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diff --git a/1272.txt b/1272.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de8140a --- /dev/null +++ b/1272.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8685 @@ +Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure +*Project Gutenberg Etext of Chemical Strategy in Peace and War* + +Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure +*Project Gutenberg Etext of Chemical Strategy in Peace and War* + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +"Emphasis" _italics_ have a * mark. +[#] footnotes moved to EOParagraphs but not renumbered. +German spelling of words need to checked particularly! + + + + + +Scanned by Charles Keller with OmniPage Professional OCR software + + + + + +THE RIDDLE +OF THE RHINE +CHEMICAL STRATEGY IN PEACE AND WAR + +_An account of the critical struggle for power +and for the decisive war initiative. The campaign +fostered by the great Rhine factories, and +the pressing problems which they represent. +A matter of pre-eminent public interest +concerning the sincerity of disarmament, the +future of warfare, and the stability of peace_. + +BY + +VICTOR LEFEBURE +Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Mil.) +Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, Officer of the Crown of Italy +Fellow of the Chemical Society, etc. + + +WITH A PREFACE BY +MARSHAL FOCH + +AND AN INTRODUCTION BY +FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON, BART. +Chief of the Imperial General Staff + + + +THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC. +81 FULTON STREET +NEW YORK CITY + + + +Published, 1923, +By THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC. +---- +_All Rights Reserved_ + +_Printed in the United States of America_ + + + +PREFACE + + +My motives in writing this book are sufficiently explained in +the first chapter. The silence surrounding the true facts of the +chemical campaign, the tardy realisation of the real forces behind it +in Germany, and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter +in the Treaty, all pointed to the need for an early statement. +More recently, this need has been emphasised by inaccurate +public utterances on the matter, and by its vital importance +for the full and fair treatment of certain legislative measures +before Allied countries. + +A unique experience of chemical warfare in all its aspects, first with a +combatant gas unit on the British front in France, then as Liaison Officer +with France and other Allies on all Chemical Warfare and allied questions, +has afforded me an exceptionally complete survey of the subject. +Later post-armistice experience in Paris, and the occupied territories, +assisting Lord Moulton on various chemical questions in connection +with the Treaty, and surveying the great chemical munition factories +of the Rhine, has provided a central view of the whole matter which can +have been the privilege and opportunity of very few. + +Further, my association with the dye industry, since commencing this book, +leaves me with a deep conviction of the critical importance for disarmament, +of a world redistribution of organic chemical production. It is inevitable +that such a step should benefit the growing organic chemical industries +of countries other than Germany, but this issue need not be shirked. +The importance of the matter is so vital that it eclipses all reproach +that the disarmament argument for the maintenance of the dye industry +is used on selfish grounds. Such reproach cannot, in fairness, +be heard unless it destroys the case which we have established. +We are faced with the following alternatives. Safety demands strong +organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical +warfare establishments. The stability of future peace depends upon +the former, and the extent to which we must establish, or can abandon, +the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose +special duty it is to organise against war. + +A recent visit to America revealed the considerable publicity and public +interest surrounding chemical warfare, strengthening my conviction that +the facts, now noised abroad, should be presented in their proper setting. +They are supremely significant at the present time and for the future, +hence the chapters which follow. + V. LEFEBURE. + HAMPSTEAD, _October_ 12, 1920. + + + +PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH + + +In 1918, chemical warfare had developed considerably in our army. +Before 1914 Germany possessed chemical factories which permitted +her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front, +and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting. + +The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and organise important +centres for production. Only in this way, though starting late, +were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing +necessities of their armies. + +To-day, the ability for aviation to carry increasing weight furnishes a new +method for abundantly spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and +stronger bombs, and to reach armies, the centres of population in the rear, +or to render regions uninhabitable. + +Chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to produce more formidable +results over more extended areas. + +It is incontestable on the other hand that this growth will find an easy +realisation in one country, Germany, addicted in times of peace, +to wholesale manufacture of chemical products, which a simple modification +in reactions can transform into war products. + +This country, deprived, partially at least, of its former methods of fighting, +and its numerous forces of specially trained soldiers, regularly organised +and strongly armed, will be more drawn toward the new systems of attack-- +that of chemical warfare. + +Chemical warfare must therefore enter into our future provisions +and preparations, if we do not wish to experience some terrible surprises. + +The work of Major Lefebure gives an exact idea of the possibilities he finds +to-day in Germany, and through them the dangers with which she threatens us. +In this form it constitutes a warning; and information of the highest order, +for the minds who remain anxious for the fate of their country confronted +by the inefficience of the old fighting methods which the progress of industry +out of date renders daily. + +By sounding the alarm in both our countries, I find myself in company +with my faithful friend Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. This is an +old habit, contracted by both of us, many years ago, which we still +maintain at the present time to insure for ourselves once again, +peace in the future. + +Together, we say, read this work of Major Lefebure. F. FOCH. + + + +CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I-EXPLANATORY The Riddle of the +Rhine-A Critical Point in Disarmament-Need for a Balanced View +of Chemical Warfare-Some Preliminary Explanation--"Poison Gas" +a Misleading Term-The French Physiological Classification-Asphyxiating +Substances-Toxic Substances-Lachrymators-Vesicant or +Blistering Compounds-Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances-The +Tactical Classification-Persistent Substances-Non-persistent +Substances-Penetrants-Special Gas Weapons and Appliances-Gas Shell. +17 + +CHAPTER II-THE GERMAN SURPRISE The First Cloud Gas Attack-The Element +of Surprise -Lord Kitchener's Protest-German Preparations-- +Research-Production-Field Preparations-German Opinion of +Results-Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly-Standard Uses +for Gas-Gas Shell-Further German Cloud Attacks-Hill 60-Origin of +German Gas Shell-Early German Gas Shell-A Successful Experiment-Lachrymators +at Loos, 1915-The Flammenwerfer-German Phosgene Clouds-Gas and +the Eastern Theatre-Conclusion. 31 + +CHAPTER III-THE ALLIED REACTION The Need of Retaliation-First Signs-The +Loos Attack, September, 1915-The Somme Battle, 1916--Reasons for +British Cloud Gas Success-Our Casualties-Exhausting Preparations +for Cloud Attack-The Livens Projector-British Gas Shell-German Gas +Shell Development, 1916-Main Features of the Period. 48 + +CHAPTER IV-INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE The Mustard Gas Surprise-Blue +Cross-German Emphasis on Gas Shell-The German Projector-German Projector +Improvements-Dyes in Gas Shell--German Flame Projectors-Their Origin-Further +Flame Development-The 1918 Offensive-Ludendorff's Testimony-Preparations +for Assault-Gas Defensive Flank at Armentieres-Fixed Gas Barrage at +Kemmel-Percentage of Chemical Shell-Gas Re-Contents + +PAGE treat Tactics-General Hartley's Analysis-Percentage of German Gas Shell +in Enemy Dumps-Forced Exhaustion of Stocks-Yperite, French Mustard Gas-Effect +on German Gas Discipline-Allied Gas Statistics-Critical Importance of +Rapid German Production. 66 + +CHAPTER V-CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS German +Research-Leverkusen-Hochst-Ludwigshaven-Early Formulation of Policy-Movements +of Personnel-German Simplicity of Organisation-German Organisation at the +Front-The Gas Regiment--Early German Gas School-New Gas Regiments-Gas Shell +Experts-Inspection of Protective Masks and Method-British Field Organisation-- +"Breach" Organisations-Central Laboratory-New Type of Casualty~Directorate +of Gas Services-British Home Organisations-The Royal Society-Royal +Society Chemical Sub-Committee-The Trench Warfare Department-Scientific +Advisory Committee -Commercial Advisory Committee-Split Between Research +and Supply-Munitions Inventions Department-Imperial College of Science-The +Chemical Warfare Department-The Anti-Gas Department -Designs Committee +French Organisation-Italian Developments-Supply Organisations-British Supply +Organisation-Allied Handicaps-The German Solution--Departmental Difficulties-- +Allied Success Against Odds-Allied Lack of Vision in Production-British Lag +in Organisation-French and American Characteristics-Inter-Allied +Chemical Warfare Liaison-Inter-Allied Supply-Nature of +Chemical Warfare Research-Discovery of New Substances-Technical Method of +Preparation-Filling Problem-Protection-Half Scale Investigation-Two Classes +of Research-Conclusion-The "Outer and Inner Lines." 85 + +CHAPTER VI-THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE Meaning of the +Chemical Initiative-Controlling Factors--Rapid Manufacture Rapid +Identification Essential-Propaganda and Morale-Peculiar Peace-time +Danger-War Fluctuations of Initiative-The Tense Protective +Struggle-The German Mask-Enforced German Modifications-Shortage +of Rubber-Gas Discipline-Summary-New German Attempts-Yellow and +Blue Cross-Yellow Cross-Blue Cross-"Particulate" Clouds-Potential Production +and Peace. lit + +Contents PAGE CHAPTER VII-REVIEW OF PRODUCTION Critical Importance +of Production-Significance of the German Dye Industry--The Interessen +Gemeinschaft-War Production by the I.G.-Allied Difficulties-Conclusion. 143 + +CHAPTER VIII-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS Special Attention justified-Special Value +of American Opinion-Early American Activities-Field Activities -Special +Difficulties-Edgewood Arsenal-Research--Production-Post-Armistice +Developments-Views of General Fries-The Gas Cloud Inescapable-Importance +of Smoke-Casualty Percent ages-Short Range Projectors-Vast Expansion +in Personnel. 173 + +CHAPTER IX-GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY Origin of German Chemical Monopolies-German +Chemical Commercial Policy-Evidence of the U. S. A. Alien Property +Custodian-Pre-war American Situation--German Price Cutting--Salicylic Acid-- +Full Line Forcing--Bribery and Corruption--German Patent Policy--Propaganda +and Information--Espionage-Activities of the Dye Agencies-Manoeuvring Raw +Materials-Chemical Exchange Association -Doctor Albert's Letter-Dye Agency +Information System-Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare-The Moral Aspect-Report +of the New York World-German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the +U. S. A.--Professor Stieglitz's Evidence Ehrlich's Discovery--Drugs and +Medicinal Products-The German Monopoly-National Health Insurance +Commission-The Royal Society--Novocain--Beta-Eucaine--Photographic +Chemicals-War Activities of the I.G.-The Rhine Factories and +the Armistice-War Mentality of the I.G.-German Attitude towards +Inspection-The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast-German Revolution and +the Industrial Leaders-The German Peace Delegation -Recent Signs of +Government Interest-Nitrogen Fixation-The German Nitrogen Syndicate-Haber +Process Prominent-The New German Dye Combine -Aggressive Nationalist Policy. +186 + +CHAPTER X-LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT The Element of +Speculation-Chemical Tactics and Strategy-New War Chemicals--"Camouflage" +Chemicals-Functions Hitherto Immune-Chemical Constitution and +Physiological Action-Unsolved Prob- + +Contents PAGE lems of Mustard Gas-A New Type of Obstacle-- +The "Persistent Lethal" Substance-The Critical Range-The New +No-Man's-Land-The "Alert Gas Zone"--Gas and Aircraft-Protective +Development -Individual Protection-Collective Protection-Conclusion. 215 + +CHAPTER XI-HUMANE OR INHUMANE? Nature of Gas Casualties-Sargent's +Picture-Need for Safeguards. 238 + +CHAPTER XII-CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT The Treaty of +Versailles-German Information-Limitation of Armament-Report of the Hartley +Mission -New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament-Limitation Mechanical and +Chemical-Tank Disarmament -Chemical Limitation-Research-Production-Mechanical +and Chemical Preparations for War-Recent Disarmament Proposals-The Covenant +of the League Need for Guarantees-Viscount Grey, "Germany must disarm first'~-- +Suggested Methods--"Vested Interests"--"Handing Over" Inventions-Neglect of +Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty. 242 + +CONCLUSION-THE TREATY OF THE FUTURE. 264 + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + +THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-I. _Frontispiece_ + +A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, with a battery +on the left rear, half dug in. Suitably camouflaged with brush, +the batteries are not observable by aircraft, and, being in +"No-Man's-Land," neither party can detect them by day. + + FACING + PAGE +TYPICAL GAS SHELL BURSTING. 30 + +THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-II 61 + +A working party fitting electric leads and adjusting bombs prior +to discharge. This work occurs at night. + +THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-III. 133 Explosion of Livens bombs on the objective. + +SMOKE BARRAGE. 181 + +Note the sharp curtain which is formed, behind which the infantry advance. + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +No one who has the welfare of the country at heart can fail to share +Major Lefebure's anxiety that a clear, accurate, and unbiased +account of chemical warfare should be presented to the public, +so that the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard to poison +gas and its uses may be dispelled. + +The whole subject of chemical warfare is at present _sub judice_, +and there is great danger that the future safety of this +country may be jeopardised by the almost universal ignorance +of the peculiarities and potentialities of this class of warfare. +Recent publications in the Press have shown a tendency to deal +with the subject on purely sentimental grounds, and attempts +have been made to declare this form of warfare illegitimate +without full and careful consideration of all the facts and their +significance for the future. + +Major Lefebure has therefore attempted in his book to make it quite +clear that no convention, guarantee, or disarmament safeguard will +prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison gas, especially if +that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent, or possesses, +as Germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry, +a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically +a moment's notice; further, that the safety of this country makes it +imperative that the study and investigation of the subject should be +continued and that our chemical and dye industry should be developed, +so that when an emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities +for supply ready to hand. + +It is not for me to express any opinion here either as to the desirability +of using gas as a weapon or as to the possibility of preventing an enemy from +using it. But I am convinced that a decision come to without full knowledge +of the facts may involve grave danger and heavy preventable loss of life. +I am further convinced that Major Lefebure, by his special knowledge +and long experience as chemical liaison officer during the war, is well +qualified to speak, and that his opinion is entitled to full consideration. +For these reasons I think that his book will do a much needed public service. +I wish it every success, and the greatest possible number of readers. +HENRY WILSON, F.M. + + + +CHAPTER 1 + +EXPLANATORY + + +The Riddle of the Rhine.--The Great War challenged our very existence. +But with the tension released, and the Allies victorious, +the check to the German menace appears crushing and complete. +Few realise that one formidable challenge has not been answered. +Silently menacing, the chemical threat remains unrecognised. +How, asks the reader, can this be? Are we not aware of the poison +gas campaign? Indeed, we have not yet grasped the simple technical +facts of the case, and these are merely the outward signs of a +deep-rooted menace whose nature, activities, and potentialities +are doubly important because so utterly unsuspected by those whom +they most threaten. + +How many of us, for example, realise that the Germans relied +mainly on gas for success in the great March assault of 1918, +which threatened to influence the destinies of the world. +Yet Ludendorff goes out of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it. +How many understand that the 1918 hostilities were no longer a war +of explosives. German guns were firing more than fifty per cent. +of gas and war chemical. But a deep study of such war facts reveals +a much more significant matter. + +All are aware of the enormous national enterprises built to fulfil our +explosives programme. With mushroom-like growth chemical establishments +of a magnitude hitherto unknown in England arose to meet our crying needs. +What was the German equivalent, and where were the huge reservoirs of gas +and war chemical which filled those countless shells? Krupp, of Essen, +loomed large in the mind of every Allied citizen and soldier. +There lay the sinews of war in the making. But the guns were useless +without their message. Who provided it? A satisfactory answer +to this question demands an examination of the great German I.G., +the Interessen Gemeinschaft, the world power in organic chemical enterprise, +whose monopoly existence threatened to turn the tide of war against us. +This organisation emerges from the war with renewed and greater strength. +Our splendid but improvised factories drained the vital forces of +the nation, and now lie idle, while German war chemical production fed +new life blood and grafted new tissue to the great pre-war factories +of the I.G., which, if she will, she can use against us in the future. +I do not claim that this German combine has at present any direct economic +or military policy against world peace. In any case, the facts must +speak for themselves. But the following pages will prove that the mere +existence of the complete German monopoly, represented by the forces +of the I.G., however free from suspicion might be the mentality and morals +of those directing its activities, constitutes, in itself, a serious menace. +It is, if you will, a monster camouflaged floating mine in the troubled +sea of world peace, which the forces of reconstruction have left unswept. +The existence of this giant monopoly raises vital military and economic +questions, which are, indeed, "The Riddle of the Rhine." + +Impersonal Examination of Fact.--In a sound examination +of the subject it becomes necessary to examine the activities +of our former enemies very closely. Even adopting a mild +view of the case, their reputation has not been unattacked, +and is not left untarnished. We, however, have no desire to renew +such attacks, but we wish our statement to be coldly reliable. +National and international issues are at stake which require +a background unprejudiced by war emotion. + +Placed in a similar predicament, in reporting to his Government +of the methods of German economic aggression in the United States +of America, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian, +expressed himself as follows: + +"I do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit of revenge +or in retaliation for injuries done to the United States. I do +not want to continue the war after the war. I am for peace. +I believe that the great overshadowing result which has come from this +war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the peoples +of the earth. I would help to make that an absolute certainty +by refusing to permit Germany to prosecute a war after the war. +The military arm of her war machine has been palsied by the tremendous +hammering of the allied powers. But her territory was not invaded, +and if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact, +rebuild a stable government, and still have her foreign markets +subject to her exploitation, by means no less foul and unfair +than those which she has employed on the field of battle, +we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods, +but with the same purpose that moved her on that fateful day in July +when she set out to conquer the world." + +Ours is a fair standpoint. Let us know the facts of the chemical +war into which Germany impelled us. Let us examine its mainsprings, +in conception and action, see how far they can be explained +in terms of pre-war Germany, and how far they remain ready +to function in the much desired peace which they threaten. +If the result be unpleasant, let us not hide our heads in the sand, +but exercise a wise vigilance, choose what precautions are available +and consistent with our plans for world peace. + +A Critical Point in Disarmament.--Probably never before in the history +of man has Disarmament figured as such a vitally urgent national +and international measure. Discussions and official utterances reveal +a very disquieting tendency. + +When compared with the methods, armament and materials of +the war in 1914, those of 1918 reveal basic changes which a +hundred years of former peace could not have brought about. +These developments are not merely of fact, but they represent +the opening of new fields, visions of possibilities previously +undreamed of by the practical soldier. By the concentrated +application of electricity, chemistry, and other sciences to war +two dominating factors have emerged, whose importance to war, +and danger for world peace, can only gain momentum with time. +The scientific or technical initiative, the invention of a deadly +new chemical, wireless-directed aeroplane, or other war appliance +and their incidence on war through large scale production in +the convertible industries of peace constitute a challenge which, +if unanswered by practical schemes for world disarmament, +will render the latter worse than useless, by aggravating the danger +of sudden decisive attack in an otherwise disarmed world. + +There is a tendency to ignore this aspect of disarmament. We appear +to be thinking in terms of a world still organised for war on 1914 lines. +The disbanding of the German army and semi-military organisations, +and the reduction of her artillery and small arms seem to occupy +all our attention. Such, it might be urged, is the immediate need; +we can leave the future to find answers to the other problems. +This answer is dangerous, for it ignores the disarmament aspect +of what is perhaps the most important development in the modern +offensive campaign. We refer to poison gas or chemical warfare. +This, the crux of all disarmament, is dealt with at some length +in the chapters which follow. + +A curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in certain quarters. +There is a tendency among strong adherents to the ideal +of world peace to regard themselves as its sole possessors. +Every thinking civilian and soldier must adhere to such an ideal; +the only point at issue is the method of approaching it. +The mere fact that a League of Nations is called into being +to attain world peace implies recognition of the fact +that a definite mechanism and definite measures are required +for the purpose; this is self-evident. There are those who, +having established their League of Nations, feel that they +can attain chemical peace by merely prohibiting chemical war, +in other words, they expect their mechanism to achieve its object +without functioning, to attain peace by its mere existence. +Just as special measures are required to control disarmament +in the older branches of warfare, in the same way special measures, +but not the same measures, are required to control the chemical peace. +Chemical peace guaranteed by a mere signature is no peace at all. + +In a recent Press utterance we find an appeal to prohibit chemical +warfare and to "trust the general sentiment of the civilised +world to say that the lesson has been learnt in that sense." +"There is the League of Nations to furnish that sentiment +with a mouthpiece and a sanction." We agree, but to stop there +is dangerous, the most important thing which it must furnish +is a mechanism of control, a check, or guarantee. This question +is one of the most important which confronts us for world peace. +It merits the most careful consideration. + +Even responsible and relevant officials who admit that their League must +do more than issue edicts, that their mechanism must function, are ignoring +the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose use we wish to limit. +This matter will receive later attention. + +The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to represent the salient points +in the development of chemical warfare, its causes, results, and future. +Such an attempt cannot limit itself to merely British developments, and this +is not a final detailed memoir of British chemical warfare. Further, in +considering the future, we examine another aspect of chemical warfare. +Facts lead us to believe that it was purely the most open and obvious +activity in a whole campaign of chemical aggression which had effective +unity of conception and direction long before the war started. + +Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare.--The facts of chemical +warfare have probably been less ventilated than those of any other +important war development. Yet no subject has aroused more general and +intense feeling. Tanks, aircraft, the different campaigns, enemy memoirs, +and a variety of war subjects, have received a considerable measure +of publicity, some more than full measure. Grave questions are pending +in which the chemical aspect of national defence is a prominent factor. +However willing the individual concerned, he cannot make a sound judgment +on the brief technical or popular garbled versions which have appeared. +One searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements on the question. +This may be due in no way to lack of intention, but to lack of opportunity. +Therefore, no excuse is needed for this contribution, but rather +an apology for the obscurity which has so far surrounded the subject. +What is the cause of this emotional or almost hysterical background from +which a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning to emerge? +Circumstances are to blame; the first open act of chemical warfare +decided the matter. + +This event, the first German cloud gas attack at Ypres, arriving at +the peak of allied indignation against a series of German abuses, +in particular with regard to the treatment of prisoners, +left the world aghast at the new atrocity. Further, its use +against entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolting. +The fact that such a cloud of chlorine would have passed the 1918 +armies untouched behind their modern respirators, could not be +known to, nor appreciated by the relatives of the 1915 casualties. +But the emotion and indignation called forth by the first use of gas +has survived a period of years, at the end of which the technical +facts would no longer, of themselves, justify such feeling. +We would hesitate to do anything which might dispel this emotional +momentum were we not convinced that, unaccompanied by knowledge, +it becomes a very grave danger. If we felt that the announcement +of an edict was sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would +gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an edict. +But therein lies the danger. Owing to certain technical peculiarities, +which can be clearly revealed by examination of the facts, +it is impossible to suppress chemical warfare in this way. +As well try to suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence. +But we can take precaution against disease, and the following +examination will show clearly that we can take similar precautions +against the otherwise permanent menace of chemical war. +Further, backed by such precautions, a powerful international +edict has value. + +It is, therefore, our intention to present a reasoned account of the +development of poison gas, or chemical warfare, during the recent war. +But to leave the matter there would be misleading and culpable, +for, however interesting the simple facts of the chemical campaign, +they owed their being to a combination of forces, whose nature +and significance for the future are infinitely more important. +The chief cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dangerous +world distribution of industrial organic chemical forces. +Unless some readjustment occurs, this will remain the "point faible" +in world disarmament. We, therefore, propose to examine the relationships +between chemical industry, war, and disarmament. + +Some Preliminary Explanation.--The chemistry of war, developed under +the stress of the poison gas campaign, is of absorbing chemical +and technical interest, but it has none the less a general appeal. +When its apparently disconnected and formidable facts are revealed +as an essential part of a tense struggle in which move and counter-move +followed swiftly one upon the other, its appeal becomes much wider. +Therefore, in order not to confuse the main issue in the following +chapters by entering upon tiresome definitions, it is proposed to conclude +the present chapter by explaining, simply, a number of chemical warfare +conceptions with which the expert is probably well acquainted. + +"Poison Gas" a Misleading Term--Poison gas is a misleading term, and. +our subject is much better described as "chemical, warfare." +Let us substantiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals +which were used. In the first place they were not all gases; +the tendency during the war was towards the use of liquids and solids. +Even the chemicals which appeared as gases on the field of battle +were transported and projected as liquids, produced by compression. +As the poison war developed, a large number of different +chemicals became available for use by the opposing armies. +These can he classified, either according to their tactical use, +or according to their physiological effects on man. + +The British, French, American, and German armies all tended to the final +adoption of a tactical classification, but the French emphasised +the physiological side. Let us use their classification as a basis +for a review of the chief chemicals concerned. + +The French Physiological Classification;--Asphyxiating Substances;-- +Toxic Substances;--Chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating, +toxic, lachrymatory, vesicant, or sternutatory. It is perfectly true +that the asphyxiating and toxic substances, used during the war, +produced a higher percentage of deaths than the other three classes, +but the latter were responsible for many more casualties. +The so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect by producing lesions +and congestion in the pulmonary system, causing death by suffocation. +The best known substances of this type was chlorine, employed in the liquid +state in cylinders on the occasion of the first German gas attack, +but the most formidable were phosgene (an important substance required +in the manufacture of dyes), diphosgene, chlor-picrin, made from bleaching +powder and picric acid, brom-acetone, which was also a powerful lachrymator, +and diphenylchlorarsine, known as sneezing gas, the first sternutatory +or sneezing compound to appear on the front in large quantities. +The toxic compounds were so called because of their specific effect upon +particular parts of the organism such as, for example, the nervous system. +The chief example, with regard to the military value of which there +has been much dispute, was prussic, or hydrocyanic, acid. The French +had definite evidence of the mortal effect of this compound upon +German gunners, but it was doubted by other Allies whether French gas +shell produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of military value. +It was a kill or cure compound, for recovery was rapid from any +concentration which did not produce death. + +A prominent Cambridge physiologist, in the heat of the controversy +on this matter, made a very brave and self-sacrificing experiment. +He entered a chamber of prussic acid which was sufficiently +concentrated to cause the death of other animals which were present. +They were removed in time, and he escaped because the concentration +was not a mortal one for man. This was, in a sense, an _experimentum +crucis_ and, although it did not disprove the extreme danger +of prussic acid, if employed in high concentrations, it showed, +on the other hand, that it was difficult to gauge the military +value by field experiments; battle results were necessary. +The Germans' disappointment with the use of arsenic compounds +confirms this need for battle evidence. + +Lachrymators.--There is hardly need to dwell on the next class, +the lachrymator. These compounds were employed on a large scale +to produce temporary blindness by lachrymation, or weeping. +We give later some interesting examples of their use on the front. +It is an arresting thought that even as early as 1887 +Professor Baeyer, the renowned organic chemist of Munich, +in his lectures to advanced students, included a reference +to the military value of these compounds. + +Vesicant or Blistering Compounds.--It was the introduction of +the fourth, the vesicant class, which revealed, more than any other +enemy move, the great possibilities inherent in chemical warfare. +These compounds, the chief of which was mustard gas, produced vesicant, +or skin burning, effects, which, although rarely mortal, +were sufficient to put a man out of action for a number of months. +Mustard gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early as 1860. +Victor Meyer, the famous German chemist, described the substance in 1884, +indicating its skin-blistering effects. There is evidence of further +investigation in German laboratories a year before the outbreak of war, +and whatever the motive for this work, we know that mustard gas +must have received the early attention of the German War Office, +for it was approved and in production early in 1917. +Although the Medecin aide-major Chevalier of the French services +drew attention to its importance in 1916, the French had no serious +thought of using mustard gas, and did not realise its possibilities +until the German battle experiment of July, 1917. It is not +generally known, however, that other vesicant compounds were employed, +notably some of the arsenic compounds, and the Germans were researching +on substances of this nature which gave great promise of success. +Mustard gas provides a striking example of the organic way +in which chemical warfare is bound up with the dye industry. +The compounds required for its manufacture were those which had been +made on a large scale by the I.G. for the production of indigo. +World indigo monopoly meant possession of a potential mustard gas +surprise on the outbreak of war. + +Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances.--The last class, +the sternutatory substances, produced the familiar sneezing +effect which was accompanied by intense pain and irritation +of the nose, throat, and respiratory channels. They were mostly +arsenic compounds and were not only sternutatory but also toxic, +producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning. + +The Tactical Classification.--From the point of view of our account +of chemical warfare, however, the physiological classification +of these substances is not so important as the tactical and, +indeed, once this grouping of the substances is understood, +a profound knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary. + +Persistent Substances.--Two main classes exist from the tactical +Point of view. There are those "persistent" substances which +remain for a long time on the soil or on the object on which they +are sprayed by shell, while retaining their dangerous effect. +Mustard gas was the chief example, but some of the lachrymators +were just as persistent. By their use it is possible to render +ground uninhabitable or ineffective for military movement. +The combination of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard +gas rendered it a powerful military factor. + +Non-Persistent Substances.--On the other hand, there are the relatively +volatile substances, such as phosgene, which can be used immediately +before an attack. The chief sternutatory compound, diphenylchlorarsine, +although not volatile, could also be used in this way, for, being a solid +and in a very finely pulverised state, its presence on the ground was +not a distinct danger, and it invited chemical decomposition. + +Penetrants.--The Germans introduced an additional tactical group. +This comprised pulverised substances able to penetrate the mask +on account of their existence as minute particles. The Germans +expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell markings. +The familiar Green Cross represented the slightly persistent, +volatile, lethal compounds, such as phosgene and diphosgene. +The German gunner had no need to know the content of his gas +shell so long as he could identify the cross. Yellow Cross, +representing mustard gas, was the most highly persistent type. +It is interesting to speculate whether a new persistent compound, +whose military value was due to some other property than the blistering, +would have been grouped under Yellow Cross. Logically, this should +have been done. Blue Cross covered the arsenic group of compounds, +which were non-persistent and were expected to penetrate the mask. +So strong was this tactical conception that the Allies were on +the verge of adopting a uniform shell marking based on this +principle throughout their armies. + +Special Gas Weapons and Appliances.--It is a popular misconception +that gas was only discharged from cylinders in huge clouds, +or used as artillery shell. A number of special weapons developed, +which were particularly adapted for gas. Thus, the Livens projector, +which was a great Allied advance, produced a gas cloud a long distance +from the point of discharge, while the Stokes and other short range +guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of gas shell. + +The primary conceptions with regard to protection have been brought +home to so many, through the fact that the mask was a part of the +equipment of every soldier, that we need not dwell on them here. +It is not generally realised, however, that every modification +introduced by either side was a vital and direct counter to some enemy +move planned to render the protection of the opponent ineffective. + +Gas Shell.--A word is necessary to define the use of gas shell. +The point which must be realised is that gas, and in +particular gas shell, fulfilled a special purpose in warfare, +from which it was much more suitable than explosives. +The use for neutralising batteries, cross roads, and rendering +whole areas uninhabitable, is developed fully in our reference +to the great German attacks in 1918. + +With this brief sketch to clear the ground, we can embark more freely +upon the account of chemical warfare which follows. CHAPTER II + +THE GERMAN SURPRISE + +Ypres, April, 1915, to the Somme, August, 1916. + + +The First Cloud Gas Attack.--The critical factor of surprise in war +was never nearer decisive success than on April 22nd, 1915. +Of this, the occasion of the first German gas attack +at Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French Stated: + + +"Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division +at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. +Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had +been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck +and Bixschoote. What follows almost defies description. +The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render +the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above +practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first +impossible for any one to realise what had actually happened. +The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men +were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour +the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns. +I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least +blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident." + +The Element of Surprise.--The enemy just missed colossal success rendered +possible by the use of an entirely new war method; one contrary to engagements +entered into by them at the Hague Convention. + +There were elements in this first gas attack which were absent +even from the situation created by our first use of tanks. +Unfamiliarity amongst the troops, or the staff, for that matter, +created an atmosphere of unparalleled confusion. +Men attempted to protect themselves by burying their mouths +and nostrils in the loose earth. Those chemists, on the spot, +not immediately struck down, made frantic efforts to bring up +supplies of any suitable and available chemical or material +which might assist resistance and movement in the affected zone. +Paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and brave actions +which characterised the Allied resistance, we cannot ignore +the fact that morale must have been very severely shaken locally, +and that a general disquiet and uneasiness must have permeated +the whole front until measures were known to be effectively +in progress, not only for protection, but for retaliation. +The enemy had but to exploit the attack fully to break through +to the channel ports, but failed to do so. The master mind +behind this new and deadly attack was not, let us remember, +that of a soldier. It was very strongly rumoured that this +monstrous conception and its execution were due to one or, +at the most, two renowned German Professors. The first hammer +blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two-party conspiracy, +led by world-famous scientists and the powerful I.G. with the German +army unconvinced but expectant, little more than a willing dupe. + +Lord Kitchener's Protest.--In his spirited protest in the House +of Lords, Lord Kitchener stated: "The Germans have, in the last week, +introduced a method of placing their opponents _hors de combat_ +by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases, and they +employ these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack, +according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed. +On this subject I would remind your Lordships that Germany was +a signatory to the following article in the Hague Convention: + + +" `The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles +the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.' +" + + +This protest circulated amongst neutrals prompted numerous +attempts at vindication in the German Press. In several cases we +find important newspapers arguing that the German attack was not +contrary to the Hague Convention, while others admitted the breach, +but claimed that the Germans merely followed Allied example. +The main technical excuse was that the effect of the German gas was +merely stupefying (_Colniche Zeitung_, June, 1915). It is incredible +that the German nation was, or could allow itself to be, so hoodwinked. +Scientific Germany was certainly aware of the true nature of the gases used. +Even scientific neutrals in Berlin at the outbreak of war, and during +the ensuing winter, were aware of the German poison gas work, +which commenced, in an organised way, almost as soon as war broke out. +The Germans have argued that they only entertained the idea of gas +after Allied use. The facts revealed below are a sufficient answer. +Whatever legal arguments may be involved, there is no doubt as +to German intention. + +We do not wish to enter into a comprehensive examination of the legal aspect +of the first use of cloud and shell gas by Germany. Whatever complicated +arguments may turn upon the strict reading of a phrase in the records +of the Hague Convention, we have no doubt whatever as to the desires +and intentions of the Assembly, and we regard Germany (and the Allies) +as morally engaged not to venture upon the series of chemical +enterprises which she openly commenced with the Ypres cloud attack. +The Versailles Treaty also renders fruitless any such discussion. +Article 171, accepted by Germany, is deliberately based on her breach +of International Convention. + +German Preparations.--A significant phrase occurs in the +Field-Marshal's despatch. "The brain power and thought which has +evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making +war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated +in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured +these designs for a long time." This is a most important point. +It was argued by many generous and fairminded people in April, 1915, +that the German use of gas was the result of a sudden decision, +only arrived at in a desperate effort to terminate the war. +This point of view would give us maximum hope for the future. +But the actual truth? What do we know about German preparations, +and how far back do they date? Any preparations which occurred +must have covered research on the compounds to be employed and on +the protection required for the German troops, their training +for the cloud attack, and the design and production of the special +appliances to be used. Finally, the production of the chemicals +themselves had to be faced. + +Research.--We have obtained an insight into the German research +preparations, which leaves no doubt as to their intention. +There is evidence that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and +the physico-chemical institute near by were employed for this +purpose as early as August, 1914. Reliable authority exists +for the statement that soon after this date they were working +with cacodyl oxide and phosgene, both well known before the war +for their very poisonous nature, for use, it was believed, +in hand grenades. Our quotations are from a statement +by a neutral then working at the Institute. "We could hear +the tests that Professor Haber was carrying out at the back +of the Institute, with the military authorities, who in their +steel-grey cars came to Haber's Institute every morning." +"The work was pushed day and night, and many times I saw +activity in the building at eleven o'clock in the evening. +It was common knowledge that Haber was pushing these men +as hard as he could." Sachur was Professor Haber's assistant. +"One morning there was a violent explosion in the room +in which most of this war work was carried out. The room +was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic oxide." +"The janitors began to clear the room by a hose and discovered +Professor Sachur." He was very badly hurt and died soon after. +"After that accident I believe the work on cacodyl oxide +and phosgene was suspended and I believe that work was carried +out on chlorine or chlorine compounds." "There were seven +or eight men working in the Institute on these problems, +but we heard nothing more until Haber went to the Battle +of Ypres." Rumours to this effect circulated in 1915. + +Production.--Preparations, for production can easily be imagined. +The Germans first used chlorine for cloud gas, and certain +lachrymators for shell. The chlorine was readily available. +At about this time British liquid chlorine capacity had a +maximum daily output of about one ton, while along the Rhine +alone the production was more than forty times greater. +The question of German chlorine production was, therefore, +already solved. The lachrymators were mainly raw materials +and intermediates of the dye industry submitted to a process, +the technique of which the German dye factories readily mastered. +Here, again, production presented no real difficulties. +Cylinders were also probably available from the industry. + +Field Preparations.--There remains the last question of gas attack +technique and personnel. Those of us who remember the difficulties +involved in creating our own organisation in the summer of 1915 +have no illusions on the question of German preparation. +Giving the Germans every credit for their technical and military +efficiency, some months must have been occupied in establishing +and training the special companies required, and in arriving +at a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances. +Schwarte's book, _Die Technik Im Weltkriege_,[1] tells us "specially +organised and trained troops" were required for the purpose. +Prisoners taken later revealed the German methods. Gas officers +and N.C.O.'s, after making a careful survey of the front line trench, +organised the digging of deep narrow trenches at suitable places +below the surface of the main trench, just underneath the parapet. +The heavy gas cylinders, weighing as much as ninety pounds, +were carried to the front line by the unfortunate infantry. +The discharge valves were carefully protected by domes which screwed +on to the cylinder. The latter were introduced into the holes, +tops flush with the trench bottom, and covered by a board +on which reposed the "Salzdecke," a kind of long bag stuffed +with some such material as peat moss and soaked in potash +solution to absorb any slight gas leakages. Three layers of +sandbags were built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder +from shell fragments and to form a firestep for the infantry. +This concealed the cylinders so efficiently that, in our own trenches, +I have often found the new occupants of a sector ignorant +of the presence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps. +On the favourable night the dome was removed and a lead pipe +was connected to the cylinder and directed over the parapet +into No Man's Land, with the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag. +The pioneers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each +and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket signal, +at which the infantry retired to leave the front line free +for the pioneers, who not only ran the risk of gassing from +defective appliances but were subjected to almost immediate +violent bombardment from the opposing artillery. When surprise +was complete artillery retaliation was very late in developing. +This gives a faint idea of the elaborate preparations required. +They must have been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first +occasion of cloud gas attack. + + +[1] _Die Technik Im Weltkriegre_. Publisher: Mittler, Berlin, 1920. + + +German Opinion of Results.--We can now regard the chlorine attack +of April 22, 1915, as the first and successful result of a huge +German experiment on a new method of war, the pioneer work +of which actually began at (if not before) the outbreak of war. +Quoting again from Schwarte: "G.H.Q. considered the attack near +Ypres to he a successful experiment. The impression created +was colossal and the result not inconsiderable, although it +was not fully utilised from the tactical point of view. +It was obvious that we had gained a great advantage; +the enemy was not sufficiently prepared with defensive measures +against gas." Indeed, we were absolutely unprepared, so much so, +that after the German attack nearly every household in England +contributed to our first inefficient and improvised mask. +Is not this suggestion of our preparation a deliberate attempt +to deceive the German public? They seem to have been as easily +hoodwinked on gas questions as on many others. + +Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly.--An important point arises. +The Germans failed to exploit their initial success. +This is not very surprising. Whatever the opinion of the chemists +behind the movement, the German General Staff must have retained +the elements of precaution in its opinion. It could not have +taken for granted the formidable success which the chemists +proved justified in prophesying. This being so, we can fairly +assume that had there been very serious difficulties in carrying +out this huge war experiment it might never have materialised. +Such difficulties might have been found in production. +But as we have seen, the question of production was the most +easily forged link in the chain of events which led to the use +of poison gas by Germany. In other words, this monopoly in ease +of production was an inducement to the Germans to proceed +with their experiment. + +The earliest German cloud gas attacks established beyond +a doubt the enormous value of gas against unprotected troops, +in other words, its value as a complete surprise. These conditions +were again approached in the first German use of mustard gas. +The most telling examples will probably be found in the future, +unless the correct precautions are taken. The whole history of +chemical warfare during the war was a struggle for this initiative, +a struggle between gas protection and aggression. + +Standard Uses for Gas;--Gas Shell.--But gas found an important +use besides that of strategic surprise. It became a standard +weapon for certain clear and definite tactical purposes. +(For some of these, indeed, the factor of local surprise +was important.) We refer to the specific use of gas shell +for the neutralisation of batteries, roads, and areas, and to +the use of cloud gas, prior to offensives for the production +of casualties, and wearing down of reserves. The Ypres attack +had not by any means established the use of gas for such purposes. +There is no doubt that, from this point of view, the experimental +period carried on for many months. Naturally, in some respects, +there was always an experimental element in the use of gas. + +Further German Cloud Attacks.--Two days after the first cloud +gas attack the Germans launched a second against the Canadians, +with similar results. Quoting from official despatches: +"On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas +against nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell fire, +and a most determined attack was delivered against our position +east of Ypres. The real attack commenced at 2.45 a.m. A +large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was +too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators." +These latter were hurriedly improvised after the first Ypres attack. + +Hill 60.--Four more attacks occurred in May, notably in the region of +Hill 60. "On May 1st another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported +by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused nearly all the men along +a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes." +"A second and more severe gas attack under much more favourable weather +conditions enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5th. +The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use +of asphyxiating gas." "It was only a few days later that the means which +have since proved so effective of counteracting these methods of making +war were put into practice." (Official despatches, 1915.) The despatch +further described how violent bombardments, the confusion and demoralisation +from the first great gas surprise, and subsequent almost daily gas attacks, +prevented the proper reorganisation of the line in question. + +Origin of German Gas Shell.--After May a long period elapsed +during which the Germans confined their war chemical activities +on the front to the use of gas shell. Schwarte's book describes +their origin as follows:--"The main idea which influenced +the FIRST construction of a German projectile containing chemicals +(October, 1914) was that of adding to the charge an irritant substance, +which would be pulverised by the explosion of the projectile, +and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud of dust. +This cloud would hover in the air and have such an effect +upon the mucous membranes that, for the time being, +the enemy would be unable to fight in such an atmosphere. +By altering the construction of the 10.5 c.m. universal +shell for light field howitzers, the `N.i' projectile +was created in the form of 10.5 c.m. shrapnel, the bullets +of which were embedded in a sternutatory powder (double salts +of dianisidine) well stamped down, instead of an explosive. +By means of the propelling charge and the grinding effect +of the bullets, this powder was pulverised on explosion. +The irritation caused was not very intense, lasted only a short, +time and affected only a limited area and therefore it was of no +importance in the field, but the initial step had been taken. +Liquid irritants soon came to the front--xylyl bromide +and xylylene dibromide--a mixture used later under the name +of T. stuff, bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone, +later introduced under the name of B. stuff and Bn. stuff." + +During experiments they gave such improved results in intensity, +in power of lasting and of affecting an increased area, +that practical results in the field were ensured. +The use of these liquids in projectiles, however, was contrary +to the accepted idea with regard to artillery, according to which +liquid materials should not be used for ballistic reasons. +Specially arranged shoots were required to prove that the projectiles +in use in the German Army could also be used from the ballistic +point of view when filled with liquids. + +In this way the first effective German gas projectile, the T. shell +for heavy field howitzers, was evolved (January, 1915). + +Early German Gas Shell.--The first important use of German gas +in shell was that of brominated and chlorinated organic compounds, +T. and K. stuffs. Schwarte's book tells us "the use of these +projectiles was continually hampered by lack of understanding +on the part of the troops which it was difficult to overcome. +In the summer of 1915 it was practically in the Argonne alone that +any considerable results were attained by the new projectiles." +And he describes how the first elements of the new gas tactics +were developed there. + +A Successful Experiment.