be +denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is +indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all +the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the +various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it +should have a place in a work like this. + +To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:-- + +1. Statesmanship in its relation to war. + +2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of +war, either for defense or for invasion. + +3. Grand Tactics. + +4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies. + +5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications. + +6. Minor Tactics. + +It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four +branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of +engineering. + +Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good +infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a +staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR. + + +Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman +concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and +determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the +war. + +A government goes to war,-- + +To reclaim certain rights or to defend them; + +To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, +manufactures, or agriculture; + +To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the +safety of the government or the balance of power; + +To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; + +To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to +defend them; + +To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of +territory; + +To defend the threatened independence of the state; + +To avenge insulted honor; or, + +From a mania for conquest. + +It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some +degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for +the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to +the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and +there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and +conduct of a war, as,-- + +1. A state may simply make war against another state. + +2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each +other. + +3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy. + +4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary. + +5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning +or after it has commenced. + +6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an +ally, or upon its own. + +7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant +territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and +adventurous. + +8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the +enemy. + +9. The war may be a civil or a religious war. + +War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the +art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the +operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances +of the case. + +For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the +Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the +same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to +compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as +they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to +march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper +of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or +between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in +nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by +circumstances and events. + +To these different combinations, which belong more or less to +statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management +of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong +exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the +highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general. + + + + +ARTICLE I. + +Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights. + + +When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to +enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before +action. + +The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and +which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with +the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our +times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, +though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in +reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the +Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly +settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the +general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by +all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate +legatee. + +Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an +old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus +doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if +he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur +and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as +such attempts can be justified. + +In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit +by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements +should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step +would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may +be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength +of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory +by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his +own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be +able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In +an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse +the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the +enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, +and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper +guarantees to other states. + + + + +ARTICLE II. + +Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of +View. + + +A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it +without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more +honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of +awaiting the attack on the frontiers. + +There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also +advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no +internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third +party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile +soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on +the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, +and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely +military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own +territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial +features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of +the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the +constituted authorities, possesses great advantages. + +These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war; +but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different +with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of +communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of +states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to +prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles +which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and +skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these +variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to +execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed. + +For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would +differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of +Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and +possess no steadiness under misfortunes. + + + + +ARTICLE III. + +Wars of Expediency. + + +The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish +Succession, were wars of expediency. + +There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state +undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political +reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to +prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a +state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to +form a coalition for that purpose. + +These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war. + + + + +ARTICLE IV. + +Of Wars with or without Allies. + + +Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being +equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker +states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than +either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, +but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening +portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All +history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and +neglected by any power, however formidable. + + + + + +ARTICLE V. + +Wars of Intervention. + + +To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a +state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. +The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole +weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when +it can make decisive use of its resources. + +There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal +affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations. + +Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the +first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these +interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured +in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful. +While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland, +Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere +in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution. + +Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and +perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the +right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it +certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may +reach the adjoining states. + +There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign +wars,--viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain +the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the +war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not +to be obtained otherwise. + +History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect +of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the +immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become +the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the +proper time." + +In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new +and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be +decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference +to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807 +Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Koenigsberg, +leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had +launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder, +it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there +is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the +Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred +thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field, +and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the +proper time would have decided the fate of Europe. + +There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different +interventions:-- + +1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force +specified by former treaties. + +2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending +his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil. + +3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of +war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against +one. + +4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or +interferes before the declaration of war. + +When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to +treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice +in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and +with an imposing force, the case is quite different. + +The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the +Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France: +still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of +Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as +far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate +of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad +maneuvering of their allies. + +Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate +operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of +this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the +military character of these expeditions. + +It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these +distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own +territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities +is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, +in a measure, an advantage to the state. + +In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is +both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the +allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; +finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with +the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater +number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult +struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies. + +The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the +whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising +than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807, +but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813. +Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking +his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with +two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She +regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany, +which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention +Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her +favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages. + +Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater +was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible +display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already +in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and +at the time most opportune for her. + +This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful +monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence +when they know how to profit by it. + +Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony +boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy, +and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held +France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and +arrested the great conqueror in his career. + +In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile +to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the +recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of +Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized +Prince Eugene. + +Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these +opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they +could not add to the conviction of the reader. + + + + +ARTICLE VI. + +Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons. + + +There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining +state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of +great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile. + +Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Caesar, +and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However, +there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without +incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus +and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia, +furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however, +was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his +contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to +make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he +was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of +yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world +to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories +teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his +disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence. + +A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a +crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when +induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives. + +The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object +and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which +threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its +author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the +general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a +successful termination because its object met with the approval of the +majority of the people whose territory was invaded. + +These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the +same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon; +the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought +never to have been changed. + +Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack +than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the +spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the +proper time. + +An invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the +end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome. + +An invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and +likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as +was well proved by the war in Spain, (1808,) and by the wars of the +Revolution in 1792, 1793, and 1794. In these latter wars, if France was +better prepared than Spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was +attacked by all Europe upon both land and sea. + +Although the circumstances were different, the Russian invasion of +Turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national +resistance. The religious hatred of the Ottoman powerfully incited him +to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the Greeks, who were +twice as numerous as the Turks. Had the interests of the Greeks and +Turks been harmonized, as were those of Alsace with France, the united +people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element +of religious fanaticism. The war of 1828 proved that Turkey was +formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, +while in the interior all was weakness. + +When an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the +inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. The popular +feeling rendered the invasions of Italy, Austria, and Prussia so prompt. +(These military points are treated of in Article XXIX.) But when the +invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success +will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. The first step to +insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a +state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops, +and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations, +depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. The ally must +have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this +possible. + +Diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not +powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may +arrest the most brilliant successes. The invasions of Austria in 1805 +and 1809 might have ended differently if Prussia had interfered. The +invasion of the North of Germany in 1807 was, so to speak, permitted by +Austria. That of Rumelia in 1829 might have ended in disaster, had not a +wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention. + + + + + +ARTICLE VII. + +Wars of Opinion. + + +Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes +confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice. + +Wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, +lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior +without being intestine or civil. + +Wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of +intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party +desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it +desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. Although +originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most +deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and +become vindictive, cruel, and terrible. + +The wars of Islamism, the Crusades, the Thirty Years' War, the wars of +the League, present nearly the same characteristics. Often religion is +the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of +dogmas. The successors of Mohammed cared more to extend their empire +than to preach the Koran, and Philip II., bigot as he was, did not +sustain the League in France for the purpose of advancing the Roman +Church. We agree with M. Ancelot that Louis IX., when he went on a +crusade in Egypt, thought more of the commerce of the Indies than of +gaining possession of the Holy Sepulcher. + +The dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for +it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. For +instance, the Swedes in the Thirty Years' War, and Philip II. in France, +had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. It may, +however, happen, as in the Crusades and the wars of Islamism, that the +dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter +enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful. + +The chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are +about equal. It may be recollected how in 1792 associations of fanatics +thought it possible to propagate throughout Europe the famous +declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly +alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing +the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing +it. The means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are +inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the +human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it +is the more violent. Time is the true remedy for all bad passions and +for all anarchical doctrines. A civilized nation may bear the yoke of a +factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these +storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. To attempt to +restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the +explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far +better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to +try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt. + +After a profound study of the Revolution, I am convinced that, if the +Girondists and National Assembly had not been threatened by foreign +armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands +upon the feeble but venerable head of Louis XVI. The Girondists would +never have been crushed by the Mountain but for the reverses of +Dumouriez and the threats of invasion. And if they had been permitted to +clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is +probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible Convention, the +Assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good, +temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and +the immemorial traditions of the French. + +In a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not +only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of +an exasperated people. It may be said that the violence of one party +will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of +another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all +the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is +supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the +support of the faction which possesses no such means? What service did +one hundred thousand Vendeans and one hundred thousand Federalists do +for the Coalition in 1793? + +History contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the +Revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of +attacking an intensely-excited nation. However the bad management of the +military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before +deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what +would have been the result if after the flight of Dumouriez, instead of +destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the +commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to +France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with +two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and, +again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection +of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to +decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have +depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem +thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave +one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. +Experiment alone could have determined it. + +The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national +wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country +should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and +reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of +less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be +made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being +constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its +independence or the integrity of its territory. + +The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of +this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the +conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was +made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de +Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national +war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was +thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of +opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous +difference in the results. + +Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angouleme was well carried out. +Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the +above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there +divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of +strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were +sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the +instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of +the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and +the Ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps +have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody +one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country +similar to that of 1807. + +Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it +was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it +behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from +that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged +with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of +Cadiz. + +If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship +was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid +order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its +commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the +counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of +its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand +blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep +veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority +for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The +nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have +been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew +into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,--a striking lesson, by +which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, +although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent +reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to +construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful +conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated +from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the +general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its +support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not +less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who +were in the best position to know it. + + + + +ARTICLE VIII. + +National Wars. + + +National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of +invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied +to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of +them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their +independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its +camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the +sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured. + +The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, +though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our +admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of +humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. This uprising must not be +confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions +of the state and directed by the government. + +This uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. The serfs may +rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, +affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them +the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical +people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic +in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its +institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most +dear. + +The control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a +national invasion. If the people possess a long stretch of coast, and +are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, +their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the +facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all +the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will +be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea. + +The nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility +of a national defense. In mountainous countries the people are always +most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive +forests. + +The resistance of the Swiss to Austria and to the Duke of Burgundy, that +of the Catalans in 1712 and in 1809, the difficulties encountered by the +Russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the Caucasus, and, finally, +the reiterated efforts of the Tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the +inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer +time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference +in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of +the countries. + +Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of +defense; and the Bocage of La Vendee, so justly celebrated, proves that +any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or +canals, admits of a formidable defense. + +The difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as +in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general +conducting them very difficult. The events just mentioned, the contest +of the Netherlands with Philip II. and that of the Americans with the +English, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary +struggle of La Vendee with the victorious Republic, those of Spain, +Portugal, and the Tyrol against Napoleon, and, finally, those of the +Morea against the Turks, and of Navarre against the armies of Queen +Christina, are still more striking illustrations. + +The difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by +a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. The invader has only an +army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly +in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each +individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the +non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every +means in their power. He holds scarcely any ground but that upon which +he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and +multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step. + +These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is +difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their +connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the +commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the +slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best +measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information +of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to +gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only +in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his +combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted +movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is +about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs +of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is +attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, +destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his +depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must +inevitably yield after a time. + +In Spain I was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. When +Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of +the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four +brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish +forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago +de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo, +Marchand's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the +companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never +able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal +escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had +thus made away with them. Four months afterward, Ney with a single +division marched to conquer the Asturias, descending the valley of the +Navia, while Kellermann debouched from Leon by the Oviedo road. A part +of the corps of La Romana which was guarding the Asturias marched behind +the very heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a +league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when +he was entering Gijon, the army of La Romana attacked the center of the +regiments of the division Marchand, which, being scattered to guard +Galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the +marshal to Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as +this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable +information for the French; what was given was but a lure to make them +fall more readily into snares. + +No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a +system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all +the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at +the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy +wherever he may present himself. If this enemy has a regular army of +respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what +force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the +safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies? + +The Peninsular War should be carefully studied, to learn all the +obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the +occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. What +efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops +of Napoleon, Massena, Soult, Ney, and Suchet to sustain themselves for +six years against three or four hundred thousand armed Spaniards and +Portuguese supported by the regular armies of Wellington, Beresford, +Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castanos, Reding, and Ballasteros! + +If success be possible in such a war, the following general course will +be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops +proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, +calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time +and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, +particularly, deal justly. The examples of Henry IV. in the wars of the +League, of Marshal Berwick in Catalonia, of Suchet in Aragon and +Valencia, of Hoche in La Vendee, are models of their kind, which may be +employed according to circumstances with equal success. The admirable +order and discipline of the armies of Diebitsch and Paskevitch in the +late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the +success of their enterprises. + +The immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars +have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any +other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being +also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. +This reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its +consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the +people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be +convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of +conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only +to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests, +should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how +to excite the people to a national war? For example, if one hundred +thousand Germans crossed the Rhine and entered France, originally with +the intention of preventing the conquest of Belgium by France, and +without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole +population--men, women, and children--of Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, +and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a Saragossa of every walled +town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and +incendiarism throughout the country? If all this be not done, and the +Germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces, +who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of +them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? The +difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor +of national wars. But is there no means of repelling such an invasion +without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of +extermination? Is there no mean between these contests between the +people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? Will +it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to +organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their +governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take +in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities? + +I answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the +cases stated above, I will guarantee that fifty thousand regular French +troops, supported by the National Guards of the East, would get the +better of this German army which had crossed the Vosges; for, reduced to +fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the Meuse or +arriving in Argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. +To attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good +national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive +in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. This system +was used by France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the +whole of Germany in 1813. + +I sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian +philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of +extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the +defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good +political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence. + +As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized +assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that +my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and +English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at +Fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, +and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. + + + + +ARTICLE IX. + +Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion. + + +Intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally +the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious +sectarianism. In the Middle Ages they were more frequently the +collisions of feudal parties. Religious wars are above all the most +deplorable. + +We can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force +against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would +weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that +it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in +French or Latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is +difficult of conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis +XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants, who had put +upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor. Wars of fanaticism are +horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful +when they are family quarrels. The history of France in the times of the +League should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is +difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time +of Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a +state of brutality. + +To give maxims in such wars would be absurd. There is one rule upon +which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two +parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to +reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. Indeed, the +intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with +ambitious views. + +Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a +political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although +these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is +possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. But in +religious disputes this is never the case; and Philip II. could have had +no other object in interfering in the affairs of the League than to +subject France to his influence, or to dismember it. + + + + +ARTICLE X. + +Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two Wars at Once. + + +The celebrated maxim of the Romans, not to undertake two great wars at +the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the +necessity of demonstrating its wisdom. + +A government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring +states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally +to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of +the political equilibrium. It will seldom be the case that the nations +allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter +into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it +will be an ordinary war. + +Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, the Emperor Alexander, and Napoleon, +sustained gigantic struggles against united Europe. When such contests +arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on +the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from +imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking +alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish +something like equality between the strength of the parties. + +The great coalition against Louis XIV., nominally arising from his +designs on Spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had +alarmed his neighbors. To the combined forces of Europe he could only +oppose the faithful alliance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the more +equivocal one of the Duke of Savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding +to the number of his enemies. Frederick, with only the aid of the +subsidies of England, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different +states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of +Europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends. + +Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in 1812, it was +almost impossible to avoid. + +France had the whole of Europe on its hands in 1793, in consequence of +the extravagant provocations of the Jacobins, and the Utopian ideas of +the Girondists, who boasted that with the support of the English fleets +they would defy all the kings in the world. The result of these absurd +calculations was a frightful upheaval of Europe, from which France +miraculously escaped. + +Napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has +voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable +wars,--with Spain, with England, and with Russia; but in the last case +he expected the aid of Austria and Prussia, to say nothing of that of +Turkey and Sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so +that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been +generally supposed. + +It will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made +against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary, +and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in +opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. For +instance, the double contest of Napoleon in 1809 against Austria and +Spain aided by England was a very different affair from a contest with +Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter +contests belong to ordinary wars. + +It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if +possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more +prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, +until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule, +however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the +localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure, +equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will +influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in +noting both the danger and the means of remedying it. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +MILITARY POLICY. + + +We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces +the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the +political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral, +there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a +war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We +include these under the head of _Military Policy_. + +Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any +projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy; +and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be +assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and +without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise +on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military +operations. + +Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be +fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, +their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government +or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters +and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence +of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their +operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established +force of the state and its armament, the military geography and +statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the +resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of +which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy. + +There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government +should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and +that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the +arrangement of all plans. We propose to sketch the principal points +which ought to guide in this sort of combinations. + + + + +ARTICLE XI. + +Military Statistics and Geography. + + +By the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge +possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy +with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the +topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all +the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the +examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in +the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the +country. Besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his +chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of +cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day, +despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical, +diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. I will cite two +examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau's army, entering the +Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and +forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the +declivities of the plateau that slope to the Rhine, that these, with +their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the +sources of the Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain. + +The second example was in 1813. Napoleon and his whole army supposed the +interior of Bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no +district in Europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding +it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march. + +All European officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to +the Balkan and the Turkish force in the interior. It seemed that it was +given out at Constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable +barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which I, having lived +in the Alps, did not entertain. Other prejudices, not less deeply +rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of +which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and +would defend themselves to the last extremity. Experience has proved +that the old regulations which placed the elite of the Janissaries in +the frontier-cities of the Danube made the population of those cities +more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. In fact, the projects +of reform of the Sultan Mahmoud required the overthrow of the old +system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the +empire was defenseless. Experience has constantly proved that a mere +multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a +national defense. + +Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography +and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not set forth in +treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who wrote an essay upon +them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of Europe, was not +fortunate in his maxims and predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he +represents as impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the +Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered and triumphed +with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in 1800, 1805, and +1809. + +But, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the +European staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for +instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. Awaiting +the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and +unpublished documents, shall present Europe with a good military and +strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of +topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the +excellent charts published in all European countries within the last +twenty years. At the beginning of the French Revolution topography was +in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of Cassini, the +works of Bakenberg alone merited the name. The Austrian and Prussian +staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. The +charts published recently at Vienna, at Berlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and +Paris, as well as those of the institute of Herder at Fribourg, promise +to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors. + +Military statistics is not much better known than geography. We have but +vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and +navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by +a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan +operations. Our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important +subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military +enterprises. + + + + +ARTICLE XII. + +Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the Success of a War. + + +As the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful +enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts +to allay them. We have nothing to add to what has been said on this +point under the head of national wars. + +On the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his +own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he +endeavors to repress in his adversaries. All armies are alike +susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary +with the national character. Military eloquence is one means, and has +been the subject of many a treatise. The proclamations of Napoleon and +of Paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and +those of Suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of +their different kinds. The eloquence of the Spanish Juntas, and the +miracles of the Madonna del Pilar, led to the same results by very +different means. In general, a cherished cause, and a general who +inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of +electrifying an army and conducing to victory. Some dispute the +advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in +battle. Both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. Enthusiasm +impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in +maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it, +disorder easily results. + +The greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the +armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to +rules. A cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value +of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared +with that of the enemy. A Russian general, commanding the most solidly +organized troops in Europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against +undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave +may be its individuals.[1] Concert in action makes strength; order +produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without +discipline and order no success is possible. The Russian general would +not be so bold before European troops having the same instruction and +nearly the same discipline as his own. Finally, a general may attempt +with a Mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a +Napoleon. + +The action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences +the boldness of their operations. A general whose genius and hands are +tied by an Aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match +for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal. + +As to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of +victory, all other things being equal. It is true that great generals +have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make +a rule. An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the +hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general +had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which +cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to +deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? This +risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they +are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to +apply them, and are the cause of its success. But, in admitting this +truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this +objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in +providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of +course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the number of +battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to +accident, it would not invalidate my assertion. + +If the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it +will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of +the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the +most essential parts of the military policy of a state. Unfortunately, +this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, +age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as +the public interest and justice. This subject is so important that we +will devote to it a separate article. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of +the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication, +&c., and may--as in the case of the French in 1812--make a retreat very +disastrous.] + + + + +ARTICLE XIII. + +Military Institutions. + + +One of the most important points of the military policy of a state is +the nature of its military institutions. A good army commanded by a +general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with +a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a +great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be +combined. + +Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:-- + +1. To have a good recruiting-system; + +2. A good organization; + +8. A well-organized system of national reserves; + +4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as +well as those of a campaign; + +5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of +subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the +formalities of the service; + +6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation; + +7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed; + +8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to +defensive and offensive arms; + +9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an +organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical +education of its officers; + +10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general +administration; + +11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the +principal operations of war; + +12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people. + +To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and +equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of +battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the +troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and +health of veterans. + +None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave +inconvenience. A fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without +national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered Prussia to fall in +fifteen days under the attacks of Napoleon. On the other hand, it has +often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good +army. It was the care and skill of Philip and Alexander in forming and +instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable +of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the Macedonians to subjugate +India and Persia with a handful of choice troops. It was the excessive +love of his father for soldiers which procured for Frederick the Great +an army capable of executing his great enterprises. + +A government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus +culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its +standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing +for it success. We are far from saying that a government should +sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it +ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the +prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to +fulfill his duty in this respect. In this case--which is, unfortunately, +of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise +institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the +general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of +national reserves. + +There are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the +executive the power of adopting the best systems. If the armies of the +Roman and French republics, and those of Louis XIV. and Frederick of +Prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of +operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle, +it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form +of government exercises a great influence in the development of the +military strength of a nation and the value of its troops. + +When the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected +by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and +penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, +whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a +chief devoted to all the national interests. + +The abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to +this deplorable result. Then it will be impossible for the most +far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war, +whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at +some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist +sudden aggressions. + +In the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members +of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be Richelieus, +Pitts, or Louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the +institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army +to fall into decay? Deceived by the seductive fallacies of an +exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and +their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to +the more statesmanlike preparations for war? + +I am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the +sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of +things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible, +except under conditions not existing in all countries. I simply mean +that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in +a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. And the +wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation +as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system +of military policy. + +If, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, +governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are +less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a +formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these +deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and +have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength. +Still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list +of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed +under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the +extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and +themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures +and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which +overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. Here +it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of +power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the +true cause of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention +after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of Public +Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815. Now, if the +dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank +of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that +countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and +militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they +present decided advantages. + +It is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in +the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to +degenerate. It is important to foster the military spirit in the armies, +and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly +resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in +preparing them for war. It is not less important to prevent them from +becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors +useful for the defense of the country. + +The isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst +possible systems, and the Russian and Prussian system of divisions and +permanent corps d'armee seems to be much preferable. In general terms, +the Russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and +if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable +elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be +copied from it. + +As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service, +and at the same time to open a way for merit. Three-fourths of the +promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the +remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. On +the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be +suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the +other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services. + +The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: +it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of +success. Every one can recall how nearly fatal to the French at Bylau +and Marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. We may also refer +to the great gain of the heavy French cavalry in the resumption of the +cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. Every one knows the +great advantage of the lance. Doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would +not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a +very different affair. How many brave cavalry soldiers have been the +victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a +little more trouble to carry than a saber! + +The armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the +state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great +advantages. There is little left to be desired in artillery; but the +offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the +attention of a provident government. + +The new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great +revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. Strategy alone +will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the Scipios +and Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they are independent of the +nature of the arms and the organization of the troops. + +The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful +rapidity.[2] The Congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it +is said the Austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which +throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the Perkins +steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will +multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of Eylau, +Borodino, Leipsic, and Waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the +European races. + +If governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these +inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the +half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture +with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be +obliged to resume its armor of the Middle Ages, without which a +battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy. + +We may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor, +and horses also will require the same protection. + +While there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is, +however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which +should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused +by Napoleon. We will recur to this in the chapter on Tactics. + +We will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the +military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government. + +1. The prince should receive an education both political and military. +He will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils +than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the +latter himself. + +2. If the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his +first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. He +must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the +general most capable of directing his armies. + +3. The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable +footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by +reserves, which should always be prepared. Its instruction and +discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization; +its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and +superior if possible. + +4. The materiel of war should also be upon the best footing, and +abundant. The reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals. +National jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all +improvements in this materiel made in other countries. + +5. It is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be +encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. The scientific +military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of +securing for the army men of merit and genius. + +6. The general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors +preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should +be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all +statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and +papers for the present and future. Hence it is essential that the chief +of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently +stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be +simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret +department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of +the corps. + +7. Nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography +and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their +material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the +strategic advantages of the two parties. Distinguished officers should +be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they +acquit themselves with marked ability. + +8. When a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an +entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of +operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well +as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the +enterprise. + +9. The system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the +war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the +country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of +the army or of the state. In fine, it should be based upon the moral and +material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring +into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable +alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties +during the war. + +10. The financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the +chances of a war. Still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute +to this condition the importance attached to it by Frederick the Great +in the history of his times. He was probably right at his epoch, when +armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last +crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well +organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least +for one or two campaigns. If England has proved that money will procure +soldiers and auxiliaries, France has proved that love of country and +honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made +to support war. France, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the +enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which +cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its +efforts were none the less striking. Every year the numerous reports of +the cabinet of London, and particularly of M. d'Yvernois, announced that +France was about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had +200,000,000 francs[3] in the vaults of the Tuileries, all the while +meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies. + +A power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very +badly. History, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the +strongest nor the happiest. Iron weighs at least as much as gold in the +scales of military strength. Still, we must admit that a happy +combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of +well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts +to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of +sustaining a long war. + +A volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which +a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, +and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. This +result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of +the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing +resources to an assailant. + +We need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are +not directly connected with the art of war. It is sufficient for our +purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be +for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and +localities may make in these relations. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 2: It will be recollected that the author wrote this many +years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been +attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. Artillery, which +he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important +improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less +marked, while we hear nothing now of Perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no +civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for +depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--TRANSLATORS.] + +[Footnote 3: There was a deficit in the finances of France at the fall +of Napoleon. It was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous +efforts he was obliged to make. There was no deficit in 1811.] + + + + + +ARTICLE XIV. + +The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over Operations. + + +Is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by +the monarch? Whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain +that if the prince possess the genius of Frederick, Peter the Great, or +Napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of +performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would +be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country. + +As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more +fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, +(which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will +only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other +respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who +is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he +is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much +by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public +resources for the attainment of his end. He also possesses the powerful +accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be +devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his +enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the +execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and +in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to +induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and +the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. But if he possess no +military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily +influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good +results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. Each one will +present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience +necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his +judgment to that of his intimates. His general, interfered with and +opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even +if he have the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might +accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the +contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. In this case his +presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to +great embarrassment. If the army were turned and cut off from its +communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad +results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at +head-quarters! + +When a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his +armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme +direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the +Prussian government with Bluecher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two +generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, +the other a well-instructed staff officer. If this trinity be +harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army +of Silesia in 1813. + +The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it +proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has +frequently happened since the time of Louis XIV. It has often occurred +that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, +who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with +the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin, afterward +with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendome at the battle of Audenarde, and, I +think, also at Ulm with the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is +deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known +that at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more sagacity +than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret +authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and +allow the battle to be lost. So at Ulm the archduke displayed more skill +and courage than Mack, who was to be his mentor. + +If the prince possess the genius and experience of the Archduke Charles, +he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full +selection of his instruments. If he have not yet acquired the same +titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of +the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in +execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these +counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation. + +We have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in +person, his most important duty will be to have the position of +commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done. +Without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the +more modern examples under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. The merit of Prince +Eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the +ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. After +Louvois' death, Tallard, Marsin, and Villeroi filled the places of +Turenne, Conde, and Luxembourg, and subsequently Soubise and Clermont +succeeded Marshal Saxe. Between the fashionable selections made in the +Saloons of the Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon's preference for +mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough +to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational +nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an +influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the +prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services. +But, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be +profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will +be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a +judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a skillful general +requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a +military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be +guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper +influence of cliques. The embarrassment is certainly less when there is +at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of +the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained +a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many others,) it is not +always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the +government. It may well happen that after a long period of peace, there +may not be a single general in Europe who has commanded in chief. In +this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better +than another. Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of +their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this +position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it? +Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their +subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not +astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their +appropriate positions. The judgment of the prince, misled by +appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be +deceived in his selections. + +One of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in +realizing the beautiful fiction of Fenelon in Telemachus, by finding a +faithful, sincere, and generous Philocles, who, standing between the +prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his +more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in +reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their +character and abilities. But will this faithful friend never yield to +personal affections? Will he be always free from prejudice? Suwaroff was +rejected by Potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all +the art of Catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed +so much luster upon the Russian arms. + +It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing +could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a Caesar, when he was +ignorant of the great operations of war. Would it have placed Bonaparte +at the head of the army of Italy, when he was known only by two +directors? Still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public +sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises +and the experience of events. + +The most essential qualities for a general will always be as +follow:--First, _A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_; +Secondly, _A physical courage which takes no account of danger_. His +scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned +characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It +is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His +knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be +perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next +in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is +gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others +instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit +conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even +pass for a great man. Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to +merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are +always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of +little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing +that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the +glory of its success, even when least entitled to it. + +The question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to +assign to the command a general of long experience in service with +troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little +experience in the management of troops. It is beyond question that war +is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be +able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment +against an enemy. Peter the Great, Conde, Frederick, and Napoleon are +instances of it. It cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the +staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will +not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that +he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural +genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. So, also, a +general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of +conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. So this question +does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or +negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of +the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to +a rational conclusion:-- + +1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, +who has commanded a division or a corps d'armee, will, with equal +chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one +arm or special corps. + +2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, +will be equally fitted for the command. + +3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a +commander-in-chief. + +Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the +requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the +principles of the art of war. + +The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the +formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may +advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the +operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of +organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction +into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal. + +Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never +thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General +Ruchel,[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible +rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step +from the sublime to the ridiculous! + +Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and +his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man +of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice +of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a +general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit +him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; +for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or +fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The +best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of +several designated officers, all of undoubted ability. + +It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent +councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more +weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if +the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find +in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of +the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be +expected from operations conducted by others than those who have +originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation +which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his +own conception? + +I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and +no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than +myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is +absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military +officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to +accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount +of dissent. + +What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon +proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the +maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded +them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand +difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting +them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been +executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved +failures? + +In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be +useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case +they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, +may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use +every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only +advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply +consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this +harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce +unfortunate results. + +Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of +organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by +experience, is-- + +1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, +and of unshaken firmness in danger. + +2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and +faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect +harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to +the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Bluecher, +aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would +not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command +is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon, +a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great +general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system. + +Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of +influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the +seat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed +from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also, +from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and +saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he +repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at +fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot +individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of +war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the +duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been +but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this +opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to +decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this +connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of +operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the +campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give +battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should +determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, +whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to +these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the +levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points, +it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and +ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be +limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march +to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate +the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the +unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole +responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those +who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of +directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the +scene of operations. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could +save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in +order to form an oblique line.] + + + + +ARTICLE XV. + +The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies. + + +The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army +would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a +military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London, +situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, +that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military +decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and +habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner +or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic +virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the +Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these +virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor +as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls, +the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that +whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither +neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of +industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they +should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the +strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and +heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for, +whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront +death in the footsteps of the Caesars than to fatten upon the public +miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. +Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the +tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public +estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, +health, or fortune to the defense of his country. + +The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army +with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is +to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state, +in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the +government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a +qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military +institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject +worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to +contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare +against the employment of officers of the army in other public +functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important +offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments +demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the +abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would +prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession +of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers +retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would +it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not +lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than +in the theaters and public clubs? + +It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to +the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high +military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient +to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the +early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were +bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea +that they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealous +of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for +the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for +twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and +in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be +advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but +where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people, +the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous +military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public +employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military +spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material +comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people. + +However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of +government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in +order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under +the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering +insult and dependency. + +It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people, +but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of +what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be +regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are +wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor. + +The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite +different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce +the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a +temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance, +or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the +skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is +more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the +object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage +should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank +respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions +rather than in external forms only. + +The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and +faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is +possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is +more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is +necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a +difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always +opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet +with a reward equal to that given for a great victory. + +By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation +in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over +their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a +love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by +every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage, +punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain +a high military spirit. + +Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those +formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in +the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too +heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was +lost. + +I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for +the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he +encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes' +troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would +contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians. + +The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics +which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled +by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the +surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred +thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at +Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly +charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they +fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with +panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder +is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals +becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no +maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no +resource but in ignominious flight. + +Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics; +and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy +it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never +been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind +which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which +pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle +of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after +the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still +more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen +hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two +days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most +vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history. + +Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes +more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those +who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally +promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken. + +In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others. +The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal +degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the +soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity +of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder: +the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of +precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order +contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of +most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the +slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments +or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the +rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a +momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were +offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still, +the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be +powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree +obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions. +There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient +for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the +soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and +when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize +them,--which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these +exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for +rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not +in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it. + +It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to +trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which +are purely military. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers +from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all +colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The +most venal deputies will not be those from military life.] + +[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should +pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable, +and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.] + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +STRATEGY. + +DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. + + +The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, +consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, +Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer. +We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. +In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general +when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest +importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the +necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and +ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation +and handling of a great army. + +We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its +commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the +character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, +and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into +consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. + +The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone +of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will +select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a +temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction; +namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable +opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of +operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The +temporary positions which the corps d'armee will occupy upon this front +of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions. + +When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet +resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel +him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic +lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain +degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be +confounded. + +To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, +lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established. + +If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in +annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and +dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may +be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses +be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the +result. + +The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the +enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will +be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective +point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective +point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be +commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after +detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a +strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which, +less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria, +leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty +thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul. + +If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if +it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more +important objective point. + +If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an +intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already +occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small +strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and +also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large +streams, it will construct _tetes de pont_; and, if the bridges are +within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the +means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the +strategic reserve which may occupy these posts. + +Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in +order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is +equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts +and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces. + +When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the +field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and +is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter +campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not +differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased +activity and energy to attain prompt success. + +Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, +while discussing combinations which result from these operations. + +Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:-- + +1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the +different combinations of which it admits. + +2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and +the most favorable direction for operations. + +3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of +operations. + +4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. + +5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations. + +6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or +strategic front. + +7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different +maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases. + +8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves. + +9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers. + +10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the +army. + +11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, +as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered. + +12. Points for intrenched camps, _tetes de pont,_ &c. + +13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary. + +These points are principally of importance in the determination of the +first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed +nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, +disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which +belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy. + +The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different +formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is +the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches +and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the +execution of strategical and tactical enterprises. + +To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and +comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of +posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the +ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the +ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may +extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics +comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of +strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings +the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution +and the employment of the troops. + +It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, +and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in +the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of +pitched battles the above definition holds good. + +Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the +following objects:-- + +1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle. + +2. The offensive in a defensive battle. + +3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the +attack of the enemy's line. + +4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles. + +5. Surprises of armies in the open field. + +6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle. + +7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps. + +8. _Coups de main_. + +All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, +skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and +any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be +regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations. + + +THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR. + +It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all +the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good +combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:-- + +1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, +upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the +communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising +one's own. + +2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of +one's forces. + +3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the +decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of +the first importance to overthrow. + +4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the +decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with +energy. + +This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one +objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the +forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in +recognizing those points. + +This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to +enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all +necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article +XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from +XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different +combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is +there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a +problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending +strategy. + +The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three +zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of +operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each +line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the +center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for +the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two +remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be +wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection +with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it +will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the +question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right, +to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three +simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of +giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of +strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive +talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary +to carry out any combinations previously arranged. + +We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy +and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated +campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and +the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in +the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other. + + + + +OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS. + + + + +ARTICLE XVI. + +Of the System of Operations. + + +War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it +shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant +by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a +great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is +attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense +of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, +if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is +confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the +_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly +always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the +assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and +diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and +generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion +excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he +feels that the independence of his country is threatened. + +In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad +side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, +which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in +the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are +favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the +country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are +generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck +in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek +a speedy termination of the contest. + +For a single operation, which we have called the taking the +_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly +in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses +upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the +initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he +desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to +strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy +fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows +where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel +him. + +Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less +positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party +taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect +his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail. + +The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the +obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which +account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are +about equally balanced. + +Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically +from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively +throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become +defensive before it ends. + +A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It +may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive +defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. +The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the +country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to +retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying +obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own +army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then +seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the +contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off +detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to +his progress. + +An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive +inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or +artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying +obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an +extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has +the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in +his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary; +he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon +the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of +the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and +may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the +advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a +prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all +the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take +the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike. + +During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was +the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of +the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by +his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many +opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course +was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most +suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest +talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these +two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during +the progress of a defensive war. + + + + +ARTICLE XVII. + +Of the Theater of Operations. + + +The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties +may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or +to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. +When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both +hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between France and England +since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined, +and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the +other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria +may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the +German States take part therein. + +Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole +theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which +strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the +second case each army will have its own independent theater of +operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the +territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to +defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any +maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in +danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of +action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields. +If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of +operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the +general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common +object. + +Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one +or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:-- + +1. Of a fixed base of operations. + +2. Of a principal objective point. + +3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense. + +4. Of zones and lines of operations. + +5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications. + +6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the +enemy. + +7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, +either for the offensive or defensive. + +8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective +point and the primary base. + +9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse. + +For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria +with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and +starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime +Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies +traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of +operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without +concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a +zone becomes for that army a theater of operations. + +In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective +point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point +with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive. + +It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations +_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to +move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line +of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of +maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are +excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment +of a good line of operations, but never the line itself. + +It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly +to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because +they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities +for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these +points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a +desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an +individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and +the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover, +was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use +of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for +defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial +lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are +pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses +separately. + +Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in +strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, +these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also +that if more rare they are more important and more decisive. + +Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war, +inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the +Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his +foot." + +Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have +united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of +carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of +partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the +heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the +decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys. + +These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader +that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many +points that admit of discussion. + +The most important topographical or artificial features which make up +the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be +examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to +remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the +general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the +passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of +these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and +a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo. + + + + +ARTICLE XVIII. + +Bases of Operations. + + +A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army +obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it +takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which +it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively. + +The base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not +necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, +a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or +Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine. + +When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be +alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line +of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always +be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its +own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a +vast difference between those parts of the country without military +positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those +other portions where these military resources are found; and these +latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may +have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in +Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others +beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but +if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the +Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth +upon the Loire. + +These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the +first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become +necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good +base on Befort or Besancon, on Mezieres or Sedan, as the Russian army +after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and +established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces. +These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often +decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the +country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain +himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being +held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired. + +The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in +covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from +it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so +favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more +retired. + +A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of +sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There +should be a _tete de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams. + +All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions +have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to +that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of +the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides +almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus +affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of +two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely +apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an +unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate. + +The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military +Operations:-- + + "The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a + great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and, + consequently, upon the direction of the bases. + + [Illustration: Fig. 1.] + + "If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more + or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign, + may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy + occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable + obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead + to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the + theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and + that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1, + p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the + line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of + the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the + Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces, + the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for + them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four + faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The + French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of + operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B + D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines + of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could + communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine. + + "The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He + occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle + and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented + by the side A B. The result is well known. + + "The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them + such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without + losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the + bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications + with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo, + Ulm, and Jena. + + "When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always + bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and + closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle + insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as + an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a + defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it. + The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and + fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with + impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none + the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of + war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed + in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached + the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the + frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make + it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in + Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has + control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of + establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, + since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the + shortened side,--as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806, + with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the + Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of + Franconia." + +[Illustration: Fig. 2.] + +The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my +opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the +French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense +advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded +Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor. +Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the +Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march +upon Wiazma and Krasnoi. + +If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only +be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of +the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of +operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications +and line of retreat. + +It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable +in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may +object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in +favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against +double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The +objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a +perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, +which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the +other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should +be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be +sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, +while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was +done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety +degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and +thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another +perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his +left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the +enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the +extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried +him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions +having already rejoined him. + +In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main, +forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first +and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the +extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians +at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat. + +If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them +being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is +well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be +partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in +Article XX. + +Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of +bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be +favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, +as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always +exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of +the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be +favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day +praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of +Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of +Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all +the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not +only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible +line of retreat, which was upon the fleet. + +Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras +secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes, +many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good +except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of +supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar +notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to +have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty +thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that +the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon +the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all +its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the +base were established upon the coast. + +An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a +diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, +viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained +by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe +retreat._ + +A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea +adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty +or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its +supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of +one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a +disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness. + +However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it +may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when +your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master +of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. +We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the +Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was +given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan +which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army +(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin. + +Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon +the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. The army +covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and +Silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as +its base was well established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously +would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of months longer, +or had the army not come so great a distance in 1828, the war would have +terminated with the first campaign. + +Besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own +frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or +temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's +country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they +will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in Article XXIII. + + + + + +ARTICLE XIX. + +Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and +Objective Points of Operations. + + +Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some receive this +title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: +these are permanent geographical strategic points. Others have a value +from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the +hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against +them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, +there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others +whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called DECISIVE +strategic points. + +Every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, +whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the +presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical +strategic point. + +A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily +be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated +operation. I think differently; for a strategic point is such +essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from +the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by +some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. It +would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not +necessarily decisive points. + +Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from +their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be subdivided +as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance +belong to the decisive points[7] of the theater of war, and those which +have value merely because they connect two strategic points. + +To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in +their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates +to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon +which enterprises occur. + +Although these are most intimately connected, since every objective +point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater +of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all +decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. +We will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in +our selection of the second. + +I think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all +those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the +result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose +geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor +the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense +are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy +in importance the first rank among them. + +The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. The first +are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a +consequence of the configuration of the country. For example, take the +case of the French in Belgium: whoever is master of the line of the +Meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the +country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the +Meuse and the North Sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if +he give battle parallel to that sea.[8] Similarly, the valley of the +Danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be +looked upon as the key of Southern Germany. + +Those points the possession of which would give the control of the +junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of +communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. For +instance, Lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the +valleys of the Rhone and Saone, and is at the center of communications +between France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would +not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an +extended camp with _tetes de pont_. Leipsic is most certainly a +strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the +communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and did it occupy +both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if +a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive +point. + +All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are +not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and +government. + +In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of +exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to +any enterprise in this country. It is well known how great was the +importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small fort, in +1800. + +The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, +which result from the positions of the troops on both sides. + +When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the Russian army +through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was Donauwerth +or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was +cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to +support him. On the contrary, Kray, who, in 1800, was in the same +position, expected no aid from Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and +from the army of Melas in Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon +him was not Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since +this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of +retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, +and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first objective +point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Melas by the +Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence +Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by reason +of the march of Melas upon Nice. + +It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of +maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent +operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting +forces without being exposed to the same danger. The flank opposite to +the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of +forcing the enemy upon the sea. The only exception to this is in the +case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although +dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet. + +If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the +decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be +more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed +separately. + +The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,-- + +1. The features of the ground. + +2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim. + +3. The positions occupied by the respective forces. + +These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles. + + +OBJECTIVE POINTS. + +There are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of +maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. A geographical objective +point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of +operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support +for ulterior enterprises. _Objective points of maneuver_, in +contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance +from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile +masses. + +In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. +If this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the +hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy +to make peace. In a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the +objective point. However, the geographical position of the capital, the +political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their +respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the +art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of +operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to +occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the capital, +the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line +of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which +would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. For +instance, if France were to invade Italy in a war against Austria, the +first objective point would be the line of the Ticino and Po; the +second, Mantua and the line of the Adige. In the defensive, the +objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain +possession of, is that which is to be defended. The capital, being +considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of +the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first +line and of the first base of operations. Thus, for a French army +reduced to the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be +to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the +forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the +river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the +first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,--which might be +attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front. + +As to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate +particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile +forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. The +greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in +some degree in the good choice of these points. This was the most +conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old systems, which were +satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of +an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of +accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile +army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no +organized force to protect them. To detect at a glance the relative +advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to +concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best +promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate +position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his +center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which +he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut +his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his +forces,--such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first +campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the very +best. + +When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances +and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so successful as +in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is +not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances +of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. +Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real +advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they +are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of +the adjoining states. + +The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are +almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and +in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing the choice of lines +of operations. + +As to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend +upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other +circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of +the two parties. + +In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may +be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such +as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. +In other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success +by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the +hostile army, as did Napoleon. + +The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army whose +only object is the siege of Antwerp. For very different reasons, they +could not be recommended to the French army beyond the Niemen, five +hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to +be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by +success. + +There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are +determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they +play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and +plans of cabinets. They may be called _political objective points_. + +Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in +its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are +undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but +often very irrational. They frequently lead to the commission of great +errors in strategy. We cite two examples. First, the expedition of the +Duke of York to Dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the +operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their +failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. The +expedition of the same prince to Holland in 1799--likewise due to the +views of the English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on +Belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the Archduke +Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,--a step quite contrary to the +interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. These +illustrations prove that political objective points should be +subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been +attained. + +This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd +to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one which can be given +has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective +points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or +their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events +of the campaign. Applying this rule to the examples just given, it will +be seen that it was at Cambray or in the heart of France that Dunkirk +should have been conquered in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in +other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great +attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this +kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a +separate article. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 7: I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a +line cannot be a _point_, and yet I apply to lines the name of decisive +or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark that _objective_ +points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of +expression used to designate the object which an army desires to +attain.] + +[Footnote 8: This only applies to continental armies, and not to the +English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have nothing +to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.] + + + + +ARTICLE XX. + +Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense, and Strategic +Positions. + + +There are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble +each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently +confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. Such are _fronts of +operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic +positions_. It is proposed in this article to show the distinction +between them and to expose their relations to each other. + + +FRONTS OF OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC FRONTS. + +When the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they +generally occupy strategic positions. The extent of the front occupied +toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. The portion of the +theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two +or three marches is called the _front of operations_. + +The resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to +confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other. + +Rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed +by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the +other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or +two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes +the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision. + +When the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of +the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will +undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the +strategic front or more to the rear. Hence the strategic front and line +of defense may coincide, as was the case in 1795 and 1796 upon the +Rhine, which was then a line of defense for both Austrians and French, +and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. This +occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to +confound them, while they are really very different. An army has not +necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when +its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic +front, but it is never without a front of operations. + +The two following examples will illustrate the difference between the +different terms. + +At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon's front of operations +extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg; thence it ran along the +line of the allies toward Glogau and Breslau, (his right being at +Loewenberg,) and followed along the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His +forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose +strategic positions were interior and central and presented three +different faces. Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line +of defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with a bend to +the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and Magdeburg were beyond the +strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended +his operations to these points. + +The other example is his position about Mantua in 1796. His front of +operations here really extended from the mountains of Bergamo to the +Adriatic Sea, while his real line of defense was upon the Adige, between +Lake Garda and Legnago: afterward it was upon the Mincio, between +Peschiera and Mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his +positions. + +The front of operations being the space which separates the two armies, +and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of +operations. The strategic front will have the same direction, and ought +to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend +far enough on either flank to cover this line well. However, this +direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on +account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens +that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and +parallel to the original line of operations. Such a change of strategic +front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this +means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, +thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a +base with two faces. (See Art. XVIII.) + +The strategic front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau illustrates these +points. His pivots of operations were at Warsaw and Thorn, which made +the Vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the Narew, +from whence he set out, supported by Sierock, Pultusk, and Ostrolenka, +to maneuver by his right and throw the Russians on Elbing and the +Baltic. In such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be +obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. It +ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always +be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words, +that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and +should be covered by it. Napoleon, marching from the Narew by Allenstein +upon Eylau, had behind his left Thorn, and farther from the front of the +army the _tete de pont_ of Praga and Warsaw; so that his communications +were safe, while Benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line +parallel to the Baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown +back upon the mouths of the Vistula. Napoleon executed another very +remarkable change of strategic front in his march from Gera upon Jena +and Naumburg in 1806. Moreau made another in moving by his right upon +Augsburg and Dillingen, fronting the Danube and France, and thereby +forcing Kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at Ulm. + +The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the +base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' +duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by +important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive +blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good +pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base. + +It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic +front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every +line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an +example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In +order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to +present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the +Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon. + +All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the +same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require +a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops +into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries +which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, +since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy +could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double +strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an +offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always +dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.) + +Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national +or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. +Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would +have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country +and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, +Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front, +while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined. + + +LINES OF DEFENSE. + +Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical +lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of +defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as +the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which +relate only to the temporary position of an army. + +The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a +well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as +ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of +the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the +practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great +obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in +the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine, +the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of +defense, on account of the important forts found upon them. + +Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and +every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary +fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both +strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress +of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in +search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently +strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident +tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army +from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and +artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other +hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should +fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many +armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, +it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and +receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In +addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is +difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be +able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the +outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to +Wurmser in Mantua. + + +STRATEGIC POSITIONS. + +There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position +may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for +battle. + +Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended +to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be +covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line +of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable +distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, +Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in +Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The +positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before +the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar +in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in +face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic +positions,--for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily +positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are +sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, +are of this class. + +This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several +points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of +observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the +positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position +of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile +operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large +detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying +strategic positions. + +The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, +lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a +multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety. + +In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with +the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured. + +In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of +defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural +or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of +support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and +are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of +maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of +operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months. +In 1813 Dresden was his pivot. + +Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which +it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the +fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the +pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of +Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line +of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point +of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of +support and endures throughout a campaign. + +The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as +short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if +it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the +extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the +prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous +point. + +The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it +be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to +make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a +short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither +should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is +unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not +a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results +of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful +operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same +results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in +1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could +have found another by adopting a new zone of operations. + +The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should +be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army +should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the +intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or +interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front +in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to +a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part +of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of +security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible +rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front. + +An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making +selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there +concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy +when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon +prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of +Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram. + +When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be +careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be +called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal +faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for +all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an +attack. + +Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point +upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic +front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able +to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in +rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so +as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting +a passage. + +For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation +or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however +brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of +defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete +the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with +temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.) + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great +difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.] + +[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of +positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter +devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)] + + + + +ARTICLE XXI. + +Zones and Lines of Operations. + + +A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, +which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, +whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For +example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the +right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army. + +A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of +operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or +of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. +Generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_, +depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number +of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations. + +It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a +_line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road +in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; +but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the +sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real +line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to +the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would +not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the +communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole +space bounded by them would constitute but a single line. + +The term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the +general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate +the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. +Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic +lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive +points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the +front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to +those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive +points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a +temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _Lines of +communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different +portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone +of operations. + +For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand +Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and +another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden, +Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the +forces. This zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to Leipsic as +an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading +from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic; +the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by +Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte +from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies +marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be +said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal +line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon +which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, +and over which, if compelled, it would retreat. + +If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive +combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on +each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, +it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided +into different classes, according to their relations to the different +positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, +and to the enterprises projected by the commander. + +_Simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a +frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies. + +_Double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies +proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies +which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in +distance and for long intervals of time.[11] + +_Interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to +oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the +general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in +a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose +to them a greater force.[12] _Exterior lines_ lead to the opposite +result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time +on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. + +_Concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from +widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance +of or behind the base. + +_Divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point +to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, +necessitate a subdivision of the army. + +There are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_. + +The term _maneuver-lines_ I apply to momentary strategic lines, often +adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be +confounded with the real _lines of operations_. + +_Secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each +other mutual support,--as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was +secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration +was secondary to that of Barclay. + +_Accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the +original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the +highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully +recognized only by a great and active mind. + +There may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of +operations_. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a +preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select +a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the +class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines +of operations. + +These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded +me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than +that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter +has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has +no lines of operations. + +The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two +armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of +Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large +depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest, +and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. +These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they +will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different +proposed enterprises. + +1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will +extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both +be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in +the interval which separates them from it. Even if Melas[13] had +possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have +been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy +occupied the line of the Po. + +2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated +his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double +exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided +his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him +to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to +could unite. + +Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on +its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than +when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of +support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the +establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of +operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it +has no line of operations. + + +OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH +REVOLUTION. + +At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and +Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included +in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it +being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. +The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three +zones of operations,--the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue +to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the +interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the +frontier from Givet to Dunkirk. + +When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a +union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the +zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in +Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not +conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. +Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the +concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion +of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the +King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him +not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon +France another form of government? + +When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the +French were no longer able to invade. This _role_ was reserved for the +allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves. + +The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen +thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty +leagues and divided into five corps d'armee, and could not make a good +defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was +only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in +favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could +only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the +Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the +rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the +excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this +plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception. + +The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family +reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might +subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand, +Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five +thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the +Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward +displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them +than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct +on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the +resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field, +as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During +the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for +success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had +anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more +serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the +advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions, +and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately. +Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at +Grandpre,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he +(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Chalons. + +The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with +the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to +guard every point. + +The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and +Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and +how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin +of armies. + +Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the +strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of +a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of +rendering invasion upon every point feasible. + +I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly +abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater +from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he +was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this +movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front, +while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon +the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely +in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes. + +The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty +direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered +Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations +to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves +praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this +enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the +extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had +been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized +and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a +few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new +armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of +the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of +the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood? + +Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are +particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince, +and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of +the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars +of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14] +If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was +France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had +risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having +beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and +Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the +Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the +Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army +of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with +its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It +is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or +running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the +duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army +pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several +victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on +a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they +threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies +of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes +and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon +the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one +side and Landau on the other. + +It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in +the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they +should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while +the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or +aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this +army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the +Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and +Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War? + +In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a +painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of +this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to +represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this, +it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the +armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and +the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four +corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four +divisions, which composed two armies. + +These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels, +as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only +difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders +were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this +difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position +of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank +the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of +the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to +great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on +the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate +of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon +the Baltic, is another proof of this truth. + +If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have +made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a +month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up. + +The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive +was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six +battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank +Flanders was covered by the corps d'armee of Clairfayt, and upon the +left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of +a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis +was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only _twelve battalions_ +were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were +known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to +Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army +before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay +invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his +central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and +to beat all his large detachments in detail. + +Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having +been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing +this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have +been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and +forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous +diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up +between the sea and two fortresses? + +The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical +error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on +Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi +till the 3d of June,--more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid +opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If +the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by +its left,--that is, both upon the Meuse,--the state of affairs would +have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line +of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the +different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the +center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained +by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of +three hundred miles in extent. + +In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal +theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,--which opened a new +field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this +campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim. +Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces +alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in +the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre +and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought +Pichegru back to Landau. + +In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of +1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The +armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the +extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794, +they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the +Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his +forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then +seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to +steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the +battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of +Moreau to retreat. + +Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is +to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the +battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic +lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable +army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits +the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The +lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons +every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the +first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back +upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and +is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to +keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these +lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and +Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back +upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges +of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to +take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender. + +In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed +two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and +the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the +center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia, +being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _The three +armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn_, eighty +leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he +unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the +army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern +Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of +following up their success on this central line, which cost them so +dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the +Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the +other trifles at Manheim. + +In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves +thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the +Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force +is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples +returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic +direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central +position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army +and beats it, while some leagues from the other. + +In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again +changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of +operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks +of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the +Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no +similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines, +affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt +an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. +By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts +off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving +its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which +forms its secondary line. + +Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of +the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the +armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and +Melas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the +Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of +operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of +Melas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It +may thus be seen that Melas is cut off from his base, and that, on the +contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his +communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines. + +[Illustration: Fig. 3. THE STRATIGIC FIELD OF 1806.] + +The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the +importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military +operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of +defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his +invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province. + +By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted +campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led +to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental +principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines +enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the +important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. The student may also +satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to +this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits +fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy. + + +MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS. + +From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from +that of many others, the following maxims result:-- + +1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive +point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the +choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining +this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a +campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in +1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too +much studied by military men. + +Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The +objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to +be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for +this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first +operation and the new phases it may develop. + +2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical +situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position +of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _In every case, +however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the +extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating +would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the +two extremities at the same time_.