--The development of the gas shell, +the use of which, generally speaking, is independent of, +but co-ordinated with, wind direction, may have received stimulus +from the fact that the prevailing wind, so important for cloud gas, +favoured the Allies. It is clear that this period was an experimental one, +but we know that by August, 1915, German military opinion had +crystallised out to the extent of formulating certain rules, issued as +Falkenhayn's orders for the employment of gas shell. These early orders +defined two types of shell, one persistent, for harassing purposes, +and the other non-persistent, to be used immediately before an attack. +They specified the number of shell to be used for a given task. +But in this they were unsound and it is clear that the Germans had +an exaggerated opinion of what could be achieved with a small number +of shell. They adhered too closely to high explosive practice. +Various documents reveal the fact that the Germans were much more +satisfied with their gas tactics than they would have been had they +possessed information with regard to our losses from their shell. +They attached insufficient importance to the value of surprise +and highly concentrated shoots, and had a mistaken idea of the actual +specific aggressive value of their early types. + +Lachrymators at Loos, 1915.--Germany commenced the manufacture +of lachrymators, crude brominated xylene or brominated ketones, early in, +or perhaps before 1915. These substances caused great inconvenience +through temporary blindness by lachrymation, but were not highly toxic. +In June, 1915, however, they began to produce lethal gas for shell. +Falkenhayn's orders for the use of gas shell, mentioned above, +although they represent by no means the best final practice, +were definite evidence that gas had come to stay with the Germans. +The writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachrymators +in the Loos Battle. Batteries in the open, under the crest near +the Lens road, were in position so that the wind direction practically +enfiladed them, sweeping along from the direction of Le Rutoire farm. +Gas from German shell, borne on the wind, was continually +enveloping the line of batteries, but they remained in action. +It was on this occasion while watching the bursting gas shells +from the outskirts of the mining village of Philosophe that +Major-General Wing was killed outright by a high explosive shell. +These gas shells certainly did not achieve the results which +the Germans expected, although they were not without effect. +Demolished villages, the only shelter for troops in a desolate area, +have been rendered uninhabitable for days by a concentrated +lachrymator enemy shoot of less than one hour. Again, walking into +gas "pockets" up a trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow +across the eyes, the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and sudden. +The great inconvenience which was occasioned to parties engaged +in the routine of trench warfare, on ration or engineering duties, +and the effect on movement in the rear after an assault, +taken cumulatively, represented a big military factor. + +The Flammenwerfer.--There can be no doubt that this period marks increasing +German willingness to live up to their "blood and iron" theories of war, +and, in July, 1915, another device with a considerable surprise value +was used against us: the flame projector, or the German flammenwerfer. +Field-Marshal Sir John French signalled the entry of this new weapon +as follows: "Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by +the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet. +Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army +at Hooge, on the Menin Road, early on 30th July. Most of the infantry +occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due +far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning +liquid than to the actual damage inflicted. Gallant endeavours were made +by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches. +These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches +was consolidated a short distance farther back." + +Although this weapon continued to be used right through the campaign, +it did not exert that influence which first acquaintance with it +might have led one to conclude. At the same time, there exists +a mistaken notion that the flame projector was a negligible quantity. +This may be fairly true of the huge non-portable types, +but it is certainly not true of the very efficient portable flame +projector which was the form officially adopted by the German, +and later by the French, armies. On a number of occasions Germany +gained local successes purely owing to the momentary surprise +effect of the flame projector, and the French made some use of it +for clearing out captured trench systems over which successful +waves of assault had passed. Further, the idea of flame projection +is not without certain possibilities for war. + +German Phosgene Clouds.--Germany had by no means abandoned +cloud gas, however. She had merely been planning to regain what +the Ypres attacks had lost for her, the cloud gas initiative. +We have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention of the +German research organisation in the first months of the war. +Once alive to its great importance, they must have strained all +efforts to obtain an efficient method of using it at the front. +Phosgene was remarkable for its peculiar "delayed" effect. +Relatively small quantities, inhaled and followed by vigorous +or even normal exercise, led to sudden collapse and fatal +effects sometimes more than twenty-four hours after the attack. +The case of a German prisoner in a First Army raid after +a British gas attack was often quoted on the front. +He passed through the various Intelligence headquarters as far +as the Army, explaining the feeble effect of the British gas +and his own complete recovery. But he died from delayed +action within twenty-four hours of his last interrogation. +This effect imposed strict conditions of discipline, and men +merely suspected of exposure to phosgene were compelled +to report as serious casualties and carried as such even from +the front line. + +The successful development of the phosgene cloud probably +arrived too late for the Ypres attacks, and a variety of reasons +must have led to the postponement of its use until such time +as it might once again give Germany the real initiative. +Accordingly, on December 19, 1915, a formidable cloud gas attack +was made on the north-east of the Ypres salient, using a mixture +of phosgene and chlorine in a very high concentration. +Fortunately, by this time we had established an anti-gas +organisation, which had forestalled the production of cloud +phosgene by special modifications in the British respirator. +The conditions were similar to those of April 22nd, 1915. +Instead of the first use of cloud gas, we had the first +use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud. +In both cases the Germans reckoned on our lack of protection, +correctly in the first case, but incorrectly in the second. +In both cases they were sure that great difficulties +in production would meet our attempts at retaliation. +In general this proved true, but in this case and increasingly +throughout the war, they reckoned without Allied adaptability. +The French development of phosgene manufacture was indeed remarkable. + +Very interesting light is thrown on this attack by Major Barley, +D.S.O., Chemical Adviser to the British Second Army. It appears that +in November, 1915, the French captured a prisoner who had attended a gas +school in one of the factories of the I.G. Here lecturers explained +that a new gas was to be used against the British forces, many thousands +of casualties were expected, and an attack would follow, which, +correcting the errors of the effort at Ypres, would lead to the capture +of the Channel ports. Efforts were at once made to obtain information +on gas preparation by the Germans in front of the British sectors. +In this way a sergeant-major was captured on the morning of December 16th, +and he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders were installed. +About 35,000 British troops were found to be in the direct line of the gas, +but owing to the timely warning and to the protection which had recently +been adopted, we experienced very few casualties. The Germans had prepared +a huge infantry attack, and used a new type of gas shell on this occasion. +German troops massing must have received huge casualties owing to our +preparation and the failure of their gas attack. + +The last German cloud attack on the British front occurred on August 8, 1916. +There were later attacks against the French, but the Germans were replacing +the cloud method by other methods which they considered more suitable. +These will be discussed later on, when considering our own reaction against +the chemical offensive. + +Gas and the Eastern Theatre.--The German surprise was not +limited to activities on the Western front. In fact, apart from +the first Ypres attack, cloud gas probably reaped more casualties +in the East against Russia. We learn from Schwarte's book: +"From reliable descriptions we know that our gas troops caused +an unusual amount of damage to the enemy--especially in the East-- +with very little expenditure of effort. The special battalion +formed by Austria-Hungary was, unfortunately, of no special +importance for various reasons." + +Had the nature of the Russian campaign been different, with a +smaller front, and nearer critical objectives to the front of attack, +we have no doubt that gas would have assumed enormous importance +in the East. Russia, even more feebly organised for production +than ourselves, would have been at a tremendous disadvantage, +both from the point of view of protection and of the retention +of satisfactory morale by retaliation. + +Conclusion.--This, then, was the period of the German surprise, +during which the first big shock occurred, and which promised most +success for further attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive +protection by the Allies. Looking at the matter in a very broad way, +ignoring the moral and legal aspects of the case, we can describe +this period as an example of brilliant chemical opportunism. +According to plan or otherwise, conditions for this experiment +were ripe in Germany as in no other country. Overcoming whatever +prejudices may have existed, the German authorities realised this, +seized the opportunity, and very nearly succeeded. + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE ALLIED REACTION + +Loos, September, 1915, to Ypres, July, 1917. + + +The Need of Retaliation.--The conclusive sign of the Allied +reaction to the German poison gas attack appeared at the battle +of Loos. "Owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating +gas in their attacks on our positions," says Field-Marshal French +in his despatch of October 15, 1915, "I have been compelled to resort +to similar methods, and a detachment was organised for this purpose, +which took part in the operations commencing on the 25th September +for the first time." Five months thus elapsed before retaliation. +From a military point of view their can be no doubt as to +the wisdom, in fact the absolute necessity, of using gas +in order to reply to the many German attacks of this nature. +The question of morale was bound up in this retaliation. +Had the Germans continued their chemical attacks in variety +and extent as they did, and had it been realised that for some +reason or other we were not able to retaliate in kind, none but +the gravest consequences could have resulted with regard to morale. +It must be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and shell gas +by the Germans was of local incidence, when compared with its +tremendous use along the whole of the front in the later stages +of the war. + +First Signs.--Our preparatory period was one of feverish, if somewhat +unco-ordinated, activity. The production of a protective appliance, +the gas mask, was vital. This development will be considered later. +Allied chemical warfare organisations arose, to become an important +factor in the later stages of the war. The history of Allied gas +organisation is one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare +represented a new weapon with new possibilities, new specific uses, +and new requirements from the rear. Its beginnings are seen +in the English and French Scientific Advisory Committees +appointed to examine the new German method. One could always +trace an element of reluctance, however, in Allied development, +signs that each move was forced upon us by some new German surprise. +We find the other extreme, the logical outcome of war experience, +in the completely independent Chemical Warfare Service now actually +adopted in the United States of America. This is dealt with in +a separate chapter. + +The decision to retaliate once made, our difficulties commenced. +We required gas, weapons, and methods for its use, trained personnel, +and the association of certain scientific with military standards +without losing the field efficiency of the latter. The German +staff found this in their co-operation with eminent scientists, +notably Professor Haber. Without drawing invidious distinctions +between pre-war military and public appreciation of chemical science +in England and Germany, it would be merely untrue to state that +the Germans were not in a position of advantage in this respect. +However, chemical mobilisation and co-operation proceeded sufficiently +rapidly to provide us with personnel and material for the Loos attack. + +The assembly and organisation of personnel occurred in +three directions. In the first place the Royal Society had already +begun to mobilise prominent scientists for other war purposes. +In the second place, different formations in the field, +realising the need for specialist treatment of the gas question, +after the first German attack, created staff appointments +for certain chemists chosen from infantry regiments and other +formations on the front. Thirdly, men were collected at a depot +in France to form the nucleus of the offensive gas troops. +For this purpose chemists were specially enrolled and chosen +men from infantry and other front line units were added. +Early gas attacks and gas organisation did not appear to justify +the immobilisation of so much chemical talent in the offensive +gas troops, when chemists were needed all over England for +munition production so vital to war. But later events justified +the mobilisation and military training of these specialists. +The expansion of the advisory and offensive organisations +at the front necessitated a large number of officers, +whose chemical training was of great value. It is difficult +to see where they would have been found had they not been +mobilised with the Special Companies. Moreover, their offensive +and battle experience gained with the latter was of great value. +Six or seven weeks' training witnessed the conversion of a few +hundred men of the above type into one or two so called +Special Companies. The spirit and work of these men in the Loos +attack cannot be spoken of too highly. + +The Loos Attack, September, 1915.--The Field-Marshal bears testimony +to its success as follows: "Although the enemy was known to have been +prepared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success, +and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units, +of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches. +The men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties +during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness; +and I feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own +should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare." + +There is evidence, however, that this early attack, inefficient as it +appeared to be to participants, met with considerable success. +Schwarte's book tells us: "The English succeeded in releasing gas +clouds on a large scale. Their success on this occasion was due +to the fact that they took us by surprise. Our troops refused +to believe in the danger and were not sufficiently adept in the use +of defensive measures as prescribed by G.H.Q." + +On the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks later, at the +storming of the Hohenzollern redoubt, Sergeant-Major Dawson, +in charge of a sector of gas emplacements in the front +line trench, won the Victoria Cross. The German reply +to our bombardment was very severe and under stress of it +a battery of our cylinders, either through a direct hit or +faulty connections, began to pour gas into our own trenches. +In order to prevent panic and casualties among our own troops +at this critical time, a few minutes before zero, the moment +of assault, Sergeant-Major Dawson climbed on to the parapet under +a hail of shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and, hauling up +the cylinders in question, carried them to a safe distance +into the poisoned atmosphere of No Man's Land and ensured +their complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bullet. +In addition to the Hohenzollern attack cloud gas was used +in December, 1915, in the region of Givenchy. + +The Somme Battle, 1916.--My impression as an eyewitness +and participator, however, was that the real British gas +offensive began after, and as a result of, the Loos experience. +Material, organisation, and numbers of personnel, both at +the front and at home, co-operation with staffs and tactical +conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute largely +to the efficiency of preparations for the Somme offensive +in July, 1916. During the early months of 1916, a Special Brigade +was created by expanding the four Special Companies, +and the 4-inch Stokes mortar was adopted, training being +vigorously pursued. As many as 110 cloud gas discharges, +mainly of a phosgene mixture, occurred during the Somme battle, +and evidence of their success is seen in German reports. +These successes were due not only to the magnitude of our operations, +but to the carefully developed cloud attack tactics which +aimed at obtaining maximum results from the gas employed. +The factor of surprise governed all other considerations. +Attacks occurred at night and depended for success upon +the concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the given sector +for a short, sharp discharge under the best wind conditions. +There is abundant evidence of our success in these attacks. +Probably the most marked feature of the captured documents or +of prisoners' statements during the later stages of the Somme battle +was the continual reference to the deadly effect of British cloud gas. +The captured letter of a German soldier writing home stated: +"Since the beginning of July an unparalleled slaughter has +been going on. Not a day passes but the English let off +their gas waves at one place or another. I will give you +only one instance of this gas; men 7 and 8 kilometres behind +the front line became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud, +and its effects are felt 12 kilometres behind the front. +It is deadly stuff." + +The accuracy of this reference to the long range effect of our gas +clouds is borne out in a number of other statements. For example, +we learnt from a prisoner examined by the French: "The men were thrown +into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated. +Many fell in running to the rear; a number did not become ill until +the next day. Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 8 kilometres." +Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas stated that one of the English +gas attacks was effective 10 kilometres back. + +There are also marked references to the surprise nature of our +gas attacks, which are an unconscious tribute to the successful +tactical developments which have already been referred to, and also +numerous other references to the "delayed" action of phosgene. +The prisoner mentioned above, taken at Maurepas, gave testimony +that some were only taken ill after several days, and one died +suddenly two days after, whilst writing a letter. One prisoner, +pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated that about the beginning +of September when gas came over suddenly in the late evening, +they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden. +No one was expecting gas and very few were carrying their masks. +Another one stated: "The attack was a surprise and the cloud +came over and passed fairly quickly. The whole thing did not +occupy more than ten minutes." More than thirty per cent. +of the battalion was put out of action. + +Finally, to show what a serious imposition this constant +cloud gas attack was upon the German Army, we will quote from +the Special Correspondent of the _Vossiches Zeitung_. He said: +"I devote a special chapter to this plague of our Somme warriors. +It is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they +have to struggle with this devilish and intangible foe." +He refers to the use of gas shell, and says: "This invisible +and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait +on all roads leading to the front." + +In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from Field-Marshal +Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situation is ably summarised: +"The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame +as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways +to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise +means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. +Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit +is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success +with which these new arms have been developed and perfected, +and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed +in a difficult and dangerous service. The army owes its thanks +to the chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest +rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy +in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world +by surprise. Our own experience of the numerous experiments +and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used, +of the preparations which had to be made for their manufacture, +and of the special training required for the personnel employed, +shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans +was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been +prepared for deliberately. + +"Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, +it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, +of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy +has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means +of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective." + +One of the causes which leads to a lack of understanding of the chemical +weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not, +like those of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual observer. +A period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate +effect of a gas attack was known. It was inspiring to witness +the assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on July 1st, 1916. +But few realised the part played by the preparatory gas +attacks in that and other sectors of the line, in weakening +the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves. +It is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a particular case +and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated +with some particular attack. + +The early stages of the Somme battle were characterised by a +number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose +of a feint, and reducing the strength of available reserves. +These attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north +of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far as the sea. +One of them occurred on the 30th August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras +and Bapaume. About one thousand cylinders were discharged during +the night. The usual careful organisation preceded the attack and it +is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common +to a large number of these attacks. Three German regiments were +holding the line directly in front of the British sector concerned. +Before December, 1916, the following reliable information was collected +from prisoners and confirmed by cross-examination. One Company +of the 23rd regiment, was in training and had no gas masks with it. +The gas came along quickly and about half the Company were killed. +After that there were more stringent rules about carrying masks. +They had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded. +Another man said that in his Company no special drill or training +was being done, and a large number of men were put out of action +through not being able to adjust their respirators in time. +There was no warning, although after this gas alarms were given +by ringing church bells. Other prisoners, from the 63rd, regiment, +had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said: +"The effects of the English gas are said to be appalling." +Collecting information from prisoners belonging to this or that Company, +and carefully checking by cross-examination, it is clear that this +attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties. + +Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.--The fact that the British persisted +with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the Germans, +after the first surprise, was due to a curious combination of causes, +quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind. + +Our Casualties.--In the first place, we knew from bitter experience +the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack. +We knew, for example, that in the first attack at Ypres there were +more than 5000 dead with many more times that number of casualties. +On the other hand, the Germans, left to speculate on our casualties, +retained the conviction, from apparent non-success, that cloud gas +was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop big +infantry attacks. Quoting from Schwarte: "Large gains of ground +could hardly be attained by means of an attack which followed the use +of gas clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely employed as a +means of injuring the enemy, and were not followed up by an attack." +This represented German policy, and it lacked vision. They did not +realise that their difficulty was the method of forming the cloud, +and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation +materialised, with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction, +the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again +be within their reach. + +Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.--The second reason +accounting for the relatively early cessation of German cloud +attacks is one constantly referred to in the German war memoirs. +It was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing +for such an attack. Few people realise what hours of agonised +effort were involved in preparing and executing a cloud gas attack. +The cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen emplacements +in the front line within certain time limits. The "carrying in" +could not be spread over an indefinite period and usually took +from two to six nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and +the local difficulties. Naturally, all the work occurred in the dark. +Picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install +2000 cylinders on, say, a two mile front. These cylinders would have +to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line +where the roads met the communication trenches. No horse or lorry +transport could assemble at such points before dark, nor be left +standing there after dawn. To carry this number of cylinders more than +fifty lorries would be required or, say, perhaps, go G.S. wagons. +All the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire. +These points would be normally in use for the unloading of rations +and trench engineering materials, etc., with which cylinder transport +would have to be co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points, +parties had to be provided for unloading the lorries and for +conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench. In a normally +difficult trench system, for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half +of communication trench, at least four men per cylinder are required +to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs, etc. +This implies the organisation of more than 8000 officers and men +for the installation, with a fundamental condition that only small +groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time. +The installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been +a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other +activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass the work. +But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of +the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities +was a task which tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies, +who organised, guided, and controlled these operations, but much +more so of the Infantry Brigades and Divisions whose dispositions +were interfered with, and who had to provide the men for the work. + +Add to this even more acute difficulties. The front line +trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus to avoid +the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire. +A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry hundreds of +pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as lead, round traverses +on a dark night, is a feat requiring superhuman endurance. +Therefore many "carries" finished with a hundred yards "over the top" +through the parados wire, to the near locality of the appropriate +emplacement in the front line. This last carry was critical; +a false step, the clatter of falling metal, meant drawing +the fire of some curious and alert German machine gunner. +The sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very lights +imposed instantaneous immobility. Yet all the time tired men +were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder +might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire. + +But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in all they undertook, +is to their everlasting credit. These tasks were an enemy challenge +and they accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing. +The work was indeed beyond description and the country, colonial, +and London troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically +in their own peculiar way. Think again of the need of systematic +wind observation along the whole front of attack, the disorganisation +and "gas alert" conditions imposed on the favourable night, +the possibility of postponement, and we can only draw one conclusion. +There must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas +attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance. +There is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so +exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war. +Later, however, when they realised the enemy casualties that were being +created by the gas, and what a large part it was taking in the war +of attrition, the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished. +Further, when the projector arrived to produce similar effects +with less demand upon infantry personnel, and less dependence +on the wind, the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed, +and it became almost popular. + +The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the concentration of all this +effort of preparation within a few days. In terms of military efficiency, +the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced. +We know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night +for many thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery effort +to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger. +But under normal conditions of warfare, such artillery effort would +have been expended over a much longer period of time. + +The Livens Projector.--The Somme offensive witnessed the use +of a new British gas weapon which became of the utmost importance. +This was the mortar known as the Livens Projector. Its origin +dates back many months, however, and is of considerable interest. +A British engineer, Lt. Livens (afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.) +of the Signal Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive +thought on the gas question by a double motive. He quickly +realised the tactical weakness of the German method at Ypres, +once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise. +He saw the advantage of being able to command the point or +locality of incidence of the cloud, instead of being limited +to the actual trench front. Prompted by a direct personal +interest in the huge loss sustained by the _Lusitania_ outrage, +he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by +developing his views on the future of gas clouds. In a few months +the general principles of the projector were defined and a crude +specimen resulted. Caught up, however, in the gas organisation, +preparations for the cloud attack at Loos absorbed all his +attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him +developing a flammenwerfer and training a company for its use. +It was really the Somme battle which gave him the first +opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice. +This arose in front of High Wood, which was a veritable nest of German +machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold +up our advance in that region. The huge stationary flammenwerfer +had recently been used by Major Livens and his company against +a strong point in front of Carnoy in the assault of July 1st. +Here again the effect of flame was limited even more than +that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement. +It was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found +in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil +for flame and a crude projector was devised for the emergency, +using oil cans as mortars, burying them in the earth for two-thirds +of their length and employing water cans as bombs. + +As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its +development was pressed. The usual Livens Projector consisted +of a simple tube mortar or projector closed at one end, +and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile. +By an electrical arrangement and suitable communications, +large numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors could +be discharged at a given moment. In this way quantities of gas, +comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary +cloud attack, could be used to produce a cloud which would originate, +as cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of discharge. +In other words, the advantages of cloud attack could +be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction, +and with a much greater factor of local surprise. +Thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used +in large quantities during the British Arras offensive in April, +1917, the German Army was thrown into great consternation. +But for the fact that protection had developed so strongly +on both sides, the use of the Livens Projector would have gone +far towards a decision. + +The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will +be to quote from one or two of the many Intelligence reports collected. +Thus from a captured document dated July, 1917, belonging to the 111th +German Division, signed Von Busse, we have: "The enemy has combined +in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells. +The density is equal to that of gas clouds, and the surprise effect +of shell fire is also obtained. For the bombardment the latter part +of the night is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the direction +of the latter is immaterial). The enemy aims essentially at surprise. +Our losses have been serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the majority +of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often been put on too late. . . . +As soon as a loud report like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away, +give the gas alarm. It does not matter if several false alarms are given. +Masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer. Men affected, +even if apparently only slightly, must be treated as serious cases, laid flat, +kept still, and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment. +Anti-gas officers and Company Commanders will go through a fresh course +of training on the above principles." The influence of gas discipline +is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt +to "reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline." +Again, from a prisoner we learn that "every time a battalion goes into rest, +masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer +on British gas projectors, which are stated to be the most deadly form +of warfare." So great was the impression formed by the introduction +of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on +in the Press. Thus, quoting from reference to the military discussion +before the main committee of the Reichstag. "Casualties from enemy poison +gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, as the harm involved +is only temporary, and in most cases no ill after-effects persist" +(_Tagliche Rundschau_, 24.4.18). "Cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule +accompanied by harmful consequences, even though the treatment extends +sometimes over a long period" (_Vorwarts_, 25.4.18), Based on the later +mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful. +As it was, they afforded poor consolation to the German people. + +British Gas Shell.--The British first used shell gas as lachrymators, +in trench mortar bombs, in small quantities, during the battle of the Somme, +but for the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our supplies +of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use. +Our success can be measured by the report dated April 11th, 1917, from the +General Commanding the first German Army, on "Experiences in the Battle +of Arras," in which he says: "The enemy made extensive use of gas +ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries." +"The fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing +the mask for many hours." Artillery activity seems to have been paralysed +by the effects of the gas. + +In a general comparison of British and German methods of gas warfare,[1] +General Hartley tells us "our methods improved rapidly during 1917. +At first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of rate of firing, +but we soon arrived at the method of crashes of lethal shell. +These got the surprise concentrations of gas which proved +so effective, and we realised that the number of shells required +to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally. +At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at Arras." + + +[1] Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920. + + +German Gas Shell Development, 1916.--The main evidence of Allied reaction +was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks, +but during the same period the Germans, who appeared to be abandoning +the use of cloud gas, were making steady efforts to regain their initiative +by the comprehensive development of shell gas. Thus, to quote from +General Hartley's report to the British Association, "In the Summer +of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloroformate with toxic properties similar +to those of phosgene was used against us in large quantities +during the battle of the Somme. Later this was replaced by +trichlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which was used until +the end of the war as the well-known Green Cross shell filling. +The use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in 1916." +Many of those on the front in 1916 will remember the surprise gas shell +attack of December of that year, on the Baudimont gate at Arras. We were +fortunately let off lightly with little over 100 casualties, +but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line. +The appearance of the new substances represented definite German +progress and had definite military results, but they lost decisive +value owing to the relative inefficiency of German gas shell tactics. + +Consideration of the Allied reaction must include some +reference to the appearance of the American Army in the field. +The Americans during their more or less educational period gave +serious attention to the gas question, and showed almost immediately, +by their preparations, that they attached enormous importance +to the new weapon. + +Main Features of the Period.--It is difficult to generalise. But the +following features appear to characterise the period under discussion. +In the first place we see German policy tending towards the use of gas +projectiles containing a variety of organic substances. Secondly, we have +the British exploitation of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method. +The Livens Projector provides the third important feature. Fourthly, we note +the somewhat tardy development of the British use of gas shell. +A number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility for the above. +But whether due to definitely framed policy on our part, or merely to +the hard facts of the case, one important factor seems largely responsible. +It is the relative ease of production by Germany as compared with ourselves. +When German military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell, +a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not only from German +research sources, but in quantity from the dye factories. No such quick +response could have met, or actually did meet, the demands of Allied +military policy. Whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations, +there was no quick means of converting them into German casualties. +It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote +them to the exploitation of the older gas appliances in cloud methods. +But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the absence of a strong +organic chemical industry. In other words, German flexibility of supply +meant flexibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, and, +given sound military policy, this flexibility meant surprise, the essence +of successful war. + + + +CHAPTER IV + +INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE + + +The chemical struggle became very intense in the Summer and Autumn of 1917. +Projector attacks multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased +on both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tightened up, +officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense, a peculiar alertness +towards gas. The home front was strengthened in England and France +by reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the vigorous steps taken +by America. The Germans began to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy. +At the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the production situation, +they had arrived at the so-called Hindenburg Programme. This included +a large output of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Germans +acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into 1918. +It is a very clear indication of the progress made by Germany in research, +that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the Hindenburg Programme +found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production. + +The Mustard Gas Surprise.--The next big surprise came +from Germany. Units in the line at Nieuport and Ypres +in July, 1917, were the first to experience it. Some were +sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of German shell +chemical which, in many cases, evaded the British gas discipline, +and mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious casualties. +Even those who wore the mask were attacked by the vesicant +or blistering influence of the gas. The matter is vividly +expressed in a letter, given below, which I received from +an officer wounded in the Nieuport attack: + +"I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, commonly known as mustard stuff, +on July 22nd. I was digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire +on Lambartzyde. Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. and gas +shells in Nieuport. When things quietened a little I went up with +the three G.S. wagons, all that were left, and the carrying parties. +I must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell +as horseradish. It had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat. +I suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on. + +"On arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud +of the same stuff drifting from the front line system. +As it seemed to have no effect on the eyes I gave orders for all +to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none +of the stuff, and we carried on. + +"Coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack +on Nieuport. Next morning, myself, and all the eighty men +we had up there were absolutely blind. The horrid stuff +had a delayed action on the eyes, causing temporary blindness +about seven hours afterwards. About 3000 were affected. +One or two of our party never recovered their sight and died. +The casualty clearing stations were crowded. On August 3rd, +with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses, +I came home, and went into Millbank Hospital on August 15th." + +These early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst +the troops assembling for the Northern offensives. The gas was +distinctly a new departure. Effective in low concentrations, +with very little odour, and no immediate sign of discomfort +or danger, very persistent, remaining on the ground for days, +it caused huge casualties. Fortunately, its most fatal effects +could be prevented by wearing a respirator, and only a very small +proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal. + +The insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas +discipline is shown in the following example from an official report: +"A battery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 10 p.m. to 12 +midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on the night of 23rd-24th July. +The shelling then ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had +to carry out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the air +free from gas, and Box Respirators were accordingly removed. +Shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning, +including the Battery Commander. On previous nights they +had been fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found +it safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of hours. +On the occasion in question the air was very still and damp." +In another case an officer in the Boesinghe sector, +during the gas bombardment on the night of the 22-23 July, +adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered. +His eyes were seriously affected, but he had no lung symptoms +on the morning of the 24th. + +Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called officially by the Germans) +was the war gas _par excellence_ for the purpose of causing casualties. +Indeed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied casualties than all +the various other kinds of German gas. It was used for preparation +a considerable time before the attack, or during the attack, on localities +and objects with which the attackers would have no contact. + +Blue Cross.--Another new type, the German Blue Cross, was introduced +about the same time. This represented at different times +diphenylchlorarsine, diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds. +The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive. +The enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion +of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically, +and then exercise its effects. These, violent irritation of the nose +and throat, nausea and intense pain, would cause the removal +of the respirator and allow other lethal gases to have full play. +Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were not realised, +but they were, no doubt, continuing to develop the vast possibilities +of the new method. + +German Emphasis on Gas Shell.--The Green Cross or lethal filling +was another type of German gas shell. Green Cross covered +such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate. +Although these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas, +they were relatively more fatal. Schwarte's book tells us that, +"After the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer +of 1916, at Verdun over 100,000 gas shell were used to +a single bombardment." + +From the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific +gas shell attack of March, 1918, the Germans persistently +used their new types against us with considerable effect. +Even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over, +the number of casualties caused by it was considerably +greater than during the months when the Germans were firing +only non-persistent lethal shell of the Green Cross type. +The Germans regarded these shell gas developments as largely +responsible for our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917. + +The German Projector.--During this period they also developed a projector. +Their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise. +Fortunately, protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient +state that normal "alert" conditions of the front line system were largely +able to counter the use of this new device by Germany. The first attack +was against the French at Rechicourt on the night of December 5th-6th. + +On the night of December 10th-11th, 1917, they fired several hundred +projectiles on the Cambrai and Givenchy sectors of the British line. +In both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously +into a small area including our front and support lines. +The bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line, +as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line, +followed by a loud explosion. The bombs, which emitted a trail of sparks, +were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise. +They burst with a large detonation, producing a thick, white cloud. +The discharge was followed immediately by a bombardment with H.E. shrapnel +and gas shell, and a raid was attempted south of Givenchy. We learn +that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases respirators were +adjusted before the arrival of the bombs, the resemblance to our projector +attacks having been established at once. When this was done practically +no casualties occurred. Again, to show the efficiency of British +protection against projector gas, we learn from official reports that, +"At one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants. +It should be remembered that the British box respirator protects against +very high concentrations of gas which pass at once through the German mask." +Similar discharges were made against the French on two occasions in December, +and against the Lens sector on December 30th. The compounds used +in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin. +These attacks increased in number during the ensuing months. + +German Projector Improvements.--The Germans developed a longer +range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this +weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign. +The Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy dumps. +Amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number +of a new type of projector. + +A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, captured on +August 26th, had said that they were to practise with a new +type of projector with a range of 3 kilometres, the increased +range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector. +He stated that the intention was to use the longer range +weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector, +using the new type to deal with the reserve positions. +The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth +of his statement. Two kinds of bombs were used, one containing H.E. +and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene. +This was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly +lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the highly lethal +gases had only been slightly persistent. The new projector +had a calibre of 158 mm. and was termed the "Gaswerfer, 1918." +The importance of this new projector cannot be overestimated. +Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted in +imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances +from the front line. + +Dyes in Gas Shell.--Another interesting German development of this +period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell. +After gas bombardments in the winter of 1916-17, the snow +was seen to be covered with coloured patches. These coincided +with the bursts of the shell. Analysis of the earth showed +that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff. +A number of explanations were advanced to account for the use +of the colour, of which the most probable claimed its employment +for the identification of affected localities several hours +or even days after the bombardment. This was especially the case +with persistent types. As the explosive charge of chemical shell +was feeble, some such means of identification was necessary. +It may be that the Germans expected that troops advancing after +such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour, +and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental. + +German Flame Projectors.--We have already referred to the use of flame +projectors by the enemy, and a picturesque account of their development +and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract +from the _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of the 9th of June, 1918: + +Their Origin.--"Our Flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident. +Their present commander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, received +the order, during peace manoeuvres, to hold a certain fort at all costs. +During the sham fight, having employed all means at his disposal, +he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his orders as +commander of the fort, and directed the water jets on the attacking force. +Afterwards, during the criticism of operations in the presence of the Kaiser, +he claimed that he had subjected the attackers to streams of burning oil. +The Kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible, +and he received an answer in the affirmative. + +"Long series of experiments were necessary before Engineer L. succeeded +in producing a combination of various oils, which mixture is projected +as a flame on the enemy by means of present day Flammenwerfer. + +"Major R. occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire +as commander of the Munich Fire Brigade. The `Prince of Hades,' +as he is called by his `fire spouters,' enjoys great popularity among his +men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called. +He can look back on an important development of his units. +Whereas in January, 1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group +of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with special assault +and bombing detachments, and are furnished with all requisites +for independent action. In reading Army Communiques, we often +find mention of these troops. If difficulty is experienced +in clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the `Prince +of Hades' appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out. +That conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute +a life insurance policy is obvious; nor is every man suitable. +Special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof +of keenness in assault are necessary for such work." + +Further Flame Development.--Specimens of a very neat portable +German Flammenwerfer were captured in August, 1917. It contained +three essential parts: a ring-shaped oil container surrounding +a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, which was used +to expel the oil, and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying +the jet. The whole was arranged to be carried on the back. +At about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred +to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment. + +The Germans were fond of using the Flammenwerfer during counter-attacks +and raids in which the morale factor is so important. Thus in September, +1915, in a raid against the British during our great offensive, +the German raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and +the Flammenwerfer men followed. The bombing party advanced under cover +of these men, the smoke from the flame throwers acting as a screen. +British experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put +German flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the Germans +themselves realised this weakness of isolated flame attacks for, in one +of their documents issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said: +"Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages. +They must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison +with the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns +and its grenades." + +The 1918 Offensive.--Some idea of the importance of these developments +and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns +of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the German plans +for the use of gas in their 1918 offensive, and their execution: +_Die Technik im Weltkriege_ tells us: "During the big German attacks +in 1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities +which had never been seen before, and even in open warfare the troops +were soon asking for gas." + +The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced into operation in July, +1917, were not incorporated into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918. +Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial surprise value of these +gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive. +In December, 1917, the German Army was instructed anew regarding +the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes, +laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack. +Fortunately for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were not +relatively so efficient as the German persistent types, which were devoted +to the more remote preparation for attack and to defensive purposes. +Their penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative failure. +Although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack, +facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross +shell for defensive purposes in the great German retreat. + +Ludendorffs Testimony.--Ludendorff, himself, emphasised the great +importance which was attached to gas in this offensive. +He says[1]: "And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect, +and that was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind. +I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 11 a.m, by +my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus. Up till the morning +of the 20th strength and direction were by no means very favourable; +indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack. +It would have been very hard to do. So I was very anxious to see +what sort of report I should get. It was not strikingly favourable, +but it did indicate that the attack was possible. At 12 noon +the Army Groups were told that the programme would be carried out. +Now it could no longer be stopped. Everything must run its course. +G.H.Q. higher commanders and troops had all done their duty. +The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavourable wind diminished +the effectiveness of the gas, fog retarded our movements +and prevented our superior training and leadership from reaping +its full reward." + + +[1] _My War Memories_. Hutchinson & Co., 1919. + + +Preparations for Assault;--Gas Defensive at Armentieres.--For twelve +days prior to their March assault the Germans used mustard gas over, +certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other localities. +As an example of the first method, we can state that nearly +200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross shell were used on the 9th March, +and caused us heavy casualties. The actual attack at once +confirmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on +the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas. +In the second case, of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross, +bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours +before the assault, on all defensive positions and organisations +for several miles behind the front line. Millions of rounds must +have been used. Although not without serious effect on the campaign, +this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations. +The failure of mask penetration by the Blue Cross shell prevented +the full possibilities of Green Cross coming into play. +To illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive, +and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack, +we quote from a recent statement by General Hartley.[1] Referring +to the gas shelling immediately before the extension of the attack +to the north of Lens on 9th April, he explains, "Between the 7th April +and 9th April there was no gas shelling between the La Bassee Canal +and Armentieres, while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling +immediately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such a heavy +bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas. +This indicated the probability of an attack on the front held +by the Portuguese, which occurred on 9th April, Blue and Green Cross +being used in the preliminary bombardment." The Portuguese front +lay between the two Yellow Cross regions. + + +[1] _Journal of the Royal Artillery_, February, 1920. + + +Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.--Another most interesting example +is also quoted, dealing with the shelling preceding the attack +on Kemmel on 25th April. "This is an interesting case, +as non-persistent Blue Cross shell were used within the objective +and Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th April +the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained." + +Percentage of Chemical Shell.--Some idea of the importance +which the Germans attached to their chemical ammunition, +as distinct from explosives, can be gathered from the following +extract from a captured order of the Seventh German Army, +dated May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical shell +to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on +the Aisne on 27th May, 1918. + + "(_a_) Counter-battery and long range bombardments. + For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m, + howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%, + Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15 + c/m guns fire only H.E. + (_b_) Bombardment of infantry positions. + (i) Creeping Barrage. + For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 + c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green + Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers + fire only H.E. + (ii) Box Barrage. + For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers + and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green + Cross 10%, H.E. 30%." + +What more striking demonstration is needed than these +extraordinarily high percentages? + +Gas Retreat Tactics;--General Hartley's Analysis.--No Yellow Cross +shell were to be used in the bombardment, but, as mentioned above, +there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during which they +attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas +with mustard gas. This defensive use of mustard gas was most important. +Again, quoting General Hartley, "Yellow Cross shell were used much +farther forward than previously, bombardments of the front line +system and of forward posts were frequent, and possible assembly +positions were also shelled with this gas. On more than one occasion +when an attack was expected the enemy attempted to create an impassable +zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas. +Their gas bombardments usually occurred on fronts where they had reason +to fear an attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas +where troops might be massing. It was instructive to note how supplies +of Yellow Cross shell were switched from the Third to the First Army +front late in August when they became nervous about the latter sector. +In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon, which they +did not use to the best advantage, for instance, they neglected its use +on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they +might have done. As our offensive progressed their gas shelling +became less organised, and one saw very clearly the superior value +of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones. +In the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated +ground and take up alternative positions, while in the case of a bombardment +of a large area such as the Cambrai salient, the difficulty of doing +so was greatly increased, and consequently casualties were higher. +During our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions +against gas as during stationary warfare, and the casualties were +increased on this account." + +Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps.--A test of the +importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition +which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such +types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind +the front line for some specific operation, or part of a campaign. +An examination of German production from this point of view +is very interesting, and also brings out a significant point. +The normal establishment of a German divisional ammunition dump +in July, 1918, contained about 50 per cent. of gas shell. +The dumps captured later in the year contained from 30 per cent. +to 40 per cent. These figures are significant, for they show +how much importance the German Army attached to gas shell. +When we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities +of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them, +and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres +the Germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive, +some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its +future possibilities can be obtained. Further, when we realise +that the production of explosives can be controlled and inspected +during peace, but that no such control can exist for chemical +warfare products, the significance for the future stands revealed. + +Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.--It might be thought that the lower percentages +found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing importance +of chemical shell. Examining the case less superficially, however, we soon +see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning. +In the first place, we know that the German factories were still pressing +on to their maximum output at the time of the Armistice. New units were +being brought into operation. Secondly, we have seen how huge quantities +of mustard gas were diverted to those particular German armies which were +most threatened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that certain +portions of the German front were being starved for chemical shell. +The truth of the matter is that the Germans had accumulated enormous +stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these +stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them. +We learn from Schwarte's book that, "Although the production of Yellow Cross +almost reached 1000 tons a month, yet finally the possibilities of use +and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly +output would have been sufficient." + +Yperite, French Mustard Gas.--During this period the volume +of allied gas activities also increased considerably. +But until June, 1918, our success was due to the development +of more successful tactical methods rather than to any +specific chemical surprise. + +Very great credit is due to the French for having produced large quantities +of mustard gas by the above date. + +Judging from the German Intelligence Reports the surprise effect of the French +production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier German use. +It again evaded the gas discipline of the troops, and we find the German staff +laying enormous emphasis on this question, which was already very prominent +in their general and operation orders. The occasion provided a very striking +example of German belief in their absolute predominance in production. +They were largely justified in this belief, but it carried them too far. +They explained the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the use +of German mustard gas obtained from "blind" German shell! + +Effect on German Gas Discipline.--British mustard gas was not in use +in the field until September, 1918, but the French was a great success, +and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied +success in the 1918 campaign. The French termed mustard gas +"Yperite" after Ypres, the place where it was first used. +As far as such terms can be applied to any weapon, Yperite arrived +to spread panic, and terror amongst the German formations. +A document captured by the Sixth French Army shows that Yperite used +on the 13th June against the 11th Bavarian Division was the chief cause +of the precipitate retreat of this Division. The Seventh German Army +refers to another bombardment on the 9th of June, in which the casualties +exceeded five hundred. + +It is curious to note that although the Germans had so preached +the superiority of their gases and gas methods, serious blows +by the Allies found the German gas discipline unequal to them. +It is no exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the French, +and later by the British, and the British projector, produced, +on each occasion, in the German ranks feelings allied to panic. +This is reflected in the many orders which have been captured from +army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas +discipline amongst the troops. Thus, almost immediately after +the first French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General Staff, +issued a special detailed order on the subject, and the German +document captured by the French can be taken as representative. +"Our Yellow Cross has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less +protected than now. But as a natural sequence he had developed +through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model. +On this account enemy troops have been able to cross, at once +and without loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded +with gas. We also must train our troops to an excellent +standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave +dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army." +By the time of the Armistice France had produced nearly 2000 tons +of mustard gas, British and American production was rapidly increasing, +so that the output was attaining stupendous proportions. +Some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns +of 1917-1918 can be obtained from the following figures: + +Allied Gas Statistics.--Between November, 1917, and November, 1918, +France produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator. +The British figure was probably higher. From April to November, 1918, +the French filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas. +From the 1st of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seventeen million +gas shell were completed by the French. In addition to these huge gas +shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors +and as cloud gas. During the period the British averaged fifty +large scale operations of this type per month, sometimes discharging +monthly three hundred tons of gas. The total French production of +chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached 50,000 tons, +a large proportion of which production occurred during 1917 and 1918. +The British was of the same order, but German production was at least +more than twice as high, showing what great use they made of gas shell. +The huge American programme might have reduced the margin, but no limits +can be placed on German possibilities and elasticity in production. + +Critical Importance of Rapid German Production.--These figures are +misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative +difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides. +As a general rule, where the German lag between the approval +of a substance and its use in the field covered weeks, our lag +covered months. Owing to efficient production, chemical warfare +was an infinitely more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours. +This will be readily understood when we analyse, later, +the methods of production of some of the chief German war gases. +In general, German development of these complicated substances +provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of production +of organic substances by the dye industry. On the other hand, +except in very few exceptional cases, British and French production, +although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned, +was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison. The Germans used +mustard gas in July, 1917. We identified it a few days afterwards. +But the first fruits of allied production were not in the field for +eleven months. British material was not used until a month or two before +the Armistice. Further, in this case, we were convinced of the value +of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy. +We will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production. + +The period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof +of the German experiment of 1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature, +the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part +in the campaign. They were surely destined to play a much more prominent +part had the period of stabilised warfare continued. Projector cloud +gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer. +But we will leave such considerations for a future chapter. + + + +CHAPTER V + +CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS + + +We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical +account of the above. The ramifications, of Allied organisations +were so numerous, the number of persons concerned so great, +the sacrifices made so heavy, that only an exceedingly +lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals. +In addition, such an account would not serve our purpose. +We wish to show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied +organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign, +how they compared with those of the enemy, and what lesson +the comparison may contain for the future. + +Two facts stand out in such a comparison. We are struck with +the extreme simplicity of the German organisations, as we know them, +and the great complexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments +as we saw them. We must admit from the beginning that we know +least of the German home organisations for research and production, +but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity. +The Inter-Allied Commission of Control may, and certainly should, +obtain full information, but at present the matter stands as follows. + +German Research.--The Germans relied upon two main and very strong +centres for research. They have already been indicated as the +Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber, +and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. There are various +references to internal gas organisation in captured documents. +It appears that they received their final form late in 1917. +A great gas school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin where +there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material. +Rather earlier than this the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely +appointed as the official research centre. The War Ministry had +a chemical section named A.10, which dealt with gas questions. +It is rumoured, and there is strong reason to believe, that the I.G. +was largely staffed by officers of the Reserve before the war. +Whatever their pre-war associations, if any, with the War Ministry, +hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities +of their unique research and organic chemical producing facilities. +It is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have +greatly assisted the I.G. in its operations, inventions and general +assistance for the army. + +It appears that the subdivision of work left the, direction of +chemical research in Berlin, possibly at the above Institute, +while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds, +and developing manufacturing processes for approved substances, +occurred in the laboratories of the I.G. + +Leverkusen.--We know, for example, that a very large number +of substances was produced at Leverkusen and samples forwarded +to Berlin, of which only a few were finally approved for production. +The physiological work and field tests were certainly associated +with the Berlin organisation, but it is not clear how much +of this work occurred within the I.G. An Allied mission +to Leverkusen reported as follows:--"It was emphatically +stated that no means of testing the products were resorted +to beyond inhala-tion and testing the effect of the substances +on the staff, but this statement must be accepted with reserve." +This is particularly so as we know that large numbers of +respirator-drums had been made in this factory, and that a gas +school existed at Leverkusen in 1915. + +A member of another Allied mission was informed by one of the staff +at Leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware +of the difficulties in chemical warfare, apart from production, +for they had some experience in the designing and testing of +chemical shell. It maybe that the German Government relied upon +the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the chemical war, +pending the development of official organisation. +When we remember, however, that at Leverkusen alone there +was a staff of 1500 technical and commercial specialists, +apart from thousands of workpeople, before the war, +and that the latter were increased by 1500 during the war, +we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which +might have been rendered by this research centre alone. +The opinion of the members of the Hartley Commission[1] was, +that much thought and attention had been given to chemical +warfare by the chemists of the Company. + + +[1] A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine +chemical factories, March, 1919. + + +Hochst.--A great volume of chemical warfare research occurred +also at Hochst. "The admission was made that the research +department of the factory was continuously employed during the war +on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical warfare, +many hundreds being prepared and sent to Berlin for examination. +The firm employed 300 academically trained chemists in peace time, +but during the war many more were engaged, partly for research +and partly because all shell filling was carried out under +the supervision of trained chemists." + +Ludwigshafen.--The most influential branch of the I.G. was, +undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik. It might +have been expected, as they shared largely in production, +that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur +at these works, but this was emphatically denied to Allied missions. +It may be, however, that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise +was developed there, requiring a large amount of technical +development and control, this was considered a sufficient +contribution to the general cause. + +Early Formulation of Policy.--In examining what signs we have +of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare +research and production in Germany, we are struck by the fact +that all the substances used with such dire effect against us +during the war must have been approved for production by the +Government at a relatively early date. The following table, +assembled from information supplied by the German factories, +brings this point out very clearly. + + First Use + War Chemical. Factory. Production Began. in the Field, + Diphosgene Hochst Sept., 1916 Summer, 1915 + (Green Cross) Leverkusen June, 1915 + Mustard Gas Leverkusen Spring, 1917 July, 1917 + (Yellow Cross) + Diphenyl- Hochst May, 1917 July, 1917 + chlorarsine + (Blue Cross) + Diphenyl- A.G.F.A. ? Feb., 1918 June, 1911 + cyanarsine + (Blue Cross) + Ethyl-dichlor- Hochst Aug., 1917 March, 1918 + arsine + (Blue Cross) + +We have chosen the later products to establish the point, for it +is self-evident for the earlier products, some of which were made +before the war. + +Movements of Personnel.--The movements of German chemical personnel give +us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy. +The factories were called upon to produce, as we have already shown, +towards the end of 1914, but this production largely involved +the use of substances already manufactured on a certain scale. +Large scale production of the more advanced types of war chemical +seems to have been directly stimulated by the Hindenburg programme, +in connection with which the Companies withdrew large numbers of their +skilled workers from the front. + +German Simplicity of Organisation.--We can safely conclude +from the above that Germany required no cumbersome government +mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals, +for the semi-industrial work in developing processes for +approved substances, nor for their production. By relying on +the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably some other +organisation for field and physiological tests, Germany escaped +the necessity for comprehensive government organisation, +the development of which was such a handicap to Allied countries. +It is certainly very suggestive that we only met, +in the field, substances approved before the summer of 1917. +It is with great interest and a certain amount of apprehension +that we speculate upon the research developments after that period +with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted. +If this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas, +Blue Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances, +what hidden surprises were matured in the later period? +This feature of simplicity, of linking up a new war with an old peace, +activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation. +We have seen how Germany created special formations for +cloud attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them, +throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell. +In other words, she substituted a normal weapon, the artillery. +We, on the other hand, largely impelled by the enforced +simplicity of our production, tended more towards the development +of special formations and special weapons for cloud production, +but with such success that the German Pioneer formations, +after being practically dropped, found a use in developing +and using our new weapon, the Livens Projector. + +German Organisation at the Front;--The Gas Regiment.--It is probable +that the earliest form of German organisation at the front consisted +in the liaison between Professor Haber and the German G.H.Q. It +will be remembered that Ludendorff, discussing cloud and shell gas, +refers to this co-operation, stating:[1] "Geheimrat Haber proved +of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas." +It was also rumoured soon after the first German attack that the +organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific +guidance of this renowned Professor. The attack was carried out by +the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with chemically +trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare. + +The importance of protection was realised very early, and a gas +school for officers of all armies was organised at Leverkusen +for training in protection. We cannot but regard it as significant +that Leverkusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer[2] organic +chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production. +The school dealt mainly with protection. + + +[1] _My War Memories_, page 338. + +[2] A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen Gemeinschaft, +known as the I.G. + + +Early German Gas School.--Apparently, at the end of November, 1916, +special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the +headquarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations. +In addition, these staffs had the normal routine function of +supervising inspection and instruction in gas warfare at the front. +At about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer +(gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those outlined above. +In other words, the arrangement was generalised throughout the army. +This officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men +specially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units. The great need +for these staffs is brought out in German official documents. + +New Gas Regiments;--Gas Shell Experts.--In 1917 two new +Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th respectively, were created +for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks. +These developments in organisation, both advisory and combatant, +led, at about this time, to the centralisation of the gas services +at the front under a Kommandeur der Gastruppen at G.H.Q. It +would thus appear that the Germans achieved the centralisation +of their gas services some months later than ourselves. +Further developments in organisation, of which we are aware, +were connected with two main tendencies in German gas warfare. +In the first place, the vast employment of gas shell led the Germans +to create special gas experts on the Divisional artillery staffs. +We have this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated +June 16th, 1918. This gas shell expert was not necessarily an +imported specialist, but was usually a specially trained officer +chosen from the staff in question. This was a very important move, +for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell. +This artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison +with the Divisional Gas Officer. + +Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.--The second tendency +was towards stricter protective standards and inspection. +The gas inspection centre at Berlin was given more responsibilities +in the field and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier +pigeons received great emphasis. + +British Field Organisation;--"Breach" Organisations.--Our own +field development followed very similar lines. The immediate +need in April, 1915, was for organisations on the front +to advise formations on temporary methods of protection, +to ascertain quickly the nature of any new German chemical attack, +and to provide special means of examining the treatment of +the new kind of casualty. These were "breach organisations," +so to speak, countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks +while more comprehensive and permanent cadres were created +to absorb them. The personnel of these breach organisations +was largely composed of chemists already at the front who +had in some cases taken part in the first German attacks. +Efforts were soon on foot to mobilise British chemists for +offensive purposes. So remote from the old army standards +and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare, +that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scientific +soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these +matters at the front or at home. Accordingly, in June, +1915, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O. +(then Major, R.E.) was given the difficult task of assembling +and training an offensive gas formation, and acting as +Gas Adviser to G.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created +have already been referred to in quotations from despatches. +In addition to this combatant personnel a number of +specialists and advisory organisations came into being. +Additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions, +and chemical advisers by higher formations. + +Central Laboratory.--A central laboratory was instituted at G.H.Q. under +the late Colonel W. Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly valuable +work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals. +With the development of gas shell, the chemical advisers included this +subject in their province. Reference must also be made to the medical +and physiological side. + +New Type of Casualty.--After the introduction of gas warfare +the army was always faced with the possibility that some +entirely new chemical would produce a new type of casualty +which would require special and sometimes unusual treatment. +A new element was thus introduced into army medical work. +The effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front +was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden +development of a strange epidemic. Reaction to meet these new +conditions took the form of the development of medical research +organisations at home, and of the appointment of a special medical +and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the Directorate +of Gas Services. It was thus possible, after any enemy gas attack, +and with little delay, to institute inquiries with regard +to treatment of casualties, stimulate special investigations, +and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and, +in general, introduce satisfactory alert conditions throughout +the medical organisation along the whole of the Allied front. +In this connection the effective liaison between the medical +specialists of the British and French armies must be mentioned. + +Directorate of Gas Services.--These various services were centralised +in the Directorate of Gas Services, in the Spring of 1916, +under Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is +interesting to note that although in their rear organisations +for research and supply the French preceded us in the adoption +of a logical symmetrical arrangement, yet in the field we were +the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service +which was so essential. + +British Home Organisations;--The Royal Society.--After the battle +of the Marne, Germany rapidly realised the need for scientific +and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war +had passed. Many signs and definite statements by Falkenhayn +and others in authority have shown us how this realisation +found outlet in various schemes for research and production. +The need for scientific attention to various war problems +was also realised in England, and found expression in the +mobilisation of prominent scientists by the Royal Society, +which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific +activities and to assist various Ministries or administrative +government departments in connection with scientific matters. + +Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.--The Chemical Sub-Committee +included such prominent names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and +Sir Oliver Lodge. Retaliation, decided on early in May, 1915, was reflected +in organisation. Lord Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E. +(later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., R.E.), +then in charge of a fortification section of the War Office, +with the task of examining and taking action on the possibilities +of retaliation, and a liaison with the above chemical committee +of the Royal Society was soon established. Protection became a part +of the duties of the Medical Services and was placed under the direct +control of Colonel, afterwards Sir William Horrocks, who became chairman +of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee. Further, a little later, +the Chemical Sub-Committee above referred to became an advisory body to +Colonel Jackson. This was the origin of the Chemical Warfare Department, +but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering +transformations before reaching its final, more or less efficient +and symmetrical form. + +The Trench Warfare Department.--With the formation of the Ministry of +Munitions late in May, 1915, Colonel Jackson's section was transferred to it. +At this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping +chemical warfare research, design, and supply under one head. Probably this +was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State +for War, to agree to the transference of this section to another Ministry, +and consent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department. + +Scientific Advisory Committee;--Commercial Advisory Committee.--Even at +this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found +necessary to cover such functions as in Germany were rendered unnecessary +by the existence of the I.G. It became clear that the new department +would require strong permanent scientific advice, and this was found +in the formation of the Scientific Advisory Committee. This included +the most active members of the former relevant Royal Society Committee, +amongst whom were Professor A. W. Crossley, the Secretary, +and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby, +all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this +new branch of warfare. A parallel Commercial Advisory Committee +was appointed, composed of representatives of some of the leading +manufacturers of the country. + +Split Between Research and Supply.--We cannot follow in detail the many +fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department. +They represent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed +policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research, +and circumstances imposed upon the department by the reorganisation +and fusion of Ministries and departments. There were brief periods, +notably at the commencement and in the final stages, when the desired +centralised organisation was approached, but there were also periods +when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble +and unsatisfactory liaison between the two. Speaking generally, +the break between research and supply occurred in December, 1915, +when the Trench Warfare Department was split up into two parts. +These were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in which was +included the Scientific Advisory Committee, and, shortly afterwards, +changed its name to that of the Chemical Advisory Committee, +and the Trench Warfare Supply Department. The relationships +between those two departments remained practically unchanged until +the formation of the Chemical Warfare Department in October, 1917. +This statement must be qualified, however, by a reference to the +services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., in +bringing about this liaison, not only with supply in England, +but also with that in France. + +During the early period the Royal Society Committee of Physiology +became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the +Chemical Warfare Department, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Committee. + +Munitions Inventions Department.--Another feature which is worthy of notice +because it was common to Allied organisations other than the British, +and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential +unity of chemical warfare activities, was the duplication of effort +by the Munitions Inventions Department. Suggestions which could only +have value when considered as part of the definitely directed chemical +warfare policy were constantly raised with the Inventions Department, +but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance +of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison between the two +departments by Colonel Crossley. + +Imperial College of Science.--During the early period the Imperial College +of Science rendered great services by assisting in research. +It continued to do so during the rest of the war, but was later +associated with a large number of British university chemical +and scientific departments in pursuing a huge programme of chemical +warfare research. We can only make passing reference to the development +of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an +important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy. +The Porton ground, however, was a model of its kind, a pioneer +amongst Allied experimental grounds, and a tribute to the creative +and administrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., C.B.E., +who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war. + +The Chemical Warfare Department.--The growing importance of +chemical warfare, the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by Germany +in the summer of 1917, and various other reasons led to reorganisation +of the Chemical Warfare services in this country in October, 1917, +and the Chemical Warfare Department, under Major-General Thullier, +formerly Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was constituted. +This reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research +and other activities of the department and a still greater +mobilisation of the chemists of the country. Although this +change witnessed further centralisation by the incorporation +of the Anti-Gas Department, thereby settling once and for all +the inherent association between offensive and defensive research, +a fact which had been apparent to many long before, yet it still ignored +the fundamental connection between offensive research and supply. +This had been recognised in French organisation as early as 1915, +yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war. + +The Anti-Gas Department.--We have mentioned the origin of the +Anti-Gas Department. Although separate in organisation from chemical +warfare research, yet the remarkable work and personality of the late +Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by +energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organisation. +General Hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating: +"Colonel Harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war. +It is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator, +but this he would have been the first to deny. His great merit +was as an organiser. He gathered round him an enthusiastic group +of young chemists and physicists, and the box respirator represents +the joint result of their researches, carried out under his +inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment. +He organised the manufacture of the respirator on a large scale, +and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite +of all the difficulties of production, the supplies promised to France +never failed. Fifty million respirators were produced by the department, +and of these nineteen million were box respirators." + +Anti-gas research was at first centred in the R.A.M. College, Millbank, +and from the beginning of 1917 in the Physiological Institute, +University College, London. The work done in research and production +not only protected the whole of the British Army, but formed the backbone +of American and a large part of Italian protection. Further, the sacrifices +made in connection with this work are not sufficiently known. +Numbers of young scientists sacrificed their health and sometimes life, +in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions +of Englishmen and Allies depended. + +Designs Committee.--We cannot leave this branch of the subject without +referring to the Chemical Warfare Designs Committee. An important trend +in chemical warfare was its growing independence of the normal weapons of war, +and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal +and newer types. This tendency found expression in the above Committee +under the direction of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe. The development +of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem, and the importance +of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing +with the limitation of armaments. + +French Organisation.--French development followed very similar lines. + +From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military representatives and +scientists was organised under General Curmer. This gave place in June +to a Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. Weiss, Directeur des +Mines au Ministere des Traveaux Publics. In August, 1915, three special +Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for problems from the front, +whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable +identifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the Allies; +another under M. Moureu for offensive research, whose brilliant organic +investigation characterised later French developments, and the other +under M. Vincent, for research on protection. But, in the meantime, +the importance of gas shell was impressed upon the French and, +on the 1st July, 1915, this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas's +new Ministere de L'Artillerie et des Munitions. Manufacture passed into +the hands of the Directeur du Materiel Chimique de Guerre. In September, +1915, these sections were centralised under General Ozil, attached to +the same Ministry. General Ozil's service was strongly supported +by a number of eminent French scientists, and achieved unusual success +in the face of great practical difficulties. + +A very close liaison was maintained with the army, and the initiative, +energy, and devotion of all concerned cannot be too highly praised. +In production alone the difficulties were enormous. There was no +highly organised dye industry available. The prewar German monopoly +had seen to that. Elaborate organisations and continuous research +work under difficult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth, +running normal activities of the great German dye combine. +The salient points in French production are dealt with more fully +in another chapter. + +In research and protection French activities were no less handicapped +and just as creditable. The protection of the French armies was largely +achieved through the genius and tireless industry of Professor Paul Lebeau. + +Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new German weapon, +the French developed their chemical offensive and defensive +with characteristic elan and intuition. Contributing largely +to Allied research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-operation +and liaison, and their activities in this field were due to much +worthier causes than mere geographical position. + +Italian Development.--The Italians were alive to the importance of +chemical warfare. World famous names such as those of Senator Paterno +and Professor Villavecchia were associated with their organisation. +Once again, however, although not lacking in invention and initiative, +they were continually hampered by production, which imposed such +grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seriously the success +of their campaign. The success of the great German offensive against +Italy in the autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German use +of gas of such types and in such amounts that the Italian protective +appliances were outmanoeuvred. Further, in spite of the offensive +qualities of the Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna, +lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so essential +in maintaining gas morale. + +Towards the end of the war, when the French and British production improved, +and with the entry of America and the promise of supplies therefrom, +it was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources, +and arrangements were made to supply them with the British Respirator, +to assist them in the development of the Livens Projector, to supply large +quantities of mustard and other gases, and to assist them in production. +The use of the British box respirator was undoubtedly a great factor +in repelling the Austrian offensive of June, 1918. Their experimental +fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed, and, +backed by production, Italian chemical genius would have been capable +of producing very serious results. + +Supply Organisations.--What a marked contrast between the organisation +required for German and Allied chemical warfare production! +Such organisation implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation +with research organisations, for semi-scale work, commercial functions, +priority, raw material supply, transport, and all their concomitants. +In Germany, the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions. +The Government addressed itself to one producing organisation which +was responsible for most of the relevant research. Whole Government +departments were rendered unnecessary by this centralised production. + +British Supply Organisation.--In England the situation was +entirely different. Even before the advent of mustard gas the Government +was compelled to apply to at least twenty contractors. The products +required were foreign to the normal activities of many of these. +They required assistance in raw materials, transport, technical methods, +either the result of the work of other factories or of research. +The latter again involved complex official organisation, cumbrous even +if efficiently carried out. This at once introduced difficulties. +The centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead +of in the centres of production. Much depended upon the co-ordination +of the official departments. Quite apart from the Government plants +finally engaged in chemical warfare production, more than fifty plants +were used in private organisations, of which a very high percentage +were entirely new. + +Allied Handicaps.--The functions of the allied Government supply +departments were or should have been much more than those of an +individual negotiating a contract. Owing to the fact that these were +new plants, and that the products were foreign to the production +of many of the firms concerned, two alternatives had to be faced. +Either the technical and service departments of each firm had +to be considerably strengthened, or else a special organisation +had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government +technical and liaison personnel. For reasons of secrecy and general +efficiency the latter procedure evolved, but neither represented +the ideal solution. + +The German Solution.--This was the German arrangement in which these +functions were all embodied in the centralised producing organisation, +the I.G. The German Government took the role of a pure contractor, +the only additional function being the choice of product and method, +a question of policy. This implied the existence of a Government +experimental organisation, but purely for this purpose. + +Departmental Difficulties.--The Allied task would have been +much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one, +in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided +upon at first, and need have suffered no very radical changes. +As it was, however, the British supply organisation had to +administer some seventy plants, which were really in private hands, +and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external +perplexities of the problem. They arose in its relationships +with other Government departments. + +Allied Success Against Odds.--Taking a broad view of the case, +although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas +production with anything but dismay, except in a few cases, +yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded +as well as we did with these entirely new substances. +The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the Allies is +one of devoted effort by all concerned, against overwhelming odds, +and although the level of results was poor compared with Germany, +yet we find here and there brilliant examples of Allied +adaptability and tenacity amongst which the French development +of mustard gas stands pre-eminent. + +What we have already said about supply organisation may be summed up +in one sentence. The Germans were already organised to produce. +We had to create Government departments to administer a large +number of plants in private hands, and they had to cope not only +with the external difficulties of the situation but with the almost +overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation. The checquered +career of the British supply department provides a good example. +The French and Americans suffered less than ourselves from +these troubles, the latter having the benefit of the combined +experience of the other Allies. + +Allied Lack of Vision in Production.--A survey of the earliest supply +organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events +have obscured. Few people realised the developments which chemical warfare +would produce. The early production of chemicals for gas warfare was +grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores, and graded +in order of importance, from the point of view of supply organisation +with catapults and spring guns, flame projectors and body shields! +It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather than vision forced +the importance of chemical warfare upon those responsible for munition +production in the early stages of the war. Chemical warfare production +remained under the Trench Warfare Supply Department for many months, +where it was one of ten Trench Warfare sections. The vicissitudes of trench +warfare supply are too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here, +but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly. + +British Lag in Organisation.--Examining Allied organisations, +we find that the French and Americans approached this ideal +solution more rapidly than ourselves, and we can trace in our +own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this +centralised control, although the last configuration, under the direction +of Major-General H. F. Thuillier, was the nearest approach. +French organisation for supply provides another example of their +national characteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry. +As early as September, 1915, the French centralised their research +organisation, the Inspection des Etudes et Experience Chimiques, +and their supply organisation, the Direction du Materiel Chimique +de Guerre, in their Service Chimique de Guerre under General Ozil. + +French and American Characteristics.--Their early concentration on +gas shell shows that this symmetrical organisation was due not only +to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development. +American supply organisation again provides evidence of the +national characteristic. They had no I.G. but they had plenty of money +and material, and the total of Allied experience in production. +They therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing +centre known as Edgewood Arsenal. We refer to this later. +The tremendous potentialities of this Arsenal will readily he seen, +although they did not become effective during the war. + +It would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices +made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical +warfare to leave the matter at this stage, or to make a minute +analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success. +We may say that although the efforts of all concerned were +beyond praise, yet they were so initially handicapped that it was +practically impossible even to approach the German efficiency. +In France and England we were suffering from the faults of past years, +our lack of attention to the application of science to industry. +The Americans would also have suffered, for they were in the same plight, +but they adopted the drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal. As we +show later, however, this solution was really only a very necessary +and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease. +We cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries. +If it is, then the outlook is very poor. + +Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.--Chemical warfare offered, +in theory, a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst +the Allies, The new methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed, +at first sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy +by an allied Generalissimo and staff. Co-ordination never reached +this stage, although strong liaison organisations were developed. +Inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in Paris, +where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion +of allied work. The continuity of these relationships was maintained +by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented. +The contact, so close between actual allied scientific workers +in this field, became less evident in the application of their +results to field warfare, for several reasons. In the first place, +close scientific contact in research was replaced by the actual field +relationships of the armies, and, as is well known, the central +inter-allied command did not materialise until the spring of 1918, +and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle +to the actual battlefield. The traditional differences between. +the methods of the different services of each ally still existed +to a large extent, and they found expression in type of armament, +equipment, and military standards, such as, for example, gun calibres +and shell design, to which chemical warfare had to conform. +No inter-allied gas mask materialised, although this would have been +of inestimable advantage. Probably the example of most complete +co-ordination occurred on the supply side, where absence of the above +traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most +of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination. + +Inter-Allied Supply.--The writer was responsible for initiating, +in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, whose function +was to pool effectively the allied raw materials, and to arrange +their distribution in accordance with allied programmes, +the exchange of which implied a considerable step. +Later this Committee became one of a number, similarly constituted, +forming part of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council. + +Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply, now that the +emergenices of the situation have passed, an important contrast emerges. +After three years of war, and although protected by the powerful arm +of the blockade, we were, still resorting, for chemical warfare supply, +to measures which, compared with the German methods, were complicated, +clumsy, and inefficient. This was, in a sense, forced upon us by +the number of the allies, and the fact that they held the outer lines. +But it is easily forgotten that Germany also had a number of allies, +and that Germany supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all. + +Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.--So, much has been vaguely said, +and is vaguely known, about research in chemical warfare that a brief +analysis will be of value. + +Discovery of New Substances.--Research for this purpose has +a number of very distinct functions, The most obvious is the +discovery of new substances. But there are others in connection +with which research work represents a much greater volume. +Very few new substances which found valuable application +during the war were revealed by chemical warfare research. +The bulk of the important substances were already known as such, +although their importance for war was probably not realised. +It is most important to emphasise the fact that even in +the future, should there be no direct attempts to reveal +new chemical warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise +as a normal outcome of research, even if, without exception, +every chemist in the world became a most pronounced pacifist. +A valuable substance once discovered or decided upon, however, +whole series of research investigations become necessary. + +Technical Method of Preparation;--Filling Problem;--Protection;-- +Half-Scale Investigation.--The substance must be prepared in the most +efficient manner for manufacture, which may not be the mode of its discovery. +It must be used in shells, cylinders, or some other war chemical device. +Each device represents a different filling problem, different difficulties +with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container. +If a projectile is in question the ballistics become of importance. +More important than any of these, except production, is the question +of protection. It is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive +chemical must be protected against it. It may, therefore, be necessary +to modify the existing mask or protective appliance, or to create an +entirely new one. If research reveals the necessity for the latter course +of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance. +In addition, according to productive difficulties, it may be necessary +to undertake comprehensive and very expensive research on half-scale +methods for production. It is impossible in many cases to proceed directly +from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious +risk of failure. + +Two Classes of Research.--Broadly, these research functions form two classes, +those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those +concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval. +There must be, of course, a certain amount of overlapping and liaison +between the two classes. + +Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the Germans. Their great +producing organisation, the I.G., was able to take over automatically +certain of these research functions, in particular all those with +regard to preparation and production, even of protective appliances. +The Government reserved what we have called the policy functions, +and was responsible, we assume, for the mass, of physiological and design +research which must always precede approval or a decision on policy. + +Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was even employed on certain +occasions for this latter type of research. + +Conclusion.--From the facts at our disposal there can be no +doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of +the Allies for chemical warfare investigation were considerably +more extensive and expensive than those of Germany with the one +notable exception of trained technical organic chemists. +It is very doubtful whether the German field experiments were +as largely provided for as those of the Allies. When we think +of the French grounds at Versailles and Entressin, the British +at Porton, the American grounds in France and in America, +and the Italian organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that +the total German facilities were much smaller. Under the actual +circumstances of the war, however, it was difficult to develop +more co-operation than was possible by a very close liaison. +The fact that all the experimental developments from these +grounds required special modification to meet the peculiar needs +of artillery and other equipment for each ally, prevented the +adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances. +Even uniform shell marking was found impracticable. + +The "Outer and Inner Lines."