[15] + +It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide +his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line +will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, +the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the +rear of his line of defense or front of operations. + +The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it +affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that +by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's +force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of +the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost +without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the +Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction +of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and +Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the +Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Melas were still more +brilliant. + +3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, +it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the +assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this +danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic +direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to +the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take +advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a +change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.) + +The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important +qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by +these examples. + +If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon +Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously +protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the +Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat +than Melas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points +of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and +Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of +regaining the Var or the Valais. + +In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had +there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have +been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the +Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he +placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof, +which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians +had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera +and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the +excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,--as well as the two roads +which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel. + +4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier: +such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large +coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon +the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to +have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the +principal army. + +5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces +on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more +advantageous than a double one. + +6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either +from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has +been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of +the army to each of his masses. + +7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to +exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can +be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate +of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic +plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the +adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body +of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with +instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as +much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling +back upon the principal army. + +8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of +force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring +against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,--since a +single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from +acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well +the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the +respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to +perform. + +9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other +maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and +sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in +numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted +space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to +Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not +be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the +opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however, +may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as +to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be +viewed with comparative indifference. + +10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than +two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy, +and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and +supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the +armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the +combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their +junction. + +11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the +enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by +a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to +the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior, +since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the +pursued. + + +12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of +operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and +important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great +disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an +army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these +changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to +meet unforeseen events. + +At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a +line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would +have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by +Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the +Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one +of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the +siege of Olmutz. + +In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one +which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the +fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to +the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he +possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the +most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career. + +13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical +character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on +the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages +to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like +Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they +naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the +project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle +become so important that every means should be taken to render them +impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may +be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following +figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the +army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior +lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G, +which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the +result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809. + +[Illustration: + Fig. 4. + + K + /\ + / \ + / \ + / \ + F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G / \ A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D +] + + +14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the +direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being +naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the +greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the +frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of +the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and +cutting him from his base. + +But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the +line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the +perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the +figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it +marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the +strategic advantages of its base C D. + +The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to +establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army +as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's +own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy. + +15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the +direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the +principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the +presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the +choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the +advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the +first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most +certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this +purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near +Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by +Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there +the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to +procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in +Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of +Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy +was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led +the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed +because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies +separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only +a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at +Lowicz. + +When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances +of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to +select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the +position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between +Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the +most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this +question, which is both strategic and tactical. + +Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory +is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the +directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The +point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the +center or one of the flanks of the enemy. + +A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended +line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the +dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not +think of disturbing the bridges. + +If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more +concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the +passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass +it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the +bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of +rivers. + +16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be +noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home +and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will +also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or +the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of +the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always +rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that +unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other +hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more +dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could +be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and +interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its +own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants, +authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even +private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad. + +Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the +assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert +regions, particularly when the people are not united against the +invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a +thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about +the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every +thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the +embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and +dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of +Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and +actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania. + +17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much +insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is +that on each side of the line of operations the country should be +cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line: +otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is +everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the +rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the +people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by +diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy +could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a +compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of +taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in +recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not +contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna +when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the +Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the +Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Melas? Did not Eugene march by +way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon +the Mincio but a few leagues from his base? + + +OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES--WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM. + +Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon +definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood; +and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon +themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether +the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these +principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even +admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot +disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural +principles. + +In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the +famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable +event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe +in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional +cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of +opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from +overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to +establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in +case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines +of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and +arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. +Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Bluecher, Bernadotte, and +Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior +army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed +its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not +upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are +doubly in my favor. + +Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the +Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm, +Katzbach, and Dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely +foreign to the principles in question. + +What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with +the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain +on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the +decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of +an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole +army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies +are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the +army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813. + +If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the +allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have +threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this +error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive +battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach +his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for +Bluecher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold +movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over +torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet +Bluecher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed +up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based +upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line +of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study +of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he +knew how to apply this system. + +There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the +injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in +Saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the +right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the +frontiers of Bohemia_. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central +position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them. +When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland, +Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile +enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807; +but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of +operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as +much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in 1813, +either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective +forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at +Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of +destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these +officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement. +Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can +be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army +which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, +shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented +with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who +applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover, +in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from +the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of +these maxims. + +The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic +question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions +founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses +its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with +Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of +the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer +in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred +thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of +thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them +successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong +against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and +for several good reasons:-- + +1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to +bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of +one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily +resist a much larger force. + +2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand +men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with +one of the other armies. + +3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a +quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _materiel_ of every kind, +that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts +from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the +impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to +support such numbers. + +4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in +check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be +very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such +magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will +probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the +advantages gained by the principal army. + +I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric +system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and +to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of +principles. + +Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad: +all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric +lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a +given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately +destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the +maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of +1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the +operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by +closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having +pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric +directions to disperse the defeated army.[19] + +On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When +they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be +sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the +efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately +by a stronger enemy. + +Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be +most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the +principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles +and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base +to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines +and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union +before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case +with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles. + +In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated +than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger. +What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and +Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake +Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels +be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this +city,--one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Bluecher and Wellington, +taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and +the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable +principles of war cannot be violated with impunity. + +Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not +in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim +to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and +were applied by Caesar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by +Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them +out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various +applications. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given +rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it. + +In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of +_maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great +routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three +routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the +different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three +lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two +armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a +double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment +starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six +other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have +a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to +designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set +them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single +corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal +enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an +accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or +radii, but the operation was not double.] + +[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central +positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are +mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two +masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these +are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have +done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of +double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the +theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after +all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.] + +[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct; +for Melas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was +unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication +by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to +cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.] + +[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of +Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the +French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he +had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that +the capital was at his head-quarters.] + +[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively +upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_, +and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.] + +[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main +body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended +to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic +positions, and not lines of operations.] + +[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of +Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of +operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; +but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of +lines of operations.] + +[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a +combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but +Macdonald might have fought Bluecher to advantage if he had better +understood Napoleon's instructions.] + +[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of +concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect +that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he +employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for +example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.] + + + + +ARTICLE XXII. + +Strategic Lines. + + +Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which +differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to +define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those +strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of +their position and their relation to the features of the country, like +the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the +Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute +examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this +kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern +Germany. + +The term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by +the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to +another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its +objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is +crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those +only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real +importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line +of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which +are temporary and change with the operations of the army. + +Besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of +maneuvers_. + +An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of +operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between +the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and +the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at +most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, +directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic +lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for +each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it +operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt, +according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth +and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm +with Nuremberg or Mayence. + +It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of +operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily +applicable to strategic lines. These may be _concentric_, to inflict a +decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. They are rarely _simple_, +since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they +are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if +the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical +superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes +be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the +forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much +risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the +important masses. + +Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against +one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations. + +The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good +for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply +them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves +mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of +these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations +exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done, +to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success; +but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been +taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line +of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to. + +We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army +was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne +and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp, +and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack +by Napoleon on Flanders decided Bluecher to receive battle parallel to +the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no +uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good +chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in +Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful +maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and +seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Bluecher had but three +strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht, +that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army +near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the +application of interior strategic lines,--which Napoleon here, perhaps +for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that +the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a +line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a +_strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. It was bold, because he +exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he +sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the +principles of war. + +A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving +Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right +to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his +primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in +force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose +intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the +beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing +this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did +nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the +feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe +losses at Dennewitz were the result. + +Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different +combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended +from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo +and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley +of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had +moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. +There were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow +valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, +or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the +valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two +passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to +hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis +to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano. +The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from +Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a +_strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of Bluecher on Wavre. +However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at +the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at +Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with +Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in +great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back +either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which +made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for +even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have +interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him +to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois +from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian +general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French +army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would +scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten +at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had +advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there +have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon +him the fate of Vandamme at Culm. + +I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time +and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many +adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it +may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its +line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the +enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by +demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what +is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be +adopted under an urgent necessity. + + + + +ARTICLE XXIII. + +Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or +Strategic Reserves. + + +When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or +temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as +his own frontiers. A river with _tetes de ponts_, and one or two large +towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and +to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an +excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a +temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations +leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a +good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but, +she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and +became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of +a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, +particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten +in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its +own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant +temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, +and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot +expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a +temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic +reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits +deserve notice. + +STRATEGIC RESERVES. + + +Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive, +who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of +skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government +always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them +when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army +has its own, and every corps d'armee or division should not fail to +provide one. + +The reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field, +and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the +latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of +war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend +not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and +the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army +takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of +being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve +between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active +reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of +menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to +form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active +service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be +instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central +depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them +the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and +adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be +formed capable of important service. + +Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even +in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on +the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the +neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part +alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near +Vienna. + +In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used +them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at +Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between +the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon +decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with +much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty +thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English +and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her +interests. + +The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was +badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or +Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving +Prince Hohenlohe and Bluecher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin. + +These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the +country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the +double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, +of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its +flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve. + +Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and +whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the +troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant +invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the +scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the +frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be +dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new +levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under +the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be +indispensable. + +The general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these +reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line +of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of +a hostile state. He also decides upon their position, and endeavors to +use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much +as the withdrawal of his good troops. + +These reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base +and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been +reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if +there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up +intrenched camps or _tetes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to +increase the strength of their positions. + +All that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to +temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable +if they possess such well-located pivots. + + + + +ARTICLE XXIV. + +The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System of Marches. + + +_By the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of +conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies +at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other +covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the +other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was war +from the Middle Ages to the era of the French Revolution. During this +revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less +value sprang up. War was commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the +French encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them. +It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and within, that this +system was changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million men in +fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents, +provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivouacked or were +quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of +success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns, +which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of +the broken character of the country of Flanders and the Vosges, they +threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the +columns. This system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at +first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the +methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their generals. Mack, +to whom was attributed the success of the Prince of Coburg, increased +his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose +an open order to the fire of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the +poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried +the positions. + +The first generals of the Republic were fighting-men, and nothing more. +The principal direction of affairs was in the hands of Carnot and of the +Committee of Public Safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad. +Carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the +war. In 1793 he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of +Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly +from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these +different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate France. + +The campaign of 1794 opened badly. It was the force of circumstances, +and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement +of the army of the Moselle on the Sambre; and it was this which led to +the success of Fleurus and the conquest of Belgium. + +In 1795 the mistakes of the French were so great that they were imputed +to treachery. The Austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by +Clairfayt, Chateler, and Schmidt than they had been by Mack and the +Prince of Coburg. The Archduke Charles, applying the principle of +interior lines, triumphed over Moreau and Jourdan in 1796 by a single +march. + +Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,--either +to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it +better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders +to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments, +incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in +overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when +Napoleon made his _debut_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning +worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances, +his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the +Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His +march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of +overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements +from the Rhine. + +The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new +era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He +adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the +capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less +extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies +of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was +here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely +corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system +of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy +not to meet with his approval. + +It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to +all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there +can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the +old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and +camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as +Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,--or with those of the three months +which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till +its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to +the relative merits of the two systems. + +The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, +and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of +conducting a war than this. + +It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his +personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in +urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a +throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare +to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very +distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, +without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has +marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will +for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much +modified and improved. + +If the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches, +humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and +bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, +are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian +hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. Still, it is not +likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has +been demonstrated by Napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a +certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have +a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and +military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. Then +the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as +reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more +formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more +necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results. + +If, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead +of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to +acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political +equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and +perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale. +Then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men +return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of +Napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until +then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced +so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an +active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion. + +The science of marches now includes more than details, like the +following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of +departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and +the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part +of the duties of the staff of an army. Outside and beyond these very +important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations +of strategy. For instance, the march of Napoleon by the Saint-Bernard +to fall upon the communications of Melas, those made in 1805 by +Donauwerth to cut off Mack, and in 1806 by Gera to turn the Prussians, +the march of Suwaroff from Turin to the Trebbia to meet Macdonald, that +of the Russian army on Taroutin, then upon Krasnoi, were decisive +operations, not because of their relation to Logistics, but on account +of their strategic relations. + +Indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great +principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point; +and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in +Article XIX. What was the passage of the Saint-Bernard but a line of +operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the +enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? The marches of Ulm and Jena +were the same maneuvers; and what was Bluecher's march at Waterloo but an +application of interior strategic lines? + +From this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to +throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the +front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the +principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. The +operations of the French in 1793 from Dunkirk to Landau, and those of +Napoleon in 1796, 1809, and 1814, are models of this kind. + +One of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to +so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest +strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple +object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease +and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. However, it +is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of +concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow. + +This alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the +true test of a great general. + +There is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which +deserves notice. They have always been held up as very dangerous; but +nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term +_flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of +battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate +operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to +ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in +them, unless the most common precautions of Logistics be neglected. In a +strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by +about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced +guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case there +could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another. + +There are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether +inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations, +of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as +to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the +famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on +the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. +It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of the +author. + +The second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was +the case with Napoleon at Borodino,) and particularly if this line +affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank +movement exposing this line would be a great fault. + +In countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are +still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a +change of the line of operations. The physical and moral condition of +the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders +will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements. + +The often-quoted marches of Jena and Ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so +was that upon Milan after the passage of the Chiusella, and that of +Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula at Ossiek; and their successful +issue is well known. + +A tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a +different affair. Ney suffered for a movement of this kind at Dennewitz, +and so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frederick at Kolin. + +Nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen was a +true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed +by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its +camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock +Daun was taken in flank, and not Frederick. + +In the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line +of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a +right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were +not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front +of the line of battle. + +The famous march of Eugene within view of the French army, to turn the +lines of Turin, was still more extraordinary than that of Leuthen, and +no less successful. + +In these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not +strategic. The march of Eugene from Mantua to Turin was one of the +greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to +was a movement made to turn the French camp the evening before the +battle. + + + + +ARTICLE XXV. + +Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches. + + +The subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the +commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be +supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's +country is a very difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation +between the commissariat and strategy. + +It will always be difficult to imagine how Darius and Xerxes subsisted +their immense armies in Thrace, where now it would be a hard task to +supply thirty thousand men. During the Middle Ages, the Greeks, +barbarians, and more lately the Crusaders, maintained considerable +bodies of men in that country. Caesar said that war should support war, +and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the +countries he overran. + +The Middle Ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds, +and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the Huns, Vandals, +Goths, and Mongols who successively traversed Europe, and how they lived +during their marches. The commissariat arrangements of the Crusaders +would also be an interesting subject of research. + +In the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies +of Francis I., in crossing the Alps into Italy, did not carry with them +large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or +fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of +the Ticino and Po. + +Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger; they fought +on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were +established as they moved. This interfered greatly with operations, +restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon +the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the +number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to +camp. + +During the Revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity. +The large armies which invaded Belgium and Germany lived sometimes in +the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the +country, and often by plunder and pillage. To subsist an army on the +granaries of Belgium, Italy, Swabia, and the rich banks of the Rhine and +Danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and +does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but +this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite +impossible in Russia, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It may readily be +conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where +every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. This +system gave Napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it +on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable. + +A general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded +country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the +local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to +make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their +fulfillment. If the authorities do not remain, he should create +provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary +powers. The provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points +most convenient for the operations of the army. In order to husband +them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care +to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them. +The inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the +supplies to the points occupied by the troops. + +It is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to +undertake without having previously established these depots, as much +depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of +the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:-- + +1. That in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one +hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from +the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of +country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any +single operation. + +As the first operation never requires more than a month, during which +time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be +sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants +of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain +at a particular point. Thus, the army of Napoleon, while half of it was +besieging Ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if +there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed. + +2. During this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies +obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the +wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a +position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise. + +3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be +echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of +communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the +army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive +supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should +be as well covered as possible. To this end, it would be well to have +the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations, +which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement has two +real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of +the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it +facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single +point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the +initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the +offensive and gained some advantage. + +4. In thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its +most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to +advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient +provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its +lines of depots. + +5. In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in +their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it +is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and +without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under +these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not +impossible. + +6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but +it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after +the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid +expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should +consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the +wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of +roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, +and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these +vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to +take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the +successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry +with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour. + +7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of +supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply +himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of +a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications +with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus +exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the +mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army +advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its +communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the +progress of the army. + +8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base +itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its +ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic +front opposed to the sea. + +9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations +of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also +free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise +necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the +most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case +the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is +essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from +the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior +flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the +sea. + +In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for +transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a +small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it +sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as +Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages +of rivers are more substantial. + +10. In default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be +fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous +countries, in numbers to last for some little time. This source of +supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan +leads to plunder. The requisitions for cattle should be well regulated; +and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased +elsewhere. + +I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon which may +appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. He said that in +his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops +were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy +to procure every thing in abundance. This is a remark upon which it +would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the +success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war +differs from narrow theory. + + + + +ARTICLE XXVI. + +The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.--Wars of +Sieges. + + +Forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers; +secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign. + +The defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate. +It is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great +natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and +these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. The problem here +is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. The Alps and the +Pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the Crapacks, of Riesengebirge, of +Erzgebirge, of the Boehmerwald, of the Black Forest, of the Vosges, and +of the Jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a +good system of fortresses. + +Of all these frontiers, that separating France and Piedmont was best +covered. The valleys of the Stura and Suza, the passes of Argentine, of +Mont-Genevre, and of Mont-Cenis,--the only ones considered +practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of +considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains +of Piedmont. It was certainly no easy matter to surmount these +difficulties. + +These excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage +of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be +carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other +route hitherto deemed impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis +I.,--which is so well described by Gaillard,--Napoleon's passage of the +Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in +the remark of Napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set +his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man, +and applied by him with great success. + +Other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or +as a second. It is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so +well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and +communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. It cannot be +said that the Danube divides Bessarabia from the Ottoman empire as long +as the Turks have a foothold in Moldavia. The Rhine was never the real +frontier of France and Germany; for the French for long periods held +points upon the right bank, while the Germans were in possession of +Mayence, Luxembourg, and the _tetes de ponts_ of Manheim and Wesel on +the left bank. + +If, however, the Danube, the Rhine, Rhone, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, Po, and +Adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they +should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they +permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations. + +An example of this kind is the Inn, which separates Bavaria from +Austria: flanked on the south by the Tyrolese Alps, on the north by +Bohemia and the Danube, its narrow front is covered by the three +fortified places of Passau, Braunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with some +poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose +curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most +rapid of rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of +"impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of 1800, +1805, and 1809. + +The majority of the European states have frontiers by no means so +formidable as that of the Alps and the Inn, being generally open, or +consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number +of points. We propose to give a set of general maxims equally +applicable to all cases. + +When the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to +make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses, +requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not +prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. It is much wiser to build +fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation +of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the +impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the +movements of the army which is to repel him. + +If it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the +progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels +the army to detach a part of its force or to make _detours_ in its +march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to +the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, +finally, is a place of refuge in case of need. + +Fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations; +and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy. + +The first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in +the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the +forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege; +the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege +which it proposes to cover. + +As fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same +degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. They +are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the +state whose men and money are wasted upon them. There are many in Europe +in this category. It is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses +very close together. This system has been wrongly imputed to Vauban, +who, on the contrary, had a controversy with Louvois about the great +number of points the latter desired to fortify. The maxims on this point +are as follow:-- + +1. The fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and +should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[20] There should be +three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the +third, near the center of the state. If there be four fronts, this would +require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places. + +It will be objected that this number is large, and that even Austria has +not so many. It must be recollected that France has more than forty upon +only a third of its frontiers, (from Besancon to Dunkirk,) and still has +not enough on the third line in the center of the country. A Board +convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has +decided quite recently that more were required. This does not prove that +there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition +should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much +crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence. +Admitting that France has two fronts from Dunkirk to Basel, one from +Basel to Savoy, one from Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally +distinct line of the Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts, +requiring forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this +is enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the +northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important +element of their usefulness. Austria has a less number, because she is +bordered by the small German states, which, instead of being hostile, +place their own forts at her disposal. Moreover, the number above given +is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of +nearly equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and extending +from Koenigsberg almost to the gates of Metz, should not be fortified +upon the same system as France, Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical +position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number +of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included. + +2. Fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points +already designated in Article XIX. As to their tactical qualities, their +sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in +order to increase the difficulty of blockading them. + +3. Those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own +defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those +situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. Mayence, Coblentz, +and Strasbourg, including Kehl, are true illustrations and models of +this kind. Places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command +three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take, for +instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank of the Main the +fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right, was the most formidable +place in Europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men: +so that works of this extent must be few in number. + +4. Large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are +preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the +citizens can be relied on for their defense. Metz arrested the whole +power of Charles V, and Lille for a whole year delayed Eugene and +Marlborough. Strasbourg has many times proved the security of French +armies. During the last wars these places were passed without being +besieged by the invading forces, because all Europe was in arms against +France; but one hundred and fifty thousand Germans having in their front +one hundred thousand French could not penetrate to the Seine with +impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points. + +5. Formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, +and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized +armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial +obstacles. The exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the +true course is a mean between these extremes. Doubtless, it will always +be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of +the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to +pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be +unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much depends upon +the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of +the nations. + +If Austria were the sole antagonist of France, she could not follow in +the footsteps of the allies in 1814; neither is it probable that fifty +thousand French will very soon risk themselves beyond the Noric Alps, in +the very heart of Austria, as Napoleon did in 1797.[21] Such events only +occur under exceptional circumstances. + +6. It may be concluded from what precedes,--1st, that, while fortified +places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by +dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; 2d, +that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line +of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; 3d, +that an army cannot pass a large river, like the Danube or the Rhine, +without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order +to secure a good line of retreat. Once master of this place, the army +may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other +places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the +army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege +are correspondingly diminished. + +7. While large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly +people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an +enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the +operations of an army in the field. The fort of Koenigstein in 1813 was +as useful to the French as the fortress of Dresden, because it procured +a _tete de pont_ on the Elbe. + +In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value +to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and +not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of Bard, in the valley +of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800. + +8. It follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses +as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to +facilitate military operations. Walled cities with a shallow ditch may +be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots, +hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any +small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. They will be particularly +serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken +the active army. + +9. Large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions +are a positive misfortune for both the army and state. + +10. Those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war, +except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental +army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. Benningsen +almost lost the Russian armies by basing them in 1807 on +Koenigsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. If the +Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating on Smolensk, had +supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it would have been in danger of +being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases. + +The relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of +two kinds. An invading army may pass by fortified places without +attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to +watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other +it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armee, under a single +commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. When +the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry +on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either +continue its march or take a position to cover the siege. + +Formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole +army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and +contravallation. These lines cost as much in labor and expense as the +siege itself. The famous case of the lines of Turin, which were fifteen +miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand French, +were forced by Prince Eugene with forty thousand men in 1706, is enough +to condemn this ridiculous system. + +Much as the recital of the immense labors of Caesar in the investment of +Alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in +our times will imitate his example. Nevertheless, it is very necessary +for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works +commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the +siege might be disturbed from without. This was done by Napoleon at +Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna. + +Experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and +pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. If +the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a +strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might +arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be +spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching +army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not. + +Bonaparte in 1796, at Mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the +operations of an army of observation. + + +INTRENCHED LINES. + +Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to +above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and +is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is +intended to protect a part of the frontiers. + +As a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an +army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of +intrenched lines absurd. I do not now refer to lines of small extent +closing a narrow gorge, like Fussen and Scharnitz, for they may be +regarded as forts; but I speak of extended lines many leagues in length +and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. For instance, +those of Wissembourg, which, covered by the Lauter flowing in front, +supported by the Rhine on the right and the Vosges on the left, seemed +to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on +every occasion when they were assailed. + +The lines of Stollhofen, which on the right of the Rhine played the same +part as those of Wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and +those of the Queich and the Kinzig had the same fate. + +The lines of Turin, (1706,) and those of Mayence, (1795,) although +intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in +question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. However well +they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes +their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. +To bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and +surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is +manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another +instance of it. Nevertheless, in our chapter on Tactics we will treat of +their attack and defense. + +It may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended +lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be +derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging +force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 20: The memorable campaign of 1829 is evidence of the value of +such a system. If the Porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles +of the Balkan and a good fortress toward Faki, the Russians would not +have reached Adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.] + +[Footnote 21: Still, Napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the +Frioul, since the Austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the +Rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to +beat the Archduke Charles before this force joined him. In view of the +circumstances of the case, Napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the +principles of war.] + + + + +ARTICLE XXVII. + +The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts with Strategy. + + +It would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of +ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards, +or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts. +Only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and +even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford +an army. + +It may be seen by the example of the camp of Buntzelwitz, which saved +Frederick in 1761, and by those of Kehl and Dusseldorf in 1796, that +such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. The camp of Ulm, in +1800, enabled Kray to arrest for a whole month the army of Moreau on +the Danube; and Wellington derived great advantages from his camp of +Torres-Vedras. The Turks were greatly assisted in defending the country +between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains by the camp of Shumla. + +The principal rule in this connection is that camps should be +established on strategic points which should also possess tactical +advantages. If the camp of Drissa was useless to the Russians in 1812, +it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their +defensive system, which should have rested upon Smolensk and Moscow. +Hence the Russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days. + +The maxims which have been given for the determination of the great +decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because +they ought only to be placed on such points. The influence of these +camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure +for an offensive operation, as _tetes de ponts_ to assure the crossing +of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for +a defeated army. + +However good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult +to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of +Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. Whenever it can +be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to +abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden +was an important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as it +was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an +ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps +within a few days for want of provisions. + +Despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary +support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even +when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in +reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a +_coup de main_. It is also important that they be established close to a +fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of +the camp nearest to the line of retreat. + +In general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tete de pont_ +on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city +like Mayence or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never +be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of +collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy, +it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the +open country. + +The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly +advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a +French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost +when the space between the Rhine and Elbe was held by the enemy; but if +it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a +little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the +enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving force and the +intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Rhine. + +We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but +several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover +places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little +sophistical. Doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place +when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts +and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and +principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a +temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively +upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a +camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply +to retard a siege, would be folly. The example of Wurmser, who prolonged +the defense of Mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not +his army perish? And was this sacrifice really useful? I do not think +so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the +siege-train having fallen into the hands of the Austrians, the siege was +necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by +reason of famine; and, this being the case, Wurmser's presence ought +rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender. + +The intrenched camp of the Austrians before Mayence in 1795 would, +indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the French had +possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the Rhine had not +been crossed; but as soon as Jourdan appeared on the Lahn, and Moreau in +the Black Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the +place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the event of a +fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army +to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object +of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in +Europe is upon such a site? + +So far from agreeing with these German authors, on the contrary, it +seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these +camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the +same bank as the place, or upon the other. When it is necessary to make +a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to +cover both banks, I should decidedly prefer the latter. + +To serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the +bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal +danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by +passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the +same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the +other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take +the latter in reverse. For instance, the Russians, who could not hold +for twenty-four hours their camp of Drissa, would have defied the enemy +for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of +the Dwina, covering the rear of the camp. So Moreau for three months, at +Kehl, withstood all the efforts of the Archduke Charles; while if +Strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would +easily have been turned by a passage of the Rhine. + +Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified +place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would +fulfill this condition. The fortification of Coblentz, recently +constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. This system of the +Prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent +works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its +defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense +advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine. Indeed, the +inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only +very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to +the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon +at Essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions +and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might +not avail. The system of detached permanent works of Coblentz has the +advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the +same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from +attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city were +upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp +of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security +either for the depots or the army. So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary +fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make +it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching +from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, +which is intended to protect Coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult +of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of +a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed. + +Much has been recently said of a new system used by the Archduke +Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of Linz,--by masonry towers. +As I only know of it by hearsay and the description by Captain Allard in +the _Spectateur Militaire_, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know +that the system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel Andreis +appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of +improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. We are told that +the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have +the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being +sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well +flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous +camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines. +If the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by +field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp +preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous +as afforded by the large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number +thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort +commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on the right bank, +some seven or eight are only half-towers. The circumference of this line +is about twelve miles. The towers are between five hundred and six +hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a +palisaded covered way. They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with +a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven +twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. Those +towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _deblais_ of which forms +a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but I should +think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire. + +Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete +bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a fortress of the first rank, +would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a +quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an +entirely different object. If these works are to resist a regular siege, +they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp +to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube for a large +army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war +like that of 1809, and, if existing then, would probably have saved the +capital. + +To complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to +encircle Linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built +seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the +Traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to +have included for the camp only the curved space between Linz, the +Traun, and the Danube. Then the double advantage of a fortress of the +first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even +if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army, +particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of +Perlingsberg had been preserved. + +TETES DE PONTS. + +_Tetes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. The +difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face +of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works, +which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if +the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which +may attend a rapid retreat across a large river. + +_Tetes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were +_keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also +cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they +will mutually support each other. It is needless to state that these +works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all +fronts where there are no permanent works. It may be observed that the +principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of +_tetes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of +detached and closed works, while _tetes de ponts_ usually consist of +contiguous works not closed. An intrenched line to admit of defense must +be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally +require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are +detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them. + +The attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent +part of this volume. + + + + +ARTICLE XXVIII. + +Strategic Operations in Mountains. + + +A mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under +four different aspects. It may be the whole theater of the war, or it +may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or +there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may +debouch into large and rich plains. + +If Switzerland, the Tyrol, the Noric provinces, some parts of Turkey and +Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, be excepted, in the European countries +the mountains are in single ranges. In these cases there is but a +difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome, +is an advantage rather than an objection. In fact, the range once +crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may +be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and +find a temporary refuge. The only essential precaution to be observed +is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of +retreat. The part of the Alps between France and Italy, and the +Pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this +nature. The mountains of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the +Vosges, belong to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole +country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this province, +the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of +mountains. Hungary in this respect differs little from Lombardy and +Castile; for if the Crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as +marked a feature as the Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary +obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of +the Waag, of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of +Mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the Danube and the Theiss +for a field of operations. The only difference would be in the roads, +which in the Alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in Hungary +there are none of much value. In its northern part, this chain, though +not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of +fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its +evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the +Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. The +attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study +of the most interesting character. + +When an extremely mountainous country, such as the Tyrol or Switzerland, +is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is +secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies +deciding the great contests in the valleys. It will, of course, be +otherwise if this be the whole field. + +It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave +control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave +control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and +competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that +the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, in +this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their +arrangement in the country. If sixty thousand French were advancing on +Bavaria in presence of an equal force of Austrians, and the latter +should throw thirty thousand men into the Tyrol, intending to replace +them by reinforcements on its arrival on the Inn, it would be difficult +for the French to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force +on its flanks masters of the outlets of Scharnitz, Fussen, Kufstein, and +Lofers. But if the French force were one hundred and twenty thousand +men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over +the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to +mask the passes of the Tyrol and extend its progress as far as Linz,--as +Moreau did in 1800. + +Thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only +accessory zones. If we regard them as the principal fields of +operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. The +campaigns of 1799 and 1800 are equally rich in instruction on this +branch of the art. In my account of them I have endeavored to bring out +their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and I cannot +do better than refer my readers to it. + +When we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of Switzerland by +the French Directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of +the theater of operations and making it reach from the Texel to Naples, +we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of France and Austria in the +transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of +Switzerland. Every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying +the interesting campaigns of the Archduke Charles, Suwaroff, and +Massena in 1799, and those of Napoleon and Moreau in 1800. The first is +a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is +a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided +on the plains. + +I will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this +study. + +When a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal +theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely +based upon maxims applicable in an open country. + +Transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations +of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. In +such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small +number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced +guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide +means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate +these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for +the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small +bodies of light troops. + +The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the +larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in +number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its +forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct +attacks to dislodge it. + +However, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and +difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. On the +contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these +centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of +retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it +would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two +difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the +whole army. + +If the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be +admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity +of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made +upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal +marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points. +In order to complete what I have said upon this kind of marches and the +difficulties of directing them, I will refer to what Napoleon did in +1805 to cut off Mack from Ulm. If this operation was facilitated by the +hundred roads which cross Swabia in all directions, and if it would have +been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal +routes, to make the long circuit from Donauwerth by Augsburg to +Memmingen, it is also true that Mack could by these same hundred roads +have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been +entrapped in one of the valleys of Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from +which there was but a single outlet. + +On the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country +concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to +occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be +easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very +mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal +routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the +enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious +inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not +observed. + +Nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in +mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we +attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying +down maxims for them. If it were but a question of the defense of a +single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five +converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two +or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be +easier of solution. It would then be sufficient to recommend the +construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned +point of each of these valleys. Protected by these forts, a few brigades +of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the +army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in +position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously +threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he +debouches. If to this be added good instructions to the commanders of +the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for +rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to +continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the +general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the +many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. But, if +there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which +are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the +defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a +cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a +better one. + +We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration +of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's +defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and +Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had +enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch, +and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian +army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend +such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great +valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward +Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the +trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of +the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how +abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the +approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the +Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would +be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching +force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the +masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender +the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an +inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it. + +After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it +seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line +of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,--a line shorter +than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance +to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into +Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with +the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove +that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense +in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense, +because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be +remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the +offensive. + +General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on +the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind +of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he +might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by +demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active +attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in +mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it +ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he +sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even +when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard. +Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed +to Wurmser and Alvinzi. + +As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading +the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the +Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to +capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the +presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that +general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the +Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had +been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary +was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand +men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand +allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after +four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory +_in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will +is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons, +need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not +to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I +say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations +should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally, +that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the +great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great +mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of +defending the country? + +I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous +countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a +national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes +with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every +advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always +necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or +less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of +Stanz and of the Tyrol. + +The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case: +it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are +extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous. + +In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make +demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the +enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which +promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break +through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the +defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole +line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of +Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men +on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing +this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show +that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous +mountain-ranges can generally be forced. + +The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army +which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between +Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those +_insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him +it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have +already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and +Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it +inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral +issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into +these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army +toward Turin or Carignano. + +When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and +the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to +regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a +single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought +to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In +my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to +confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the +columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six +roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; +but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the +routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the +enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the +Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the +center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to +divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march. + +The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much +greater and more difficult task than where a denouement may be +accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of +battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous +region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it +would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow +and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the +invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or +three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, +the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the +junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be +driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys. + +Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would +be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with +their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple +number. + +To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with +localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, +would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best +school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by +the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my +History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of +the Grisons by Segur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr +and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the +passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this +study. + + + + +ARTICLE XXIX. + +Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions. + + +There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those +which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The +second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of +country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. +The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea +by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the +seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes +the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, +but where a powerful state is attacked. + +As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the +Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly +be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of +these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its +base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the +same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of +defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their +arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the +Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad +fate of many of these great invasions. + +In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is +merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own +interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in +the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of +all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a +principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General +Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty +thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the +mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand +men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus +found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity +of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his +misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of +about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been +hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The +battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the +Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became +the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the +opportunity of regaining its own country. + +The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the +expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in +Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander +under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less +disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his +communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in +no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of +the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great +abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were +allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political +ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension +which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have +been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points. + +History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions +across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with +forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were +necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to +the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran +empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery +and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly +since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer +together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining +each other, no such events have taken place. + +Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the +Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of +Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been +scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of +Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; +for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in +Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the +Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, +besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no +one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe +from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be +imitated. + +Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all +invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the +same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from +these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of +operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones +applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, +although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812, +although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His +care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while +Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered +Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he +had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself +safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply +on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success. + +If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic +precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of +troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at +Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was +unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which +that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do +not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the +conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune; +although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place +immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised +distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin. +Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to +know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of +wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been +possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having +previously defeated the Russian army. + +It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of +Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _denouement_ +between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery +of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the +people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and +sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have +given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia, +he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and +enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the +greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm. + +The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point +for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never +to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance +of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a +proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which +may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of +resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these +operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the +safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual +bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to +these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, +seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and +moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried +too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can +insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five +or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly +ruined nations and armies. + +Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been +rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in +date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the +sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, +has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships, +but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions. + +It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now +is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest +of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when +Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his +fleet coasted the shore. + +Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that +the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of +immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. +Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress +depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind +of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare +occurrence. + +The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of +operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are +the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations +of war. + +Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, +are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking +Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon +the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the +Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of +Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going +as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable +troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all +be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be +undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in +view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. +Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions +as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in +Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not +be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of +policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that +day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, +and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the +strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their +co-operation cannot be obtained. + + +EPITOME OF STRATEGY + + * * * * * + +The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled +by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which +enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the +definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important +operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that +we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating +of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations +of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of +which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made. + +By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will +be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give +a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter. + +From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the +manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters +of operations is found in what follows:-- + +1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the +reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in +accordance with Article XVIII. + +2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic +field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy +with the least risk to one's self. + +3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of +operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke +Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for +retreats parallel to the frontiers. + +On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success +of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the +extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was +successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations +upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined +by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims +presented in Article XXI. + +4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them +such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the +forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from +affording each other mutual support. + +5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic +positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important +strategic points of the theater of war. + +6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and +activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may +be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of +the hostile army. + +The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an +army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the +enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will +be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive +strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to +the enemy can be given. + +However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive +course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with +attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and +successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, +thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and +continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of +gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom. + +The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most +satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already +mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in +Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty +battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and +Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four +victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been +found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive +strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the +Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon +the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the +most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most +pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic +principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most +decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon. +The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples. + +It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be +able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of +war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own +country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and +of _tetes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great +decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of +the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines +and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has +afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and +Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from +the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by +different fortified places projected or completed. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES. + + +Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great +questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to +the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, +the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and +fortune, gains victories. + +Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to +battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in +tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of +the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that +point the possession of which promises the most important results. + +Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding +features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have +been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched +battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that +a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same +character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations. + +The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which +are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the +order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the +plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, +the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers +subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the +proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, +superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and +the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as +well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and +their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting +that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot +result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few +brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish +before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his +position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the +maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. +As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage +the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of +it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and +opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's +design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the +same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than +tactical combinations to accomplish it. + +There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those +fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's +attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in +position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the +collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in +succession the different combinations they present. + + + + +ARTICLE XXX. + +Positions and Defensive Battles. + + +When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line +of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this +work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_ +and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. I +will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by +battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will +take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will +await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is +the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical +intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully +explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an +_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to +execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the +oblique order, the perpendicular order. + +This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper +distinction between two things which should by no means be +confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that +the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements; +because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will +be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of +battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of +troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some +maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to +offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the +line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of +troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a +position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or +any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases. + +Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of +positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a +favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the +purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. Such a position may be +taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such +as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls +the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege. + +There are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been +discussed in Article XX., and the _tactical_. The latter, again, are +subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied +to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a +word, intrenched camps. Their relations to strategic operations have +been treated in Article XXVII., and their attack and defense are +discussed in Article XXXV. Secondly, we have positions naturally strong, +where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third +and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the +defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary +according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance +not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too +extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep +and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary +camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this +kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of +access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, +should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops +forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles +presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy +than for the assailed. For example, it is certain that Massena, in +taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error +if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was +exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason, +Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a +good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the avenues of approach +were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover, +rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a +battle-ground. + +The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are +the following:-- + + 1. To have the communications to the front such as to make it + easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to + approach the line of battle. + + 2. To give the artillery all its effect in the defense. + + 3. To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of + troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point + deemed the proper one. + + 4. To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements. + + 5. To have an unobstructed line of retreat. + + 6. To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or + artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon + their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or + at least some point of the front. + + This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on + a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest + reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the + broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed + to afford perfect protection. This danger--about which there can be + no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy + defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable + obstacles.[23] + + 7. Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by + throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous; because a + crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may + cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of + the two lines prolonged. A strong reserve in close column behind + the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the + required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground + must always decide in the choice between the two methods. Full + details on this point are given in the description of the battle of + Prague, (Chapter II. of the Seven Years' War.) + + + 8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the + flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other + points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack + upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most + advantageous for defense,--as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo. + Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest + accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the + insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack + Wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered. + + When a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to + hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in + order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining + idle spectators of it. + +The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but +palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is +to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_. +Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been +mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us +to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo. +Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road +behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as +Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? My own opinion is that +such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely +open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure +to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a +portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would, +in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great +part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. +There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a +forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are +at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for +retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press +too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank +movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, +as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, +as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for +this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and +give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads. + +When discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying +chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give +rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the +initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and +striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon +the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is +often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by +those of the enemy. We have also seen that in tactics these advantages +are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller +extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his +movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once +counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover, the party +advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising +from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile +line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always +inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, +farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or +be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's +batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a +greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire +either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of +these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages +resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages. + +However undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more +manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history. +Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if +attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by +all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to +take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest +success. A general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping +strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give +way when properly attacked. It is not so, however, with a general who +indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall +upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and +transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward +movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength +into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether +impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. In fact, a general +who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has +the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously +arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries +placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very +dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and +when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly +assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the +advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral +effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed +to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops. + +A general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success +either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,--1st, +that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know +how to take the offensive at favorable moments; 2d, that his +_coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; 3d, that he be able +to rely surely upon his troops; 4th, that, in retaking the offensive, he +should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would +have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; 5th, +that he strike his blows upon decisive points. These truths are +demonstrated by Napoleon's course at Rivoli and Austerlitz, as well as +by Wellington's at Talavera, at Salamanca, and at Waterloo. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 22: It is from no desire to make innovations that I have +modified old terms or made new. In the development of a science, it is +wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if +we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of +troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important +maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of +battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique +system of battle_, &c. + +I prefer the method of designation I have adopted. The _order of battle_ +on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary +formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of +battle_.] + +[Footnote 23: The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and +the rivulet of Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the +famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube, +in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that +the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but, +throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the +difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not +be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen +the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost +ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.] + + + + + +ARTICLE XXXI. + +Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle. + + +We understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when +assaulting another in position.[24] An army reduced to the strategic +defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army +receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the +offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. History furnishes +numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. As defensive +battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages +of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the +consideration of offensive movements. + +It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage +over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the +latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty. + +As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack +must be adopted; and that is what I have thought ought to be called +_order of battle_. + +It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without +a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely +known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in +every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than +of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to +make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should +therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point. + +The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already +stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different +localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the +arrangement of the contending forces. For example, suppose an enemy's +flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be +attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically +considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very +difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least +importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left +of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province +was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically +considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be +held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line +of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by forcing the +right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and +throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all +their _materiel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. This +course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the +features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have +diminished the obstacles in the future. + +The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated: +1. The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical +key; 2. The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which +combines strategic with topographical advantages; 3. When the +difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic +point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point; +4. It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends +very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines +of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the +proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is +the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, +it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this +case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical +superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon +both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior +numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the +combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to +obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points +mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a +point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned. + +The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or +to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin +his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at +some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank +and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him +in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line +turned. + +To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make +choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used. + +At least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: 1. The simple +parallel order; 2. The parallel order with a defensive or offensive +crotchet; 3. The order reinforced upon one or both wings; 4. The order +reinforced in the center; 5. The simple oblique order, or the oblique +reinforced on the attacking wing; 6 and 7. The perpendicular order on +one or both wings; 8. The concave order; 9. The convex order; 10. The +order by echelon on one or both wings; 11. The order by echelon on the +center; 12. The order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the +center and one extremity simultaneously. (See Figs. 5 to 16.) + +[Illustration: Fig. 5.[25] + +A TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT + + +____________________________|____________________________ B ] + +Each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been +stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to +turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits +of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the +general principles which have been laid down. For example, it is +manifest that the parallel order (Fig. 5) is worst of all, for it +requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against +battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical +skill is needed in such a battle. + +There is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order, +which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great +strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's +communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its +own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has +reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having +effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts +should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to +open a way through for himself. Except for this single case, the +parallel order is the worst of all. I do not mean to say that a battle +cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must +gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will +then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to +engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by +fortune. + +[Illustration: Fig. 6. + + | | + | | + A | |B +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT | + | +______________________|________________________| + B +] + +The parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (Fig. 6) is most +usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an +offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in +the case of defense it is to the rear. The battle of Prague is a very +remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if +properly attacked. + +[Illustration: Fig. 7. + A +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT + + + ____|___ + ___________________|____________________ + B ____|___ +] + +The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (Fig. 7,) or upon the +center, (Fig. 8, page 190,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more +favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in +accordance with the general principles which have been laid down; +although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the +line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own +safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy. + +[Illustration: Fig. 8. + A +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT + + ________|________ + _________________ + B _________________ +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 9.] + +The oblique order (Fig. 9) is the best for an inferior force attacking a +superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main +strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it +has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only +kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double +duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of +being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged +wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas at the battles +of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in modern +times was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. (See +Chapter VII. of Treatise on Grand Operations.) + +[Illustration: Fig. 10. + C | + \ | + \ | + \| +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT/| + / | + / | + / | + C | + B-| + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + +] + +[Illustration: Fig. 11. + +| | +| | +| ___________A______________ | +| | +| | +| | +| | +| | +| | +|-B B-| +| | +| | +| | +| | +| | +] + +The perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in Figs. 10 and +11, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction +along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle. +Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions +indicated in these figures; for if the army B were to take its first +position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army +A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line; +and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the +extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right +or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take +him in reverse, as at C, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in +Fig. 10. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would +take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder +of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and +this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in +Figures 9 and 16. + +The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be +very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very +decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to +bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker +army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior +force. This truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on. + +[Illustration: Fig. 12.] + +The order concave in the center (Fig. 12) has found advocates since the +day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannae. This order may +indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to +it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him, +and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. But, if this order +is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on +the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their +extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they +had been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be scarcely +ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to +fight a battle, as will be seen farther on. + +[Illustration: Fig. 12, _bis_.] + +An army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line +with the center retired, (Fig. 12, _bis_.) If several writers may be +believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the English on the +famous days of Crecy and Agincourt. This order is certainly better than +a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack, +whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the +advantages of concentration of fire. These advantages vanish if the +enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is +content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon +one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous use of a +concave line; but it must not be inferred that Napoleon committed an +error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the Danube +behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of +communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at +pleasure. + +[Illustration: Fig. 13.] + +The convex order with the center salient (Fig. 13) answers for an +engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must +be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a +defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be +passed and the defile covered, as at Leipsic; and, finally, it may +become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If +an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single +wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[26] + + +The French tried it at Fleurus in 1794, and were successful, because +the Prince of Coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center +or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six +diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. Nearly the +same convex order was adopted at Essling, and during the second and +third days of the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had +just the result that might have been expected. + +[Illustration: Fig. 14 + A +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT + +_____ _____ + _____ _____ + _____ _____ + _____ B _____ + _______ +] +The order by echelon upon the two wings Fig. 14 is of the same nature as +the perpendicular order, (Fig. 11,) being, however, better than that, +because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where +the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as +regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center +and make at that point a threatening counter-attack. + +[Illustration: Fig. 15 + A +TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT + + ___|___ + ___|__ __|___ + _____ _____ + _____B B_____ +_____ _____ + +] + +The order by echelon on the center (Fig. 15) may be used with special +success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too +extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the +wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be +probably destroyed. But, applying the test of the same fundamental +principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of +success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the +reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act +either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost +echelons, might readily repulse them. + +If this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge +or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of Winkelried, it also +differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid +mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of +artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would +render movements more easy. This formation is suitable, as has been +said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might +be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the +wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the +flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result. +A parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be +a much better arrangement, (Figs. 8 and 16;) for the parallel line in +this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to +the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons +of the center by the flank. + +This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the +intrenched camp of Buntzelwitz. (Treatise on Grand Operations, chapter +xxviii.) In such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain +that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, +there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this +formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point +of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made +upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack. + +[Illustration Fig 16.] + +The order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the +same time (Fig. 16) is better than the preceding, especially in an +attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. It may +even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. The +attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents +the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank, +as was done by Hannibal and Marshal Saxe. The enemy's wing which is +hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having +to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and +probably destroyed. It was this maneuver which gave Napoleon his +victories of Wagram and Ligny. This was what he wished to attempt at +Borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the +heroic conduct of the Russian left and the division of Paskevitch in the +famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of Baggavout's +corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at +Bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but +for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing +intended to cut off the allies from the road to Wurschen, every +arrangement having been made with that view. + +It should be observed that these different orders are not to be +understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general +who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon +paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be +likely to suffer defeat. This is particularly true as battles are now +fought. In the time of Louis XIV. or of Frederick, it was possible to +form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures, +because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected +together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving +ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns +to be at regular distances from each other. But in our day,--when armies +bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility, +when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given +them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has +been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally, +when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of +battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be +laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. These figures +have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate +arrangements. + +If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the +influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of +winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of +battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of +maneuvers arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different; +for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to +render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous +fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give +good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is +to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive +maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is +to result in victory. + +Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be +understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, +excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective +_coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with +the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without +speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the +arrival of a corps at the appointed place. + +Hence result two undoubted truths: 1. The more simple a decisive +maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; 2. Sudden maneuvers +seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than +those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to +previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to +decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the +expected result. Waterloo and Bautzen are proofs of the last. From the +moment when Bluecher and Bulow had reached the heights of Frichermont, +nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and +they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like +manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the retreat of the +allies during the night of the 20th of May could alone have saved them, +for on the 21st it was too late; and, if Ney had executed better what +he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one. + +As to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the +co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, +with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, +it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends +upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely +seen. This subject will be considered in Art. XXXII. + +Besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an +order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin +without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the +collision may have been expected. This uncertainty results either from +circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's +position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be +still expected to arrive on the field. + +From these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to +reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that +the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an +engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases +cited above. Indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it +is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy +lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the +party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm +will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to +be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts +to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack +shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed +against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once. +Whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a +resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. Even in +unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is +hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the +different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless. + +There is nothing even in Napoleon's battles which disproves my +assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being +represented by lines accurately laid down. We see him, however, at +Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward +the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. +At the Pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. At +Leipsic, Essling, and Brienne he used a kind of convex order very like +Fig. 11. At Wagram his order was altogether like Fig. 16, bringing up +two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing; +and this he wished to repeat at Borodino and at Waterloo before the +Prussians came up. At Eylau, although the collision was almost entirely +unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive +movement of the Russians, he outflanked their left almost +perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break +through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the +center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst Davoust did not attack +vigorously upon the left until toward one. At Dresden he attacked by the +two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center +was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition, +the attack of his left was combined with that of Vandamme upon the +enemy's line of retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself, +the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole, saved +him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were battles won by +strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with +them. At Ulm there was not even a regular battle. + +I think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark +out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be +used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless +bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so +combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be +similar to one of them. He should endeavor in all his combinations, +whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to +form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field; +and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's +line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy +requires him to operate. He will then give his attention and efforts to +this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or +watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point +the possession of which will insure him the victory. Acting thus, he +will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can +impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the +most perfect manner. The manner of determining the decisive point of a +battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (Art. XIX.) + +Having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me +that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in +the Memoirs of Napoleon published by General Montholon. + +The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern +invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion I can by no means share; for +the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it +used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon's seems the more +remarkable because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo, +the very order of which he thus denies the existence. + +If we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid +and precise manner inculcated by General Ruchel at the Berlin school. +Napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but I +repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and +when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it +can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by +the use of a known symbol. It is nevertheless true that every line of +battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must +be oblique of necessity. If one army attacks the extremity of another +army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it +while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of +the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it +will be nearer the enemy than the other. The oblique order is so far +from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by +echelons on one wing, (Fig. 14.) + +As to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied +that at Essling and Fleurus the general arrangement of the Austrians was +a concave line, and that of the French a convex. In these orders +parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they +would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of +the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than +another. + +Laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical +figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles +in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended +to:-- + + 1. An offensive order of battle should have for its object to force + the enemy from his position by all reasonable means. + + 2. The maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm + one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. An + enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and + turning his position. + + 3. These attempts have a much greater probability of success if + concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault. + + 4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without + having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the + rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very + strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points. + + 5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least + half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, + while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of + attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique + line. + + 6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or + otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform + strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point. + + 7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the + attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be + such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, + and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to + fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least + expect to meet it. + + 8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method + to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order + of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of + the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. + A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting + alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good + combination. In the practical use of this system many variations + must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the + _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers + and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c. + + 9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy + from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best + means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can + be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the + direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better + results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing + which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus + threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if + attacked by main force. + + History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, + especially when used against generals of weak character; and, + although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and + the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete + successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a + skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them + when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these + turning movements with attacks by main force. + + 10. The combination of these two methods--that is to say, the + attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render + the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but, + in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in + presence of a contemptible enemy. + + 11. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force + is the following:--Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and + well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by + vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus + gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front + by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry. + + But, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the + first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, + the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking + party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral + effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat + of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence + of mind. In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat + disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to + replace them by those of the second line, because they generally + follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within + musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to + substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the + moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in + repelling the attack. + + These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the + troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance + of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks + and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually + be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to + insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be + launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the + proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable, + and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first. + + 12. From the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth: + "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the + means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in + strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second + line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of + masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the + decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is + presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of + battles." + + In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain + guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never + compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient + substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience + in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. + + The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all + arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be + always held in hand,[27] will, therefore, at the critical moment of + the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will + attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention. + This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties + is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put + forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to + wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to + make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous + attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous. + + 13. In the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more + effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to + be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and + marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as + skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. The + object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the + troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry + will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the + enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part + of the cavalry must be launched against him. There will then be a + strong probability of his repulse. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 24: In every battle one party must be the assailant and the +other assailed. Every battle is hence offensive for one party and +defensive for the other.] + +[Footnote 25: The letter A in this and other figures of the twelve +orders indicates the defensive army, and B the offensive. The armies are +represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the +figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle +ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of +attack, in squares, or checkerwise.] + +[Footnote 26: An attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in +some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the +enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. As a rule, a +false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one +extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.] + +[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when +it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final +reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau +decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what +Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of +history.] + + + + + +ARTICLE XXXII. + +Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles. + + +We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn +an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may +be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide +detours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of +so many plans seemingly well arranged. + +It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which +is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking +place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, +as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_ +of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which +he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many +maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded +against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous +in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire +success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to +take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself +have been in the habit of moving in this manner. + +It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. +The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the +force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, +however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. +A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any +thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and +seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be +more daring. + +A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of +the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these +extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the +armies concerned in them. + +In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because +the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards +between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part +remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was +the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter +distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had +to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick +was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it. + +On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, +because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and +disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of +Marshal Daun.[28] Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric +movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose +line was thus reformed. + +The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in point. All who are familiar +with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother +wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the +plateau of Rivoli. Their center was beaten,--while their left was piled +up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making +a wide _detour_ to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was +speedily surrounded and captured. + +No one can forget the day of Stockach, where Jourdan conceived the +unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of +sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight +thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst +Saint-Cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to +pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of +sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these +divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their +rear. Saint-Cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle. + +We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to +surround Napoleon at Rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at Austerlitz, +in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of +the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off +from Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement +of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their +line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and +surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes +Tellnitz and Melnitz. + +Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a maneuver very similar to +Napoleon's, because Marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to +Portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing +which, the English general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no +support. + +If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austerlitz, he +might have destroyed the French army, instead of suffering in each case +a total defeat; for the general who at Stockach attacked a mass of sixty +thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be +unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper +advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the same way, +Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca an adversary whose chief +merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. With the Duke of +York or Moore for an antagonist, Marmont would probably have been +successful. + +Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo +and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was +almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare +concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will +search in vain in military history for another example of a single +brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, +and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in +the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all +probability, to lay down his arms. + +At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the +successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center +under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune +assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have +been the result. + +So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that +no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for +it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an +order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find +himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; +but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his +enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to +regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers +or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were +the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to +outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and +opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the +enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. +Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications +before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army +preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be +successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected +maneuver during the battle. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and +XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.] + + + + +ARTICLE XXXIII. + +Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March. + + +The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives +rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war. + +In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a +position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as +close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,--especially +as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each +intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision +ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it +does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another +which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the French at +Rossbach. + +A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a +skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is always +possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander +may not have great capacity; but victories like those of Lutzen, +Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius +endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations. + +There is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no +means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the +very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the +fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying +them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided +upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms. + +Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage, +and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause +their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they +are traversing. In each army the forces should at the same time be +concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction +considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in +deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the +deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a +badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced +guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the +troops which were forming. (See the account of the battle of Rossbach, +Treatise on Grand Operations.) + +In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon +several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, +these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are +unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then +the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best +suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the +enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him. + + + + + +ARTICLE XXXIV. + +Of Surprises of Armies. + + +I shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief +features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light +Russian and Turkish cavalry are so well adapted. I shall confine myself +to an examination of the surprise of whole armies. + +Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected +than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are +heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to +an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten +and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known +because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War +presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that +a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are +sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the +combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity +of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it +so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from +their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point +intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack. + +As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march, +prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan +one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's +camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a +surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected +attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in +1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his +imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but +there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his +own negligence. + +It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to +fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of +the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place; +and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can +give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his +forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events +occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although +it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which +renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought. + +For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities +for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to +prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any +well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last. + + + + +ARTICLE XXXV. + +Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or +Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General. + + +There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, +are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be +carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether +practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other +means of getting to the parapet. + +The attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations +as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de +main_. + +This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the strength +of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on which they are +built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; 4th, with +the morale of the respective parties. History gives us examples of all +of these varieties. + +For examples, take the intrenched camps of Kehl, Dresden, and Warsaw, +the lines of Turin and Mayence, the intrenchments of Feldkirch, +Scharnitz, and Assiette. Here I have mentioned several cases, each with +varying circumstances and results. At Kehl (1796) the intrenchments were +better connected and better constructed than at Warsaw. There was, in +fact, a _tete de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for +the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would +have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. At +Warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had +as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended +by a number of desperate men. + +Dresden, in 1813, had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of +which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was +suited to a field-work. The camp proper was protected by simple +redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep +giving it its sole strength.[29] + +At Mayence and at Turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation; +but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at +Turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant +parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. +In the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were +attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when Prince Eugene +assailed them from without. At Mayence the lines were attacked in front, +only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right +flank. + +The tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few +in number. If it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked +a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if +this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by +no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp +will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of +all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. As an attack +by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the +following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:-- + + 1. Silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire, + which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the + defenders. + + 2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as + fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and + mount the parapet. + + 3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken, + skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their + support. + + 4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover + for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible. + + 5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their + duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of + attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of + cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground + permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing + more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as + actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the + gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most + daring rashness. + +Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for +escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great +advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the +passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets. + +Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read, +none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched +camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions +for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is +an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited +as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal +Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be +followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for +attacking Dresden in 1813. + +Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or +escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both +preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in +neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault. + +Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better +interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried, +because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost +impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. +The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described +in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,) +and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent +lessons for study. + +This famous event at Turin, which has been so often referred to, is so +familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of +it; but I cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was +bought and how little it should have been expected. The strategic plan +was certainly admirable; and the march from the Adige through Piacenza +to Asti by the right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio, +was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. When +we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess that the victors +owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. It required no +great effort of genius upon the part of Prince Eugene to prepare the +order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt +for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied +troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the +one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for +forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever +attempted. The order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of +instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a +better. Directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade +in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make +openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make +up the sum total of all the science exhibited by Eugene in order to +carry out his rash undertaking It is true he selected the weak point of +the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the +bodies of its defenders. + +But I am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation +of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. If +they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by +assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by +strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last +indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. If, however, there is any +reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one +of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored. +There have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the +defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that +point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded +simply because unexpected. In these operations the locality and the +character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to +be pursued. + +The attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps. +It has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief +and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be +quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away +from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of +moderate activity. The ramparts of Ismail and Praga were of this +character; so also was the citadel of Smolensk, which Paskevitch so +gloriously defended against Ney, because he preferred making his stand +at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with +an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees. + +If one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think +of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces, +the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns +advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them. +This absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the +enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive +return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. A +general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half +conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them +when their intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I +cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk +and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could have no just cause of +complaint. + +Very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and +lines. The first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between +the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of +the left wing and on the left of the right wing. With this arrangement +succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which +could not be done were there but one central reserve. It has been +suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment +is very extensive; but I decidedly incline to the opinion that two are +quite enough. Another recommendation may be given, and it is of great +importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means +despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point; +because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack +the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have +supposed in his power. + + +COUPS DE MAIN. + +These are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the +capture of posts of different strength or importance.[30] They partake +of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both +these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a +successful issue. Although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical +operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the +captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. It will become +necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main +in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However tiresome these +repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state here the manner of executing +such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack +of intrenchments. + +I do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these +operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules +are not applicable to them. I desire only to call attention to them, and +refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic, +where they are mentioned. + +I have previously stated that important results may often follow from +these enterprises. The capture of Sizeboli in 1828, the unsuccessful +attack of General Petrasch upon Kehl in 1796, the remarkable surprises +of Cremona in 1702, of Gibraltar in 1704, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1814, +as well as the escalades of Port Mahon and Badajos, give an idea of the +different kinds of _coup de main_. Some are effected by surprise, others +by open force. Skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the +assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things +which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_. + +As war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer +of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon +the results of a great strategic operation. + +The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that +of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the +two attacks which were made in 1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the +Grisons; the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, +the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of +provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the +enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging +in them may be exposed. + +Posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with +fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the +same purpose. Ladders are generally necessary, and should always be +prepared. Hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of +soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the +intrenchment. An entrance was effected through the sewers at Cremona by +Prince Eugene. + +In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for +what has been done once may be done again. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 29: The number of defenders at Dresden the first day (August +25) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the +third day, more than one hundred thousand.] + +[Footnote 30: The distinction between the importance and the strength of +a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little +importance, and vice aversa.] + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL +AND PARTLY TACTICAL. + + + + +ARTICLE XXXVI. + +Of Diversions and Great Detachments. + + +The operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important +a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining +their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest +and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing +is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and +having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally +certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately +adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it as one of the essential +qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many +detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of +attacking the main body during their absence. + +The division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been +carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many +persons now believe it better to have none of them. It is undoubtedly +much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass; +but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a +complete or even considerable success. The essential point in this +matter is to send out as few detachments as possible. + +There are several kinds of detachments. + + 1. There are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of + operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater + or less importance. + + 2. There are large detachments made in the zone of operations to + cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard + a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if + threatened. + + 3. There are large detachments made upon the front of operations, + in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some + combined operation. + + 4. There are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect + of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an + important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign. + +I understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a +distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a +theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly +supposed the whole campaign depends. Such diversions are useful in but +two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed +cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the +real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a +detachment would receive strong support from the population among which +it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than +military combinations. A few illustrative examples may not be out of +place here. + +The unfortunate results for the allied powers of the Anglo-Russian +expedition to Holland, and of that of the Archduke Charles toward the +end of the last century, (which have been referred to in Article XIX.,) +are well known. + +In 1805, Napoleon was occupying Naples and Hanover. The allies intended +an Anglo-Russian army to drive him out of Italy, while the combined +forces of England, Russia, and Sweden should drive him from Hanover, +nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated +points. But, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities +of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of Naples and Hanover, +Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction with Massena in the Frioul, and +Bernadotte, leaving Hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of +Ulm and Austerlitz. After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no +difficulty in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the +failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an operation +would have been proper. + +In the civil wars of 1793, if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to +La Vendee, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the +numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at Toulon, upon the +Rhine, and in Belgium. Here is a case where a diversion would have been +not only very useful, but decisive. + + +It has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of +small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations +of the main army. + +If the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary +objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is +no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be, +indispensable. + +These great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. The first are +permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction +opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a +campaign. The second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of +assisting in carrying out some special enterprise. + +Among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an +army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which +mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when +the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For +example, a Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to +leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk, and the +valley of the Danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of +operations. However successful it may be, a respectable force must +always be left toward Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of +the river toward Routchouk. + +This single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a +double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps +must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the +main army. Other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned +where this measure would be equally essential to safety. One case is the +double strategic front of the Tyrol and the Frioul for a French army +passing the Adige. On whichever side it may wish to direct its main +column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong +to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of +communications. The third example is the frontier of Spain, which +enables the Spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the +road to Madrid, the other having Saragossa or Galicia as a base. To +whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the +other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction. + +All that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge +as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to +give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them +by opportune movements to strike important blows. A most remarkable +illustration of this truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of +1797. Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the +valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was operating toward +the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk +of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts +of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that +he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no +particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon +his communications. + +Great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following +reasons:-- + + 1. To compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations, + or else to cover your own. + + 2. To intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body + of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own + reinforcements. + + 3. To observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing + army, while a blow is struck at the remainder. + + 4. To carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions, + on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the + success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a + convoy of your own. + + 5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where + you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an + enterprise in another direction. + + 6. To mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a + certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison + shut up within the ramparts. + + 7. To take possession of an important point upon the communications + of an enemy already retreating. + +However great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as +those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are +always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be +successful at the decisive points. A multiplication of detachments must, +therefore, be avoided. Armies have been destroyed for no other reason +than that they were not kept together. + +We will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their +success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill +of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution. + +Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of Charles +XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous +convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars entirely defeated at Denain +the large detachment Prince Eugene sent out in 1709 under D'Albermale. + +The destruction of the great convoy Laudon took from Frederick during +the siege of Olmutz compelled the king to evacuate Moravia. The fate of +the two detachments of Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen +in 1759, demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making +detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come nearer our own +times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was a bloody lesson, teaching +that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must +admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault +was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it +properly, as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at +Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason. + +Diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are +decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the +enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is +collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck. +In such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps +making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main +body. We will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts. + +In 1800, Moreau, wishing to deceive Kray as to the true direction of his +march, carried his left wing toward Rastadt from Kehl, whilst he was +really filing off his army toward Stockach; his left, having simply +shown itself, returned toward the center by Fribourg in Brisgau. + +In 1805, Napoleon, while master of Vienna, detached the corps of +Bernadotte to Iglau to overawe Bohemia and paralyze the Archduke +Ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another +direction he sent Davoust to Presburg to show himself in Hungary; but he +withdrew them to Brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide +the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the +result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so far from being +in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to +facilitate their application. + +It readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be +laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of +which depends on so many minute details. Generals should run the risk of +making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of +all the surrounding circumstances. The only reasonable rules on the +subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall +thorn immediately when their duty is performed. The inconveniences +necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving +judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders: +herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff. + +One of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments +sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by +tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good +positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict +with too large a body of troops. In such cases ease and rapidity of +motion will be most likely to insure safety. It seldom happens that it +is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position +it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order. + +It is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of +field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the +army itself. + +Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments +those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few +examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may +call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end +of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of +Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians +rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential +_point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in +advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of +failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had +been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping. + +In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted by +the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and +destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would +have had very important consequences if it had not failed. + +In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and, +as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may +be freely recommended. + +Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's +operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few +hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they +may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small +detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a +great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his +plans to fail by intercepting his couriers. + +For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full +of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they +can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a +telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any +dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and +presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are +qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. +For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter +XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this +work, on light cavalry. + + + + +ARTICLE XXXVII. + +Passage of Rivers and Other Streams. + + +The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place +or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations +belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large +river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the +Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest +study. + +The art of building military bridges is a special branch of military +science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. It is not from +this point of view that I propose to consider the passage of a stream, +but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver. + +The passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the +point of passage may have an important connection with all the +operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. The +passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800 is an excellent +illustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skillful +strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to +take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him +off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau, who had +already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience +to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. The +tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the +strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk +attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same +campaign Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high +strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of +the reserve, after the engagement of the Chiusella, could either march +by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino +and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino, +enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with +twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at +Piacenza, expecting to get before Melas more certainly in that direction +than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of +the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar +operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of +the destruction of Mack's army. + +The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by +recollecting the principles laid down in Article XIX.; and it is here +only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in +every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive +points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the +distribution of the hostile forces. + +If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical, +no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles +exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the +new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement +as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction. +Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great +influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another +consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is +that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and +line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first +marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon +different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting +a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling. + +Enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations +influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. We will now +proceed to speak of the passage itself. History is the best school in +which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such +operations. The ancients deemed the passage of the Granicus--which is a +small stream--a wonderful exploit. So far as this point is concerned, +the people of modern days can cite much greater. + +The passage of the Rhine at Tholhuys by Louis XIV. has been greatly +lauded; and it was really remarkable. In our own time, General Dedon has +made famous the two passages of the Rhine at Kehl and of the Danube at +Hochstadt in 1800. His work is a model as far as concerns the details; +and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. More +recently, three other passages of the Danube, and the ever-famous +passage of the Beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind +previously seen. The two first were executed by Napoleon at Essling and +at Wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men +provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the +bed of the stream is broadest. General Pelet's interesting account of +them should be carefully read. The third was executed by the Russian +army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not to be compared with the +two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local +difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The +passage of the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give +historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the special +narratives of these events. I will give several general rules to be +observed. + + 1. It is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of + passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. In + addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be + made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the + enemy. For this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to + make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not + to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the + real attempt is to be made. + + 2. The construction of the bridge should be covered as much as + possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging + the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and + these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods, + or other obstacles in the vicinity. + + 3. It is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy + caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any + artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while + building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from + which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other. + + 4. The proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives + great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for + constructing the bridge. In like manner, a smaller stream emptying + into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for + collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge. + + 5. It is well to choose a position where the river makes a + re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can + cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land + from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus + taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the + passage. + + 6. The locality selected should be near good roads on both banks, + that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on + both banks of the river. For this reason, those points where the + banks are high and steep should be usually avoided. + +The rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from +those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract +the efforts of the assailants. The important thing is to have the +course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without +attempting to make a defense at every point. Concentrate rapidly at the +threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of +his army shall have passed. Imitate the Duke of Vendome at Cassano, and +the Archduke Charles at Essling in 1809,--the last example being +particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so +decidedly successful as might have been expected. + +In Article XXI. attention was called to the influence that the passage +of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction +to the lines of operations. We will now see what connection it may have +with subsequent strategic movements. + +One of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to +cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without +interfering too much with the free movement of the army. When the army +is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed +just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling; +but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are +about equal, the case is very different. + +If one hundred thousand Frenchmen pass the Rhine at Strasbourg or at +Manheim in presence of one hundred thousand Austrians, the first thing +to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first, +before them as far as the Black Forest, secondly, by the right in order +to cover the bridges on the Upper Rhine, and thirdly, by the left to +cover the bridges of Mayence and the Lower Rhine. This necessity is the +cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the +inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be +insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be +separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain +absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the +natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces. + +The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in +which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he +divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend +with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and +have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the +enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point, +the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find +himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a +victory. + +The best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which +will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all +possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage, +to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to +beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of +touching the bridges. In some cases eccentric lines of operations may be +used. If the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several +corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with +one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line +of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be +overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be +formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly +drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them +from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges. +But if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the +enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy +may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that +Frederick tactically beat the Austrian line at Leuthen throughout its +length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain +protected during all the forward movements. It was in this manner that +Jourdan, having passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme +right of the Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the +Main. He was driven away because the French, having a double and +exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men +inactive between Mayence and Basel, while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan +upon the Lahn. But this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages +gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic +front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that +previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and +the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of +the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as +well as the positions of the enemy. The mention of these combinations, +of which something has already been said in the article on lines of +operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection +with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion. + +It sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is +attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with +Jourdan and Moreau in 1796. If the advantage is gained of having in case +of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus +operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him, +in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a +condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at +different points. Such an operation will always lead to disastrous +results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to +take advantage of this violation of principles. + +In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be +diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points, +which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two +portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy +from destroying them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this +rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of +Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have +achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of being driven back upon +the Rhine. + + + + +ARTICLE XXXVIII. + +Retreats and Pursuits. + + +Retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. This remark +is so true that the celebrated Prince de Ligne said, in his usual +piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in +retreating. When we think of the physical and moral condition of an army +in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving +order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard +to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to +attempt such an operation. + +What method of retreat shall be recommended? Shall the fight be +continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under +cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance, +but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong +opposition still made to the pursuing army? Should a forced march be +made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as +possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of +fighting again? Each of these methods, although entirely proper in +certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. If the +theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is +certainly one of them. + +If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose +yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced +retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in +darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your +army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing +properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in +broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold +it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is +about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the +troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to +blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing +may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat +commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not +become a rout? + +When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide +whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the +enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause +the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its +salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that, +in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to +retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of +sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check +for several hours. + +Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which +they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in +order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his +present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was +thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the +allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that +Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed +to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was +known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to +choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I +was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde +movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding +the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.) + +A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point +threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of +retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an +exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer +its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost +battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise. + +These are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. Their +character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be +passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. They are specially +dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the +retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of +operations, they become painful and difficult. + +From the time of the famous retreat of the Ten Thousand, so justly +celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the French army +in 1812, history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. That +of Antony, driven out of Media, was more painful than glorious. That of +the Emperor Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In +more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when he passed +by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an admirable one. The +retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does not deserve the praises it +has received. Those executed by the King of Prussia after raising the +siege of Olmutz and after the surprise at Hochkirch were very well +arranged; but they were for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796, +which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but +not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin to +Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the defeat of the +Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Chur, were +glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration. +The retreat of the Russian army from the Niemen to Moscow--a space of +two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as Napoleon +and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat commanded, was certainly +admirable. It was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances, +but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by +the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable +fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. Although +the retreat from Moscow was a bloody catastrophe for Napoleon, it was +also glorious for him and the troops who were at Krasnoi and the +Beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single +man should have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties +covered themselves with glory. + +The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be +traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the +attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or +inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances +which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out +of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make +for their execution. + +A general falling back toward his native land along his line of +magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order, +and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist +his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended +position. It would be absurd to pretend that a French army retiring from +Moscow to the Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry +and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and +with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well provided with every +thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense +number of light cavalry. + +There are five methods of arranging a retreat:-- + + The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road. + + The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps, + marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order + to avoid confusion, especially in the _materiel_. + + The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads + nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival. + + The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. + + The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging + roads. + +I have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is +taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well +sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. This arrangement is +common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the +strategic relations of these operations. + +An army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as +soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it +shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first +method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and +enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it +is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder +of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. An +army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the +single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be +occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure. + +When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having +the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a +great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but +moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular +direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal +days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being +chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the +departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery +may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march, +the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a +half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in succession with +an interval of two hours between the departure of their several +army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in +ordinary countries. In crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other +calculations would doubtless be necessary. + +I apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one +hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand +or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. The army +may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each, +encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. Each of +these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may +either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the +road. In either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five +A.M. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference +with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second +mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the +first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same +time. + +When there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least +for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. It is +scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used +when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best, +because the army is then marching in battle-order. In long days and in +hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early +part of the day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics +to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for +armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats. + +Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and +great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or +division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a +little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and +the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to +arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army +is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as +much mischief as a rout. + +If the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to +relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt +with this object in view. The enemy seeing eighty thousand men in +battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns; +and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space +which has been lost. + +The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is +excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they +are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other +wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it +to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg +toward the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind. + +The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is +undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the +retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite +the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting +this. + +The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of +eccentric lines, which I have attributed to Bulow, and have opposed so +warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because I thought I could +not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or +as to the object of his system. I gathered from his definition that he +recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to +separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object +of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting +his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. I +found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten +army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its +forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy. + +Bulow has found defenders who declare that I mistake his meaning, and +that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat +made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being +directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of +the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along +the line of the frontier of the country. + +I may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and +in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for I have strongly +recommended that kind of a retreat to which I have given the name of the +parallel retreat. It is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which +leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of +moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly +parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and +its base. It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel +retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric +retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the +strategic front. + +However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was +the obscurity of Bulow's text, I find fault only with those retreats +made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater +extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks. + +By using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be +given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. An +army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally; +because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical +inferiority. Shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? I +find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the +ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but I am +speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. Suppose an +army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand. +If the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men, +the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. Can +he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession +all his divisions? How can they escape such a fate? _By concentration_. +This being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls +of itself. + +I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When the leading +divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by Wurmser, Bonaparte +collected them all together at Roverbella; and, although he had only +forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had +only to contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent +retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? Wurmser, +after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two +wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. What was the +result? His right, although supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was +beaten at Trent. Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and +destroyed that at Bassano and Mantua. + +When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts of the +French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an eccentric +movement? Was not the salvation of Germany due to his concentric +retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of +isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his +own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the +alternative of retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all +the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it +was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two +hundred miles. Such examples must put an end to further discussion.[31] + +There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then +only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great +defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection +within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the +sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the +army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province; +but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on +according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply +absurd. + +There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of +a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the +frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be +parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the +line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for +his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France, +or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees. +In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward +Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia. + +These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that +they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the +center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a +retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the +positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may +have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct +communications with the central portions of the state. + +Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army +penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon +Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either +case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of +operations would be at the mercy of their adversary. + +The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same +advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them. + +In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the +nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is +striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army +penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the +Saone, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or +as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way +of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The +occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very +hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based +upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all +countries having double fronts of operations.[32] + +Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the +directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube. +Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions +connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this +frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This +assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800, +1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial +on that ground, the question is still an open one. + +It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method +depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of +each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of +Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it +would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into +the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this +way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left +upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate +division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the +whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would +be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy, +beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application +on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy +approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations +would be too contracted. + +In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against +an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its +employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the +Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria +were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the +country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the +direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a +movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin. + +When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a +pursuit always follows. + +A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army +in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and +this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of +supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then +becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its +difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy +in conducting the pursuit. + +The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon +the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of +the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases +of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:-- + + 1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of + the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own + country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly + or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must, + however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might + then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely. + + 2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as + possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained; + because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously + followed up. + + 3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of + gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say; + for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a + country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have + been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers. + +Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the +subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand +combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical +measures which may render them more easy of execution. + +One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to +familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be +resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that +the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops +harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is +at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special +importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be +furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the +purpose of getting supplies by marauding. + +It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer +of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in +advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for +occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so +rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have +considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the +execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of +thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to +prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the +retreating columns. + +It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the +distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would +run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When, +however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may +increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to +the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same +degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. +If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it +may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its +strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of +the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance +not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is +made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time +to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the +Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and +Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of +the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of +troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and +spoils. + +Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of +interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over +it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when +the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge, +it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be +taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that +they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for +the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard +should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as +far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will +permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much +hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall +have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the +main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the +rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass +through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the +river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give +him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new +rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the +river, breaking the bridges after it. + +It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form +on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps +left to hold the enemy in check. + +The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the +precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be +taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be +constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the +construction of a regular _tete de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will +be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops. + +If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only +pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is +threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy +in force. + +The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most +remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more +desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and +skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve +hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in +front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded +by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the +honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped +its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise +should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of +operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of +Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a +rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the +capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the +lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies. + +The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be +closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, +and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one +which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place +yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such +a case is rare. + +If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by +regular _tetes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the +rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use +every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the +bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also +fire-ships and mills,--a means the Austrians used in 1796 against +Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised +the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same +thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and +brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin. + +It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character +unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be +anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating +bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the +concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army. +Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the +end, the cause of his ruin.] + +[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces +nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive, +it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly +upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the +frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.] + + + + + +ARTICLE XXXIX. + +Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter +Quarters. + + +So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my +subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly. + +To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is +generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there +is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country +where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia, +or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of +quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops +have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the +divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia, +portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is +more difficult to put an army into winter quarters. + +Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the +end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan +character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts. + +The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by +Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of +conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the +other side to prevent its success. + +The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the +following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and +occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too +extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and +cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer +line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by +field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the +troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by +which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry; +finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any +point. + +In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments +behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being +hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered more +than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite +in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position +until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be +expected to be the case everywhere. + +An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to +have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries +where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size +of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country +occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means +of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion. +The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty +thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with +the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in +check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is +assembled. + +It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going +into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems +inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn +from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an +army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in +quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice. + +In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a +campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or +waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will +probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such +positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order +that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy +to do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist +readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be +ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are +by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to +place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in +case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may +present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march +from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same +rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter +quarters. + + + + +ARTICLE XL. + +Descents. + + +These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the +most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared +enemy. + +Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in +navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous +three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred +cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a +numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until +the debarkation of the army takes place. + +Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of +war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and +could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the +number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests, +the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much +certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these +reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern +times. + +Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the +Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,--the +innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,--the great +expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of +Alexander into Asia Minor, those of Caesar to England and Africa, that +of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,--the Crusades,--the expeditions +of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy? + +Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II. +was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on +foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions +were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of +Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents +of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St. +Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, +Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for +that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the +difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts. + +The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the +world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against +second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation +for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense +trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. + +We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast +problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true +that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred +and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles: +unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left +us entirely in the dark as to this grave question. + +It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the +Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of +being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to +pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would +become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war +and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the +fleet or oblige it to regain its ports? + +Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future +generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or +at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their +deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains +of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and +the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring +to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen +between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the +preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the +present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of +statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France +from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the +activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the +careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the +possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the +English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had +had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept +moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not +so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover, +the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water +that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in +preparation and vast means of transportation. + +Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an +expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is +evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four +cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against +second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad; +3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a +position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a +diversion, at once political and military, against a state already +engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the +point of the descent. + +It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character. +About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive +the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels +may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much +activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some +strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on +shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection +to the troops that have landed. + +A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the +transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed +in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great +advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to +great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats, +tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness +for the proper use of their arms? + +I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces +too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an impossibility to +line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but +the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be +protected must be closed. Signals should be arranged for giving prompt +notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable +force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a +firm foothold. + +The configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and +their prosecution. There are countries where the coasts are steep and +present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be +landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent +becomes more difficult. + +Finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents +which may be usefully pointed out. The same principle which forbids a +continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the +enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a +coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the +shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies. +For the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the +possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land +which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened +by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be +re-embarked without hurry and loss. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES. + + + + +ARTICLE XLI. + +A few Remarks on Logistics in General. + + +Is logistics simply a science of detail? Or, on the contrary, is it a +general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of +war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate +collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the +different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations +of the art? + +These questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly +convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and +believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems +already accurately classified. For my own part, I am persuaded that good +definitions lead to clear ideas; and I acknowledge some embarrassment in +answering these questions which seem so simple. + +In the earlier editions of this work I followed the example of other +military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of +staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and +of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. This +was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. The word _logistics_ +is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major general des logis_, +(translated in German by _Quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it +formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the +marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. Logistics was +then quite limited. But when war began to be waged without camps, +movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more +extended functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of +transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points +of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents +for arranging plans of operations. The chief of staff was called to the +assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of +them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to +supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute +details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the +operations of a campaign. + +To be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man +should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. If +the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the Archduke +Charles, the voluminous treatises of Guibert, Laroche-Aymon, Bousmard, +and Ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete +sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than +the science of applying all possible military knowledge. + +It appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is +insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the +real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to +instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be +accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the +general principles of the art. Governments should take the precaution to +publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties +of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to +the best methods of performing these duties. + +The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their +government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted +to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. This is the only +work of the kind I have seen. There are, no doubt, others, both public +and secret; but I have no knowledge of their existence. Several +generals--as, for instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut--have prepared +manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued +several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a +complete manual on the subject. + +If it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details +of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff +officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most +important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics +includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we +retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and +developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of +ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief. + +To convince my readers of this fact, I will mention the principal points +that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and +detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings +resulting from such movements:-- + + 1. The preparation of all the material necessary for setting the + army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign. + Drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage + of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of + operations. + + 2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief + for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected + battles. + + 3. Arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the + measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be + used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to + facilitate the operations of the army. + + 4. Ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and + procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as + possible of the positions and movements of the enemy. + + 5. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements + ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different + columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner. + Ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and + safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and time of + halts. + + 6. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards, + flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions + for their guidance. Providing all the means necessary for the + performance of their duties. + + 7. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or + their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing + up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as + their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to + engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the + character of the enemy.[33] + + 8. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen + points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and + informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of + need. + + 9. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, + munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in + their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the + movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking + precautions for order and security, both on the march and when + trains are halted and parked. + + 10. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. + Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of + the army, and regulating their use. + + 11. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations + for their safety, good order, and police. + + 12. Establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies, + as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached + bodies. Designating officers capable of organizing and commanding + in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and + convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also + for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its + base. + + 13. Organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, + movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their + safety. + + 14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the + flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking + out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on + detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some + center of action, and forming strategic reserves. + + 15. Organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up + isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction + between the army and its base of operations. + + 16. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of + the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of + artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those + troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults. + + 17. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving + order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard; + causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where + the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his + pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the + movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that + they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper + precautions to insure safety. + + 18. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; + indicating to each principal division of the army a place of + assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders, + instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed. + +An examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer +by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that +these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff +officers. This truth I announced some time ago; and it is for the very +purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention +to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided +with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution. +Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and +woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! This +want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have +faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual +interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and +hindering them in performing their duties.[34] + + +It is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the +guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious +duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff +officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that I should be +obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these +details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these +subjects. + +I will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of +the first articles enumerated above:-- + +1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army +to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are +likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. They +should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that +the _materiel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses, +carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully +examined and any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool +trains, _materiel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move, +ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of +_materiel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order. + +If the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers, +gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft +should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will +probably be used. Intelligent officers should examine the most favorable +points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those +localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary +establishment on the opposite bank. + +The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be +necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the +proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction +to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any +thing relative to the projected enterprise. + +If the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief +engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of +operations, when _tetes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be +constructed there. If the war is defensive, these works will be built +between the first line of defense and the second base. + +2. An essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to +making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the +general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of +staff. The next most important qualification of a general, after that of +knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating +the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. Whatever may be +the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a +commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the +general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he +can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief. + +I have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the +service. The first, which may be styled the old school, consists in +issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general +instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much +the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps, +who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same +sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of +school. + +The other method is that of the detached orders given by Napoleon to +his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself, +and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on +the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the +operations of the whole army.[35] I have good reasons for knowing that +he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of +mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands +of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans. + +It is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans +secret; and Frederick the Great was right when he said that if his +night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire. +That kind of secrecy was practicable in Frederick's time, when his whole +army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of +Napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of +action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is +going on around them? + +Of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. A judicious mean +may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of Napoleon and the +minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like Barclay, +Kleist, and Wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies +and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more +ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the +enemy is impracticable. It would be sufficient, I think, in such cases, +to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to +add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of +the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing +it. When a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted +verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it +accurately. Indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and +concert of action would be secured. + +3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some +enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and +precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual +precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue +and to cover its movements thoroughly. + +There are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of +the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or +retiring. These marches particularly have undergone great changes in +late years. Formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had +been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had +roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each +other. At present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing +roads usually answer all purposes. It is, however, of importance, when +an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced +guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove +obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and +secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of +the army. + +In the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and +distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different +distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and +giving them instructions the following particulars must be +considered:--1, the distances to be passed over; 2, the amount of +_materiel_ in each train; 3, the nature of the country; 4, the obstacles +placed in the way by the enemy; 5, the fact whether or not it is +important for the march to be concealed or open. + +Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging +the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all +those corps not marching with the column attached to the general +head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the +generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them +understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will +then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the +object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which +they will be expected to be in position. They should be informed what +corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads +to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves +accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the +enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[36] + +All those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the +chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in +position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. To see that they +march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but +they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the +appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their +command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. In retreats, +however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into +divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated. + +Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its +march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient +also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each +column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools +for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of +these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light +trestle-bridge train will be found very useful. + +4. The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard, +or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing +may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves +and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced +guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that +half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these +circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the +road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be +made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the +general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved +in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the +march of the center must be applied to that wing. + +Advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of +forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an +accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his +plans understandingly. The commander of the advanced guard should assist +the general in the same way. A general advanced guard should be composed +of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _elite_ troops of +the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some +horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and +pontoons for passing small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out +of place. A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch +of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. A body of +irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular +cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such +service. + +5. As the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes +the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which +may keep up the connection of the army with its base. The staff officers +will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being +established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number +of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected +as the site of the principal depot. + +The secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to +thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. The mean distance +apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. This will give fifteen +depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into +three or four brigades of depots. Each of these will have a commander +and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the +arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the +authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities +for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees +that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. If possible, there +should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the +principal one in each brigade. The command of all the depots embraced +within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and +able general officers; for the security of the communications of the +army often depends on their operations.[37] These commands may sometimes +become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art. XXIII.; a few good +battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing +continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to +keep open the communications. + +6. The study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to +be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of +march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires +going into such minute detail that I must pass it over nearly in +silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous +works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war. + +Before leaving this interesting subject, I think a few examples should +be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of +logistics. One of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the +French army in the plains of Gera in 1806; another is the entrance of +the army upon the campaign of 1815. + +In each of these cases Napoleon possessed the ability to make such +arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated, +were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of +the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue +of the campaign. The choice of the decisive point was the result of a +skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements +for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated +in his own closet. It has been long claimed that Berthier framed those +instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually +transmitted with so much clearness; but I have had frequent +opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. The emperor was +his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to +a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight +line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into +account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched +at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the +supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, +he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and +precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers about from point +to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches +necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a +certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in +mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the +hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone +enough to make any man famous. + +Ney coming from the shores of Lake Constance, Lannes from Upper Swabia, +Soult and Davoust from Bavaria and the Palatinate, Bernadotte and +Augereau from Franconia, and the Imperial Guard from Paris, were all +thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously +between Saalfeld, Gera, and Plauen, few persons in the army or in +Germany having any conception of the object of these movements which +seemed so very complicated. + +In the same manner, in 1815, when Bluecher had his army quietly in +cantonments between the Sambre and the Rhine, and Wellington was +attending _fetes_ in Brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of +France, Napoleon, who was supposed to be at Paris entirely engrossed +with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been +but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon +Charleroi and Bluecher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points +of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the 14th of June, in the +plains of Beaumont and upon the banks of the Sambre. (Napoleon did not +leave Paris until the 12th.) + +The combinations described above were the results of wise strategic +calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of +logistics. In order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures, +I will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics +came very near leading to fatal consequences. Napoleon having been +recalled from Spain in 1809 by the fact of Austria's taking up arms, and +being certain that this power intended war, he sent Berthier into +Bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was +extended from Braunau as far as Strasbourg and Erfurt. Davoust was +returning from the latter city, Oudinot from Frankfort; Massena, who had +been on his way to Spain, was retiring toward Ulm by the Strasbourg +route; the Saxons, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers were moving from their +respective countries. The corps were thus separated by great distances, +and the Austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break +through this spider's web or brush away its threads. Napoleon was justly +uneasy, and ordered Berthier to assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war +had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it +in a more retired position toward Ulm. + +The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war had begun, +Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as +the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred +thousand enemies; but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the +army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have +five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a +highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated. + +No great talent was needed to understand this. Hostilities having +commenced, however, but a few days after Berthier's arrival at Munich, +this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a +literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its +obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at Ratisbon, +but even obliged Davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal +had had the good sense to fall back from Amberg toward Ingolstadt. + +Napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the +passage of the Inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the +speed of lightning to Abensberg, just as Davoust was on the point of +being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one +hundred and eighty thousand enemies. We know how wonderfully Napoleon +succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the +glorious days of Abensberg, Siegberg, Landshut, Eckmuehl, and Ratisbon, +that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his +contemptible logistics. + +We shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which +preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the Danube before the +battle of Wagram. The measures taken to bring to a specified point of +the island of Lobau the corps of the Viceroy of Italy from Hungary, that +of Marmont from Styria, that of Bernadotte from Linz, are less wonderful +than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated +the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains +of Enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand Austrians +and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fete_. +These masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the +4th of July; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the +Danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst +torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the +bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before +mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they +covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time +than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver +for instruction and after being several times repeated. The enemy had, +it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage; +but Napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions +is not at all diminished by it. + +Singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten +copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge +of the center had been assigned to Davoust, who had the right wing, +whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the +center. These two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not +been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene +of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the supineness of the +enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few +detachments following corps to which they did not belong. The most +remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that +after such a blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince +of Wagram. + +The error doubtless originated with Napoleon while dictating his decree; +but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten +copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of +the troops? + +Another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good +logistics was afforded at the battle of Leipsic. In fighting this +battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at Leipsic, and in the +midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it +was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the +banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. These +precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but +they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well +as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder +and of there being no roads of escape. The unaccountable blowing up of +the bridge of Lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness +upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name, +owing to the manner of Berthier's management of it. We must also agree +that Napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures +of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would +be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was +present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future +unless by his direction. + +To complete what I proposed when I commenced this article, it becomes +necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances. +They are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and +statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its +accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its +resources and means of every kind. At the present day, when the sciences +of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state, +these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are +still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any +country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed +with. There are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of +making these reconnoissances, and I must direct the attention of my +readers to them. + +Reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to +gain information of the movements of the enemy. They are made by +detachments of greater or less strength. If the enemy is drawn up in +battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the +reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be +thrown out to break through his screen of posts. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 33: I refer here to general instructions and forms, which are +not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.] + +[Footnote 34: The chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the +administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the +general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. There should, of +course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high +officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of +the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise, +confusion is inevitable.] + +[Footnote 35: I believe that at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, +and at the opening of the second campaign of 1813, Napoleon deviated +from his usual custom by issuing a general order.] + +[Footnote 36: Napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no +general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten. +In many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often +indispensable.] + +[Footnote 37: It may be objected that in some wars, as where the +population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to +organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed +to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most +necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid +was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the +guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the +line extended as far as Cadiz.] + + + + +ARTICLE XLII. + +Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct Information of +the Movements of the Enemy. + + +One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to +order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's +proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if +he is ignorant what his adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of +the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the +utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the +chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice +of war. + +From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply +learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired +that practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the +direction of military operations. It is a very easy matter for a +school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line +of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of +both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful, +active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect +riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the +incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius. + +I have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if I had +to put a general to the test, I should have a much higher regard for the +man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy +than for him who could make a grand display of theories,--things so +difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once +exemplified. + +There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations. +The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in +reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third, +in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of +probabilities. This last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is +also a fifth method,--that of signals. Although this is used rather for +indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to +his designs, it may be classed with the others. + +Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other +agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for +reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing +beyond the line of the advanced guard. I do not mean to say that they +should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining +information; but I do say that their results are small and not to be +depended upon. Reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is +generally dangerous to credit them. A skillful chief of staff will +always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their +questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and +deserters. + +The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of +operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is +almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information +they possess. An extensive system of espionage will generally be +successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the +general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for +him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his +own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the general receives +from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those +which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally +to attempt. Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed +through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed through Gera +toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, Where are they +going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? These things the most +skillful spy cannot learn. + +When armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the +enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be +thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report +accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into +corps d'armee which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to +learn any thing about them. Spies may, however, be very useful when the +hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who +always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. Such, for +example, were the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon. If it was known when +they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to +conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of +smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly. + +A skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making +reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. I can with great satisfaction +say that this means hardly ever failed me. Though fortune never placed +me at the head of an army, I have been chief of staff to nearly a +hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils +of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under +consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of +Europe; and I was never more than two or three times mistaken in my +hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. As +I have said before, I have constantly noticed that, as an army can +operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of +operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that +can possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and +conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan +which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the +future. I will cite a few examples which have come under my own +observation. + +In 1806, when people in France were still uncertain as to the war with +Prussia, I wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the +operations which would take place. + +I made the three following hypotheses:--1st. The Prussians will await +Napoleon's attack behind the Elbe, and will fight on the defensive as +far as the Oder, in expectation of aid from Russia and Austria; 2d. Or +they will advance upon the Saale, resting their left upon the frontier +of Bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of Franconia; 3d. +Or else, expecting the French by the great Mayence road, they will +advance imprudently to Erfurt. + +I do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the +Prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces, +already inferior to the French, upon the two directions of Wesel and +Mayence,--a useless mistake, since there had not been a French soldier +on the first of these roads since the Seven Years' War. + +These hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask +what course Napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that the +mass of the French army being already assembled in Bavaria, it should be +thrown upon the left of the Prussians by way of Grera and Hof, for the +gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan +they should adopt." + +If they advanced to Erfurt, he could move to Gera, cut their line of +retreat, and press them back along the Lower Elbe to the North Sea. If +they rested upon the Saale, he could attack their left by way of Hof and +Gera, defeat them partially, and reach Berlin before them by way of +Leipsic. If they stood fast behind the Elbe, he must still attack them +by way of Gera and Hof. + +Since Napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what +mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? Being certain +of the correctness of these principles, I did not hesitate to announce, +_a month before the war_, that Napoleon would attempt just what he did, +and that if the Prussians passed the Saale battles would take place at +Jena and Naumburg! + +I relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that +were my motive I might mention many more of a similar character. I have +only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often +arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without +much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's +movements. + +Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has been +neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. In 1813 the +staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for +such services, and the Emperor Alexander was obliged to furnish the +staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to +send agents into Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon's +whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick in 1806, +were no better informed; and the French generals in Spain often suffered +severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get +information as to what was going on around them. + +The Russian army is better provided than any other for gathering +information, by the use of roving bodies of Cossacks; and history +confirms my assertion. + +The expedition of Prince Koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of +Dresden to the Prince of Sweden, and who crossed the Elbe by swimming +and marched in the midst of the French columns as far, nearly, as +Wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. The information +furnished by the partisan troops of Generals Czernicheff, Benkendorf, +Davidoff, and Seslawin was exceedingly valuable. We may recollect it was +through a dispatch from Napoleon to the Empress Maria Louisa, +intercepted near Chalons by the Cossacks, that the allies were informed +of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his +whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns +of Lorraine and Alsace. This highly-important piece of information +decided Bluecher and Schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies, +which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought +to act in concert except at Leipsic and Brienne. + +We know, also, that the warning given by Seslawin to General Doctoroff +saved him from being crushed at Borovsk by Napoleon, who had just left +Moscow in retreat with his whole army. Doctoroff did not at first credit +this news,--which so irritated Seslawin that he effected the capture of +a French officer and several soldiers of the guard from the French +bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. This warning, which +decided the march of Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon +from taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found greater +facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous +days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The catastrophe which befell him would +thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented. + +Such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good +partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers. + +I will conclude this article with the following summary:-- + +1. A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the +enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of +reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable +officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. + +2. By multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter +how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be +sifted from them. + +3. Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means. + +4. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods +mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses +of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative +situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of +the principles of the art. + +I can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very +unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,--as has so often happened +to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should +at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is +going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each +of these hypotheses.[38] It cannot be too much insisted upon that the +real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these +reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is +always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of +regulating one's conduct is neglected. + +In order to make this article complete, I must state what is to be +gained by using a system of signals. Of these there are several kinds. +Telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all. +Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Ratisbon, in 1809, to the fact +of his having established a telegraphic communication between the +head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris when the +Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading +Bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in +twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred +miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he +had gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the +telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact is +sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value. + +It has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. Such a telegraphic +arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could +communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of +battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters. +Repeated trials of it were made in Russia; but the project was given +up,--for what reason, however, I have not been able to learn. These +communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method +could not be depended upon. A vocabulary for such purposes could be +reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by +signs. I think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be +necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of +transmitting them with accuracy. There would certainly be a gain of +rapidity.[39] attempt of another kind was made in 1794, at the battle of +Fleurus, where General Jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist +to observe and give notice of the movements of the Austrians. I am not +aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again +used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the +victory: of this, however, I have great doubts. + +It is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness +to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful +observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy +of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining +information. By giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with +it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's +movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection +with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its +use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of +distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to +which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very +unreliable. For example, a balloonist would have been greatly +embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was +Grouchy or Bluecher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road; but +this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed. +I had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations +when I was stationed in the spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic; +and Prince Schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the same +point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was +prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the Pleisse and the +Elster. An observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than +in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at +hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at +pleasure. + +There is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires +kindled upon elevated points of the country. Before the invention of the +telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an +invasion from one end of the country to the other. The Swiss have made +use of them to call the militia to arms. They have been also used to +give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more +rapidly. The signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so +as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's +threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to +meet him. These signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of +descents. + +Finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by +means of military instruments. This method of signals has been brought +to greater perfection in the Russian army than in any other I know of. +While I am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of +setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of +the commander, I am convinced that it must be a long time before the +problem is solved. Signals with instruments are of little use except for +skirmishers. A movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly +simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly +from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of +inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. I have seen but two +cases of it in thirteen campaigns. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 38: I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in +war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove +the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the +surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the +opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been +anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of +probability or possibility.] + +[Footnote 39: When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not +known.--Translators.] + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE +OF THE THREE ARMS. + + + + +ARTICLE XLIII. + +Posting Troops in Line of Battle. + + +Having explained in Article XXX. what is to be understood by the term +_line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, +and how the different troops are to be distributed in it. + +Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and +brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines, +each of which had a right and a left wing. The cavalry was usually +placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very +unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. The army camped +together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry +wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns +were thus formed. When they marched by lines, (which was specially +applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on +account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry +had camped in a third line,--which was rare. + +This method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary +to give such orders as the following:--"The army will move in such +direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." This +monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better +could have been devised as war was carried on in those days. + +The French attempted something new at Minden, by forming as many columns +as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a +simple impossibility. + +If the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping +and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were +applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty +thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would +be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of Rossbach. + +The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up +the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the +field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground. +This change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme +to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the +Romans. These divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and +cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. They were very much extended, +either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an +absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of +the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen +marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from +each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support +than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four +hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his +forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced, +and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could +do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns. + +Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly +by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and +partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where +the decisive blow was to fall. When he became the head of the +government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly +increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger +organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system +and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional +system. Beginning with the campaign of 1800, he organized corps of two +or three divisions, which he placed under the command of +lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the +reserve of his army.[40] + +This system was finally developed fully at the camp of Boulogne, where +he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had +under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, +from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. Each +corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an +army. The heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, +composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of +light cavalry. The grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry +reserve. At a later period--1812--the cavalry was also organized into +corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the +constantly-increasing masses of this arm. This organization was as near +perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such +great results, was the model which all the armies of Europe soon +imitated. + +Some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have +recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act +independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because +this number will allow one for the center and each wing. This would +certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two +brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades +on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot +with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with three +brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in +reserve,--a manifest advantage. But, if thirty brigades formed in ten +divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen +divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this +perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry +by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to +two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps +is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a +division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for +that[41]. + +What is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon +a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics; +because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization +in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out +continually. + +The history of the grand army of Boulogne, whose organization seemed to +leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. The +center under Soult, the right under Davoust, the left under Ney, and the +reserve under Lannes, formed together a regular and formidable +battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those +of the guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of Bernadotte +and Marmont detached to the right, and that of Augereau to the left, +were ready for action on the flanks. But after the passage of the Danube +at Donauwerth every thing was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five +divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to +the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was +destroyed. + +It will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. Events +are, however, seldom so complicated as those of 1805; and Moreau's +campaign of 1800 proves that the original organization may sometimes be +maintained, at least for the mass of the army. With this view, it would +seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center, +and a reserve. The composition of these parts may vary with the strength +of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes +necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line +in order to furnish the necessary detachments. While these divisions are +with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or +give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the +main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. Bach of the four +great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four +divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. In this last case there +would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps +should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to +the center. + +With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line +in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps +may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and +from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march +of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a weak +order of battle. + +These facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of +battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light +cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more +stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions. + +But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the +units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the +operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly +varied. I cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the +principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two +or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have +indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one +behind the other, or side by side. (See Figures from 17 to 28 +inclusive.) + +_Different Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry._ + +[Illustration: Fig. 17. Two Corps deployed, One behind the Other.] + + First Corps. +----- ----- ^ ----- ----- +2d Division. | 1st Division. + + Second Corps. +----- ----- ^ ----- ----- +2d Division. | 1st Division. + +[Illustration: Fig. 18. Two Corps formed Side by Side.] + +Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + | +----- ----- | ----- ----- +1st Division. | 1st Division. + | +----- ----- | ----- ----- +2d Division. | 2d Division. + +[Illustration: Fig. 19. Two Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.] + + + First Corps. + +----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- + 2d Division. | 1st Division. + + Second Corps. + +----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- + 2d Division. | 1st Division. + +[Illustration: Fig. 20. Two Corps Side by Side.] + + + Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + | +----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- + 1st Division. | 1st Division. + | +----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- + 2d Division. | 2d Division. + +[Illustration: Fig. 21. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each.] + + First Corps. + +2d Division. 1st Division. +----- ----- ----- ----- + ----- ----- + + Second Corps. + +2d Division. 1st Division. +----- ----- ----- ----- + ----- ----- + + +[Illustration: Fig. 22. 2 Corps of 2 Divisions of 3 Brigades each, +placed Side by Side.] + + +Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + | +1st Division. | 1st Division. + ----- ----- | ----- ----- + ----- | ----- + | + 2d Division. | 2d Division. + ----- ----- | ----- ----- + ----- | ----- + +_Formation of Two Corps of Three Divisions of Two Brigades each._ + +[Illustration: Fig. 23.] + + First Corps. + ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- +3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division. + + Second Corps. + ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- +3d Division. | 2d Division. | 1st Division. + + +[Illustration: Fig. 24.] + + Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- | ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- +2d Division. | 1st Division | 2d Division. | 1st Division + | + ---- ---- | ---- ---- + 3d Division. | 3d Division. + + +[Illustration: Fig. 25.] + + 2d Corps. ^ 1st Corps. + | + ---- ---- | ---- ---- +1st Division.| 1st Division. + | + ---- ---- | ---- ---- +2d Division. | 2d Division. + | + ---- ---- | ---- ---- +3d Division. | 3d Division. + + * * * * * + +_Two Corps of Three Divisions of Three Brigades each._ + +[Illustration: Fig. 26. Two Divisions in the 1st Line, and one in the +2d Line.] + + First Corps. + + ^ +---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- + 2d Division. | 1st Division. + + ---- ---- ---- + 3d Division. + + + Second Corps. + + ^ +---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- + 2d Division. | 1st Division. + + ---- ---- ---- + 3d Division. + +[Illustration: Fig. 27. Same Order with 3d Brigade as Reserve, and the +2 Corps Side by Side.] + + Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + | +2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. + ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- + ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- + | + | + ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- + 3d Division. | 3d Division. + + +[Illustration: _Shallower Formation: Twelve Brigades in the First Line, +and Six in the Second Line._ + +Fig. 28.] + + Second Corps. ^ First Corps. + | +2d Division. ^ 1st Division. | 2d Division. ^ 1st Division. +---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- + | + ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- + 3d Division. | 3d Division. + + * * * * * + +Note.--In all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but +these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in +columns of attack by divisions of two companies. The cavalry attached to +the corps will be placed on the flanks. The brigades might be so drawn +up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. + +The question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place +two corps one behind the other, as Napoleon often did, particularly at +Wagram. I think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be +used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle; +for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its +reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under +different commanders. However much one general may be disposed to +support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for +that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a +colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable +he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly +needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line +cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front +was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own +troops drawn up in rear. + +The table below[42] will show that the number of men in an army will +have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that +the subject is a complicated one. + +In making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the +case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from 1812 to +1815, when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength +from two to five divisions. With such large numbers nothing better can +be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. Of +these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six +for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that +might require support. If this system be applied to an army of one +hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ +divisions of two brigades each where Napoleon and the allies used corps. + +If nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the +center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen +divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one +hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three +battalions. This supposition brings our army up to one hundred and +forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With +regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and +twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment +contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men +strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty +thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men. +These calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must +be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. If an +army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation +by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of this was +Napoleon's army of 1800. + +Having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat +permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out +of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if +it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the +composition of corps and their positions. + +I admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained +while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. If +the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the +center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of +three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing +which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a +corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce +it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by +a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. The enemy +would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the +line. + +But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable that, +whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the +organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of +Europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must +be made upon that basis. + +The distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in +recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. Formerly it +was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more +reserves. In recent[43] conflicts in Europe, when the masses brought +into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two +lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines; +and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of +infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. Such a formation +may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best +for battle, as it is entirely too deep. + +The classical formation--if I may employ that term--is still two lines +for the infantry. The greater or less extent of the battle-field and the +strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but +these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and +the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of +men to be simultaneously engaged. + +When an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in +front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the +reserve;[44] but, as has been previously stated, this will not often +happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each wing +has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main +or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading +corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return +to their proper positions in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve +is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent +its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle +by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding +general. + +From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great +changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of +the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the French Revolution, +and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of +Peter the Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from +the stand-point of those days. + +One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of +example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the +cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an +army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the +center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the +extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry +to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference +to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If +the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the +organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the +center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If +that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on +the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing. +These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be +threatened.[45] + +The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as +formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division +remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover, that, the organization +of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous +distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake +to scatter it too much. Few precise rules can be laid down for the +proper distribution of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise +as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one +hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support, +as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not desire to go here into +much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but I will give the +following rules:-- + +1. The horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move +freely in every direction. + +2. Foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy +caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from +sudden charges of cavalry. It is hardly necessary for me to add--what +every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are +not those to give artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping +ground is better. + +3. The horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is +well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily +thrown into any desired position. It is, moreover, proper to have +horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible +to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for +self-congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve; +for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself +when his line had been broken through between the center and the left. + +4. On the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in +front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to +attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of +checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns. + +5. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not +in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole +line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must +not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of +the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the +artillery to move to a wing or to the center. + +6. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very +powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make +a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a +degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate +of the battle is to turn. I shall at another place have more to say as +to the employment of artillery in battles. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 40: Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing +of three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under +Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, the +general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own +immediate orders.] + +[Footnote 41: Thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two +brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while +the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each +may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But it +then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have +but two in a corps,--which would be a faulty arrangement, because the +corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than +the division.] + +[Footnote 42: Every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,--in +all, four principal subdivisions,--besides accidental detachments. + +Below are some of the different formations that may be given to +infantry. + +1st. In regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:-- + + Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, and + three divisions for detachments.................. 11 = 22 = 88 = + 72,000 + + Four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for + detachments................... 15 = 30 = 120 = 96,000 + + Seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for + detachments....................... 16 = 32 = 128 = 103,000 + +2d. In regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:-- + + Div's. Brig's. Batt'ns. Men. Four corps of two divisions each, + besides detachments,............................... 11 = 22 = 132 + 105,000 + + Four corps of three divisions each, besides + detachments................................ 15 = 30 = 180 = 144,000 + + Eight corps of two divisions each............ 16 = 32 = 192 = + 154,000 + +If to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and +engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known. + +It is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred +men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months' +campaigning. If they do not consist of three battalions, then each +battalion should contain one thousand men.] + +[Footnote 43: The term _recent_ here refers to the later wars of +Napoleon I.--Translators.] + +[Footnote 44: As the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every +day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour +of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the +line of battle.] + +[Footnote 45: This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon +the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. This is +the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.] + + + + +ARTICLE XLIV. + +Formation and Employment of Infantry. + + +Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it +forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense +of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, +the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, +it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and +artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times +be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial +success. + +We shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and +the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, +is far from being settled absolutely. The war in Spain and the battle of +Waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages +of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep +order. I will give my own opinion farther on. + +There must, however, be no misconception on this subject. The question +now is not whether Lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, +armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of +producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater +resistance when attacked. Every officer of experience knows the +difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in +three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the +disorder without adding any advantage. It is astonishing that Lloyd, who +had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material +advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for +it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops +takes place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn +their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This increase +in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing +upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much +mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. It is much more difficult +to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three: +although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks +cannot be kept properly closed. + +Lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd +that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. He +wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred +and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. We may well ask +what would befall those battalions thus separated. The cavalry may +penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind. + +But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of +deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of +attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division +and depending on its force and impetuosity? + +I will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of +the question in hand. + +There are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an +enemy:--l, as skirmishers; 2, in deployed lines, either continuous or +checkerwise; 3, in lines of battalions formed in column on the central +divisions; 4, in deep masses; 5, in small squares. + +The skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers +are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage +of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up +intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position. + +These different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four: +the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the +half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on +the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are +partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed +of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other. + + +[Illustration: Fig. 29.[46] + + Deployed order in two lines. +----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- +----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- + +] + +The formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used +to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. These +deployed lines may either be continuous, (Fig. 29,) or checkerwise, or +in echelons. + +[Illustration: Fig. 30. + +Twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in +the intervals. + + -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- +-----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- +----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- +----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- +----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- + +] + +A more compact order is shown in Fig. 30, where each battalion is formed +into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. +It is really a line of small columns + +In the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[47] will +have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way +too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the +artillery. To remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, +whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two +ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the +other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of +the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these +skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (See Fig. 31.) +Each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides +those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. There would be, +also, an increase of the whole front. By this arrangement, while having +really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred +men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each +battalion. Force and mobility would both be obtained.[48] A battalion of +eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four +divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first +alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. Bach +battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a +volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in Fig. 31 it would deliver +four hundred. + +[Illustration: Fig. 31.] + +While searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we +must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and +that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to +fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement +is lost. Moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous +against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three +ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry. +The Archduke Charles found it advantageous at Essling, and particularly +at Wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my +chapter on the General Principles of War, published in 1807. The brave +cavalry of Bessieres could make no impression upon these small masses. + +To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it +is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would +be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a +charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. If to +remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military +men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as +columns. The English squares at Waterloo were, however, only in two +ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the French cavalry, +only one battalion was broken. I will observe, in conclusion, that, if +the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be +difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is +scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to +employ them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable that +any European army, except the English, will undertake to use deployed +lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never move except in columns +of attack. + +I conclude that the system employed by the Russians and Prussians, of +forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be +employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable +than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would +be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation. + +[Illustration: Fig. 32.] + +There is a mixed order, which was used by Napoleon at the Tagliamento +and by the Russians at Eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions, +one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in +columns. (See Fig. 32.) This arrangement--which belongs also to the +half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the +first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him +into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may +debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in +disorder. This arrangement would probably be improved by placing the +leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line +with the central deployed battalion. There would thus be a +half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means +unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear +that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their +battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the +enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. The order may be +useful in many cases. I have therefore indicated it. + +[Illustration: Fig 33.] + +[Illustration: Fig 34.] + +The order in very deep masses (see Figs. 33 and 34) is certainly the +most injudicious. In the later wars of Napoleon, twelve battalions were +sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six +ranks closely packed together. Such masses are greatly exposed to the +destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are +diminished, while their strength is not increased. The use of such +masses at Waterloo was one cause of the French being defeated. +Macdonald's column was more fortunate at Wagram, but at a great +sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have +been victorious had it not been for the successes of Davoust and +Oudinot on the left of the archduke's line. + +When it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly +be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that +if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in +its progress. (See Fig. 33.) Under the protection of these battalions, +which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to +the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed +to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will +be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or broken as was +the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius. + +Squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority +in cavalry. It is agreed that the regimental square is best for the +defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (See Figs. 35, +36, 37.) + +[Illustration: Fig. 35. + +Division in battalion squares.] + +[Illustration: Fig. 36. + +The same division in long battalion squares.] + +[Illustration: Fig. 37. + +Squared of regiments of three battalions.] + +The figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front +and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. A +regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling +the center battalion half to the right and half to the left. + +In the Turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because +hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of Bessarabia, Moldavia, +or Wallachia, and the Turks had an immense force of cavalry. But if the +seat of war be the Balkan Mountains or beyond them, and their irregular +cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions +usual in Europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the +Russian infantry will show its superiority in Rumelia. + +However this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions +seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the +superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for +the enemy's charges. The elongated square, especially when applied to a +battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and +one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed +battalion. It would not be so good as the column proposed above; but +there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the +battalion marched in a deployed line. It would have the advantage, also, +of being prepared to resist cavalry. + +Squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each +other. All the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with +deployed lines. + +It cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described +is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness +of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the +offensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and +_momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and also +the power of delivering _as much fire as possible_. + +This truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the +bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in +presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one +round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand +in five minutes. In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been +carried by Russian, French, and Prussian columns with their arms at a +shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of _momentum_ and +the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the +English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera, +Busaco, Fuentes-de-Onore, Albuera, and Waterloo. + +We must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the +advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for +when the French formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not +at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they +were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been +repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if they had used +columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the +center? I think not. Before deciding finally as to the superiority of +the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep +order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a +deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like Fig. 31, +(page 293.) These small columns have always succeeded wherever I have +seen them tried. + +Is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to +attack a position? Can an immense deployed line be moved up into action +while firing? I think no one will answer affirmatively. Suppose the +attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while +firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended +position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired +point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of +sheep. + +What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? 1. If the +deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive. +2. The column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for +carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as +much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy +a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's +fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by +cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed and the second +in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. 4. Either of them may be +successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use +his troops properly in the manner indicated in Articles XVI. and XXX. + +Since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been +made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more +destructive. The effect of this is to incline men to prefer the +shallower formations, even in the attack. We cannot, however, forget the +lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, +shrapnel-shot, and the Perkins musket, I cannot imagine a better method +of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. Some +persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and +breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack +in deployed lines. But, if there is a general return to the deployed +system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the +attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with +proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position, +or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of +companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy +who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. A skillful +commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these +arrangements, according to circumstances. + +Experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical +problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle; +but I have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a +single method is an impossibility. + +In the first place, the topography of different countries is very +various. In some, as Champagne, two hundred thousand men might be +maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy, Switzerland, the +valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a +division of ten battalions. The degree of instruction of the troops, and +their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the +system of formation. + +Owing to the thorough discipline of the Russian army and its instruction +in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines +so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which +would be entirely out of the question for the French or Prussian armies +of the present day. My long experience has taught me to believe that +nothing is impossible; and I do not belong to the class of men who think +that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all +countries. + +To approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it +seems to me, we ought to find out:--1. The best method of moving when in +sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; 2. The best method of coming +to close quarters with him; 3. The best defensive order. + +In whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all +cases to exercise the troops--1. In marching in columns of battalions +doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when +coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; 2. In marching in +continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; 3. In marching in +deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are +more easily moved than continuous lines; 4. In moving to the front by +the flanks of companies; 5. In marching to the front in small squares, +either in line or checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these +different methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by +columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more +expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best +suited to all kinds of ground. + +Of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of +companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. In a plain +it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. It +breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates +to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all +confusion can be avoided. The only objection to it is the danger to +which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by +cavalry. This danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and +not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over +the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. At the +least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed +instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. Whatever +precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with +well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. I have never +seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where +it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front. + +I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in +checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same +battalions in continuous lines did not. The French, particularly, have +never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. This checkered +order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. It +may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it +more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the +leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is easy to form +line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only +between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget +that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, +which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the +marches of continuous lines. + +It is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for +making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. Of all the methods I +have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. Form twenty-four +battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center +ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace +toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then +deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread +out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and +pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows +the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through +the intervals of the first line. This maneuver was executed when no +enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the +advantages of firing and of the column. + +Besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of +attacking in the half-deep order. + +The first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others +in column on the wings of those deployed, (Fig. 32, page 295.) The +deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would +open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. The +second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching +half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line +through the intervals of the first. The third is the order in echelons, +mentioned on page 193, and shown in Fig. 15 on that page. + +Finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed +lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the +other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen. + +I cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for I +have not seen them used in actual service. In fact, in real combats of +infantry I have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing +to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly +against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or +repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved +out to meet the advance. I have seen _melees_ of infantry in defiles and +in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision +and thrust each other with the bayonet; but I never saw such a thing on +a regular field of battle. + +In whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and +should be continued. It would be absurd to discard as useless the fire +of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation; +and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of +tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every +different nation. It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper +combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. I must, +however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned. + +I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be +attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops +as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by +withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all +inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of +the enemy. When the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, +it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is +then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers +and troops on the defensive. + +It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a +position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is +assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must +never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene, +seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke +through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were +sacrificed in defending these posts. + +For like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, +which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the +troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the +enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. The case of the park of +Hougoumont at the battle of Waterloo is a fine example of the influence +the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, +may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin the +possession of the woods was very important. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 46: In this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of +twelve battalions.] + +[Footnote 47: The word _division_ being used to designate four or five +regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of +confusion in its use.] + +[Footnote 48: In the Russian army the skirmishers are taken from the +third rank of each division,--which makes the column eight men in depth, +instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. To facilitate rallying the +skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the +whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three +divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there +would be twelve ranks.] + + + + +ARTICLE XLV. + +Cavalry. + + +The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, +somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole +army, and upon its quality. Even cavalry of an inferior character may be +so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper +moments. + +The numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied +greatly. It depends on the natural tastes of nations making their +people more or less fit for good troopers. The number and quality of +horses, also, have something to do with it. In the wars of the +Revolution, the French cavalry, although badly organized and greatly +inferior to the Austrian, performed wonders. In 1796 I saw what was +pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine,--a weak +brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! Ten years later I saw the same +reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so +much had ideas and means changed. + +As a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country +should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in +mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice. + +The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of +motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we +must be careful lest a false application be made of this last. + +Whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of +war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of +infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to +render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the +enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered +infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient +in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats +extremely difficult. + +The proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon +the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's +movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned +here. I can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its +use. + +All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good +order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be +supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo the French paid dearly +for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great +fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged +to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for +charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing +infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others +prove this. + +There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over +infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they +cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, +and so did the Austrian left at Dresden. + +Infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way +may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was +made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against +squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed. + +A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and +enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry +must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this +character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of +before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. The +beautiful charge of the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, +October 16, is a fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo +with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because +unsupported. The daring charge of Ney's weak cavalry upon Prince +Hohenlohe's artillery at Jena is an example of what may be done under +such circumstances. + +General charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it +from the field of battle and return more free to act against his +infantry. + +Cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an +enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the +infantry. If repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if +successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. This operation is +rarely attempted, but I see no reason why it should not be very good; +for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in +rear of the enemy. This is a duty for which light cavalry is +particularly fitted. + +In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by +opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing +line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. It +may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause +the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. +This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at +Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a corps d'armee +may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined +attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to +finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat. + +It is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it +depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. There are but +four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a +gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. In +charges in line, the lance is very useful; in _melees_, the saber is +much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, +which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which +finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. Pistol-firing is +of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or +when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous +to a charge. I do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of +cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, +and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. +There are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on +horseback and in rapid motion. + +I have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. +It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the +advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the +contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every +thing depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of the +movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. +Galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over +the ground as rapidly as possible. In like manner, if the cavalry is +armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the +enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. But if the +cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since +the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of +good order: in a _melee_ the lance is almost useless. + +If the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop +to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the +trotting party will not. The only advantage of the gallop is its +apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is +estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his +firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping +in confusion. + +In their charges against infantry the Turks and Mamelukes showed the +small advantage of mere impetuosity. No cavalry will penetrate where +lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. It is only when infantry is +much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any +advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. To break good +squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers +armed with lances. For charges in open order there are no better models +for imitation than the Turks and the Cossacks. + +Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using +cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an +enemy's line which is also attacked in front. That this maneuver may be +completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, +it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in +collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. It +is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a +quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head. + +Much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and +organizing cavalry. The lance is the best arm for offensive purposes +when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an +enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a +second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily +handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become +broken. It would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of +lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, +penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory. + +The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the cuirass of +strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, +the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. Some military men +of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, +believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of +former days, would bear down every thing before them. A lance would +certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and I do not see why they +should not have lances like those of the light cavalry. + +Opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called +dragoons. It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of +mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in +retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a +soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This +might have been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons when +fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish cavalry fought +quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has been said that the greatest +inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of +being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot +resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with +his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. This argument has +more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make +men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more +reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave +foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always +depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other +things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the +commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and +musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of +victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, +will always be more than a match for a coward. By impressing these +truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their +adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This is the case +with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to +fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like +foot-soldiers. + +It requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring +soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties. + +The conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or +mounted, doubtless induced the Emperor Nicholas to collect the large +number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while +he did not consider Napoleon's unfortunate experiment with French +dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment +of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this +concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the +instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and +that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions +of the army. It cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might +result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on +horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. It +thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have +their respective advantages and disadvantages. A judicious mean between +the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the +army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and +then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps. + +Every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is +applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:-- + +1. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry +than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too +much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed +in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. The checkerwise +formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements +before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend +themselves in every direction against cavalry. Whether checkered or full +lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is +checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is +well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less +than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full. +It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be +left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column +upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of +the troops which have been brought up. + +2. When the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, +cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. +The regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling +on the center into divisions, three may be formed. If there are only +four squadrons, there can be but two lines. + +3. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ like +that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron +distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge +separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops +engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be +closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be +passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be +kept beyond cannon-range. + +4. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a +combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in +echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form +to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction. + +5. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons +against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. +Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and +it may be better. + +6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the +commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the +formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would +not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the +other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and +one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper +reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in +a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for +a general to control the deployed regiments. + +By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to +dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a +general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to +think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may +then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as +a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the +line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be +preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the +others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three +regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks +of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is +beaten back. (See Fig. 38.) + +[Illustration: Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments. + +Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full +lines.] + +7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all +encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must +sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first +charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy +will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at +length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that, +with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will +remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness +to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also +engaged. + +Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the +proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle. + +Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large +cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very +unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career +the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a +blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the +attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian +cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry. + +In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never +intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, +or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry, +expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, +the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line +breaks and turns.[49] + +With cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very +important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and +the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _melee_ or +in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the +adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is +adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the +victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious +formation. + +The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old +disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get +the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious +encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to +the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy +by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several +exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry +seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry, +I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does +not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship, +organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude +it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to +accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They +acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst +they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common +object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the +Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively. + +Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the +best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that +they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate +of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack +in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results. + +From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry +a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, +however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed +with pistols, lances, and sabers. + +Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a +numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great +influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a +feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can +carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his +communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his +operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising +_en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and +rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty +in his calculations. + +Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides +for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation +of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, +be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not +possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on +horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure +supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off +than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of +her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she +can bring into the field at very short notice. + +Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the +Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:-- + +"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to +be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock +of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in +pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to +the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of +the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in +danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few +regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has +not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or +twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a +country where the population is not hostile to them. + +"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a +strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much +unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's +regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue. + +"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, +may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered +and move freely about from point to point." + +In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources +possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia +have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if +for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those +occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as +forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on +outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be +more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the +line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often +restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where +he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose +excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 49: To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the +battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry +in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise. +Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed +checkered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success was +his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirch +and Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight +squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had +twice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But I +cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which I +have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry +tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.] + + + + +ARTICLE XLVI. + +Employment of Artillery. + + +Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and +defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break +an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the +troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the +strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it +inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral +effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of +approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less +important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched +camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of +fortification. + +I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as +to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is +difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the +battle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can act +independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At +Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the +gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check +the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance. +This was a special case, and should not be often imitated. + +I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules, +observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service, +(1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say +little with reference to them. + +1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should +concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be +struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it +assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry. + +2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive +movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended +for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an +offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column +without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may +have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front. + +3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be +held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[50] +For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence +it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the +best positions for the heavy calibers. + +4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the +defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points +where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of +the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery +should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the +battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The +distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these. + +5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the +front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet +firing: a converging fire is the best. + +6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in +battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their +batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, +in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may +be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed +against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. + +7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor +to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can +be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is +produced. + +8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It +is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank +and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is +inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. +The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few +pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked +them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he +was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards +upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far +overbalancing the risks run. + +9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and +especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be +deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this. + +10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry, +preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells, +and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in +such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, +when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind +the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they +should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller +squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in +frightening the horses. + +11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its +fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. +The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the +battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of +the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by +the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will +cause its destruction. + +12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon +conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in 1812 he +invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. +These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. +Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this +allowance will depend on circumstances. + +The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between +wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery, +whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A +remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong +artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The +great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the +Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With +wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along +the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and +to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously +captured. In three months he doubled the _materiel_ and _personnel_ of +his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own +frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war. + +13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage +is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist +and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of +the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the +different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with +the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of +the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful +issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus +massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding +general. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 50: Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by +mounting the men on the boxes.] + + + + +ARTICLE XLVII. + +Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms. + + +To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the +combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by +considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if +I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed +operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid +down for each of the arms. + +Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject very +extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they +consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual +minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the +place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the +subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the +commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ +them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after +all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the +attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in +every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied, +would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the +object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the +consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best +works which do treat of them. + +I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms +be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to +the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they +be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being +taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the +events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of +war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability +to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of +the three arms, either single or combined. + + + + +CONCLUSION. + + +I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be +regarded as fundamental in war. War in its _ensemble_ is not a science, +but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed +laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of +war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as +often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may +become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a +thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The +passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the +warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their +commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and +epochs,[51]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and +metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results. + +Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as +tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What +military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are +we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by +inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their +battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and +Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena, +or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When +the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured +victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their +favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their +occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their +value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a +theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the +whole number of chances of success in its favor? + +The _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the +fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect +produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a +hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly +enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than +the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same +point. + +Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the +greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the +theater of war or of the zone of operations. + +Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they +shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the +art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point +of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of +fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which +I use the term. + +A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed +of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent +strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in +presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, +and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be +able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his +wits he will lose his army. + +The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and +strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory +that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately +seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a +decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor +courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will +undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations +can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost +unavoidable defeat. + +No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is +bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some +occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling. +Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence +to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle. + +These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound +rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will +lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with +mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but +it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which +should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for +these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding +brave troops, means of almost certain success. + +The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains +to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability +consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however, +leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim +relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the +greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and +place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations +which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to +be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for +the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the +field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a +strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a +column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division +coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist +of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, +or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the +adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause +of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is +simply impossible. + +If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, +his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he +may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents +for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly +proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most +suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep +constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to +lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly +endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective +points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its +subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, +depending upon its first successes. + +The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to +neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting +operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the +war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of +the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the +purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, +covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c. + +Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but +no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain +always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your +lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well +concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements +which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful +in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of +your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally +matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those +stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and +Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the +chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence. + +If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully +studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great +masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles +nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of +Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince +Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning." + +Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual +events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true +school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great +men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take +rank next after the natural masters of the art of war. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 51: The well-known Spanish proverb, _He was brave on such a +day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at +Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at +Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.] + +[Footnote 52: The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable +of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who +will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result +of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.] + + + + +SUPPLEMENT + +TO THE + +SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR. + + +My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the +military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a +concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give +it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the +means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_. + +It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that +in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy +for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to +which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of +these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend +them clearly and to apply them properly. + +I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of +war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary +intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity, +many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. +Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing +themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is +just within their reach if they only would think so. + +Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he +must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it +to a successful termination_. The first of these talents may be a +natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The +second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal +attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved. + +It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government +to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he +may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations +and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted +to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity +of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and +having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the +command of an army. + +If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive +ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military +combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have +characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only +brave soldiers without being at all improved by study. + +From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to +several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of +the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths. + +The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to +choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the +enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the +importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he +is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in +Articles from XVIII. to XXII. + +The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the +theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See Article +XVII.) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two +fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid +movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against +fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive +direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of +his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time +his success would yield him no great advantages. + +The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these +two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected +or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also +would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending +out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every +well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with +central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than +the enemy's. + +The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If +you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's, +you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of +them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to +observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty +battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to +take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior +lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile +line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these +means is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following.) + +In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a +strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a +center and two extremities."_ A theater has usually three zones,--a +right, a left, and a central. + +In choosing a zone of operations, select one,--1, that will furnish a +safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by +yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in +mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the +dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near +the theater of war. + +One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the +other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances. + +The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts +must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are +two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or +geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense +which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched +camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in +the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving +attention to geographical points of any kind_. This was the favorite +objective of Napoleon.[53] + +I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this +point, (page 86;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the +most important thing in a plan of operations_, I recommend the whole of +Article XIX., (pages 84 and following.) + +The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one +or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the +fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the +character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the +enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his +troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two geographical +lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces +along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by +detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main +body. + +The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in +presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary +strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy +may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important +consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations +and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX., +(page 93.) + +The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that +the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front +remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more +closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and +more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will +be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot +concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving +in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be +able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious +measure. + +But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, +that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, +is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each +other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War; +or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its +sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the +enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical +inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the +extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his +masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you. + +It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive +points of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that the +principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, +to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be +adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points +already known, and afterward upon secondary points. + +To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a +sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See Plate +III.) + +It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the +frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea. + +The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.) + +Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.) + +The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin. +(No. 3.) + +The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and +was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong +detachments. (No. 4.) + +Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.) + +Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and +Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.) + +Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.) + +The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.) + +The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.) + +General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No. +10.) + +The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile +corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise, +Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,) +composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern +frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's +line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, +(i, k, l, m.) + +This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near +Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the +Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of +Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the +Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, +and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser +from the lines of Wissembourg. + +The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar +operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the +allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5, +and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected +three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at +Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the +Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North +Sea, and would have obtained immense results. + +The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance +that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the +English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be +cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for +this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good +reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The +principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the +strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of +retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of +punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the +English as he might have done. + +It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the +whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had +decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because, +when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, +and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession, +none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the +French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse, +had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had +fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski, +assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him +vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at +Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different. + +I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two +important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses +of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession +and at decisive points.[54] + +Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and +will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon +their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say, +the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the +center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of +importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater +accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following +them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every +precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a +dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. +Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose +positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with +_offensive returns_, (Art. XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the +forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) the +faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune +moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as +the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which +will constitute him a skillful tactician. + +It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of +battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here +that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little +value. + +It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which +explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to +what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall +himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be +prepared for any eventuality. + +I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments. +These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may +prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are, +to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_, +to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give +them good instructions for avoiding disasters. + +I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military +policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of +this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but +should be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however, +invite special attention to Article XIV., relating to the command of +armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most +anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often +depends the safety of the nation. + +We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of +staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of +tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action +of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great +captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant +results. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 53: The objective may be in some degree +_political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs +of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.] + +[Footnote 54: The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing +masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, but +because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, he +would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be would +have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line of +retreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillful +operations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be +convinced.] + + + + +NOTE + +UPON + +THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL. + + +The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable +practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, +never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or +to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be +procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable +characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in +practice the finest theories in the world. + +When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully +impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against +successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he +recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon +decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire +to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I +have already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary, +indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained. +There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in +all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--_in every +position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate +by the right, by the left, or by the front_. + +To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take +this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first +care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the +greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him +in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three +zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,) +and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII. pointed out the manner of +perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a +zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty. + +When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with +the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be +established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations +toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of +operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains, +then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can +injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if +he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have +dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary. + +Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the +field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon +the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and +center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these +three directions of striking. + +Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the +theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the +North Sea. (See Fig. 39.) + +Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical +sections,--viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that +between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the +Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is +nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the +front of operations will have only three general directions to choose +from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone, +as it will always have one on the right and another on the left. + +[Illustration: Fig. 39.] + +The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose +base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If +it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,) +it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the +Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg, +might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and +fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if +seriously defeated. + +If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon +the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified +towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences +still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force +toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this +wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward +Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but +two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its +way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers. + +It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most +disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient, +although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone +remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable +advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward +Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations +of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon +Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own +communications. + +When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone, +they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the +enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in +view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the +enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of +his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to +operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest +effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to +gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you +anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the +contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of +crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver +by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered +by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back +upon the sea in case of a reverse. + +Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm, +and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in +those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the +direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the +line of retreat of Melas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led +by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat +of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of +retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera. + +In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the +right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the +center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left, +leading to the line of communications of Melas, by way of Saint-Bernard +or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and +the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to +Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive +direction was evidently that by the left. + +I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point. + +The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the +arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical +considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for +battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the +base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but +this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the +ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement: +these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a +position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it, +sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In +such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon +the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or +destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing +his way through your line. + +I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen +in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's +wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in +1812. + +[Illustration: Fig. 40.] + +The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A +A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to +cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's +army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the +French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been +anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus +fifteen hundred miles from its true base. + +There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by +outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would +have entirely cut them off from the Rhine. + +At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which +was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the +right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a +few days later. + +In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is +that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this +line you must seize while protecting your own. + +When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and +behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the +center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the +least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first +consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total +destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical +strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with +reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down. + +Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the +enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at +Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been +secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent +the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing +better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for +maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who +is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike +most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most +speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass +of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All +that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be +toward the right or the left. + +It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the +presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the +general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an +exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the +bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw +the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of +taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back +upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in +another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a +very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of +Wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be +desired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII., (pages 224 and +following.) + +A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that +have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate +_coup-d'oeil_. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who +estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use, +either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, +will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and +even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will +always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by +constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which +should regulate all the operations of war. + +Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime +art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate +thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of +combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special +talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the +noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men +co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well +what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make +such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point +simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with +arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special +talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted +that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best +strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime +characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the +command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability, +have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved +imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other! +Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny, +Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen. + +I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said. +To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me +for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims +laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to +announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of +passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight +and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the +impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence +upon it." I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed +history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most +celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where +these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success. + +As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating +mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only +what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things +into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have +seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of +reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived +incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men +intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most +extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment +and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended +for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to +facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by +pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for +having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really +desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms. + +Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:-- + +"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is, +that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly +martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit +faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels." + +[Blank Page] + + + + +SECOND APPENDIX + +TO THE + +SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR. + +ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE. + + +Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person +did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in +fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making +war. + +I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of +tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand +combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the +application of the principles which had led to the success of great +generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Caesar as well as of Frederick +and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my +opinion. + +The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not +produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest +between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and +mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without +precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances +which produced it cannot occur again. + +Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance +to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot +influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the +tactics of battles. + +The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the +murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate +the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the +tactics for infantry. + +I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to +complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the +Summary of the Art of War. + +The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is +not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and +particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said) +because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in +loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more +than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose at this epoch between +the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is +known to all military students. + +The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the +infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle, +was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve. + +The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as +the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of +battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such +as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small +intrenchments.[56] + + +The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic +forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the +system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the +nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the +Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendee--rendered +this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to +attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed +regiments? + +In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as +they were nearly always the assailants. + +In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the +title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which +I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns +of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to +the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, +preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by +intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a +battalion and the minimum of the front of one column. + +What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and +Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of +marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to +attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to +publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some +attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on +account of what was said on tactics. + +The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops +deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the +murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds +as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till +after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore +renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray. + +In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest +minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in +the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange, +without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances, +national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had +proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I +never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the +defense. + +I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was +approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the +Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles +observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had +published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808 +from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not +thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at +the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to +form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr +particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the +cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, +they could not have done if they had been deployed. + +At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was +formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible +fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his +army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown +back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was +satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this +mixture of small columns with deployed battalions. + +The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, +not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of +Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the +controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to +which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. +He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French +upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a +solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well +supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these +deep columns were very different from the small columns which I +proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, +and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force +than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of +artillery. + +I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the +Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He +answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the +English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line +formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. +He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends +upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act +in the same manner under all circumstances." + +To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the +campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the +infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the +most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807. + +The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at +Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns +of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper. + +If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it +would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at +least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line +extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but +several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed +in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being +deployed behind each other at six paces' interval. + +This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms +of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four +regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which +is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on +the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by +divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813 +should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it +very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, +would have executed one of the following formations:-- + +1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in +four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to +the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight +battalions.[57] + +2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of +battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the +system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:-- + +I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to +the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is +important that in every language there should be two different terms to +express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions +and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion. + +Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary +already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I +devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages +of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations +relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which +consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the +central one, the other two being in column on the wings. + + * * * * * + +After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:-- + +1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. + +2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be +as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was +successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento. + +3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in +marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over +an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient +order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the +front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. + +I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as +impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the +attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for +success. + +Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these +terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault +upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the +assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in +good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from +each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass +as a whole. + +I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden, +Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland, +Katzbach, or Dennewitz. + +I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in +deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally +awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by +maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was +beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what +fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of +Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in +position on the heights of La Belle Alliance? + +I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be +necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my +Summary of the Art of War was written. + +Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813 +from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its +value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to +make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this +view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one +behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in +small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of +two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four +sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as +skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small +column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form +four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small +columns instead of three-- + +[Illustration: + +3d Battalion. 2d Battalion. 1st Battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- +--- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ +--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- +--- --- --- --- ---] + +It is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the +enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty +skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never +present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. +Still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, +indeed, it has already been practiced in Prussia and Austria. + +The same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight +companies. In this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, +but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns, +according to the number of companies. + +Two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these +formations. If vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions +would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if +driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in +the columns of battalions. Still, either of them may be employed, +according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops. +Experience alone can assign to each its proper value. I am not aware +whether the Austrians applied these columns of companies at Custozza and +Novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their +camps of instruction. + +Be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be +considered:-- + +"Will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring +about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now +recognized principles of tactics?" + +If these arms aided the allies at the Alma and Inkermann, it was because +the Russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten +that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so +that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side. + +What change will it make in tactics? + +Will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be +necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or +three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns? + +Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will +fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall +retreat or be destroyed? + +What military man will reply in the affirmative? + +It follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary, +and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and +he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of +battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two +companies. To attempt to prescribe by regulation under what +circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd. + +If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the +enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the +shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to +the attack of isolated posts; but I freely confess that I would never +accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a +regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very +deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep +in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their +destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in +any respect their chances of success. + +If the organization of an army were left to me, I would adopt for +infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization +according with the formation for battle. I would then make each regiment +of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. Each battalion +should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the +depth would be three divisions or six ranks. + +This formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the +battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each +battalion, or on any other division. + +The columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be +so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the +mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them +upon the enemy with great force. The deployment of these small columns +could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming +of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in +several respects to one of four or six divisions. + +In the Russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two +hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division +in the French organization. The maneuver of double column on the center +is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval +separating the second and third companies. Hence the column must be +simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. Something +analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by +forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third +respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than +in column; and this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of +the battalion in six companies or three divisions. + +By dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight +in all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made on +the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each +division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different +companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his +company under the command of another officer, and half of his own +division would be made up of another company. + +Such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as +the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his +own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than +any stranger. In addition, if the double column should meet with a +decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it +would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to +run from one side to the other to find their companies. In the French +system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as +many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each +company is conducted by its own captain. It is true that there will be +two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an +advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation +between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater +display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, +to command the division as a whole. + +It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important +question at issue. + +Since I have alluded to the system adopted by Wellington, it is proper +to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light +of historical events. + +In Spain and Portugal, particularly, Wellington had under his command a +mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence +in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of +instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred +of the French and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the +enemy. Having learned by experience the effects of the fury and +impetuosity of the French columns when led by such men as Massena and +Ney, Wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity +and afterward securing a triumph over it. He chose positions difficult +to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and +Portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the +inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the +tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled +the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, +while his excellent English infantry, sheltered from the fire, were +posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of +these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out +of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general +discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the +infantry with the bayonet. + +This system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to +Spain and Portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of +troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could +be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable +to Belgium. At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a +gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field +of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this +plateau were well protected. Wellington, from the crest of the plateau, +could discover the slightest movement in the French army, while his own +were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his +losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his +aid. + +Every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible +battle, which I have elsewhere impartially described. I demonstrated +that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of +deployed lines by the English, but to the following accidental causes, +viz.:-- + +1. To the mud, which rendered the progress of the French in the attack +painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, +and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery. + +2. To the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the +French, principally on the right wing. + +3. To the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the +infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each +other, but they were in no case simultaneous. + +4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole Prussian +army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the +French. + +Every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and +the firmness of the English infantry, if the mass of the French infantry +had been thrown on the English in columns of battalions immediately +after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been +broken and forced back on Antwerp. Independently of this, if the +Prussians had not arrived, the English would have been compelled to +retreat; and I maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof +of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in +columns. + +From all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions, +viz.:-- + +1. That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important +change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be +useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of +columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or +skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those +armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them +through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail +sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which +would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this +plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the +others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies +be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of +light infantry to each division. + +2. That if Wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be +excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an +attack upon an enemy in position. + +3. That, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a +battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it +will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the +other. + +4. That, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, +upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand +tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great +mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the +battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action +of the three arms. + +5. That it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this +subject in Chapters IV. and V.; and that it would be unreasonable to +define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle. + +6. That victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking +the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking +his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy, +adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the +spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character. + +Finally, I will terminate this article with the following remark: That +war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned +drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but +also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical +complications. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 55: It is probable that Baron Jomini here refers to iron, +instead of cylindrical, ramrods. Before 1730, all European troops used +wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is +attributed by some to the Prince of Anhalt, and by others to Prince +Leopold of Dessau. The Prussians were the first to adopt the iron +ramrod, and at the date of the battle of Mollwitz (1741) it had not been +introduced into the Austrian service. + +Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till 1777, thirty-six +years after the battle of Mollwitz. The advantage of the cylindrical +ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time +necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time +could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded +once,--all other things being equal.--Translators.] + +[Footnote 56: Columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be +intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in +order to facilitate their deployment.] + +[Footnote 57: We suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if +there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then +consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while +in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead +of eight, the depth not being increased.] + + + + +SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS. + + +I have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal +maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents. + +The naval forces of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes are the earliest +mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. The Persians +conquered these nations, as well as Asia Minor, and became the most +formidable power on both land and sea. + +About the same time the Carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of +Mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of Cadiz, passed the +straits, colonized Boetica and took possession of the Balearic Isles and +Sardinia, and finally made a descent on Sicily. + +The Greeks contended against the Persians with a success that could not +have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably +situated for a naval power than Greece, with her fifty islands and her +great extent of coast. + +The merchant marine of Athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the +naval power to which Greece was indebted for her independence. Her +fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under Themistocles, the +terror of the Persians and the rulers of the East. They never made grand +descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their +naval strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a +confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens, Syracuse, +Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other, +it is probable that the Greeks would have conquered the world before the +Romans. + +If we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old Greek +historians, the famous army of Xerxes had not less than four thousand +vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account +of them by Herodotus. It is more difficult to believe that at the same +time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed +three hundred thousand Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were totally +defeated by Gelon on the same day that Themistocles destroyed the fleet +of Xerxes at Salamis. Three other expeditions, under Hannibal, Imilcon, +and Hamilcar, carried into Sicily from one hundred to one hundred and +fifty thousand men: Agrigentum and Palermo were taken, Lilybaeum was +founded, and Syracuse besieged twice. The third time Androcles, with +fifteen thousand men, landed in Africa, and made Carthage tremble. This +contest lasted one year and a half. + +Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont with only fifty thousand men: +his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the Persians +had four hundred; and to save his fleet Alexander sent it back to +Greece. + +After Alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division +of the empire, made no important naval expedition. + +Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by their +fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand +horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in Italy. This was +two hundred and eighty years before the Christian era. + +Conqueror of the Romans at Heraclea and Ascoli, it is difficult to +understand why he should have gone to Sicily at the solicitation of the +Syracusans to expel the Carthaginians. Recalled, after some success, by +the Tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the Carthaginian +fleet: then, reinforced by the Samnites or Calabrians, he, a little too +late, concluded to march on Rome. He in turn was beaten and repulsed on +Beneventum, when he returned to Epirus with nine thousand men, which was +all that remained of his force. + +Carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the +ruin of Tyre and the Persian empire. + +The Punic wars between Carthage and Rome, now the preponderating power +in Italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity. +The Romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they +improved and increased their marine. In the year 264 B.C. their boats or +vessels were scarcely fit to cross to Sicily; and eight years after +found Regulus conqueror at Ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large +vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty +combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. The +Carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand +men and fifty vessels. + +The victory of Ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of +Actium--was the first important step of the Romans toward universal +empire. The subsequent descent in Africa consisted of forty thousand +men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to Sicily, the +remainder was overthrown, and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as +celebrated by his death as by his famous victory. + +The great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at Clypea, but +was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same +fate at Cape Palinuro. In the year 249 B.C. the Romans were defeated at +Drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred +vessels. Another fleet, on its way to besiege Lilybaeum, in the same +year, was lost off Cape Pactyrus. + +Discouraged by this succession of disasters, the Senate at first +resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of Sicily +and Spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm +its fleets again, and in the year 242 Lutatius Catullus set out with +three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for Drepanum, and +gained the battle in the AEgates Islands, in which the Carthaginians lost +one hundred and twenty vessels. This victory brought to a close the +first Punic war. + +The second, distinguished by Hannibal's expedition to Italy, was less +maritime in its character. Scipio, however, bore the Roman eagles to +Cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the +Carthaginians in Spain. Finally, he carried the war into Africa with a +force inferior to that of Regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the +battle of Zama, imposing a shameful peace on Carthage and burning five +hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio's brother crossed the +Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at Magnesia gained the +celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the Romans the +kingdom of Antiochus and all Asia. This expedition was aided by a +victory gained at Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and +Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus. + +From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power +by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. Paulus +Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at Samothrace at the head of +twenty-five thousand men, conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to +submission. + +Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of Carthage. +The important port of Utica having been given up to the Romans, an +immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand +foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the +son of Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the glory +of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had begun, by +destroying the bitter rival of his country. + +After this triumph, the power of Rome in Africa, as well as in Europe, +was supreme; but her empire in Asia was for a moment shaken by +Mithridates. This powerful king, after seizing in succession the small +adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty +thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three +hundred were decked. He defeated the three Roman generals who commanded +in Cappadocia, invaded Asia Minor and massacred there at least eighty +thousand Roman subjects, and even sent a large army into Greece. + +Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand +Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in succession two large +armies by the Bosporus and the Dardanelles: the first, one hundred +thousand strong, was destroyed at Chaeronea, and the second, of eighty +thousand men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time, +Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of +Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes, was prepared to +transport Sylla's army from Sestos to Asia; and Mithridates, from fear, +made peace. + +In the second and third wars, respectively conducted by Murena and +Lucullus, there were no descents effected. Mithridates, driven step by +step into Colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the +project of turning the Black Sea by the Caucasus, in order to pass +through Thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult +to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his +kingdom against fifty thousand Romans. + +Caesar, in his second descent on England, had six hundred vessels, +transporting forty thousand men. During the civil wars he transported +thirty-five thousand men to Greece. Antony came from Brundusium to join +him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of +Pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of Caesar +as by the arrangements of his lieutenants. + +Afterward Caesar carried an army of sixty thousand men to Africa; they +did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments. + +The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman republic was that +of Augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand +horses into Greece to oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous +transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty +vessels of war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land, +but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one +hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of Cleopatra's +galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides +the necessary rowers. + +Later, Germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels, +carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths +of the Ems. Half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm; +and it is difficult to understand why Germanicus, controlling both banks +of the Rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, +when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days. + +When the Roman authority extended from the Rhine to the Euphrates, +maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of +the North of Europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave +employment to the Roman armies on the sides of Germany and Thrace. The +eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which +the possession of the islands of the Archipelago made a necessity, while +at the same time it afforded the means. + +The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few events of +interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having acquired Spain, landed +in Africa, eighty thousand strong, under Genseric. They were defeated by +Belisarius; but, holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled +the Mediterranean for a time. + +At the very epoch when the nations of the East invaded Europe, the +Scandinavians began to land on the coast of England. Their operations +are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in +the mysteries of Odin. + +The Scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to +Sweden. Less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the +Danes and three hundred to Norway: these frequently acted in concert. + +The Swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the Baltic, +and drove the Varangians into Russia. The Danes, more favorably situated +with respect to the North Sea, directed their course toward the coasts +of France and England. + +If the account cited by Depping is correct, the greater part of these +vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of +rowers. There were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers. +The largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. The incursions of the +Danes, who had long before ascended the Seine and Loire, lead us to +infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small. + +However, Hengist, invited by the Briton Vortigern, transported five +thousand Saxons to England in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show +that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the Elbe +was superior to that of the Scandinavians. + +Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under Ida and +Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided it into seven +kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed (833) that +they were again united under the authority of Egbert. + +The African races, in their turn, visited the South of Europe. In 712, +the Moors crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, under the lead of Tarik. +They came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of Count Julian; and, +far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous +enemies of the Visigoths. This was the happy era of the Caliphs, and the +Arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of +the North. Tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated +Rodrigo at Jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. In time, several +millions of the inhabitants of Mauritania crossed the sea and settled in +Spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents, +still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in +history, occurring between the incursions of the Vandals in Africa and +the Crusades in the East. + +A revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable +traces, marked in the North the establishment of the vast empire now +known as Russia. The Varangian princes, invited by the Novgorodians, of +whom Rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great +expeditions. + +In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two +thousand boats on the Dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and +debouched in the Black Sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. They +proceeded to Constantinople, and forced Leo the Philosopher to pay +tribute. + +Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a fleet said to +have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near Constantinople his fleet, +terrified by the effects of the Greek fire, was driven on the coast of +Asia, where the force was disembarked. It was defeated, and the +expedition returned home. + +Not discouraged, Igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to +the mouths of the Danube, where the Emperor Romanus I. sent to renew the +tribute and ask for peace, (943.) + +In 967, Svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of Nicephorus with the King of +Bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the Black Sea, +ascended the Danube, and seized Bulgaria. Recalled by the Petchenegs, +who were menacing Kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned +into Bulgaria, broke his alliance with the Greeks, and, being reinforced +by the Hungarians, crossed the Balkan and marched to attack Adrianople. +The throne of Constantine was held by Zimisces, who was worthy of his +position. Instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his +predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a +respectable fleet, repulsed Svatoslav at Adrianople, obliged him to +retreat to Silistria, and took by assault the capital of the Bulgarians. +The Russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from +Silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one +of the most memorable sieges recorded in history. + +In a second and still more bloody battle, the Russians performed +prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers. +Zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty. + +About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the hope of +pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their king, Ogier, to +France to be avenged of his brothers. The first success of these pirates +increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six +years their bands swarmed on the coasts of France and Britain and +devastated the country. Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted +them sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the mouths of +the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is even asserted that +Hastings entered the Mediterranean and ascended the Rhone to Avignon; +but this is, to say the least, doubtful. The strength of their fleets is +not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail. + +In the beginning of the tenth century, Rollo at first landed in England, +but, finding little chance of success against Alfred, he entered into +alliance with him, landed in Neustria in 911, and advanced from Rouen on +Paris: other bodies marched from Nantes on Chartres. Repulsed here, +Rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. Charles the Simple +saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing +scourge than to offer Rollo the fine province of Neustria on condition +that he would marry his daughter and turn Christian,--an offer which was +eagerly accepted. + +Thirty years later, Rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of +Charles, called to his aid the King of Denmark. The latter landed in +considerable force, defeated the French, took the king prisoner, and +assured Rollo's son in the possession of Normandy. + +During the same interval (838 to 950) the Danes exhibited even greater +hostility toward England than to France, although they were much more +assimilated to the Saxons than to the French in language and customs. +Ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in +Northumberland. Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar's successors, +succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of +the Danes. + +The aspect of affairs changes anew: Sweyn, still more fortunate than +Ivar, after conquering and devastating England, granted peace on +condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to Denmark, +leaving a part of his army behind him. + +Ethelred, who had weakly disputed with Sweyn what remained of the Saxon +power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his +importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the +Danes in the kingdom, (1002.) But Sweyn reappeared in the following +year at the head of an imposing force, and between 1003 and 1007 three +successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate +England was ravaged anew. + +In 1012, Sweyn landed at the mouth of the Humber and again swept over +the land like a torrent, and the English, tired of obedience to kings +who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the North. His son, +Canute the Great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him, +(Edmund Ironside.) Returning from Denmark at the head of a considerable +force, and aided by the perfidious Edric, Canute ravaged the southern +part of England and threatened London. A new division of the kingdom +resulted; but, Edmund having been assassinated by Edric, Canute was +finally recognized as king of all England. Afterward he sailed to +conquer Norway, from which country he returned to attack Scotland. When +he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to +the usage of the times. + +Five years after Canute's death, the English assigned the crown to their +Anglo-Saxon princes; but Edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to +be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. He died in +1066, leaving to Harold a crown which the chief of the Normans settled +in France contested with him, and to whom, it is said, Edward had made a +cession of the kingdom. Unfortunately for Harold, this chief was a great +and ambitious man. + +The year 1066 was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. While William +the Conqueror was preparing in Normandy a formidable armament against +Harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from +Northumberland for his crimes, sought support in Norway, and, with the +King of Norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred +vessels, and landed at the mouth of the Humber. Harold almost entirely +destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near York; but a more +formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. William took +advantage of the time when the Anglo-Saxon king was fighting the +Norwegians, to sail from St. Valery with a very large armament. Hume +asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities +reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy +thousand men. Harold hastened from York, and fought a decisive battle +near Hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate +rival soon reduced the country to submission. + +At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer, Robert +Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria and Sicily with a +handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.) + +Scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic +priest animated Europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large +forces upon Asia to conquer the Holy Land. + +At first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred +thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the +attacks of the Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, Peter the Hermit +succeeded in crossing the Bosporus, and arrived before Nice with from +fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the +Saracens. + +An expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of +religious pilgrims. One hundred thousand men, composed of French, +Burgundians, Germans, and inhabitants of Lorraine, under Godfrey of +Bouillon, marched through Austria on Constantinople; an equal number, +under the Count of Toulouse, marched by Lyons, Italy, Dalmatia, and +Macedonia; and Bohemond, Prince of Tarentum, embarked with a force of +Normans, Sicilians, and Italians, and took the route by Greece on +Gallipolis. + +This extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of +Xerxes. The Genoese, Venetian, and Greek fleets were chartered to +transport these swarms of Crusaders by the Bosporus or Dardanelles to +Asia. More than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the +plains of Nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors. +Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as Jerusalem, +where he founded a kingdom. + +All the maritime resources of Greece and the flourishing republics of +Italy were required to transport these masses across the Bosporus and in +provisioning them during the siege of Nice; and the great impulse thus +given to the coast states of Italy was perhaps the most advantageous +result of the Crusades. + +This temporary success of the Crusaders became the source of great +disasters. The Mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united +to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the Christian +camps. A new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave +Noureddin was threatening. Louis VII. and the Emperor Conrad, each at +the head of one hundred thousand Crusaders, marched, as their +predecessors had done, by the route of Constantinople, (1142.) But the +Greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, +plotted their destruction. + +Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for +him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by +the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more fortunate, defeated the Turks on the +banks of the Mender; but, being deprived of the support of Conrad, and +his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage +of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to Attalia, +on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. The +means furnished by the Greeks were insufficient, and not more than +fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at Antioch with the king: the +remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens. + +This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the +climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were +continually aided by small bodies brought over from Europe by the +Italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of +Saladin, when the court of Rome succeeded in effecting an alliance +between the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and +England to save the Holy Land. + +The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one hundred +thousand Germans, he opened a passage through Thrace in spite of the +formal resistance of the Greeks, now governed by Isaac Angelus. He +marched to Gallipolis, crossed the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He +died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been +pretended, was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the +Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais scarcely six +thousand men. + +At the same time, Richard Coeur-de-Lion[58] and Philip Augustus more +judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from Marseilles and +Genoa with two immense fleets,(1190.) The first seized Cyprus, and both +landed in Syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the +rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which Philip +returned to France. + +Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon, (1203.) Part of +the Crusaders embarked from Provence or Italy; others, led by the Count +of Flanders and the Marquis of Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the +intention of embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by +the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinople, upon +the pretext of upholding the rights of Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac +Angelus, who had fought the Emperor Frederick and was the successor of +those Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of +Conrad and Louis VII. + +Twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of +the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. They +assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. The usurper fled, and +Alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat: +the Greeks made an insurrection in favor of Murzupha, but the Latins +took possession of Constantinople after a more bloody assault than the +first, and placed upon the throne their chief, Count Baldwin of +Flanders. This empire lasted a half-century. The remnant of the Greeks +took refuge at Nice and Trebizond. + +A sixth expedition was directed against Egypt by John of Brienne, who, +notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of Damietta, +was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the +Mussulman population. The remains of his splendid army, after a narrow +escape from drowning in the Nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in +being able to purchase permission to re-embark for Europe. + +The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of +Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits, +encouraged the German princes to uphold the tottering realm at +Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the Landgrave of Hesse embarked at +Brundusium in 1227, at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The +landgrave, and afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put +in at Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the +presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him because he was too +slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with +ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical +thunders. + +Louis IX., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may +credit Ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from +Aigues-Mortes, in 1248, with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and +fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the Genoese, the Venetians and +the Catalans; for France was at that time without a navy, although +washed by two seas. This king proceeded to Cyprus, and, having there +collected a still larger force, set out, according to Joinville's +statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent +into Egypt. His army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, +although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of +Syria, he marched upon Cairo a few months later with sixty thousand +fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. It should be stated that +the Count of Poictiers had arrived also with troops from France. + +The sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the +same king from engaging in a new Crusade, twenty years later,(1270.) He +disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of Carthage, and besieged +Tunis. The plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself +was one of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with powerful +reinforcements at the time of Louis's death, and desiring to carry back +the remains of the army to his island of Sicily, encountered a tempest +which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. This +prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of +the Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater +value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and successor of Saint +Louis, being anxious to return to France, would have nothing to do with +that project. This was the last effort. The Christians who were +abandoned in Syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and +Ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at +Cyprus and established themselves at Rhodes. + +The Mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipolis in +1355, and took possession, one after the other, of the European +provinces of the Eastern Empire, to which the Latins had themselves +given the fatal blow. + +Mohammed II., while besieging Constantinople in 1453, is said to have +had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal +and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be +manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. After the capture of +this capital, Mohammed found his means increased by all those of the +Greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of +maritime powers. He ordered an attack to be made upon Rhodes and upon +Otranto on the Italian main, whilst he proceeded to Hungary in search of +a more worthy opponent (Hunniades.) Repulsed and wounded at Belgrade, +the sultan fell upon Trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city +to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail +to make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he carried by +assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the +head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a +failure, with loss to the assailants. Mohammed was preparing to go to +that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of +Ionia, which Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death +closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect. + +About the same period England began to be formidable to her neighbors on +land as well as on the sea; the Dutch also, reclaiming their country +from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more +extraordinary even than that of Venice. + +Edward III. landed in France and besieged Calais with eight hundred +ships and forty thousand men. + +Henry V. made two descents in 1414 and 1417: he had, it is stated, +fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six +thousand were cavalry. + +All the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and +including the capture of Constantinople, were before the invention of +gunpowder; for if Henry V. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimed by +some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. From that +time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and +this revolution took place--if I may use that expression--at the time +when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of America +and of the Cape of Good Hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of +the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of +colonial dependencies. + +I shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the Spaniards to +America, or those of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English to India by +doubling the Cape of Good Hope. Notwithstanding their great influence +upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of Gama, +Albuquerque, and Cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies +of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of +fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view. + +The Spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this +discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign +of Charles V. However, the glory of the expedition to Tunis, which was +conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers +transported in five hundred Genoese or Spanish vessels, was balanced by +the disaster which befell a similar expedition against Algiers, (1541,) +undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the +wise counsels of Admiral Doria. The expedition was scarcely under way +when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight +thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the +skill of Doria, and assembled at Cape Metafuz, where Charles V. himself +arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril. + +While these events were transpiring, the successors of Mohammed were not +neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine +maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the +control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period +the Turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and +the military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the apex of +their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and captured Rhodes +(1552) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and +forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the +supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half. + +In 1565, Mustapha and the celebrated Dragut made a descent upon Malta, +where the Knights of Rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried +over thirty-two thousand Janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships. +John of Valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing +them. + +A more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and +fifty-five thousand men, was sent in 1527 to the isle of Cyprus, where +Nicosia was taken and Famagosta besieged. The horrible cruelties +practiced by Mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. +Spain, Venice, Naples, and Malta united their naval forces to succor +Cyprus; but Famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the +heroic defense of Bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by +Mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand Turks that had +perished in the space of two years spent on the island. + +The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of Austria, +brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the Turkish fleet at +the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the promontory of Actium, +where Antony and Augustus once fought for the empire of the world. The +Turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred +vessels and thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.) +This victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but was a +great check in their career of greatness. However, they made such +vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea +during the next year. Peace terminated this contest, in which such +enormous losses were sustained. + +The bad fortune of Charles V. in his expedition against Algiers did not +deter Sebastian of Portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of +Morocco, where he was invited by a Moorish prince who had been deprived +of his estates. Having disembarked upon the shores of Morocco at the +head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army +cut to pieces at the battle of Alcazar by Muley Abdulmalek, in 1578. + +Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of Lepanto +on account of the success he had gained in France by his diplomacy and +by the folly of the adherents of the League, deemed his arms +irresistible. He thought to bring England to his feet. The invincible +Armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was +composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including, +according to Hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, +armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and +carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand +sailors. To these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand +men which the Duke of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way +of Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the failure +of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the +period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding +name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels +before it even came near the English coast. + +After this expedition comes in chronological order that of Gustavus +Adolphus to Germany,(1630.) The army contained only from fifteen to +eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine +thousand sailors; M. Ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that +it carried eight thousand cannon. The debarkation in Pomerania received +little opposition from the Imperial troops, and the King of Sweden had a +strong party among the German people. His successor was the leader of a +very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other +example mentioned in history: I refer to the march of Charles X. of +Sweden across the Belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from Sleswick +upon Copenhagen by way of the island of Funen,(1658.) He had twenty-five +thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in +proportion. This undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice +was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage +having broken through and been lost. + +After seventy-five years of peace, the war between Venice and the Turks +recommenced in 1645. The latter transported an army of fifty-five +thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to Candia, and gained +possession of the important post of Canea before the republic thought of +sending succor. Although the people of Venice began to lose the spirit +which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble +souls: Morosini, Grimani, and Mocenigo struggled several years against +the Turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority +and the possession of Canea. The Venetian fleet had, nevertheless, +gained a marked ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of +it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself +perished. + +In 1648, the siege of Candia began. Jussuf attacked the city furiously +at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two +assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being +made. The Turks entered the place: Mocenigo rushed to meet them, +expecting to die in their midst. A brilliant victory was the reward of +his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with +their dead bodies. + +Venice might have driven off the Turks by sending twenty thousand men to +Candia; but Europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already +called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce. + +The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of Troy, and +each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the Turks to +carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the +Venetians. The latter people had kept up with the advance of naval +tactics in Europe, and thus were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who +adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every +attempt to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of +Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous in this +protracted struggle. + +Finally, the celebrated Coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of +the Ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this +war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island, +where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he +conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.(1667.) + +In this memorable siege the Turks exhibited more skill than previously: +their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the +first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an +Italian engineer. + +The Venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by +mines. Never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual +destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. Their heroic resistance +enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, Venice +sent reinforcements and the Duke of Feuillade brought a few hundreds of +French volunteers. + +The Turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their +efforts. The siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand Frenchmen +came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the Duke +of Beaufort and Navailles,(1669.) A badly-conducted sortie discouraged +these presumptuous young men, and Navailles, disgusted with the +sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end +of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to France. +Morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place +which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a +truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. Candia had +cost the Turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred +thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. It +is estimated that thirty-five thousand Christians of different nations +perished in the glorious defense of the place. + +The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England gives examples of +great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. That of James II. +in Ireland (1690) was composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although +De Tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying +five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. A +grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men +into Ireland with such means as were disposable. Two years later, De +Tourville had been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the +remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through +the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the +island. + +At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Swedes and Russians +undertook two expeditions very different in character. + +Charles XII., wishing to aid the Duke of Holstein, made a descent upon +Denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred +vessels and protected by a strong squadron. He was really assisted by +the English and Dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason +the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. The same +prince effected a descent into Livonia to aid Narva, but he landed his +troops at a Swedish port. + +Peter the Great, having some cause of complaint against the Persians, +and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in 1722) +upon the Volga: he entered the Caspian Sea with two hundred and seventy +vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to +Agrakhan, at the mouths of the Koisou, where he expected to meet his +cavalry. This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand +Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the Caucasus. The czar +then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou, and finally made a treaty with one +of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the +empire of the Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of +the Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian empire. + +The time of Louis XV. furnished examples of none but secondary +expeditions, unless we except that of Richelieu against Minorca, which +was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent. + +[In 1762, an English fleet sailed from Portsmouth: this was joined by a +portion of the squadron from Martinico. The whole amounted to nineteen +ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and +fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. The expedition besieged and +captured Havana.--TRS.] + +The Spaniards, however, in 1775, made a descent with fifteen or sixteen +thousand men upon Algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the +sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious +action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on +account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the +Turkish and Arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding +the city. The troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand +men placed _hors de combat_. + +The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts +upon the part of the French. Europe was astonished to see this power +send Count d'Estaing to America with twenty-five ships of the line, +while at the same time M. Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of +sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with +three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at Havre and +St. Malo. + +This new armada moved back and forth for several months, but +accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port. + +D'Estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority +in the Antilles and in landing in the United States six thousand +Frenchmen under Rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by +another division, and assisted in investing the English army under +Cornwallis at Yorktown, (1781:) the independence of America was thus +secured. France would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable +rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display +made in the English Channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand +men more to India with Admiral Suffren. + +During the French Revolution, there were few examples of descents: the +fire at Toulon, emigration, and the battle of Ushant had greatly injured +the French navy. + +Hoche's expedition against Ireland with twenty-five thousand men was +scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were +made. (1796.) + +At a later date, Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, consisting of +twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four +hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were +followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed +fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but were all captured or driven into +the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of +intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an +excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under +similar circumstances. + +The expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in 1802 to +St. Domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the +ravages of yellow fever. + +Since their success against Louis XIV., the English have given their +attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of +colonies than to great descents. The attempts made in the eighteenth +century against Brest and Cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve +thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like +France. The remarkable conquests which procured them their Indian empire +occurred in succession. Having obtained possession of Calcutta, and then +of Bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of +troops in small bodies and by using the Sepoys, whom they disciplined to +the number of one hundred and fifty thousand. + +The Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799 was composed of forty +thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the +details of the operations is, however, quite interesting. + +In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz, effected a +descent into Egypt with twenty thousand Englishmen. The results of this +expedition are well known. + +General Stuart's expedition to Calabria, (1806,) after some successes at +Maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of Sicily. That +against Buenos Ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was +terminated by a capitulation. + +In 1807, Lord Cathcart attacked Copenhagen with twenty-five thousand +men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the +Danish fleet, which was his object. + +In 1808, Wellington appeared in Portugal with fifteen thousand men. +After gaining the victory of Vimeira, and assisted by the general rising +of the Portuguese, he forced Junot to evacuate the kingdom. The same +army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under +Moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into Spain with a +view of relieving Madrid, was forced to retreat to Corunna and there +re-embark, after suffering severe losses. Wellington, having effected +another landing in Portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of +thirty thousand Englishmen and as many Portuguese, with which he avenged +Moore's misfortunes by surprising Soult at Oporto, (May, 1809,) and then +beating Joseph at Talavera, under the very gates of his capital. + +The expedition to Antwerp in the same year was one of the largest +England has undertaken since the time of Henry V. It was composed of not +less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and +thirty thousand sailors. It did not succeed, on account of the +incapacity of the leader. + +A descent entirely similar in character to that of Charles X. of Sweden +was effected by thirty Russian battalions passing the Gulf of Bothnia on +the ice in five columns, with their artillery. Their object was to take +possession of the islands of Aland and spread a feeling of apprehension +to the very gates of Stockholm. Another division passed the gulf to +Umea, (March, 1809.) + +General Murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the +neighborhood of Tarragona in 1813, with the intention of cutting Suchet +off from Valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought +best to re-embark. + +The expedition set on foot by England against Napoleon after his return +from Elba in 1815 was remarkable on account of the great mass of +_materiel_ landed at Ostend and Antwerp. The Anglo-Hanoverian army +contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were +disembarked at a friendly port. + +The English engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be +regarded as very extraordinary: I refer to the attack on the capital of +the United States. The world was astonished to see a handful of seven or +eight thousand Englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a +state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its +capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled +in history. We would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary +spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not +risen, like those of Greece, Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their +homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an +English expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely +defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states under the orders +of General Jackson. + +If the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of Xerxes and +the Crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been +actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with +powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and +proportionate preparations made by Napoleon for throwing one hundred and +fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of England by the use of three +thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the +line[59]. + +From the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference +there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between +descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in +width, and those in which the troops and _materiel_ are to be +transported long distances over the open sea. This fact gives the reason +why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the +Bosporus. + + * * * * * + +[The following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:-- + +In 1830, the French government sent an expedition to Algiers, composed +of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and +eighty pieces of artillery. More than five hundred vessels of war and +transports were employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon. + +In 1838, France sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to Vera Cruz. The +castle of San Juan d'Ulloa fell into their hands after a short +bombardment. A small force of about one thousand men, in three columns, +took the city of Vera Cruz by assault: the resistance was slight. + +In 1847, the United States caused a descent to be made upon the coast of +Mexico, at Vera Cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the +command of General Scott. One hundred and fifty vessels were employed, +including men-of-war and transports. The city of Vera Cruz and the +castle of San Juan d'Ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the +forces of the United States. This important post became the secondary +base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the +capture of the city of Mexico. + +In 1854 commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between Russia on +the one side and England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey on the other. +Several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of +the Russian coast: of these the first was in the Baltic Sea. An English +fleet sailed from Spithead, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, on +the 12th of March, and a French fleet from Brest, under the command of +Vice-Admiral Parseval Deschenes, on the 19th of April. They effected a +junction in the Bay of Barosund on the 11th of June. The allied fleet +numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels. +The naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of Bomarsund, on one +of the Aland Isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the +conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of +ten thousand men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General +Baraguay-d'Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced. + +Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed; +and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to +give an idea of its magnitude:-- + +September 14, 1854, an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and +two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, composed of +thirty thousand French, twenty-one thousand five hundred English, and +seven thousand Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of +landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and +transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma, +(September 20,) and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took +possession of the harbor of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch: these +were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the +army in the Crimea were sent. + +November 5, at the battle of Inkermann, the allied army numbered +seventy-one thousand men. + +At the end of January, 1855, the French force was seventy-five thousand +men and ten thousand horses. Up to the same time, the English had sent +fifty-four thousand men to the Crimea, but only fifteen thousand were +alive, present, and fit for duty. + +February 4, the French numbered eighty-five thousand; the English, +twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the Turks, twenty-five thousand. + +May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with fifteen +thousand Sardinians. + +In the latter part of May, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was +sent to Kertch. + +In August, the French force at Sebastopol had risen to one hundred and +twenty thousand men. + +September 8, the final assault took place, which resulted in the +evacuation of the place by the Russians. The allies had then in battery +more than eight hundred pieces of artillery. + +The fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack +of October 17, 1854, consisted of twenty-five ships. There were present +and prepared to attack in September, 1855, thirty-four ships. + +October, 1855, an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to +Kinburn, which place was captured. + +Marshal Vaillant, in his report, as Minister of War, to the French +emperor, says there were sent from France and Algeria three hundred and +ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and +twenty-seven thousand men returned to France and Algeria. + +The marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only +to French operations:-) + +The artillery _materiel_ at the disposal of the Army of the East +comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, +two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine +million pounds of powder. There were sent to the army three thousand +tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and +seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand +war-rockets. + +On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen +batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of +powder. They required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions. + +Of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. The engineers +executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty +thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags. + +Of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent. + +Of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons. + +Hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons. + +Provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons. + +In all, about six hundred thousand tons. + +It is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the English, +Sardinian, and Turkish armies. + +In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a force of forty +thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of +artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and +twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous +transports. + +In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the coast of China, +whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This +expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which +ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and +succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the +most populous empire in the world. + +The French expedition to Syria in 1860 was small in numbers, and +presented no remarkable features. + +Toward the close of the year 1861, the government of the United States +sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to Port Royal, on the coast +of South Carolina, one of the seceding States. The fleet of war-vessels +and transports sailed from Hampton Roads, under command of Captain +Dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and +_materiel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the +rendezvous. The defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval +forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, General +Sherman being in command. + +England, France, and Spain are now (January 16, 1862) engaged in an +expedition directed against Mexico. The first operations were the +capture, by the Spanish forces, of Vera Cruz and its defenses: the +Mexicans offered no resistance at that point. The future will develop +the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if, +indeed, one be attempted by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three +of the most powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and +tottering republic of Mexico.] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 58: Richard sailed from England with twenty thousand foot and +five thousand horsemen, and landed in Normandy, whence he proceeded by +land to Marseilles. We do not know what fleet he employed to transport +his troops to Asia. Philip embarked at Genoa on Italian ships, and with +a force at least as large as that of Richard.] + +[Footnote 59: See the account of the expedition to the +Crimea.--TRANSLATORS.] + + + + +INDEX + +A. + +Abercrombie's descent on Egypt, 384. + +Accidental lines, 103. + +Action, concert of, how secured, 259. + +Active armies and sieges, relation between, 152. + +Advanced guard, 261, 262. + attack of the enemy's, in retreats, 243. + in armies meeting unexpectedly, 208. + in battle, 288, 289. + +Advance, line of, how determined, 71. + +Advantages of awaiting invasion, 17. + of elevated points for observation, 276. + +Aggressive wars for conquest, 22. + +Agincourt, order of battle at, 192. + +Albis, position of, 181. + +Alcazar, battle of, 378. + +Alexander the Great, 173, 362. + +Alfred the Great, 369. + +Algiers, French descent on, in 1830, 386. + Spanish descent on, 382. + +Alise, investment of, by Caesar, 153. + +Allies, at Bautzen, 187. + defeat of, at Zurich, 112. + error of, in 1793, 107, 108. + failure of diversion of, in 1805, 219. + in war, 18. + march of, upon Leipsic, 123. + +Alps, passage of, by Francis I., 168. + +American Revolution, French maritime efforts during, 383. + +Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, 384. + +Angouleme, Duke of, expedition of, 28. + +Antony, retreat of, from Media, 233. + +Antwerp, English expedition to, 385. + +Archduke Charles, 294. + concentric retreat of, in 1796,238. + interior lines of, 136. + opinion of, as to small-column formation, 350. + opinion of, as to the valley of the Danube, 162. + success of, 110, 111. + +Archduke Ferdinand, 53. + +Armada, Spanish, 249, 378, 379. + +Armament, French, at Eylau and Marengo, 47. + superior, importance of, 47, 48. + +Armies, auxiliary, 170. + central, observations on, 126. + command of, 52. + French, in the Revolution, 135. + how to act, 75. + in intrenchments, 154. + in peace, how preserved, 47. + large, fitness of central lines for, 125. + large, organization of, 286. + meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, 208. + morale of, 60, 178, 322. + movements of, points to be attended to in, 254-256. + of French Revolution, how subsisted, 142. + of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., how subsisted, 142. + of Napoleon, operations of, 136. + promotions in, 47. + standing, effect of, on distant invasions, 171. + surprises of, 209. + two, on interior lines, 117. + two, on the same frontier, 116. + unexpected meeting of two, 207. + +Armor, defensive, for cavalry, 308. + +Arms and organization of cavalry, 307, 308. + +Arms for irregular cavalry, 313. + +Army, best means of organizing the command of, 59. + +Army corps, system of, 279. + +Army, defensive, proper course for, 324. + defensive, when it has the advantage, 202. + head-quarters of, when the most important point, 107. + how perfected, 43. + importance of a good, 44. + number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, 285. + +Army of Boulogne, 280. + of four corps, 281. + of seven corps, 281. + offensive, proper course for, 324. + of invasion, line of defense important to, 99. + of the Rhine in 1800, 115. + permanent, necessary condition of, 49. + proportion of cavalry in, 304. + pursuing, has the advantage, 241. + +Artillerists, directions for, in battle, 317. + +Artillery, concentration of fire of, + in offensive line of battle, 290. + employment of, 315-318. + heavy, in defensive line of battle, 290. + importance of, to infantry, 290. + materiel of the French army in the Crimea, 388. + Napoleon's, at Wagrani, 289, 316. + post of, in line of battle, 289. + proportion of, 318. + protection of infantry from the enemy's, 303. + rules for use of, in battle, 316-318. + use of, in the offensive, 316. + who should command, 318. + +Art of war, definition of, 13. + principal parts of, 66. + +Assailant, advantages of, 186. + +Assailant's best means of victory, 202. + +Assault, beat formation of infantry for, 298. + of field-works, instances of well-arranged, 212. + +Athens, naval power of, 361. + +Attack, cavalry column of, 310. + close, formation for, 301. + column of, in two lines, 292. + columns of, 293, 356. + columns of, of single battalions, 298. + five methods of forming troops for, 292. + formation for, at Turin, 213. + in columns, order of, 194. + in front, 201. + in rear, 207. + of field-works, directions for, 211, 212. + of fortified places, 210. + of intrenched lines, 214. + on flank, 203. + on Sank, cavalry, 310. + when order in squares suitable for, 297. + +Attacks and marches, arrangements of, 258. + in half-deep order, 302. + +Audenarde, battle of, 53. + +Augustus, armament of, 365. + +Aulic Council, 59. + +Austerlitz, 170, 179, 206. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Austria, course of, in the French Revolution, 106. + force of, in the French Revolution, 106. + fortresses of, 149. + interest of, in the French Revolution, 105. + intervention of, in 1813, 21. + +Austrian army, situation of, in 1800, 112. + camp before Mayence, 157. + order at Essling and Fleurus, 200. + +Austrians, surprise of, by Turenne, 246. + why victorious in 1753, 107. + +Austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, 240. + +Authority of counselors, 53. + + +B. + +Balloons, difficulties in use of, 275, 276. + how they might be useful, 275. + used at Fleurus, 275. + +Barbarossa, 373. + +Bard, fort of, 152, 167. + importance of defile of, 87. + +Base of operations, where to be established, 84. + +Bases of operations, definition of, 77 + of operations, how to be chosen, 79, 80. + of operations, plurality of, 78. + on the sea, 83, 84. + temporary or eventual, 84. + temporary, when necessary, 132. + with two faces, 83. + +Bassano, Napoleon's march on, 131. + +Battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, 301. + +Battalion squares, 296. + +Batteries, 317. + +Battle, advanced guard in, 288, 289. + calculation of distances in, 334. + classification of orders of, useful, 197. + combinations of, 187. + concave order of, 191. + convex order of, 192. + critical moment of, 203. + decisive moment of, 334. + defensive arrangements for, 201. + +Battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, 186. + decisive point of, 187. + strategic point of, when important, 187. + +Battle-formation in small columns, 350. + influence of topography upon, 299. + +Battle, formation of troops for, 347-360. + influence of orders of, on result of engagements, 197. + line of, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. + line of, before the French Revolution, 277. + line of, definition of, 179. + line of, distribution of troops in, 287. + line of, post of artillery in, 289. + lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. + oblique order of, 190. + of Agincourt, 192. + of Alcazar, 378. + of Audenarde, 53. + of Austerlitz, 170, 179, 198, 206. + of Bautzen, 187, 196, 317. + of Blenheim, 303. + of Cannae, 191. + of Crecy, 192. + of Ecnomos, 363. + of Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. + of Fossano, 168. + of Jena, 90, 198, 305. + of Leipsic, 158, 192, 193, 198, 267, 305. + of Lepanto, 378. + of Leuthen, 140, 190, 229, 342. + of Millesimo, 111. + of Mollwitz, 348. + of Prague, 189, 205. + of Ramillies, 312. + of Rivoli, 179, 198, 205. + of Torgau, 205. + of Turin, 53. + of Ulm, 53, 90. + of Ulm, won by strategy, 198. + of Waterloo, 127, 129, 130, 181, 182, 183, 196, 198, 206, 294, 295, + 303-306, 354, 358, 359. + offensive, object of, 188. + offensive order of, 200. + order of, 186. + order of, at Leipsic, 193. + order of, definition of, 180. + orders of, 188. + parallel order of, 188. + reinforced, 189. + when suitable, 189. + with crotchet, 189. + perpendicular order of, 190. + position for, 341. + posting troops in line of, 277. + results of, depend on what, 178. + rules for use of artillery in, 316-318. + +Battle-order for cavalry, 312. + +Battle-orders, various, 349. + +Battles, 178. + defensive, 179. + elements of uncertainty regarding, 197. + great difficulty of tactics of, 196. + influence of musketry-fire in, 348. + offensive, 186. + of Napoleon, orders of, 198. + rules for scientific, 200. + success in, depends on maneuvering, 360. + three kinds of, 179. + what may interfere with success of, 196. + +Bautzen, battle of, 187, 317. + French at, 196. + +Bellegarde, 166. + +Benningsen, movement of, in 1807, 109. + +Benningsen's artillery reserve at Eylau, 289. + base on Koenigsberg in 1807, 152. + position in 1807, 171. + mixed system at Eylau, 352. + +Beresina, passage of, 226, 245. + +Berg-op-Zoom, assault of, 212. + +Berthier at Leipsic, 267. + +Berthier's error at Wagram, 267. + error in campaign of 1809, 265. + +Blenheim, battle of, 303. + +Bluecher, 53, 130. + +"Boar's head" of the ancients, 194. + +Bonaparte's career in Italy, 111. + expedition to Egypt, 383. + +Borodino, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Boulogne, army of, 280. + camp of, 279. + +Bravery, first requisite for a leader, 345. + +Bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., 245. + in retreats, 244. + means of destroying, 245. + protection of, after passage, 229. + +Bridge-trains, importance of, 121. + +Brienne, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Buntzelwitz, camp of, 154. + +Burgundy, Duke of, 53. + + +C. + +Caesar's investment of Alise, 153. + maritime expeditions, 365. + +Campaign, Napoleon's, of 1800, 137. + of 1793, 107. + of 1799, 111. + of 1800, 112. + of 1812, Napoleon's error in, 172. + of the Spaniards in Flanders, 171. + of the Swedes in Germany, 171. + +Campaigns in mountains, instances of, 169. + in winter, 68. + of 1799 and 1800, 162. + +Camp at Kehl, 167. + intrenched, influence of, 155. + intrenched, on which side of a river, 157. + intrenched, on river, 156. + of Boulogne, 279. + of Drissa, 157. + +Camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, 215. + fortified, 154. + intrenched, connection of, with strategy, 154. + intrenched, instances of, 210, 211. + intrenched, maxims on, 155, 156. + intrenched, Prussian system of, 158. + intrenched, use of, 156. + intrenched, where to be established, 155. + strategic square for, 99. + +Candia, siege of, 380, 381. + Turkish descent on, 379. + +Cannae, order of battle at, 191. + +Cantonment of Napoleon on the Passarge, 247. + +Cantonments, 246. + duty of staff officers in, 256. + rules for establishing, 246. + selection of positions for, 247. + +Canute, 370. + +Capitals as strategic points, 87. + +Capital, when the center of power, 107. + +Capture of posts, means for, 216. + when important, 216. + +Carbine, in cavalry-charges, 306. + +Carnot, 59. + operations of, 136. + +Carthage, destruction of, 364. + +Carthaginians, expeditions of, 361, 362. + +Cavalry, 303. + advantages of large corps of, 309. + arms and organization of, 307, 308. + arrangement of, in line of battle, 288. + at Ramillies, 312. + battle-order for, 312. + best formation of infantry against, 294. + charge at Hohenfriedberg, 305. + charge, general, 305. + charges, four kinds of, 306. + charges of the Turks, 307. + defensive armor for, 308. + divisions of five regiments, 311. + duties of, 304. + encounters of, against cavalry, 311. + flank charges of, 307. + formations of, 309-311. + importance of, in retreats, 243. + importance of, to infantry, 290. + influence of, in a war, 313, 314. + in the defensive, 306. + irregular, 313. + light, advantages of, 314. + militia as, 314, 315. + morale of, 312. + must be supported by infantry, 304. + proportion of, in an army, 304. + reserves, 288, 311. + when it should charge a line of infantry, 305. + +Center, when proper point of attack, 187. + +Central armies, 126. + line of Napoleon in Saxony, 124. + lines, application of, to large masses, 125. + position, when untenable, 331. + +Chaeronea, 365. + +Charges, irregular cavalry, 313. + +Charles V. of Spain, expedition of, 377. + VIII., retreat of, to Naples, 233. + X. of Sweden, expedition of, 379. + XII. of Sweden, descent of, on Denmark, 382. + +Checkerwise formation of cavalry, 310. + order, infantry, 301. + +Chief of staff, 57, 253. + +China, English and French expedition to, 389. + +Choice of objective points, 90. + +Circumvallation, lines of, 152. + +Civil wars, 35. + +Clairfayt, victories of, 110. + +Clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, 178. + opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, 166. + +Coalition against France in 1793, 37. + Frederick the Great, 36, 37. + Louis XIV., 36. + +Coasts, influence of, on descents, 251. + +Coblentz, fortification of, 157, 158. + towers of, 159. + +Coburg, Prince of, 109, 193. + +Column of attack, cavalry, 310. + of attack in two lines, 292. + +Columns of attack, 293, 294, 356. + of attack of single battalions, 298. + of four divisions in three ranks, 294. + +Combinations of battle, 187. + strategic, 72. + +Combined use of the three arms, 203, 319, 320. + +Commander, difficulty of selecting, 55. + essential qualities for a, 55. + importance of, 54. + +Commander, first care of, on taking the field, 66. + of artillery, duties of, 319. + +Command of an army, best means of organizing, 59. + of armies, 52. + +Commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, 141. + of Louis XIV. and Frederick II., 142. + the, and strategy, 141. + +Committee of Public Safety, 136. + +Concave order of battle, 191. + +Concentration of artillery-fire, 290. + in retreat, advantages of, 238. + +Concentric lines, 102. + retreats, instances of, 238, 239. + system, 126. + +Concert of action, how secured, 259. + in action, importance of, 42. + +Conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, 31-34. + wars for, instances of, 22. + +Conrad III., Crusade of, 372. + +Constantinople, expeditions against, by the Russians, 368. + siege of, by the Crusaders, 373. + siege of, by Mohammed II., 375. + +Contempt for the enemy, 63. + +Contravallation, lines of, 152. + +Control of operations, 52. + +Convergent operations, 126. + +Converging lines more advantageous than divergent, 118. + +Continuous intrenched lines, 213. + +Control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, 30. + +Convex order of battle, 192. + +Copenhagen, siege of, 384. + +Cordon system, 165. + +Corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, 287. + organization of an army in four, 281. + organization of an army in seven, 281. + system of, 279. + two, one behind the other, 285. + +Cossacks, 272, 273, 313, 314. + +Council of war at seat of government, 59. + +Councils of war, value of, 58. + +Counselors, authority of, 53. + +Coup-d'oeil, strategic, 337-345. + +Coups de main, 215. + instances of, 216, 223. + +Crecy, order of battle at, 192. + +Crimea, details of the allied expedition to, 387-389. + +Crimean War, 387. + +Critical moment of battles, 203. + +Crossing a river in presence of an enemy, 120. + +Crotchet, parallel order of battle with, 189. + +Crotchets, danger of, 182. + +Crusade of 1203, 373. + +Crusades, 25, 371-375. + +Cuirass, 47, 308. + +Cuirassiers, 308. + +Culm, 221. + +Cyprus, Turkish expedition against, 377. + + +D. + + +Danes, incursions of, 368, 369. + +Danger of two wars at once, 36. + +Dangers of auxiliary armies, 170. + +Danube, Napoleon's passage of, 226. + valley of, key of Southern Germany, 162. + +Decisive direction, 328. + moment of battle, 334. + point at Bautzen, 187. + point, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. + point of battle-field, 187. + point of battle-field, how determined, 88, 186. + points, 337. + points, defiles as, 87. + points of the theater of war, 85. + +Deep columns, 356. + at Waterloo, 359. + masses, 298, 302. + order, disadvantages of, 298. + +Defeat, 68. + of the French at Waterloo, causes of, 359. + +Defense, in mountainous countries, 163. + line of, important to an army of invasion, 99. + line of, should be short, 98. + of frontiers, 146. + of intrenched camps and lines, 215. + rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, 96. + second lines of, 147. + should not be passive, 185. + tactical, of Switzerland, 169. + maxims for frontier, 148, 149. + +Defensive armor for cavalry, 308. + army has the advantage, when, 202. + army, proper course for, 324. + arrangements for battle, 201. + battles, 179. + best formation of infantry for, 298. + cavalry in, 306. + characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. + in descents, duty of, 251. + line of battle, heavy artillery in, 290. + +Defensive movements, when advised, 124. + -offensive war, 74. + or offensive system, either may be employed, 185. + the, in a level country, 164. + war, 72, 73. + +Defiles as decisive points, 87. + as eventual lines of defense, 96. + in retreats, 243. + +Definitive lines, 103. + +Dennewitz, Ney's error at, 130. + +Deployed battalions in checkerwise order, 301. + lines in two ranks, 294. + lines, two, formation of infantry in, 292. + +Depots, establishment of, on march, 262. + command of, 263. + lines of, 263. + of supplies, 141. + of supplies, general maxims, 143. + secondary, 262, 263. + +Descents, 248. + cases where made, 250. + difficulties of, 250. + duty of defensive in, 251. + effect of modern inventions on, 248. + more extensive in ancient times, 248. + precautions after landing, 252. + rules for conducting, 251. + +D'Estaing's fleet, 383. + +Detached orders of Napoleon, 259. + works, importance of, 154. + +Detachments, field of operations of, should be large, 220. + four kinds of, 217. + great, 217, 219, 334. + great, instances of, 221, 222. + great, why made, 220, 221. + multiplication of, must be avoided, 221. + necessary when there is a double strategic front, 220. + of Napoleon in 1805, 222. + precise rules for, cannot be laid down, 222. + requisites in officers of, 224. + small, how useful, 224. + +Detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, 219. + +Detours, 197, 204. + +Difficulty of applying theories in war, 269. + +Diplomacy in invasions, 24. + +Direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, 116. + of lines of operations, 115. + +Discipline, importance of, 42. + importance of, in retreats, 242. + +Distances in battle, calculation of, 334. + +Distant expeditions, 169. + invasions across extensive territories, 171. + invasions, maxim for, 173. + invasions to aid an ally, 170. + +Distribution of troops in line of battle, 287. + +Divergent lines, 103. + +Duke of York's expedition to Dunkirk, 91. + to Holland in 1799, 91. + +Dumouriez, errors of, in 1792, 106, 107. + +Dunkirk, expedition to, 91. + +Duties of cavalry, 304. + of staff officers, 254-256. + +Duty of a general, 324. + of statesmen in offensive wars, 17. + +Diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, 222. + +Division, improper use of the term, 351. + +Divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, 311. + defects of system of, 278. + remedied by Napoleon, 278. + formation by, when preferable, 286. + organization of, 279, 280. + system of, 278. + +Doctoroff, warning given to, in 1812, by Seslawin, 273. + +Double line of operations, when applicable, 117. + when necessary, 116. + lines of operations, 102, 110. + when advantageous, 123. + lines to be avoided, 330. + passages of rivers, 230. + strategic front, 95. + wars, 36. + wars of Napoleon, 37. + +Dragoons, 308. + concentration of, by Emperor + Nicholas, 309. + +Drepanum, 363. + +Dresden, 305. + intrenched camp at, 155, 211. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + victory at, 124. + +Drissa, camp of, 155, 157. + +Divergent lines, when advantageous, 118. + operations, 126. + retreats, when admissible, 239. + +Diversions, 218. + instances of, 218. + when useful, 218. + + +E. + +Eccentric lines, 237. + retreat. Bulow's use of the term, + 237. + +Eccentric system, 126. + +Echelon, order of battle by, 193. + +Echelons, order in, 193. + squares in, 297. + +Ecnomos, victory of, 363. + +Edward III. of England, 376. + +Egypt, expedition of John of Brienne against, 374. + +Ehrenbreitstein, 158. + +Elchingen, Ney at, 182. + +Elective governments, weakness of, 46. + +Elevated points, advantage of, for observation, 276. + +Elongated squares, 296, 297. + +Employment of artillery, 315-318. + +Encounters of cavalry against cavalry, 311. + +Enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, 67. + contempt for, 63. + how dislodged, 188. + how to drive from his position, 201, 202. + should not be paid to leave a country, 242. + +Enemy's movements, importance of knowing, 268. + +England controls the sea, 173. + invasion of, by Sweyn, 370. + projected invasion of, by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386. + +England's attack on Washington in 1814, 385. + +English and French expedition to China, 389. + +English, descents of, on France, 376. + expedition against Napoleon in 1815, 385. + expedition in 1762 against Havana, 382. + maritime expeditions, 384-390. + squares at Waterloo, 294. + +Enthusiasm, importance of, 41. + not military spirit, 62. + +Epaminondas, 190. + +Error of Napoleon in campaign of 1812, 172. + +Error of the allies in 1793, 107, 108. + +Errors in strategy, 91. + +Essential bases of military policy, 49. + +Essling, 192, 193, 200, 350. + Napoleon at, 158. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + order of battle at, 192, 193. + +Eugene at Turin, 153. + march of, 141. + +Eventual bases, 84. + lines of defense, 96. + +Expediency, wars of, 18. + +Expedition of Prince Koudacheff, 273. + to the Crimea, details of, 387-389. + +Expeditions, assistance of fleets in, 174. + distant, 169. + marine, in modern times, 249. + maritime, 361-390. + of the ancients, 248. + of the Middle Ages, 171. + partly on land, partly by sea, 173. + +Extended movements, when dangerous, 204. + +Exterior lines of operations, 102. + +Extermination, wars of, 34. + +Eylau, 305, 306, 318, 352. + French armament at, 47. + Napoleon's march on, 94. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + Russian artillery reserve at, 289. + Russian order at, 295. + + +F. + +Famous retreats, instances of, 233. + +Field, strategic, of 1806, 113. + +Field-works, directions for attack of, 211, 212. + instances of well-arranged assaults on, 212. + +Final reserves, 203. + +Financial considerations, 50. + +Fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, 347, 355, 359. + +Fire-signals, how used, 276. + +Flank attack, 203. + attack, cavalry, 310. + charges of cavalry, 307. + marches, 139, 140. + marches, where inadmissible, 140. + tactical maneuver by, 140. + +Flanks of companies, movement by, 300, 301. + protection of, in tactical positions, 182. + +Fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, 174. + +Fleurus, 136, 193, 200. + balloons used at, 275. + order of battle at, 192. + +Foot-artillery in line of battle, 289. + in the offensive, 316. + +Forests, advantages of, in retreats, 183. + +Formation by divisions, when preferable, 286. + for attack at Turin, 213. + for battle in small columns, 350. + for battle, Napoleon's system, 278, 279. + for battle often determined by size of army, 285. + for battle, Prussian and Austrian system, 354. + for close attack, 301. + of infantry for attack, five methods of, 292. + in two ranks, 356. + of troops for battle, 347-350. + +Formations of cavalry, 309-311. + of lines of battle for two infantry corps, 282-284. + various, for infantry, 285. + +Fortification of Coblentz, 157, 158. + +Fortifications, remark upon, 151. + +Fortified camps, 154. + places, attack of, 210. + places on the sea-coast, importance of, 152. + places, when a misfortune, 152. + +Fortresses at Mayence, 150. + greatest advantages of, 150. + large, when preferable, 150. + number and position of, 149. + of France and Austria, 149. + on frontiers, 148. + relation of, to strategy, 148, 150. + +Forts in a mountainous country, 151. + purposes of, 146. + +Fossano, battle of, 168. + +Four-rank formation of infantry, 291. + +France adapted to parallel retreats, 240. + coalition against, in 1793, 37. + course and error of, in 1792, 105. + fortresses of, 149. + intention of, when declaring war in 1792, 105. + invasions of, by the English, 376. + +Francis I., passage of the Alps by, 168. + +Frederick the Great, 36, 37. + at Leuthen, 229. + at Prague, 205. + at Torgau, 206. + commissariat of, 142. + defensive-offensive operations of, 74. + maneuver of, at Leuthen, 141. + military genius of, 16. + +Frederick II., Crusade of, 374. + +French and English expedition to China, 389. + +French armies in the Revolution, 135. + armies, situation of, in 1800, 112. + at Bautzen, 196. + at Fleurus, why successful, 193. + at Waterloo, 196. + capture of Vera Cruz by, in 1838, 386. + causes of defeat of, at Waterloo, 359. + cavalry, 313. + columns at Waterloo, 351. + defeat of, at Stockach, 111. + descent on Algiers in 1830, 386. + errors in 1795, 136. + expedition to Syria, 390. + in Bohemia in 1742, 171. + invasions of 1766 and 1795, 120. + +French, maritime efforts of, during American Revolution, 383. + operations in Italy, 112. + operations of, at close of 1793, 331-333. + operations of, in 1794, 108. + order at Essling and Fleurus, 200. + order at Minden, 278. + plan in 1799, error of, 110. + Revolution, 26-28. + Revolution, armies of, how subsisted, 142. + Revolution, course of Austria in, 106. + Revolution, course of Prussia in, 105, 106. + Revolution, interest of Austria in, 105. + Revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, 104. + Revolution, relation of Italy to, 104. + Revolution, relation of Prussia and Austria to, 104. + Revolution, theater of operations in, 104. + Revolution, zones of operations in, 105. + +Frontier defenses, maxims for, 148, 149. + when a permanent line of defense, 96. + +Frontiers, defense of, 146. + disadvantage of fortresses on, 148. + how to be fortified, 152. + mountains as, 146. + rivers as, 147. + +Front of operations, 330, 338. + of operations, extent of, 98. + of operations, how varied, 93. + strategic, change of, 94. + strategic, not to be too extended, 98. + +Fronts of operations, 92. + +Fronts, strategic, 92. + +Fundamental principle of war, 66. + maxims of, 70. + principles for employment of troops, 328. + + +G. + +Gallop, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307. + +General advanced guard, how composed, 262. + cavalry charge, 305. + +General, essential qualities of a, 55. + importance of a skillful, 43. + one of the greatest talents of, 74. + qualities of a skillful, 334. + what constitutes a, 327. + +General principle of war, manner of applying, 175. + staff, employment of, in time of peace, 49. + staff, usefulness of, 57. + +Genoa, panic at siege of, 64. + +Geography, military, 39. + +Geographical objective points, 88. + +Germanicus, expedition of, 366. + +Girondists, 26, 37. + +Gosa, French charge on, 305. + +Governments, elective, weakness of, 46. + should not be unprepared for war, 46. + +Grand tactics, 69, 70, 178. + principles of, 360. + +Great detachments, 217, 219, 334. + instances of, 221, 222. + why made, 220, 221. + +Grouchy, 127. + +Guard, advanced, 261, 262. + in battle, 288, 289. + in unexpected battles, 208. + +Gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, 171. + +Gustavus Adolphus, expedition of, 375. + + +H. + +Half-deep order, infantry-formation, 295. + attacks in, 302. + +Halts and departures in retreats, hours of, 236. + +Halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, 236. + +Hannibal at Cannae, 191. + at Zama, 179. + +Harold, 370, 371. + +Head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, 107. + +Heights to be secured in mountainous countries, 167. + +Hengist, 367. + +Henry V. of England, descents of, on France, 376. + +Hoche's expedition to Ireland, 383. + +Hochkirch, 303. + surprise of, 209. + +Hohenfriedberg, 305. + +Hohenlinden, 183, 206. + +Holland, expedition to, 91. + +Horse-artillery in line of battle, 289. + in the offensive, 316. + +Houchard, 333. + +Hougoumont, 303. + +Hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, 161. + +Hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, 270. + +Hypotheses of the author in 1806, 271. + how events justified them, 272. + + +I. + +Igor, expeditions of, 368. + +Illustrations of importance of logistics, 263-268. + +Improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, 299. + effects of, on war, 347, 355, 359. + +Industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, 60, 61. + +Infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, 287. + best formation of, for assault, 298. + best formation of, for the defensive, 298. + cavalry must be supported by, 304. + checkerwise formation, 310. + formation of, in two deployed lines, 292. + formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, 299. + importance of, 290. + in three-rank formation, 293. + in what movements should be exercised, 300. + lines of battle for, 282-284. + mixed order, 295. + mounted, 308. + needs support of cavalry and artillery, 290. + protection of, from enemy's artillery, 303. + squares, 294, 296. + supports of artillery, 316, 317. + three-rank formation of, 291. + various formations for, 285. + when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, 305. + +Information from partisans, 270. + of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, 273, 274. + of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, 269. + +Initiative, advantages of, 184. + +Institutions, military, 43. + +Interior and simple lines, advantage of, 114. + +Interior lines, observations on, 123. + of Archduke Charles, 136. + of operations, 102. + of operations, why preferable, 127. + should not be too much extended, 117. + two armies on, 117. + +Intervention, instances of, 20-22. + kinds of, 19. + reasons for, 19. + wars of, 19. + wars of, essentials in, 21. + +Intestine wars, 35. + +Intrenched camp, on which side of a river, 157. + +Intrenched camps and lines, defense of, 215. + connection of, with strategy, 154. + how differ from tetes deponts, 160. + influence of, 155. + instances of, 210, 211. + maxims on, 155, 156. + on river, 156. + Prussian system of. 158. + use of, 156. + where to be established, 155. + +Intrenched lines, 146, 153. + attack of, 214. + continuous, 213. + +Intrenched positions, 181. + +Intrenchments, armies in, 154 + +Invaded country, how made to contribute to success, 142. + +Invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, 72. + advantages of awaiting, 17. + army of, line of defense important to, 99. + control of the sea important in, 30. + difficult in national wars, 144. + how rendered feasible, 106. + of a mountainous country, 169. + of England contemplated by Napoleon, 249, 250, 386. + of Turkey by Russia, 23. + two kinds of, 22. + wars of, when advantageous, 17. + +Invasions, diplomacy in, 24. + distant, across extensive territories, 171. + distant, effect of standing armies on, 171. + distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, 171. + distant, maxim for, 173. + distant, to aid an ally, 170. + how to be carried on, 24. + neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, 174. + of neighboring states, 174. + of Spain, 23. + when excusable, 23. + +Investing a city, false system of, 152. + force, how strengthened, 153. + +Irregular cavalry, 313. + arms for, 313. + +Islamism, wars of, 25. + +Italy, operations of the French in, 111, 112. + parallel retreats in, 241. + relation of, in the French Revolution, 104. + +Ivar, expedition of, 369. + + +J. + +James II., expedition of, in Ireland, 381. + +Jemmapes, 342. + +Jena, battle of, won by strategy, 198. + maneuvers at, 90. + Napoleon's march on, 94. + Ney's charge at, 305. + +Jourdan, 229. + at Stockach, 205. + balloons used by, at Fleurus, 275. + +Jourdan's passage of the Rhine in 1795, 120. + +Julian, retreat of, from Parthia, 233. + + +K. + +Kagoul, panic at, 64. + +Katzbach, 124. + +Kehl, intrenchments at, 157, 210, 211. + +Kolin, 303. + +Koudacheff's expedition, 273. + +Koutousoff, 170. + +Krasnoi, combination at, 342. + +Kray, 87. + +Kunnersdorf, 304. + + +L. + +Lance, importance of, 47. + when best for cavalry, 307. + when useful, 306. + +Lender, bravery the first requisite for, 345. + +League, wars of the, 25. + +Leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, 87. + battle of, 192, 193, 267, 305. + march of the allies upon, 123. + march on, modified, 140. / + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + order of battle at, 193. + +Lepanto, battle of, 378. + +Leuthen, battle of, 190, 229, 342. + maneuver of Frederick at, 140. + +Level country, defensive in, 164 + +Light cavalry, advantages of, 314. + +Ligny, 195. + +Line of advance, how determined, 71. + of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, 288. + of battle before the French Revolution, 277. + of battle, definition of, 179. + of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, 290. + of battle, distribution of troops in, 287. + of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, 290. + of battle, posting troops in, 277. + +Line of battle, post of artillery in, 289. + of defense important to an army of invasion, 99. + of defense should be short, 98. + of operations, double, when necessary, 116. + of operations, how protected, 132. + of operations, single, when advantageous, 116. + of retreat, 261, 341-343. + +Lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, 215. + and points, strategic, 85. + central, application of, to large masses, 125. + deployed, in two ranks, 294. + double, to be avoided, 330. + eccentric, 237. + interior, observations on, 123. + interior, two armies on, 117. + intrenched, 146, 153. + intrenched, attack of, 214. + of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, 282-284. + of circumvallation, 152. + of contravallation, 152. + of defense, second, 147. + of defense, eventual, 96. + of defense, permanent, 95. + of defense, strategical and tactical, 95. + of depots, 263. + of direction, importance of, illustrated, 116. + of maneuver, importance of, 114. + of operations, 100-103. + of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, 121. + of operations, best direction of, 115. + of operations, change of, 118. + of operations, converging and divergent, 118. + of operations, double, 110. + of operations, double, when advantageous, 123. + of operations, great art of directing, 120. + of operations, how established, 114. + of operations, how influenced, 119. + of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of 1806, 113. + of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, 122. + of operations in the wars of the French Revolution, 104. + of operations, maxims on, 114. + of operations, rivers as, 76. + of operations, selecting of, 80. + +Lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, 115. + of Stollhofen, 154. + of Turin, 153. + of Turin, capture of, 213. + parallel, 200. + strategic, 128, 129. + strategic, of Napoleon in 1796, 131. + +Linz, towers of, 158. + +Lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, 291. + +Logistics, 69, 252-268. + derivation of the term, 253. + faulty, instances of, 265-267. + illustration of importance of, 263-268. + of battle of Leipsic, 267. + principal points of, 254-256. + +Louis VII., Crusade of, 372. + IX., Crusade of, 374. + IX., expedition of, to Tunis, 375. + XIV., coalition against, 36. + XIV., commissariat of, 142. + +Louvois, 59. + +Lyons as a strategic and decisive point, 87. + + +M. + +Macdonald's column at Wagram, 295, 296. + error at Katzbach, 124. + +Mack, 164, 170. + at Ulm, 53. + +Magnesia, victory of, 364. + +Malplaquet, 183. + +Malta, descent of Mugtapha on, 377. + +Maneuvering, success in battle depends on, 360. + +Maneuver line, 114, 115. + lines, 103. + lines of, their importance, 114. + objective points of, 88. + pivots of, 98. + tactical, by flank, 140. + turning, 179, 206. + +Maneuvers, 200, 201, 207. + at Ulm and Jena, 90. + for breaking through a line, 197. + must conform to strategic principles, 333. + objective points of, 89. + of Napoleon in 1814,118. + simplest, most likely to be successful, 196. + strategic lines of, 128. + sudden, generally better than predetermined, 196. + transversal, 163. + +Maneuvers, turning, rules for, 204. + +Mantua, siege of, 111. + Wurmser at, 156. + +March, establishment of depots on, 262. + +Marches and attacks, arrangements of, 258. + effects of systems of, 138. + flank, 139. + instructions to generals commanding corps in, 260, 261. + particulars to be considered in, 260. + system of, 135, 138. + rapid, 176. + rules for, 257-263. + transversal, in mountainous countries, 163. + two kinds of, 260. + +Marengo, French armament at, 47. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Maritime expeditions, 361-390. + +Marmont at Salamanca, 206. + +Marsin, 53. + +Masonry towers, Archduke Maximilian's system of defense by, 158. + +Massena, position of, in Switzerland in 1799,165, 166. + +Massena's position of the Albis, 181. + +Materiel of war, 49. + should be inspected by staff officers, 257. + +Maurice of Saxony, 22. + +Maxim for distant invasions, 173. + +Maxims for frontier defenses, 148, 152. + of fundamental principle of war, 70. + on intrenched camps, 155, 156. + on lines of operations, 114-122. + on operations in mountainous countries, 163. + on strategic fronts, 98, 99. + on strategic operations, 90. + relative to supplies, 143-146. + +Mayence, Austrian camp before, 157. + fortresses at, 150. + intrenched camp at, 211. + +Mexico, expedition against, in 1862, 390. + +Middle Ages, expeditions of the, 171. + +Military education important to a ruler, 49. + geography and statistics, importance + of a knowledge of, 40. + geography, Lloyd's essay on, 40. + institutions, 43. + institutions of Rome, 61. + instruments, signals by, 276. + operations influenced by a cabinet, 42. + policy, 38. + policy, essential bases of, 49. + sciences, study of. 49. + spirit, how encouraged, 61. + spirit, how maintained, 63. + spirit of nations, 60. + statistics and geography, 39. + +Militia as cavalry, 314, 315. + +Millesimo, effect of the battle of, 111. + +Minden, French order at, 278. + +Mithridates, 364, 365. + +Mixed order, infantry formation, 295. + system of Benningsen at Eylau, 352. + +Modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, 376. + marine expeditions, 249. + +Mohammed II., 375. + +Molitor, General, 167. + +Mollwitz, battle of, 348. + +Montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, 125. + +Moors, invasion of Europe by, 367. + +Morale of armies, 60, 178, 322. + of cavalry, 312. + +Moreau at Engen, 203. + base of operations of, in 1800, 82. + retreat of, in 1796, 233. + +Moreau's diversion toward Kastadt in 1800, 222. + passage of the Rhine in 1800, 224, 225. + +Morocco, Spanish descent on, in 1859, 389. + +Moscow, retreat of the French from, 233. + +Mountain-campaigns, instances of, 169. + +Mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, 162. + countries, cavalry in, 304. + countries, defense in, 163. + countries, heights to be secured in, 167. + countries, strategic defense in, 164. + countries, strategic positions of, 76. + countries, the offensive in, 167. + countries, transversal marches in, 163. + country, character of a war in, 169. + country, forts in a, 151. + country, invasion of a, 169. + +Mountains as eventual lines of defense, 96. + as frontiers, 146. + campaigns in, 169. + importance of, when secondary, 161, 162. + of European countries, relation of, to warlike operations, 161. + strategic operations in, 160. + +Mounted infantry, 308. + militia, 315. + +Movement by flanks of companies, 300, 301. + +Movements, extended, when dangerous, 204. + in which infantry should be exercised, 300. + of armies, points to be attended to, 254-256. + of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, 273, 274. + +Murat, surprise of, at Taroutin, 209. + +Murray's descent in 1813, 385. + +Musketry-fire better for defensive, 203. + influence of, in battles, 348. + + +N. + +Nansouty's charge at Chateau-Thierry, 212. + +Naples, French army at, 112. + +Napoleon, 111, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177, 185, 198, 218. + and Grouchy at Waterloo, 127,130. + at Austerlitz, 206. + at Essling, 158. + at Ligny, 195. + at Ratisbon, 274. + at Wagram, 195. + double wars of, 37. + English expedition against, in 1815, 385. + his own chief staff officer, 264. + operations of the armies of, 136. + +Napoleon's artillery, 318. + artillery at Wagram, 316. + base of operations in 1806, 80-82. + battles, orders of, 198. + bold maneuvers in 1814, 118. + campaign of 1800, 137. + cantonment on the Passarge, 247. + central lines in Saxony, 124. + central position in 1813, why disastrous, 123. + changes of line of operations, 118. + choice of objective points, 89. + concentric retreat in 1796, 238. + defense in Champagne in 1814, 125. + detachments in 1805, 222. + error after his victory at Dresden, 124. + error in the campaign of 1812, 172. + favorite objective, 330. + front of operations in 1796, 93. + front of operations in 1813, 93. + infantry, panic of, at Wagram, 64. + line of defense in 1813, 93. + logistics in 1806 and 1815, 264, 265. + march on Bassano, 131. + +Napoleon's march on Eylau, 94. + march on Jena in 1806, 94. + march on Naumburg in 1806, 94. + march to Koenigsberg, 20. + mode of issuing orders, 259. + motives and necessities, 22. + operations, comments on, 116. + order at the Tagliamento, 295. + passages of the Danube, 226, 266. + passage of the Saint-Bernard, 168. + passage of the Po in 1800, 225. + projected invasion of England, 249, 250, 386. + reserves, 133. + retreat from Smolensk, 235. + return from Egypt in 1800, 112. + rule for the passage of an army, 147. + strategic lines in 1796, 130, 131. + strategic positions, 97. + system of formation for battle, 278, 279. + system of marches, 137. + victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, 23. + +National wars, character of, in mountainous countries, 167. + wars, definition of, 29. + wars, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. + wars, effect of the nature of the country in, 30. + wars, how prevented, 33, 34. + wars, how success attained in, 33. + wars, invasion difficult in, 144. + wars, military precepts for, 27. + +Nations, military spirit of, 60. + +Nature and extent of war, how influenced, 14. + +Naumburg, Napoleon's march on, 94. + +Naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, 376. + +Neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, 174. + +Ney, 31, 168, 196. + at Bautzen, 317. + at Dennewitz, 130. + at Elchingen, 182. + at Jena, 305. + +Nicholas I., concentration of dragoons by, 309. + + +O. + +Objective point, how held, 67. + point, manner of approach to, 67. + point of Napoleon in 1800, 87. + point, selection of, 66. + points, geographical, 88. + points, how chosen, 90. + +Objective points in strategy, how determined, 88. + points of maneuver, 88, 89. + points of operations, 85. + points, political, 91. + +Objectives of operations, 329, 330. + +Objects of war, 14. + +Oblique order, 199, 200. + order, antiquity of, 199. + order assumed by Napoleon at Marengo, 198. + order of battle, 190. + +Offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, 184. + army, proper course for, 324. + battle, object of, 188. + battles, 186. + characteristics of infantry formation for, 297. + line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, 290. + movements, when advised, 124. + or defensive system, either may be employed, 185. + order of battle, 200. + system to be followed in, 176. + the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, 184. + the, in mountainous countries, 167. + use of artillery in, 316. + war, 72, 73. + war, duty of staff officers in, 258. + war, reserves, how posted in, 133, 135. + wars, duty of statesmen in, 17. + wars, how conducted, 16. + wars to reclaim rights, 16. + +Oleg, expedition of, 867. + +Open positions, 181. + +Operations, base of, where to be established, 84. + bases of, definition of, 77. + how to be chosen, 79, 80. + plurality of, 78. + change of lines of, 118. + control of, 52. + divergent and convergent, 126, 127. + double lines of, 102, 110, 123. + exterior lines of, 102. + fronts of, 92, 330, 338. + in mountainous countries, maxims on, 163. + interior lines of, 102. + line of, how protected, 132. + lines of, 100, 120. + lines of, converging and divergent, 118. + lines of, how established, 114. + lines of, how influenced, 119. + lines of, maxims on, 114. + military, influenced by a cabinet, 42. + objective points of, 85. + objectives of, 329, 330. + of 1809 and 1814, 176, 177. + of the French at the close of 1793, 331-333. + pivots of, 98. + simple lines of, 101. + system of, 72. + system of, how to be judged, 125. + system of, necessary in war, 50. + theater of, 74, 75. + theater of, between the Rhine and the North Sea, 338-340. + theater of, how divided, 71. + zone of, 66. + zone of, how to select, 329. + zones of, 100, 338. + +Opinion, public, danger of, 55. + wars of, 25. + +Orchomenus, 365. + +Order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, 301. + half-deep, attacks in, 302. + half-deep, infantry formation, 295. + importance of, 42. + in deep masses, infantry formation, 295, 296. + in echelons, 193. + in squares, when suitable for attack, 297. + mixed, infantry formation, 295, + oblique, 199, 200. + of attack in columns, 194. + of battle, 186. + of battle at Agincourt, 192. + at Cannae, 189. + at Crecy, 192. + at Essling, 192, 193. + at Fleurus, 192. + at Leipsic, 193. + at Mollwitz, 348. + at passage of a river, 192. + by echelon, 193. + convex, 192. + definition of, 180. + oblique, 190. + offensive, 200. + of the generals of the Republic, 349. + of infantry as skirmishers, 292. + shallow, infantry, 292. + +Orders, best mode of issuing, 259. + how issued by Napoleon, 259. + inaccurate transmission of, 196. + of battle, 188. + of battle, classification of, useful, 197. + +Orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, 197. + of Napoleon's battles, 198. + should be clear, 258. + two methods of issuing, 258, 259. + +Organization and arms of cavalry, 307, 308. + by corps, likely to be permanent, 287. + of an army in four corps, 281. + in seven corps, 281. + of divisions, 279, 280. + of very large armies, 286. + + +P. + +Panics, cause and remedy of, 65. + instances of, 64. + officers and troops to be warned against, 63. + +Parallel lines, 200. + order of battle, 188. + order of battle reinforced, 189. + order of battle, when suitable, 189. + order of battle with crotchet, 189. + retreat, 237. + retreats, countries adapted to, 240, 241. + retreats, when preferable, 239. + +Partisans, information from, 270. + +Partisan troops, services of, illustrated, 273. + +Paskevitch's passage of the Vistula in 1831, 120. + +Passage of an army, Napoleon's rule for, 147. + of a river, best position for, 226. + of the Beresina, 226, 245. + of the Danube by Napoleon, 266. + of the Rhine in 1795, 120. + of the Saint-Bernard by Napoleon, 168. + of rivers, 224, 343. + of rivers, double, 230. + of rivers, famous modern, 226. + of rivers in retreats, 243, 244. + of rivers in retreats, rules for, 245. + of rivers, rules for, 227. + of rivers, rules for preventing, 228. + +Peninsular War, 32. + +Perfect army, essential conditions of, 43. + +Permanent lines of defense, 95. + +Perpendicular order of battle, 190. + +Peter the Great, expedition of, against Persia, 382. + +Peter the Hermit, 371. + +Peterwardein, panic at, 64. + +Philip II. of Spain, 378. + +Pichegru, movements of, in 1794, 109. + +Pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, 306. + +Pivots of maneuver, 98. + +Pivots of operations, 98. + +Points, decisive, 337. + decisive and objective, 86. + decisive geographic, 87. + decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, 187. + decisive, of battle-field, now determined, 186. + decisive strategic, 86. + of operations, objective, 85. + +Political objective points, 91. + objective points subordinate to strategy, 91. + wars, 26. + +Po, Napoleon's passage of, in 1800, 225. + +Portable telegraphs, 275. + +Port Mahon, assault of, 212. + +Port Royal, expedition of U.S. government to, 390. + +Position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, 183. + for battle, 341. + how to drive an enemy from, 201, 202. + strong, essentials for, 181. + system of wars of, 135. + tactical, protection of flanks in, 182. + +Positions, 179. + for cantonments, selection of, 247. + intrenched, 181. + open, 181. + strategic, 66, 97, 330, 331. + tactical, 181. + tactical, rules for selecting, 181. + two kinds of, 180, 181. + +Post, capture of, when important, 216. + +Posting troops in line of battle, 277. + +Posts, means for capture of, 216. + +Prague, battle of, 189, 205. + +Preservation of armies in time of peace, 47. + +Prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, 54. + +Prince Eugene, 54, 141, 153, 213. + of Coburg, error of, in 1794, 109. + +Principle of decisive points of maneuver, 88. + +Principles of strategy, 331. + of strategy always the same, 17. + +Promotions in armies, 47. + +Protection by trees and brushwood, 303. + +Provisional lines, 103. + +Prussia, course of, in the French Revolution, 105, 106. + parallel retreat in, 241. + relation of, in the French Revolution, 104. + +Prussian army at Waterloo, 129. + reserves in 1806, 134. + system of forming columns, 294. + system of intrenched camps, 158. + +Public opinion, danger of, 55. + +Punic wars, 363, 364. + +Pursuit, rules for, 242. + +Pursuits, 241. + +Pyramids, Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Pyrrhus, descent of, on Italy, 362. + + +Q. + +Qualities of a skillful general, 334. + + +R. + +Ramillies, 312. + +Ramrods, 348. + +Rapid marches, 176. + +Ratisbon, Napoleon at, 274. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Rear, attack in, 207. + +Rear-guard in retreat, 243. + +Rear-guards in retreat, 234. + +Rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, 244. + +Reconnoissances, 268. + give but limited information, 269. + to gain information of the enemy's movements, 268. + +Religion, wars of, 35. + +Reports of prisoners, 269. + +Reserve, cavalry, 311. + final, 203. + horse-artillery, advantages of, 289. + +Reserves, cavalry, 288. + importance of, 133, 134. + in offensive war, how posted, 133, 135. + nature of, 133. + of Napoleon, 133. + Prussian, in 1806, 134. + strategic, 67, 133. + +Retreat along converging roads, 236 + along diverging roads, 237. + along parallel roads, 236. + by several corps, 235. + difficulty of deciding method of, 231. + five methods of arranging, 234. + in single mass, when preferable, 234. + line of, 261, 341-343. + means of, to be considered in a defensive position, 183. + parallel, 237. + well effected, should be rewarded, 63. + +Retreats, 230. + at night, 231. + attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, 243. + bridges in, 244. + by diverging roads, danger of, 238. + cavalry in, 243. + circumstances influencing, 232, 233. + concentration in, 238. + concentric, instances of, 238, 239. + defiles in, 243. + divergent, when admissible, 239. + duty of staff officers in, 256. + firmness of Russians in, 64. + halts in, to relieve rear-guard, 236. + hours of departures and halts in, 236. + in daylight, 231. + instances of famous, 233. + measures to insure success of, 242, 243. + parallel, countries adapted to, 240, 241. + parallel, when preferable, 239. + passage of rivers in, 243, 244. + Prince de Ligne's remark on, 230. + rear-guard in, 234, 243. + should be slow, 232. + various kinds of, 231. + +Reverse fire, 317. + +Rhine, passages of, 120, 224, 226. + +Rhodes, capture of, by the Turks, 377. + +Richard Coeur-de-Lion, 373. + +Richelieu, expedition of, against Minorca, 382. + +River, best position for passage of, 226. + crossing of, in presence of an enemy, 120. + order of battle at passage of, 192. + +Rivers as eventual lines of defense, 96. + as frontiers, 147. + as lines of operations, 76. + double passage of, 230. + famous modern passages of, 226. + passage of, 224, 343. + passage of, in retreats, 243, 244. + rules for, 245. + points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, 121. + rules for passage of, 227. + rules for preventing passage of, 228. + +Rivoli 179, 205. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + +Rocket-batteries, use of, 318. + +Rollo, 369. + +Roman legions, cause of the ruin of, 63. + nation, cause of the decline of, 60. + +Romans, naval expeditions of, 363. + +Rome, military institutions of, 61. + +Rossbach, 207. + +Ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, 328. + +Rules for conducting descents, 251. + for fighting battles scientifically, 203. + for gaining information of enemy's movements, 273, 274. + for offensive or defensive operations, 185. + for passage of rivers, 227. + for passage of a river in retreat, 245. + for pursuit, 242. + for preventing passage of rivers, 228. + for use of artillery in battle, 316-318. + to be observed in selecting tactical positions, 181. + +Russian army, firmness of, in retreats, 64. + army, skirmishers in, 293. + base in 1828 and 1829, 84. + cavalry, 314. + expeditions in 1809, 385. + order at Eylau, 295. + retreat in 1812, 233. + system of forming columns, 294. + +Russians, early maritime expeditions of, 368, 369. + + +S. + +Saber, when best for cavalry, 308. + when useful, 306. + +Saint-Bernard, Napoleon's passage of, 168. + +Saint-Cyr at Stockach, 205. + +Saxons, expedition of, 367. + +Saxony, Napoleon's central lines in, in 1813, 124. + +Savoy, Duke of, 22. + +Scandinavians, 366. + +Science of marches, essential point in, 139. + of marches, includes what, 138. + +Sciences, military, study of, 49. + +Scipio, 364. + +Sea-coast as a base of operations, 83, 84. + +Sea, control of, held by England, 173. + control of, important in an invasion, 30. + +Secondary lines, 103. + +Sebastian of Portugal, descent of, on Morocco, 378. + +Sebastopol, 347. + +Secondary depots, 262, 263. + +Shallow order, 298. + order, infantry, 292. + +Shumla, camp of, 155. + +Siege, how covered, 153. + of Candia, 380, 381. + of Copenhagen, 384. + of Mantua, 111. + +Sieges and active armies, relations between, 112. + duty of staff officers in, 256. + wars of, 146. + +Signaling by fires, 276. + +Signals by military instruments, 276. + simultaneous shouts as, 277. + system of, 274. + +Simple and interior lines, advantage of, 114. + lines of operations, 101. + +Simultaneous shouts as signals, 277. + +Single line of operations, when preferable, 116. + +Sizeboli, capture of, 223. + +Skill, superiority in, 42. + +Skirmishers, 359, 360. + +Skirmishing-order, 292. + +Small detachments, how useful, 224. + +Smolensk, Napoleon's retreat from, 235. + +Southern Germany, valley of the Danube the strategic key of, 162. + +Sovereign as commander, 52. + +Spain adapted to parallel retreats, 240. + and Portugal, Wellington's tactics in, 358. + invasions of, 23. + war in, in 1823, 27. + +Spanish Armada, 249, 378, 379. + capture of Vera Cruz by, 390. + descent on Algiers, 382. + descent on Morocco in 1859, 389. + +Spies, 269. + best course for, 270. + difficulties in their way, 270. + use of, neglected in many modern armies, 270. + when especially useful, 270. + +Squares in echelons, 297. + infantry, 294, 296, 297. + in two ranks, 294. + +Staff, chief of, 253, + chief of, how selected, 57. + general, usefulness of, 57. + officers and general must act in concert, 257. + officers, duties of, should be defined, 253. + officers, duty of, in offensive war, 258. + officers should inspect materiel, 257. + officers, summary of duties of, 254-256. + +Standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, 171. + +State, how rendered secure, 138. + +Statesmanship, relation of, to war, 14. + +Statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, 17. + +Statistics, military, 39. + +St. Domingo, expedition to, in 1802, 384. + +Stockach, 179, 205. + defeat of the French at, 111. + +Strategic defense in mountainous countries, 164. + +Stollhofen, lines of, 152. + +Strategical and tactical lines of defense, 95. + +Strategic combinations, 72. + combinations, when better than tactical, 179. + coup-d'oeil, 337-345. + field of 1806, 113. + front and line of defense may coincide, 92. + front, change of, 94. + front, double, 95. + front not to be too extended, 98. + front of Napoleon in his march on Eylau, 94. + fronts, 92. + fronts, maxims on, 98. + lines, 128, 129. + lines and points, 85. + lines at Waterloo, 130. + lines of maneuvers, 128. + lines of Napoleon in 1796, 130, 131. + operations in mountains, 160. + operations, maxims on, 90. + point, Leipsic as a, 87. + Lyons as a, 87. + point of a battle-field, when important, 187. + points, capitals as, 87. + position, essential conditions for, 99. + positions, 66, 97, 330, 331. + positions of mountainous countries, 76. + positions of Napoleon, 97. + reserves, 67, 133. + square for camps, 99. + +Strategy, 322, 337. + advantage of the offensive in, 184. + and the commissariat, 141. + battles of Ulm and Jena won by, 198. + connection of intrenched camps with, 154. + connection of tetes de ponts with, 154. + definition of, 66. + directs movements, tactics executes them, 175. + errors in, 91. + how it should be studied, 337. + illustration of, by operations of 1793, 331-333. + illustrations of, 339-341. + in what it consists, 328. + objective points in, how determined, 88. + one great end of, 177. + points embraced by, 68. + political objective points subordinate to, 91. + principles of, 331. + principles of, always the same, 17. + province of, 178. + relation of fortresses to, 148, 150. + science of marches in, 138. + system of, developed in 1800, 137. + the art of, 69. + +Strong position, essentials for a, 181. + +Study of strategy, how made profitable, 337. + +Successful retreat, how to insure, 242, 243. + +Surprises of armies, 209. + difficulty of, 209. + +Suwaroff, 55, 170. + +Suwaroff's expedition in Switzerland, 166. + +Supplies, depots of, 141, 143. + +Suza, position of Swiss and Italians at, 168. + +Svatoslav, expedition of, 308. + +Sweyn, 369, 370. + +Switzerland, invasion of, by French Directory, 162. + Massena in, in 1799, 165. + Suwaroff in, 166. + tactical defense of, 169. + +Syria, French expedition to, 390. + +System, concentric or eccentric, 126. + of corps, 279. + of divisions, 278. + of marches, 135. + of marches, effects of, 138. + of marches, includes what, 138. + of marches, relation of, to commissariat, 141. + of marches the result of circumstances, 135. + of operations, 72. + of operations, how to be judged, 125. + of signals, 274. + of strategy developed in 1800, 137. + of wars, change of, 135. + of wars of position, 135. + +Systems modified by forms of government, 45. + + +T. + +Tactical combinations, guiding principle in, 178. + defense of Switzerland, 169. + operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, 184. + position, protection of flanks in, 182. + +Tactical positions, 181. + positions, rules for selecting, 181. + +Tactics, 322. + executes movements, strategy directs them, 175. + grand, 69, 70. + of battles, great difficulty of, 196. + of Wellington in Spain and Portugal, 358. + +Tagliamento, Napoleon's order at, 295. + +Taroutin, surprise of Murat at, 209. + +Telegraphs, portable, 275. + +Temporary bases, 84. + bases, when necessary, 132. + +Tetes de ponts, 160. + connection of, with strategy, 154. + how differ from intrenched camps, 160. + +Theater of operations, 74, 75. + of operations between the Rhine and North Sea, 338-340. + of operations, how composed, 75. + of operations, how divided, 71. + of operations in the French Revolution, 104. + of war, border of the, 80, 81. + of war, decisive points of the, 85. + of war, definition of, 74. + +Theories, difficulty of applying, in war, 269. + use of, in war, 323. + +Thirty Years' War, 25. + +Three-rank formation of infantry, 291, 293. + +Topographical and statistical reconnoissances, 268. + +Torgau, battle of, 205. + +Torres-Vedras, camp of, 155. + intrenched camp at, 83. + +Towers, masonry, 158. + of Coblentz, 159. + of Linz, 158. + +Transversal maneuvers, 163. + marches in mountainous countries, 163. + +Trees, clumps of, should be occupied, 303. + +Troops, distribution of, in line of battle, 287. + employment of, 328. + +Trot, when best for cavalry charge, 306, 307. + +Turenne's surprise of the Austrian cantonments, 246. + +Turin, battle of, 53. + intrenched camp at, 211. + lines of, 153, 213. + +Turkey, invasion of, 23. + +Turkish war of 1828 and 1829, 84. + wars, squares in, 296, 297. + +Turks, cavalry charge of, 307. + naval expeditions of, 377, 378, 380. + +Turning maneuvers, 179, 201, 206. + maneuver, rules for, 204. + +Two corps, one behind the other, 285. + +Two-rank formation, 346. + +Two wars at once, danger of, 36. + + +U. + +Ulm, battle of, 53. + battle of, won by strategy, 198. + camp of, 154. + maneuvers at, 90. + +Uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, 197. + +Unexpected battles, advanced guard in, 208. + meeting of two armies, 207. + +United States, capture of Vera Cruz by, 387. + English expeditions against, in 1814 and 1815, 385, 386. + expedition to Port Royal, 390. + +Use of spies neglected in many modern armies, 272. + of the three arms combined, 203. + + +V. + +Vandals, 366. + +Vandamme's disaster at Culm, lesson of, 221. + +Venice, 379, 380. + +Vera Cruz captured by the Spaniards, 390. + taken by the French, 386. + taken by the United States, 387. + +Vessels, Roman, 363. + Scandinavian, 366. + +Victories, French, of 1793, why indecisive, 333. + +Victory, assailant's best means of, 202. + on what it depends, 309, 310. + when it may be expected, 360. + +Villages, importance of, on front of a position, 303. + +Villars's infantry, panic among, 64. + +Vistula, passage of, by Paskevitch, 120. + + +W. + +Wagram, 195, 206, 266, 317, 343, 350. + Macdonald's column at, 295, 296. + Napoleon's artillery at, 289, 316. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + panic at, 64. + +War an art, 321. + border of the theater of, 80, 81. + character of, from Middle Ages to French Revolution, 135. + circumstances which influence result of, 321. + council of, at seat of government, 59. + councils of, 58. + decisive points of the theater of, 85. + defensive-offensive, 74. + definition of the art of, 13. + fundamental principle of, 66, 70. + governments should not be unprepared for, 46. + how to be conducted, 15. + influence of cavalry in a, 313, 314. + influence of improvements in fire-arms on, 347, 355, 359. + manner of applying general principle of, 175. + materiel of, 49. + maxims of fundamental principles of, 70. + nature and extent of, how influenced, 14. + not an exact science, 344, 350. + objects of, 14. + of the Crimea, 387. + offensive and defensive, definition of, 72. + offensive, duty of staff officers in, 258. + operations of, how directed, 150. + principal parts of the art of, 66. + relation of statesmanship to, 14. + theater of, definition, 74. + use of theories in, 323. + +Warsaw, intrenchments at, 211. + +Wars, aggressive, for conquest, 22. + change of system of, 135. + civil, 35. + defensive politically, offensive militarily, 17. + double, 36. + for conquest, instances of, 22. + intestine, 35. + natural character of, in mountainous countries, 167. + national, definition of, 29. + national, difficulties of conquest in, 31-34. + national, effect of nature of the country on, 30. + national, how prevented, 33, 34. + national, invasion difficult in, 144. + offensive, how conducted, 16. + offensive, to reclaim rights, 16. + of expediency, 18. + kinds of, 18. + of extermination, 34. + of intervention, 19. + of intervention, essentials in wars of, 21. + of intervention, military chances in, 20. + of invasion, when advantageous, 17. + of opinion, 25. + of opinion, character of, 26. + of opinion, instances of, 25. + of opinion, military precepts for, 27. + of position, system of, 135. + of religion, 35. + of sieges, 146. + political, 26. + political part of, how modified, 17. + Punic, 363, 364. + Turkish, squares in, 296, 297. + when most just, 16. + with or without allies, 18. + +Waterloo, 127, 183, 206, 295, 303-306, 354. + Bluecher at, 130. + campaign of, 129, 130. + English squares at, 294 + formations at, 351. + French at, 196. + Napoleon's order of battle at, 198. + Ney at, 182,183. + strategic lines at, 130. + Wellington's position at, 181, 388. + +Wellington, 181, 185, 353, 357, 358, 381, 382, 384, 385. + and Bluecher at Waterloo, 127, 130. + at Salamanca, 206. + at Torres-Vedras, 83. + defensive-offensive operations of, 74. + +Wellington's position at Waterloo, 181. + +Weyrother, 205, 206. + +William the Conqueror, 370, 371. + +Winkelried, column of, 194. + +Winter campaigns, 68. + quarters, countries adapted to, 246. + quarters, when dangerous, 247. + quarters, when strategic, 97. + +Woods, importance of possession of, 303. + +Wurmser at Mantua, 156. + eccentric retreat of, in 1796, 238. + error of, 111. + + +X. + +Xerxes, 173. + army of, 362. + + +Z. + +Zama, battle of, 364. + +Zimisces, 368. + +Zone of operations, 66, 100, 338. + of operations, how to select, 329. + of operations in 1813, 101. + +Zones of operations in the French Revolution, 105. + +Zurich, defeat of the allies at, 112. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Art of War, by Baron Henri de Jomini + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR *** + +***** This file should be named 13549.txt or 13549.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/3/5/4/13549/ + +Produced by Suzanne Shell, Stephen Schulze and the Online Distributed +Proofreaders Team + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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