--The Allied situation compelled the +multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries. +Lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a +considerable disadvantage, compared with Germany, in the development +of such organisations. Using a strategic comparison, we can say +that Germany not only possessed the "inner lines" in the chemical war, +but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in the shape +of the great I.G. + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE + + +Meaning of the Chemical Initiative.--The German invasion of Belgium +in 1914 was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war. +By disregarding their pledge, a "scrap of paper," they automatically +introduced into this attack the elements of military surprise. +We, the enemy, were unprepared, and a complete rearrangement +of dispositions became necessary. + +A recent writer has admirably summarised the facts.[1] + + +[1] A. F. Pollard. _A Short History of the Great War_. Methuen, 1920. + + +"Germany began the war on the Western front before it was declared, +and on 1-2 August, German cavalry crossed the French frontier +between Luxembourg and Switzerland at three points in the direction +of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort. But these were only feints +designed to prolong the delusion that Germany would attack +on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay +the reconstruction of the French defence required to meet +the real offensive. The reasons for German strategy were +conclusive to the General Staff, and they were frankly explained +by Bethmann-Hollweg to the British Ambassador. There was no +time to lose if France was to be defeated before an effective +Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal attack. +The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium; +the Vosges protected more than half of the French frontier +south of Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap between +them and Switzerland, and even the wider thirty miles' +gap between the northern slopes of the Vosges and Luxembourg +was too narrow for the deployment of Germany's strength; +the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications +of Verdun, Toul, and Nancy. Strategy pointed conclusively to +the Belgium route, and its advantages were clinched by the fact +that France was relying on the illusory scrap of paper." + +The first German cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain +the decisive initiative, by the unauthorised use of a surprise +of an entirely different nature. + +Modern writers are at great pains to establish how the world war, +although leaving the final function of the infantry unchanged, +rendered them and their staff subservient to mass munition production. +Mr. H. G. Wells explains this to the Kaiser in a delightful imaginary +interview between that august person and an hypothetical manufacturer.[1] +Professor Pollard tells us how, when the first German surprise had failed, +the war became "a test of endurance rather than generalship." +We will leave a clear field for any military challenge to such +a point of view. Our objection is that it is not fully developed. +The war was still a test of generalship, that of directed production. +This war has shown, and future wars may unfortunately confirm, +that the type and secrecy of production is as important as its volume. +There will still be the purely military surprise and manoeuvre, +but superimposed, co-ordinated, and sometimes predominant will appear +the technical surprise, the result of the generalship of production. + + +[1] _War and the Future_. Cassel, 1917. + + +Such a surprise is achieved by the sudden introduction on a large +scale of some entirely new war weapon, capable of achieving +a strategic or tactical objective in an unsuspected manner. + +Although the general idea of this second type of surprise existed +before the war, particularly in naval warfare, it required +the coincidence of the Great European War and modern scientific +development to demonstrate its great importance on land. + +Thus the first German gas attack found the opposing troops +entirely unprotected, not merely through the absence of a mask, +but in training and technical discipline. The case is quoted of an +indignant gassed soldier who, in an early gas attack, when reproached +for not protecting himself, thereupon opened his tunic and revealed +a mask firmly tied round his chest! It is a far cry from such a case +to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an army of millions. +The attack reaped the corresponding results in casualties and morale. +It found the opposing medical services unequipped, not only to treat +the new type of casualty, but even to determine its nature rapidly +and efficiently. In short, it found the enemy utterly unprepared, +either in theory or practice, to counter its effect. The importance +of this second type of surprise lies in its peculiar potentialities. +It may affect a given military result with an extraordinarily +small expenditure of material, energy, and eventually human life, +when compared with the older military weapons. Chemical warfare is +a weapon, par excellence, to achieve this second type of surprise. +Therein lies its chief importance. + +As a result, the history of chemical warfare becomes one of +continual attempts, on both sides, to achieve surprise and to +counter it by some accurate forecast in protective methods. +It is a struggle for the initiative. + +More than this, as the use of chemical warfare becomes an organic +part of operations, as it did during the war, these operations +become correspondingly dependent upon conditions imposed +by the chemical campaign. One can imagine the case of an army +unprotected against a new gas, aware that the enemy is ready to +employ the latter, compelled to postpone some huge offensive until +its protective methods were equal to countering the new chemical. +General Fries, the American authority, states, in reference +to mustard gas, and the Northern offensives in 1917: +"It is no disparagement of the British, nor of any one else, +to say that they held up the date of their attack for two weeks +pending further investigations into the effects of this new gas." +Ludendorff, referring to the German offensive in March, 1918, +tells us, "Our artillery relied on gas for its effect. +Up till the morning of the 20th strength and direction +(of the wind) were by no means favourable, and it seemed +almost necessary to put off the attack." Such a point becomes +of greater importance as the influence of other arms decreases. +If we assume international arrangements for the limitation +of other types of armament in the future, chemical warfare +at once stands out as decisive. + +Controlling Factors;--Rapid Manufacture.--Certain well-defined +factors hold a controlling position in the chemical initiative. +Before any chemical discovery can be used for surprise on the front +a second step must occur; this is large scale manufacture. +This period is vital to surprise. Success in chemical +warfare is largely dependent on secrecy, which means +achieving production in the shortest possible time, and this +is particularly important at the commencement of hostilities. +Throughout the war the Germans possessed this advantage and, +in the future, unless certain steps are taken, it will be +theirs again. A very simple example will suffice to show +the importance of the combination of these two factors. +Let us assume the not remote possibility that Germany had +refrained from using poison gas until she had reached the stage +of development which existed at the time of her 1918 offensive. +There is little room for doubt that the big scale use of cloud +attacks which would then have been available, and of shell gas, +in particular mustard gas, would have achieved decisive success. +The Allies would have been totally unprotected, the moral effect +would have been enormous, and, even if we ignore the latter, +the number of casualties would have produced a gap the size +of which was only dependent on German wishes. + +Rapid Identification Essential.--It is important to remember, +however, that once a chemical campaign has commenced, +certain factors may militate against any lengthy retention +of the initiative by either party. Organisations develop whose +function is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical devices +so that protective research and production can commence with +the minimum delay. This assumes the existence of a protective +appliance and organisation. The very efficient collaboration +of the British Central Laboratory in France for the examination +of new gas shell with the French organisation centred in Paris +provides numerous examples of the functioning of this safeguard. +No time was lost in identifying the nature of the various +chemicals employed by Germany in her shell fillings. +Speed was vital. The use of a new type of chemical in shell, +bomb, or other contrivance, in any sector of the front, +on whatever scale, however small, was reported without delay. +Then followed instantaneous collection and examination, +after which all front line formations, other formations, +allies, and rear organisations were expeditiously warned. +The harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type might +be followed by the use of hundreds of thousands in a deadly +attack one hundred miles away or on another allied front. +Not only were captured offensive contrivances of value for +this purpose, but the rapid examination of new enemy masks was +of prime importance, for it could be assumed that the enemy would +be protected against his own surprises in store for others. + +Attempts to ascertain the enemy's gas activities were not +confined to examining captured material after their first use. +Raids and artillery fire were both used to obtain intelligence +regarding preparations, or to break up the gas emplacements. +The Germans have provided us with a particularly gallant +and interesting attempt. + +Near Nieuport the front penetrated a region inundated by +the Belgians during the desperate German offensives of 1914. +The trench system, winding through a mile or so of sand dunes, +passed in a southeasterly direction through the marshy sector known +as Lombartzyde. Here the bogged front lines were intersected by +the Yser canal, the German front trench being some 80 yards away. +Allied gas was installed in the Lombartzyde and neighbouring +sectors ready for discharge on the first favourable opportunity. +For some reason or other the Germans suspected this, +and at night a raiding party swam down the ice cold Yser, and, +negotiating the submerged wire, landed in the Allied support line. +Stunning the sentry with a bomb which, fortunately, refused to explode, +they proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplacements. +Either through unexpected disturbance, or for some other reason, +they were compelled to leave before completing their inspection, +and successfully swam the Yser canal back to their own trenches. +This hazardous enterprise represents but one of many raids whose +function it was to ascertain the presence of enemy gas. + +Propaganda and Morale.--Another factor intended to facilitate the +attainment of the chemical initiative was the German use of propaganda. +Rumours, reflected in the Press, were often current at the Front, +at home, and in neutral countries, that some particularly fiendish +chemical contrivance was about to be launched against the Allies +by Germany. Thus, in January and February of 1916, vigorous propaganda +activity of this kind in Switzerland preceded the great German +offensive at Verdun. The new gas was heralded by fantastic stories. +Certain death was threatened for all within one hundred yards of the +shell burst. The origin of the report was traced to various sources. +In one case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a German factory, +desirous of warning the French through Swiss friends, in other cases +German scientists were reported to be influencing Francophile +neutrals in order that they might warn the French. But an analysis +of the propaganda reveals something more than its sensational nature. +The information arrived at well-defined periods, which usually preceded +the actual use of a new gas or chemical device by Germany. But when +the actual effort is compared with the prophecy we find that in no case +was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas. Thus, before the use +of phosgene by the Germans at the end of 1915, definite reports reached +the Allies regarding the projected use of at least ten new gases +by Germany, which were described not only chemically, but as being +colourless, odourless, powerful, blinding, and instantaneously deadly! +No such volume of propaganda was experienced before the first German +cloud attack at Ypres. Indeed, one would not have expected it, +for the mere fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war, +and of military value. + +This propaganda was not without its effect, and, but for the excellent +Allied gas discipline, would have been an effective precursor +to the gas itself. Cases were not absent, at the Battle of Loos, +for example, in which the German use of lachrymators found +British soldiers so mentally unprepared, or rather let us say +"prepared" by propaganda, as to spread ridiculous rumours on +the battlefield as to the all-powerful nature of the new German +gas shell. These were, in fact, bursting a few yards away, +with no more serious results than lachrymation and vomiting. +The extended use of shell gas by the Germans in the summer +of 1916 was again preceded by intensive propaganda during +the early months of that year, in which the promise of prussic +acid was prominent. The influence of a name is very curious. +Prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties than any +other gas. This fact became apparent with the increasing +use of the French Vincennite, which contained prussic acid. +Yet German propaganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire +fear in the Allied soldiers by the threat to use prussic acid. +It is clear that armies cannot abandon gas discipline, and that +an important factor in strengthening this discipline is a wise +distribution of gas knowledge. The use of mustard gas and newer +shell gases in 1917 was again preceded by a burst of propaganda. +In this period we find the first reference to long-range gas +shell and aircraft gas bomb, and, curiously enough, a certain +amount of propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical, +which partially described mustard gas. + +As further confirmation of the General Staff origin of this propaganda +we find that the 1918 outburst occurred two or three months earlier in +the year than in 1917. This was accounted for, no doubt, by its intended +influence upon Allied morale in the great German offensive of early 1918. +This last wave of propaganda includes one very interesting example. +It is better known than other cases through its association with the +International Red Cross at Geneva. This body represented in February, +1918, that Germany was about to use a really terrible gas which would +have such disastrous effects that it was absolutely essential to make +a last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas warfare. The official wire +reads as follows:--"Protest of International Red Cross against the use +of Poison Gas. I have received private letter from Monsieur X., President +of International Red Cross, which I think that I ought to lay before you. +He says that Red Cross were induced to make protest by what they had +heard of new gas Germans are preparing although Red Cross understands +that the Allies are aware of the gas and are taking their precautions. +As they did not wish to draw an indictment of Germany they appealed to +both groups of belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this weapon. +Red Cross asks whether the Entente leaders through Inter-Allied Council at +Versailles could not make a loud declaration which would reach the peoples +of the Central Empires as well as their rulers, pledging themselves not to use +such gas on condition that the two Emperors similarly bind themselves not +to employ it. If the latter refuse, all the guilt will rest with them." +Although there can be no doubt that the International Red Cross and the Swiss +involved in this move were absolutely bona fide, yet whoever was responsible +for initiating the move on the German side played his hand very well. +If, as actually occurred, the protest did not result in the cessation +of gas hostilities, it still served its purpose as propaganda aimed +at Allied morale. Knowing his dispositions for gas defence, and our +own offensive preparations, it is probable that the enemy was willing +to withdraw before being overwhelmed by Allied and American production. +After three years of costly improvised production by the Allies, Germany could +no longer securely enjoy the fruits of the initiative provided by the plants +and factories of the I.G. + +Peculiar Peace-Time Danger.--There can be no doubt therefore that the mere +contact of two armies during war acts as a check against the decisive +use of chemical warfare, except in the very early stages. During peace +this contact will be practically non-existent, and it would be possible +for any country so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery that, +given rapid means of production, it could repeat the German surprise of 1915, +this time with decisive results. Should such a nation possess a monopoly +in the means of rapid production, the world is practically at her mercy. +Should she be prepared to break her word, the usual means of controlling +disarmament are impotent against these developments. + +War Fluctuations of Initiative.--In the light of the above remarks the +fluctuations in the initiative during the recent war are very significant. +The first marked feature was the development of British and Allied +protection to counter the enemy attacks which would presumably follow +the first German use of cloud gas. Immediately after the German +chemical surprise, and while the Allies were still undecided whether +to retaliate, work proceeded feverishly on the development of some +form of protection for the hitherto unprotected soldier. In response +to Lord Kitchener's dramatic appeal to the women of England and France, +masks were sent to France in sufficient quantity within a few days. +They were of a very primitive type, and consisted of a pad of cotton +wool impregnated with certain chemicals, to be held in place over +the mouth, which was superseded, in May, by a very similar contrivance, +slightly more efficient with regard to the length of time of protection. +Dr. Haldane and certain other prominent chemists and physiologists worked +on the different improvised types. With this feeble protection, or, +in the first case, with none at all, our armies had to face the first +German cloud gas attacks. + +The idea of the gas helmet which covered the whole head was brought +to England by Captain Macpherson of the Newfoundland Corps, +early in May. Suitably impregnated, it made satisfactory tests. +The helmet type of respirator made of flannel was first tested in +the Anti-Gas laboratories on May 10th, 1915, and was a great success +compared with previously suggested types. Arrangements for its +manufacture were accordingly made, and this began in June, 1915. +This protective device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid +film eyepiece, and was called the hypo helmet. The fabric was impregnated +with the same solution as the cotton waste pads described above, +the dipping being carried out largely at Oxford Works, but partly in +the Royal Army Clothing Department, Pimlico. Its manufacture was continued +until September, 1915, about two and a half millions being made in all. +From June, 1915, we never really lost the initiative in the matter +of defence, although, at different times, the struggle was very intense. +It was this helmet, with the modified phenate impregnation, which, known as +the P. helmet, formed the first line of defence against the probable +employment of phosgene by Germany. It became known as the "Tube Helmet" +when fitted with a mouthpiece for exhaled air, and, in this form, +countered the formidable enemy phosgene attack in December, 1915. +The later addition of hexamine, suggested from Russia, greatly improved +the efficiency against phosgene and led to the P.H. helmet, which was +issued from January, 1916. It was not withdrawn until February, +1918, but in the later stages was used as a second line of defence. +The magnitude of this manoeuvring for protection can be judged from +the facts that two and a half millions of hypo helmets, nine millions +of P. helmets, and fourteen millions of P.H. helmets were issued +during the campaign. + +There is no doubt that this early period, however, was a very costly +experiment on the use of the different masks, the success of which +involved the loss of numbers of men who were compelled, through reasons +of supply or uncertain design, to use the less efficient types. +In one case, for example, the trial of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise +efficient masks absolutely useless by breaking, and caused losses. +We cannot afford to repeat such experiments in future. Failure to +develop protective appliances fatally implies large-scale experiments +in future wars in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur. +If steady research in peace can diminish this possible loss, +shall it be stopped? + +The urgency of these developments can be understood from +a case quoted by General Hartley:[1] "A certain modification +of the respirator was considered necessary in France, +and officers were sent home to explain what was needed. +Within forty-eight hours of their arrival arrangements +were made to modify the respirators, and within a few weeks +the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the new pattern. +Less than three months after the change had been recommended +three attacks were made by the Germans which would certainly +have had very serious consequences if our troops had not been +in possession of the improved respirator, as the older pattern +would not have withstood the concentration of gas employed. +This was only one of many changes that were made in the respirator +to meet new developments." + + +[1] Report before the British Association, 1919. + + +How urgent was the need for these developments? It was vital. +Here is a case showing frightful losses sustained by partially +or inefficiently protected troops. Between May and July of 1915 +the Germans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the Russians, +immediately west of Warsaw. In all these attacks, taken together, +gas was discharged for a total time of not more than one hour, and they +were all practically from the same position, on a front of about six miles. +The affair seems relatively small, yet what was the result? +The Russians lost not less than 5000 dead on the field, and their +total casualties were of the order of 25,000 officers and men. +A Siberian regiment had, before the last attack, a ration strength +of about forty officers and 4000 men. This was reduced by a twenty +minutes gas discharge to four officers and four hundred men. +No other weapon could have reproduced, under the most favourable +conditions for its use, in as many days, what gas was able to do +in as many minutes. + +Although our protection had countered the later German attacks +with cloud gas, yet it threatened to fail to meet the situation +created by the use of a variety of organic chemicals in shell. +In order to counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the enemy, +compounds which penetrated the helmet insufficiently to cause serious +casualties but sufficiently to hamper the individual by lachrymation, +goggles were introduced in which the eyes were protected by rims +of rubber sponge. This remedied the weakness of the P.H. helmet +and produced the P.H.G. helmet, of which more than one and a half +millions were issued during 1916-1917. + +Towards the end of 1915 the standard protection was the P. and P.H. helmet, +but the use of lachrymators compelled us to use the P.H.G. Even +this helmet was not satisfactory against the high concentrations +of phosgene or lachrymators, and after much research the opinion +gained ground that further development must be on other lines. +In addition, the need for a more general form of protection was +emphasised by the German adoption of a mask of cartridge design. +In other words, the fabric of the helmet, or facial portion of the mask, +was made impermeable, and the filtration of the poisoned air occurred +through a cartridge, or filtering box, attached to the fabric +in the form of a snout. The cartridge provided a much greater +protective range and capacity. It was clear that such German +protection was evidence of their plans for the further use of gas. +The new German cartridge mask appeared in the autumn of 1915. +Doctor H. Pick, reviewing German protective measures in Schwarte's book, +enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal mask and explains, +"It was only our early recognition of these requirements +which gave us an advantage over the enemy from the first in +the sphere of defensive measures against gas, and which spared +us from having to undertake radical alterations in the apparatus +as the English, French, and Russians had to do more than once." +This early adoption of a comprehensive view on protection +by Germany is a testimony to both German thoroughness and their +definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chemical war. +The latter is not mere inference, for it is borne out by the dates +at which they commenced production in their dye factories. +Further, even if the German cartridge mask was only decided upon +after Loos, which is not probable, our feeble reply in that battle +would hardly have justified such a radical advance in protection. + +It was thus forecasted that not only would new ranges of compounds +be employed which it would be most difficult to counter individually, +but aggressive methods would arise, either entirely new or modifications +of the cloud method, which would enable much higher concentrations to be +obtained than those in evidence hitherto. Accordingly the first type +of the well-known British Box Respirator was designed, giving a big +capacity of highly efficient filtering material, or granule, contained in +a canister, with an improved face-piece and breathing arrangements. +Without going into details, it may be said that Colonel Harrison +and Major Lambert were associated with a number of other enthusiastic +workers in developing the Box Respirator. + +Here again the question of chemical supply threatened to +influence our retention of the initiative. Without going into +the development of the granule in the respirator, the supply +of potassium permanganate was of prime importance, and the country +was woefully deficient in the production of this substance. +The determined efforts of British manufacturers overcame this difficulty. +It was now possible to work on general lines for the improvement +of this canister to increase its protective range, and to modify +the canister specifically in accordance with intelligence as to +what the enemy had recently done or was about to do. In this way, +and successively, the army was successfully protected against the higher +concentrations employed and the newer substances introduced. +The issue of the large Box Respirator commenced in February, 1916. +It was replaced by the small Box Respirator which came out +in August, 1916, and of which over sixteen millions had been +issued before the signing of the Armistice. At one time over a +quarter of a million small Box Respirators were produced weekly. +The chief modifications were the use of a smaller box or canister, +the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in the former type. + +It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to provide more efficient +protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate +the respirator as minute particles, and the first form consisted +in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small +Box Respirator. The use of Blue Cross compounds by Germany in the summer +of 1917 rendered this matter more urgent, and a special filter jacket +was designed which fitted round the Small Box Respirator. A million +were made and sent to France. Developments proceeded on these lines. +Altogether, more than fifty million masks and respirators of different +kinds were manufactured by the British Anti-Gas Department for our own +and Allied armies. + +We thus have some idea of the importance of protection +in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need +of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on. +There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question. +It is not only in the interest of the army, whether a League of Nations +or a national army, but also in those of the civil population. + +The Tense Protective Struggle.--Few people realise how the development +of Allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced +upon each side in a number of critical steps. At each of these, +had research and production been unequal to the task, the armies would +have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole +trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some +peculiar way, thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel, +rifle, and machine-gun fire. The army has an apt expression. +An officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed "half naked." +To be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness. +A modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten +than one without boots. More than this, it must be clearly +understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production +will remain of very little use unless, supported by comprehensive +research which, itself, gains enormously in efficiency if related +to enemy offensive activities. + +The German Mask.--Consider the German mask for a moment. +We have seen how Germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge +form before any of the other belligerents, and in good time +to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene, +at the end of 1915. Indeed, Germany probably held up the use +of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed, +although Schwarte's book claims that the German mask issue in 1915 +was mainly a protection against chlorine. The filling consisted +of some such material as powdered pumice-stone saturated with a +solution of potash, and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal +in order to protect against organic irritants and phosgene. +These were the familiar one-layer drums. Then came the British +concentrated cloud gas offensive in the summer of 1916, +which undoubtedly found the German mask unequal to some of the higher +concentrations which were obtained under most favourable conditions. +The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army stated in a document +issued in November, 1916: "Considerable losses were caused +by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly. +The casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dugouts, +to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not being at hand, +to faulty masks, and to the use of old pattern drums _*which could +not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy_. +(The italics are our own.--V.L.) + +Evidence is found in the introduction of the German three-layer drum +in the autumn of 1916. An army does not undertake the manufacture +of millions of new appliances without very good reason. +This new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection. +The middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal, +which had the property of absorbing large quantities of organic +irritants and phosgene. In the three-layer drum the latter +gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes, +although we have reason to believe that the German staff was +always apprehensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the actual +penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality +of projector discharges. + +Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte's book what is already well known, +that the charcoal layer has a wide, "non-specific effect, and it retains +almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small, +even if very strongly neutral in character (as, for example, chlorpicrin)." +He goes on to say "the progressive development of gas warfare +led to the use of these very materials, whilst substances with +acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and more into disuse. +The three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence. +When the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in 1917, +the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers. +This stage of development ended in 1918, when the other layers were +done away with altogether, and the entire three sets were filled +with `A' charcoal." " `A' charcoal was a particularly efficient form. +We learn from the same source that the increased protection against +phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view of the danger arising +from gas projector attacks. Further, the capacity for absorption of +the German charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign production." +This was certainly true for the greater part of the war. +But Dr. Pick continues, in a sentence which is full of significance: +"In consequence of the high quality of the drum's absorption, we were able to +carry on to the end of the war with a drum of relatively small proportions." +This point is so important as to demand further explanation. + +Enforced German Modifications.--The most important +disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing. +Men undertaking arduous and dangerous duties in the presence of gas +must wear a mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if their +breathing is seriously interfered with. This is particularly +so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery. +Now the resistance depends, for a given type of filling, +upon the area of the cross-section of the drum. Breathing will be +easier through a very large area than through a very small one. +The British appliance was a frank admission that, with its filling, +a large drum was necessary, so large that the weight of it could +not be borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the chest, +the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible +rubber tube. But the Germans adopted from the beginning +a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge +was attached to and supported by the mask. In other words, +their development was limited by the weight of their drum, +unless they completely changed their type on British lines. +It is quite clear that they realised this, for Doctor Pick +tells us, referring to the large size of the British box: +"For this reason the weight of the box is so great that it +is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask. +It is, therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece +of the mask by a flexible tube." + +The development of British cloud gas compelled the Germans so to modify +their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably. +They countered this, however, by introducing an exceedingly active charcoal, +realising that the weight of their drum had already reached the limit +possible with that type of apparatus, and that they could not, +therefore, get better breathing capacity by increasing its size. +When, however, the Blue Cross compounds were introduced, it was necessary +for both armies to take special precautions. These precautions involved +introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum. +Dr. Pick tells us: "When the material of the Blue Cross type became +of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus had to be issued. +A thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton +was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid. +This arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the +Blue Cross type used by the enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride, +whilst the German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, was only +retained to a moderate degree." This is a direct admission that, +in order to counter the Allied use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering +arrangements would have been necessary. But the resistance to +breathing of the German apparatus was already strained to the utmost. +It is exceedingly improbable that the Germans, having already reached +the limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable to obtain +better breathing by increase in size, could have introduced any such +device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit. +In other words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have compelled +them to adopt the British type of apparatus, that is, a bigger box supported +by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube. +This would have led them into an _impasse_. + +Shortage of Rubber.--We know how, in the beginning of 1917, they were +compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask. +Dr. Pick admits that this was due to lack of raw material, rubber, +and there are many other signs that this was so. Although leather was +not altogether a bad substitute for this purpose, rubber would have been +essential for the flexible tube, and the millions required to refit +the army would have completely broken the German rubber resources. +Many facts, including their feverish development of synthetic rubber, +small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, go to prove +this conclusion. The submarine, _Deutschland_, returning to Germany +in 1916, from its historic trip to America, carried shipments of the most +sorely needed commodities, including large quantities of raw rubber. +Stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent +its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles. +The first naval expedition to Baltic ports after the Armistice +found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber. +The Germans were being driven into an impossible position. +In other words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross compounds, +could have regained the gas initiative. There is no doubt that they +were within a few months of doing so. Once again we see the importance +of production. Lack of raw materials for protective purposes was +endangering the German position, but delay in offensive production +by the Allies removed that danger. Although their pressing need +was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were not available. +The chemical war involves manoeuvring for position just as definitely +as the older forms, but in it production, formerly a routine activity, +assumes critical strategic importance. + +Gas Discipline.--This constant vigilance against enemy surprise +imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption +of a protective appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing. +Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and when to use it. +A gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask +at the right time with the least hampering of operations. +Gas discipline thus became one of the most important features of +general training, a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies +of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results. +This discipline, like all other protective work, was dependent +in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initiative. +One example out of many is found in the numerous German Army Orders +which followed our introduction of the Livens projector. +This weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations +at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly +possible and for a time German gas discipline was severely shaken, +and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation. +The introduction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear case +of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the Allies. A telegram +from German General Headquarters stated: "The English have +achieved considerable success by firing gas mines simultaneously +from a considerable number of projectors on to one point. +Casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning, +and because its concentration was so great that a single breath +would incapacitate a man." + +This is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative +was very difficult to obtain after two years of war, whereas by +the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement. +The general development of German protection was a partial safeguard, +but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an +order was issued for all German working parties to wear gas masks +when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights not obviously +unsuitable for Allied gas discharges. It is difficult to exaggerate +the military importance of such an imposition. + +Summary.--We have thus covered a period, the main features +of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by Germany +and our rapid and successful protective reaction. +The conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar. +The complete surprise attending it could only be repeated +at the commencement of another war. It failed for entirely +different reasons from those which prevented the decisive +use of phosgene by the Germans. But our reaction carried +us further, and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack, +the Livens projector, which, in its turn, taxed the German +protection to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it. +History repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle. + +Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German phosgene attempt +and the Livens projector, were both partially successful. +Had either of those attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd, +1915, their success would have been many times greater. +It was contact on the battle front that developed a protective +appliance and organisation, by giving us an insight +into enemy appliances and projects. We cannot emphasise +too strongly the significance of this for the future. +Apart from remote exceptions, contact will be entirely absent. +We can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will +be revealed, either between nations or to a central body. +Suppose the Germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities +of cloud gas, and, realising the dependence of their one method +upon wind direction and caprice, had developed our method of +producing cloud at a distance. The combinations of the two methods +at Ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure. +This is a feeble example of what may occur. + +New German Attempts.--By this time it was not easy +to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise +by the use of chemicals aimed at the respiratory system. +It appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms +of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field. + +Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas warfare, +in Schwarte's book, reveals how Germany counted on obtaining +the gas initiative against the French at Verdun. He explains +how the decision to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided +with certain modifications in the design of the German gas shell, +which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid. +"The manufacture of Green Cross," he also tells us, "was assured +in the special progress in technical chemistry, and the output +was adequate," and goes on to explain, "The first use of per +stuff[1] found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection. +The French had equipped their troops with protection against chlorine, +but had provided no protection against phosgene,"--"the results +of Green Cross ammunition were recognised by the troops. +During the big operations before Verdun, however, the enemy +did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask M2 for +the respirator XTX. Gas mask M2 was a protection against +Green Cross. For this reason Green Cross ammunition alone could +not be expected to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out +defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or some better apparatus. +This reverse spurred on the Germans to renewed efforts." +The writer proceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted +in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas or Yellow Cross +and the arsenic compounds of the Blue Cross type. + + +[1] Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents. + + +Yellow and Blue Cross.--The Germans had, somewhat hastily, +laid aside their cloud activities. But they were very keenly +pursuing another line, the development of shell gas. Thus, in July, +1917, they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative +by the use of shell gas, and were very largely successful in one case. +We refer to the Yellow and Blue Cross shell, containing mustard +gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively. + +Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte's book, relates: "Gas was used +to a much greater extent, over 100,000 shells to a bombardment +after the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916 +at Verdun. From that time the use of gas became much more varied +as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased, +field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles. +The most tremendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery, +and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the summer of 1917 +with the introduction of the three elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue, +one after another. This introduced the most varied possibilities +of employing gas, which were utilised to the full in many places +on the front during the successful defensive operations of 1917, +above all in Flanders and at Verdun. The hardly perceptible poisoning +of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the surprise gas +attack became two of the new regulation methods of using gas." + +Yellow Cross.--The respirator afforded complete protection +against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system, +but this gas evaded protection in other ways. In the first place, +its early unfamiliarity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies, +and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary. +This was speedily corrected, but its second line of attack was not easily, +and never finally countered. We refer to its vesicant action. +Mustard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds +in such slight concentrations, even through clothing, that it +was a tremendous casualty producer, putting men out of action +for several weeks or months, with a very low rate of mortality. +Used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army, +its results might well have been decisive. + +This was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function. +We had too readily assumed that gas, or chemical attack, +would be restricted to the respiratory system, or to the eyes. +We had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead +of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe. +Mustard gas was a rude awakening. It was impossible to protect +fully against mustard gas, unless we protected the whole body, +and it was never possible to do this during the war without +too seriously influencing the movements of the soldier. + +Blue Cross.--The Blue Cross Shell was a deliberate attempt +to pierce the respirator. It represented to the German mind +such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect +on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unprotected. +Some idea of the German estimate of its importance can be found +in the following quotation from Captain Geyer: "The search +for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations +led to the discovery of a series of effective substances. +In view of the obvious importance of highly irritant compounds +capable of existing in a very finely divided, pulverised, +or particulate form, research was made in the domain of little +volatile substances with boiling points up to 400'0. This led +to the astonishing discovery that _diphenylarsenious chloride_ +when scattered would penetrate all gas masks then in use, +even the German, practically unweakened, and would have serious +irritant effects on the wearers. This discovery could only be +explained by the supposition that the irritant works in the form +of particles which it is difficult to keep back by means +of a respirator, even a completely protecting respirator, +such as the German and English gas masks were at that time. +Further analysis showed that the mixture of air and gas examined +revealed a concentration of gas greatly in excess of the point +of saturation for the vapour given off by this stuff. Finally, ultra +microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles. +A new type of fighting material had been discovered." + +He also tells us how, following this discovery, production rose +to 600 tons monthly, and used up all the arsenic obtainable +in Germany. The Allies were fully alive to the importance +of this matter, and we have already explained that, had they +been in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross compounds, +they might have forced German protection into an impossible position. +No better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed +by Germany owing to her flexible and efficient producing organisation. +Captain Geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these +projectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly production +reached a figure of over one million shell. We have already emphasised +the question of design in chemical warfare, and its importance is +borne out by the comparative failure of these German projectiles. +Geyer explains how only minute particles less than 1/10,000 +of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask, +and he develops the difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining +such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance. +He explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at +a suitable shell, and their unsuccessful struggle to overcome +the necessity of a glass container, which, he says, demanded "a +considerable advance in the technical work of shell production." + +This attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of Blue Cross +illustrates another method of attack. Geyer says, "Blue and Green Cross +ammunition were used simultaneously in the field--called coloured cross +(Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of Blue Cross, to force the enemy +to remove gas masks, whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous +effects of Green Cross. Matters seldom reached that point, however, +for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of `coloured cross' +ammunition, they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it +from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire. +The English in particular had tried to protect the troops against the +effects of diphenylarsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide +(which followed it and was even more effective) by the use of filters +made of woollen material and wadding. They were to a great extent +technically successful, but the most effective defensive apparatus, +the `jacket' to the box, was unsatisfactory from the military point +of view, as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing +to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned." + +The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation. +The relative inefficiency of the German shell rendered this unnecessary. +In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our troops were specially protected +in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds. An examination of our +protective device by the Germans obviously led them to believe that resistance +to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable. +But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British troops +became effective. There is no doubt that the new mask was worn just +as constantly and satisfactorily as the old. Captain Geyer's remarks are +also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred: +they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising +the minds of those responsible for German protection. + +"Particulate" Clouds.--The principle of particulate clouds was not +entirely new, both sides having used smoke combined with lethal +gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator. +It was thought that the particulate form of the smoke +would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up +vapours and gases. The reasoning was perfectly sound. +It was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way. +There were good grounds to believe that such substances would +penetrate the respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel +the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms produced, to allow +some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier. +Fortunately for us, these objectives were not attained, but this +was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the German +preparations than to any inherent impossibility. + +After this period, although chemical warfare became increasingly +an organic part of German (and Allied) operations, yet there is no +serious field evidence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative. +It must be remembered, however, that gas figured very largely indeed +in the March, 1918, attempt, by Germany, to regain the general initiative. +It is stated authoritatively, for example, that in July, 1918, +the German Divisional Ammunition Dump contained normally 50 per cent. +of gas shell and, in the preparation, in May, 1918, for German attacks +on the Aisne, artillery programmes included as much as 80 per cent. +gas shell for certain objectives. + +Potential Production and Peace.--Enough has been said to show +the general nature of the chemical warfare struggle. +The question of the chemical initiative is vital at the commencement +of hostilities. Unless, then, we completely rule out any possibility +whatever of a future war, it is vital for that occasion. +We have indicated sufficiently clearly the factors upon +which such initiative depends, to show the critical importance +of manufacturing capacity, and protective preparedness. + +A further quotation from Schwarte's book is very much to the point. +It tells us: + + +"Whilst on our side only a few gases were introduced, but with successful +results, the use of gas by the enemy presents quite another picture. +We know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the enemy, and of fifteen +types of gas projectile used by the French alone, and we know, from `blind' +(dud) shells which have been found, what they contain. The only +effective gases amongst them were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide. +The other substances are harmless preparations, used most probably +for purposes of camouflage, a method highly esteemed by the enemy, +but which did not enter into the question with us, owing to the capacity +of our chemical industry for the production of effective materials." + + +This is true to a considerable extent. Our dependence on improvised +and relatively inefficient production imposed conditions upon +Allied policy, whereas, in Germany, they had but to command +a flexible and highly efficient producing machine. + +The world movement towards disarmament will hardly countenance +the maintenance of permanent chemical arsenals. In the face of war +experience and further research developments the laborious war improvisation +of these arsenals will not save us as it did in the last struggle. +Any nation devoid of the means of production invites enemy chemical +aggression and is helpless against it. This, and the need to keep +abreast of chemical warfare development--particularly in protection-- +are the chief lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative. + + + +CHAPTER VII + +REVIEW OF PRODUCTION + + +Critical Importance of Production.--Our analysis of the struggle +for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production. +In the chemical more than in any other form of warfare, +production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions +as an organic part of the offensive scheme. A tendency in modern +war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear. +Staffs cannot leave the discoveries of the technical +workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations, +for their sudden introduction into a campaign may have +more influence on its result than the massing of a million +men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault. +The use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations +more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort. + +When, after the first brilliant assault on the Somme on July 1st, we began to +lose men, material, and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks, +we were even then regaining it by the home development of the tank. +Even before the colossal German effort was frustrated by the first Marne +battle and the development of trench warfare, the German laboratories +were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas. +After the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans sought to gain +the initiative and a decision by the use of phosgene, the quiet work +of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered +the move weeks before. + +But in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective +without large-scale production. This was absolutely fundamental. +Had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank, had the Germans +failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of +succeeding in weeks, and had the box respirator taken longer to produce, +all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments +would have had practically no influence on the campaign, for they would +have had no incidence upon it. We could go on multiplying examples. +But what is the conclusion? + +From this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges. +The initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs, +unless we enlarge the staff conception. Vital moves can be +engineered from a point very remote in organisation and distance +from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field. But there is a critical +step between the invention and its effect on military initiative. +This is production, which for these newer methods becomes an organic +part of the campaign. + +But the future is our chief preoccupation. What would be +the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war? +It would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate +and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise. +Three factors would be pre-eminent, the nature of the idea or invention, +the magnitude on which it is employed, and its actual time of incidence, +that is, the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use. +Now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors, +which are entirely dependent on production. When, in 1917, +the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to +reply to German Yellow Cross, their urgent representations met +with no satisfactory response until nearly a year had elapsed. +This was not due to lack of invention, for we had simply to copy +the German discovery. Failure to meet the crying demands of the Front +was due to delay in production. + +Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine conditions +of disarmament, depend on peace industry, for no such conditions +will tolerate the existence of huge military arensals. +We have already indicated the type of peace-time industry +_par excellence_, which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war. +It is the organic chemical industry. Therefore, whatever the war may +have taught us as to the value of chemical industry, its importance +from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times. +The surprise factor is responsible. The next war will only +commence once, however long it may drag on, and it is to the start +that all efforts of a nation planning war will be directed. +It is, therefore, of importance to examine in detail the development +of chemical production during the recent war. + +A close examination is of more than historical significance, and should +provide answers to certain vital questions. German chemical industry was the +critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall. +How did the activities of this industry compare with our own production? +To this an answer is attempted below, but graver questions follow. +Was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal +economic conditions, and were we the victims of a considered policy? +If so, who directed it, and when did it first give evidence of activity? +An answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter. + +Significance of the German Dye Industry.--At the end of 1914 the nation began +to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monopoly. +Apart from the immediate economic war disadvantages, the variety and sinister +peace ramifications of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed. +Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, stated with regard +to the dye industry: "The inquiries of the Government have led them +to the conclusion that the excessive dependence of this country on a single +foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry +in which millions of our workpeople were employed, constitutes a permanent +danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale +which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of State encouragement." +Measures were defined later. + +In the debate in the House of Commons in February, 1915, on the +aniline dye industry, a member prominent in the discussion, +referring to "taking sides on the question of Free Trade," stated that, +"It was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of +the House is occupied with regard to MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR," +and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national +importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils. +Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance +of the "technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry." +These are two out of many references to the pressure due to +the absence of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic +grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on the one hand, +and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other. + +Exactly one month later came the first German gas shock. +Such statements as the above tempt us to ask who, at this time, +realised the common source of the direct military +and indirect economic attack. It can hardly be doubted +that the existence of the German dye factories was largely +responsible for the first German use of gas on the front. +We have already seen how, from the first month of the war, +the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research. +Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor +which finally determined its use. Referring to difficulties +of production, he says, "Only those who held responsible posts +in the German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can form any +estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time. +The adjustment of science and engineering . . . took place +almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished before +the enemy quite knew what was happening. Particular stress +was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions . . . +as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare." +Referring to protective methods of trench warfare, he continues, +"Where one party had gained time . . . the ordinary methods of attack +often failed completely. A weapon had, therefore, to be found +which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax +the limited capacity of German war industry in its production. +Such a weapon existed in gas." + +The Germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred, +and Ludendorff supplements our information by telling us how he discussed +the supply of war material with Herr Duisburg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen +in Halbach, "whom I had asked to join the train" in the autumn of 1916. +The former was the Chairman of the I.G., the great dye combine. + +Those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the +possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon +after the first shock. For the Germans the answer was obvious. +The Allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months, +if not years. Without the means of production available in Germany, +we are not at all, convinced that the gas experiment would have been made, +and had it not been made, and its formidable success revealed, +Germany's hesitation to use this new weapon would probably have +carried the day. This, at least, is the most generous point of view. +In other words, the German poison gas experiment owed a large part +of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly. +The combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led +to the great experiment. The future may again provide this combination, +unless the monopoly is removed. + +Following up this line of thought, we can see how tempting was the German +course of action. Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed +upon Germany by the stabilisation of the Western Front early in 1915. +The tension between the Great General Headquarters and the Home Government +was already in evidence, and would have caused difficulty in attaining +suitable home and liaison organisations, in particular with regard +to supply. We can well understand this when we remember the drastic +changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments. +But what organisation was required for chemical warfare supply? +Very little! Quoting from the report of the Hartley Mission to the chemical +factories in the occupied zone, we know that when the Government wished +to produce a new gas "a conference with the various firms was held +at Berlin to determine how manufacture should be subdivided in order +to use the existing plant to the best advantage." The firms referred +to were the constituent members of the highly organised I.G. There +was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an +efficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the Government demands. +The path could not have been smoother. Ludendorff states in his memoirs +that the Hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production. +Increased supply of explosives was also provided for. He says: +"We aimed at approximately doubling the previous production." And again: +"Gas production, too, had to keep pace with the increased output +of ammunition. The discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less. +The use of gas shells increased correspondingly." This programme represented +a determined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of 1916. +It included not only gas but explosives, both of which could be supplied +by the I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and nitrating plants, +which already existed, standardised, in the factories of the dye combine. +The unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted +for the production of explosives is instanced in the operation +of a T.N.T. plant at Leverkusen, producing 250 tons per month. +The conversion only took six weeks. The factories of the I.G. supplied +a considerable proportion of the high explosives used by Germany. + +In the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace +production was even more intimate. Chemical warfare products are +closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished +organic chemicals and intermediates produced by the dye industry. +Therefore, in most cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical +may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye +research laboratories, the products fall automatically into the class +handled by the dye industry. + +Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass +production of the older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types, +poison gases? Is there even a shadow of exaggeration in our claims? +There may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with +Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable settling of her debts, +regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed. +Can even such concoct material to whitewash the military front of the I.G.? If +they would, they must explain away these facts. + +The plants of the I.G. produced more than two thousand tons +of explosives per week, at their average pre-war rate. +This is an enormous quantity. How can we best visualise it? +In view of the chapters on Disarmament which follow, +we will use the following comparison. The Treaty of Versailles +allows Germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell +of different stated calibres. How much explosive will these +shell require? They could be filled by less than two days' +explosives production of the I.G. at its average war rate. +Between two and three million shell could be filled by +the result of a week's production in this organisation. +Further, the average rate of poison gas production within +the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per month, +sufficient to fill more than two million shell of Treaty calibres. +Unless drastic action has been taken, the bulk of this +capacity will remain, and Germany will be able to produce +enough poison gas in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell; +this in a country where the manufacture and use of such substances +are specially prohibited. + +It is appropriate at this stage to describe as briefly as possible +the origin and composition of this great German combination, +the Interessen Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. There is no need +to go into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual rooting +out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry in other countries, +notably England, France, and America. + +The Interessen Gemeinschaft.--By the end of the nineteenth century +the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost +exclusively in six great firms. These were the Badische Anilin +und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, known as the Badische; +the Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer, & Co., in Leverkusen, +known as Bayer; Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation +in Berlin; Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Bruning in Hochst am Main, +referred to as Hochst; Leopold Cassella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort; +and Kalle & Co., Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich. + +Each of these six great companies had attained enormous +proportions long before the war. Only two other concerns +had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale. These were +the Chemische Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M., +a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers, +and the Chemische Fabriken vormals Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen. + +The position of all these establishments, with one single exception, +along the Rhine and its tributaries is well known. +Their growth has been illustrated in their own prospectuses. +Hochst was organised in 1863 and started with five workmen. +In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 academically +trained chemists, and 74 highly qualified engineers. +The works of the Badische, which was organised in 1865, covered, +in 1914, 500 acres, with a water front of a mile and half on +the Rhine. There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 workmen, +and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks. +The establishment of Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable. +Quoting from an official American report,[1] "Griesheim Elektron, +prior to the war, had enormous works chiefly devoted to the +manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important +factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years, when by +absorption of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke Griesheim, +its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the +larger houses." This move on the part of the Griesheim Elektron +is interesting as an example of the general tendency which has +characterised the development of the German dye industry. +This firm, producing inorganic materials and intermediates, +absorbed the Oehler Works in order to find an independent outlet +for its intermediate products, thus becoming directly interested +in dyestuffs production. This move towards independence in +the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere, +owing to the manner in which it simplified German production +for chemical warfare. + +Combination, however, did not cease in the creation +of these enormous establishments. The cartel fever raged +here as in other German industries. By 1904 two immense +combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry. +One of these comprised Bayer, Badische, and Berlin; +the other Hochst, Cassella, and Kalle. "By pooling profits, +by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in +the other companies of its own cartel, and by other familiar means, +the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business +and the immense increases of export trade were minimised. +The centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here. +In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined with +Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and various smaller +companies in one gigantic cartel, representing a nationalisation +of the entire German dye and pharmaceutical industry." +The combination was extremely close. Profits of the companies +were pooled, and after being ascertained each year on common +principles were divided according to agreed percentages. +Each factory maintained an independent administration, but they +kept each other informed as to processes and experiences. +"There was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff +obstacles in other countries materials were to he produced +outside of Germany by common action and at common expense +whenever and wherever desirable. + + +[1] Alien Property Custodian's Report, 1919. + + +"At the time of the formation of this enormous organisation +the capitalisation of each of the principal component +companies was largely increased. Hochst, Badische, and Bayer +each increased their capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks, +bringing the capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks." +"Berlin increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 marks. +Other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group +to over 383,000,000 marks. For many years a large part of +the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into +the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations. +The real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure. +In fact, it is estimated that the actual investment in the works +comprising the cartel is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot +be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has +been created expressly for the expected war after the war, +and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently +and on a larger scale the various methods by which German +attacks upon all competition were carried on." + +Two additional features must be indicated. A policy to +which we have referred was most actively followed, aiming at +complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters +relevant to production, especially regarding raw materials. +We mention later how the war has strengthened the strong prewar +position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials +for the intermediates and finished dyes. + +Recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation, +including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new +synthetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and the other products +normally obtained by wood distillation. Again, the policy of the I.G. +appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war. +Exchanges of directing personnel and of capital amongst the branches have +been recorded for which the term "cartel" is no longer a fair description. +In addition, considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only +reveal the vision and activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close +contact with the German Government. With such an organisation in existence +and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors +and the German Government for other purposes than chemical warfare, +and in agreement with the paternal policy adopted by the latter towards +this chemical industry, production became simplicity itself. + +War Production by the I.G.--Let us, therefore, examine in some detail +the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order +to obtain an idea regarding case of production, we will later make +a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the Allies. + +From the point of view of this statement, there are two main classes +of production, that in which the majority of the steps involved +were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye, +pharmaceutical or other chemical product, and, in the second place, +that in which no such coincidence occurred, but in which the general +technique developed, and the varieties of existing plant covered +the needs of the case. Without stretching the point, every war +chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories. +In order to assist the less technical reader, we will consider +the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they +appeared against us on the front. + +_Chlorine_.--This important raw material, used in a variety +of operations, notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black, +two highly important dyes, was produced along the Rhine +before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day. +The only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already +existing plant at the large factory of Ludwigshaven. The following +table of production illustrates the point: + +CHLORINE (METRIC TONS PER DAY) + 1914 1918 + Leverkusen 20 20 + Hochst 4 8 + Ludwigshafen 13 35 + ---- ---- + Total 37 63 + +Chlorine was important, nor only as a raw material for most of the known +chemical warfare products, but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack. +Owing to the development of protection, the use of liquid chlorine +for the latter purpose became obsolete. + +_Phosgene_.--This was produced in considerable quantity +before the war at Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen, leading to many +exceedingly important dyes, amongst the most commonly used at +present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely +used in England. More expansion of plant was necessitated. +At Leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons +a month, and we learn "the plant remains intact ready for use." +At Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, amounting to +600 tons per month. As production was commenced before the war, +there were no difficulties in developing the process, +expansion alone being necessary. + +_Xylyl Bromide_.--This was one of the early lachrymators, and was produced +at Leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons. +Production began, according to a statement on the works, in March, 1915. +Its case can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost +as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres. + +The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their +brominated lachrymators. In this connection their persistent +efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product +and to crush the American industry before the war are significant. +The success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult +situation during the war, both with regard to production of +drugs and lachrymators. + +German bromine was associated with potash in the Stassfurt mineral deposits, +whereas the American product was produced from numerous salt springs +and rock salt mines. Although Germany had not succeeded in crushing +the American industry, yet the outbreak of war found her in a +predominant position, for her two chief opponents, France and England, +were cut off from their supplies, which were German; and American production +was of little use, owing to the great excess of demand over supply, +and the manipulation of output by German agents in America. A possible +source of bromine existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons, +whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an Austrian combination. +The French wisely developed a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their +own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us with small quantities. +But the development of such an enterprise in time of war was +a severe handicap. + +_Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate_.--This substance was toxic, +a lachrymator, and slightly persistent. It attained a maximum +monthly Output Of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons +at Hochst. This was not a simple compound to make, and had no direct +relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry. +At the same time, it provides an example of the way in which general technique +developed by the industry was rapidly used to master the new process. +In particular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here. +The reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate +and its subsequent chlorination. The methyl-formate plant was part +of an existing installation, but the chlorination and distillation +plant were specially installed. + +_Chlorpicrin_.--This was mixed with diphosgene and used +in the familiar Green Cross shell. The production was very +readily mastered and attained the rate of 200 tons per month. +Picric acid, chlorine, and lime were required, all three +being normal raw materials or products of the industry. +At Hochst no new plant was installed, the manufacture being +carried out in the synthetic indigo plant. + +_Phenylcarbylamine Chloride_.--This was used in German chemical shell, +and was not particularly effective against us, although produced in large +quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace time for a very +common intermediate, monochlorbenzene. The ease of production of this +substance may account for its use in large quantities by the Germans, +in order to increase their gas shell programme. + +_Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide_.--This was prepared +in four stages: + + +(1) Preparation of Ethylene--by heating alcohol with an aluminium +oxide catalyst at 400'0 C. + +(2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by passing ethylene +and carbon dioxide into a 10 per cent. solution of bleaching +powder at a temperature below zero centigrade, and subsequent +concentration of the product to a 20 per cent. solution. + +(3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thiodiglycol by treatment +with sodium sulphide. + +(4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas +(dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gaseous hydrochloric acid. + + +The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and provides one +of the best examples of the adaptation of the German dye works +for the purpose of producing war chemical. Technically, ethylene is +a fairly difficult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the +Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of the past. +There were twelve big units before the war, and, by the time +of the Armistice, these had been increased to seventy-two +in connection with mustard gas manufacture. In a similar way, +the number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, was increased +from three to eighteen. These two processes had all been worked +out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo. +These new plants were identical with the peace-time units. +The expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no +new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay. +Success was assured. The last step, the production of thiodiglycol, +occurred in the causticising house, to which no substantial +alterations or additions appear to have been made for the purpose. +As sodium sulphide is used in large quantities as a raw material +in the dye industry, and was already produced within the I.G., +no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply. + +The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories, one of which +was Leverkusen, where 300 tons of mustard gas were produced monthly. +The reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which +required very considerable care. At one stage of the war the Allies viewed +with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method. +But the technique of the German dye industry solved this as satisfactorily +and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its technical +experience to bear on the different difficulties involved. + +_Diphenychlorarsine_.--This was the earliest and main constituent +of the familiar Blue Cross shell. It was prepared in four stages: + + +(1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid. + +(2) The conversion of the above to phenyl arsenious oxide. + +(3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid. + +(4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl-chlor-arsine. + + + +This is another example of a highly complicated product +which might have presented great difficulties of production, +but the problem of whose manufacture was solved, almost automatically, +by the German organisation. + +The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid, +was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye +sheds without any alteration of plant, just as a new azo dye +might have been produced in the same shed. It is believed +that another dye factory also produced this substance. +At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred. +This was again carried out in the azo colour shed, with no +more modification than that involved in passing, from one azo +dye to another. + +This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was, and could still be, +practically invisible in operation. Not only was the process practically +the same as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were not particularly +poisonous in the intermediate stages, there was no risk to the workers, +and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions. + +The final stage, the preparation of diphenylchlorarsine, +the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, occurred at Hochst, +which also carried out the first three stages, already outlined +as occurring at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen. The last stage +was a simple one and was carried out in plant and buildings +previously used for peace purposes. + +The other substances employed provide further examples of this ease +of production. Ethyl-dichlor-arsine was produced in homogeneously +lead-lined vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene. +Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved +by applying the German method of using tiled vessels. + +The part played by the I.G. in the German chemical warfare organisation +has already been outlined, and we have seen how the German Government was +content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine. +The latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best +use of their organisation, which was done after reviewing the plant at their +disposal in the different branches. An interesting feature of the production +of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by examining the actual locality +of the separate operations leading to any one of the individual poison gases. +The attached table shows us how the production of any particular war chemical +involved a number of stages, each of which occurred in a different factory. +The directors of the I.G. simply chose a particular plant in a particular +factory which was most suited for the operation concerned. They + +{The table (spread over pages 162-163) are "raw OCR" feed! NEEDS FIXED!!!} + + FIRST STAGE + RAW +WAR CHEMICAL MATERIALS FROM THE I.G. PROCESS FACTORY + +Phenyl Carbylamine 1. Aniline Condensation of aniline Kalle Chloride 2. +Chlorine with carbon bisul 3. Caustic phide to phenyldithio soda carbamic +acid Mustard Gas 1. Carbon Preparation of Ethyl-Ludwigs dioxide lene +from Alcohol hafen 2. Bleaching + +powder 3. Sodium + +sulphide 4. Hydro chloric + +acid Diphenylchlorarsine I. Aniline Conversion of Diazo- Ludwigs 2. +Sodium benzene to Phenylar- hafen + +nitrite sinic acid Kalle 3. Sodium Hochst + +bisulphite 4. Sodium + +hydrate 5. Sulphur + +dioxide 6. Hydro chloric acid Ethyl -dichl or a rsine 1. +Ethyl Production of Ethylar-Ludwigs chloride sinic acid from +Ethyl hafen 2. Caustic chloride + +soda 3. Sulphur + +dioxide 4. Hydro chloric + +acid gas 5. Iodine Sym-dichlor-methyl- I. Chlorsul- Production +of Formal- Mainz + +ether phonic dehyde from Methyl116chst + +acid alcohol + +Z. Sulphuric + +acid 162 + +Review of Production + +SECOND STAGE THIRD STAGE FOURTH STAGE + +PROCESS FACTORI PROCESS FACTORi PROCESS FACTORY + +Conversion of Kalle Chlorination of Hochst + +Phenyidithio- Phenyl Mus carbamic acid tard Oil giving + +to Phenyl Mus- Phenyl Carby tard Oil by lamine Chlo zinc chloride ride +Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lever Ethylene +into wigs- Chlorhydrin wigs- Thiodiglycol kusen + +Ethylene hafen to Thio-di- hafen to Mustard + +Chlorhydrin glycol Gas + +Reduction of Lever- Conversion to Lever- Reduction of A.G.F.A. Phenyl arjinic +kusen Diphenylar- kusen Diphenylar- Hochst acid to Phenyl and sinic acid +by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide Hochst treatment Hijchst Diphenyl: + +with Diazo chlor-arsine + +benzene by Sulphur + +dioxide in + +HCl solution + +Reduction of Lud- Conversion of W)chst + +Ethyl arsinic wigs- Ethyl arseni acid to Ethyl hafen ous Oxide to + +arsenious oxide Ethyl dichlor by sulphur arsine by + +dioxide HCl and iodine Conversion of H8chst + +paraformalde hyde to sym + +dichlor methyl + +ether by means + +of chlorsul phonic acid {END OF TABLE NEEDING FIXED!} aimed at +the minimum conversion, and in a number of cases none was required. +The above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that +the organic chemical industry is the logical place for efficient +chemical warfare production. It cannot leave us unconvinced as to +the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence. + +Allied Difficulties.--Our own production was nothing but a +series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations. +We have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical +warfare organisation for research and supply during the war. +These added to the difficulties of the supply department, +just as they did to its complement, the research department. +Only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible +the relative success achieved, not only by the departments, +but in particular by the firms with whom they were called +upon to co-ordinate. + +We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in July, 1917. +Research work began almost from that date, yet successful large scale +production did not materialise in England until more than a year later. +We must admit, however, that the French were in a position to use +their product on the front in July, 1918. Let us examine some +of our difficulties. + +The first efforts were directed towards the process by which, +as we eventually ascertained, the Germans produced the whole +of their mustard gas. The actual chemical laboratory details +of the process presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties +multiplied as soon as we attempted large scale work. +We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work had been done on this +during the war for the National Health Insurance Commissioners +in connection with the production of novocain. Half scale +work had occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm, +and experience so gained was freely offered and used +in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas +by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers. +Pressing requests for the material were continually coming from +G.H.Q., the programmes outlined being more and more ambitious. +We had to reproduce the result of years of German effort spent +in developing their monochlor-hydrin process for indigo. +As a consequence, large sums of money were expended on the process, +although it never eventually operated. Its difficulties, +and other reasons, led us to research on other and more +direct methods which the French were also investigating. +The successful outcome of this early research was due, in particular, +to Sir William Pope and those associated with him in the work. +The process was so promising that the long and cumbersome chlor-hydrin +method was abandoned. As a result our five or six months' +work on the German method meant so much time lost. +The new direct, sulphur monochloride method was taken up +actively and several private firms attempted to develop +the small scale manufacture. The work was dangerous. +Lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique, +which was practically a German monopoly, rendered the task much +more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one +of the I.G. factories. + +The French, realising the importance of the new methods, +spared nothing in their attempts to develop them. +Their casualties multiplied at the works, but the only reply was +to put the factories concerned under the same regime as the front, +and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel. +The French realised the nature of their task, and organised +for it. When the difficulties of production were pointed +out in August, 1917, in the British Ministry of Munitions, +reports were instanced that the Germans had used forced labour. +The French in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone, +employed volunteer German prisoners. It was a curious +contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants +representatives of the American, Italian, and British Missions, +with French officers, French technical men, and German prisoners. +The latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work. +They were used for certain limited purposes, such as handling +raw materials, and were not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous +operations against which the French struggled so heroically +and successfully. It was as though a small section of the front +had been transferred to the heart of France. We saw the minister +visiting a factory and pinning the Legion of Honour on to +the breast of a worker blinded by yperite. We saw messages +of congratulation from the front to the factories themselves. +The morale was wonderful. As a result, the French mastered +the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell +filling by June, 1918. They shared information with us, but the race +had started neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard +completely the large plants to which we were already committed. +Without disparaging our own efforts, we must pay a tribute to the +achievement of the French yperite producing and filling factories. +It is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without +going beyond our scope, and we can only draw general comparisons. +But we must draw attention to the following. The German factories +passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which, +compared with the final Allied method, was clumsy and complicated, +but which suited their pre-war plant. Their policy was, +therefore, sound from the point of view of the campaign. +The Allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining +large scale manufacture with a simpler process. + +The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic endeavour was +shown in this country, but we were handicapped in mustard gas +production by the energetic way in which we had pressed forward +the industrial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method. +The French, less committed in terms of plant and finance, could more +readily adjust their energy, materials, and money to the new method. +It must not be forgotten, also, that, at this period, +chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing certain +critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency. +Here again the earlier centralisation of research and production +by France was a great factor in her favour. + +Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular with the arsenic compounds +described above, were of the same nature, involving us in casualties, +great expenditure, and little success, when compared with German production. +The great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as February, +1918, and investigations began even at that date, but they had not appeared +in the field by the time of the Armistice. Whatever mistakes we may have made +locally during the war, they are small compared with the big mistake which +was responsible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare production. +We were almost completely lacking in organic chemical industrial experience. + +It is interesting to note that the activities of those elements +of organic chemical industry which did exist in France and England +fully justified the conclusions we have drawn. Thus, although +entering late into the field of chemical warfare production, +Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their +collaborators of the firm of Levinstein Limited were able to develop +rapidly a successful industrial mustard gas process which was +of considerable assistance to England and America. This work, +both in research and production, deserves the greatest credit. +Again, the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist +in French production and were of considerable assistance. + +It would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other +war activities of our own dye industries. The outbreak of war found +them by no means inactive. In this country, for example, our own dye +factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes +created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment. +In particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the +Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a considerable achievement. +In addition, the new State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely +diverted to explosives production, and rendered very valuable services +in the supply of Tetryl, T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum. +For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and the use of dye capacity +for explosives, the important part which the rapidly expanding industry +could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised +quickly enough by the relevant authorities. This is not surprising, +for the war significance of the German dye industry was not fully +realised until the Armistice. It required the Hartley Mission +to drive this fact home. When, however, the brilliant researches, +referred to above, on the mustard gas method had decided our policy, +the dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously converted the process +into a technical success, and what was still a laboratory reaction +in the spring of 1917 became a successful manufacturing process in July +of that year. + +Released from its war responsibilities at the time of the Armistice, +the British industry developed so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech +to the Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, stated: +"A few months before the war broke out England produced only one-tenth +of the dyes she needed, but the amount which I am informed we shall +be able to turn out at the end of this year would, in weight, +be within one-fifth of the amount which England used before the war." + +But the Allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack +of suitable peace-time plant, and industrial organic chemical experience-- +they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw +materials and intermediates, the products of other chemical manufacture. +They had to create a liquid chlorine industry. In April, 1915, the only +liquid chlorine plant in England was in the hands of the firm of +Castner Kellner, whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day. +Increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments. +Chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and--practically every important +substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder. +Tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of +chlorpicrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front. +We refer elsewhere to the developing use of bleach in order to create +lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard gas. +A very simple calculation will show what quantities would be required +for such an operation. It is true that, as regards chlorine, we were +more favourably situated than France, and forwarded her considerable +supplies in exchange for phosgene. This chlorine was essential for +phosgene production. New plants were brought into being at different places, +largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm, +but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary, in order +to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time, to institute +a control of chlorine. More than 20,000 tons of liquid chlorine were +produced under the administration of the supply department concerned. +When we consider the effort which such an increase in production must +have involved, and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under +the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, but were +continually being modified to meet expansions or diminutions of programme, +we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the Germans owing +to their large initial experience and production. + +We have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old +Trench Warfare Supply Department and the firms with which it was in contact, +notably the one referred to above, in connection with the Loos attack. +But for them, we would not have been in a position to retaliate, +even at that date. + +The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine. +The French performed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine +industry in Tunis, the development of which reads like a romance. +Apparently this industry is dying out, and German predominance in bromine +is again asserted. + +French mustard gas production, for which they made such huge sacrifices, +was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples +can be multiplied. The Germans were in a very different position. +The development of their dye industry had followed the policy +of absolute independence of external chemical industry. +This independence was acquired either by the absorption of other +enterprises or by the definite development of processes and plant +for raw materials and intermediates. In every case the war has +strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products. +In 1918 they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia +as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per cent. +as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice as much +liquid chlorine. This was not purely a commercial question. +Our lack of such products was due to the fact that the Allies, +in pre-war times, possessed few or feeble industries whose +consumption would stimulate the production of these raw materials. +They lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard +for the fundamental importance of science, and particularly +chemical science, in industry. + +Conclusion.--We have shown how, during the war, chemical warfare proved its +surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor. +We have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from +the point of view of the future. The only logical conclusion is that +the country which does not possess a strong dye industry, or enormously +comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape +serious military results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical surprises. +The situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity +exists as a monopoly in the hands of Germany. No patriotic and thinking +person can, therefore, conclude otherwise than to encourage the creation +of dye industries in countries other than Germany, particularly in our own. +It is true, however, that patriotic sentiment and political views do +not always lead to the same solution. But we must insist that there +can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question, +and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment +in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility. + +Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue +by inaccurate thinking. When we find a Member of Parliament seriously +discussing disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter +in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those methods of warfare +in connection with which production can he easily prevented,[1] +we can only stand in amazement before our traditional fault, +deliberate sidetracking of expert guidance. When we realise that it +was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley Commission +opened our eyes to the war importance of the German dye industry, +we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence. + + +[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_, Major David Davies, M.P. + + +From the point of view of results on the front, for which all were working, +the German dye factories, when considered as a war weapon, were as much +in advance of Allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun +is ahead of the old muzzle-loader. + +Further, for progressive and flexible organic chemical production, +some such difference will always exist between the modern dye +industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained +to meet specific emergencies. + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS + + +Special Attention Justified;--Special Value of American Opinion.--Various +reasons prompt us to pay special attention to the development of +chemical warfare by the United States of America. In the preceding +chapters we have attempted a more or less connected account of its +development during the campaign. Such an account must necessarily +make constant reference to French and British developments. +But American preparations, although on a colossal scale, +were not in time to influence the campaign seriously and directly. +Therefore, purely for the symmetry of our account, special reference +should be made to America. But a more serious reason is to be found +in the great importance attached by America to this branch of warfare. +As everybody knows, the arrival of the American troops in large numbers +was preceded by an educational period, during which American staffs, +officers, and men became acquainted with Allied staffs, operations, +and methods on the Western Front. They were less biased by military +tradition, and not under the same necessity as the European Allies +to organise in an improvised way for different violent emergencies. +Their opinions of war methods on the Western Front are, therefore, +of great interest. + +Chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime importance in +their schemes, receiving a stimulus and a momentum which, rather than +losing force during peace, appears to have gathered intensity. +There was at first no particular background of emotion, +or desire for specific retaliation in this American development. +It was purely a question of deciding on technical grounds +the relative importance of different methods of warfare. +Solid facts determined the matter later. We have it on the best +authority that 75,000 out of the total 275,000 American casualties +were due to gas. + +Early American Activities.--The earliest American activities, +consisted in attaching various officers to the British formations +in France and to the French research and producing organisations +centred in Paris. A period ensued of remarkably rapid and efficient +assimilation of the best developments in allied chemical warfare. +Two American gas companies were attached to ours for instruction +in the first month of 1918, and they assisted in several gas attacks +on the British front. + +Field Activities.--In a sense the development of chemical warfare +organisations by the Americans was deprived of its promised success. +The Allies regained the general and final offensive before American +plans matured. But if the latter were prevented from participating +in various types of cloud and stationary attack along the front, +yet the coincidence of their organisation with the development of more +open warfare gave them an opportunity, which they readily seized, +to demonstrate the possibilities of mobile chemical attack. +Two gas companies, known as the 30th Engineers, were assembled, +partially trained, and embarked for France at the end of 1917. +They entered upon a course of training with the British Special Brigade R.E. +while further units were being organised in America. The projector +at-tracted the Americans, and they were ready, as General Fries +informs us, to launch a big projector gas attack, when Marshal Foch's +counter attack disorganised the front concerned. They then turned +their attention to the use of the four-inch Stokes mortar in an attempt +to neutralise the German machine-gun nests, using phosphorus for smoke +and thermit shell, and continued to assist the infantry either by taking +part in the preparations for attack or in subsequent operations. + +Special Difficulties.--The great length of the American +lines of communication led them to develop certain research +and experimental organisations near to the front. +These had to deal with the "short range" problems, those of +immediate importance, without referring them back +to America. The 3000 miles of ocean represented a necessary loss +of contact which prevented the home workers, however willing, +from fully realising the needs of the problems concerned. +Accordingly a strong experimental station, Hanlon Field, +was developed near Chaumont, and a well-equipped laboratory +was established at Puteaux, near Paris. + +Edgewood Arsenal.--The organisations developed in America were +of very great interest. The American officers in the field, +through their contact with the British and French, realised early +that we were extended to the utmost in the matter of production, +that our demands and programmes were far ahead of our output, +and that they could not reasonably expect serious help from us, +either with regard to the results or the material means of production. +They, therefore, made surveys of our methods and wisely determined +to concentrate on production in America. As a result, they developed +the phenomenal chemical warfare arsenal of Edgewood. Had the war +lasted longer, there can be no doubt that this centre of production +would have represented one of the most important contributions +by America to the world war. Probably had production been conceived +on a smaller scale, however, its results would have materialised +sooner and produced greater actual influence. + +A few facts with regard to Edgewood suffice to confirm its potentialities. +We learn[1] that the arsenal organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant, +probably the largest in the world, various chemical plants for the manufacture +of the chief chemical warfare substances adopted by the European belligerents, +and shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more than 200,000 shell +and bomb daily. + + +[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919. + + +Research.--Supporting this production, and in connection with +the other branches of chemical warfare, a tremendous research +organisation developed which, with the exception of the combined +research facilities of the I.G.[2] was probably the largest +research organisation ever assembled for one specific object. +It grew until it contained 1200 technical men and 700 +service assistants, and we are told that its work covered +exhaustive research on more than 4000 different materials. +Nor were the Americans less ambitious on protection. +Wisely adopting the British Box Respirator during the +early stages, they made vigorous attempts at the same time, +with considerable success, to develop a form of their own. + + +[2] The great German organic chemical combine. + + +Production.--An American opinion on the importance of Edgewood Arsenal +at the time of the Armistice is worth quoting.[3] "Here is a +mammoth plant, constructed in record time, efficiently manned, +capable of an enormous output of toxic material, and just reaching +its full possibilities of death-dealing at the moment when news +is hourly expected of the signing of the Armistice. What a pity +we did not possess this great engine of war from the day American +troops first sailed for France, for, had we been so prepared, +how many of our boys who `have gone West' could have returned +for the welcome home! Shall we forget this lesson of preparedness? +Is this great plant to be scrapped? Possibly wise heads may find +a solution of the problem which will add this great resource +to American chemical industry, at the same time preserving its +value to the nation as a greater asset, in case of future war, +than a standing army." + + +[3] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919. + + +Although mainly dependent on Edgewood Arsenal for their war schemes, +it is perfectly clear that the Americans realised that theirs +was not the ideal way, in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient +way to produce poison gases or chemical warfare substances. +Indeed, even during the war, in spite of their huge arsenal they +established contact with various American chemical producers. +At the present time, except in connection with its use for emergencies +during the next few years, this huge source of production +at Edgewood must be regarded as an unnecessary burden upon +the State. To be of any use, it requires costly maintenance. +It is only capable of producing a limited number of organic substances. +Some of these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on. +This reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only out of accord with any +international scheme for disarmament, but it is altogether too ponderous, +and not sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies. +This is fully realised in America. General Fries, addressing the +American Chemical Society, said: "The magnificent plant at Edgewood +may soon be a thing of the past. We do not believe the Government +should attempt to manufacture poisonous gases on a huge scale." +He explains how, by reliance upon normal chemical industry, +"We believe we can build up more quickly and to a greater extent +than by any other method the necessary large output of poisonous +gases required in a war with a first-class Power." Referring to +the mobilisation of industry for this purpose, he says: +"We believe that if this is done satisfactorily it will be one +of the greatest possible guarantees of future peace." + +Post-Armistice Developments.--But perhaps the most interesting +and significant aspect of American chemical warfare development +concerns what has occurred since the Armistice. Valuable and +successful attempts have been made to educate not only +the public but also political leaders to its real meaning. +No one examining the American daily and scientific press, +or reading the records of the various Government Committees +on the proposed bills of chemical, or chemical warfare, +interest can doubt that the Americans are probably as a whole much +more alive to the importance of this matter than any other ally. +Discussions on the Longworth Bill and on the new chemical warfare +service have provided full ventilation for the facts of the case, +in their proper setting. + +It was a striking contrast to land in America early in 1920 +and find New York plastered with recruiting posters setting +forth the various reasons why Americans should join their +Chemical Warfare Service. It was not only a sign of American +methods but also one of their appreciation of the importance +of the matter. This is amply borne out by their final +step in reconstruction during the last few months. +A separate Chemical Warfare Service has been reorgan-ised in +America in such a way as to give it a position of independence +equivalent to that of the older branches of the service. +The specific possibilities in the development of this form of +warfare are acknowledged by the action of the American Congress, +and this result is very largely due to the creation of +an intelligently informed political and public opinion. +Large grants of money have been placed at the disposal of +the new Chemical Warfare Service, and its research facilities +promise to equal the war establishments of the older services +of other Allied countries. + +Views of General Fries.--In view of the creation of this independent +Chemical Warfare Service in America and of its importance +when measured in terms of financial and material facilities, +it is of interest to summarise some of the views already +expressed by General Fries,[1] the head of the new service. +With regard to the general function of chemical warfare, he tells us: +"In the first place, chemical warfare is a complete science in itself. +No other invention since that of gunpowder has made so profound +a change in warfare as gas is making, or will make, in the future. + + +[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, 1920. + + +"To-day there are only four really distinct arms of the Service, +viz.: the Infantry, the Artillery, Aviation, and Chemical Warfare. All other +forms of warfare are a combination, more or less complete, of these. +The gases, smoke, and incendiary materials that make up chemical warfare +are used to a greater or lesser extent by other arms, but wherever gas +is used it compels precautionary measures that are found in no other branch +of the Service. + +"Considering its power, it has no equal. Physical vigour is one of +the greatest assets in any army. Gas, used properly and in quantities +that will be easily obtainable in future wars, will make the wearing +of the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two to five +miles of the front line, and in certain places for many miles beyond. +If it never killed a man, the reduction in physical vigour, and, therefore, +in efficiency of an army forced at all times to wear masks, would amount +to at least 25 per cent., equivalent to disabling a quarter of a million +men out of an army of a million." + +The Gas Cloud Inescapable.--He goes on to explain some of the more +specific military needs which can be met by chemical means, +and refers independently to a point which the Germans have +mentioned repeatedly in their memoirs. "One great reason why +chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long-felt +want on the part of the soldier, that of shooting successfully +around a stump or rock. The gas cloud is inescapable. +It sweeps over and into everything in its path. No trench +is too deep for it, no dug-out, unless hermetically sealed, +is safe from it. Night and darkness only heighten its effect. +It is the only weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky +blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant sunshine. +Only the mask and the training that go with it protect. +Terror, confusion, lack of discipline and control are fatal." + +Importance of Smoke.--General Fries is insistent on the future importance +of smoke in warfare: + +"Chemical warfare includes gas, smoke, and incendiary materials, +and they can't well be subdivided. As before stated, +all the early gas attacks were in the form of clouds. +The value of that cloud, not only for carrying gas but for +screening purposes, began to be realised in the fall of 1917. +Clouds of smoke may or may not be poisonous, and they will or will +not be poisonous, at the will of the one producing the smoke. +For that reason every cloud of smoke in the future must be +looked upon as possibly containing some deadly form of gas. +When you consider this for a moment, you can realise +the tremendous possibilities for ingenuity that gas and smoke +afford the attacker. + +"The American, trained for 300 years in meeting nature on her great +plains and in her vast forests, was early appealed to by this side +of chemical warfare. As early as November 3, 1917, the United States +was urged, in a cablegram from the Chemical Warfare Service in France, +to push the development of a large phosphorous supply for use in smokes. +Not only were the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by +later events, but to-day the future of smoke appears greater still. +The battle-field of the future will be covered with smoke-- +not the all-pervading black smoke of the battles of the Civil War +and of earlier wars before smokeless powder came into use, +but a field covered with dots and patches of smoke, big and little, +here and there and everywhere. + +"Every man who has hunted ducks and been caught in a dense fog +with ducks quacking all round, and who has tried to get ducks +by firing at the quack in the fog, can realise the difficulty +of hitting a man on the battlefield when you cannot see him, +and have only a quack, or less, by which to locate him. +The smoke will be generated in candles of two or three-pound +cans that can be thrown out in front of trenches; by knapsacks +that can be carried and which will give off dense white smoke +in large volume for many minutes; by grenades which, while they +may be thrown by hand, will generally be fired from rifles; +by artillery shells reaching ten, fifteen, twenty miles back +of the main battle line; and finally, from aeroplane bombs whose +radius of action is limited only by the size of the earth. +And thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war in the future. +It is more or less wholly protective in its nature, but as it +costs more and takes longer to train a man in the various problems +involved in modern war than ever before in this history of the world, +it is worth while taking every precaution to protect him, +once you have him trained." + +Casualty Percentages.--He also brings out very dearly the unique +possibility possessed by gas warfare of increasing its military efficiency, +while decreasing its relative atrocity: + +"The death rate in the first gas attack was probably +in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent. of all casualties-- +and everybody in front of the wave was a casualty. +With the development of masks and training in the use of the mask +and in taking advantage of the ground, the death rate fell. +At the same time the total number of casualties fell, but not +at all in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate. +From a probable death rate of 35 per cent. in the first attack +it fell to 24 per cent., then to 18 per cent., and, as gas +attacks by artillery became general, to 6 per cent., and finally, +with the extended use of mustard gas, the rate fell to 2.5 +per cent. or less." + +Again referring to casualties, he gives us the startling fact that 75,000 +out of the 275,000 American casualties were caused by gas, "And yet," +he says "the Germans used it in a halting, comparatively feeble manner." + +Short Range Projectors.--Very much alive to the future of the +short-range projectors developed in connection with gas warfare, +he tells us, "The Gas Regiment in the St. Mihiel battle fired +on the Cote des Esparges one hundred of these high explosive +bombs at the zero hour on the morning of the attack. That hill, +famous for its strength through four years of struggle between the +French and Germans, dis-appeared completely as an enemy standpoint. +Nothing remained but torn and broken barbed wire, bits of concrete +pill-boxes, and trenches filled with debris, and a few scattered +fragments of clothing. + +"The gas troops will, in the future, handle all short-range +methods of firing gas, smoke, or high explosive. +They will deliver the greatest quantities of material possible +up to ranges of a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters. +So effective and so efficient are these short-range methods +of projection that the No-Man's-Land of the future will +be the width covered by these projectors and mortars. +They can't, and never will, compete with the artillery, +where range and great accuracy are the most important factors. +The efficiency of artillery gas shell or artillery smoke or high +explosive shell is only one-fifth that of the projector. +Hence, for economy and efficiency, the artillery will be used +to fire gas, smoke, high explosive, and incendiary materials +only at ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops." + +Again, showing how the American authorities were seized with the importance +of the matter, we read: + +Vast Expansion in Personnel.--"So greatly were these possibilities +appreciated in the summer of 1918 that the number of gas troops +authorised for use against the Germans was increased from six companies +to fifty-four. Back of all this, however, was the productive capacity +of the United States, which ensured that those troops would be able +to fight day and night, summer, winter, and fall, until the war was over. +No wonder the German quit--it was time, and he knew it." + +And in conclusion General Fries tells us: + +"The universal adoption of gas warfare on sea and land and in the air, +combined with its persistent quality, will make that nation able +to produce and use gas in the largest quantity superior in war +to any other nation on the globe. The United States can reach +that position and maintain it, and I believe that we are going to get +such encouragement from the War Department that we can do it. +I feel sure that the army appreciates the value of chemical warfare, +and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists to chemical warfare. + +"So long as there is any danger of other nations continuing these methods +of warfare, research and experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued. +Research must not only be directed towards the gases and apparatus, +likely to be employed in the future, but also towards protection +against all possible gases. Training in the use of gas will be confined +to appropriate branches, but training in defensive measures will include +the whole army. + +"We must continue our studies of what is known as chemical warfare. +No nation has renounced the use of poison gases as the result of the +Peace Conference. There are nations whose word we could not respect +if they did renounce it. It is essential to study the offensive +side of chemical warfare if we are to be prepared for defence. +The great importance of adequate defensive appliances arises +from the fact that preparations for the offensive use of gas can +be made in peace-time with great secrecy, and may have far-reaching +and even fatal results in the early stages of a war. + +" . . . For these reasons it is necessary to make adequate provision +for research, experiment, and design in connection with war material. +It is equally necessary to avoid overlap, duplication of effort, +and the setting up of military institutions for scientific research +which can better be done by existing civil institutions." + +He also quotes from a statement from General Debeney, Director of +the French College of Warfare: + +"Should war begin now, aviation, and especially gas, would play one +of the most important parts. The progress of aviation would make +the rear of each front, and very far in rear, extremely dangerous, +and the progress of chemistry would permit the use of gas on zones +of such an extent as cannot be imagined. + +"Making gas is naturally rapidly done, because all the manufacturers +of chemical product--still so numerous in Germany--can be requisitioned, +but to make airplanes is much slower. + +"The defence against gas seems to be more difficult than against airplanes. +I believe that against airplanes, the anti-aircraft artillery is susceptible +of making rapid progress, and perhaps in that very instance gas will be one +of the best ways, if with appropriate shells _*the air can be poisoned all +around the attacking airplanes_. + +"It would be much more effective to create, for example, a sphere +of poisoned air a mile round the airplane, instead of trying to hit +the machine directly with bits of the shell." + +British, French, and even German opinion, while not +underestimating the importance of the matter, may not agree +in an unqualified way with all the above statements. +But we claim that they show vision in a branch of war which, +on account of its scientific basis, may, more than any other, +speedily prove the visionary a true prophet. + + + +CHAPTER IX + +GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY + + +The preceding account of chemical warfare leaves the impression of a +successful Allied struggle against persistently unfavourable circumstances. +We were constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace set by +the enemy. There were exceptions, undoubtedly, but in the main Germany +kept ahead in the chemical struggle. + +So far, in examining the root of our troubles, we have been content +to refer to the existence of the I.G., to describe its chemical +warfare activities, and to indicate, briefly, its unique power to +produce large quantities of organic chemical products at short notice. +The close connection between the German dye industry and chemical +warfare is now well recognised in official circles, and, to some extent, +by the general public. Its belated exposure was almost entirely +due to the facts revealed by the Inter-Allied Mission to the German +chemical factories some months after the Armistice. + +But the situation thus revealed was not created in a day, nor by chance. +Indeed, one of the military features of industrial chemical development +in the I.G. has already been traced to pre-war activities. +I refer to the Haber process for the production of synthetic ammonia. +It would be short-sighted policy to accept the set of conditions against +which we struggled, and to explain them in terms of the I.G., without +looking more closely into the pre-war activities of this organisation. +Such an examination may reveal the basic forces which determined +our inferior position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war. +It is true that we can explain away our inferiority by referring +to the German breach of faith, which automatically created conditions +for which we were unprepared. This is a comfortable solution. +But had chemical warfare been a strongly developed and accepted method of war +before the outbreak of hostilities, would we then have been prepared? +The records of the past, before April, 1915, must be consulted to answer +this question. We may find that our position is due to more than a mere +negative attitude, to more than our simple neglect of the organic +chemical industry. It maybe that there were forces which definitely +exploited this national characteristic to our disadvantage. +The pre-war policy and activities of the I.G. must be examined from +this point of view. In no country has such an investigation been +more complete than in America, and official statements have been issued +by the American Alien Property Custodian[1] which throw a flood of light +on the pre-war activities of the constituent branches of the I.G. They +conclusively reveal the existence of a carefully directed German chemical +policy making for world domination in the organic chemical industry, +which greatly hampered the military effectiveness of other countries, +and directly strengthened the military resources of Germany. On broad lines, +the pre-war and war activities of the I.G. produced the same result +as an attempt to strangle the economic life of possible opponents, +enfeebling their resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer blow +designed to take maximum advantage of the situation thus created. +Twenty years or more under the regime of a forceful economic policy, +not without its sinister aspects, prepared the ground by weakening us +in the concentrated chemical warfare which, ensued. The success of this +policy manoeuvred us into such a position that we barely escaped defeat +under the hammer blows of German chemical aggression. This, in fact, +appears to have been the German conception of modern war in its relation +to industry, and American reports have shown that it was carried through +with typical thoroughness by familiar German methods. + + +[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, Washington. +Government Printing Office, 1919. + + +Origin of German Chemical Monopolies.--The completeness of our organic +chemical deficiencies, and the thorough way in which we had failed +to develop organic chemical industries, creates such a sharp impression, +when thrown into relief by the outbreak of war, that we are led to +inquire into the methods by which these monopolies were established. +Let us admit, without any further delay, that Germany owed the origin +and assertion of these monopolies in part to her scientific development, +fostered by a vigorous policy of applying scientific research +to industrial enterprise. So far as her success depended upon +such factors, it merits our unqualified admiration and envy. +But stimulating these developments was a very definite general +and commercial policy which requires close examination. + +German Chemical Commercial Policy;--Evidence of the +U.S.A. Alien Property Custodian.--Giving every credit to German +initiative and thoroughness in the application of science to industry, +we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly came to be so complete. +We can rely on more than mere rumour, when examining the commercial methods +of the great I.G. The American Alien Property Custodian, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, +and, later, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, had occasion and opportunity to make +minute examination of the German dye agencies in America in connection +with general investigations on the reorganisation of alien property. +Their revelations truly merit the term, showing remarkably clearly +the unity of conception, determination of purpose, and co-operation +with the German Government which characterised the policy of the I.G. + +Pre-war American Situation.--Let us briefly consider the relevant +aspects of the pre-war American situation. According to fairly +well-known facts, confirmed by the reports of the two American officials +mentioned above, the American pre-war organic chemical industry +consisted of little more than a series of small assembling plants. +Although enormous supplies of coal-tar products were available, +yet the dye intermediates derived from them were not made in America, +but imported from Germany. After various attempts to establish +the dye industry, it seemed, at one time, about 1880, +to have definitely taken root, but, within the space of five years, +there were only four dye producing establishments remaining. + +German Price-cutting;--Salicylic Acid.--In every instance the manufacture +was almost immediately brought to an end by German price-cutting. +The same source reveals the direct and indirect methods used by +Germany to prevent, at all costs, the development of an independent +organic chemical industry. There are many pointed examples of +the direct method, and we will glance at the case of salicylic acid. +This is a very important chemical, used not only for certain important +drugs but also as in intermediate for dyes and photographic chemicals. +In 1903 the United States possessed five manufacturers of this product. +In ten years' time three of these had failed, and one of the survivors +was a mere branch of a German house. During this fatal ten years, +the product was being sold in that country at a price twenty-five per cent. +lower than in Germany. The manipulation of the prices of the other products +of the German monopoly enabled them, by such methods, to maintain it. +Many other examples, including such important products as bromine, +oxalic acid, and aniline, could be quoted to show the results of the German +price-cutting policy. The direct significance of bromine for chemical +warfare must be borne in mind. + +Full Line Forcing.--Besides directly attacking the production +of raw materials and intermediates, the Germans used an indirect +method which has been described as "full line forcing." +They were the sole producers of certain specialities, such as +alizarine colours, anthracene colours, and synthetic indigo. +These were indispensable to the textile manufacturers, +and by refusing to supply them, except to houses which +would buy their other supplies from German manufacturers, +the latter could squeeze out home producers of simple dyes, +however efficient their production. + +Bribery and Corruption;--German Patent Policy.--The dyeing +industry was peculiarly susceptible to corruption. +It was so simple for the head dyer of a mill to show +a partiality for dyes from any particular source of supply. +The American Alien Property Custodian very frankly tells us[1]: "The +methods of the great German houses in carrying on their business +in this country were from the first honeycombed with corruption. +Bribery of dyers was carried on almost universally on a large +scale. . . . So extensive was this corruption that I came across +only one American consumer that had escaped its ill effects." +Such were hardly the methods of decent commercial competition, +although it appears that the strong patriotic sense of the German +was able to justify, in his own eyes, what might be regarded +as reprehensible methods. This is not a question of bringing +up old reproaches, but merely of coldly examining facts. +We have already referred to their patent policy, whereby thousands +of patents were taken out, the only value of many of them, +being to cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals. +Professor Stieglitz explains how the German patents were useless +in developing large scale manufacture. "The patent protects +the product, but does not reveal the method." Sir William Pope +has also brought out this point, showing how the Germans use +thousands of bogus patents to protect their chemical industry. +He tells us,[1b] "In fact, some German patents are drawn +up for the purpose of discouraging investigation by more +practical methods; thus, any one who attempted to repeat +the method for manufacturing a dyestuff protected by Salzman & +Kruger in the German patent No. 12,096 would be pretty certain +to kill himself during the operation." + + +[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p. 34. + +[1b] _Science and the Nation_. A. C. Seward, F.R.S. Cambridge +University Press, 1917. + + +Propaganda and Information;--Espionage; Activities of +the Dye Agencies.--But another method which was used in this +commercial offensive, to which we must draw further attention, +dealt with propaganda and information. In his comprehensive report, +the American Men Property Custodian examines a number of large +industries and reveals how the German interest in these industries +through their American ramifications were active, "sowing the seeds +of German propaganda," and collecting information, both commercial +and military, for the use of the German Government and its agents. +Quoting again from this report, "In many of the large German-owned +companies taken over by the Alien Property Custodian, after investigation +it was found that espionage was one of the chief functions. +Every scrap of information of commercial or military value +to Germany was carefully gathered by the representatives of these +concerns in this country and quickly forwarded to the home office +in Germany. The German agents were particularly keen on gathering +information that would be helpful to Germany's commercial warfare. +Once in Germany, this information was carefully card-indexed +for the use of the manufacturers. Bulletins of commercial +information were also prepared and placed at their disposal. +In Germany, the collection of all commercial information is under +a bureau which is controlled and financed by the great German banks, +such as the Dresdner, Disconto, and Reichs Bank." This statement +is not mere generalisation, but is backed by innumerable examples. +Thus we find a light railway equipment manufacturer, a projectile company, +a wireless company, various magneto companies, insurance companies, +and German shipping companies, all engaged in spreading propaganda, +acquiring information, and influencing public opinion in favour +of Germany. But, undoubtedly more important than any of these, +and taking a leading part in the general scheme, was the German +dye organisation. The American publications make this quite clear. +Mr. Garvan goes so far as to say: "As long as you were supplied +by the big six (_i.e_. the I.G.), your business had no secret unknown +to Berlin. In Berlin you will find the card index system which +recites every fact connected with each and every one of your sources +which can be of any possible value to your rivals over there." +Referring to assistance rendered by various American and Allied +departments, including Military, Naval, and War Trade Intelligence, +we learn from the same sources: "All these bodies worked in close +co-operation and their mutual assistance was of inestimable value. +Information derived from these sources demonstrated that the chemical +industry was a natural centre for espionage and that this had been +true long before we entered the war--indeed, before the war began. +The relation between the German Government and the great German +chemical houses was so close that representatives of the industry +were naturally almost direct representatives of the Government, +and their work in this country gave them unequalled opportunities +for examining our industries from within." + +With the outbreak of war, this organisation became more clearly defined. +It was, perhaps, difficult before the war to know where to draw the line +between purely commercial and actual governmental German activities. +The outbreak of war left no room for doubt. The German dye agencies became, +at once, the active agents of their Government in various schemes, +the nature of which we shall outline, and their "information" functions +became very definitely describable as espionage. + +Manoeuvring Raw Materials.--In the first place, the Alien Property Custodian +found unexampled, evidence of a definite German scheme to corner and divert +certain important war materials destined for the Allies. + +Chemical Exchange Association;--Doctor Albert's Letter.--Many such plots +could be quoted, but we will limit ourselves to one,[1] chosen because on its +stage move the chief figures of this espionage system. This case has been +described under the name of the "Chemical Exchange Association," and is much +more fitted for the pen of a Conan Doyle. The move appears to have been +initiated by Dr. Albert, the financial adviser of the German Government +in America, in collaboration with von Bernstorff. Its purpose was to +corner the immediate supplies of American phenol in order to prevent its +manufacture into high explosives, including the well-known picric acid. +The outbreak of war instantly stopped the entry of phenol into the country. +Further, this product was not manufactured there to any extent before. +Large supplies were required for the production of synthetic resins, +for the gramophone industry, This led to the development of a phenol industry +by the Edison works, and there appeared, automatically, a phenol surplus. +Dr. Albert, aware of the probable fate of this surplus as raw material +for allied munitions, determined to seize it for the German Government, +and he did this through Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, one of the most prominent +members of the American agency of the great Bayer works. In June, 1915, +Dr. Schweitzer contracted with the selling agents of the Edison Co. +for the entire surplus of phenol available for sale, offering a large cash +security which was furnished by Dr. Albert. A lapse of a week witnessed +another contract with the Heyden Chemical Works, a branch of the German house, +by which this phenol was purchased for conversion into salicylic acid and +other products. To avoid exposing the nature of the deal, Dr. Schweitzer +registered as the "Chemical Exchange Association." The profits amounted to +nearly a million dollars, half of which belonged to Dr. Schweitzer. This, we +are told, went immediately to the German Government. As a suitable +climax to such a venture, a dinner was given at the Hotel Astor by +Dr. Schweitzer in honour of Dr. Albert, and is described as a typical +gathering of the most active German propagandists in the country. +It was as a result of this deal that Dr. Albert sent Dr. Schweitzer +a memorable letter in which he praises his "breadth of highmindedness," +and compares his work with "a military coup accomplished by an army +leader in destroying three railroad trains of forty cars containing four +and a half million pounds of explosives." + + +[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p. 43. + + +Dye Agency Information System;--Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare.-- +Although a great deal has been said in America with regard to +the activities of Dr. Schweitzer and his followers, very little +has been heard on this side. Explaining the complete information +system possessed by the Germans, Mr. F. P. Garvan informs us +that the head of the system in America for years before the war +was Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, President of the Bayer Company there, +and he even quotes his secret service number given him by +the Imperial Minister of War, stating that he came to America, +became a citizen on the instruction of the German Government, +and led the espionage and propagandist movements down to the day +of his sudden death in November, 1917. The relationships between +Dr. Albert and Dr. Schweitzer, when the former was leaving for Germany +in 1917, are very illuminating. We learn from the same source +how Dr. Schweitzer received from the former nearly one and a half +million dollars, all to be spent in espionage and propaganda. +Dr. Albert, leaving Dr. Schweitzer a letter of appreciation, +to which we have referred in connection with the Chemical Exchange, +makes a very significant reference to chemical warfare. +"Of still greater and more beneficial effect is the support which you +have afforded to the purchase of bromine. We have a well-founded +hope that, with the exclusion of perhaps small quantities, we shall +be in a position to buy up the total production of the country. +Bromine, together with chloral, is used in making nitric gases, +which are of such great importance in trench warfare. +Without bromine these nitric gases are of slight effect: in connection +with bromine they are of terrible effect. Bromine is produced only +in the United States and Germany. While, therefore, the material +is on hand in satisfactory quantities for the Germans, the Allies +are entirely dependent upon importation from America." Making due +allowance for the fact that Dr. Albert was not a technical man, +this information possesses an element of truth, indeed France +was driven to the extreme of establishing a bromine industry +in the wilds of Tunis in order to counter the German attack. + +The Moral Aspect.--Such facts tempt us to think hardly of these +representatives of German culture. But they were, no doubt, +fiercely patriotic Germans, and it is not difficult for us +to understand their activities after the outbreak of war. +An American, however, can hardly adopt such a lenient view, if, as has +been claimed, many of these agents were naturalised Americans, +for they were abusing the privileges and the confidence of their +adopted country. We have no wish, however, to dwell on this aspect +of the matter, and have no doubt whatever that many good Germans +could justify all these activities according to their own codes. +It would have been better not to have given this information +the light of day, were it not of some value for the future. + +Report of the New York World;--German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies +to the U.S.A.--How far can the parent organisation of these +dye agencies be regarded as aware of their activities? +They were largely responsible for their inspiration. +Mr. Garvan says, "Practically all the dye salesmen were only +nominally in the employ of the branches here; all had secret +and personal contracts with the Home Office." From these facts +alone there can hardly be any doubt as to the connivance of the +home organisation. Again, on April 28, 1915, the _New York World_ +printed an editorial explaining that "two large German chemical +and aniline dye concerns are reported to be establishing factories +in New Jersey, to supply American demands hither to supplied +from Germany." This statement apparently alarmed Captain Boy-Ed, +the German Naval Attache, and he communicated with Dr. Albert, +the financial representative in New York, for the establishment +of these factories would have countered the German policy +of bringing political pressure by refusing dye shipments. +Dr. Albert's reply to Boy-Ed contains the following phrase: +"With regard to the dyes, I got into touch with local experts +in order to determine what truth there is in the news. +According to my knowledge of things, the matter is a fake, +inasmuch as _*our factories have bound themselves orally +and by word of honour to do nothing in the present situation +which might help the United States_." As further evidence of this +definite policy, witness a letter from Consul-General Hossenfelder +to the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. This +letter is dated New York, March 3, 1916, and, after a detailed +examination of the economic relationships between Germany +and America, states: "Further, we should, according to my conviction, +hold ourselves absolutely passive in relation to the proposals +for the exportation of potash, chemicals, and dyestuffs, +and if the opportunity arises, make the sanction for them, +not dependent upon the consent for an exchange of articles, +but upon the abolition _en bloc_ of all hindrances to intercourse +contrary to international laws which have been instituted +by England." Further, Dr. Albert, cabling to the German Government +in April, 1916, on the export of dyestuffs, tells us: +"The hope was entertained of bringing American industries +which were solely dependent upon German deliveries of dyestuffs +into a position that they would have to insist on the importation +of dyestuffs under the conditions demanded by Germany." There can +then be no doubt that the parent organisation of the I.G. was +in close touch with the activities of its agencies. + +This, then, is a brief account of the methods by which Germany created +the monopoly whose existence threatened our success in the world war. +Before leaving the question of the monopoly, let us inquire a little +more closely into its exact nature and range. Various American official +reports have revealed the desperate measures necessitated in that country +in order to meet deficiencies in vital products when the German source +of supply was removed. + +Professor Stieglitz's Evidence.--Professor Stieglitz, of the University +of Chicago, giving evidence before the United States Senate, stated:[1] + + +[1] Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920. + + +"I have come to the conclusion that we would have saved a great deal of +suffering and a great many lives in this country, if we had had an organic +chemical industry, as they have in Germany, before we started the war." +Characterising the dye industry as the source of war chemicals, +including explosives and poison gas, he emphasises the drug question +and shows how their development depends absolutely upon the existence +of certain raw materials, and facilities for comprehensive organic +chemical research, which only find a _raison d'etre_ in the existence +of a flourishing dye industry, + +Ehrlich's Discovery.--Pointing out the difficulties in developing +the manufacture of salvarsan, he explains how the process was +originally discovered by an organic chemist, Dr. Paul Ehrlich, +co-operating with a German dye company, the crude material coming +from the dye plants, the product itself strongly resembling dyes, +"containing arsenic instead of part of their nitrogen." +The great importance of this drug is brought out by another witness +before the same committee, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, who explains how, +by refusing or neglecting to ship salvarsan, Germany wanted the +United States "to starve to death" for lack of it, and he continues: +"Think what an extension of disease and that an intensification +of suffering and distress Germany was willing to impose upon +her best market in order to obtain her imperial will." + +Germany had monopolised the production of the important +synthetic drugs, including the derivatives of salicylic acid, +of which aspirin had developed wide use in Allied countries. +After every household had learnt the value of German +produced aspirin, its supply was cut off at the outbreak of war. +The same disadvantages applied in the field of anaesthetics. +For a long period America had no local anaesthetics for hospital +surgical work, being compelled to use what were termed +"Bulgarian Operations," that is, operations without anaesthetics. +Professor Stieglitz claims that the lack of drugs and +anaesthetics threw back American surgery some fifty to seventy +years in civilisation. + +But what of this country? We have already outlined how the outbreak +of war found us with, at the most, two or three relatively small +producing centres, which did valiant service during the war +and amply proved the importance of the dye industry by revealing +what could have been done had we been many times stronger. +Was the same German chemical policy responsible for our +pre-war position? As far as we know official investigations +have not been pursued to the same length as in America, but it +is beyond doubt that the German dye companies took every possible +step to stifle the development of our organic chemical production. +When the war broke out, our comfortable commercial contact +with the I.G. became a strangle-hold. It could not be otherwise. +Whatever the German attitude, and we could hardly expect it to +be friendly, the strangle-hold at the outbreak of war was inevitable. +But this dye menace facing our textile industries, and weakening +our power of retaliation in the chemical war, was not the only +danger from the I.G. We were in a critical position through failure +to produce other commodities than dyes. + +Drugs and Medicinal Products;--The German Monopoly;--National Health +Insurance Commission.--The question of drugs assumed critical +importance at the outbreak of war. Germany had been asserting +her monopoly for years in the field of medicinal chemicals. +Cessation of supplies at the outbreak of war caused grave +apprehension of a serious shortage in these products, +so important for the adequate treatment of disease. +In some cases we possessed neither the raw materials nor +the technical knowledge to undertake rapid home production. +But in the important group of the synthetic drugs derived from +coal-tar products, the raw materials were produced in quantity in +the United, Kingdom, only to be exported to Germany, thus contributing +to her monopoly. British manufacturers, on the other hand, +held their own in the production of certain kinds of drugs, +such as the alkaloids, gaseous anaesthetics, and some inorganic +salts of bismuth and mercury. In a summary of certain war +activities of the National Health Insurance Commission, we read: +"It was chiefly in the making of the coal-tar synthetic remedies +that Germany was pre-eminent, and that position was due not to any +lack of skill or invention on the part of the British chemists, +but to the high degree of organisation attained by the German +chemical industry, which made it possible to convert the by-products +of the aniline factories into medicaments of high therapeutic +and commercial value." + +The Royal Society;--Novocain.--So serious was the situation +that for some time we existed on feeble stocks. But during this +period the utmost efforts were made to develop our own production. +The Royal Society promptly came forward with a scheme to link +up would-be producers with appropriate centres of research. +The latter not only assisted production but actually produced sufficient +quantities of important drugs to tide us over the difficult period. +Thus, for example, for the production of novocain the assistance +of about forty university laboratories throughout the country +was invoked, and they proceeded to produce the intermediates, +diethylamine and ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. These substances +were converted into diethyl-amino-ethanol, and the final step, +the production of novocain, was undertaken by manufacturers, +including a prominent dye firm. We have referred to one of these +substances in connection with the German production of mustard gas, +and need only say that in England, in a time of national emergency, +the Government had to depend on the improvised assistance +of forty teaching and research institutions for the production +of small quantities of drug intermediates. Further, this work, +although to the permanent credit of those who undertook it, +did not enable us later to produce rapidly war quantities of +mustard gas, itself dependent on the same important intermediate, +ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Germany settled the drug and mustard +gas question by a simple demand to the I.G., because the latter, +holding the indigo monopoly, possessed actual large-scale +ethylene-chlor-hydrin production. + +Other cases, although equally creditable to those actually engaged +in the work, also reflect our national unpreparedness and neglect +of chemical industry. + +Beta-Eucaine.--Beta-eucaine is a very important local anaesthetic. +Before the war we obtained it almost exclusively from Germany. When urgently +needed in 1915 for the War Office and Admiralty, the Government discovered +that it could not obtain this substance from commercial sources. +Seventeen laboratories co-operated to produce two hundred and sixteen +pounds of the material. Such examples would be ludicrous did they +not possess such a serious national aspect. Our position was almost +as desperate regarding chloral-hydrate, the important hypnotic, +and the rare carbo-hydrates required for bacteriological purposes. +Sir William Pope's comprehensive statement[1] supplies further examples. + + +[1] _Science and the Nation_, A. C, Seward. F.R.S. Cambridge +University Press, 1917. + + +Photographic Chemicals.--Our dependence upon German monopoly, +so drastically revealed at the outbreak of war, was not limited +to dyes and drugs, Photographic chemicals were of special importance +for war purposes, yet, when the development of aviation increased our +demands for photographic chemicals, we had no normal sufficient source +to which to turn. We needed not only the essential bulk chemicals, +such as amidol, metol, para-amidophenol, and glycine, but also +certain rarer substances, such as the photographic sensitisers, +which were so essential for the Air Force. By calling upon chemical +industry and research institutions both needs were satisfactorily met, +but the contrast with Germany leads perforce to the same conclusion, +their case and speed of production as compared with ours. + +This examination shows the fine texture of the tenacious web by which Germany +had entangled and stifled the organic chemical industries of other countries. +Although at the outbreak of war the Allies were slow to realise the war +significance of the dye industry, yet they were quick to determine that +the resumption of peace would not find them in such an ignominious position. +Steps were taken to establish dye industries in England, France, +and America. Not only did plants spring up to meet the immediate +needs of the textile industries of the world outside Germany, +but the question received considerable Government attention. +Promises were made and steps taken to encourage the growing industries. +But these cannot be examined in detail here, and the main facts are +common knowledge. Two points emerge, however, which are of prime +importance from the point of view of our discussion. In the first place, +the acute needs of the armies prevented the maximum use of the war +opportunity for developing Allied dye industries on a sound basis. +No sooner was producing capacity installed, than it was taken over for +the production of urgently needed organic chemicals for explosives. +Dye enthusiasts would have regarded the war as a supreme opportunity +for a period of concentrated organic chemical research to make up +the leeway which existed, owing to forty years of German development. +But the research energies of the country were occupied on more +pressing problems. In Germany, the war chemical activities of the dye +factories all contributed to their future post-war strength. +In England and France it was otherwise. Our equivalent energies were +concentrated on developing improvised processes and plant, absolutely +necessary to counter the German attacks, but almost without exception +of no direct ultimate value to our peace organic chemical industries. +This is a point which merits careful consideration. These industries +voluntarily threw aside what was, logically, a great opportunity for them +to push their research investigations so necessary for eventual success. +The state-aided Huddersfield factory represented national vision, whose fruits +were stolen by our ceaseless need to improvise counters to German aggression. +But we owe to our dye industry the national recognition of these facts. +Stress of war gave us true vision, but prevented its logical outcome. +War needs are now removed, and everything should be done to place at +the disposal of the dye industries those facilities which they necessarily, +but gladly, sacrificed in time of emergency. + +The brief survey of the preceding pages reveals the existence of a German +chemical policy pursued vigorously for many years before the war. +It also shows how this policy developed in America, the chief neutral country, +during the war period, for two years before her entry. + +The Americans have also established beyond doubt the active +co-operation between the German Government and the I.G. But, +if the policy of the German Government and of the organic +chemical industry had many points in common before the war, +they became one before hostilities were many months old. +The part played by the I.G. in munitions production, in which it +was virtually a tool of the Government, has already been seen. +It must be remembered that, after the first Battle of the Marne, +the German Government turned to the I.G. for a large part of +its explosives and practically all its poison gas, and, as has +been stated on many occasions, and with reason, Germany would +not have been able to continue the war after the summer of 1915 +but for the commercial development of the Haber process +by the I.G. The story is too well known to repeat at length. +The basic element of explosives is nitrogen, which is introduced +by nitric acid. This was produced from imported Chili saltpetre, +but the blockade cut short these imports, and but for the Haber +method, the vital step in producing nitric acid from the air, +Germany would have been compelled to abandon the struggle. + +There is striking coincidence between the commencement of +the Great War and the successful completion of certain vital +German chemical developments. As late as 1912 Germany still +depended on other countries, chiefly England, for her phenol, +the basic raw material for picric acid as well as a dye necessity. +Soon after that date the development of the Bayer plant made +her independent in that product, and gave her, in fact, +an exportable surplus. + +War Activities of the I.G.--Reviewing all these activities and realising +how they all emanate from this one organisation, we are overwhelmed by its +formidable nature as an offensive and defensive weapon in time of war. +Here we have an organisation, the I.G., whose sinister pre-war +ramifications dominated the world by their hold on the supply of organic +chemicals vital for peace and war. This organisation functioned, +in a sense, as the life blood of German offensive warfare. +German sources tell us very little of the war activities and future +significance of the I.G. A veil of secrecy seems to be cast +over the whole matter, but behind this veil must exist an acute +realisation of the value of the I.G. as a trump card for the future. +Krupp is uncovered, the whole world was alarmed at its meaning for war, +but heard with a comfortable sense of security how Krupp was +exchanging the sword for the plough. But the gigantic I.G. controls +in its great hand a sword or plough for war or peace at will. +This is no far-fetched metaphor. + +The Rhine Factories and the Armistice,--It therefore becomes important +to inquire into the attitude and activities of the I.G. since +the Armistice, and to examine its position in world reconstruction. +For one brief period, the few weeks following the Armistice, the German dye +industries appear to have been without policy, its leaders in confusion. +But with the confidence inspired by the Allied Rhineland occupation, +with the assistance provided by the Allied controlling organisations, +with regard to labour, fuel, and commercial transactions, the industrial +morale speedily recovered. + +The tide of revolution which accompanied the German debacle in +the autumn of 1918 swept over the Rhineland chemical factories. +Colonel Norris, writing on his visit in February, 1919, tells us +that after peace was restored by the Allied forces:[1]-- +"the managers of several factories agreed that the occupation +of the territory was the best thing that could have happened. +On the other side of the Rhine, labour refused to work, +and demanded unheard-of pay--everything was topsy-turvy. In fact, +before the Allied armies arrived, revolutionary notions were +growing rapidly along the Rhine. One director of a well-known +chemical plant is said to have escaped by night with his life +by way of the river, when his employees were especially menacing. +When the British Army came he returned, and is now at his old post." +Thus, although the I.G. was model in its institutions for +the welfare of employees, at least one of its most prominent +directors was compelled to take refuge from infuriated labour. +What with danger from the latter, and the uncertainty of action +by the oncoming Allied troops, the future of the factories +appeared very gloomy. In fact, there are fairly credible +rumours that the German directors were willing to dispose +of their assets to the Allies while they remained intact. +But the same Allied troops, whose advent was feared, rolled back +the tide of revolution from the banks of the Rhine, and restored +industrial security. It is doubtful whether the investing +armies realised the full war significance of these factories, +except the French. The latter instituted a fairly thorough +control almost at once. But, judging from reports of +different missions to these factories, we were even backward +in organising inspection of the purely munitions plants. +Thus the Hartley Mission did not materialise until three +months had elapsed. + + +[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol. XI., 1919, +Page 817. + + +War Mentality of the I.G.--We watch a vivid impression of the war +mentality of the I.G. in a few phrases from Colonel Norris's account: +"Around the walls of the director's room was a beautifully painted +and artistic frieze which pictured the various plants of the +Bayer Company and their activities. Dr. Duisberg, the director, +pointed out proudly to the Americans the view of the company's plant +on the Hudson River. We were not surprised to see it, although pre-war +advertisements had assured us at home that Bayer aspirin had been made +on the Hudson for years by an American company. During the war an +ante-room had been decorated in a similar way, with pictures illustrating +the activity of the plant in the preparation of war-gas materials. +One saw how gas was made, shells were filled, and gas masks assembled. +The work was done by an artist, and has a permanent value. +The fact that the thing was conceived and executed during the stress +of war throws an interesting sidelight on German character." +Incidentally, it also throws a further sidelight upon the part played +by Leverkusen in the chemical warfare campaign. + +German Attitude towards Inspection.--As was quite to be expected, +the German factories did not receive our missions with open arms, +and they were particularly jealous of any inspection at Oppau, +the site of the wonderful Haber synthetic ammonia plant. +Lieut. McConnel, of the U.S. Navy, tells us:[1] "Upon arrival +at the plant the Germans displayed a polite but sullen attitude. +They seemed willing to afford the opportunity of a cursory +inspection, but strongly objected to a detailed examination. +On the third day of the visit the writer was informed that his +presence had become a source of serious objection and that if his +examination were prolonged a formal complaint would be submitted +to the Peace Conference." The Allies had only themselves to blame. +Their facile yielding to the argument that this great arsenal +was principally of peace significance, owing to the fertilisers +which it would eventually make, and the feeble backing provided +for inspecting missions, were reflected in the semi-resistant +attitude of the I.G. personnel. + + +[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol. XI., 1919, +page 837. + + +The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast.--It was a curious contrast, however, +to pass through Chaulny on the way to the Rhine. At Chaulny, +the oldest chemical works in France, quoting again from +Colonel Norris, "where Gay-Lussac did his famous work on the +manufacture of sulphuric acid, where Courtois discovered iodine, +and where plate glass was first made, had grown with the times, +and was amongst the largest factories in France. Around it +was a thriving town of about 13,000 inhabitants, with some +excellent public modern buildings. When the Germans in their +first retreat were forced to leave the place, they dismantled +the factory and carried away everything that was portable. +The fortunes of war brought them back, and before they left +a second time a regiment of soldiers was put to work to destroy +systematically the factory and the entire town. For, a month +they kept at work, and when they withdrew but a few bricks were +left standing. Every boiler had been blown up with dynamite, +and every tank too heavy to be carted away rendered useless. +About half an acre was covered with chemical stoneware of +all kinds; each piece had been broken with a sledgehammer. +Nothing was too small or too large to escape destruction. +And to make sure of a good job, everything that would burn was +set on fire." Yet within twenty-four hours one met Germans, +in-directly or directly responsible for this policy of destruction, +resenting peaceful Allied inquiries on the munition activities +of their own plants. We hardly know whether to attribute such +effects of Allied policy to our own integrity in respecting +the peace activities of these arsenals or to official ignorance +of their war-like nature. + +German Revolution and the Industrial Leaders.--It is curious how +the leadership of the captains of German industry was left untouched +by the revolutionary disturbances of the post-Armistice period. +Evidence is to be found in the composition of the main German delegation +to Paris for the settlement of the Versailles Treaty. Many of the +members were big industrial magnates, several had direct connection +with chemical industry, and at least one was a prominent director +of the I.G. + +The German Peace Delegation.--Commenting on the composition of the main +German delegation in the spring of 1919, we find the German press +deploring the omission of any "visible representative" of Army +or Navy. Does this imply the presence of invisible representation? +Whether intended or not, there is truth in the implication. +The list contains the name of one of the leading representatives of +the big dye combine. Others of the delegates have chemical interests. +This is significant. It more than implies the German official +acknowledgment of the importance of the dye industry in general +for the future of Germany, and of its prime importance for war. + +Recent Signs of Government Interest.--Recent developments +have merely strengthened the dye combine and provided +further evidence of Government interest in its welfare. +The chief signs of reviving. German Government interest in the I.G. +are to be found in the loan for the nitrogen enterprise and in +the privileges which it enjoys with regard to Government taxes. +An American source,[1] a witness before a Senate Committee, +reveals that the dye plants "have to pay no direct Government taxes. +According to an understanding with the present Government, +all organic chemical productions, the companies themselves, +as well as all dependencies, without exception, +for the next ten years, are freed from all direct State tax. +In so far as community taxes come into consideration, +I believe we will obtain a remission for our profession." +The latest sign of Government support is to be found in +the preferential treatment obtained by the German dye industry +in coal deliveries. Coal is a critical factor in the German +attempt to regain their monopoly. + +Nitrogen Fixation.--The industrial fixation of nitrogen by Germany to form +ammonia has great importance from the point of view of our discussion. +Statements by various prominent Germans, such as Dr. Max Sering, +of the University of Berlin, and Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, already referred to, +leave no doubt. The former, writing in 1915, tells us: +"The complete cutting off of the supply of Chili saltpetre during +the war has been made good by our now taking nitrogen directly +out of the air in large factories built during and before the war. +With extraordinary rapidity the question has been solved how the +enormous quantities of the needed ammunition were to be produced, +a question which in England still meets with difficulties, in spite +of the help from America." + + +[1] Hearings before Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920, page 195. + + +The German Nitrogen Syndicate.--The two great Haber plants at Oppau +and Merseburg are both constituent parts of the I.G., and they +introduce a new element of Government interest into the I.G. policy. +Giving evidence before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry +of the United States Senate, Colonel Joyce develops this question +of Government interest in detail. He tells us how war nitrogen supply +was energetically and specifically fostered by the German Government +through an Imperial Commissioner under the War Department. One of +the three advisers of this campaign was Doctor Bueb, +representing the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik. Colonel Joyce tells us: +"That was a strictly war control organisation, but even before +the war closed, Germany, with her usual foresight, was giving +consideration to the future commercial aspects of her nitrogen works, +and in August, 1919, there was definitely formed an association +of the producers which was called the Stickstoff Syndikat G.m.b.H. +or Nitrogen Syndicate. This designation is a commercial one, +and the organisation is along commercial lines, but it is, +reliably stated that the establishment of this syndicate was +largely due to governmental influence. This will be more easily +understood if it be realised that the German Government had given +financial assistance to many of the new plants and plant increases +which the war had necessitated." + +Haber Process Prominent.--The Badische Co. holds a large part of the capital +stock of this syndicate, whose Board contains a Government nominee. +in addition the Board of Managers will have a Government chairman. +Through such arrangements, Government interest in the I.G. nitrogen +enterprise is clearly revealed. In conclusion, Colonel Joyce informs us, +"This information, which comes from most reliable sources and is +not to be disputed, shows that, beyond question, any one outside +of Germany producing or desiring to purchase nitrogenous fertilisers +or similar compounds, will have to deal with a single organisation, +essentially a branch of the German Government, which will have +an absolute monopolistic control of all such products produced in +Germany or whatever surplus there may be for export (Hearing before +the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, S. 3390, +Mar. 22nd, 1920, p. 52)." It is reported that the preliminary allotment +of production to the Badische Co. in the Syndicate is three hundred thousand +tons per annum, which should leave a considerable exportable surplus. +This would constitute a formidable weapon in any price-cutting campaigns +entered upon by the I.G. in order to preserve her various monopolies. +We learn from the _Colour Trade Journal_ of August, 1920, that the +German Government has advanced something over ten million pounds +for the construction and operation of the Haber plant. + +The New German Dye Combine.--Internal changes have accompanied +the development of these external relationships. The interchange +of capital and directors between the different branches, +the use of all assets for a common purpose, and the pooling of +all profits effected in 1919, has brought about a closer union. +From the relatively loose pre-war combination held together by common +price interests, the organisation has passed through the cartel +to what is now practically a form of trust. The German dye industry +is now a closely woven, almost homogeneous institution. It has added +economic cohesion to technical efficiency, and is to-day the largest +technically efficient potential instrument of war in the world. +We have thus revealed the existence, and indicated the nature, +of the resultant activities of the chemical policy guiding +the pre-war German combination of organic chemical or dye producers. +Further, it is seen how the war stimulated and sealed closer relationships +between the constituent firms, and between the resultant organisation, +the I.G., and the German Government. Continuing, we find the above +tendencies intensified since the Armistice, from unmistakable signs +briefly referred to above. + +Aggressive Nationalistic Policy.--Both in peace and war, +the combination of interests, known as the I.G., has successfully +pursued an intensely nationalistic and aggressive chemical policy. +We might ignore what some have regarded as the sinister side +of the I.G. activities, considering the whole as a wonderful +monument to German science, thoroughness and patriotism, +which it undoubtedly is in many respects. But the significance +to the Allies and associated countries remains the same. +Even without any thought or intention on the part of present day +Germany to use this thing for war, it remains a serious menace. +But the direct evidence which we possess does not actually +support such a peaceful view. Her press confidently prophesies +the resumption of the pre-war German monopoly, reassuring its +readers by careful analysis of the causes of the eventful failure +to establish organic chemical industries in Allied countries. + +Are we to yield in this field of economic war? If so, then one +of the chief lessons of the Great War will remain unheeded, +and the future cannot fall to prove this to the hilt, +to our cost. + + + +CHAPTER X + +LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT + + +The Element of Speculation.--It is of considerable interest to Introduce +an element of speculation into our discussion of chemical warfare. +In glancing at future possibilities, we can adopt one of two courses, +follow up the clearly marked lines of recent development, or give +the imagination play within the whole field of scientific possibility. +The former course lies more within the scope of this book. + +Chemical Tactics and Strategy.--Two basic military conceptions come +to our assistance in attempting to characterise types of chemical +warfare development. With a little explanation it is possible +to place this or that method in the tactical or strategic class. +Any new chemical warfare development capable, under a given +system of individual protection, of successfully attacking +the hitherto protected individual, may be termed strategic. +The method may be aimed at a protected or hitherto immune human function, +but if it overcomes protection it is then capable of effecting +strategic results by its use on a sufficiently large scale. +Thus we regard the first introduction of cloud gas by Germany, +or their use of mustard gas, as examples of strategic chemical +warfare moves. Any fundamental discovery of this sort, +applicable to chemical warfare, is capable of strategic effects. +Used only on a small scale, however, these possibilities may be +lost and tactical advantages may alone accrue. + +The tactical type of chemical warfare method involves the use +of some new or old war chemical device in achieving a tactical +objective which may, itself, form part of a larger scheme with +strategic significance. Examples were plentiful during the recent war. +We may refer to the use of smoke, of gas shell for neutralisation, +or of cloud gas as preparation for a local infantry advance. + +The same classification can be applied to the protective +as to the offensive side of chemical warfare. The equipment +of an army of millions with a gas mask has a strategic value, +if it counters the large-scale use of gas by the enemy. +The mere fact of this protection may serve the same purpose +as a violent resistance to a huge enemy attack. It may render +the attack, and, therefore, the resistance, out of the question. +By permitting the individual soldier to retain the efficient use +of his weapons in gas, the mask, or other form of individual +protection, may render a costly counter-attack unnecessary. +In this way protective methods in chemical warfare may be the +determining factor in some strategic campaign or tactical activity. +The distinction between tactics and strategy in chemical +warfare cannot be made by grouping substances, or their methods +of application to war, any more than one can say that certain +infantry or artillery formations or weapons have a purely +strategic or tactical function. The distinction lies rather +in the magnitude and incidence of use of the chemical appliance +on the battle-field, while depending on its novel nature. +A new substance, possessing potential strategic value, +may be wasted, and its surprise effect lost, in some local affair. +This applies to the use of mustard gas by the Germans and to our +own use of the Livens projector. Our armies were surprised +and our plans modified by the German use of mustard gas at +Ypres and Nieuport. We were not clear where this new thing +was tending. Think of its strategic and psychological value +had it been used on a scale and front twenty times larger. +Leaving the chemical field, we can say that the first British +use of the tank provided another example. + +New War Chemicals.--The question of entirely new war +chemicals is of general interest. The first main group +of substances with which we were faced during the war +contained such types as chlorine and phosgene, whose chief +line of attack was directed towards the respiratory system. +Specific protection rapidly developed and, once obtained, +led to violent attempts to penetrate it or "break it down." +In other words, the attempts to penetrate the mask by using higher +concentrations of phosgene were analogous, from our point of view, +to similar attempts by the use of an entirely new substance aimed +again at the respiratory system. The introduction of mustard +gas confirmed, what the use of lachrymators had suggested, +that the most fruitful line would be found by attacking human +functions hitherto immune. First the lungs, then the eyes, +then the skin of the human being came under fire, so to speak. +What further developments appear possible on these lines? +Assuming that means are found to protect satisfactorily +the respiratory system, and the eyes, what other vulnerable +points can the war chemical find in the human organism? +Some more specific vesicant, some modification of mustard gas, +might arise, limited in attack to certain portions of the human being. +The Germans were already at work on these lines. + +"Camouflage" Chemicals.--It is by no means visionary to picture +the loss of the sense of taste and smell by the use of some chemical. +Partially successful efforts were made by both sides during +the war to mask the odour of the harmful constituent of a shell +filling by introducing an appropriate "camouflage" compound. +Whole series of chemicals were examined from this point of view +by the American field laboratory at Puteaux near Paris. The step +from specific camouflage compounds to a single general type +is by no means unbridgeable in theory. + +An insight into work of this kind has been given by Colonel R. F. Bacon +of the American Chemical Warfare Service. He says: +"The gas-camouflage is of particular interest. It has been found +that malodorous compounds (butyl mercaptan, dimethyl tricarbonate, +etc.), are useful to mask the presence of other `gases' or to force +the enemy to wear respirators when no other `gases' are present. +As in the case of lachrymators, such `stink gases' must frequently +be accompanied by other `gases,' in order that the enemy may never +know when toxic gases are actually absent. Camouflage gases are also +useful in that they save `mustard gas' and the highly lethal gases. +Their value has been demonstrated in trials at Hanlon Field and also +at the front." The use of such compounds has an obvious value. +By removing the possibility of detecting the dangerous chemical, +they enforce the permanent use of the protective appliance or encourage +a fatal carelessness in the individual soldier. + +Functions Hitherto Immune.--In this field of chemical attack upon +hitherto immune human functions, it is particularly easy to class +suggestions as visionary and to be wise only after the event. +But it must be borne in mind that any nation in a position +to effect such a surprise would be in a commanding position. +It is believed, for example, that the human being maintains his +equilibrium through the proper functioning of the semi-circular canals, +organs situated behind the inner ear. It does not appear possible +to attain them chemically directly, but they might be reached +by the absorption of some suitable chemical into the system in +the very small concentrations now possible on the field of battle. +We doubt whether any physiologist would go further than to say +that such a mode of attack is improbable in the near future. +No qualified person would class it as impossible. +It has been advanced that the control of equilibrium occurs +through the movement of certain hairs through a liquid +within these canals. If this be so, then one would simply +require to solidify or change the viscosity of this liquid. +Would this be difficult? Probably not, for most of the body +fluids are of that colloidal nature in which coagulation +occurs in the presence of small quantities of special agents. +Such a result might cause the individual to lose his equilibrium. +This would prohibit all organised movement. An army thus +attained would be less mobile than a colony of cripples. + +Picture for a moment such a battle as the great German attack of March, +1918--millions of men urged forward from fixed positions under highly +centralised control--they advance, say, two or three miles beyond this +control and are largely dependent on local initiative for the attack. +They then enter clouds of shell chemical and in less than fifteen minutes +a fair percentage becomes incapable of advancing in a fixed direction, +of obeying local orders, or of anything more than a sort of drunken movement. +By this time their supporting artillery would have been identified +and attained, and the whole attack reduced to almost farcical conditions. +Such a compound may never develop, but who will class it as beyond +the realm of eventual possibility? + +Every one is acquainted with the peculiar effects produced by +various anaesthetics. The emergency uses to which they are put and +our personal acquaintance with them may have dulled the imagination. +Think for a moment of the possibilities which they unfold. +Gaseous anaesthetics, in certain concentrations, produce +temporary unconsciousness, other anaesthetics, so called local, +produce absolute immobility without loss of consciousness. +Chloroform and ether are common forms of the first type, but they +are required in such concentrations as to render their battle +use impracticable. But the second type, of which stovaine, +the new synthetic drug, is a good example, produces its effects +in very small concentration. A few drops injected into the spinal +column are sufficient to prevent all movement for a number of hours. +We cannot expect to obtain the conditions of the operating table +on the battle-field, but chemicals which are effective in very +small quantities or concentrations may find another channel into +the human system. For this reason the development of the mask, +the protection of the respiratory channels, is of great importance, +for it blocks the way to substances which by mere absorption +might produce valuable military results. + +Chemical Constitution and Physiological Action.--It is impossible +to adopt a more than speculative outlook in this field. +So little is known regarding the relationships between chemical +constitution and physiological action and very few sound generalisations +have been made. A considerable amount of scientific work occurred +on these lines in various countries before the war on the connection +between the chemical nature of compounds and their taste and smell, +but the relationships are still obscure. + +Unsolved Problems of Mustard Gas.--The use of a chemical +which attacks some unexpected human function introduces many +disturbing and disorganising factors. Thus the introduction +of mustard gas has left us with a number of unsolved problems. +By employing this substance Germany departed from her usual caution +and violated one of the first principles of chemical warfare. +It is unsound for any nation to introduce a new weapon, +unless that nation is, itself, furnished with the means +of protection against its eventual employment by the enemy. +The Germans have, themselves, explained this breach of +the principles of war. They were convinced that we could not +retaliate with mustard gas, because we could not produce it. +It was a miscalculation but based on grounds of which they +were sure, having been largely instrumental in determining them +through their aggressive chemical policy. + +Mustard gas attacks the respiratory system and the outer skin of man. +The armies were efficiently protected against the first line of attack, +but they never developed efficient protection against the second. +Protection of the skin of the individual soldier against +mustard gas was theoretically possible in three ways. +In the first place a number of chemical solutions were devised which, +applied to the affected skin, would destroy the poisonous chemical. +This was a bad method, and was never efficiently employed. +German army orders after the French introduction of mustard gas were +bristling with references to chloride of lime or bleaching powder. +It was to be kept in every conceivable place where the gas was +likely to penetrate. Soldiers were provided with boxes of bleach +called "Gelbolin." Permanganate of potash was carried as an alternative +for a brief period. A wire from the Third German Army to the +War Ministry, Berlin, dated 17th July, 1918, stated: "Chloride of lime +has all been issued in boxes to the troops. Reserves exhausted." +One had the impression of a drowning man catching at a straw. +Supply on a sufficient scale to cover most cases was practically impossible. +Each soldier would have to carry the protective chemical as part +of his equipment, and its proper use depended on training. +There was no time to identify and assemble the thousands of affected cases +for central treatment. Mustard gas penetrated thick clothing, even boots. +and was often only identified hours after the damage was done. +The second method which was attempted on a large scale was the protection +of each soldier by special mustard-gas-proof clothing, but a man, +fighting for his life on the battle-field, will not tolerate such +a handicap to movement, and, although hundreds of thousands of oiled +suits were prepared and were of definite use in certain special cases, +for example in certain artillery formations, yet the method +must be rejected as unsuitable from a military point of view. +The third solution, which was tried experimentally on a large scale, +was to cover soldiers going into action with a cream or paste of +protective chemical. This, again, could only be applied in special cases, +prior to an assault, for example, and could not be regarded as a +permanent form of protection. + +As we have seen, mustard gas infected whole areas for many days, owing to its +great persistency. It was often necessary to cross such zones for attack +or counter-attack. How was this to be effected without huge losses? +It was found possible, literally by creating roads of bleach, that is, +by sprinkling bleaching powder on chosen lanes through the infected area, +to pass columns of troops through such areas, but this cannot be viewed +as a practicable solution. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would +have taxed the possibilities of supply beyond their utmost capacity. +Here, then, we have a case in which it is not possible to protect a soldier +by some specific appliance, and the war found us embarking on schemes +of protection by the use of chemicals in quantities which threatened +to carry us out of the range of possible manufacture. + +A New Type of Obstacle.--Chemical warfare has introduced a new type +of strategic and tactical obstacle. Mediaeval methods of war relied +largely on natural and man-built barriers. Rivers, moats, forts were, +and still are, to a certain extent, critical factors in war. +The conceptions of a Vauban could determine the issue of a campaign. +Such obstacles were only effective, however, when properly manned and armed. +The Hindenburg Line and the Canal du Nord were tremendous obstacles when +backed by German artillery, rifles, and machine-guns, but, without the latter, +they would have been mere inconveniences for the passage of an army. +The massing of a multitude of guns, used for the first time during +the recent war, produced another form of temporary obstacle, but troops +could be trained to, and actually did, advance through the barrage. +Further, the ultimate limits of supply and the use of counter artillery +introduces time and quantitative limitations to the use of the really +intensive barrage. Chemical warfare, however, has introduced a method +of blocking out chosen areas of the battle-field in such a way as to +prevent their effective use for military defence, communications, +or other purposes. It is now possible, by chemical means, to give +a normal piece of country the same value as a natural obstacle, +or one organised for defence by formidable engineering construction, +and manned by rifles and machine-guns. This can be achieved by the use +of a highly persistent dangerous gas or war chemical of which, so far, +mustard gas is the most effective example. We have seen how the Germans +formed defensive flanks during their March, 1918, offensive, by spraying +certain areas between their fronts of attack with mustard gas. +It is true that, in the quantities in which it has, so far, been used, +mustard gas has not converted open areas into absolute obstacles against +the movement of a determined individual, platoon, or even larger unit. +But even in the quantities which have already appeared on the battle-field, +it has rendered whole zones practically unusable for huge masses of men, +owing to the certainty of a very high percentage of casualties. +Up to the present its value has been rather as a serious factor in Staff +consideration of losses than as an actual physical barrier. Many of +the casualties are only incurred a few hours after contact with the gas. +This may not deter a man from crossing an affected zone, but it may deter +the Staffs from using that zone, when they realise that this would imply +the certainty of many thousands of casualties amongst the troops. +The choice is between two evils, tactical acquiescence to the enemy's plan, +blocking out a certain area, or the certainty of huge casualties. +A very interesting case occurred in the German attack near Mt. Kemmel in +the spring of 1918, where large quantities of German mustard gas were +used some distance in front of the original line of German attack. +In this case, not only was it clear that the Germans would not attempt +to advance beyond a limited objective (and they did not), but the development +of their attack left them organising their defences behind their own +mustard gas barrage. + +The "Persistent Lethal" Substance.--The importance of these +considerations can hardly be exaggerated when we realise that, +at any time, a substance possessing the same strategic value as mustard +gas, but much more violent casualty effects, may be discovered. +The Germans were certainly aware of these possibilities. +According to the statement of an apparently reliable prisoner +of the 30th R.I.R., July, 1918, the Regimental Gas Officer +stated in a lecture that, as the Allies had used a new gas, +the Germans were going to employ a "White Cross" gas shell. +This gas was "stronger" than any of the gases at present +in use; it possessed a persistence up to eight days, +and could, therefore, not be used on the front for an assault. +Its persistence was favoured by damp or misty weather +and by the nature of the ground. Neither the German drum +nor the masks of the Allies afforded protection against it. +The last important German development consisted in the use +of pumice impregnated with phosgene in their Livens bombs. +It was clear that the Germans were attempting to produce +a gas which was not only highly lethal but persistent. +Following up this idea, we can forecast the use of a chemical +which will not only permit the formation of defensive flanks, +or pockets, in the enemy front, or in our own defensive positions, +through their influence on Staff considerations with regard +to casualties, but, by replacing the relatively mild casualty effect +of mustard gas by a highly and rapidly lethal effect, will render +these areas not only strategically, but physically, impassable. +One of the most significant possibilities in chemical warfare +development is the arrival of this type of the compound, +the highly lethal, highly persistent chemical. + +The Critical Range.--These considerations are very interesting +from the military point of view. Consider the phenomenal +amount of muscular energy required to organise any captured +stretch of territory against counter-attack. The type +of compound we have outlined is likely to change completely +the aspect of attack and counter-attack. The Somme battlefield, +for example, gave the impression of a series of defensive +positions organised by the one side or the other after attack +or counter-attack, in order to hold small gains of ground, +which were never intended to represent the final advance. +Successful progress from one trench system meant building another, +under the pounding of the enemy's artillery, and the deadly +fire of machine-guns, exposing, in this improvised system, +large numbers of troops, among which casualties constituted +a continuous drain upon eventual reserves. The arrival +of the highly persistent lethal compound should provide +an effective substitute for this laborious constructional +protection in the shape of the persistent lethal barrage. +This will render immediate counter-attack and near machine-gun +fire very difficult. Automatically, fewer men will be +needed to hold the advanced positions. It is true that, +with the next attack, "kicking off" and assembly positions will +be required, for these can be much more efficiently developed +behind a deep chemical barrage and will demand the exposure +of fewer men where more time is available for preparation. +Such conditions, however, can only occur if one, side possesses +some distinct advantage with regard to surprise by, +or efficient protection against, the persistent lethal compound. +When both sides are equally matched in this respect, a duel +will arise in which the winner will be the one who can throw +the critical concentrations of chemical into a given area at +the greatest range. This might be called the "critical range." +Herein lies the importance of the development of such weapons +as the Livens projector, and the Germans had certainly grasped +an important principle, when they used our own modified +weapon against us with a much greater range than our own. +If we admit the possibility of a persistent lethal compound, +this question of critical range assumes outstanding importance. + +The New No-Man's-Land.--The recent war witnessed a rather sudden +adoption of trench warfare, during a period in which the artillery +strengths of both sides were relatively feeble, when compared with +the later stages of the war. Accordingly, there arose very definite +lines of field fortifications, and strongly held trench systems, +separated from each other by a comparatively narrow No-Man's-Land, With +the development of the formidable artillery strengths of belligerents, +there was a tendency to form a much wider No-Man's-Land, and the front +line systems were lightly held, approximating, in many cases, +to an outpost line. + +The discovery and mass production of a persistent lethal substance is +likely to convert No-Man's-Land into a permanently infected gas zone, +manned by special outposts of permanently protected troops. +Combined with the development of smoke, this may render unnecessary +the highly organised trench assembly systems of the recent war, +used before the assault, and, with the development of the tank +as a fast fighting machine, and for the transport of troops, one can +obtain a glimpse of the nature of the new attack and counter-attack. +A recent writer[1] has shown us the future tank carrying war into +the enemy's country and destroying his nerve centres by actually +reaching and paralysing the G.H.Q.s. of armies and smaller formations. +Such operations will have to occur through a wide zone of the new gas +and will necessitate the anti-gas tank. Indeed, one of the most +important functions of the tank will be to carry the advance guard +of an army beyond the infected No-Man's-Land, and such an advance will +occur behind a series of smoke barrages created, in the first place, +by the artillery, and, later, by the advance of tanks themselves. + + +[1] _Tanks in the Great War_, Col. J. F. C. Fuller., D.S.O. + + +The "Alert Gas Zone."--The development of the "gas alert" +idea has definite interest for the future of chemical warfare. +It is well known how the development of gas shell and surprise gas shoots +by the Germans led to the necessity for "gas alert" conditions between +certain times and within certain distances of the front line. +The mask had to be worn in the so-called ready position, in order +that swift adjustment might be possible in case of surprise attack. +The summer of 1917 witnessed a great increase in gas shell activity. +This was reflected in important changes in the "gas alert" regulations. +In the autumn of that year all periods of readiness were abolished +and replaced by a constant state of readiness. In the forward area +absolute readiness was required within two miles of the front line, +and special precautions were taken as far back as twelve miles. +That the Germans suffered under the same restraints is witnessed +by many captured documents. In particular, a divisional order +taken in December, 1917, gave the gas danger zone as within +fifteen kilometres of the front line, and within this region +every one must carry a mask. The alert position of the mask +was insisted upon within two kilometres of the front line. +By July the alert zone had increased in depth in both armies. +This tendency must have increased, had the war continued, for both +sides were employing gas in guns of larger calibres, and weapons +were being devised, such as the improved German Livens projector, +which gave high concentrations at much greater distances from +the front line, _i.e_. with greater critical ranges. + +We have seen how the possible development of a persistent lethal compound +may produce an infected and wide No-Man's-Land. Imposed on this, +there will, no doubt, be "gas alert" conditions of great depths. +How do these conceptions work out for the war of movement? +It would appear that the possession of such a compound and the means of +producing and using it on a very large scale could determine the stationary +or open nature of warfare, if other forces were not too unequal. +A new military factor emerges, the artificial, permanent, unmanned obstacle, +which can be laid down at will on areas whose magnitude depends finally +on manufacturing capacity. The germ of the idea appeared during +the war at Kemmel and in the various mustard gas barrages formed by +artillery or delayed mines used by the Germans in their great retreat. +The sudden development of such barriers will be equivalent in effect +to the creation of strong trench systems, but these could never result, +under war conditions, in time to approach the strategic flexibility +and importance of the persistent lethal infected barrier. + +Gas and Aircraft.--The combination of gas and aircraft presents +the possibility of attaining strategic effects by chemical means. +Many rumours were afloat, towards the end of the war, regarding the use +of gas by enemy aircraft, and there was apprehension amongst +the civil populations, which has been reflected in numerous +public utterances. Evidence on the matter is very scanty. +In July, 1917, the use of gas in aeroplane bombs by the Germans +was reported, but not confirmed. Further reports in August +indicated the use of Blue Cross, owing to the sneezing effects +which were produced on those within reach of the air bomb. +In October, the evidence was more conclusive. But the German +aeroplanes left no blind or dud shell, and, beyond the violent nasal +and sneezing effects of Blue Cross, evidence was again absent. +This report was very persistent, for, in July, 1918, there were +again rumours that Blue Cross bombs had been dropped on the British +near Ficheux. The Air Forces of the different armies were, +perhaps, the last to feel the effects of the gas campaign, +but the pilots of low-flying aeroplanes in the 1918 offensive +were constantly crossing pockets of gas, and this, added to +the fact that the pilots were often compelled to land in gas, +led to their equipment with gas masks. A respirator of special type +was taken from a German aviator in April, 1918, after the fighting +at Passchendaele. But the war gave us no direct evidence +of the successful use of gas and war chemicals from aircraft. +This, however, is no criterion as to its eventual importance. +The Allies definitely refrained from employing the combination +until Germany should give them the start in what was regarded +as a new atrocity. The main reason for their lack of development +on these lines was probably the fact that the most suitable +type of gas only developed during the later stages of the war, +when it was required exceedingly urgently on the front. +No really harmful persistent compound appeared before the advent +of mustard gas, and the dangerous non-persistent types, +such as phosgene, could not have been used with great success, +owing to the fact that very considerable quantities +would have been required to produce any serious effect. +Mustard gas, however, which could have haunted a city for days, +would not have been required in such large quantities. +But its more urgent need on the front, and the fact that soon +after it arrived the Germans were sending out feelers to see whether +the Allies would consider the cessation of chemical warfare, +were probably sufficient reasons to explain their failure to use +it from aeroplanes. + +Another point must be raised in connection with the use of gas +from aircraft which has not yet received much attention. +We must remember that the use of projectiles from aircraft +over a city was a very different proposition from their use +over a battle-field. One of the advantages of gas over explosives +on the field of battle was its greater range of action. +It produced effects at longer distances from the point of impact, +but no such incentive existed for the use of gas from aeroplanes +over large cities. Explosives, which might miss their +objective on the field of battle, could not do so in a city. +They were bound to hit something. The load of the aeroplane +is always important, and the essential is to carry, weight +for weight, the material which will produce the most effect. +There is no doubt what this will he when the persistent lethal +compound arrives, and mustard gas would probably have been superior +to explosives for use by German aircraft on British cities. + +Protective Development;--Individual Protection.--The question of protection +against chemical attack presents some knotty problems for the future. Let us +glance at the broad lines of war development in this field and forecast their +future in a speculative way. Protection developed along two main lines. +Individual protection covered the mask and any other protective appliance +used by the individual soldier, while the term collective protection was +applied to any method or appliance which afforded simultaneous protection +for a number of individuals. + +In general, the former represented an attempt to purify the poisoned +air actually inspired by the soldier, whereas the latter was an +attempt to purify the atmosphere of a locality or to prevent its +initial poisoning. How far can the individual form of protection +develop to meet the possibilities of the chemical attack? +It certainly seems to have countered satisfactorily all the war +attacks upon the respiratory system, although, as we have pointed out, +the Germans might have failed, had we been sufficiently prompt +in introducing our arsenic compounds. But we have forecasted the use +of chemicals which may attack human functions hitherto immune. +For the sake of our argument, we can divide these into two classes, +those attained through the respiratory and digestive systems and +those attained through contact with some other part of the body. +The former can probably be satisfactorily met by developments +in the mask. Even that does not appear certain, when we +remember the emphasis laid by Germany upon the possibility +of penetrating the mask by using a particulate cloud. +The last word has certainly not been spoken in the struggle +between the mask and the chemical attempting to penetrate it. +But both the introduction of mustard gas and general speculative +grounds justify us in concluding that attacks may materialise upon +other parts of the human organism, We cannot foresee the actual +point of attack and can, therefore, only view with assurance +some form of protection which covers the whole body. + +Collective Protection.--All parties dabbled in such a form of protection, +but the French were the only ones to make a large-scale experiment +on the front. It was not very successful, for the burden of these +oilskin suits was intolerable. It may be that some successful form +of protection for the whole body will materialise, but on general +grounds we can assume that development will follow other lines. +What are the possibilities? They all lie in the direction of +collective protection. The individual cannot be satisfactorily +protected from the new gas and remain an efficient soldier. +We must, therefore, see whether it is not possible to protect numbers +of men by removing them from contact with the poisoned atmosphere. +A stationary form of such protection was used by all the armies, +but emphasised by the French, by the creation of a large number of enormous +underground chambers, some capable of holding more than a thousand men, +the entries to which were carefully protected by special filtering +devices to prevent the entry of the poisoned external atmosphere. +On the British front these enormous dug-outs, although not absent, +were largely replaced by the efficient gas-proof organisation +of the smaller dugouts. The use of impregnated blankets for this +purpose must be well known to any who visited the front or took part +in hostilities. But you cannot imprison a whole army in this way. +The value of these collective protective chambers depended on the fact +that a certain number of men were always on the alert in the defensive +systems outside and around the chambers, exposed to those gases +against which the latter chambers were devised. + +In my opinion, the further intensive development of gas warfare, +such as would have accompanied, say, the doubling or quadrupling +of the German factory output, would have forced us into realising +the limit of this collective protection. It would have compelled +us to immobilise, in these shelters, more men than was consistent +with the safety of the zone in question. Undoubtedly, the future +of collective protection lies in some form which will leave +the soldier his combatant powers, in other words some mobile form. +This has already been forecasted by Colonel Fuller in his book on +_Tanks in the Great War_. But he passes lightly over the protection +of the tank against gas. With the increase in depth of infected zones, +through the increasingly lethal nature of the persistent compound, +the tank will he compelled to rely on filtration methods of protection, +instead of the use of compressed oxygen in a gas-tight compartment. +Once committed to the use of oxygen, the only safe procedure will +be to close up the tank and employ the oxygen while there is any +suspicion of the presence of gas, and, under these conditions, +oxygen transport would become a factor militating against +the prime purpose of the tank, the transport of troops and arms. +It is safe to forecast a tense struggle between chemical weapons +and protective tank devices in the event of future wars. + +Conclusion.--The facts which we have surveyed in early chapters, +and the development foreshadowed above, form part of a much +wider subject, for they are but one aspect of scientific warfare. +In what main directions has science modified or revolutionised +modern war? Its influence has touched practically every weapon +in manufacture or design, introducing profound modifications in +many cases. The sum total of such changes may be claimed to have +revolutionised warfare, but the term revolution should be reserved, +for some more specific scientific innovation, which threatens to change +the nature of war rather than merely improve existing weapons. +Modern wars have all echoed the popular cry for some new scientific +principle or device to settle hostilities with one sharp stroke. +This conception has been the sport of writers of fiction +and others for many years. The "electric" death-dealing ray, +the all-powerful gas, the deadly bacteria, and the "explosion" +wave have all shared in buoying up the hopes or quickening +the fears of warring peoples. Contrary to popular supposition, +a decisive scientific military surprise of this nature is not likely +to follow close on the heels of the discovery of a new phenomenon. +It is more than eighty years since the mind of a Faraday delved +so fruitfully into electrical science, yet the oft prophesied +large scale direct use of high voltage electricity, or some +other form in war has not materialised. Organic chemistry was +a well-founded branch of science early in the nineteenth century, +and flourishing industries, fostered by it, were in existence +thirty years ago, yet it was not until the early twentieth century, +and the recent war, that we witnessed the rapid growth of organic +chemical warfare, which, I claim, was as revolutionary as any +other war development. The physical sciences, have left their +mark on every weapon and mechanical appliance, and the cumulative +effect of these changes is indeed large, but the most revolutionary +upheaval in warfare, with permanent results, came from chemistry. +The flexible nature of organic chemistry must not be lost sight of. +In the physical sciences, electricity, for example, years of +co-ordinated world progress are required to produce an epoch-making +discovery which might have critical and direct war significance. +Radioactivity has shown us what undreamt-of energy is bound up +in the atom, and many are the prophesies regarding the harnessing +of these forces for constructive activities. At least one prominent +novelist has pictured their destructive use in the radioactive bomb. +But the use of this wonderful store of energy for peace and war +can only result from years of costly and voluminous research, +and we have no idea of the difficulties involved in production, +without which any invention, however telling and revolutionary, +has no incidence on war. But in organic chemistry a single worker, +following up some rare family of compounds, may stumble +upon a substance pot far removed chemically from related +compounds yet infinitely more potent for war. Mustard gas, +or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, is a member of a group of compounds +differing only slightly in chemical structure the one from the other. +Yet its nearest chemical relative is comparatively harmless. +The persistent lethal compound which will vastly change the nature +of warfare will probably be but a slight chemical modification +of some harmless substance, Thus, by comparison with other +branches of science as the handmaids of war, organic chemistry +is sympathetic, flexible, and theoretically capable of yielding +revolutionary discoveries in a relatively short time. +We can only base such speculations on general grounds. +Circumstances may disprove our contention over a short historical period, +but it will be borne out in the long run. This is not the only reason, +however, for the unique war importance of organic chemicals. +It so happens that many of them are essential to our daily life, +as dyes, drugs, photographic and other synthetic products. +Industries, therefore, have arisen for their manufacture. +And this is not all. Organic chemical factories have proved to be +not only arsenals in disguise but endowed with the flexibility +of their parent, the science itself. The factories and plants +ignore the war significance of the problems put to them. +They can develop the production of practically any chemical +which research can produce. The will of man can thus silently +and swiftly convert the dye factory into an arsenal. + +These inherent possibilities of organic chemistry, flexibility in research +and production, make chemical warfare the most important war problem +in the future reconstruction of the world. + + + +CHAPTER XI + +HUMANE OR INHUMANE? + + +A good deal of abuse has been showered on chemical warfare +methods by those who understand very little about them. +It has been claimed by such that gas is particularly atrocious. +Feeling on the matter has been so strong in certain +quarters that the fact that all war is particularly vile +and atrocious seems to have been completely lost sight of. +Let us take up this matter in a rational way. In the first place, +what do we mean by the atrocity or inhumanity of a weapon? +We can either appeal to the imagination or the reason, in the +first case, by visualising the battlefields, or, in the second, +by making a cold analysis of the casualties caused by gas. + +Nature of Gas Casualties.--Every normal person who experienced +and survived the throes of the different stages of the war, +and of the different gas surprises, mainly German, which were +sprung upon us, finds it difficult to think out, or express, +a cool and balanced view on the question of poison gas. +But such a balanced view is most important for the future. +It must be remembered that the official protests in 1915 arose +on the grounds, to use Lord Kitchener's words, that "they +employed these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack, +according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed." +Had the rules of war permitted their use, we should, no doubt, +have been protected. But these protests, submerged in popular +sentiment, became an outcry against the atrocity of the new weapon. +This, a just criticism at the time, became inaccurate +when the Allies reacted, methods of protection developed, +and the specific tactical uses of gas were realised. +The view of the peculiar atrocity of gas has outlived the truth +of war experience with regard to it. We agree that chemical +warfare is atrocious. But it is no exception, for thus are all +the aggressive methods of warfare. Indeed, when we attempt +to interpret atrocity in terms of available casualty statistics, +we find that gas is slightly less atrocious than the other weapons. +We must either incline to this view or dispute the figures, +which are authoritative. Consider the American figures. +These will he more truly representative than our own, +because their troops were only exposed during the later +and more developed phases of the war. Of the total strength +of the A.E.F., the number gassed was about six per cent., wounded +by rifle and machine-gun fire about one per cent., wounded +by high explosive one and a half per cent., shrapnel wounds +three percent., and bayonet wounds less than one half per cent. +But although enemy gas caused more than 70,000 casualties, yet of +these only one and a half per cent. were fatal, while the total +number of deaths for all types of casualties was thirty per cent. +Thus against the American army, measured by casualties produced, +gas was by far the most effective, and yet by far the least +deadly weapon. What can be more atrocious than the actual cone +of tens or even hundreds of dead and wounded invariably left +before an untouched machine-gun emplacement in an assault? +What is more horrible than the captured first line trench after +its treatment by the preparatory bombardment, or the mutilation +of men peacefully sleeping in billets behind the battle front +and thrown, broken and bloody, through their billet walls +under the wheels of passing transport, as one has seen them? + +The whole experience of real war is beyond adjectives. +But, leaving impressions, let us turn to facts. +With regard to the future and from the point of view of atrocity, +gas has a hopeful outlook as compared with other weapons. +This may seem a curious statement to make, but consider the following. +We cannot envisage advances in the use of explosives in shell or bomb +to render them more humane. Explosives, if their development be pressed, +can only become more violent, with a wider range of action. +Chemical warfare may follow the same lines, but it has +the unique possibility of developing on more humane lines. +The vesicant action of mustard gas produced huge casualties with +relatively little permanent harm. Chemicals may be found which +temporarily influence human functions, enabling military objectives +to be attained with a remarkably small amount of pain and death. +In a fair review of the whole situation, this possibility cannot +be overlooked. It is more than possible that a League of Nations, +compelled to employ an element of force in its eventual control +of peace, may find its most effective and humane weapon in some +chemical development. However visionary these views may appear, +they are not unjustified as scientific possibilities. +Analysis of war gas casualties reveal two main trends. +As the struggle became more intense the number of casualties multiplied. +They were considerable during the first period of cylinder attack, +and the rate remained steady until the beginning of the mustard +gas period. From the summer of 1917 to November, 1918, +there were more than ten times as many gas casualties as for +the preceding three years of war. But the percentage mortality, +the number of deaths amongst each hundred men attained, +decreased considerably. As high as twenty-five per cent. +during the early cylinder attacks, it decreased to two and a +half per cent. for the huge number of mustard gas cases. +Yet mustard gas was an exceedingly important military factor. +It illustrates the possibility of development on these lines, +but we must by no means disregard the atrocity of chemical warfare, +and safeguards are required for the future. + +We cannot do better than conclude by quoting from General Hartley's +report to the British Association. He says: + + +"The general impression that gas is an inhumane weapon is derived partly +from the German breach of faith in using it contrary to the Hague Convention, +and partly from the nature and number of casualties in the earliest cloud +attacks which were made against unprotected troops. Under the stress of a +long war the individual is apt to forget the physical and mental sufferings +it involves, unless he is daily in contact with them, but a dramatic +occurrence such as that of the first gas attack forces on the imagination +the brutal significance of war--the struggle for victory by killing--and the +new weapon is judged as inhumane, like gunpowder in the fifteenth century. +If we accept war as a possibility, the most humane weapon is that which leads +to a decision with the smallest amount of human suffering and death. +Judged from this standpoint, gas compares favourably with other weapons during +the period when both sides were fully equipped for offence and defence. +The death-rate among gas casualties was much lower than that among casualties +from other causes, and not only was the death-rate lower, but a much +smaller proportion of the injured suffered any permanent disability. +There is no comparison between the permanent damage caused by gas, +and the suffering caused to those who were maimed and blinded by shell +and rifle fire. It is now generally admitted that in the later stages +of the war many military objects could be attained with less suffering +by using gas than by any other means. + +Sargent's Picture.--"The judgment of future generations on the use +of gas may well be influenced by the pathetic appeal of Sargent's +picture of the first `Mustard Gas' casualties at Ypres, but it must +not be forgotten in looking at that picture that 75 per cent. +of the blinded men he drew were fit for duty within three months, +and that had their limbs and nerves been shattered by the effects +of high explosive, their fate would have been infinitely worse." + + +Need for Safeguards.--We have continually referred to the need +for safeguards instead of mere reliance on prohibition. +Such views and facts as the above should be more generally +known in order that very worthy sentiments may not impel us +to adopt an unsound solution for future peace. However alarmed +and revolted we may have been in 1915 and later during the war, +it is essential to take a balanced view in the present critical +period of reconstruction. + + + +CHAPTER XII + +CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT + + +Preceding chapters have shown how chemical warfare has now +become a normal, technical, and increasingly important part +of the science of war. Further, it has opened vast possibilities, +the limits of which it is very difficult to fix. + +The Treaty of Versailles.--Chemical warfare received definite attention +in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles. Lord Moulton, +one of the few Allied representatives who realised the full importance of +the matter, has drawn attention to its Treaty aspect in a recent speech. +He lays emphasis on the fact that the full significance of the German +dye industry was not realised during the war. Referring to its +chameleon-like nature in peace and war, Lord Moulton says: +"All this was imperfectly present to my mind throughout the war, +and I was aware of the gravity of the matter, but until I learnt +what had passed in Germany I could not appreciate it fully. +I have spoken to you of the extent to which the Germans turned +their chemical works into general works for supplying explosives. +I have not touched the part in which they played the most deadly +game against us, and that was where they used their chemical works +to produce those toxic gases." + +The same statement tells us, "The knowledge that I have gleaned +as to what was going on in Germany during the war makes me +feel that all my anticipa-tions of the importance of chemical +industries in time of war, all the views that I expressed +of that importance, did not nearly approach what has been +proved to have gone on in the enemy's country during the war." +He then proceeds to explain how a clause was inserted in the +treaty--"whereby the Germans have to tell us all the secrets of their +manufacture of explosives, all their methods of making toxic gases-- +in fact, all the military secrets that made them so terrible. +This clause was a very just one. It is not fair that when we +have gone through this agonising struggle, and when we are still +suffering from the consequences of all the wealth of knowledge +and ingenuity which they employed for their infamous purposes-- +it is not fair, I say, to allow them to keep these secrets +to themselves, and I think you will agree with me it was in the highest +degree consonant with justice that we should make them reveal +them all to us." Small wonder that we missed this vital point, +that we failed to fathom the force behind the German chemical war, +if such an eminent authority was left groping for the truth. +There was no time for mature reflection with the problems +of war supply pressing forward in an endless stream. +Lord Moulton was himself responsible for the brilliant solution +of the most important, the problem of explosives supply. + +The realisation of the facts in question led to the direct +admission of their importance in the Treaty. Article 172, +the one in question, states: "Within a period of three +months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, +the German Government will disclose . . . the nature and mode +of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other +like chemical preparations used by them in the war, or prepared +by them for the purpose of being so used." + +German Information.--This clause should be fulfilled in detail. +In any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end, +the Germans, in addition to those devices in operation, must have had +a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation. +It is important to get as much information as possible on this development. + +A striking fact emerges. The years 1915, 1916, and the early part +of 1917 witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were +used by Germany on the front. All the research and other work which +precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier. +What surprises, then, had the German laboratories in store for us after 1917? +Have these been revealed under authority of the Treaty? + +Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation +with regard to the Haber process. Its critical importance in +the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use +the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace. +This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely +responsible for the three years of war agony which followed. +It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its +claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry. +To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten +the greater ideal of world peace. + +Limitation of Armament.--This clause, covering only war development, +cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future. +It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome +of Allied success and the German breach of faith. +But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance +of chemical warfare for the future. Article 171 states: +"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of +analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, +their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden +in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended +for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products +or devices." What kind of guarantee is this? How far is it +supported by other disarmament? It is very important to answer +these questions. In a sense the full execution of the other +relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer. +We deal with these in the next chapter. + +Report of the Hartley Mission.--Chemical warfare is the _point +faible_ in world disarmament. Judging from the above clause +of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised. +Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition. The lesson +of the war is not learnt. The chemical menace is not countered. +Why should this be? There are two main reasons. In the first place, +very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch +of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no +direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions. +The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of +the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the +solid facts of the case. The great importance of the projector, +the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery, +and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army +of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped. +The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye +factories for chemical warfare production. But we have a shrewd +idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed +on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is, +on the military value of chemical warfare. + +New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.--The second +difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies +in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain +conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook. +Let us examine the matter as simply as possible. + +During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles +were suggested as a basis. One which received recognition +in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors +or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover +all projectile-throwing weapons. Thus, in the sense implied, +rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors. +Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which, +on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive +shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely. +This is true--with one most important qualification. +Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector, +the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence +will decrease. New forms of chemical weapon will evolve. +Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one +can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector, +and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors +can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated. +These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a +field or heavy gun. But there is one serious exception +to the covering power of this method of limitation. +You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors, +but you can run a chemical campaign without them. + +Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations +or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume +armament reduced to a police basis. In other words, the use +of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum +required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace, +and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war. +The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material +within certain prescribed bounds. The work of the League +of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here. +We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions, +in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted. This may +take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their +inspection by the League. Here we meet with considerable difficulty. +Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can +be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world +inspecting the administration and organisation of the other. +The matter becomes an absurdity. + +Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.--Considering the present +trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring +limitation into three classes--the combatants, and weapons +of a mechanical and chemical nature. + +Tank Disarmament.--A little thought will show that the limitation +of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types, +and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility +of inspection. Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check +against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry, +for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns. +If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank, +we find it no exception to the above remarks. Without projectors, that is, +machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops +and material from one place to another. + +Two possibilities then arise. The number of tanks required +might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light +projectors without entering upon large-scale production. +Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon +without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance. +This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit +the output of the tank itself. Are such steps possible? +We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become, +a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number +of special parts which normal industry does not provide, +and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection +with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors. +We now come to the third type requiring limitation under +a disarmament scheme. + +Chemical Limitation.--Can we limit chemical armament? +Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so, +unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry +which is essential for world progress by its contribution +of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities. The factories +of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted +into arsenals than any other type. It is true that, under normal +conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign +might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery. +But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited, +the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance. +One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development +of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without +a complicated form of projector, or with none at all. Having thus +shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions +of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question. +What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare? + +Research.--In the first place, can any research results accrue under +Treaty or League conditions? The chief poison gases used during +the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research +which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical. +Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on +the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine. +Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects +of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called +radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds +of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member. +This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members +of the series were harmless. + +These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research. +We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially +directed towards their discovery, but it is practically +impossible to control such work. The research worker's nearest +confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was +developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare. +No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon +such research. If, then, the Government of any country desires +to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for +chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY +international arrangements, however prohibitive. + +Production.--But what of production? Here, again, we have an entirely +different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun. +Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new +organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last +step produces the toxic substance. This is a fair assumption. +Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection, +_i.e_. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously +toxic properties. Given a big organic chemical industry, +there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control. +With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they +will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other +commercial organic product. The products of these first reactions can +either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction, +in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction +can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through +a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container. +The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a +problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial +secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled +owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced. +The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch +with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs. + +Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment. They cover a very wide +range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and +rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit. +Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance +to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical +works with which we are acquainted. Even under such favourable +conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult. +Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant, +and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or +finished materials. For the inspection of suspected poison +gas production, an examination of the first two would be of +no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical. +Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks. +Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred +different compounds at the same time, and each one of these +compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages. +The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown +the plant for the manufacture of _p_-amidophenol, an important +dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building +filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides, +"We have no special plant for the product you mention; +we make it in this building with a great many other products, +for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one +product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety." +In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked +eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed +by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another. +It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct +chemical tests at the different stages. The difficulty of inspection +is incontestable. It could be done with a large staff, but we +must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small +corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection. +Even under the most favourable conditions for detection, +the chances are exceedingly small. But, in most cases, an enemy +with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake +manufacture during peace. He could rely on the potentialities +of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence +production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war. +The question of the use of the chemical then arises. +If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take +its share of use in the limited number of guns available; +on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very +simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised +in the future. + +Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case. +The latest German designs have a range well over a mile. +This range maybe increased. Yet the Livens projector can +be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant, +in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced. +The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy +is not required, and simplification of production of the gas +projector follows naturally. We conclude from the above that +whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting +chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods +of control, and must find safety in some other measure. + +Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.--There is a fundamental +difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war. +This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method +from the point of view of disarmament. All the modern mechanical types +of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy, +witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts, +the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future +tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices. +This characteristic of great structural development has certain +concomitants which are of considerable military importance. +It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories +for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts. +It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance. +All this brings control and inspection within the region of the +theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise. +The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions +in military training. It takes a definite period of time to create +a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves. +He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs. He must be trained. +The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance, +such as the tank. In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check +on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament. + +But consider the chemical method. The specific property +of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately +its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties +or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops. +There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical +structure of the substance in question. This, however, +does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for +the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense. +In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical +the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers, +pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind. +Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale +conditions on the research. Nor is it fair to say that from +the point of view of production there is a parallel between +the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it. +The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were +produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself +when compared with the marvellous installation developed +to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple +sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production. +Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly +complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate +temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium. +Naturally, chemical engineering is very important, +but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel +with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a +distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance. +More than this, we believe that developments in both fields +will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference. +We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends +to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be +perfectly adequate for the mechanical type. + +Recent Disarmament Proposals.--A superficial examination of recent +disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves +one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal. +But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical, +but not cynical, frame of mind. Disarmament depends for success on +the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out +of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely +added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged +supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war. +The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements +in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood. + +The great case and rapidity with which the German dye +factories mobilised for poison gas production on a +super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated. +It took forty years and more to develop those factories. +Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages +of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others. +In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual +munitions long before the outbreak of war. We must not remain +insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon. +When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America, +with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison +made in the same factories. Even when our textile industries +were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on +which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas, +each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life. +But how does this touch disarmament? Very simply. +A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances +will show that we are not pressing the point without need. +But let us follow the matter through in a logical way. + +The Covenant of the League;--Need for Guarantees.--We start from +the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8, +recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point +consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation +and revision of plans for such reduction and states: +"The members of the League undertake to interchange full +and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, +their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such +of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." +Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries. +But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction +with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague. Thus, from +Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague. +These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion +which has brought about so many wars. Nations who put their +trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League +will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude. +The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere +do not give this assurance. Something more definite is required," +and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered +by an efficient disarmament scheme. + +[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_. Major David Davies, M.P. + + +"(_a_) Allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal +order within its own boundaries, and sufficient also to furnish +its quota for the League of Nations when required. + +"(_b_) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless +by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation. + +"(_c_) Provide the League of Nations with an adequate force +for immediate use. + + +"All the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an +International Police Force. This scheme, which is given in +the merest outline, is based on the assumption that our national +security must always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before +we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must +be certain that the alternative offers complete protection." +Other exponents emphasise this last essential. This reference +to an International Police Force raises an important issue. +Such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations. +Without any doubt, one of the most important contributions from +the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and +technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament +conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries. + +Viscount Grey--"Germany Must Disarm First."--Viscount Grey, +at the public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations +on October 10th, 1918, stated: "Germany must disarm first. +She led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments. +She must lead the way down the hill. That as a first condition, +from our point of view, goes without saying. There can be no talk +of disarmament until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed." +One can only heartily agree with such expressions, but the +_denouement_ brings a sense of disappointment. There is a feeling +that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution. +The peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely +admitted in these utterances. Thus Major David Davies states: +"If they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise +a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack, it was more than +possible that they would have completely broken the Allied line," +and Lord Grey, "You cannot limit the amount of merchant +ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments, +fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons +of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships, aeroplanes, +chemicals of all kinds." + +Left in this state the case is true but not complete. +The essential point is that the new and telling types +of armament will develop from these very peace industries. +We are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude +in a state of disarmament, but with the critical types which may +develop from them. + +So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to counter the menace? +In reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals, +we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer +weapons fall into two classes. + +Suggested Methods.--In the first place, it is suggested "that war's +newest weapons--poison gas, aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery, +and tanks, should be ceded to the League to form the _Headquarter's Force_, +and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any +new invention for warlike purposes. + +"There should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can +claim long traditions. Vested interests have not yet been created on +a permanent footing. Great disturbance would not be caused at present +by the suggestion of denationalisation." + +This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is +absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard, +periodic "inspection." Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and +munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff, +who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a +nation other than that in whose territory they were situated." +We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon +to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G. +for war purposes. A distinction must be made between those weapons whose +production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection. +In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is +difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy +to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines." +No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks +and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods +of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an +elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament +arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security. +_*Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is +difficult to prevent_. + +"Vested Interests."--With regard to the vested interests +in the new method of warfare, the most striking example +is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and +the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast +munition programme. Few people have realised the existence +of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation +to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament +to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly. +For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety. +While the sole big source of production of these substances +exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter, +no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground. + +"Handing Over" Inventions.--Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous +ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over" +to the League. How can an invention be handed over? If every country +informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries +would still be aware of them. It is possible, commercially, to hand over any +invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes. +What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a +valuable war invention? Secondly, the cession of an invention to +the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned. +No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions. +Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view, +than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector, +or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never +know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye. +World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries +of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood. + +We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the +possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this +for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare. +If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from +a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League +the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace. + +Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.--Let us face the facts. +Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations +and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature. +We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most +menacing munition plants in existence. We knew the grave dangers of +leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly. +Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored. +Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns. + +Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large +scale production. The former cannot be checked, and the latter +cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion +for war purposes. Yet three distinct features of this weapon make +the disarmament need imperative. + +In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament" +as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons. +The aggressive agent in war is the chemical. All weapons, +except the bayonet, depend upon it. + +In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important +that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not, +first and foremost, tackle this question. + +Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon +than did Germany for chemical warfare. Yet the levelling up process +which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium, +towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm. +Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further +increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war. + +This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war +and disarmament. Others will follow as science progresses. +Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions, +and therefore war incentive will be removed. Sir Oliver Lodge +prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy. +The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war +industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell. +It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness. +At present the chemical industry holds the field. + +Surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution +of these organic chemical forces. This, indeed, is the one solid +chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about. + +The certain establishment of these industries in the chief +countries outside Germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard +of local politics and the reach of organised German attack. +True, it is essential that no such support should in any way +drug the will, weaken the initiative and impoverish the service +of the fostered industries. This must depend upon wise +organisation and control in the country concerned. + +I claim, however, that it is one of the main duties of any League +of Nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed +two steps beyond the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant. This runs +as follows: "The members of the League undertake to interchange +full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, +their military, naval, and air programmes, and the conditions +of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." +Such an exchange of information must be used, first, to isolate that +industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period, +either on account of its value as a universal check, or because it +fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent. +The chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions, for without it, +all weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it includes the organic +chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period. + +Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the existence +of monopoly in this critical industry. It may be objected +that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws. +But we must face the possibility that the war of the future +can never be averted without such interference. Indeed, if we +accept the reports of the American Alien Property Custodian, +this very monopoly which now threatens us was established +by methods open to the same objections. It is indeed an +interesting question whether the German dye monopoly resulted +from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law. +Further, the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the +industries which disarmament most concerns, governing technical +changes are constantly occurring, and the normal home for +the production of a whole range of chemical products may be +shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials +or new types of energy and power. We must be ready, in certain +critical cases, to regard disarmament as the paramount need. +International agreement, through the League or otherwise, +must find a suitable method to control the critical industry +and prevent its use against world peace. + +To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its official guardian, +does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international +and national issue. After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful, +attempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on rational lines. + + + +CONCLUSION + +THE TREATY AND THE FUTURE + + +I have endeavoured to present the facts of chemical warfare +as briefly yet as truly as possible, giving a glimpse of the war +possibilities inherent in this branch of applied chemical science. +Nor have I ignored the hidden forces which inspired, stimulated, +and supported the huge war chemical experiment. The great Rhine +factories of the I.G. still cast their shadow on the outer world, +obscuring the issues of reconstruction. This looming menace, +its share in the past and future of chemical warfare, and the fatal +growth of the latter present questions demanding an imperative answer. +It is the weak point of world disarmament. + +The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in principle, +but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled? + +Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions production to factories +or works approved by the Allied and Associated Governments. "All other +establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall +be closed down." + +True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants, +have a dual function for peace and war. But their recent vital +use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope +of the above clause. Are they still equipped for war purposes? +Very drastic action will have been necessary by the +Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer. +Has that action been taken? If not, the I.G., a second Krupp, +remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval +but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent. +of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually +provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in +synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none +the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous. +Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments +voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast +source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168? + +Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for +the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised +as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army, +must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless." +The most formidable examples of such excess production were, +and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants +of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives +and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs +of the German Army. Why, then, should they be left. intact? + +What is the authorised equipment of the German Army? In the first +place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden +by the Treaty. The plants in question are therefore all in excess +of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless. +At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at +short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month. +Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment? +If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty. + +The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell. +Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production +of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available, +could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production +of little more than one day! + +Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade +their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need? + +Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within +the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by +the Treaty. It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants, +or in special plants of the same type. Germany's great +advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly. +The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are +given below, under (A) and (B) : + + A B C + Country. Dye Production, Home Dye Dye Production, + 1913. Consumption. 1918, + Tons Tons Tons + Germany 135,000 20,000 135,000 + (probably + more) + Switzerland 10,000 3,000 12,000 + France 7,500 9,430 18,000 + U.K . 4,500 31,730 25,000 + U.S.A 3,000 26,020 27,000 + Other Countries 3,000 72,820 4,000 + ---- ---- ---- + Total 163,000 163,000 221,000 + + +The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed. +If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for +poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war +_raison d'etre_ unless the feeble production of other countries +had even further diminished. + +Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption? There is an +increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum. +Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed +national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the +exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly. +Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered +by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives. + +There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants. +There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them. +In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed +because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon. +Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty +plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use, +the claim could not be supported before neutral experts. The Treaty +provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants. +Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this +critical disarmament measure. The need may justify Treaty exemption +for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect +is not so overwhelmingly important. The matter demands examination. +We can hardly conceive that this has not been done. Are our missions +equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter? +In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry +policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G. +munition plants. Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument. + +The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubtedly demand +the same critical examination. These plants were built almost +entirely for war purposes, for the production of ammonia to be +oxidised to nitric acid. Ammonium nitrate also resulted. +These substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, as a +matter of fact, their production in these very plants was the chief +factor which enabled Germany to continue the war beyond 1915. + +Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, the plants +should "be destroyed or rendered useless." Here, possibly, +strong arguments will be advanced by Germany for the retention +of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil. +The argument is strong, for the impoverishment of German soil +has been such as to demand, theoretically, enormous tonnages +of ammonium sulphate. But it is vital, for the stability +of peace, that this unique capacity for producing explosives +must not remain the monopoly of any one country. +It is the expressed intention of certain governments outside +Germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise. If, then, +we admit the immunity of these German plants from the Treaty, +for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow Germany +to use this privilege as a military advantage. + +In other words, if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions. +In the first place, the plants to evade the Treaty clauses must +be proved necessary for German agriculture. Secondly, the products +of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other. +As far as we know, no attempt has been made to apply the Treaty +to the nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead of being +mainly used for agriculture on German soil, have served as a deliberate +weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries. + +Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full +demands of German agriculture were met, the plants built and projected +leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use. +According to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of November 23rd, 1919, the total +consumption of nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as follows: + + Tons + Source and Nature Tons Calculated as + Nitrogen + Chili Saltpetre 750,000 116,000 + Ammonium Sulphate 460,000, 92,000 + Norwegian Nitrate 35,000 4,500 + Calcium Cyanamide 30,000 6,000 + Haber Ammonium Sulphate + (by Fixation) 20,000 4,000 + ------- + Total 222,500 + + +The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the capacity of the finished +Haber plants to be equivalent to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum, +and the total consumption of the old German Empire was thus less than +the amount available from one source alone, _i.e_. nitrogen fixation +by the Haber process. But other pre-war German sources of nitrogen, +expanded by the war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota. +We can therefore very safely assume German capacity of above 400,000 tons +of nitrogen per annum, approximately twice the pre-war consumption. +It is exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually consume such +a quantity. In any case, a large excess is now deliberately used +to recapture world chemical markets, and this, as explained above, +should be dealt with under the Treaty even if special immunity be afforded +the capacity required for home purposes. We are indeed entitled to ask, +what is being done on this vital matter? + +Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind +into Germany. Considered from the point of view of chemical munitions, +this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation. +Far from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves Germany the greatest +potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world. +Further, it is not improbable that countries outside Germany +may encourage her in munitions production for export. +Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in December, 1914: +"Supposing our War Minister had been in the last few years +buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness, +and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp's +of Essen. Gentlemen, I think he would have been lynched about +three months ago." + +We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days! +Knowing the true war significance of the I.G. as a second Krupp, +if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries, +that warning may become a prophecy. + +Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous +materials in Germany. + +Has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control? +With such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production, +need Germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace? +Once engaged in war, what is the value of the prohibition? +True, failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of +the Treaty. But a similar breach of International Convention is +already involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 171: +"The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc." + +It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties be actually +incurred for the existing breach, why Article IV would be a serious +deterrent for the future. + +A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this Treaty Article, +and the actual operation of other Articles which should support it. + +The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference +to chemical warfare. They issued a special edict against its use. +This alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of +the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures of general application +to the means of production of the different types of weapon. +Have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic +action under the Treaty? It is to be feared that they and other war +chemical plants of the I.G. have received undeserved immunity. + +Where lies our help apart from the Treaty? World peace +depends upon disarmament. True peace must come from a +radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals. +The forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers. +But a League of Nations can forward the cause by wise measures +of disarmament, and this implies limiting war producing capacity. +The weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry. +There must be a redistribution of capacity, for while Germany retains +a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions, +which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas, +and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration +and sustenance, disarmament will be a hollow farce. + +The League of Nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production +of certain munitions. But organic chemical factories must survive +for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity. +They cannot be inspected and controlled, as we have shown, +and there is only one sound solution. The obstacle to peace must +be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories. +We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country. +It now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created +and wielded it with such success. Redistributed, this dangerous +productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength +to a League of Nations, and will invite a national sense of security, +so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime. +This has only one meaning, the establishment of dye industries +in Allied countries. This may clash with certain political schools +of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of +the organic way in which production links up with national defence. +But let there be no misunderstanding. The refusal to support this +critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues. +Political principles responsible for such opposition no longer +merit the name; they have become a fetish. + +Our armies repelled the German chemical attack. +They stood and fell unprotected before the early German clouds +and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas. +The awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more +than rest contented with the sacrifice. It is an imperative +and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the race, +and to the Empire, that, faced once again with modern war, +we should be able to say, "every possible precaution was taken." +But the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic +chemical industries are fostered on Imperial soil. + +But what of chemical warfare itself? It is a growth, +malignant or otherwise, according to our creeds, which will continue +until very definite steps be taken to suppress it, with all war. +Therefore, urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely +essential until the web of peace is strongly organised, which cannot +be until the immediate menace of the monopoly in production is removed. +But even then, until the general peace is fairly implanted, +we must be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous enemy. +Research and training in chemical protection must be continued, and this +can only be ensured by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare. +"The Struggle for the Initiative" has at least established this. + +Each nation and any League of Nations must seriously face the question of +the establishment of elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisations. +It seems to me that the logical course of thought and action is as follows. +If guarantees are forthcoming, internationally, removing this grave German +chemical warfare threat through her manufacturing monopoly, then the need for +a definite chemical striking force and organisation will be greatly reduced. +National safety is itself a corollary of world disarmament. +But if satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming it would be consistent +with national safety to limit the chemical warfare equipment of each +nation to what would actually represent a scientific military brain. +So long as national ministries for war or defence exist, they must possess +even under the most stringent disarmament conditions, fully accredited +within their regular staffs, an individual or individuals with scientific +and military training, who represent knowledge, vision, and the power +to expand in chemical warfare. What would be said of a great nation +not equipped to think for the future on naval or artillery questions? +Technical naval and military minds have evolved for these purposes. +We are not slow to judge and act on the value of a new ship, tank, +or machine-gun. The chemical arm is even more specialised and demands +the same combination of scientific and military thinking and training. +Whatever international disarmament decisions may be forthcoming, +unless they seriously dismember the Defence Ministries, we should ensure +that the pre-war position is corrected and that our staff conception +and organisation covers the chemical weapon. + +One alone of the Allied and Associated Powers was able to see +the chemical menace with clear and unprejudiced vision. +This was America, for she not only entered the war less hampered +by traditions than the rest, but at a period when the chemical +war was in full blast. More than a quarter of all her casualties +were due to "gas," and no other arm produced as many in her ranks. +As a result, we see America establishing an independent peace +Chemical Warfare Service, as sister service to the Infantry +and Artillery. This can only be interpreted as a frank realisation +of the place of chemical warfare and of the need for serious +international guarantees in the present situation. + +Let us take a balanced view of the facts, realise the unique significance +of chemical warfare and chemical industry, for war and disarmament, +and act accordingly. + + + +INDEX {Raw OCR, needs fixed or stripped out...} + +A. charcoal, 129. Aircraft, gas and, 181, 185, 229, 230, 231. +Aisne, German attacks on, 77, 141. Aktien Gesellschaft +fur Anilin Fabrikation, 151. Alert Gas Zone, 229. +Alien Property Custodian, report of, Y9, 152, 187, 189) 190, 191, +194~ 262. Allied Gas Statistics, 82. -Missions, 86, +87-Reaction, 48. American activities, 64, 1731 174. +-chemical warfare development, 105, 173P 174, 178, 273f 274. +chemical warfare service, 49, 178P 3179) 274. Amidol, 203. +Ammonia, synthetic, see Nitrogen Fixation. Anaesthetics, 201, 220. +-local, 199, 202, 220. Anti-Gas Committee, British, 95. +-Department, British, 98, 127. Armendires, bombardment of, 77. +Arras, Battle of, 63-, British 1917 offensive, 61. +Arsenic Compounds, 26, 28, 69, 136, 137) 139, x6o, x63- See also +Blue Cross. Artillery Gas experts, 91. Asphyxiating Compounds, 25. +Aspirin, 199, 208. + +Austria-Hungary, gas battalion of, 47. Azo Dyes, 16o. + +Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, 88, 1151P 207P 212. +Bleaching Powder, x6g, 221, 222. Blue Cross, 29, 69, 74-771 89, +126, 131P 132, 136p 137, z6o, 229, 253, 258. Bn. Stuff, 42. +Box Respirator, British, 69, 99, + +1101P 125, x26t 176. Bribery and Corruption, x9o. +British Association, General Hartley's report, 64, 123, 240.-- +Central Laboratory, 93,1115. -Dyes Limited, 116g, x6g. Brominated m +ethyl -ethylketone, 42. Bromine, American Industry, 157) 190, 191. +-French, 1157, 171P z96. -Monopoly, German, 157. Bromoacetone, 26, 41. +B. Stuff, 4r. Buntkreuz, ii3q. + +Cacodyl oxide, 35. Cambrai sector, attack Or', 70, 79. +Camouflage chemicals, 141, 217, 218. Canadians, gas attack on, 19. +Captured Documents, 52, 53t 74, 82, 128, 133, 221, 222, 229. +Carnoy, attack at, 61. 27S Index + +Cartridge Mask, German, 124, 3128. Castner Kellner, 169. +Casualties, gas, 56, 93, X74, 182, 237-241, 274. Chaulny, 209. +Chemical Advisory Committee, 96. -Exchange Association, +x94, z96. -Initiative, see Initiative, struggle for. +-Policy, German, z86-i8S, 200, 205. -Warfare Department, British, +96-98.--Designs Committee, 99.--Medical Committee, 97. +-Organisations, 85, 215, 217, 228, 239, 264. ngliSh, 92, 9'~,--' E + +103~ 105, 165.--, French, 94, 99, 100, 105.--, German, +85, 89, 102, 103, 149. Italian, iox. Policy, 88, 249p 250. +Production, see Production. Research, see Research.--Service, American, +see American Chemical Warfare Service. Chemische Fabrik +Griesheim Elektron, iSi, 152.--Fabriken Yorm. Weilerter-Meer, x5x. +Chloral Hydrate, 196, 202. Chlorine, 23, Z5, 35, 36, x55, 156, 169, +171p 217. 276 + +ChlormethylchIoroform ate, 64,6 9. Chloroform, z20. Chlorpicrin, 25, 158, +169. Cloud Gas attacks, 23, 46~ Szy 56, 57, 65, 215. Coloured Cross, x39. +Colour Users Association, Y69. Commercial Advisory Committee, British, 96. +Critical Industries, 261-z63, 272. -Range, 226, 229. + +Defence, national, see Dye Industry and National Defence. +Dianisidine, double salts Of, 41. Dichlor-diethyl-sulphide, see +Mustard Gas. Dichlor-methylether, x63. Diethfiamine, 201. +Diphenylchlorarsine, see Arsenic compounds. Diphenylcyanarsine, see +Arsenic compounds. Diphosgene, 25, 29, 157, 163. Directeur du +Mat6riel Chimique de Guerre, ioo. Director of Gas Services, +94, 98. Disarmament, 20, 2,~, 142, 145, 150, 172t 177, +242, 245, 246, 252, 254-262, 267, 271-274. See also Limitation +of Armaments. Drugs, igg-2or. Dumps, enemy, 79# 141. +Dye Agency, German information system, r92, x93, 1957 197. +-Industry and National Defence, 163, 171t 172t 198, 203, 204, 272. +-Industry, British, 146, 168, 203~ 204- + +Index + +Dye Industry, German, 146, 147, 153$ x86, 242, 25 -Monopoly, German, see +Monopoly, German Dye. supplies to America, 197. Dyes, use in Gas Shell, 72. +Edgewood Arsenal, xo5, xo6, 175-178Entressin experimental grounds, + +110. Espionage, 192, 193Ether, 220. Fthyldichlorarsine, x63. +Ethylenemonochlorhydrin, x64, 202. P-Eucaine, 202. +Exhaustion of Stocks, forced, go. Explosives, English Production, x6g. +German Production, i4q, 1150) 1151. Farben fabriken vorm. Fr. Bayer + +and CO., 90, 15T, 194, 208. Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius and Briining, +87, 151Field Organisation, British, go.--German, go. -Tests, 86, xio. +Flame Projector, see Flammenwerfer. Flammenwerfer, 43, 631, 72) +73Flexibility of Supply, German, 65, 138. French College of Warfare, 185. +Full Line Forcing, x9o. Future of Chemical Warfare, 14-4, 183. + +Gas and Aircraft, see Aircraft. -Casualties, see Casualties, gas. +-Discipline, 62, 81-82, 132P 133, 140- + +Gas Experts on Artillery staffs, see Artillery Gas Experts. -Mask, see +Mask, gas, and Helmet, gas.--Personnel, 89.--Regiment~ go, +gi.--School, German, 86, go, gi. -Shell, see Shell, gas. +-Specific uses Of, 39Gaswerfer, 1918, 71Gelbolin, 221. +German Dye Industry, see Dye Industry, German. Patent Policy, +see Patent Policy, German. Press, 33, 54. -Production, see +Production, German. Givenchy, attack near, 51, 70Green Cross, +29, 69P 77, 135, ,36, i5g. + +Haber Process, see Nitrogen. Fixation. Hague Convention, 32, 33, +240Hanlon Field, experimental sta tion, 175, 2318Hartley Mission, +87, 14 149, + +172, 207, 245. Heeres-Gasschule, see Gas + +School, German. Helmet, Gas, X21, 122, 124- See also Mask. Hexamine, x22. +Hill 6o, attack on, 40. Hindenburg Programme, 66, 89, 149. +116chst, Y7, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, x6x. Hohenzollern Redoubt, +storming Of, 51. Hooge, attack on 2nd Army, 44. 277 I ndex + +Hydrocyanic acid, see Prussic acid, + +I.G., see Interessen Gemeinschaft. Immune Functions, 217, 2x8, 232. +Imperial College of Science, 97Indigo, 28, 155t 158, +159, 165, x68, 202, 255. Initiative, Struggle for, 111, 121, +1347 273Interessen Gemeinschaft, 18, 32, 86, 89, 109P 148, +149-151, z54, 163, x86, 187, 192, 198, 200, 202, 205, 214, 258-26o, +264-267, 27P. Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, 107-Commission +of Control, $5, 264.--Liaison, xo6.--Munitions Council, 107. +Intensive Chemical Warfare, 66. International Police Force, 256. + +Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 35, 85, $9. Kalle and Co., 151, Kernmel, attack on, +77, 224, 229. K. Stuff, 41KornmandeurderGastruppen,gi, Krupp's Works, 206. + +La Bassie Canal, 76. LachrymatorS, 26, 42, x18, 124, 156, 170, +2171 218. League of Nations, 2r, 127, 259, 246, 247, 255, +256, 258, 26o, 261, 262, 2631 271-273Lens, attack at, 77, 76. +Le Rutoire Farm, 43, Leopold Cassella, G.m.b.H., 3151. +Leverkusen, 86, go, z4g, r5lt 156-158, L59, z61, 208, 250. +Levinstein Limited, x68, 16q. 278 + +Lewis Gun, 252. Limitation of Armament, 114, 244-248, 254, +264, 265, 267See also Disarmament. Livens Projector, +29, 6o, 41, 65, 90) IOT, 133, 175, 2x6, 227) 228, 245, 252. +Longworth Bill, 178. Loos, Battle Of, 43, 50, ix8f 170Ludwigshafen, +88, 151, i56p 159# r6o, x61. + +M2, French Mask, 135. March, 19x8, German Offensive, +17, 69, 76, 219, 224Marne, Battle of, 94, 143, 205Mask, first +improvised gas, 121. See also Helmet, gas.--German cartridge, +see Cartridge Mask, German.--M2 French, see M2, French Mask. +resistance of, to breathing, 130, 1311 140MetOl, 203. Minist6re de +I'Artillerie et des Munitions, 200. Monchy, attack at, 55. +Monopoly, Germany Dye, z8, 38, 148, i8g, 198, 214, 266. +Montauban attack, 55. Munitions Inventions Department, 97. +Mustard Gas, 27-29, 28, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 78, 8r, 89, xig, +136t 1137, 141, 158, 170, 216, 217, 221, 224, 230, 236, 240, +2491 255, 258, 272.--Allied Production, 8o, 81, zo,4, 164Y 165, +x68, 171-casualties, 69', 224# + +Index + +Mustard Gas, defensive use of, 229.--- first use of, 66~ 67, 215. +German production, 158, 202. protection a g a i n I t, 137, 221, 222. +Surprise, 66, 67, 69. + +National Health Insurance Commission, 164, 201. Neglect of Chemical Industry, + +171, 187New War Chemicals, see War Chemicals. Nieuport, 66, 67, +217Nitric Acid, 171. Nitrogen Fixation, 88, 171s z86, 205, 208, +211-213, 244, 26o, 265, 2671 268, 269. No-Man's-Land, fvture, +227, 229Non-persistent substances, 28, 29. Novocain, 201. + +Obstacle, new type Of, 223, 229. Organic Chemical Industry, 145, + +235, 2S6, 250, 251, 271Oxalic Acid, igo. + +Particulate Clouds, 140, 232. Patent Policy, German, x91. Penetrants, 29. +Persistent lethal substance, 225227, 229, 231. -substances, 29, 29. +Phenol, German cornering of, 194. Phenylca rbyl amine chloride, 158. +Phosgene, 25, 29, 64, 69, 124,141, 156, z67, 217, 230, 249. +4,delayed action," 45, 53French development of, T 70 German cloud, +44-46. Phosphorus, r75, 181- + +Photographic chemicals, 189, 203. Physiological classification, 25. +Poison gas, 25, 1507 151. Porton, experimental station, 97, + +110`. Portuguese front, attack on, 77. Potassium permanganate, 126, 2M Price +cutting policy, German, 189, 213. Production, 83, 149, 162, 163, 249, 250. +critical importance of, 143Y 144, 171, 26o. statistics, 82, 83, 88. +Projector, German development Of, 70) 711. -Livens, see Livens Projector. +-short range, 182. Propaganda by German dye agents, igr. +-,German use of, 113. Protection, 38, 90, 92, 95, 99, loop 109, 113p 114) +121, 124~ 125, 127~ 128, 176, 216, 217, 220, 221. -collective, 231, 233. +-future deinclopmentS, 231. -Individual, 231, 232. -of animals, 92. +Prussic acid, 26, ixS. Puteaux, American laboratory, 175, 21S. + +Rechicourt, attack on French, 7(RedCross appeal toendwar, i ig. +Research, 35,85, 108Y176,184,249. Respirator, Box, see Box Respirator. +-drurns, 97.--XTXY 13 5. Rhincland occupation, Allied, 206. 279 Index + +Royal Society, 50, 94-97. Rubber, German shortage of, x32. +Russia, gas attacks against, 47, 123p 124. + +St. Mihiel Battle, z82. Salicylic acid, igg, x94, igg. +Salvarsan, igg. Scientific Advisory Committee, 499 95, 96. +Serni-Circular Canals, 2x5. Sensitisers, photographic, 203. +Service Chemique de Guerre, ioS. Shell, Gas, 30, 40, 41, 64., 136, + +A3, 216. + +-Falkenhayn's orders,+3.--percentage Of, 77, 79, 80, 141, 245. +Smoke, future importance of, ISO, 181, 2A. -use with lethal gases, +i40, 180. Somme offensive, 52,55, 6r, 64,143. Speculative element, +2115, 220. Special Brigade R.E., 52, x74. -Companies, 50, 93. +Sternutatory compounds, a6, 28, 41. Stokes Mortar, +29, 52, 175. Stovaine, 220. Strategy, chemical, see Tactics +and Strategy. Sulphur Black, 155. Sulphuric acid, 171, 253. +Supply Department, British, iox, 105. -Organisations, ioz. +Surprise, critical factor of, 31, 32, 53, 111. 113, 114, 144. + +Tactics and Strategy, 215, 216, 225. Tactical classification, 25, 28. 280 + +Tanks, 143, 217, 227) 253P 254, 247, 248. Technik im Weltkriege, Die, +36 371 40) 417 47, 51, 57, 69, 74: 80,125,128,129,135, 136,141. +Thermite shell, 175. Thiodiglycol, 159. Toxic compounds, 26. +Treaty Stocks, 150. Trench Warfare Department, British, 95, 96. +Re~earch Department, 96. Supply Department, 96, io5, +170Tri-chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, 64, 157. T. Stuffy 41. +Verdun, gas attack at, 69. Versailles, TreatY'Of, 34,150,210, +242-244, 264-267, 270, 271. Vesicant Compounds, 27, 137) +217, 239Vested Interests, 258, 259. Vincennite, zi8. +War chemicals, new, 217, 225.--Physiological classification, +see Physiological classification.--Tactical classification, +see Tactical Classification. Warsaw, cloud attacks, 123. White Cross +shell, 225. Xylyl bromide, 41, 156. Xylylene dibromide, 41. +Yellow Cross, see Mustard Gas. Yperite, 8o, z66. Ypres, first +German gas attack, 23~ 31, 32, 38-first Mustard gas, 66, 217. +Yser, raid by Germans, 117. + +NAME INDEX + +Albert, Dr., x94-x96, 197t 198- + +Bacon, Colonel R. F., 218. Baeyer, Professor, 27Baker, Professor H. B., +95Barley, Major, D.S.O., 46. Beilby, Sir George, 96. Bernstorff, von, 194. +Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 111, 197. Boy-Ed, Captain, 197. Bueb, Dr., 212. + +Cadman, Sir John, 96. Chevalier, Medecin aide-major, + +27Crossley, Professor A. W., 95, + +97Curmer, General, 99. + +Davies, Major David, M.P., 1172, 255, 257, 258. Davy, J., 249. +Dawson, Sergeant-Major, 5z. Debeney, General, 185. Duisberg, Herr, 1+7, 208- + +Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, x9g. + +Falkenhayn, General, 94, 147) 148. Foch, Marshal, 175. +Foulkes, Brig.--General C. H., 92. + +French, Field-Marshal Sir 31t 43, 48Fries, Brig.--General A. A., 114, +17S9 177t 1791 1809 183Fuller, Colonel J. F. C., 227, 233- + +Garvan, Francis P., i8q, 195, 197, 199Geyer, Captain, 136-140. +Green, Prof. A. G., 168. Grey, Viscount, 256, 257. Guthrie, 249. + +Haber, Professor, 35, 49, 85, 90Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 54. +Haldane, Dr., 121. Harrison, Lieut.--Colonel E. F., 98, x26. +Hartley, Brig.--General H., 63, 76, 98, 123, 240. +Horrocks, Sir William, 95Hossenf elder, Consul-General, + +197- + +Jackson, Colonel L., 942 95Joyce, Colonel, 212. + +Kirschbaum, Prof. F. P., 1135. Kitchener, Lord, 33, 94~ 95) +121) 237. Kling, M., i0o. Krupp, von Bohlen, Herr, 147, + +259 281 Name Index + +Lambert, Major, 126. Lebeau, Professor P., iot. Levinstein, Dr. H., 168. +Livens, Major, 6o. Lodge, Sir Oliver, 94, Ludendorff, General, 70, +82P 90, 91) 114) 147, 149, 259. + +Meyer, Victor, 27 Macpherson, Captain, z2i. McConnel, Lieut., 208. +Moulton of Bank, Rt. Hon. + +Lord, 5, 16q, 242) 243, 270. Moureu, M. Charles, 200. + +Norris, Colonel, 206, 208, 209. + +Ozil, General, 200, 105. + +Palmer, Mitchell, ig, z8g. Paterno, Senator, zoi. Penna, Colonel, zoi. +Pick, Dr. H., iz5, i2q, 130, 131. Pollard, Professor A. F., zz2. +Pope, Sir William, z65, 191, 202. + +Ramsay, Sir William, 9+. Rayleigh, Lord, 94. Runciman, W., 146- + +Sachur, Professor, 35. Schmaus, Lieut. Dr., 75, Schwarte, see Technik +im Weltkriege (Subject Index). Schweitzer, Dr. Hugo, 194, 195, + +211. Sering, Dr. Max, zii. Stieglitz, Professor Julius, x9r, + +198, 200. + +Thomasl Albert, 200. Thorpe, Prof. J. F., 96, 99. +Thuillier, Major-General H. F., + +94, 98P 105- + +Villavecehia, Prof. zot. Vincent, Monsieur, 200. + +Watson, Colonel, 95. Weiss, M., 200. Wells, H. G., izz. +Wing, Major-General, 43. + +282 + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure + |