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+Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure
+*Project Gutenberg Etext of Chemical Strategy in Peace and War*
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+The Riddle of the Rhine:
+Chemical Strategy in Peace and War
+
+by Victor LeFebure
+
+by J. Walker McSpadden
+
+April, 1998  [Etext #1272]
+
+
+Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure
+*Project Gutenberg Etext of Chemical Strategy in Peace and War*
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+
+THE RIDDLE
+OF THE RHINE
+CHEMICAL STRATEGY IN PEACE AND WAR
+
+_An account of the critical struggle for power
+and for the decisive war initiative. The campaign
+fostered by the great Rhine factories, and
+the pressing problems which they represent.
+A matter of pre-eminent public interest
+concerning the sincerity of disarmament, the
+future of warfare, and the stability of peace_.
+
+BY
+
+VICTOR LEFEBURE
+Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Mil.)
+Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, Officer of the Crown of Italy
+Fellow of the Chemical Society, etc.
+
+
+WITH A PREFACE BY
+MARSHAL FOCH
+
+AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
+FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON, BART.
+Chief of the Imperial General Staff
+
+
+
+THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC.
+81 FULTON STREET
+NEW YORK CITY
+
+
+
+Published, 1923,
+By THE CHEMICAL FOUNDATION, INC.
+----
+_All Rights Reserved_
+
+_Printed in the United States of America_
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+My motives in writing this book are sufficiently explained in
+the first chapter.  The silence surrounding the true facts of the
+chemical campaign, the tardy realisation of the real forces behind it
+in Germany, and our failure to grasp the significance of the matter
+in the Treaty, all pointed to the need for an early statement.
+More recently, this need has been emphasised by inaccurate
+public utterances on the matter, and by its vital importance
+for the full and fair treatment of certain legislative measures
+before Allied countries.
+
+A unique experience of chemical warfare in all its aspects, first with a
+combatant gas unit on the British front in France, then as Liaison Officer
+with France and other Allies on all Chemical Warfare and allied questions,
+has afforded me an exceptionally complete survey of the subject.
+Later post-armistice experience in Paris, and the occupied territories,
+assisting Lord Moulton on various chemical questions in connection
+with the Treaty, and surveying the great chemical munition factories
+of the Rhine, has provided a central view of the whole matter which can
+have been the privilege and opportunity of very few.
+
+Further, my association with the dye industry, since commencing this book,
+leaves me with a deep conviction of the critical importance for disarmament,
+of a world redistribution of organic chemical production.  It is inevitable
+that such a step should benefit the growing organic chemical industries
+of countries other than Germany, but this issue need not be shirked.
+The importance of the matter is so vital that it eclipses all reproach
+that the disarmament argument for the maintenance of the dye industry
+is used on selfish grounds.  Such reproach cannot, in fairness,
+be heard unless it destroys the case which we have established.
+We are faced with the following alternatives.  Safety demands strong
+organic chemical industries or cumbersome and burdensome chemical
+warfare establishments.  The stability of future peace depends upon
+the former, and the extent to which we must establish, or can abandon,
+the latter depends entirely on the activity and success of those whose
+special duty it is to organise against war.
+
+A recent visit to America revealed the considerable publicity and public
+interest surrounding chemical warfare, strengthening my conviction that
+the facts, now noised abroad, should be presented in their proper setting.
+They are supremely significant at the present time and for the future,
+hence the chapters which follow.
+                         V. LEFEBURE.
+     HAMPSTEAD, _October_ 12, 1920.
+
+
+
+PREFACE BY FIELD MARSHAL FOCH
+
+
+In 1918, chemical warfare had developed considerably in our army.
+Before 1914 Germany possessed chemical factories which permitted
+her to manufacture in great quantities chemicals used at the front,
+and to develop on a large scale this new form of fighting.
+
+The Allies, to retaliate, had to experiment and organise important
+centres for production.  Only in this way, though starting late,
+were they able to put themselves in a position to supply the growing
+necessities of their armies.
+
+To-day, the ability for aviation to carry increasing weight furnishes a new
+method for abundantly spreading poison gases with the aid of stronger and
+stronger bombs, and to reach armies, the centres of population in the rear,
+or to render regions uninhabitable.
+
+Chemical warfare is therefore in a condition to produce more formidable
+results over more extended areas.
+
+It is incontestable on the other hand that this growth will find an easy
+realisation in one country, Germany, addicted in times of peace,
+to wholesale manufacture of chemical products, which a simple modification
+in reactions can transform into war products.
+
+This country, deprived, partially at least, of its former methods of fighting,
+and its numerous forces of specially trained soldiers, regularly organised
+and strongly armed, will be more drawn toward the new systems of attack--
+that of chemical warfare.
+
+Chemical warfare must therefore enter into our future provisions
+and preparations, if we do not wish to experience some terrible surprises.
+
+The work of Major Lefebure gives an exact idea of the possibilities he finds
+to-day in Germany, and through them the dangers with which she threatens us.
+In this form it constitutes a warning; and information of the highest order,
+for the minds who remain anxious for the fate of their country confronted
+by the inefficience of the old fighting methods which the progress of industry
+out of date renders daily.
+
+By sounding the alarm in both our countries, I find myself in company
+with my faithful friend Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.  This is an
+old habit, contracted by both of us, many years ago, which we still
+maintain at the present time to insure for ourselves once again,
+peace in the future.
+
+Together, we say, read this work of Major Lefebure.  F. FOCH.
+
+
+
+CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER I-EXPLANATORY The Riddle of the
+Rhine-A Critical Point in Disarmament-Need for a Balanced View
+of Chemical Warfare-Some Preliminary Explanation--"Poison Gas"
+a Misleading Term-The French Physiological Classification-Asphyxiating
+Substances-Toxic Substances-Lachrymators-Vesicant or
+Blistering Compounds-Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances-The
+Tactical Classification-Persistent Substances-Non-persistent
+Substances-Penetrants-Special Gas Weapons and Appliances-Gas Shell.
+17
+
+CHAPTER II-THE GERMAN SURPRISE The First Cloud Gas Attack-The Element
+of Surprise -Lord Kitchener's Protest-German Preparations--
+Research-Production-Field Preparations-German Opinion of
+Results-Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly-Standard Uses
+for Gas-Gas Shell-Further German Cloud Attacks-Hill 60-Origin of
+German Gas Shell-Early German Gas Shell-A Successful Experiment-Lachrymators
+at Loos, 1915-The Flammenwerfer-German Phosgene Clouds-Gas and
+the Eastern Theatre-Conclusion. 31
+
+CHAPTER III-THE ALLIED REACTION The Need of Retaliation-First Signs-The
+Loos Attack, September, 1915-The Somme Battle, 1916--Reasons for
+British Cloud Gas Success-Our Casualties-Exhausting Preparations
+for Cloud Attack-The Livens Projector-British Gas Shell-German Gas
+Shell Development, 1916-Main Features of the Period.  48
+
+CHAPTER IV-INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE The Mustard Gas Surprise-Blue
+Cross-German Emphasis on Gas Shell-The German Projector-German Projector
+Improvements-Dyes in Gas Shell--German Flame Projectors-Their Origin-Further
+Flame Development-The 1918 Offensive-Ludendorff's Testimony-Preparations
+for Assault-Gas Defensive Flank at Armentieres-Fixed Gas Barrage at
+Kemmel-Percentage of Chemical Shell-Gas Re-Contents
+
+PAGE treat Tactics-General Hartley's Analysis-Percentage of German Gas Shell
+in Enemy Dumps-Forced Exhaustion of Stocks-Yperite, French Mustard Gas-Effect
+on German Gas Discipline-Allied Gas Statistics-Critical Importance of
+Rapid German Production.  66
+
+CHAPTER V-CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS German
+Research-Leverkusen-Hochst-Ludwigshaven-Early Formulation of Policy-Movements
+of Personnel-German Simplicity of Organisation-German Organisation at the
+Front-The Gas Regiment--Early German Gas School-New Gas Regiments-Gas Shell
+Experts-Inspection of Protective Masks and Method-British Field Organisation--
+"Breach" Organisations-Central Laboratory-New Type of Casualty~Directorate
+of Gas Services-British Home Organisations-The Royal Society-Royal
+Society Chemical Sub-Committee-The Trench Warfare Department-Scientific
+Advisory Committee -Commercial Advisory Committee-Split Between Research
+and Supply-Munitions Inventions Department-Imperial College of Science-The
+Chemical Warfare Department-The Anti-Gas Department -Designs Committee
+French Organisation-Italian Developments-Supply Organisations-British Supply
+Organisation-Allied Handicaps-The German Solution--Departmental Difficulties--
+Allied Success Against Odds-Allied Lack of Vision in Production-British Lag
+in Organisation-French and American Characteristics-Inter-Allied
+Chemical Warfare Liaison-Inter-Allied Supply-Nature of
+Chemical Warfare Research-Discovery of New Substances-Technical Method of
+Preparation-Filling Problem-Protection-Half Scale Investigation-Two Classes
+of Research-Conclusion-The "Outer and Inner Lines."  85
+
+CHAPTER VI-THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE Meaning of the
+Chemical Initiative-Controlling Factors--Rapid Manufacture Rapid
+Identification Essential-Propaganda and Morale-Peculiar Peace-time
+Danger-War Fluctuations of Initiative-The Tense Protective
+Struggle-The German Mask-Enforced German Modifications-Shortage
+of Rubber-Gas Discipline-Summary-New German Attempts-Yellow and
+Blue Cross-Yellow Cross-Blue Cross-"Particulate" Clouds-Potential Production
+and Peace.  lit
+
+Contents PAGE CHAPTER VII-REVIEW OF PRODUCTION Critical Importance
+of Production-Significance of the German Dye Industry--The Interessen
+Gemeinschaft-War Production by the I.G.-Allied Difficulties-Conclusion. 143
+
+CHAPTER VIII-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS Special Attention justified-Special Value
+of American Opinion-Early American Activities-Field Activities -Special
+Difficulties-Edgewood Arsenal-Research--Production-Post-Armistice
+Developments-Views of General Fries-The Gas Cloud Inescapable-Importance
+of Smoke-Casualty Percent ages-Short Range Projectors-Vast Expansion
+in Personnel.  173
+
+CHAPTER IX-GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY Origin of German Chemical Monopolies-German
+Chemical Commercial Policy-Evidence of the U. S. A. Alien Property
+Custodian-Pre-war American Situation--German Price Cutting--Salicylic Acid--
+Full Line Forcing--Bribery and Corruption--German Patent Policy--Propaganda
+and Information--Espionage-Activities of the Dye Agencies-Manoeuvring Raw
+Materials-Chemical Exchange Association -Doctor Albert's Letter-Dye Agency
+Information System-Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare-The Moral Aspect-Report
+of the New York World-German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies to the
+U. S. A.--Professor Stieglitz's Evidence Ehrlich's Discovery--Drugs and
+Medicinal Products-The German Monopoly-National Health Insurance
+Commission-The Royal Society--Novocain--Beta-Eucaine--Photographic
+Chemicals-War Activities of the I.G.-The Rhine Factories and
+the Armistice-War Mentality of the I.G.-German Attitude towards
+Inspection-The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast-German Revolution and
+the Industrial Leaders-The German Peace Delegation -Recent Signs of
+Government Interest-Nitrogen Fixation-The German Nitrogen Syndicate-Haber
+Process Prominent-The New German Dye Combine -Aggressive Nationalist Policy.
+186
+
+CHAPTER X-LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT The Element of
+Speculation-Chemical Tactics and Strategy-New War Chemicals--"Camouflage"
+Chemicals-Functions Hitherto Immune-Chemical Constitution and
+Physiological Action-Unsolved Prob-
+
+Contents PAGE lems of Mustard Gas-A New Type of Obstacle--
+The "Persistent Lethal" Substance-The Critical Range-The New
+No-Man's-Land-The "Alert Gas Zone"--Gas and Aircraft-Protective
+Development -Individual Protection-Collective Protection-Conclusion. 215
+
+CHAPTER XI-HUMANE OR INHUMANE?  Nature of Gas Casualties-Sargent's
+Picture-Need for Safeguards.  238
+
+CHAPTER XII-CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT The Treaty of
+Versailles-German Information-Limitation of Armament-Report of the Hartley
+Mission -New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament-Limitation Mechanical and
+Chemical-Tank Disarmament -Chemical Limitation-Research-Production-Mechanical
+and Chemical Preparations for War-Recent Disarmament Proposals-The Covenant
+of the League Need for Guarantees-Viscount Grey, "Germany must disarm first'~--
+Suggested Methods--"Vested Interests"--"Handing Over" Inventions-Neglect of
+Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.  242
+
+CONCLUSION-THE TREATY OF THE FUTURE.  264
+
+
+
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-I. _Frontispiece_
+
+A completed battery of projectors in the foreground, with a battery
+on the left rear, half dug in.  Suitably camouflaged with brush,
+the batteries are not observable by aircraft, and, being in
+"No-Man's-Land," neither party can detect them by day.
+
+                                                   FACING
+                                                   PAGE
+TYPICAL GAS SHELL BURSTING.  30
+
+THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-II 61
+
+A working party fitting electric leads and adjusting bombs prior
+to discharge.  This work occurs at night.
+
+THE LIVENS PROJECTOR-III. 133 Explosion of Livens bombs on the objective.
+
+SMOKE BARRAGE.  181
+
+Note the sharp curtain which is formed, behind which the infantry advance.
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+No one who has the welfare of the country at heart can fail to share
+Major Lefebure's anxiety that a clear, accurate, and unbiased
+account of chemical warfare should be presented to the public,
+so that the many erroneous ideas now prevalent in regard to poison
+gas and its uses may be dispelled.
+
+The whole subject of chemical warfare is at present _sub judice_,
+and there is great danger that the future safety of this
+country may be jeopardised by the almost universal ignorance
+of the peculiarities and potentialities of this class of warfare.
+Recent publications in the Press have shown a tendency to deal
+with the subject on purely sentimental grounds, and attempts
+have been made to declare this form of warfare illegitimate
+without full and careful consideration of all the facts and their
+significance for the future.
+
+Major Lefebure has therefore attempted in his book to make it quite
+clear that no convention, guarantee, or disarmament safeguard will
+prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison gas, especially if
+that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent, or possesses,
+as Germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry,
+a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically
+a moment's notice; further, that the safety of this country makes it
+imperative that the study and investigation of the subject should be
+continued and that our chemical and dye industry should be developed,
+so that when an emergency arises we may have the necessary facilities
+for supply ready to hand.
+
+It is not for me to express any opinion here either as to the desirability
+of using gas as a weapon or as to the possibility of preventing an enemy from
+using it.  But I am convinced that a decision come to without full knowledge
+of the facts may involve grave danger and heavy preventable loss of life.
+I am further convinced that Major Lefebure, by his special knowledge
+and long experience as chemical liaison officer during the war, is well
+qualified to speak, and that his opinion is entitled to full consideration.
+For these reasons I think that his book will do a much needed public service.
+I wish it every success, and the greatest possible number of readers.
+HENRY WILSON, F.M.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1
+
+EXPLANATORY
+
+
+The Riddle of the Rhine.--The Great War challenged our very existence.
+But with the tension released, and the Allies victorious,
+the check to the German menace appears crushing and complete.
+Few realise that one formidable challenge has not been answered.
+Silently menacing, the chemical threat remains unrecognised.
+How, asks the reader, can this be?  Are we not aware of the poison
+gas campaign?  Indeed, we have not yet grasped the simple technical
+facts of the case, and these are merely the outward signs of a
+deep-rooted menace whose nature, activities, and potentialities
+are doubly important because so utterly unsuspected by those whom
+they most threaten.
+
+How many of us, for example, realise that the Germans relied
+mainly on gas for success in the great March assault of 1918,
+which threatened to influence the destinies of the world.
+Yet Ludendorff goes out of his way to tell us how much he counted upon it.
+How many understand that the 1918 hostilities were no longer a war
+of explosives.  German guns were firing more than fifty per cent.
+of gas and war chemical.  But a deep study of such war facts reveals
+a much more significant matter.
+
+All are aware of the enormous national enterprises built to fulfil our
+explosives programme.  With mushroom-like growth chemical establishments
+of a magnitude hitherto unknown in England arose to meet our crying needs.
+What was the German equivalent, and where were the huge reservoirs of gas
+and war chemical which filled those countless shells?  Krupp, of Essen,
+loomed large in the mind of every Allied citizen and soldier.
+There lay the sinews of war in the making.  But the guns were useless
+without their message.  Who provided it?  A satisfactory answer
+to this question demands an examination of the great German I.G.,
+the Interessen Gemeinschaft, the world power in organic chemical enterprise,
+whose monopoly existence threatened to turn the tide of war against us.
+This organisation emerges from the war with renewed and greater strength.
+Our splendid but improvised factories drained the vital forces of
+the nation, and now lie idle, while German war chemical production fed
+new life blood and grafted new tissue to the great pre-war factories
+of the I.G., which, if she will, she can use against us in the future.
+I do not claim that this German combine has at present any direct economic
+or military policy against world peace.  In any case, the facts must
+speak for themselves.  But the following pages will prove that the mere
+existence of the complete German monopoly, represented by the forces
+of the I.G., however free from suspicion might be the mentality and morals
+of those directing its activities, constitutes, in itself, a serious menace.
+It is, if you will, a monster camouflaged floating mine in the troubled
+sea of world peace, which the forces of reconstruction have left unswept.
+The existence of this giant monopoly raises vital military and economic
+questions, which are, indeed, "The Riddle of the Rhine."
+
+Impersonal Examination of Fact.--In a sound examination
+of the subject it becomes necessary to examine the activities
+of our former enemies very closely.  Even adopting a mild
+view of the case, their reputation has not been unattacked,
+and is not left untarnished.  We, however, have no desire to renew
+such attacks, but we wish our statement to be coldly reliable.
+National and international issues are at stake which require
+a background unprejudiced by war emotion.
+
+Placed in a similar predicament, in reporting to his Government
+of the methods of German economic aggression in the United States
+of America, Mr. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian,
+expressed himself as follows:
+
+"I do not advocate any trade boycott out of spirit of revenge
+or in retaliation for injuries done to the United States.  I do
+not want to continue the war after the war.  I am for peace.
+I believe that the great overshadowing result which has come from this
+war is the assurance of peace almost everlasting amongst the peoples
+of the earth.  I would help to make that an absolute certainty
+by refusing to permit Germany to prosecute a war after the war.
+The military arm of her war machine has been palsied by the tremendous
+hammering of the allied powers.  But her territory was not invaded,
+and if she can get out of the war with her home territory intact,
+rebuild a stable government, and still have her foreign markets
+subject to her exploitation, by means no less foul and unfair
+than those which she has employed on the field of battle,
+we shall not be safe from future onslaughts different in methods,
+but with the same purpose that moved her on that fateful day in July
+when she set out to conquer the world."
+
+Ours is a fair standpoint.  Let us know the facts of the chemical
+war into which Germany impelled us.  Let us examine its mainsprings,
+in conception and action, see how far they can be explained
+in terms of pre-war Germany, and how far they remain ready
+to function in the much desired peace which they threaten.
+If the result be unpleasant, let us not hide our heads in the sand,
+but exercise a wise vigilance, choose what precautions are available
+and consistent with our plans for world peace.
+
+A Critical Point in Disarmament.--Probably never before in the history
+of man has Disarmament figured as such a vitally urgent national
+and international measure.  Discussions and official utterances reveal
+a very disquieting tendency.
+
+When compared with the methods, armament and materials of
+the war in 1914, those of 1918 reveal basic changes which a
+hundred years of former peace could not have brought about.
+These developments are not merely of fact, but they represent
+the opening of new fields, visions of possibilities previously
+undreamed of by the practical soldier.  By the concentrated
+application of electricity, chemistry, and other sciences to war
+two dominating factors have emerged, whose importance to war,
+and danger for world peace, can only gain momentum with time.
+The scientific or technical initiative, the invention of a deadly
+new chemical, wireless-directed aeroplane, or other war appliance
+and their incidence on war through large scale production in
+the convertible industries of peace constitute a challenge which,
+if unanswered by practical schemes for world disarmament,
+will render the latter worse than useless, by aggravating the danger
+of sudden decisive attack in an otherwise disarmed world.
+
+There is a tendency to ignore this aspect of disarmament.  We appear
+to be thinking in terms of a world still organised for war on 1914 lines.
+The disbanding of the German army and semi-military organisations,
+and the reduction of her artillery and small arms seem to occupy
+all our attention.  Such, it might be urged, is the immediate need;
+we can leave the future to find answers to the other problems.
+This answer is dangerous, for it ignores the disarmament aspect
+of what is perhaps the most important development in the modern
+offensive campaign.  We refer to poison gas or chemical warfare.
+This, the crux of all disarmament, is dealt with at some length
+in the chapters which follow.
+
+A curiously illogical attitude of mind has arisen in certain quarters.
+There is a tendency among strong adherents to the ideal
+of world peace to regard themselves as its sole possessors.
+Every thinking civilian and soldier must adhere to such an ideal;
+the only point at issue is the method of approaching it.
+The mere fact that a League of Nations is called into being
+to attain world peace implies recognition of the fact
+that a definite mechanism and definite measures are required
+for the purpose; this is self-evident. There are those who,
+having established their League of Nations, feel that they
+can attain chemical peace by merely prohibiting chemical war,
+in other words, they expect their mechanism to achieve its object
+without functioning, to attain peace by its mere existence.
+Just as special measures are required to control disarmament
+in the older branches of warfare, in the same way special measures,
+but not the same measures, are required to control the chemical peace.
+Chemical peace guaranteed by a mere signature is no peace at all.
+
+In a recent Press utterance we find an appeal to prohibit chemical
+warfare and to "trust the general sentiment of the civilised
+world to say that the lesson has been learnt in that sense."
+"There is the League of Nations to furnish that sentiment
+with a mouthpiece and a sanction."  We agree, but to stop there
+is dangerous, the most important thing which it must furnish
+is a mechanism of control, a check, or guarantee.  This question
+is one of the most important which confronts us for world peace.
+It merits the most careful consideration.
+
+Even responsible and relevant officials who admit that their League must
+do more than issue edicts, that their mechanism must function, are ignoring
+the specific technical aspect of the war methods whose use we wish to limit.
+This matter will receive later attention.
+
+The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to represent the salient points
+in the development of chemical warfare, its causes, results, and future.
+Such an attempt cannot limit itself to merely British developments, and this
+is not a final detailed memoir of British chemical warfare.  Further, in
+considering the future, we examine another aspect of chemical warfare.
+Facts lead us to believe that it was purely the most open and obvious
+activity in a whole campaign of chemical aggression which had effective
+unity of conception and direction long before the war started.
+
+Need for a Balanced View of Chemical Warfare.--The facts of chemical
+warfare have probably been less ventilated than those of any other
+important war development.  Yet no subject has aroused more general and
+intense feeling.  Tanks, aircraft, the different campaigns, enemy memoirs,
+and a variety of war subjects, have received a considerable measure
+of publicity, some more than full measure.  Grave questions are pending
+in which the chemical aspect of national defence is a prominent factor.
+However willing the individual concerned, he cannot make a sound judgment
+on the brief technical or popular garbled versions which have appeared.
+One searches in vain for balanced and detailed statements on the question.
+This may be due in no way to lack of intention, but to lack of opportunity.
+Therefore, no excuse is needed for this contribution, but rather
+an apology for the obscurity which has so far surrounded the subject.
+What is the cause of this emotional or almost hysterical background from
+which a clear definition of the matter is only now beginning to emerge?
+Circumstances are to blame; the first open act of chemical warfare
+decided the matter.
+
+This event, the first German cloud gas attack at Ypres, arriving at
+the peak of allied indignation against a series of German abuses,
+in particular with regard to the treatment of prisoners,
+left the world aghast at the new atrocity.  Further, its use
+against entirely unprotected troops was particularly revolting.
+The fact that such a cloud of chlorine would have passed the 1918
+armies untouched behind their modern respirators, could not be
+known to, nor appreciated by the relatives of the 1915 casualties.
+But the emotion and indignation called forth by the first use of gas
+has survived a period of years, at the end of which the technical
+facts would no longer, of themselves, justify such feeling.
+We would hesitate to do anything which might dispel this emotional
+momentum were we not convinced that, unaccompanied by knowledge,
+it becomes a very grave danger.  If we felt that the announcement
+of an edict was sufficient to suppress chemical warfare we would
+gladly stimulate any public emotion to create such an edict.
+But therein lies the danger.  Owing to certain technical peculiarities,
+which can be clearly revealed by examination of the facts,
+it is impossible to suppress chemical warfare in this way.
+As well try to suppress disease by forbidding its recurrence.
+But we can take precaution against disease, and the following
+examination will show clearly that we can take similar precautions
+against the otherwise permanent menace of chemical war.
+Further, backed by such precautions, a powerful international
+edict has value.
+
+It is, therefore, our intention to present a reasoned account of the
+development of poison gas, or chemical warfare, during the recent war.
+But to leave the matter there would be misleading and culpable,
+for, however interesting the simple facts of the chemical campaign,
+they owed their being to a combination of forces, whose nature
+and significance for the future are infinitely more important.
+The chief cause of the chemical war was an unsound and dangerous
+world distribution of industrial organic chemical forces.
+Unless some readjustment occurs, this will remain the "point faible"
+in world disarmament.  We, therefore, propose to examine the relationships
+between chemical industry, war, and disarmament.
+
+Some Preliminary Explanation.--The chemistry of war, developed under
+the stress of the poison gas campaign, is of absorbing chemical
+and technical interest, but it has none the less a general appeal.
+When its apparently disconnected and formidable facts are revealed
+as an essential part of a tense struggle in which move and counter-move
+followed swiftly one upon the other, its appeal becomes much wider.
+Therefore, in order not to confuse the main issue in the following
+chapters by entering upon tiresome definitions, it is proposed to conclude
+the present chapter by explaining, simply, a number of chemical warfare
+conceptions with which the expert is probably well acquainted.
+
+"Poison Gas" a Misleading Term--Poison gas is a misleading term, and.
+our subject is much better described as "chemical, warfare."
+Let us substantiate this by examining briefly the types of chemicals
+which were used.  In the first place they were not all gases;
+the tendency during the war was towards the use of liquids and solids.
+Even the chemicals which appeared as gases on the field of battle
+were transported and projected as liquids, produced by compression.
+As the poison war developed, a large number of different
+chemicals became available for use by the opposing armies.
+These can he classified, either according to their tactical use,
+or according to their physiological effects on man.
+
+The British, French, American, and German armies all tended to the final
+adoption of a tactical classification, but the French emphasised
+the physiological side.  Let us use their classification as a basis
+for a review of the chief chemicals concerned.
+
+The French Physiological Classification;--Asphyxiating Substances;--
+Toxic Substances;--Chemicals or poison gases were either asphyxiating,
+toxic, lachrymatory, vesicant, or sternutatory.  It is perfectly true
+that the asphyxiating and toxic substances, used during the war,
+produced a higher percentage of deaths than the other three classes,
+but the latter were responsible for many more casualties.
+The so-called asphyxiating gases produced their effect by producing lesions
+and congestion in the pulmonary system, causing death by suffocation.
+The best known substances of this type was chlorine, employed in the liquid
+state in cylinders on the occasion of the first German gas attack,
+but the most formidable were phosgene (an important substance required
+in the manufacture of dyes), diphosgene, chlor-picrin, made from bleaching
+powder and picric acid, brom-acetone, which was also a powerful lachrymator,
+and diphenylchlorarsine, known as sneezing gas, the first sternutatory
+or sneezing compound to appear on the front in large quantities.
+The toxic compounds were so called because of their specific effect upon
+particular parts of the organism such as, for example, the nervous system.
+The chief example, with regard to the military value of which there
+has been much dispute, was prussic, or hydrocyanic, acid.  The French
+had definite evidence of the mortal effect of this compound upon
+German gunners, but it was doubted by other Allies whether French gas
+shell produced a sufficient concentration of gas to be of military value.
+It was a kill or cure compound, for recovery was rapid from any
+concentration which did not produce death.
+
+A prominent Cambridge physiologist, in the heat of the controversy
+on this matter, made a very brave and self-sacrificing experiment.
+He entered a chamber of prussic acid which was sufficiently
+concentrated to cause the death of other animals which were present.
+They were removed in time, and he escaped because the concentration
+was not a mortal one for man.  This was, in a sense, an _experimentum
+crucis_ and, although it did not disprove the extreme danger
+of prussic acid, if employed in high concentrations, it showed,
+on the other hand, that it was difficult to gauge the military
+value by field experiments; battle results were necessary.
+The Germans' disappointment with the use of arsenic compounds
+confirms this need for battle evidence.
+
+Lachrymators.--There is hardly need to dwell on the next class,
+the lachrymator.  These compounds were employed on a large scale
+to produce temporary blindness by lachrymation, or weeping.
+We give later some interesting examples of their use on the front.
+It is an arresting thought that even as early as 1887
+Professor Baeyer, the renowned organic chemist of Munich,
+in his lectures to advanced students, included a reference
+to the military value of these compounds.
+
+Vesicant or Blistering Compounds.--It was the introduction of
+the fourth, the vesicant class, which revealed, more than any other
+enemy move, the great possibilities inherent in chemical warfare.
+These compounds, the chief of which was mustard gas, produced vesicant,
+or skin burning, effects, which, although rarely mortal,
+were sufficient to put a man out of action for a number of months.
+Mustard gas resulted from pure scientific investigation as early as 1860.
+Victor Meyer, the famous German chemist, described the substance in 1884,
+indicating its skin-blistering effects.  There is evidence of further
+investigation in German laboratories a year before the outbreak of war,
+and whatever the motive for this work, we know that mustard gas
+must have received the early attention of the German War Office,
+for it was approved and in production early in 1917.
+Although the Medecin aide-major Chevalier of the French services
+drew attention to its importance in 1916, the French had no serious
+thought of using mustard gas, and did not realise its possibilities
+until the German battle experiment of July, 1917.  It is not
+generally known, however, that other vesicant compounds were employed,
+notably some of the arsenic compounds, and the Germans were researching
+on substances of this nature which gave great promise of success.
+Mustard gas provides a striking example of the organic way
+in which chemical warfare is bound up with the dye industry.
+The compounds required for its manufacture were those which had been
+made on a large scale by the I.G. for the production of indigo.
+World indigo monopoly meant possession of a potential mustard gas
+surprise on the outbreak of war.
+
+Sneezing or Sternutatory Substances.--The last class,
+the sternutatory substances, produced the familiar sneezing
+effect which was accompanied by intense pain and irritation
+of the nose, throat, and respiratory channels.  They were mostly
+arsenic compounds and were not only sternutatory but also toxic,
+producing the after effects of arsenic poisoning.
+
+The Tactical Classification.--From the point of view of our account
+of chemical warfare, however, the physiological classification
+of these substances is not so important as the tactical and,
+indeed, once this grouping of the substances is understood,
+a profound knowledge of their chemical nature is not necessary.
+
+Persistent Substances.--Two main classes exist from the tactical
+Point of view.  There are those "persistent" substances which
+remain for a long time on the soil or on the object on which they
+are sprayed by shell, while retaining their dangerous effect.
+Mustard gas was the chief example, but some of the lachrymators
+were just as persistent.  By their use it is possible to render
+ground uninhabitable or ineffective for military movement.
+The combination of the vesicant and persistent properties of mustard
+gas rendered it a powerful military factor.
+
+Non-Persistent Substances.--On the other hand, there are the relatively
+volatile substances, such as phosgene, which can be used immediately
+before an attack.  The chief sternutatory compound, diphenylchlorarsine,
+although not volatile, could also be used in this way, for, being a solid
+and in a very finely pulverised state, its presence on the ground was
+not a distinct danger, and it invited chemical decomposition.
+
+Penetrants.--The Germans introduced an additional tactical group.
+This comprised pulverised substances able to penetrate the mask
+on account of their existence as minute particles.  The Germans
+expressed these tactical conceptions by their shell markings.
+The familiar Green Cross represented the slightly persistent,
+volatile, lethal compounds, such as phosgene and diphosgene.
+The German gunner had no need to know the content of his gas
+shell so long as he could identify the cross.  Yellow Cross,
+representing mustard gas, was the most highly persistent type.
+It is interesting to speculate whether a new persistent compound,
+whose military value was due to some other property than the blistering,
+would have been grouped under Yellow Cross.  Logically, this should
+have been done.  Blue Cross covered the arsenic group of compounds,
+which were non-persistent and were expected to penetrate the mask.
+So strong was this tactical conception that the Allies were on
+the verge of adopting a uniform shell marking based on this
+principle throughout their armies.
+
+Special Gas Weapons and Appliances.--It is a popular misconception
+that gas was only discharged from cylinders in huge clouds,
+or used as artillery shell.  A number of special weapons developed,
+which were particularly adapted for gas.  Thus, the Livens projector,
+which was a great Allied advance, produced a gas cloud a long distance
+from the point of discharge, while the Stokes and other short range
+guns were used for rapid fire of large numbers of gas shell.
+
+The primary conceptions with regard to protection have been brought
+home to so many, through the fact that the mask was a part of the
+equipment of every soldier, that we need not dwell on them here.
+It is not generally realised, however, that every modification
+introduced by either side was a vital and direct counter to some enemy
+move planned to render the protection of the opponent ineffective.
+
+Gas Shell.--A word is necessary to define the use of gas shell.
+The point which must be realised is that gas, and in
+particular gas shell, fulfilled a special purpose in warfare,
+from which it was much more suitable than explosives.
+The use for neutralising batteries, cross roads, and rendering
+whole areas uninhabitable, is developed fully in our reference
+to the great German attacks in 1918.
+
+With this brief sketch to clear the ground, we can embark more freely
+upon the account of chemical warfare which follows.  CHAPTER II
+
+THE GERMAN SURPRISE
+
+Ypres, April, 1915, to the Somme, August, 1916.
+
+
+The First Cloud Gas Attack.--The critical factor of surprise in war
+was never nearer decisive success than on April 22nd, 1915.
+Of this, the occasion of the first German gas attack
+at Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French Stated:
+
+
+"Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division
+at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time.
+Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had
+been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck
+and Bixschoote.  What follows almost defies description.
+The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render
+the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above
+practically incapable of any action at all.  It was at first
+impossible for any one to realise what had actually happened.
+The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men
+were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour
+the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.
+I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least
+blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident."
+
+The Element of Surprise.--The enemy just missed colossal success rendered
+possible by the use of an entirely new war method; one contrary to engagements
+entered into by them at the Hague Convention.
+
+There were elements in this first gas attack which were absent
+even from the situation created by our first use of tanks.
+Unfamiliarity amongst the troops, or the staff, for that matter,
+created an atmosphere of unparalleled confusion.
+Men attempted to protect themselves by burying their mouths
+and nostrils in the loose earth.  Those chemists, on the spot,
+not immediately struck down, made frantic efforts to bring up
+supplies of any suitable and available chemical or material
+which might assist resistance and movement in the affected zone.
+Paying every homage to the heroic sacrifices and brave actions
+which characterised the Allied resistance, we cannot ignore
+the fact that morale must have been very severely shaken locally,
+and that a general disquiet and uneasiness must have permeated
+the whole front until measures were known to be effectively
+in progress, not only for protection, but for retaliation.
+The enemy had but to exploit the attack fully to break through
+to the channel ports, but failed to do so.  The master mind
+behind this new and deadly attack was not, let us remember,
+that of a soldier.  It was very strongly rumoured that this
+monstrous conception and its execution were due to one or,
+at the most, two renowned German Professors.  The first hammer
+blow in the enemy chemical campaign was a two-party conspiracy,
+led by world-famous scientists and the powerful I.G. with the German
+army unconvinced but expectant, little more than a willing dupe.
+
+Lord Kitchener's Protest.--In his spirited protest in the House
+of Lords, Lord Kitchener stated:  "The Germans have, in the last week,
+introduced a method of placing their opponents _hors de combat_
+by the use of asphyxiating and deleterious gases, and they
+employ these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack,
+according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed.
+On this subject I would remind your Lordships that Germany was
+a signatory to the following article in the Hague Convention:
+
+
+" `The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles
+the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.'
+"
+
+
+This protest circulated amongst neutrals prompted numerous
+attempts at vindication in the German Press.  In several cases we
+find important newspapers arguing that the German attack was not
+contrary to the Hague Convention, while others admitted the breach,
+but claimed that the Germans merely followed Allied example.
+The main technical excuse was that the effect of the German gas was
+merely stupefying (_Colniche Zeitung_, June, 1915). It is incredible
+that the German nation was, or could allow itself to be, so hoodwinked.
+Scientific Germany was certainly aware of the true nature of the gases used.
+Even scientific neutrals in Berlin at the outbreak of war, and during
+the ensuing winter, were aware of the German poison gas work,
+which commenced, in an organised way, almost as soon as war broke out.
+The Germans have argued that they only entertained the idea of gas
+after Allied use.  The facts revealed below are a sufficient answer.
+Whatever legal arguments may be involved, there is no doubt as
+to German intention.
+
+We do not wish to enter into a comprehensive examination of the legal aspect
+of the first use of cloud and shell gas by Germany.  Whatever complicated
+arguments may turn upon the strict reading of a phrase in the records
+of the Hague Convention, we have no doubt whatever as to the desires
+and intentions of the Assembly, and we regard Germany (and the Allies)
+as morally engaged not to venture upon the series of chemical
+enterprises which she openly commenced with the Ypres cloud attack.
+The Versailles Treaty also renders fruitless any such discussion.
+Article 171, accepted by Germany, is deliberately based on her breach
+of International Convention.
+
+German Preparations.--A significant phrase occurs in the
+Field-Marshal's despatch.  "The brain power and thought which has
+evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making
+war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated
+in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured
+these designs for a long time."  This is a most important point.
+It was argued by many generous and fairminded people in April, 1915,
+that the German use of gas was the result of a sudden decision,
+only arrived at in a desperate effort to terminate the war.
+This point of view would give us maximum hope for the future.
+But the actual truth?  What do we know about German preparations,
+and how far back do they date?  Any preparations which occurred
+must have covered research on the compounds to be employed and on
+the protection required for the German troops, their training
+for the cloud attack, and the design and production of the special
+appliances to be used.  Finally, the production of the chemicals
+themselves had to be faced.
+
+Research.--We have obtained an insight into the German research
+preparations, which leaves no doubt as to their intention.
+There is evidence that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and
+the physico-chemical institute near by were employed for this
+purpose as early as August, 1914.  Reliable authority exists
+for the statement that soon after this date they were working
+with cacodyl oxide and phosgene, both well known before the war
+for their very poisonous nature, for use, it was believed,
+in hand grenades.  Our quotations are from a statement
+by a neutral then working at the Institute.  "We could hear
+the tests that Professor Haber was carrying out at the back
+of the Institute, with the military authorities, who in their
+steel-grey cars came to Haber's Institute every morning."
+"The work was pushed day and night, and many times I saw
+activity in the building at eleven o'clock in the evening.
+It was common knowledge that Haber was pushing these men
+as hard as he could."  Sachur was Professor Haber's assistant.
+"One morning there was a violent explosion in the room
+in which most of this war work was carried out.  The room
+was instantly filled with dense clouds of arsenic oxide."
+"The janitors began to clear the room by a hose and discovered
+Professor Sachur."  He was very badly hurt and died soon after.
+"After that accident I believe the work on cacodyl oxide
+and phosgene was suspended and I believe that work was carried
+out on chlorine or chlorine compounds."  "There were seven
+or eight men working in the Institute on these problems,
+but we heard nothing more until Haber went to the Battle
+of Ypres."  Rumours to this effect circulated in 1915.
+
+Production.--Preparations, for production can easily be imagined.
+The Germans first used chlorine for cloud gas, and certain
+lachrymators for shell.  The chlorine was readily available.
+At about this time British liquid chlorine capacity had a
+maximum daily output of about one ton, while along the Rhine
+alone the production was more than forty times greater.
+The question of German chlorine production was, therefore,
+already solved.  The lachrymators were mainly raw materials
+and intermediates of the dye industry submitted to a process,
+the technique of which the German dye factories readily mastered.
+Here, again, production presented no real difficulties.
+Cylinders were also probably available from the industry.
+
+Field Preparations.--There remains the last question of gas attack
+technique and personnel.  Those of us who remember the difficulties
+involved in creating our own organisation in the summer of 1915
+have no illusions on the question of German preparation.
+Giving the Germans every credit for their technical and military
+efficiency, some months must have been occupied in establishing
+and training the special companies required, and in arriving
+at a satisfactory design for the discharge appliances.
+Schwarte's book, _Die Technik Im Weltkriege_,[1] tells us "specially
+organised and trained troops" were required for the purpose.
+Prisoners taken later revealed the German methods.  Gas officers
+and N.C.O.'s, after making a careful survey of the front line trench,
+organised the digging of deep narrow trenches at suitable places
+below the surface of the main trench, just underneath the parapet.
+The heavy gas cylinders, weighing as much as ninety pounds,
+were carried to the front line by the unfortunate infantry.
+The discharge valves were carefully protected by domes which screwed
+on to the cylinder.  The latter were introduced into the holes,
+tops flush with the trench bottom, and covered by a board
+on which reposed the "Salzdecke," a kind of long bag stuffed
+with some such material as peat moss and soaked in potash
+solution to absorb any slight gas leakages.  Three layers of
+sandbags were built above the salzdecke to protect the cylinder
+from shell fragments and to form a firestep for the infantry.
+This concealed the cylinders so efficiently that, in our own trenches,
+I have often found the new occupants of a sector ignorant
+of the presence of gas cylinders under their own firesteps.
+On the favourable night the dome was removed and a lead pipe
+was connected to the cylinder and directed over the parapet
+into No Man's Land, with the nozzle weighed down by a sandbag.
+The pioneers stood by the batteries of twenty cylinders each
+and let off the gas a fixed few minutes after a rocket signal,
+at which the infantry retired to leave the front line free
+for the pioneers, who not only ran the risk of gassing from
+defective appliances but were subjected to almost immediate
+violent bombardment from the opposing artillery.  When surprise
+was complete artillery retaliation was very late in developing.
+This gives a faint idea of the elaborate preparations required.
+They must have been doubly arduous and lengthy on the very first
+occasion of cloud gas attack.
+
+
+[1] _Die Technik Im Weltkriegre_.  Publisher:  Mittler, Berlin, 1920.
+
+
+German Opinion of Results.--We can now regard the chlorine attack
+of April 22, 1915, as the first and successful result of a huge
+German experiment on a new method of war, the pioneer work
+of which actually began at (if not before) the outbreak of war.
+Quoting again from Schwarte:  "G.H.Q. considered the attack near
+Ypres to he a successful experiment.  The impression created
+was colossal and the result not inconsiderable, although it
+was not fully utilised from the tactical point of view.
+It was obvious that we had gained a great advantage;
+the enemy was not sufficiently prepared with defensive measures
+against gas."  Indeed, we were absolutely unprepared, so much so,
+that after the German attack nearly every household in England
+contributed to our first inefficient and improvised mask.
+Is not this suggestion of our preparation a deliberate attempt
+to deceive the German public?  They seem to have been as easily
+hoodwinked on gas questions as on many others.
+
+Germany Prompted by Production Monopoly.--An important point arises.
+The Germans failed to exploit their initial success.
+This is not very surprising.  Whatever the opinion of the chemists
+behind the movement, the German General Staff must have retained
+the elements of precaution in its opinion.  It could not have
+taken for granted the formidable success which the chemists
+proved justified in prophesying.  This being so, we can fairly
+assume that had there been very serious difficulties in carrying
+out this huge war experiment it might never have materialised.
+Such difficulties might have been found in production.
+But as we have seen, the question of production was the most
+easily forged link in the chain of events which led to the use
+of poison gas by Germany.  In other words, this monopoly in ease
+of production was an inducement to the Germans to proceed
+with their experiment.
+
+The earliest German cloud gas attacks established beyond
+a doubt the enormous value of gas against unprotected troops,
+in other words, its value as a complete surprise.  These conditions
+were again approached in the first German use of mustard gas.
+The most telling examples will probably be found in the future,
+unless the correct precautions are taken.  The whole history of
+chemical warfare during the war was a struggle for this initiative,
+a struggle between gas protection and aggression.
+
+Standard Uses for Gas;--Gas Shell.--But gas found an important
+use besides that of strategic surprise.  It became a standard
+weapon for certain clear and definite tactical purposes.
+(For some of these, indeed, the factor of local surprise
+was important.) We refer to the specific use of gas shell
+for the neutralisation of batteries, roads, and areas, and to
+the use of cloud gas, prior to offensives for the production
+of casualties, and wearing down of reserves.  The Ypres attack
+had not by any means established the use of gas for such purposes.
+There is no doubt that, from this point of view, the experimental
+period carried on for many months.  Naturally, in some respects,
+there was always an experimental element in the use of gas.
+
+Further German Cloud Attacks.--Two days after the first cloud
+gas attack the Germans launched a second against the Canadians,
+with similar results.  Quoting from official despatches:
+"On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas
+against nearly the whole front was varied by heavy shell fire,
+and a most determined attack was delivered against our position
+east of Ypres.  The real attack commenced at 2.45 a.m. A
+large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was
+too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators."
+These latter were hurriedly improvised after the first Ypres attack.
+
+Hill 60.--Four more attacks occurred in May, notably in the region of
+Hill 60.  "On May 1st another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported
+by great volumes of asphyxiating gas which caused nearly all the men along
+a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes."
+"A second and more severe gas attack under much more favourable weather
+conditions enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5th.
+The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use
+of asphyxiating gas."  "It was only a few days later that the means which
+have since proved so effective of counteracting these methods of making
+war were put into practice."  (Official despatches, 1915.) The despatch
+further described how violent bombardments, the confusion and demoralisation
+from the first great gas surprise, and subsequent almost daily gas attacks,
+prevented the proper reorganisation of the line in question.
+
+Origin of German Gas Shell.--After May a long period elapsed
+during which the Germans confined their war chemical activities
+on the front to the use of gas shell.  Schwarte's book describes
+their origin as follows:--"The main idea which influenced
+the FIRST construction of a German projectile containing chemicals
+(October, 1914) was that of adding to the charge an irritant substance,
+which would be pulverised by the explosion of the projectile,
+and would overwhelm the enemy with a cloud of dust.
+This cloud would hover in the air and have such an effect
+upon the mucous membranes that, for the time being,
+the enemy would be unable to fight in such an atmosphere.
+By altering the construction of the 10.5 c.m. universal
+shell for light field howitzers, the `N.i' projectile
+was created in the form of 10.5 c.m. shrapnel, the bullets
+of which were embedded in a sternutatory powder (double salts
+of dianisidine) well stamped down, instead of an explosive.
+By means of the propelling charge and the grinding effect
+of the bullets, this powder was pulverised on explosion.
+The irritation caused was not very intense, lasted only a short,
+time and affected only a limited area and therefore it was of no
+importance in the field, but the initial step had been taken.
+Liquid irritants soon came to the front--xylyl bromide
+and xylylene dibromide--a mixture used later under the name
+of T. stuff, bromo-acetone and brominated methyl ethyl ketone,
+later introduced under the name of B. stuff and Bn.  stuff."
+
+During experiments they gave such improved results in intensity,
+in power of lasting and of affecting an increased area,
+that practical results in the field were ensured.
+The use of these liquids in projectiles, however, was contrary
+to the accepted idea with regard to artillery, according to which
+liquid materials should not be used for ballistic reasons.
+Specially arranged shoots were required to prove that the projectiles
+in use in the German Army could also be used from the ballistic
+point of view when filled with liquids.
+
+In this way the first effective German gas projectile, the T. shell
+for heavy field howitzers, was evolved (January, 1915).
+
+Early German Gas Shell.--The first important use of German gas
+in shell was that of brominated and chlorinated organic compounds,
+T. and K. stuffs.  Schwarte's book tells us "the use of these
+projectiles was continually hampered by lack of understanding
+on the part of the troops which it was difficult to overcome.
+In the summer of 1915 it was practically in the Argonne alone that
+any considerable results were attained by the new projectiles."
+And he describes how the first elements of the new gas tactics
+were developed there.
+
+A Successful Experiment.--The development of the gas shell,
+the use of which, generally speaking, is independent of,
+but co-ordinated with, wind direction, may have received stimulus
+from the fact that the prevailing wind, so important for cloud gas,
+favoured the Allies.  It is clear that this period was an experimental one,
+but we know that by August, 1915, German military opinion had
+crystallised out to the extent of formulating certain rules, issued as
+Falkenhayn's orders for the employment of gas shell.  These early orders
+defined two types of shell, one persistent, for harassing purposes,
+and the other non-persistent, to be used immediately before an attack.
+They specified the number of shell to be used for a given task.
+But in this they were unsound and it is clear that the Germans had
+an exaggerated opinion of what could be achieved with a small number
+of shell.  They adhered too closely to high explosive practice.
+Various documents reveal the fact that the Germans were much more
+satisfied with their gas tactics than they would have been had they
+possessed information with regard to our losses from their shell.
+They attached insufficient importance to the value of surprise
+and highly concentrated shoots, and had a mistaken idea of the actual
+specific aggressive value of their early types.
+
+Lachrymators at Loos, 1915.--Germany commenced the manufacture
+of lachrymators, crude brominated xylene or brominated ketones, early in,
+or perhaps before 1915.  These substances caused great inconvenience
+through temporary blindness by lachrymation, but were not highly toxic.
+In June, 1915, however, they began to produce lethal gas for shell.
+Falkenhayn's orders for the use of gas shell, mentioned above,
+although they represent by no means the best final practice,
+were definite evidence that gas had come to stay with the Germans.
+The writer has vivid recollections of their use of lachrymators
+in the Loos Battle.  Batteries in the open, under the crest near
+the Lens road, were in position so that the wind direction practically
+enfiladed them, sweeping along from the direction of Le Rutoire farm.
+Gas from German shell, borne on the wind, was continually
+enveloping the line of batteries, but they remained in action.
+It was on this occasion while watching the bursting gas shells
+from the outskirts of the mining village of Philosophe that
+Major-General Wing was killed outright by a high explosive shell.
+These gas shells certainly did not achieve the results which
+the Germans expected, although they were not without effect.
+Demolished villages, the only shelter for troops in a desolate area,
+have been rendered uninhabitable for days by a concentrated
+lachrymator enemy shoot of less than one hour.  Again, walking into
+gas "pockets" up a trench one has been stopped as by a fierce blow
+across the eyes, the lachrymatory effect was so piercing and sudden.
+The great inconvenience which was occasioned to parties engaged
+in the routine of trench warfare, on ration or engineering duties,
+and the effect on movement in the rear after an assault,
+taken cumulatively, represented a big military factor.
+
+The Flammenwerfer.--There can be no doubt that this period marks increasing
+German willingness to live up to their "blood and iron" theories of war,
+and, in July, 1915, another device with a considerable surprise value
+was used against us:  the flame projector, or the German flammenwerfer.
+Field-Marshal Sir John French signalled the entry of this new weapon
+as follows:  "Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by
+the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet.
+Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army
+at Hooge, on the Menin Road, early on 30th July.  Most of the infantry
+occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due
+far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning
+liquid than to the actual damage inflicted.  Gallant endeavours were made
+by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches.
+These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches
+was consolidated a short distance farther back."
+
+Although this weapon continued to be used right through the campaign,
+it did not exert that influence which first acquaintance with it
+might have led one to conclude.  At the same time, there exists
+a mistaken notion that the flame projector was a negligible quantity.
+This may be fairly true of the huge non-portable types,
+but it is certainly not true of the very efficient portable flame
+projector which was the form officially adopted by the German,
+and later by the French, armies.  On a number of occasions Germany
+gained local successes purely owing to the momentary surprise
+effect of the flame projector, and the French made some use of it
+for clearing out captured trench systems over which successful
+waves of assault had passed.  Further, the idea of flame projection
+is not without certain possibilities for war.
+
+German Phosgene Clouds.--Germany had by no means abandoned
+cloud gas, however.  She had merely been planning to regain what
+the Ypres attacks had lost for her, the cloud gas initiative.
+We have seen how phosgene had occupied the attention of the
+German research organisation in the first months of the war.
+Once alive to its great importance, they must have strained all
+efforts to obtain an efficient method of using it at the front.
+Phosgene was remarkable for its peculiar "delayed" effect.
+Relatively small quantities, inhaled and followed by vigorous
+or even normal exercise, led to sudden collapse and fatal
+effects sometimes more than twenty-four hours after the attack.
+The case of a German prisoner in a First Army raid after
+a British gas attack was often quoted on the front.
+He passed through the various Intelligence headquarters as far
+as the Army, explaining the feeble effect of the British gas
+and his own complete recovery.  But he died from delayed
+action within twenty-four hours of his last interrogation.
+This effect imposed strict conditions of discipline, and men
+merely suspected of exposure to phosgene were compelled
+to report as serious casualties and carried as such even from
+the front line.
+
+The successful development of the phosgene cloud probably
+arrived too late for the Ypres attacks, and a variety of reasons
+must have led to the postponement of its use until such time
+as it might once again give Germany the real initiative.
+Accordingly, on December 19, 1915, a formidable cloud gas attack
+was made on the north-east of the Ypres salient, using a mixture
+of phosgene and chlorine in a very high concentration.
+Fortunately, by this time we had established an anti-gas
+organisation, which had forestalled the production of cloud
+phosgene by special modifications in the British respirator.
+The conditions were similar to those of April 22nd, 1915.
+Instead of the first use of cloud gas, we had the first
+use of the new gas in highly concentrated cloud.
+In both cases the Germans reckoned on our lack of protection,
+correctly in the first case, but incorrectly in the second.
+In both cases they were sure that great difficulties
+in production would meet our attempts at retaliation.
+In general this proved true, but in this case and increasingly
+throughout the war, they reckoned without Allied adaptability.
+The French development of phosgene manufacture was indeed remarkable.
+
+Very interesting light is thrown on this attack by Major Barley,
+D.S.O., Chemical Adviser to the British Second Army.  It appears that
+in November, 1915, the French captured a prisoner who had attended a gas
+school in one of the factories of the I.G. Here lecturers explained
+that a new gas was to be used against the British forces, many thousands
+of casualties were expected, and an attack would follow, which,
+correcting the errors of the effort at Ypres, would lead to the capture
+of the Channel ports.  Efforts were at once made to obtain information
+on gas preparation by the Germans in front of the British sectors.
+In this way a sergeant-major was captured on the morning of December 16th,
+and he revealed the date and front on which the cylinders were installed.
+About 35,000 British troops were found to be in the direct line of the gas,
+but owing to the timely warning and to the protection which had recently
+been adopted, we experienced very few casualties.  The Germans had prepared
+a huge infantry attack, and used a new type of gas shell on this occasion.
+German troops massing must have received huge casualties owing to our
+preparation and the failure of their gas attack.
+
+The last German cloud attack on the British front occurred on August 8, 1916.
+There were later attacks against the French, but the Germans were replacing
+the cloud method by other methods which they considered more suitable.
+These will be discussed later on, when considering our own reaction against
+the chemical offensive.
+
+Gas and the Eastern Theatre.--The German surprise was not
+limited to activities on the Western front.  In fact, apart from
+the first Ypres attack, cloud gas probably reaped more casualties
+in the East against Russia.  We learn from Schwarte's book:
+"From reliable descriptions we know that our gas troops caused
+an unusual amount of damage to the enemy--especially in the East--
+with very little expenditure of effort.  The special battalion
+formed by Austria-Hungary was, unfortunately, of no special
+importance for various reasons."
+
+Had the nature of the Russian campaign been different, with a
+smaller front, and nearer critical objectives to the front of attack,
+we have no doubt that gas would have assumed enormous importance
+in the East.  Russia, even more feebly organised for production
+than ourselves, would have been at a tremendous disadvantage,
+both from the point of view of protection and of the retention
+of satisfactory morale by retaliation.
+
+Conclusion.--This, then, was the period of the German surprise,
+during which the first big shock occurred, and which promised most
+success for further attempts owing to the lack of comprehensive
+protection by the Allies.  Looking at the matter in a very broad way,
+ignoring the moral and legal aspects of the case, we can describe
+this period as an example of brilliant chemical opportunism.
+According to plan or otherwise, conditions for this experiment
+were ripe in Germany as in no other country.  Overcoming whatever
+prejudices may have existed, the German authorities realised this,
+seized the opportunity, and very nearly succeeded.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE ALLIED REACTION
+
+Loos, September, 1915, to Ypres, July, 1917.
+
+
+The Need of Retaliation.--The conclusive sign of the Allied
+reaction to the German poison gas attack appeared at the battle
+of Loos.  "Owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating
+gas in their attacks on our positions," says Field-Marshal French
+in his despatch of October 15, 1915, "I have been compelled to resort
+to similar methods, and a detachment was organised for this purpose,
+which took part in the operations commencing on the 25th September
+for the first time."  Five months thus elapsed before retaliation.
+From a military point of view their can be no doubt as to
+the wisdom, in fact the absolute necessity, of using gas
+in order to reply to the many German attacks of this nature.
+The question of morale was bound up in this retaliation.
+Had the Germans continued their chemical attacks in variety
+and extent as they did, and had it been realised that for some
+reason or other we were not able to retaliate in kind, none but
+the gravest consequences could have resulted with regard to morale.
+It must be remembered that the earlier use of cloud and shell gas
+by the Germans was of local incidence, when compared with its
+tremendous use along the whole of the front in the later stages
+of the war.
+
+First Signs.--Our preparatory period was one of feverish, if somewhat
+unco-ordinated, activity.  The production of a protective appliance,
+the gas mask, was vital.  This development will be considered later.
+Allied chemical warfare organisations arose, to become an important
+factor in the later stages of the war.  The history of Allied gas
+organisation is one of the gradual recognition that chemical warfare
+represented a new weapon with new possibilities, new specific uses,
+and new requirements from the rear.  Its beginnings are seen
+in the English and French Scientific Advisory Committees
+appointed to examine the new German method.  One could always
+trace an element of reluctance, however, in Allied development,
+signs that each move was forced upon us by some new German surprise.
+We find the other extreme, the logical outcome of war experience,
+in the completely independent Chemical Warfare Service now actually
+adopted in the United States of America.  This is dealt with in
+a separate chapter.
+
+The decision to retaliate once made, our difficulties commenced.
+We required gas, weapons, and methods for its use, trained personnel,
+and the association of certain scientific with military standards
+without losing the field efficiency of the latter.  The German
+staff found this in their co-operation with eminent scientists,
+notably Professor Haber.  Without drawing invidious distinctions
+between pre-war military and public appreciation of chemical science
+in England and Germany, it would be merely untrue to state that
+the Germans were not in a position of advantage in this respect.
+However, chemical mobilisation and co-operation proceeded sufficiently
+rapidly to provide us with personnel and material for the Loos attack.
+
+The assembly and organisation of personnel occurred in
+three directions.  In the first place the Royal Society had already
+begun to mobilise prominent scientists for other war purposes.
+In the second place, different formations in the field,
+realising the need for specialist treatment of the gas question,
+after the first German attack, created staff appointments
+for certain chemists chosen from infantry regiments and other
+formations on the front.  Thirdly, men were collected at a depot
+in France to form the nucleus of the offensive gas troops.
+For this purpose chemists were specially enrolled and chosen
+men from infantry and other front line units were added.
+Early gas attacks and gas organisation did not appear to justify
+the immobilisation of so much chemical talent in the offensive
+gas troops, when chemists were needed all over England for
+munition production so vital to war.  But later events justified
+the mobilisation and military training of these specialists.
+The expansion of the advisory and offensive organisations
+at the front necessitated a large number of officers,
+whose chemical training was of great value.  It is difficult
+to see where they would have been found had they not been
+mobilised with the Special Companies.  Moreover, their offensive
+and battle experience gained with the latter was of great value.
+Six or seven weeks' training witnessed the conversion of a few
+hundred men of the above type into one or two so called
+Special Companies.  The spirit and work of these men in the Loos
+attack cannot be spoken of too highly.
+
+The Loos Attack, September, 1915.--The Field-Marshal bears testimony
+to its success as follows:  "Although the enemy was known to have been
+prepared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success,
+and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units,
+of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches.
+The men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties
+during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness;
+and I feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own
+should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare."
+
+There is evidence, however, that this early attack, inefficient as it
+appeared to be to participants, met with considerable success.
+Schwarte's book tells us:  "The English succeeded in releasing gas
+clouds on a large scale.  Their success on this occasion was due
+to the fact that they took us by surprise.  Our troops refused
+to believe in the danger and were not sufficiently adept in the use
+of defensive measures as prescribed by G.H.Q."
+
+On the occasion of a cloud attack a few weeks later, at the
+storming of the Hohenzollern redoubt, Sergeant-Major Dawson,
+in charge of a sector of gas emplacements in the front
+line trench, won the Victoria Cross.  The German reply
+to our bombardment was very severe and under stress of it
+a battery of our cylinders, either through a direct hit or
+faulty connections, began to pour gas into our own trenches.
+In order to prevent panic and casualties among our own troops
+at this critical time, a few minutes before zero, the moment
+of assault, Sergeant-Major Dawson climbed on to the parapet under
+a hail of shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, and, hauling up
+the cylinders in question, carried them to a safe distance
+into the poisoned atmosphere of No Man's Land and ensured
+their complete discharge by boring them with a rifle bullet.
+In addition to the Hohenzollern attack cloud gas was used
+in December, 1915, in the region of Givenchy.
+
+The Somme Battle, 1916.--My impression as an eyewitness
+and participator, however, was that the real British gas
+offensive began after, and as a result of, the Loos experience.
+Material, organisation, and numbers of personnel, both at
+the front and at home, co-operation with staffs and tactical
+conceptions all improved vastly in time to contribute largely
+to the efficiency of preparations for the Somme offensive
+in July, 1916.  During the early months of 1916, a Special Brigade
+was created by expanding the four Special Companies,
+and the 4-inch Stokes mortar was adopted, training being
+vigorously pursued.  As many as 110 cloud gas discharges,
+mainly of a phosgene mixture, occurred during the Somme battle,
+and evidence of their success is seen in German reports.
+These successes were due not only to the magnitude of our operations,
+but to the carefully developed cloud attack tactics which
+aimed at obtaining maximum results from the gas employed.
+The factor of surprise governed all other considerations.
+Attacks occurred at night and depended for success upon
+the concentration of the maximum amount of gas in the given sector
+for a short, sharp discharge under the best wind conditions.
+There is abundant evidence of our success in these attacks.
+Probably the most marked feature of the captured documents or
+of prisoners' statements during the later stages of the Somme battle
+was the continual reference to the deadly effect of British cloud gas.
+The captured letter of a German soldier writing home stated:
+"Since the beginning of July an unparalleled slaughter has
+been going on.  Not a day passes but the English let off
+their gas waves at one place or another.  I will give you
+only one instance of this gas; men 7 and 8 kilometres behind
+the front line became unconscious from the tail of the gas cloud,
+and its effects are felt 12 kilometres behind the front.
+It is deadly stuff."
+
+The accuracy of this reference to the long range effect of our gas
+clouds is borne out in a number of other statements.  For example,
+we learnt from a prisoner examined by the French:  "The men were thrown
+into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated.
+Many fell in running to the rear; a number did not become ill until
+the next day.  Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 8 kilometres."
+Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas stated that one of the English
+gas attacks was effective 10 kilometres back.
+
+There are also marked references to the surprise nature of our
+gas attacks, which are an unconscious tribute to the successful
+tactical developments which have already been referred to, and also
+numerous other references to the "delayed" action of phosgene.
+The prisoner mentioned above, taken at Maurepas, gave testimony
+that some were only taken ill after several days, and one died
+suddenly two days after, whilst writing a letter.  One prisoner,
+pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated that about the beginning
+of September when gas came over suddenly in the late evening,
+they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden.
+No one was expecting gas and very few were carrying their masks.
+Another one stated:  "The attack was a surprise and the cloud
+came over and passed fairly quickly.  The whole thing did not
+occupy more than ten minutes."  More than thirty per cent.
+of the battalion was put out of action.
+
+Finally, to show what a serious imposition this constant
+cloud gas attack was upon the German Army, we will quote from
+the Special Correspondent of the _Vossiches Zeitung_.  He said:
+"I devote a special chapter to this plague of our Somme warriors.
+It is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they
+have to struggle with this devilish and intangible foe."
+He refers to the use of gas shell, and says:  "This invisible
+and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait
+on all roads leading to the front."
+
+In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from Field-Marshal
+Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situation is ably summarised:
+"The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame
+as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways
+to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise
+means to make use of the same instruments of destruction.
+Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit
+is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success
+with which these new arms have been developed and perfected,
+and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed
+in a difficult and dangerous service.  The army owes its thanks
+to the chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest
+rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy
+in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world
+by surprise.  Our own experience of the numerous experiments
+and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used,
+of the preparations which had to be made for their manufacture,
+and of the special training required for the personnel employed,
+shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans
+was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been
+prepared for deliberately.
+
+"Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods,
+it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners,
+of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy
+has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means
+of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective."
+
+One of the causes which leads to a lack of understanding of the chemical
+weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not,
+like those of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual observer.
+A period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate
+effect of a gas attack was known.  It was inspiring to witness
+the assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on July 1st, 1916.
+But few realised the part played by the preparatory gas
+attacks in that and other sectors of the line, in weakening
+the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves.
+It is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a particular case
+and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated
+with some particular attack.
+
+The early stages of the Somme battle were characterised by a
+number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose
+of a feint, and reducing the strength of available reserves.
+These attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north
+of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far as the sea.
+One of them occurred on the 30th August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras
+and Bapaume.  About one thousand cylinders were discharged during
+the night.  The usual careful organisation preceded the attack and it
+is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common
+to a large number of these attacks.  Three German regiments were
+holding the line directly in front of the British sector concerned.
+Before December, 1916, the following reliable information was collected
+from prisoners and confirmed by cross-examination. One Company
+of the 23rd regiment, was in training and had no gas masks with it.
+The gas came along quickly and about half the Company were killed.
+After that there were more stringent rules about carrying masks.
+They had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded.
+Another man said that in his Company no special drill or training
+was being done, and a large number of men were put out of action
+through not being able to adjust their respirators in time.
+There was no warning, although after this gas alarms were given
+by ringing church bells.  Other prisoners, from the 63rd, regiment,
+had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said:
+"The effects of the English gas are said to be appalling."
+Collecting information from prisoners belonging to this or that Company,
+and carefully checking by cross-examination, it is clear that this
+attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties.
+
+Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.--The fact that the British persisted
+with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the Germans,
+after the first surprise, was due to a curious combination of causes,
+quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind.
+
+Our Casualties.--In the first place, we knew from bitter experience
+the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack.
+We knew, for example, that in the first attack at Ypres there were
+more than 5000 dead with many more times that number of casualties.
+On the other hand, the Germans, left to speculate on our casualties,
+retained the conviction, from apparent non-success, that cloud gas
+was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop big
+infantry attacks.  Quoting from Schwarte:  "Large gains of ground
+could hardly be attained by means of an attack which followed the use
+of gas clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely employed as a
+means of injuring the enemy, and were not followed up by an attack."
+This represented German policy, and it lacked vision.  They did not
+realise that their difficulty was the method of forming the cloud,
+and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation
+materialised, with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction,
+the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again
+be within their reach.
+
+Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.--The second reason
+accounting for the relatively early cessation of German cloud
+attacks is one constantly referred to in the German war memoirs.
+It was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing
+for such an attack.  Few people realise what hours of agonised
+effort were involved in preparing and executing a cloud gas attack.
+The cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen emplacements
+in the front line within certain time limits.  The "carrying in"
+could not be spread over an indefinite period and usually took
+from two to six nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and
+the local difficulties.  Naturally, all the work occurred in the dark.
+Picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install
+2000 cylinders on, say, a two mile front.  These cylinders would have
+to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line
+where the roads met the communication trenches.  No horse or lorry
+transport could assemble at such points before dark, nor be left
+standing there after dawn.  To carry this number of cylinders more than
+fifty lorries would be required or, say, perhaps, go G.S. wagons.
+All the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire.
+These points would be normally in use for the unloading of rations
+and trench engineering materials, etc., with which cylinder transport
+would have to be co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points,
+parties had to be provided for unloading the lorries and for
+conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench.  In a normally
+difficult trench system, for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half
+of communication trench, at least four men per cylinder are required
+to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs, etc.
+This implies the organisation of more than 8000 officers and men
+for the installation, with a fundamental condition that only small
+groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time.
+The installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been
+a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other
+activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass the work.
+But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of
+the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities
+was a task which tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies,
+who organised, guided, and controlled these operations, but much
+more so of the Infantry Brigades and Divisions whose dispositions
+were interfered with, and who had to provide the men for the work.
+
+Add to this even more acute difficulties.  The front line
+trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus to avoid
+the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire.
+A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry hundreds of
+pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as lead, round traverses
+on a dark night, is a feat requiring superhuman endurance.
+Therefore many "carries" finished with a hundred yards "over the top"
+through the parados wire, to the near locality of the appropriate
+emplacement in the front line.  This last carry was critical;
+a false step, the clatter of falling metal, meant drawing
+the fire of some curious and alert German machine gunner.
+The sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very lights
+imposed instantaneous immobility.  Yet all the time tired men
+were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder
+might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire.
+
+But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in all they undertook,
+is to their everlasting credit.  These tasks were an enemy challenge
+and they accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing.
+The work was indeed beyond description and the country, colonial,
+and London troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically
+in their own peculiar way.  Think again of the need of systematic
+wind observation along the whole front of attack, the disorganisation
+and "gas alert" conditions imposed on the favourable night,
+the possibility of postponement, and we can only draw one conclusion.
+There must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas
+attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance.
+There is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so
+exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war.
+Later, however, when they realised the enemy casualties that were being
+created by the gas, and what a large part it was taking in the war
+of attrition, the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished.
+Further, when the projector arrived to produce similar effects
+with less demand upon infantry personnel, and less dependence
+on the wind, the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed,
+and it became almost popular.
+
+The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the concentration of all this
+effort of preparation within a few days.  In terms of military efficiency,
+the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced.
+We know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night
+for many thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery effort
+to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger.
+But under normal conditions of warfare, such artillery effort would
+have been expended over a much longer period of time.
+
+The Livens Projector.--The Somme offensive witnessed the use
+of a new British gas weapon which became of the utmost importance.
+This was the mortar known as the Livens Projector.  Its origin
+dates back many months, however, and is of considerable interest.
+A British engineer, Lt.  Livens (afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.)
+of the Signal Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive
+thought on the gas question by a double motive.  He quickly
+realised the tactical weakness of the German method at Ypres,
+once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise.
+He saw the advantage of being able to command the point or
+locality of incidence of the cloud, instead of being limited
+to the actual trench front.  Prompted by a direct personal
+interest in the huge loss sustained by the _Lusitania_ outrage,
+he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by
+developing his views on the future of gas clouds.  In a few months
+the general principles of the projector were defined and a crude
+specimen resulted.  Caught up, however, in the gas organisation,
+preparations for the cloud attack at Loos absorbed all his
+attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him
+developing a flammenwerfer and training a company for its use.
+It was really the Somme battle which gave him the first
+opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice.
+This arose in front of High Wood, which was a veritable nest of German
+machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold
+up our advance in that region.  The huge stationary flammenwerfer
+had recently been used by Major Livens and his company against
+a strong point in front of Carnoy in the assault of July 1st.
+Here again the effect of flame was limited even more than
+that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement.
+It was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found
+in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil
+for flame and a crude projector was devised for the emergency,
+using oil cans as mortars, burying them in the earth for two-thirds
+of their length and employing water cans as bombs.
+
+As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its
+development was pressed.  The usual Livens Projector consisted
+of a simple tube mortar or projector closed at one end,
+and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile.
+By an electrical arrangement and suitable communications,
+large numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors could
+be discharged at a given moment.  In this way quantities of gas,
+comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary
+cloud attack, could be used to produce a cloud which would originate,
+as cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of discharge.
+In other words, the advantages of cloud attack could
+be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction,
+and with a much greater factor of local surprise.
+Thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used
+in large quantities during the British Arras offensive in April,
+1917, the German Army was thrown into great consternation.
+But for the fact that protection had developed so strongly
+on both sides, the use of the Livens Projector would have gone
+far towards a decision.
+
+The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will
+be to quote from one or two of the many Intelligence reports collected.
+Thus from a captured document dated July, 1917, belonging to the 111th
+German Division, signed Von Busse, we have:  "The enemy has combined
+in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells.
+The density is equal to that of gas clouds, and the surprise effect
+of shell fire is also obtained.  For the bombardment the latter part
+of the night is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the direction
+of the latter is immaterial). The enemy aims essentially at surprise.
+Our losses have been serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the majority
+of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often been put on too late. . . .
+As soon as a loud report like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away,
+give the gas alarm.  It does not matter if several false alarms are given.
+Masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer.  Men affected,
+even if apparently only slightly, must be treated as serious cases, laid flat,
+kept still, and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment.
+Anti-gas officers and Company Commanders will go through a fresh course
+of training on the above principles."  The influence of gas discipline
+is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt
+to "reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline."
+Again, from a prisoner we learn that "every time a battalion goes into rest,
+masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer
+on British gas projectors, which are stated to be the most deadly form
+of warfare."  So great was the impression formed by the introduction
+of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on
+in the Press.  Thus, quoting from reference to the military discussion
+before the main committee of the Reichstag.  "Casualties from enemy poison
+gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, as the harm involved
+is only temporary, and in most cases no ill after-effects persist"
+(_Tagliche Rundschau_, 24.4.18). "Cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule
+accompanied by harmful consequences, even though the treatment extends
+sometimes over a long period" (_Vorwarts_, 25.4.18), Based on the later
+mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful.
+As it was, they afforded poor consolation to the German people.
+
+British Gas Shell.--The British first used shell gas as lachrymators,
+in trench mortar bombs, in small quantities, during the battle of the Somme,
+but for the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our supplies
+of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use.
+Our success can be measured by the report dated April 11th, 1917, from the
+General Commanding the first German Army, on "Experiences in the Battle
+of Arras," in which he says:  "The enemy made extensive use of gas
+ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries."
+"The fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing
+the mask for many hours."  Artillery activity seems to have been paralysed
+by the effects of the gas.
+
+In a general comparison of British and German methods of gas warfare,[1]
+General Hartley tells us "our methods improved rapidly during 1917.
+At first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of rate of firing,
+but we soon arrived at the method of crashes of lethal shell.
+These got the surprise concentrations of gas which proved
+so effective, and we realised that the number of shells required
+to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally.
+At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at Arras."
+
+
+[1] Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920.
+
+
+German Gas Shell Development, 1916.--The main evidence of Allied reaction
+was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks,
+but during the same period the Germans, who appeared to be abandoning
+the use of cloud gas, were making steady efforts to regain their initiative
+by the comprehensive development of shell gas.  Thus, to quote from
+General Hartley's report to the British Association, "In the Summer
+of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloroformate with toxic properties similar
+to those of phosgene was used against us in large quantities
+during the battle of the Somme.  Later this was replaced by
+trichlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which was used until
+the end of the war as the well-known Green Cross shell filling.
+The use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in 1916."
+Many of those on the front in 1916 will remember the surprise gas shell
+attack of December of that year, on the Baudimont gate at Arras.  We were
+fortunately let off lightly with little over 100 casualties,
+but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line.
+The appearance of the new substances represented definite German
+progress and had definite military results, but they lost decisive
+value owing to the relative inefficiency of German gas shell tactics.
+
+Consideration of the Allied reaction must include some
+reference to the appearance of the American Army in the field.
+The Americans during their more or less educational period gave
+serious attention to the gas question, and showed almost immediately,
+by their preparations, that they attached enormous importance
+to the new weapon.
+
+Main Features of the Period.--It is difficult to generalise.  But the
+following features appear to characterise the period under discussion.
+In the first place we see German policy tending towards the use of gas
+projectiles containing a variety of organic substances.  Secondly, we have
+the British exploitation of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method.
+The Livens Projector provides the third important feature.  Fourthly, we note
+the somewhat tardy development of the British use of gas shell.
+A number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility for the above.
+But whether due to definitely framed policy on our part, or merely to
+the hard facts of the case, one important factor seems largely responsible.
+It is the relative ease of production by Germany as compared with ourselves.
+When German military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell,
+a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not only from German
+research sources, but in quantity from the dye factories.  No such quick
+response could have met, or actually did meet, the demands of Allied
+military policy.  Whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations,
+there was no quick means of converting them into German casualties.
+It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote
+them to the exploitation of the older gas appliances in cloud methods.
+But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the absence of a strong
+organic chemical industry.  In other words, German flexibility of supply
+meant flexibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, and,
+given sound military policy, this flexibility meant surprise, the essence
+of successful war.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE
+
+
+The chemical struggle became very intense in the Summer and Autumn of 1917.
+Projector attacks multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased
+on both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tightened up,
+officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense, a peculiar alertness
+towards gas.  The home front was strengthened in England and France
+by reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the vigorous steps taken
+by America.  The Germans began to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy.
+At the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the production situation,
+they had arrived at the so-called Hindenburg Programme.  This included
+a large output of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Germans
+acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into 1918.
+It is a very clear indication of the progress made by Germany in research,
+that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the Hindenburg Programme
+found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production.
+
+The Mustard Gas Surprise.--The next big surprise came
+from Germany.  Units in the line at Nieuport and Ypres
+in July, 1917, were the first to experience it.  Some were
+sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of German shell
+chemical which, in many cases, evaded the British gas discipline,
+and mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious casualties.
+Even those who wore the mask were attacked by the vesicant
+or blistering influence of the gas.  The matter is vividly
+expressed in a letter, given below, which I received from
+an officer wounded in the Nieuport attack:
+
+"I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, commonly known as mustard stuff,
+on July 22nd.  I was digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire
+on Lambartzyde.  Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. and gas
+shells in Nieuport.  When things quietened a little I went up with
+the three G.S. wagons, all that were left, and the carrying parties.
+I must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell
+as horseradish.  It had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat.
+I suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on.
+
+"On arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud
+of the same stuff drifting from the front line system.
+As it seemed to have no effect on the eyes I gave orders for all
+to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none
+of the stuff, and we carried on.
+
+"Coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack
+on Nieuport.  Next morning, myself, and all the eighty men
+we had up there were absolutely blind.  The horrid stuff
+had a delayed action on the eyes, causing temporary blindness
+about seven hours afterwards.  About 3000 were affected.
+One or two of our party never recovered their sight and died.
+The casualty clearing stations were crowded.  On August 3rd,
+with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses,
+I came home, and went into Millbank Hospital on August 15th."
+
+These early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst
+the troops assembling for the Northern offensives.  The gas was
+distinctly a new departure.  Effective in low concentrations,
+with very little odour, and no immediate sign of discomfort
+or danger, very persistent, remaining on the ground for days,
+it caused huge casualties.  Fortunately, its most fatal effects
+could be prevented by wearing a respirator, and only a very small
+proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal.
+
+The insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas
+discipline is shown in the following example from an official report:
+"A battery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 10 p.m. to 12
+midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on the night of 23rd-24th July.
+The shelling then ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had
+to carry out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the air
+free from gas, and Box Respirators were accordingly removed.
+Shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning,
+including the Battery Commander.  On previous nights they
+had been fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found
+it safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of hours.
+On the occasion in question the air was very still and damp."
+In another case an officer in the Boesinghe sector,
+during the gas bombardment on the night of the 22-23 July,
+adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered.
+His eyes were seriously affected, but he had no lung symptoms
+on the morning of the 24th.
+
+Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called officially by the Germans)
+was the war gas _par excellence_ for the purpose of causing casualties.
+Indeed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied casualties than all
+the various other kinds of German gas.  It was used for preparation
+a considerable time before the attack, or during the attack, on localities
+and objects with which the attackers would have no contact.
+
+Blue Cross.--Another new type, the German Blue Cross, was introduced
+about the same time.  This represented at different times
+diphenylchlorarsine, diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds.
+The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive.
+The enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion
+of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically,
+and then exercise its effects.  These, violent irritation of the nose
+and throat, nausea and intense pain, would cause the removal
+of the respirator and allow other lethal gases to have full play.
+Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were not realised,
+but they were, no doubt, continuing to develop the vast possibilities
+of the new method.
+
+German Emphasis on Gas Shell.--The Green Cross or lethal filling
+was another type of German gas shell.  Green Cross covered
+such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate.
+Although these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas,
+they were relatively more fatal.  Schwarte's book tells us that,
+"After the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer
+of 1916, at Verdun over 100,000 gas shell were used to
+a single bombardment."
+
+From the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific
+gas shell attack of March, 1918, the Germans persistently
+used their new types against us with considerable effect.
+Even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over,
+the number of casualties caused by it was considerably
+greater than during the months when the Germans were firing
+only non-persistent lethal shell of the Green Cross type.
+The Germans regarded these shell gas developments as largely
+responsible for our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917.
+
+The German Projector.--During this period they also developed a projector.
+Their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise.
+Fortunately, protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient
+state that normal "alert" conditions of the front line system were largely
+able to counter the use of this new device by Germany.  The first attack
+was against the French at Rechicourt on the night of December 5th-6th.
+
+On the night of December 10th-11th, 1917, they fired several hundred
+projectiles on the Cambrai and Givenchy sectors of the British line.
+In both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously
+into a small area including our front and support lines.
+The bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line,
+as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line,
+followed by a loud explosion.  The bombs, which emitted a trail of sparks,
+were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise.
+They burst with a large detonation, producing a thick, white cloud.
+The discharge was followed immediately by a bombardment with H.E. shrapnel
+and gas shell, and a raid was attempted south of Givenchy.  We learn
+that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases respirators were
+adjusted before the arrival of the bombs, the resemblance to our projector
+attacks having been established at once.  When this was done practically
+no casualties occurred.  Again, to show the efficiency of British
+protection against projector gas, we learn from official reports that,
+"At one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants.
+It should be remembered that the British box respirator protects against
+very high concentrations of gas which pass at once through the German mask."
+Similar discharges were made against the French on two occasions in December,
+and against the Lens sector on December 30th.  The compounds used
+in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin.
+These attacks increased in number during the ensuing months.
+
+German Projector Improvements.--The Germans developed a longer
+range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this
+weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign.
+The Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy dumps.
+Amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number
+of a new type of projector.
+
+A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, captured on
+August 26th, had said that they were to practise with a new
+type of projector with a range of 3 kilometres, the increased
+range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector.
+He stated that the intention was to use the longer range
+weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector,
+using the new type to deal with the reserve positions.
+The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth
+of his statement.  Two kinds of bombs were used, one containing H.E.
+and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene.
+This was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly
+lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the highly lethal
+gases had only been slightly persistent.  The new projector
+had a calibre of 158 mm.  and was termed the "Gaswerfer, 1918."
+The importance of this new projector cannot be overestimated.
+Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted in
+imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances
+from the front line.
+
+Dyes in Gas Shell.--Another interesting German development of this
+period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell.
+After gas bombardments in the winter of 1916-17, the snow
+was seen to be covered with coloured patches.  These coincided
+with the bursts of the shell.  Analysis of the earth showed
+that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff.
+A number of explanations were advanced to account for the use
+of the colour, of which the most probable claimed its employment
+for the identification of affected localities several hours
+or even days after the bombardment.  This was especially the case
+with persistent types.  As the explosive charge of chemical shell
+was feeble, some such means of identification was necessary.
+It may be that the Germans expected that troops advancing after
+such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour,
+and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental.
+
+German Flame Projectors.--We have already referred to the use of flame
+projectors by the enemy, and a picturesque account of their development
+and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract
+from the _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of the 9th of June, 1918:
+
+Their Origin.--"Our Flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident.
+Their present commander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, received
+the order, during peace manoeuvres, to hold a certain fort at all costs.
+During the sham fight, having employed all means at his disposal,
+he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his orders as
+commander of the fort, and directed the water jets on the attacking force.
+Afterwards, during the criticism of operations in the presence of the Kaiser,
+he claimed that he had subjected the attackers to streams of burning oil.
+The Kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible,
+and he received an answer in the affirmative.
+
+"Long series of experiments were necessary before Engineer L. succeeded
+in producing a combination of various oils, which mixture is projected
+as a flame on the enemy by means of present day Flammenwerfer.
+
+"Major R. occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire
+as commander of the Munich Fire Brigade.  The `Prince of Hades,'
+as he is called by his `fire spouters,' enjoys great popularity among his
+men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called.
+He can look back on an important development of his units.
+Whereas in January, 1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group
+of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with special assault
+and bombing detachments, and are furnished with all requisites
+for independent action.  In reading Army Communiques, we often
+find mention of these troops.  If difficulty is experienced
+in clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the `Prince
+of Hades' appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out.
+That conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute
+a life insurance policy is obvious; nor is every man suitable.
+Special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof
+of keenness in assault are necessary for such work."
+
+Further Flame Development.--Specimens of a very neat portable
+German Flammenwerfer were captured in August, 1917.  It contained
+three essential parts:  a ring-shaped oil container surrounding
+a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, which was used
+to expel the oil, and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying
+the jet.  The whole was arranged to be carried on the back.
+At about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred
+to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment.
+
+The Germans were fond of using the Flammenwerfer during counter-attacks
+and raids in which the morale factor is so important.  Thus in September,
+1915, in a raid against the British during our great offensive,
+the German raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and
+the Flammenwerfer men followed.  The bombing party advanced under cover
+of these men, the smoke from the flame throwers acting as a screen.
+British experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put
+German flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the Germans
+themselves realised this weakness of isolated flame attacks for, in one
+of their documents issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said:
+"Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages.
+They must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison
+with the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns
+and its grenades."
+
+The 1918 Offensive.--Some idea of the importance of these developments
+and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns
+of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the German plans
+for the use of gas in their 1918 offensive, and their execution:
+_Die Technik im Weltkriege_ tells us:  "During the big German attacks
+in 1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities
+which had never been seen before, and even in open warfare the troops
+were soon asking for gas."
+
+The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced into operation in July,
+1917, were not incorporated into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918.
+Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial surprise value of these
+gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive.
+In December, 1917, the German Army was instructed anew regarding
+the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes,
+laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack.
+Fortunately for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were not
+relatively so efficient as the German persistent types, which were devoted
+to the more remote preparation for attack and to defensive purposes.
+Their penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative failure.
+Although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack,
+facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross
+shell for defensive purposes in the great German retreat.
+
+Ludendorffs Testimony.--Ludendorff, himself, emphasised the great
+importance which was attached to gas in this offensive.
+He says[1]: "And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect,
+and that was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind.
+I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 11 a.m, by
+my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus.  Up till the morning
+of the 20th strength and direction were by no means very favourable;
+indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack.
+It would have been very hard to do.  So I was very anxious to see
+what sort of report I should get.  It was not strikingly favourable,
+but it did indicate that the attack was possible.  At 12 noon
+the Army Groups were told that the programme would be carried out.
+Now it could no longer be stopped.  Everything must run its course.
+G.H.Q. higher commanders and troops had all done their duty.
+The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavourable wind diminished
+the effectiveness of the gas, fog retarded our movements
+and prevented our superior training and leadership from reaping
+its full reward."
+
+
+[1] _My War Memories_.  Hutchinson & Co., 1919.
+
+
+Preparations for Assault;--Gas Defensive at Armentieres.--For twelve
+days prior to their March assault the Germans used mustard gas over,
+certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other localities.
+As an example of the first method, we can state that nearly
+200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross shell were used on the 9th March,
+and caused us heavy casualties.  The actual attack at once
+confirmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on
+the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas.
+In the second case, of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross,
+bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours
+before the assault, on all defensive positions and organisations
+for several miles behind the front line.  Millions of rounds must
+have been used.  Although not without serious effect on the campaign,
+this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations.
+The failure of mask penetration by the Blue Cross shell prevented
+the full possibilities of Green Cross coming into play.
+To illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive,
+and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack,
+we quote from a recent statement by General Hartley.[1] Referring
+to the gas shelling immediately before the extension of the attack
+to the north of Lens on 9th April, he explains, "Between the 7th April
+and 9th April there was no gas shelling between the La Bassee Canal
+and Armentieres, while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling
+immediately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such a heavy
+bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas.
+This indicated the probability of an attack on the front held
+by the Portuguese, which occurred on 9th April, Blue and Green Cross
+being used in the preliminary bombardment."  The Portuguese front
+lay between the two Yellow Cross regions.
+
+
+[1] _Journal of the Royal Artillery_, February, 1920.
+
+
+Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.--Another most interesting example
+is also quoted, dealing with the shelling preceding the attack
+on Kemmel on 25th April.  "This is an interesting case,
+as non-persistent Blue Cross shell were used within the objective
+and Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th April
+the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained."
+
+Percentage of Chemical Shell.--Some idea of the importance
+which the Germans attached to their chemical ammunition,
+as distinct from explosives, can be gathered from the following
+extract from a captured order of the Seventh German Army,
+dated May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical shell
+to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on
+the Aisne on 27th May, 1918.
+
+     "(_a_) Counter-battery and long range bombardments.
+          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m,
+          howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%,
+          Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15
+          c/m guns fire only H.E.
+     (_b_) Bombardment of infantry positions.
+          (i) Creeping Barrage.
+          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15
+          c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green
+          Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers
+          fire only H.E.
+          (ii) Box Barrage.
+          For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers
+          and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green
+          Cross 10%, H.E. 30%."
+
+What more striking demonstration is needed than these
+extraordinarily high percentages?
+
+Gas Retreat Tactics;--General Hartley's Analysis.--No Yellow Cross
+shell were to be used in the bombardment, but, as mentioned above,
+there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during which they
+attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas
+with mustard gas.  This defensive use of mustard gas was most important.
+Again, quoting General Hartley, "Yellow Cross shell were used much
+farther forward than previously, bombardments of the front line
+system and of forward posts were frequent, and possible assembly
+positions were also shelled with this gas.  On more than one occasion
+when an attack was expected the enemy attempted to create an impassable
+zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas.
+Their gas bombardments usually occurred on fronts where they had reason
+to fear an attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas
+where troops might be massing.  It was instructive to note how supplies
+of Yellow Cross shell were switched from the Third to the First Army
+front late in August when they became nervous about the latter sector.
+In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon, which they
+did not use to the best advantage, for instance, they neglected its use
+on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they
+might have done.  As our offensive progressed their gas shelling
+became less organised, and one saw very clearly the superior value
+of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones.
+In the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated
+ground and take up alternative positions, while in the case of a bombardment
+of a large area such as the Cambrai salient, the difficulty of doing
+so was greatly increased, and consequently casualties were higher.
+During our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions
+against gas as during stationary warfare, and the casualties were
+increased on this account."
+
+Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps.--A test of the
+importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition
+which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such
+types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind
+the front line for some specific operation, or part of a campaign.
+An examination of German production from this point of view
+is very interesting, and also brings out a significant point.
+The normal establishment of a German divisional ammunition dump
+in July, 1918, contained about 50 per cent.  of gas shell.
+The dumps captured later in the year contained from 30 per cent.
+to 40 per cent.  These figures are significant, for they show
+how much importance the German Army attached to gas shell.
+When we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities
+of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them,
+and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres
+the Germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive,
+some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its
+future possibilities can be obtained.  Further, when we realise
+that the production of explosives can be controlled and inspected
+during peace, but that no such control can exist for chemical
+warfare products, the significance for the future stands revealed.
+
+Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.--It might be thought that the lower percentages
+found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing importance
+of chemical shell.  Examining the case less superficially, however, we soon
+see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning.
+In the first place, we know that the German factories were still pressing
+on to their maximum output at the time of the Armistice.  New units were
+being brought into operation.  Secondly, we have seen how huge quantities
+of mustard gas were diverted to those particular German armies which were
+most threatened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that certain
+portions of the German front were being starved for chemical shell.
+The truth of the matter is that the Germans had accumulated enormous
+stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these
+stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them.
+We learn from Schwarte's book that, "Although the production of Yellow Cross
+almost reached 1000 tons a month, yet finally the possibilities of use
+and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly
+output would have been sufficient."
+
+Yperite, French Mustard Gas.--During this period the volume
+of allied gas activities also increased considerably.
+But until June, 1918, our success was due to the development
+of more successful tactical methods rather than to any
+specific chemical surprise.
+
+Very great credit is due to the French for having produced large quantities
+of mustard gas by the above date.
+
+Judging from the German Intelligence Reports the surprise effect of the French
+production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier German use.
+It again evaded the gas discipline of the troops, and we find the German staff
+laying enormous emphasis on this question, which was already very prominent
+in their general and operation orders.  The occasion provided a very striking
+example of German belief in their absolute predominance in production.
+They were largely justified in this belief, but it carried them too far.
+They explained the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the use
+of German mustard gas obtained from "blind" German shell!
+
+Effect on German Gas Discipline.--British mustard gas was not in use
+in the field until September, 1918, but the French was a great success,
+and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied
+success in the 1918 campaign.  The French termed mustard gas
+"Yperite" after Ypres, the place where it was first used.
+As far as such terms can be applied to any weapon, Yperite arrived
+to spread panic, and terror amongst the German formations.
+A document captured by the Sixth French Army shows that Yperite used
+on the 13th June against the 11th Bavarian Division was the chief cause
+of the precipitate retreat of this Division.  The Seventh German Army
+refers to another bombardment on the 9th of June, in which the casualties
+exceeded five hundred.
+
+It is curious to note that although the Germans had so preached
+the superiority of their gases and gas methods, serious blows
+by the Allies found the German gas discipline unequal to them.
+It is no exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the French,
+and later by the British, and the British projector, produced,
+on each occasion, in the German ranks feelings allied to panic.
+This is reflected in the many orders which have been captured from
+army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas
+discipline amongst the troops.  Thus, almost immediately after
+the first French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General Staff,
+issued a special detailed order on the subject, and the German
+document captured by the French can be taken as representative.
+"Our Yellow Cross has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less
+protected than now.  But as a natural sequence he had developed
+through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model.
+On this account enemy troops have been able to cross, at once
+and without loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded
+with gas.  We also must train our troops to an excellent
+standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave
+dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army."
+By the time of the Armistice France had produced nearly 2000 tons
+of mustard gas, British and American production was rapidly increasing,
+so that the output was attaining stupendous proportions.
+Some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns
+of 1917-1918 can be obtained from the following figures:
+
+Allied Gas Statistics.--Between November, 1917, and November, 1918,
+France produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator.
+The British figure was probably higher.  From April to November, 1918,
+the French filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas.
+From the 1st of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seventeen million
+gas shell were completed by the French.  In addition to these huge gas
+shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors
+and as cloud gas.  During the period the British averaged fifty
+large scale operations of this type per month, sometimes discharging
+monthly three hundred tons of gas.  The total French production of
+chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached 50,000 tons,
+a large proportion of which production occurred during 1917 and 1918.
+The British was of the same order, but German production was at least
+more than twice as high, showing what great use they made of gas shell.
+The huge American programme might have reduced the margin, but no limits
+can be placed on German possibilities and elasticity in production.
+
+Critical Importance of Rapid German Production.--These figures are
+misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative
+difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides.
+As a general rule, where the German lag between the approval
+of a substance and its use in the field covered weeks, our lag
+covered months.  Owing to efficient production, chemical warfare
+was an infinitely more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours.
+This will be readily understood when we analyse, later,
+the methods of production of some of the chief German war gases.
+In general, German development of these complicated substances
+provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of production
+of organic substances by the dye industry.  On the other hand,
+except in very few exceptional cases, British and French production,
+although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned,
+was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison.  The Germans used
+mustard gas in July, 1917.  We identified it a few days afterwards.
+But the first fruits of allied production were not in the field for
+eleven months.  British material was not used until a month or two before
+the Armistice.  Further, in this case, we were convinced of the value
+of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy.
+We will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production.
+
+The period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof
+of the German experiment of 1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature,
+the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part
+in the campaign.  They were surely destined to play a much more prominent
+part had the period of stabilised warfare continued.  Projector cloud
+gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer.
+But we will leave such considerations for a future chapter.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS
+
+
+We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical
+account of the above.  The ramifications, of Allied organisations
+were so numerous, the number of persons concerned so great,
+the sacrifices made so heavy, that only an exceedingly
+lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals.
+In addition, such an account would not serve our purpose.
+We wish to show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied
+organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign,
+how they compared with those of the enemy, and what lesson
+the comparison may contain for the future.
+
+Two facts stand out in such a comparison.  We are struck with
+the extreme simplicity of the German organisations, as we know them,
+and the great complexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments
+as we saw them.  We must admit from the beginning that we know
+least of the German home organisations for research and production,
+but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity.
+The Inter-Allied Commission of Control may, and certainly should,
+obtain full information, but at present the matter stands as follows.
+
+German Research.--The Germans relied upon two main and very strong
+centres for research.  They have already been indicated as the
+Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber,
+and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. There are various
+references to internal gas organisation in captured documents.
+It appears that they received their final form late in 1917.
+A great gas school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin where
+there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material.
+Rather earlier than this the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely
+appointed as the official research centre.  The War Ministry had
+a chemical section named A.10, which dealt with gas questions.
+It is rumoured, and there is strong reason to believe, that the I.G.
+was largely staffed by officers of the Reserve before the war.
+Whatever their pre-war associations, if any, with the War Ministry,
+hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities
+of their unique research and organic chemical producing facilities.
+It is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have
+greatly assisted the I.G. in its operations, inventions and general
+assistance for the army.
+
+It appears that the subdivision of work left the, direction of
+chemical research in Berlin, possibly at the above Institute,
+while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds,
+and developing manufacturing processes for approved substances,
+occurred in the laboratories of the I.G.
+
+Leverkusen.--We know, for example, that a very large number
+of substances was produced at Leverkusen and samples forwarded
+to Berlin, of which only a few were finally approved for production.
+The physiological work and field tests were certainly associated
+with the Berlin organisation, but it is not clear how much
+of this work occurred within the I.G. An Allied mission
+to Leverkusen reported as follows:--"It was emphatically
+stated that no means of testing the products were resorted
+to beyond inhala-tion and testing the effect of the substances
+on the staff, but this statement must be accepted with reserve."
+This is particularly so as we know that large numbers of
+respirator-drums had been made in this factory, and that a gas
+school existed at Leverkusen in 1915.
+
+A member of another Allied mission was informed by one of the staff
+at Leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware
+of the difficulties in chemical warfare, apart from production,
+for they had some experience in the designing and testing of
+chemical shell.  It maybe that the German Government relied upon
+the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the chemical war,
+pending the development of official organisation.
+When we remember, however, that at Leverkusen alone there
+was a staff of 1500 technical and commercial specialists,
+apart from thousands of workpeople, before the war,
+and that the latter were increased by 1500 during the war,
+we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which
+might have been rendered by this research centre alone.
+The opinion of the members of the Hartley Commission[1] was,
+that much thought and attention had been given to chemical
+warfare by the chemists of the Company.
+
+
+[1] A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine
+chemical factories, March, 1919.
+
+
+Hochst.--A great volume of chemical warfare research occurred
+also at Hochst.  "The admission was made that the research
+department of the factory was continuously employed during the war
+on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical warfare,
+many hundreds being prepared and sent to Berlin for examination.
+The firm employed 300 academically trained chemists in peace time,
+but during the war many more were engaged, partly for research
+and partly because all shell filling was carried out under
+the supervision of trained chemists."
+
+Ludwigshafen.--The most influential branch of the I.G. was,
+undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik.  It might
+have been expected, as they shared largely in production,
+that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur
+at these works, but this was emphatically denied to Allied missions.
+It may be, however, that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise
+was developed there, requiring a large amount of technical
+development and control, this was considered a sufficient
+contribution to the general cause.
+
+Early Formulation of Policy.--In examining what signs we have
+of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare
+research and production in Germany, we are struck by the fact
+that all the substances used with such dire effect against us
+during the war must have been approved for production by the
+Government at a relatively early date.  The following table,
+assembled from information supplied by the German factories,
+brings this point out very clearly.
+
+                                                       First Use
+ War Chemical.      Factory.       Production Began.        in the Field,
+ Diphosgene              Hochst      Sept., 1916              Summer, 1915
+ (Green Cross)      Leverkusen          June, 1915
+ Mustard Gas        Leverkusen          Spring, 1917        July, 1917
+ (Yellow Cross)
+ Diphenyl-               Hochst      May, 1917           July, 1917
+     chlorarsine
+ (Blue Cross)
+ Diphenyl-               A.G.F.A. ?          Feb., 1918               June, 1911
+     cyanarsine
+ (Blue Cross)
+ Ethyl-dichlor-          Hochst      Aug., 1917               March, 1918
+     arsine
+ (Blue Cross)
+
+We have chosen the later products to establish the point, for it
+is self-evident for the earlier products, some of which were made
+before the war.
+
+Movements of Personnel.--The movements of German chemical personnel give
+us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy.
+The factories were called upon to produce, as we have already shown,
+towards the end of 1914, but this production largely involved
+the use of substances already manufactured on a certain scale.
+Large scale production of the more advanced types of war chemical
+seems to have been directly stimulated by the Hindenburg programme,
+in connection with which the Companies withdrew large numbers of their
+skilled workers from the front.
+
+German Simplicity of Organisation.--We can safely conclude
+from the above that Germany required no cumbersome government
+mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals,
+for the semi-industrial work in developing processes for
+approved substances, nor for their production.  By relying on
+the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably some other
+organisation for field and physiological tests, Germany escaped
+the necessity for comprehensive government organisation,
+the development of which was such a handicap to Allied countries.
+It is certainly very suggestive that we only met,
+in the field, substances approved before the summer of 1917.
+It is with great interest and a certain amount of apprehension
+that we speculate upon the research developments after that period
+with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted.
+If this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas,
+Blue Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances,
+what hidden surprises were matured in the later period?
+This feature of simplicity, of linking up a new war with an old peace,
+activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation.
+We have seen how Germany created special formations for
+cloud attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them,
+throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell.
+In other words, she substituted a normal weapon, the artillery.
+We, on the other hand, largely impelled by the enforced
+simplicity of our production, tended more towards the development
+of special formations and special weapons for cloud production,
+but with such success that the German Pioneer formations,
+after being practically dropped, found a use in developing
+and using our new weapon, the Livens Projector.
+
+German Organisation at the Front;--The Gas Regiment.--It is probable
+that the earliest form of German organisation at the front consisted
+in the liaison between Professor Haber and the German G.H.Q. It
+will be remembered that Ludendorff, discussing cloud and shell gas,
+refers to this co-operation, stating:[1] "Geheimrat Haber proved
+of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas."
+It was also rumoured soon after the first German attack that the
+organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific
+guidance of this renowned Professor.  The attack was carried out by
+the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with chemically
+trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare.
+
+The importance of protection was realised very early, and a gas
+school for officers of all armies was organised at Leverkusen
+for training in protection.  We cannot but regard it as significant
+that Leverkusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer[2] organic
+chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production.
+The school dealt mainly with protection.
+
+
+[1] _My War Memories_, page 338.
+
+[2] A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen Gemeinschaft,
+known as the I.G.
+
+
+Early German Gas School.--Apparently, at the end of November, 1916,
+special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the
+headquarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations.
+In addition, these staffs had the normal routine function of
+supervising inspection and instruction in gas warfare at the front.
+At about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer
+(gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those outlined above.
+In other words, the arrangement was generalised throughout the army.
+This officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men
+specially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units.  The great need
+for these staffs is brought out in German official documents.
+
+New Gas Regiments;--Gas Shell Experts.--In 1917 two new
+Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th respectively, were created
+for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks.
+These developments in organisation, both advisory and combatant,
+led, at about this time, to the centralisation of the gas services
+at the front under a Kommandeur der Gastruppen at G.H.Q. It
+would thus appear that the Germans achieved the centralisation
+of their gas services some months later than ourselves.
+Further developments in organisation, of which we are aware,
+were connected with two main tendencies in German gas warfare.
+In the first place, the vast employment of gas shell led the Germans
+to create special gas experts on the Divisional artillery staffs.
+We have this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated
+June 16th, 1918.  This gas shell expert was not necessarily an
+imported specialist, but was usually a specially trained officer
+chosen from the staff in question.  This was a very important move,
+for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell.
+This artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison
+with the Divisional Gas Officer.
+
+Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.--The second tendency
+was towards stricter protective standards and inspection.
+The gas inspection centre at Berlin was given more responsibilities
+in the field and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier
+pigeons received great emphasis.
+
+British Field Organisation;--"Breach" Organisations.--Our own
+field development followed very similar lines.  The immediate
+need in April, 1915, was for organisations on the front
+to advise formations on temporary methods of protection,
+to ascertain quickly the nature of any new German chemical attack,
+and to provide special means of examining the treatment of
+the new kind of casualty.  These were "breach organisations,"
+so to speak, countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks
+while more comprehensive and permanent cadres were created
+to absorb them.  The personnel of these breach organisations
+was largely composed of chemists already at the front who
+had in some cases taken part in the first German attacks.
+Efforts were soon on foot to mobilise British chemists for
+offensive purposes.  So remote from the old army standards
+and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare,
+that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scientific
+soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these
+matters at the front or at home.  Accordingly, in June,
+1915, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O.
+(then Major, R.E.) was given the difficult task of assembling
+and training an offensive gas formation, and acting as
+Gas Adviser to G.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created
+have already been referred to in quotations from despatches.
+In addition to this combatant personnel a number of
+specialists and advisory organisations came into being.
+Additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions,
+and chemical advisers by higher formations.
+
+Central Laboratory.--A central laboratory was instituted at G.H.Q. under
+the late Colonel W. Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly valuable
+work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals.
+With the development of gas shell, the chemical advisers included this
+subject in their province.  Reference must also be made to the medical
+and physiological side.
+
+New Type of Casualty.--After the introduction of gas warfare
+the army was always faced with the possibility that some
+entirely new chemical would produce a new type of casualty
+which would require special and sometimes unusual treatment.
+A new element was thus introduced into army medical work.
+The effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front
+was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden
+development of a strange epidemic.  Reaction to meet these new
+conditions took the form of the development of medical research
+organisations at home, and of the appointment of a special medical
+and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the Directorate
+of Gas Services.  It was thus possible, after any enemy gas attack,
+and with little delay, to institute inquiries with regard
+to treatment of casualties, stimulate special investigations,
+and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and,
+in general, introduce satisfactory alert conditions throughout
+the medical organisation along the whole of the Allied front.
+In this connection the effective liaison between the medical
+specialists of the British and French armies must be mentioned.
+
+Directorate of Gas Services.--These various services were centralised
+in the Directorate of Gas Services, in the Spring of 1916,
+under Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is
+interesting to note that although in their rear organisations
+for research and supply the French preceded us in the adoption
+of a logical symmetrical arrangement, yet in the field we were
+the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service
+which was so essential.
+
+British Home Organisations;--The Royal Society.--After the battle
+of the Marne, Germany rapidly realised the need for scientific
+and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war
+had passed.  Many signs and definite statements by Falkenhayn
+and others in authority have shown us how this realisation
+found outlet in various schemes for research and production.
+The need for scientific attention to various war problems
+was also realised in England, and found expression in the
+mobilisation of prominent scientists by the Royal Society,
+which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific
+activities and to assist various Ministries or administrative
+government departments in connection with scientific matters.
+
+Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.--The Chemical Sub-Committee
+included such prominent names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and
+Sir Oliver Lodge.  Retaliation, decided on early in May, 1915, was reflected
+in organisation.  Lord Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E.
+(later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., R.E.),
+then in charge of a fortification section of the War Office,
+with the task of examining and taking action on the possibilities
+of retaliation, and a liaison with the above chemical committee
+of the Royal Society was soon established.  Protection became a part
+of the duties of the Medical Services and was placed under the direct
+control of Colonel, afterwards Sir William Horrocks, who became chairman
+of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee.  Further, a little later,
+the Chemical Sub-Committee above referred to became an advisory body to
+Colonel Jackson.  This was the origin of the Chemical Warfare Department,
+but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering
+transformations before reaching its final, more or less efficient
+and symmetrical form.
+
+The Trench Warfare Department.--With the formation of the Ministry of
+Munitions late in May, 1915, Colonel Jackson's section was transferred to it.
+At this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping
+chemical warfare research, design, and supply under one head.  Probably this
+was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State
+for War, to agree to the transference of this section to another Ministry,
+and consent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department.
+
+Scientific Advisory Committee;--Commercial Advisory Committee.--Even at
+this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found
+necessary to cover such functions as in Germany were rendered unnecessary
+by the existence of the I.G. It became clear that the new department
+would require strong permanent scientific advice, and this was found
+in the formation of the Scientific Advisory Committee.  This included
+the most active members of the former relevant Royal Society Committee,
+amongst whom were Professor A. W. Crossley, the Secretary,
+and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby,
+all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this
+new branch of warfare.  A parallel Commercial Advisory Committee
+was appointed, composed of representatives of some of the leading
+manufacturers of the country.
+
+Split Between Research and Supply.--We cannot follow in detail the many
+fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department.
+They represent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed
+policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research,
+and circumstances imposed upon the department by the reorganisation
+and fusion of Ministries and departments.  There were brief periods,
+notably at the commencement and in the final stages, when the desired
+centralised organisation was approached, but there were also periods
+when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble
+and unsatisfactory liaison between the two.  Speaking generally,
+the break between research and supply occurred in December, 1915,
+when the Trench Warfare Department was split up into two parts.
+These were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in which was
+included the Scientific Advisory Committee, and, shortly afterwards,
+changed its name to that of the Chemical Advisory Committee,
+and the Trench Warfare Supply Department.  The relationships
+between those two departments remained practically unchanged until
+the formation of the Chemical Warfare Department in October, 1917.
+This statement must be qualified, however, by a reference to the
+services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., in
+bringing about this liaison, not only with supply in England,
+but also with that in France.
+
+During the early period the Royal Society Committee of Physiology
+became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the
+Chemical Warfare Department, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Committee.
+
+Munitions Inventions Department.--Another feature which is worthy of notice
+because it was common to Allied organisations other than the British,
+and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential
+unity of chemical warfare activities, was the duplication of effort
+by the Munitions Inventions Department.  Suggestions which could only
+have value when considered as part of the definitely directed chemical
+warfare policy were constantly raised with the Inventions Department,
+but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance
+of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison between the two
+departments by Colonel Crossley.
+
+Imperial College of Science.--During the early period the Imperial College
+of Science rendered great services by assisting in research.
+It continued to do so during the rest of the war, but was later
+associated with a large number of British university chemical
+and scientific departments in pursuing a huge programme of chemical
+warfare research.  We can only make passing reference to the development
+of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an
+important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy.
+The Porton ground, however, was a model of its kind, a pioneer
+amongst Allied experimental grounds, and a tribute to the creative
+and administrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., C.B.E.,
+who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war.
+
+The Chemical Warfare Department.--The growing importance of
+chemical warfare, the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by Germany
+in the summer of 1917, and various other reasons led to reorganisation
+of the Chemical Warfare services in this country in October, 1917,
+and the Chemical Warfare Department, under Major-General Thullier,
+formerly Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was constituted.
+This reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research
+and other activities of the department and a still greater
+mobilisation of the chemists of the country.  Although this
+change witnessed further centralisation by the incorporation
+of the Anti-Gas Department, thereby settling once and for all
+the inherent association between offensive and defensive research,
+a fact which had been apparent to many long before, yet it still ignored
+the fundamental connection between offensive research and supply.
+This had been recognised in French organisation as early as 1915,
+yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war.
+
+The Anti-Gas Department.--We have mentioned the origin of the
+Anti-Gas Department.  Although separate in organisation from chemical
+warfare research, yet the remarkable work and personality of the late
+Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by
+energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organisation.
+General Hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating:
+"Colonel Harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war.
+It is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator,
+but this he would have been the first to deny.  His great merit
+was as an organiser.  He gathered round him an enthusiastic group
+of young chemists and physicists, and the box respirator represents
+the joint result of their researches, carried out under his
+inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment.
+He organised the manufacture of the respirator on a large scale,
+and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite
+of all the difficulties of production, the supplies promised to France
+never failed.  Fifty million respirators were produced by the department,
+and of these nineteen million were box respirators."
+
+Anti-gas research was at first centred in the R.A.M. College, Millbank,
+and from the beginning of 1917 in the Physiological Institute,
+University College, London.  The work done in research and production
+not only protected the whole of the British Army, but formed the backbone
+of American and a large part of Italian protection.  Further, the sacrifices
+made in connection with this work are not sufficiently known.
+Numbers of young scientists sacrificed their health and sometimes life,
+in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions
+of Englishmen and Allies depended.
+
+Designs Committee.--We cannot leave this branch of the subject without
+referring to the Chemical Warfare Designs Committee.  An important trend
+in chemical warfare was its growing independence of the normal weapons of war,
+and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal
+and newer types.  This tendency found expression in the above Committee
+under the direction of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe.  The development
+of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem, and the importance
+of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing
+with the limitation of armaments.
+
+French Organisation.--French development followed very similar lines.
+
+From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military representatives and
+scientists was organised under General Curmer.  This gave place in June
+to a Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. Weiss, Directeur des
+Mines au Ministere des Traveaux Publics.  In August, 1915, three special
+Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for problems from the front,
+whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable
+identifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the Allies;
+another under M. Moureu for offensive research, whose brilliant organic
+investigation characterised later French developments, and the other
+under M. Vincent, for research on protection.  But, in the meantime,
+the importance of gas shell was impressed upon the French and,
+on the 1st July, 1915, this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas's
+new Ministere de L'Artillerie et des Munitions.  Manufacture passed into
+the hands of the Directeur du Materiel Chimique de Guerre.  In September,
+1915, these sections were centralised under General Ozil, attached to
+the same Ministry.  General Ozil's service was strongly supported
+by a number of eminent French scientists, and achieved unusual success
+in the face of great practical difficulties.
+
+A very close liaison was maintained with the army, and the initiative,
+energy, and devotion of all concerned cannot be too highly praised.
+In production alone the difficulties were enormous.  There was no
+highly organised dye industry available.  The prewar German monopoly
+had seen to that.  Elaborate organisations and continuous research
+work under difficult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth,
+running normal activities of the great German dye combine.
+The salient points in French production are dealt with more fully
+in another chapter.
+
+In research and protection French activities were no less handicapped
+and just as creditable.  The protection of the French armies was largely
+achieved through the genius and tireless industry of Professor Paul Lebeau.
+
+Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new German weapon,
+the French developed their chemical offensive and defensive
+with characteristic elan and intuition.  Contributing largely
+to Allied research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-operation
+and liaison, and their activities in this field were due to much
+worthier causes than mere geographical position.
+
+Italian Development.--The Italians were alive to the importance of
+chemical warfare.  World famous names such as those of Senator Paterno
+and Professor Villavecchia were associated with their organisation.
+Once again, however, although not lacking in invention and initiative,
+they were continually hampered by production, which imposed such
+grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seriously the success
+of their campaign.  The success of the great German offensive against
+Italy in the autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German use
+of gas of such types and in such amounts that the Italian protective
+appliances were outmanoeuvred.  Further, in spite of the offensive
+qualities of the Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna,
+lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so essential
+in maintaining gas morale.
+
+Towards the end of the war, when the French and British production improved,
+and with the entry of America and the promise of supplies therefrom,
+it was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources,
+and arrangements were made to supply them with the British Respirator,
+to assist them in the development of the Livens Projector, to supply large
+quantities of mustard and other gases, and to assist them in production.
+The use of the British box respirator was undoubtedly a great factor
+in repelling the Austrian offensive of June, 1918.  Their experimental
+fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed, and,
+backed by production, Italian chemical genius would have been capable
+of producing very serious results.
+
+Supply Organisations.--What a marked contrast between the organisation
+required for German and Allied chemical warfare production!
+Such organisation implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation
+with research organisations, for semi-scale work, commercial functions,
+priority, raw material supply, transport, and all their concomitants.
+In Germany, the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions.
+The Government addressed itself to one producing organisation which
+was responsible for most of the relevant research.  Whole Government
+departments were rendered unnecessary by this centralised production.
+
+British Supply Organisation.--In England the situation was
+entirely different.  Even before the advent of mustard gas the Government
+was compelled to apply to at least twenty contractors.  The products
+required were foreign to the normal activities of many of these.
+They required assistance in raw materials, transport, technical methods,
+either the result of the work of other factories or of research.
+The latter again involved complex official organisation, cumbrous even
+if efficiently carried out.  This at once introduced difficulties.
+The centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead
+of in the centres of production.  Much depended upon the co-ordination
+of the official departments.  Quite apart from the Government plants
+finally engaged in chemical warfare production, more than fifty plants
+were used in private organisations, of which a very high percentage
+were entirely new.
+
+Allied Handicaps.--The functions of the allied Government supply
+departments were or should have been much more than those of an
+individual negotiating a contract.  Owing to the fact that these were
+new plants, and that the products were foreign to the production
+of many of the firms concerned, two alternatives had to be faced.
+Either the technical and service departments of each firm had
+to be considerably strengthened, or else a special organisation
+had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government
+technical and liaison personnel.  For reasons of secrecy and general
+efficiency the latter procedure evolved, but neither represented
+the ideal solution.
+
+The German Solution.--This was the German arrangement in which these
+functions were all embodied in the centralised producing organisation,
+the I.G. The German Government took the role of a pure contractor,
+the only additional function being the choice of product and method,
+a question of policy.  This implied the existence of a Government
+experimental organisation, but purely for this purpose.
+
+Departmental Difficulties.--The Allied task would have been
+much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one,
+in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided
+upon at first, and need have suffered no very radical changes.
+As it was, however, the British supply organisation had to
+administer some seventy plants, which were really in private hands,
+and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external
+perplexities of the problem.  They arose in its relationships
+with other Government departments.
+
+Allied Success Against Odds.--Taking a broad view of the case,
+although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas
+production with anything but dismay, except in a few cases,
+yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded
+as well as we did with these entirely new substances.
+The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the Allies is
+one of devoted effort by all concerned, against overwhelming odds,
+and although the level of results was poor compared with Germany,
+yet we find here and there brilliant examples of Allied
+adaptability and tenacity amongst which the French development
+of mustard gas stands pre-eminent.
+
+What we have already said about supply organisation may be summed up
+in one sentence.  The Germans were already organised to produce.
+We had to create Government departments to administer a large
+number of plants in private hands, and they had to cope not only
+with the external difficulties of the situation but with the almost
+overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation.  The checquered
+career of the British supply department provides a good example.
+The French and Americans suffered less than ourselves from
+these troubles, the latter having the benefit of the combined
+experience of the other Allies.
+
+Allied Lack of Vision in Production.--A survey of the earliest supply
+organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events
+have obscured.  Few people realised the developments which chemical warfare
+would produce.  The early production of chemicals for gas warfare was
+grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores, and graded
+in order of importance, from the point of view of supply organisation
+with catapults and spring guns, flame projectors and body shields!
+It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather than vision forced
+the importance of chemical warfare upon those responsible for munition
+production in the early stages of the war.  Chemical warfare production
+remained under the Trench Warfare Supply Department for many months,
+where it was one of ten Trench Warfare sections.  The vicissitudes of trench
+warfare supply are too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here,
+but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly.
+
+British Lag in Organisation.--Examining Allied organisations,
+we find that the French and Americans approached this ideal
+solution more rapidly than ourselves, and we can trace in our
+own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this
+centralised control, although the last configuration, under the direction
+of Major-General H. F. Thuillier, was the nearest approach.
+French organisation for supply provides another example of their
+national characteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry.
+As early as September, 1915, the French centralised their research
+organisation, the Inspection des Etudes et Experience Chimiques,
+and their supply organisation, the Direction du Materiel Chimique
+de Guerre, in their Service Chimique de Guerre under General Ozil.
+
+French and American Characteristics.--Their early concentration on
+gas shell shows that this symmetrical organisation was due not only
+to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development.
+American supply organisation again provides evidence of the
+national characteristic.  They had no I.G. but they had plenty of money
+and material, and the total of Allied experience in production.
+They therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing
+centre known as Edgewood Arsenal.  We refer to this later.
+The tremendous potentialities of this Arsenal will readily he seen,
+although they did not become effective during the war.
+
+It would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices
+made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical
+warfare to leave the matter at this stage, or to make a minute
+analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success.
+We may say that although the efforts of all concerned were
+beyond praise, yet they were so initially handicapped that it was
+practically impossible even to approach the German efficiency.
+In France and England we were suffering from the faults of past years,
+our lack of attention to the application of science to industry.
+The Americans would also have suffered, for they were in the same plight,
+but they adopted the drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal.  As we
+show later, however, this solution was really only a very necessary
+and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease.
+We cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries.
+If it is, then the outlook is very poor.
+
+Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.--Chemical warfare offered,
+in theory, a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst
+the Allies, The new methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed,
+at first sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy
+by an allied Generalissimo and staff.  Co-ordination never reached
+this stage, although strong liaison organisations were developed.
+Inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in Paris,
+where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion
+of allied work.  The continuity of these relationships was maintained
+by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented.
+The contact, so close between actual allied scientific workers
+in this field, became less evident in the application of their
+results to field warfare, for several reasons.  In the first place,
+close scientific contact in research was replaced by the actual field
+relationships of the armies, and, as is well known, the central
+inter-allied command did not materialise until the spring of 1918,
+and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle
+to the actual battlefield.  The traditional differences between.
+the methods of the different services of each ally still existed
+to a large extent, and they found expression in type of armament,
+equipment, and military standards, such as, for example, gun calibres
+and shell design, to which chemical warfare had to conform.
+No inter-allied gas mask materialised, although this would have been
+of inestimable advantage.  Probably the example of most complete
+co-ordination occurred on the supply side, where absence of the above
+traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most
+of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination.
+
+Inter-Allied Supply.--The writer was responsible for initiating,
+in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, whose function
+was to pool effectively the allied raw materials, and to arrange
+their distribution in accordance with allied programmes,
+the exchange of which implied a considerable step.
+Later this Committee became one of a number, similarly constituted,
+forming part of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
+
+Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply, now that the
+emergenices of the situation have passed, an important contrast emerges.
+After three years of war, and although protected by the powerful arm
+of the blockade, we were, still resorting, for chemical warfare supply,
+to measures which, compared with the German methods, were complicated,
+clumsy, and inefficient.  This was, in a sense, forced upon us by
+the number of the allies, and the fact that they held the outer lines.
+But it is easily forgotten that Germany also had a number of allies,
+and that Germany supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all.
+
+Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.--So, much has been vaguely said,
+and is vaguely known, about research in chemical warfare that a brief
+analysis will be of value.
+
+Discovery of New Substances.--Research for this purpose has
+a number of very distinct functions, The most obvious is the
+discovery of new substances.  But there are others in connection
+with which research work represents a much greater volume.
+Very few new substances which found valuable application
+during the war were revealed by chemical warfare research.
+The bulk of the important substances were already known as such,
+although their importance for war was probably not realised.
+It is most important to emphasise the fact that even in
+the future, should there be no direct attempts to reveal
+new chemical warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise
+as a normal outcome of research, even if, without exception,
+every chemist in the world became a most pronounced pacifist.
+A valuable substance once discovered or decided upon, however,
+whole series of research investigations become necessary.
+
+Technical Method of Preparation;--Filling Problem;--Protection;--
+Half-Scale Investigation.--The substance must be prepared in the most
+efficient manner for manufacture, which may not be the mode of its discovery.
+It must be used in shells, cylinders, or some other war chemical device.
+Each device represents a different filling problem, different difficulties
+with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container.
+If a projectile is in question the ballistics become of importance.
+More important than any of these, except production, is the question
+of protection.  It is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive
+chemical must be protected against it.  It may, therefore, be necessary
+to modify the existing mask or protective appliance, or to create an
+entirely new one.  If research reveals the necessity for the latter course
+of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance.
+In addition, according to productive difficulties, it may be necessary
+to undertake comprehensive and very expensive research on half-scale
+methods for production.  It is impossible in many cases to proceed directly
+from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious
+risk of failure.
+
+Two Classes of Research.--Broadly, these research functions form two classes,
+those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those
+concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval.
+There must be, of course, a certain amount of overlapping and liaison
+between the two classes.
+
+Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the Germans.  Their great
+producing organisation, the I.G., was able to take over automatically
+certain of these research functions, in particular all those with
+regard to preparation and production, even of protective appliances.
+The Government reserved what we have called the policy functions,
+and was responsible, we assume, for the mass, of physiological and design
+research which must always precede approval or a decision on policy.
+
+Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was even employed on certain
+occasions for this latter type of research.
+
+Conclusion.--From the facts at our disposal there can be no
+doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of
+the Allies for chemical warfare investigation were considerably
+more extensive and expensive than those of Germany with the one
+notable exception of trained technical organic chemists.
+It is very doubtful whether the German field experiments were
+as largely provided for as those of the Allies.  When we think
+of the French grounds at Versailles and Entressin, the British
+at Porton, the American grounds in France and in America,
+and the Italian organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that
+the total German facilities were much smaller.  Under the actual
+circumstances of the war, however, it was difficult to develop
+more co-operation than was possible by a very close liaison.
+The fact that all the experimental developments from these
+grounds required special modification to meet the peculiar needs
+of artillery and other equipment for each ally, prevented the
+adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances.
+Even uniform shell marking was found impracticable.
+
+The "Outer and Inner Lines."--The Allied situation compelled the
+multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries.
+Lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a
+considerable disadvantage, compared with Germany, in the development
+of such organisations.  Using a strategic comparison, we can say
+that Germany not only possessed the "inner lines" in the chemical war,
+but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in the shape
+of the great I.G.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE
+
+
+Meaning of the Chemical Initiative.--The German invasion of Belgium
+in 1914 was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war.
+By disregarding their pledge, a "scrap of paper," they automatically
+introduced into this attack the elements of military surprise.
+We, the enemy, were unprepared, and a complete rearrangement
+of dispositions became necessary.
+
+A recent writer has admirably summarised the facts.[1]
+
+
+[1] A. F. Pollard.  _A Short History of the Great War_.  Methuen, 1920.
+
+
+"Germany began the war on the Western front before it was declared,
+and on 1-2 August, German cavalry crossed the French frontier
+between Luxembourg and Switzerland at three points in the direction
+of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort.  But these were only feints
+designed to prolong the delusion that Germany would attack
+on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay
+the reconstruction of the French defence required to meet
+the real offensive.  The reasons for German strategy were
+conclusive to the General Staff, and they were frankly explained
+by Bethmann-Hollweg to the British Ambassador.  There was no
+time to lose if France was to be defeated before an effective
+Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal attack.
+The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium;
+the Vosges protected more than half of the French frontier
+south of Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap between
+them and Switzerland, and even the wider thirty miles'
+gap between the northern slopes of the Vosges and Luxembourg
+was too narrow for the deployment of Germany's strength;
+the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications
+of Verdun, Toul, and Nancy.  Strategy pointed conclusively to
+the Belgium route, and its advantages were clinched by the fact
+that France was relying on the illusory scrap of paper."
+
+The first German cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain
+the decisive initiative, by the unauthorised use of a surprise
+of an entirely different nature.
+
+Modern writers are at great pains to establish how the world war,
+although leaving the final function of the infantry unchanged,
+rendered them and their staff subservient to mass munition production.
+Mr. H. G. Wells explains this to the Kaiser in a delightful imaginary
+interview between that august person and an hypothetical manufacturer.[1]
+Professor Pollard tells us how, when the first German surprise had failed,
+the war became "a test of endurance rather than generalship."
+We will leave a clear field for any military challenge to such
+a point of view.  Our objection is that it is not fully developed.
+The war was still a test of generalship, that of directed production.
+This war has shown, and future wars may unfortunately confirm,
+that the type and secrecy of production is as important as its volume.
+There will still be the purely military surprise and manoeuvre,
+but superimposed, co-ordinated, and sometimes predominant will appear
+the technical surprise, the result of the generalship of production.
+
+
+[1] _War and the Future_.  Cassel, 1917.
+
+
+Such a surprise is achieved by the sudden introduction on a large
+scale of some entirely new war weapon, capable of achieving
+a strategic or tactical objective in an unsuspected manner.
+
+Although the general idea of this second type of surprise existed
+before the war, particularly in naval warfare, it required
+the coincidence of the Great European War and modern scientific
+development to demonstrate its great importance on land.
+
+Thus the first German gas attack found the opposing troops
+entirely unprotected, not merely through the absence of a mask,
+but in training and technical discipline.  The case is quoted of an
+indignant gassed soldier who, in an early gas attack, when reproached
+for not protecting himself, thereupon opened his tunic and revealed
+a mask firmly tied round his chest!  It is a far cry from such a case
+to the inculcation of strict gas discipline into an army of millions.
+The attack reaped the corresponding results in casualties and morale.
+It found the opposing medical services unequipped, not only to treat
+the new type of casualty, but even to determine its nature rapidly
+and efficiently.  In short, it found the enemy utterly unprepared,
+either in theory or practice, to counter its effect.  The importance
+of this second type of surprise lies in its peculiar potentialities.
+It may affect a given military result with an extraordinarily
+small expenditure of material, energy, and eventually human life,
+when compared with the older military weapons.  Chemical warfare is
+a weapon, par excellence, to achieve this second type of surprise.
+Therein lies its chief importance.
+
+As a result, the history of chemical warfare becomes one of
+continual attempts, on both sides, to achieve surprise and to
+counter it by some accurate forecast in protective methods.
+It is a struggle for the initiative.
+
+More than this, as the use of chemical warfare becomes an organic
+part of operations, as it did during the war, these operations
+become correspondingly dependent upon conditions imposed
+by the chemical campaign.  One can imagine the case of an army
+unprotected against a new gas, aware that the enemy is ready to
+employ the latter, compelled to postpone some huge offensive until
+its protective methods were equal to countering the new chemical.
+General Fries, the American authority, states, in reference
+to mustard gas, and the Northern offensives in 1917:
+"It is no disparagement of the British, nor of any one else,
+to say that they held up the date of their attack for two weeks
+pending further investigations into the effects of this new gas."
+Ludendorff, referring to the German offensive in March, 1918,
+tells us, "Our artillery relied on gas for its effect.
+Up till the morning of the 20th strength and direction
+(of the wind) were by no means favourable, and it seemed
+almost necessary to put off the attack."  Such a point becomes
+of greater importance as the influence of other arms decreases.
+If we assume international arrangements for the limitation
+of other types of armament in the future, chemical warfare
+at once stands out as decisive.
+
+Controlling Factors;--Rapid Manufacture.--Certain well-defined
+factors hold a controlling position in the chemical initiative.
+Before any chemical discovery can be used for surprise on the front
+a second step must occur; this is large scale manufacture.
+This period is vital to surprise.  Success in chemical
+warfare is largely dependent on secrecy, which means
+achieving production in the shortest possible time, and this
+is particularly important at the commencement of hostilities.
+Throughout the war the Germans possessed this advantage and,
+in the future, unless certain steps are taken, it will be
+theirs again.  A very simple example will suffice to show
+the importance of the combination of these two factors.
+Let us assume the not remote possibility that Germany had
+refrained from using poison gas until she had reached the stage
+of development which existed at the time of her 1918 offensive.
+There is little room for doubt that the big scale use of cloud
+attacks which would then have been available, and of shell gas,
+in particular mustard gas, would have achieved decisive success.
+The Allies would have been totally unprotected, the moral effect
+would have been enormous, and, even if we ignore the latter,
+the number of casualties would have produced a gap the size
+of which was only dependent on German wishes.
+
+Rapid Identification Essential.--It is important to remember,
+however, that once a chemical campaign has commenced,
+certain factors may militate against any lengthy retention
+of the initiative by either party.  Organisations develop whose
+function is to ascertain the nature of new enemy chemical devices
+so that protective research and production can commence with
+the minimum delay.  This assumes the existence of a protective
+appliance and organisation.  The very efficient collaboration
+of the British Central Laboratory in France for the examination
+of new gas shell with the French organisation centred in Paris
+provides numerous examples of the functioning of this safeguard.
+No time was lost in identifying the nature of the various
+chemicals employed by Germany in her shell fillings.
+Speed was vital.  The use of a new type of chemical in shell,
+bomb, or other contrivance, in any sector of the front,
+on whatever scale, however small, was reported without delay.
+Then followed instantaneous collection and examination,
+after which all front line formations, other formations,
+allies, and rear organisations were expeditiously warned.
+The harmless trial flight of the few shell of a new type might
+be followed by the use of hundreds of thousands in a deadly
+attack one hundred miles away or on another allied front.
+Not only were captured offensive contrivances of value for
+this purpose, but the rapid examination of new enemy masks was
+of prime importance, for it could be assumed that the enemy would
+be protected against his own surprises in store for others.
+
+Attempts to ascertain the enemy's gas activities were not
+confined to examining captured material after their first use.
+Raids and artillery fire were both used to obtain intelligence
+regarding preparations, or to break up the gas emplacements.
+The Germans have provided us with a particularly gallant
+and interesting attempt.
+
+Near Nieuport the front penetrated a region inundated by
+the Belgians during the desperate German offensives of 1914.
+The trench system, winding through a mile or so of sand dunes,
+passed in a southeasterly direction through the marshy sector known
+as Lombartzyde.  Here the bogged front lines were intersected by
+the Yser canal, the German front trench being some 80 yards away.
+Allied gas was installed in the Lombartzyde and neighbouring
+sectors ready for discharge on the first favourable opportunity.
+For some reason or other the Germans suspected this,
+and at night a raiding party swam down the ice cold Yser, and,
+negotiating the submerged wire, landed in the Allied support line.
+Stunning the sentry with a bomb which, fortunately, refused to explode,
+they proceeded to the front line to seek gas emplacements.
+Either through unexpected disturbance, or for some other reason,
+they were compelled to leave before completing their inspection,
+and successfully swam the Yser canal back to their own trenches.
+This hazardous enterprise represents but one of many raids whose
+function it was to ascertain the presence of enemy gas.
+
+Propaganda and Morale.--Another factor intended to facilitate the
+attainment of the chemical initiative was the German use of propaganda.
+Rumours, reflected in the Press, were often current at the Front,
+at home, and in neutral countries, that some particularly fiendish
+chemical contrivance was about to be launched against the Allies
+by Germany.  Thus, in January and February of 1916, vigorous propaganda
+activity of this kind in Switzerland preceded the great German
+offensive at Verdun.  The new gas was heralded by fantastic stories.
+Certain death was threatened for all within one hundred yards of the
+shell burst.  The origin of the report was traced to various sources.
+In one case rumours concerned a conscientious worker in a German factory,
+desirous of warning the French through Swiss friends, in other cases
+German scientists were reported to be influencing Francophile
+neutrals in order that they might warn the French.  But an analysis
+of the propaganda reveals something more than its sensational nature.
+The information arrived at well-defined periods, which usually preceded
+the actual use of a new gas or chemical device by Germany.  But when
+the actual effort is compared with the prophecy we find that in no case
+was there any real clue as to the nature of the gas.  Thus, before the use
+of phosgene by the Germans at the end of 1915, definite reports reached
+the Allies regarding the projected use of at least ten new gases
+by Germany, which were described not only chemically, but as being
+colourless, odourless, powerful, blinding, and instantaneously deadly!
+No such volume of propaganda was experienced before the first German
+cloud attack at Ypres.  Indeed, one would not have expected it,
+for the mere fact of the use of cloud gas was then new to war,
+and of military value.
+
+This propaganda was not without its effect, and, but for the excellent
+Allied gas discipline, would have been an effective precursor
+to the gas itself.  Cases were not absent, at the Battle of Loos,
+for example, in which the German use of lachrymators found
+British soldiers so mentally unprepared, or rather let us say
+"prepared" by propaganda, as to spread ridiculous rumours on
+the battlefield as to the all-powerful nature of the new German
+gas shell.  These were, in fact, bursting a few yards away,
+with no more serious results than lachrymation and vomiting.
+The extended use of shell gas by the Germans in the summer
+of 1916 was again preceded by intensive propaganda during
+the early months of that year, in which the promise of prussic
+acid was prominent.  The influence of a name is very curious.
+Prussic acid probably accounted for fewer casualties than any
+other gas.  This fact became apparent with the increasing
+use of the French Vincennite, which contained prussic acid.
+Yet German propaganda redoubled its efforts as time went on to inspire
+fear in the Allied soldiers by the threat to use prussic acid.
+It is clear that armies cannot abandon gas discipline, and that
+an important factor in strengthening this discipline is a wise
+distribution of gas knowledge.  The use of mustard gas and newer
+shell gases in 1917 was again preceded by a burst of propaganda.
+In this period we find the first reference to long-range gas
+shell and aircraft gas bomb, and, curiously enough, a certain
+amount of propaganda with regard to a blinding chemical,
+which partially described mustard gas.
+
+As further confirmation of the General Staff origin of this propaganda
+we find that the 1918 outburst occurred two or three months earlier in
+the year than in 1917.  This was accounted for, no doubt, by its intended
+influence upon Allied morale in the great German offensive of early 1918.
+This last wave of propaganda includes one very interesting example.
+It is better known than other cases through its association with the
+International Red Cross at Geneva.  This body represented in February,
+1918, that Germany was about to use a really terrible gas which would
+have such disastrous effects that it was absolutely essential to make
+a last attempt to get both sides to abandon gas warfare.  The official wire
+reads as follows:--"Protest of International Red Cross against the use
+of Poison Gas.  I have received private letter from Monsieur X., President
+of International Red Cross, which I think that I ought to lay before you.
+He says that Red Cross were induced to make protest by what they had
+heard of new gas Germans are preparing although Red Cross understands
+that the Allies are aware of the gas and are taking their precautions.
+As they did not wish to draw an indictment of Germany they appealed to
+both groups of belligerents to pledge themselves not to use this weapon.
+Red Cross asks whether the Entente leaders through Inter-Allied Council at
+Versailles could not make a loud declaration which would reach the peoples
+of the Central Empires as well as their rulers, pledging themselves not to use
+such gas on condition that the two Emperors similarly bind themselves not
+to employ it.  If the latter refuse, all the guilt will rest with them."
+Although there can be no doubt that the International Red Cross and the Swiss
+involved in this move were absolutely bona fide, yet whoever was responsible
+for initiating the move on the German side played his hand very well.
+If, as actually occurred, the protest did not result in the cessation
+of gas hostilities, it still served its purpose as propaganda aimed
+at Allied morale.  Knowing his dispositions for gas defence, and our
+own offensive preparations, it is probable that the enemy was willing
+to withdraw before being overwhelmed by Allied and American production.
+After three years of costly improvised production by the Allies, Germany could
+no longer securely enjoy the fruits of the initiative provided by the plants
+and factories of the I.G.
+
+Peculiar Peace-Time Danger.--There can be no doubt therefore that the mere
+contact of two armies during war acts as a check against the decisive
+use of chemical warfare, except in the very early stages.  During peace
+this contact will be practically non-existent, and it would be possible
+for any country so to diverge in its lines of research and discovery that,
+given rapid means of production, it could repeat the German surprise of 1915,
+this time with decisive results.  Should such a nation possess a monopoly
+in the means of rapid production, the world is practically at her mercy.
+Should she be prepared to break her word, the usual means of controlling
+disarmament are impotent against these developments.
+
+War Fluctuations of Initiative.--In the light of the above remarks the
+fluctuations in the initiative during the recent war are very significant.
+The first marked feature was the development of British and Allied
+protection to counter the enemy attacks which would presumably follow
+the first German use of cloud gas.  Immediately after the German
+chemical surprise, and while the Allies were still undecided whether
+to retaliate, work proceeded feverishly on the development of some
+form of protection for the hitherto unprotected soldier.  In response
+to Lord Kitchener's dramatic appeal to the women of England and France,
+masks were sent to France in sufficient quantity within a few days.
+They were of a very primitive type, and consisted of a pad of cotton
+wool impregnated with certain chemicals, to be held in place over
+the mouth, which was superseded, in May, by a very similar contrivance,
+slightly more efficient with regard to the length of time of protection.
+Dr. Haldane and certain other prominent chemists and physiologists worked
+on the different improvised types.  With this feeble protection, or,
+in the first case, with none at all, our armies had to face the first
+German cloud gas attacks.
+
+The idea of the gas helmet which covered the whole head was brought
+to England by Captain Macpherson of the Newfoundland Corps,
+early in May.  Suitably impregnated, it made satisfactory tests.
+The helmet type of respirator made of flannel was first tested in
+the Anti-Gas laboratories on May 10th, 1915, and was a great success
+compared with previously suggested types.  Arrangements for its
+manufacture were accordingly made, and this began in June, 1915.
+This protective device consisted of a flannel helmet with a celluloid
+film eyepiece, and was called the hypo helmet.  The fabric was impregnated
+with the same solution as the cotton waste pads described above,
+the dipping being carried out largely at Oxford Works, but partly in
+the Royal Army Clothing Department, Pimlico.  Its manufacture was continued
+until September, 1915, about two and a half millions being made in all.
+From June, 1915, we never really lost the initiative in the matter
+of defence, although, at different times, the struggle was very intense.
+It was this helmet, with the modified phenate impregnation, which, known as
+the P. helmet, formed the first line of defence against the probable
+employment of phosgene by Germany.  It became known as the "Tube Helmet"
+when fitted with a mouthpiece for exhaled air, and, in this form,
+countered the formidable enemy phosgene attack in December, 1915.
+The later addition of hexamine, suggested from Russia, greatly improved
+the efficiency against phosgene and led to the P.H. helmet, which was
+issued from January, 1916.  It was not withdrawn until February,
+1918, but in the later stages was used as a second line of defence.
+The magnitude of this manoeuvring for protection can be judged from
+the facts that two and a half millions of hypo helmets, nine millions
+of P. helmets, and fourteen millions of P.H. helmets were issued
+during the campaign.
+
+There is no doubt that this early period, however, was a very costly
+experiment on the use of the different masks, the success of which
+involved the loss of numbers of men who were compelled, through reasons
+of supply or uncertain design, to use the less efficient types.
+In one case, for example, the trial of mica eyepieces rendered otherwise
+efficient masks absolutely useless by breaking, and caused losses.
+We cannot afford to repeat such experiments in future.  Failure to
+develop protective appliances fatally implies large-scale experiments
+in future wars in which unnecessary loss of life is bound to occur.
+If steady research in peace can diminish this possible loss,
+shall it be stopped?
+
+The urgency of these developments can be understood from
+a case quoted by General Hartley:[1] "A certain modification
+of the respirator was considered necessary in France,
+and officers were sent home to explain what was needed.
+Within forty-eight hours of their arrival arrangements
+were made to modify the respirators, and within a few weeks
+the fighting troops had been re-equipped with the new pattern.
+Less than three months after the change had been recommended
+three attacks were made by the Germans which would certainly
+have had very serious consequences if our troops had not been
+in possession of the improved respirator, as the older pattern
+would not have withstood the concentration of gas employed.
+This was only one of many changes that were made in the respirator
+to meet new developments."
+
+
+[1] Report before the British Association, 1919.
+
+
+How urgent was the need for these developments?  It was vital.
+Here is a case showing frightful losses sustained by partially
+or inefficiently protected troops.  Between May and July of 1915
+the Germans made at least three cloud gas attacks upon the Russians,
+immediately west of Warsaw.  In all these attacks, taken together,
+gas was discharged for a total time of not more than one hour, and they
+were all practically from the same position, on a front of about six miles.
+The affair seems relatively small, yet what was the result?
+The Russians lost not less than 5000 dead on the field, and their
+total casualties were of the order of 25,000 officers and men.
+A Siberian regiment had, before the last attack, a ration strength
+of about forty officers and 4000 men.  This was reduced by a twenty
+minutes gas discharge to four officers and four hundred men.
+No other weapon could have reproduced, under the most favourable
+conditions for its use, in as many days, what gas was able to do
+in as many minutes.
+
+Although our protection had countered the later German attacks
+with cloud gas, yet it threatened to fail to meet the situation
+created by the use of a variety of organic chemicals in shell.
+In order to counter the use of lachrymatory compounds by the enemy,
+compounds which penetrated the helmet insufficiently to cause serious
+casualties but sufficiently to hamper the individual by lachrymation,
+goggles were introduced in which the eyes were protected by rims
+of rubber sponge.  This remedied the weakness of the P.H. helmet
+and produced the P.H.G. helmet, of which more than one and a half
+millions were issued during 1916-1917.
+
+Towards the end of 1915 the standard protection was the P. and P.H. helmet,
+but the use of lachrymators compelled us to use the P.H.G. Even
+this helmet was not satisfactory against the high concentrations
+of phosgene or lachrymators, and after much research the opinion
+gained ground that further development must be on other lines.
+In addition, the need for a more general form of protection was
+emphasised by the German adoption of a mask of cartridge design.
+In other words, the fabric of the helmet, or facial portion of the mask,
+was made impermeable, and the filtration of the poisoned air occurred
+through a cartridge, or filtering box, attached to the fabric
+in the form of a snout.  The cartridge provided a much greater
+protective range and capacity.  It was clear that such German
+protection was evidence of their plans for the further use of gas.
+The new German cartridge mask appeared in the autumn of 1915.
+Doctor H. Pick, reviewing German protective measures in Schwarte's book,
+enumerates the various desiderata of the ideal mask and explains,
+"It was only our early recognition of these requirements
+which gave us an advantage over the enemy from the first in
+the sphere of defensive measures against gas, and which spared
+us from having to undertake radical alterations in the apparatus
+as the English, French, and Russians had to do more than once."
+This early adoption of a comprehensive view on protection
+by Germany is a testimony to both German thoroughness and their
+definite intention to proceed with a vigorous chemical war.
+The latter is not mere inference, for it is borne out by the dates
+at which they commenced production in their dye factories.
+Further, even if the German cartridge mask was only decided upon
+after Loos, which is not probable, our feeble reply in that battle
+would hardly have justified such a radical advance in protection.
+
+It was thus forecasted that not only would new ranges of compounds
+be employed which it would be most difficult to counter individually,
+but aggressive methods would arise, either entirely new or modifications
+of the cloud method, which would enable much higher concentrations to be
+obtained than those in evidence hitherto.  Accordingly the first type
+of the well-known British Box Respirator was designed, giving a big
+capacity of highly efficient filtering material, or granule, contained in
+a canister, with an improved face-piece and breathing arrangements.
+Without going into details, it may be said that Colonel Harrison
+and Major Lambert were associated with a number of other enthusiastic
+workers in developing the Box Respirator.
+
+Here again the question of chemical supply threatened to
+influence our retention of the initiative.  Without going into
+the development of the granule in the respirator, the supply
+of potassium permanganate was of prime importance, and the country
+was woefully deficient in the production of this substance.
+The determined efforts of British manufacturers overcame this difficulty.
+It was now possible to work on general lines for the improvement
+of this canister to increase its protective range, and to modify
+the canister specifically in accordance with intelligence as to
+what the enemy had recently done or was about to do.  In this way,
+and successively, the army was successfully protected against the higher
+concentrations employed and the newer substances introduced.
+The issue of the large Box Respirator commenced in February, 1916.
+It was replaced by the small Box Respirator which came out
+in August, 1916, and of which over sixteen millions had been
+issued before the signing of the Armistice.  At one time over a
+quarter of a million small Box Respirators were produced weekly.
+The chief modifications were the use of a smaller box or canister,
+the margin of protection being unnecessarily large in the former type.
+
+It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to provide more efficient
+protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate
+the respirator as minute particles, and the first form consisted
+in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small
+Box Respirator.  The use of Blue Cross compounds by Germany in the summer
+of 1917 rendered this matter more urgent, and a special filter jacket
+was designed which fitted round the Small Box Respirator.  A million
+were made and sent to France.  Developments proceeded on these lines.
+Altogether, more than fifty million masks and respirators of different
+kinds were manufactured by the British Anti-Gas Department for our own
+and Allied armies.
+
+We thus have some idea of the importance of protection
+in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need
+of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on.
+There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question.
+It is not only in the interest of the army, whether a League of Nations
+or a national army, but also in those of the civil population.
+
+The Tense Protective Struggle.--Few people realise how the development
+of Allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced
+upon each side in a number of critical steps.  At each of these,
+had research and production been unequal to the task, the armies would
+have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole
+trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some
+peculiar way, thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel,
+rifle, and machine-gun fire.  The army has an apt expression.
+An officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed "half naked."
+To be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness.
+A modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten
+than one without boots.  More than this, it must be clearly
+understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production
+will remain of very little use unless, supported by comprehensive
+research which, itself, gains enormously in efficiency if related
+to enemy offensive activities.
+
+The German Mask.--Consider the German mask for a moment.
+We have seen how Germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge
+form before any of the other belligerents, and in good time
+to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene,
+at the end of 1915.  Indeed, Germany probably held up the use
+of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed,
+although Schwarte's book claims that the German mask issue in 1915
+was mainly a protection against chlorine.  The filling consisted
+of some such material as powdered pumice-stone saturated with a
+solution of potash, and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal
+in order to protect against organic irritants and phosgene.
+These were the familiar one-layer drums.  Then came the British
+concentrated cloud gas offensive in the summer of 1916,
+which undoubtedly found the German mask unequal to some of the higher
+concentrations which were obtained under most favourable conditions.
+The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army stated in a document
+issued in November, 1916:  "Considerable losses were caused
+by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly.
+The casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dugouts,
+to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not being at hand,
+to faulty masks, and to the use of old pattern drums _*which could
+not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy_.
+(The italics are our own.--V.L.)
+
+Evidence is found in the introduction of the German three-layer drum
+in the autumn of 1916.  An army does not undertake the manufacture
+of millions of new appliances without very good reason.
+This new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection.
+The middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal,
+which had the property of absorbing large quantities of organic
+irritants and phosgene.  In the three-layer drum the latter
+gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes,
+although we have reason to believe that the German staff was
+always apprehensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the actual
+penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality
+of projector discharges.
+
+Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte's book what is already well known,
+that the charcoal layer has a wide, "non-specific effect, and it retains
+almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small,
+even if very strongly neutral in character (as, for example, chlorpicrin)."
+He goes on to say "the progressive development of gas warfare
+led to the use of these very materials, whilst substances with
+acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and more into disuse.
+The three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence.
+When the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in 1917,
+the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers.
+This stage of development ended in 1918, when the other layers were
+done away with altogether, and the entire three sets were filled
+with `A' charcoal."  " `A' charcoal was a particularly efficient form.
+We learn from the same source that the increased protection against
+phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view of the danger arising
+from gas projector attacks.  Further, the capacity for absorption of
+the German charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign production."
+This was certainly true for the greater part of the war.
+But Dr. Pick continues, in a sentence which is full of significance:
+"In consequence of the high quality of the drum's absorption, we were able to
+carry on to the end of the war with a drum of relatively small proportions."
+This point is so important as to demand further explanation.
+
+Enforced German Modifications.--The most important
+disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing.
+Men undertaking arduous and dangerous duties in the presence of gas
+must wear a mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if their
+breathing is seriously interfered with.  This is particularly
+so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery.
+Now the resistance depends, for a given type of filling,
+upon the area of the cross-section of the drum.  Breathing will be
+easier through a very large area than through a very small one.
+The British appliance was a frank admission that, with its filling,
+a large drum was necessary, so large that the weight of it could
+not be borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the chest,
+the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible
+rubber tube.  But the Germans adopted from the beginning
+a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge
+was attached to and supported by the mask.  In other words,
+their development was limited by the weight of their drum,
+unless they completely changed their type on British lines.
+It is quite clear that they realised this, for Doctor Pick
+tells us, referring to the large size of the British box:
+"For this reason the weight of the box is so great that it
+is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask.
+It is, therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece
+of the mask by a flexible tube."
+
+The development of British cloud gas compelled the Germans so to modify
+their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably.
+They countered this, however, by introducing an exceedingly active charcoal,
+realising that the weight of their drum had already reached the limit
+possible with that type of apparatus, and that they could not,
+therefore, get better breathing capacity by increasing its size.
+When, however, the Blue Cross compounds were introduced, it was necessary
+for both armies to take special precautions.  These precautions involved
+introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum.
+Dr. Pick tells us:  "When the material of the Blue Cross type became
+of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus had to be issued.
+A thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton
+was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid.
+This arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the
+Blue Cross type used by the enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride,
+whilst the German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, was only
+retained to a moderate degree."  This is a direct admission that,
+in order to counter the Allied use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering
+arrangements would have been necessary.  But the resistance to
+breathing of the German apparatus was already strained to the utmost.
+It is exceedingly improbable that the Germans, having already reached
+the limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable to obtain
+better breathing by increase in size, could have introduced any such
+device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit.
+In other words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have compelled
+them to adopt the British type of apparatus, that is, a bigger box supported
+by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube.
+This would have led them into an _impasse_.
+
+Shortage of Rubber.--We know how, in the beginning of 1917, they were
+compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask.
+Dr. Pick admits that this was due to lack of raw material, rubber,
+and there are many other signs that this was so.  Although leather was
+not altogether a bad substitute for this purpose, rubber would have been
+essential for the flexible tube, and the millions required to refit
+the army would have completely broken the German rubber resources.
+Many facts, including their feverish development of synthetic rubber,
+small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, go to prove
+this conclusion.  The submarine, _Deutschland_, returning to Germany
+in 1916, from its historic trip to America, carried shipments of the most
+sorely needed commodities, including large quantities of raw rubber.
+Stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent
+its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles.
+The first naval expedition to Baltic ports after the Armistice
+found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber.
+The Germans were being driven into an impossible position.
+In other words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross compounds,
+could have regained the gas initiative.  There is no doubt that they
+were within a few months of doing so.  Once again we see the importance
+of production.  Lack of raw materials for protective purposes was
+endangering the German position, but delay in offensive production
+by the Allies removed that danger.  Although their pressing need
+was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were not available.
+The chemical war involves manoeuvring for position just as definitely
+as the older forms, but in it production, formerly a routine activity,
+assumes critical strategic importance.
+
+Gas Discipline.--This constant vigilance against enemy surprise
+imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption
+of a protective appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing.
+Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and when to use it.
+A gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask
+at the right time with the least hampering of operations.
+Gas discipline thus became one of the most important features of
+general training, a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies
+of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results.
+This discipline, like all other protective work, was dependent
+in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initiative.
+One example out of many is found in the numerous German Army Orders
+which followed our introduction of the Livens projector.
+This weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations
+at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly
+possible and for a time German gas discipline was severely shaken,
+and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation.
+The introduction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear case
+of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the Allies.  A telegram
+from German General Headquarters stated:  "The English have
+achieved considerable success by firing gas mines simultaneously
+from a considerable number of projectors on to one point.
+Casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning,
+and because its concentration was so great that a single breath
+would incapacitate a man."
+
+This is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative
+was very difficult to obtain after two years of war, whereas by
+the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement.
+The general development of German protection was a partial safeguard,
+but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an
+order was issued for all German working parties to wear gas masks
+when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights not obviously
+unsuitable for Allied gas discharges.  It is difficult to exaggerate
+the military importance of such an imposition.
+
+Summary.--We have thus covered a period, the main features
+of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by Germany
+and our rapid and successful protective reaction.
+The conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar.
+The complete surprise attending it could only be repeated
+at the commencement of another war.  It failed for entirely
+different reasons from those which prevented the decisive
+use of phosgene by the Germans.  But our reaction carried
+us further, and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack,
+the Livens projector, which, in its turn, taxed the German
+protection to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it.
+History repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle.
+
+Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German phosgene attempt
+and the Livens projector, were both partially successful.
+Had either of those attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd,
+1915, their success would have been many times greater.
+It was contact on the battle front that developed a protective
+appliance and organisation, by giving us an insight
+into enemy appliances and projects.  We cannot emphasise
+too strongly the significance of this for the future.
+Apart from remote exceptions, contact will be entirely absent.
+We can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will
+be revealed, either between nations or to a central body.
+Suppose the Germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities
+of cloud gas, and, realising the dependence of their one method
+upon wind direction and caprice, had developed our method of
+producing cloud at a distance.  The combinations of the two methods
+at Ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure.
+This is a feeble example of what may occur.
+
+New German Attempts.--By this time it was not easy
+to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise
+by the use of chemicals aimed at the respiratory system.
+It appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms
+of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field.
+
+Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas warfare,
+in Schwarte's book, reveals how Germany counted on obtaining
+the gas initiative against the French at Verdun.  He explains
+how the decision to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided
+with certain modifications in the design of the German gas shell,
+which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid.
+"The manufacture of Green Cross," he also tells us, "was assured
+in the special progress in technical chemistry, and the output
+was adequate," and goes on to explain, "The first use of per
+stuff[1] found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection.
+The French had equipped their troops with protection against chlorine,
+but had provided no protection against phosgene,"--"the results
+of Green Cross ammunition were recognised by the troops.
+During the big operations before Verdun, however, the enemy
+did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask M2 for
+the respirator XTX.  Gas mask M2 was a protection against
+Green Cross.  For this reason Green Cross ammunition alone could
+not be expected to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out
+defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or some better apparatus.
+This reverse spurred on the Germans to renewed efforts."
+The writer proceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted
+in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas or Yellow Cross
+and the arsenic compounds of the Blue Cross type.
+
+
+[1] Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents.
+
+
+Yellow and Blue Cross.--The Germans had, somewhat hastily,
+laid aside their cloud activities.  But they were very keenly
+pursuing another line, the development of shell gas.  Thus, in July,
+1917, they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative
+by the use of shell gas, and were very largely successful in one case.
+We refer to the Yellow and Blue Cross shell, containing mustard
+gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively.
+
+Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte's book, relates:  "Gas was used
+to a much greater extent, over 100,000 shells to a bombardment
+after the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916
+at Verdun.  From that time the use of gas became much more varied
+as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased,
+field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles.
+The most tremendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery,
+and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the summer of 1917
+with the introduction of the three elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue,
+one after another.  This introduced the most varied possibilities
+of employing gas, which were utilised to the full in many places
+on the front during the successful defensive operations of 1917,
+above all in Flanders and at Verdun.  The hardly perceptible poisoning
+of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the surprise gas
+attack became two of the new regulation methods of using gas."
+
+Yellow Cross.--The respirator afforded complete protection
+against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system,
+but this gas evaded protection in other ways.  In the first place,
+its early unfamiliarity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies,
+and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary.
+This was speedily corrected, but its second line of attack was not easily,
+and never finally countered.  We refer to its vesicant action.
+Mustard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds
+in such slight concentrations, even through clothing, that it
+was a tremendous casualty producer, putting men out of action
+for several weeks or months, with a very low rate of mortality.
+Used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army,
+its results might well have been decisive.
+
+This was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function.
+We had too readily assumed that gas, or chemical attack,
+would be restricted to the respiratory system, or to the eyes.
+We had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead
+of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe.
+Mustard gas was a rude awakening.  It was impossible to protect
+fully against mustard gas, unless we protected the whole body,
+and it was never possible to do this during the war without
+too seriously influencing the movements of the soldier.
+
+Blue Cross.--The Blue Cross Shell was a deliberate attempt
+to pierce the respirator.  It represented to the German mind
+such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect
+on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unprotected.
+Some idea of the German estimate of its importance can be found
+in the following quotation from Captain Geyer:  "The search
+for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations
+led to the discovery of a series of effective substances.
+In view of the obvious importance of highly irritant compounds
+capable of existing in a very finely divided, pulverised,
+or particulate form, research was made in the domain of little
+volatile substances with boiling points up to 400'0. This led
+to the astonishing discovery that _diphenylarsenious chloride_
+when scattered would penetrate all gas masks then in use,
+even the German, practically unweakened, and would have serious
+irritant effects on the wearers.  This discovery could only be
+explained by the supposition that the irritant works in the form
+of particles which it is difficult to keep back by means
+of a respirator, even a completely protecting respirator,
+such as the German and English gas masks were at that time.
+Further analysis showed that the mixture of air and gas examined
+revealed a concentration of gas greatly in excess of the point
+of saturation for the vapour given off by this stuff.  Finally, ultra
+microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles.
+A new type of fighting material had been discovered."
+
+He also tells us how, following this discovery, production rose
+to 600 tons monthly, and used up all the arsenic obtainable
+in Germany.  The Allies were fully alive to the importance
+of this matter, and we have already explained that, had they
+been in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross compounds,
+they might have forced German protection into an impossible position.
+No better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed
+by Germany owing to her flexible and efficient producing organisation.
+Captain Geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these
+projectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly production
+reached a figure of over one million shell.  We have already emphasised
+the question of design in chemical warfare, and its importance is
+borne out by the comparative failure of these German projectiles.
+Geyer explains how only minute particles less than 1/10,000
+of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask,
+and he develops the difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining
+such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance.
+He explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at
+a suitable shell, and their unsuccessful struggle to overcome
+the necessity of a glass container, which, he says, demanded "a
+considerable advance in the technical work of shell production."
+
+This attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of Blue Cross
+illustrates another method of attack.  Geyer says, "Blue and Green Cross
+ammunition were used simultaneously in the field--called coloured cross
+(Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of Blue Cross, to force the enemy
+to remove gas masks, whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous
+effects of Green Cross.  Matters seldom reached that point, however,
+for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of `coloured cross'
+ammunition, they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it
+from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire.
+The English in particular had tried to protect the troops against the
+effects of diphenylarsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide
+(which followed it and was even more effective) by the use of filters
+made of woollen material and wadding.  They were to a great extent
+technically successful, but the most effective defensive apparatus,
+the `jacket' to the box, was unsatisfactory from the military point
+of view, as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing
+to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned."
+
+The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation.
+The relative inefficiency of the German shell rendered this unnecessary.
+In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our troops were specially protected
+in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds.  An examination of our
+protective device by the Germans obviously led them to believe that resistance
+to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable.
+But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British troops
+became effective.  There is no doubt that the new mask was worn just
+as constantly and satisfactorily as the old.  Captain Geyer's remarks are
+also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred:
+they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising
+the minds of those responsible for German protection.
+
+"Particulate" Clouds.--The principle of particulate clouds was not
+entirely new, both sides having used smoke combined with lethal
+gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator.
+It was thought that the particulate form of the smoke
+would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up
+vapours and gases.  The reasoning was perfectly sound.
+It was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way.
+There were good grounds to believe that such substances would
+penetrate the respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel
+the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms produced, to allow
+some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier.
+Fortunately for us, these objectives were not attained, but this
+was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the German
+preparations than to any inherent impossibility.
+
+After this period, although chemical warfare became increasingly
+an organic part of German (and Allied) operations, yet there is no
+serious field evidence of a deliberate attempt at the gas initiative.
+It must be remembered, however, that gas figured very largely indeed
+in the March, 1918, attempt, by Germany, to regain the general initiative.
+It is stated authoritatively, for example, that in July, 1918,
+the German Divisional Ammunition Dump contained normally 50 per cent.
+of gas shell and, in the preparation, in May, 1918, for German attacks
+on the Aisne, artillery programmes included as much as 80 per cent.
+gas shell for certain objectives.
+
+Potential Production and Peace.--Enough has been said to show
+the general nature of the chemical warfare struggle.
+The question of the chemical initiative is vital at the commencement
+of hostilities.  Unless, then, we completely rule out any possibility
+whatever of a future war, it is vital for that occasion.
+We have indicated sufficiently clearly the factors upon
+which such initiative depends, to show the critical importance
+of manufacturing capacity, and protective preparedness.
+
+A further quotation from Schwarte's book is very much to the point.
+It tells us:
+
+
+"Whilst on our side only a few gases were introduced, but with successful
+results, the use of gas by the enemy presents quite another picture.
+We know of no less than twenty-five gases used by the enemy, and of fifteen
+types of gas projectile used by the French alone, and we know, from `blind'
+(dud) shells which have been found, what they contain.  The only
+effective gases amongst them were phosgene and dichlorodiethyl sulphide.
+The other substances are harmless preparations, used most probably
+for purposes of camouflage, a method highly esteemed by the enemy,
+but which did not enter into the question with us, owing to the capacity
+of our chemical industry for the production of effective materials."
+
+
+This is true to a considerable extent.  Our dependence on improvised
+and relatively inefficient production imposed conditions upon
+Allied policy, whereas, in Germany, they had but to command
+a flexible and highly efficient producing machine.
+
+The world movement towards disarmament will hardly countenance
+the maintenance of permanent chemical arsenals.  In the face of war
+experience and further research developments the laborious war improvisation
+of these arsenals will not save us as it did in the last struggle.
+Any nation devoid of the means of production invites enemy chemical
+aggression and is helpless against it.  This, and the need to keep
+abreast of chemical warfare development--particularly in protection--
+are the chief lessons of the struggle for the chemical initiative.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+REVIEW OF PRODUCTION
+
+
+Critical Importance of Production.--Our analysis of the struggle
+for the initiative reveals the critical importance of production.
+In the chemical more than in any other form of warfare,
+production has a tactical and strategic importance and functions
+as an organic part of the offensive scheme.  A tendency in modern
+war is to displace the incidence of initiative towards the rear.
+Staffs cannot leave the discoveries of the technical
+workshop or scientific laboratory out of their calculations,
+for their sudden introduction into a campaign may have
+more influence on its result than the massing of a million
+men with their arms and equipment for a surprise assault.
+The use of a new war device may shake the opposing formations
+more than the most cunningly devised attack of this sort.
+
+When, after the first brilliant assault on the Somme on July 1st, we began to
+lose men, material, and the initiative, in an endless series of local attacks,
+we were even then regaining it by the home development of the tank.
+Even before the colossal German effort was frustrated by the first Marne
+battle and the development of trench warfare, the German laboratories
+were within an ace of regaining the initiative by their work on cloud gas.
+After the lull in their gas attacks, when the Germans sought to gain
+the initiative and a decision by the use of phosgene, the quiet work
+of our defensive organisations at home had completely countered
+the move weeks before.
+
+But in all these cases the counter idea could not become effective
+without large-scale production.  This was absolutely fundamental.
+Had we taken six years to produce the first type of tank, had the Germans
+failed to manufacture mustard gas within a period of years instead of
+succeeding in weeks, and had the box respirator taken longer to produce,
+all the brilliant thinking and research underlying these developments
+would have had practically no influence on the campaign, for they would
+have had no incidence upon it.  We could go on multiplying examples.
+But what is the conclusion?
+
+From this rapid development of methods a new principle emerges.
+The initiative no longer remains the sole property of the staffs,
+unless we enlarge the staff conception.  Vital moves can be
+engineered from a point very remote in organisation and distance
+from the G.H.Q. of armies in the field.  But there is a critical
+step between the invention and its effect on military initiative.
+This is production, which for these newer methods becomes an organic
+part of the campaign.
+
+But the future is our chief preoccupation.  What would be
+the supreme characteristics of the early stages of a future war?
+It would be distinguished by attempts of belligerents to win immediate
+and decisive success by large scale use of various types of surprise.
+Three factors would be pre-eminent, the nature of the idea or invention,
+the magnitude on which it is employed, and its actual time of incidence,
+that is, the delay between the actual declaration of war and its use.
+Now the invention is of no use whatever without the last two factors,
+which are entirely dependent on production.  When, in 1917,
+the Allied staffs pressed repeatedly for gases with which to
+reply to German Yellow Cross, their urgent representations met
+with no satisfactory response until nearly a year had elapsed.
+This was not due to lack of invention, for we had simply to copy
+the German discovery.  Failure to meet the crying demands of the Front
+was due to delay in production.
+
+Any eventual chemical surprise will, under genuine conditions
+of disarmament, depend on peace industry, for no such conditions
+will tolerate the existence of huge military arensals.
+We have already indicated the type of peace-time industry
+_par excellence_, which can rapidly and silently mobilise for war.
+It is the organic chemical industry.  Therefore, whatever the war may
+have taught us as to the value of chemical industry, its importance
+from the point of view of a future war is magnified many times.
+The surprise factor is responsible.  The next war will only
+commence once, however long it may drag on, and it is to the start
+that all efforts of a nation planning war will be directed.
+It is, therefore, of importance to examine in detail the development
+of chemical production during the recent war.
+
+A close examination is of more than historical significance, and should
+provide answers to certain vital questions.  German chemical industry was the
+critical factor in this new method of war which almost led to our downfall.
+How did the activities of this industry compare with our own production?
+To this an answer is attempted below, but graver questions follow.
+Was our inferior position due to more than a combination of normal
+economic conditions, and were we the victims of a considered policy?
+If so, who directed it, and when did it first give evidence of activity?
+An answer to these questions will be attempted in a later chapter.
+
+Significance of the German Dye Industry.--At the end of 1914 the nation began
+to realise what it meant to be at the mercy of the German dye monopoly.
+Apart from the immediate economic war disadvantages, the variety and sinister
+peace ramifications of this monopoly had not been clearly revealed.
+Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, stated with regard
+to the dye industry:  "The inquiries of the Government have led them
+to the conclusion that the excessive dependence of this country on a single
+foreign country for materials of such vital importance to the industry
+in which millions of our workpeople were employed, constitutes a permanent
+danger which can only be remedied by a combined national effort on a scale
+which requires and justifies an exceptional measure of State encouragement."
+Measures were defined later.
+
+In the debate in the House of Commons in February, 1915, on the
+aniline dye industry, a member prominent in the discussion,
+referring to "taking sides on the question of Free Trade," stated that,
+"It was a great pity that this should occur when the attention of
+the House is occupied with regard to MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR,"
+and proceeded to draw a comparison between the national
+importance of the manufacture of dyes and that of lead pencils.
+Fortunately he prefaced his remarks by explaining his ignorance
+of the "technical matters involved in this aniline dye industry."
+These are two out of many references to the pressure due to
+the absence of German dyes, which illustrate the purely economic
+grounds on which the issue was being discussed, on the one hand,
+and reveal the prevailing ignorance of its importance on the other.
+
+Exactly one month later came the first German gas shock.
+Such statements as the above tempt us to ask who, at this time,
+realised the common source of the direct military
+and indirect economic attack.  It can hardly be doubted
+that the existence of the German dye factories was largely
+responsible for the first German use of gas on the front.
+We have already seen how, from the first month of the war,
+the chemical weapon was the subject of definite research.
+Falkenhayn leaves us in no doubt as to the chief factor
+which finally determined its use.  Referring to difficulties
+of production, he says, "Only those who held responsible posts
+in the German G.H.Q. in the winter of 1914-15 . . . can form any
+estimate of the difficulty which had to be overcome at that time.
+The adjustment of science and engineering . . . took place
+almost noiselessly, so that they were accomplished before
+the enemy quite knew what was happening.  Particular stress
+was laid upon the promotion of the production of munitions . . .
+as well as the development of gas as a means of warfare."
+Referring to protective methods of trench warfare, he continues,
+"Where one party had gained time . . . the ordinary methods of attack
+often failed completely.  A weapon had, therefore, to be found
+which was superior to them but which would not excessively tax
+the limited capacity of German war industry in its production.
+Such a weapon existed in gas."
+
+The Germans had themselves shown us where this production occurred,
+and Ludendorff supplements our information by telling us how he discussed
+the supply of war material with Herr Duisburg and Herr Krupp von Bohlen
+in Halbach, "whom I had asked to join the train" in the autumn of 1916.
+The former was the Chairman of the I.G., the great dye combine.
+
+Those producing a new weapon of war must always consider the
+possibilities possessed by their opponents to exploit the same weapon
+after the first shock.  For the Germans the answer was obvious.
+The Allies would be held at a material disadvantage for months,
+if not years.  Without the means of production available in Germany,
+we are not at all, convinced that the gas experiment would have been made,
+and had it not been made, and its formidable success revealed,
+Germany's hesitation to use this new weapon would probably have
+carried the day.  This, at least, is the most generous point of view.
+In other words, the German poison gas experiment owed a large part
+of its initial momentum to ease of production by a monopoly.
+The combination of this factor with the willingness to use gas led
+to the great experiment.  The future may again provide this combination,
+unless the monopoly is removed.
+
+Following up this line of thought, we can see how tempting was the German
+course of action.  Falkenhayn has told us what a violent strain was imposed
+upon Germany by the stabilisation of the Western Front early in 1915.
+The tension between the Great General Headquarters and the Home Government
+was already in evidence, and would have caused difficulty in attaining
+suitable home and liaison organisations, in particular with regard
+to supply.  We can well understand this when we remember the drastic
+changes which occurred in our own ministries and departments.
+But what organisation was required for chemical warfare supply?
+Very little!  Quoting from the report of the Hartley Mission to the chemical
+factories in the occupied zone, we know that when the Government wished
+to produce a new gas "a conference with the various firms was held
+at Berlin to determine how manufacture should be subdivided in order
+to use the existing plant to the best advantage."  The firms referred
+to were the constituent members of the highly organised I.G. There
+was no need to create a clumsy and complicated organisation with an
+efficient one existing in the I.G. ready to meet the Government demands.
+The path could not have been smoother.  Ludendorff states in his memoirs
+that the Hindenburg programme made a special feature of gas production.
+Increased supply of explosives was also provided for.  He says:
+"We aimed at approximately doubling the previous production."  And again:
+"Gas production, too, had to keep pace with the increased output
+of ammunition.  The discharge of gas from cylinders was used less and less.
+The use of gas shells increased correspondingly."  This programme represented
+a determined effort to speed up munitions production in the autumn of 1916.
+It included not only gas but explosives, both of which could be supplied
+by the I.G. Explosives demanded oleum, nitric acid, and nitrating plants,
+which already existed, standardised, in the factories of the dye combine.
+The unusual speed with which standard dye-producing plant was converted
+for the production of explosives is instanced in the operation
+of a T.N.T. plant at Leverkusen, producing 250 tons per month.
+The conversion only took six weeks.  The factories of the I.G. supplied
+a considerable proportion of the high explosives used by Germany.
+
+In the field of chemical warfare the relationship between war and peace
+production was even more intimate.  Chemical warfare products are
+closely allied and in some cases almost identical with the finished
+organic chemicals and intermediates produced by the dye industry.
+Therefore, in most cases, even when the suggestion of the new chemical
+may come from a research organisation entirely apart from the dye
+research laboratories, the products fall automatically into the class
+handled by the dye industry.
+
+Is there any doubt that the I.G. was a terribly effective arsenal for the mass
+production of the older war chemicals, explosives, and the newer types,
+poison gases?  Is there even a shadow of exaggeration in our claims?
+There may be those who would see a speedy resumption of friendship with
+Germany at all costs, regardless of the honourable settling of her debts,
+regardless of her disarmament and due reparation for wrongs committed.
+Can even such concoct material to whitewash the military front of the I.G.? If
+they would, they must explain away these facts.
+
+The plants of the I.G. produced more than two thousand tons
+of explosives per week, at their average pre-war rate.
+This is an enormous quantity.  How can we best visualise it?
+In view of the chapters on Disarmament which follow,
+we will use the following comparison.  The Treaty of Versailles
+allows Germany to hold a stock of about half a million shell
+of different stated calibres.  How much explosive will these
+shell require?  They could be filled by less than two days'
+explosives production of the I.G. at its average war rate.
+Between two and three million shell could be filled by
+the result of a week's production in this organisation.
+Further, the average rate of poison gas production within
+the I.G. was at least three thousand tons per month,
+sufficient to fill more than two million shell of Treaty calibres.
+Unless drastic action has been taken, the bulk of this
+capacity will remain, and Germany will be able to produce
+enough poison gas in a week to fill the Treaty stock of shell;
+this in a country where the manufacture and use of such substances
+are specially prohibited.
+
+It is appropriate at this stage to describe as briefly as possible
+the origin and composition of this great German combination,
+the Interessen Gemeinschaft, known as the I.G. There is no need
+to go into the gradual self-neglect, and the eventual rooting
+out by Germany, of the dye-producing industry in other countries,
+notably England, France, and America.
+
+The Interessen Gemeinschaft.--By the end of the nineteenth century
+the manufacture of dyes on a large scale was concentrated almost
+exclusively in six great firms.  These were the Badische Anilin
+und Soda Fabrik, Ludwigshafen on the Rhine, known as the Badische;
+the Farbenfabriken vorm.  Friedr.  Bayer, & Co., in Leverkusen,
+known as Bayer; Aktien-Gesellschaft fur Anilin-Fabrikation
+in Berlin; Farbwerke vorm.  Meister Lucius & Bruning in Hochst am Main,
+referred to as Hochst; Leopold Cassella G.m.b.H. in Frankfort;
+and Kalle & Co., Aktien-Gesellschaft in Biebrich.
+
+Each of these six great companies had attained enormous
+proportions long before the war.  Only two other concerns
+had carried on manufacture on a comparable scale.  These were
+the Chemische Fabrik Greisheim-Elektron of Frankfort A.M.,
+a company which has absorbed a number of smaller manufacturers,
+and the Chemische Fabriken vormals Weiler-ter Meer, Uerdingen.
+
+The position of all these establishments, with one single exception,
+along the Rhine and its tributaries is well known.
+Their growth has been illustrated in their own prospectuses.
+Hochst was organised in 1863 and started with five workmen.
+In 1912 it employed 7680 workmen, 374 foremen, 307 academically
+trained chemists, and 74 highly qualified engineers.
+The works of the Badische, which was organised in 1865, covered,
+in 1914, 500 acres, with a water front of a mile and half on
+the Rhine.  There were 100 acres of buildings, 11,000 workmen,
+and the company was capitalised at fifty-four million marks.
+The establishment of Bayer was on a scale entirely comparable.
+Quoting from an official American report,[1] "Griesheim Elektron,
+prior to the war, had enormous works chiefly devoted to the
+manufacture of electrolytic chemicals and became an important
+factor in the dyestuff business only within recent years, when by
+absorption of the Oehler Works and the Chemikalien Werke Griesheim,
+its colour production reached a scale approaching that of the
+larger houses."  This move on the part of the Griesheim Elektron
+is interesting as an example of the general tendency which has
+characterised the development of the German dye industry.
+This firm, producing inorganic materials and intermediates,
+absorbed the Oehler Works in order to find an independent outlet
+for its intermediate products, thus becoming directly interested
+in dyestuffs production.  This move towards independence in
+the whole range of products involved is referred to elsewhere,
+owing to the manner in which it simplified German production
+for chemical warfare.
+
+Combination, however, did not cease in the creation
+of these enormous establishments.  The cartel fever raged
+here as in other German industries.  By 1904 two immense
+combinations had been formed in the dyestuff industry.
+One of these comprised Bayer, Badische, and Berlin;
+the other Hochst, Cassella, and Kalle.  "By pooling profits,
+by so arranging capitalisation that each company held stock in
+the other companies of its own cartel, and by other familiar means,
+the risks incident to the enormous expansion of the business
+and the immense increases of export trade were minimised.
+The centripetal tendency, however, did not stop here.
+In 1916, the two pre-existing cartels were combined with
+Griesheim Elektron, Weilerter Meer, and various smaller
+companies in one gigantic cartel, representing a nationalisation
+of the entire German dye and pharmaceutical industry."
+The combination was extremely close.  Profits of the companies
+were pooled, and after being ascertained each year on common
+principles were divided according to agreed percentages.
+Each factory maintained an independent administration, but they
+kept each other informed as to processes and experiences.
+"There was also an agreement that in order to circumvent tariff
+obstacles in other countries materials were to he produced
+outside of Germany by common action and at common expense
+whenever and wherever desirable.
+
+
+[1] Alien Property Custodian's Report, 1919.
+
+
+"At the time of the formation of this enormous organisation
+the capitalisation of each of the principal component
+companies was largely increased.  Hochst, Badische, and Bayer
+each increased their capitalisation by 36,000,000 marks,
+bringing the capital of each up to 90,000,000 marks."
+"Berlin increased its capital from 19,800,000 to 33,000,000 marks.
+Other increases brought the total nominal capital of the group
+to over 383,000,000 marks.  For many years a large part of
+the enormous profits of these concerns has been put back into
+the works with the result indicated by the stock quotations.
+The real capitalisation is thus much greater than this nominal figure.
+In fact, it is estimated that the actual investment in the works
+comprising the cartel is not less than $400,000,000. It cannot
+be doubted that this enormous engine of commercial warfare has
+been created expressly for the expected war after the war,
+and that it is intended to undertake still more efficiently
+and on a larger scale the various methods by which German
+attacks upon all competition were carried on."
+
+Two additional features must be indicated.  A policy to
+which we have referred was most actively followed, aiming at
+complete independence and self-sufficiency in all matters
+relevant to production, especially regarding raw materials.
+We mention later how the war has strengthened the strong prewar
+position of the I.G. in heavy chemicals needed as raw materials
+for the intermediates and finished dyes.
+
+Recent information reveals a further widening of their basis of operation,
+including a strong hold on the electro-chemical industry and on the new
+synthetic processes from carbide, for acetic acid and the other products
+normally obtained by wood distillation.  Again, the policy of the I.G.
+appears to have moved towards more complete unity since the war.
+Exchanges of directing personnel and of capital amongst the branches have
+been recorded for which the term "cartel" is no longer a fair description.
+In addition, considerable increases in capital have occurred which not only
+reveal the vision and activity of the I.G. but which indicate its close
+contact with the German Government.  With such an organisation in existence
+and with the complete liaison which had developed between the directors
+and the German Government for other purposes than chemical warfare,
+and in agreement with the paternal policy adopted by the latter towards
+this chemical industry, production became simplicity itself.
+
+War Production by the I.G.--Let us, therefore, examine in some detail
+the actual production of war gases and chemicals by the I.G. In order
+to obtain an idea regarding case of production, we will later make
+a comparison with the magnitude and rapidity of that of the Allies.
+
+From the point of view of this statement, there are two main classes
+of production, that in which the majority of the steps involved
+were actual processes employed for the manufacture of some dye,
+pharmaceutical or other chemical product, and, in the second place,
+that in which no such coincidence occurred, but in which the general
+technique developed, and the varieties of existing plant covered
+the needs of the case.  Without stretching the point, every war
+chemical employed came easily under one of these two categories.
+In order to assist the less technical reader, we will consider
+the production of the chief war chemicals in the order in which they
+appeared against us on the front.
+
+_Chlorine_.--This important raw material, used in a variety
+of operations, notably for the production of indigo and sulphur black,
+two highly important dyes, was produced along the Rhine
+before the war to the extent of nearly forty tons a day.
+The only serious expansion required for war was an increase of already
+existing plant at the large factory of Ludwigshaven.  The following
+table of production illustrates the point:
+
+CHLORINE (METRIC TONS PER DAY)
+                    1914 1918
+     Leverkusen          20   20
+     Hochst           4    8
+     Ludwigshafen   13   35
+                    ---- ----
+          Total     37   63
+
+Chlorine was important, nor only as a raw material for most of the known
+chemical warfare products, but also, in the liquid form, for cloud attack.
+Owing to the development of protection, the use of liquid chlorine
+for the latter purpose became obsolete.
+
+_Phosgene_.--This was produced in considerable quantity
+before the war at Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen, leading to many
+exceedingly important dyes, amongst the most commonly used at
+present being the brilliant acid fast cotton scarlets so largely
+used in England.  More expansion of plant was necessitated.
+At Leverkusen the existing plant can produce at least thirty tons
+a month, and we learn "the plant remains intact ready for use."
+At Ludwigshafen the capacity was considerably higher, amounting to
+600 tons per month.  As production was commenced before the war,
+there were no difficulties in developing the process,
+expansion alone being necessary.
+
+_Xylyl Bromide_.--This was one of the early lachrymators, and was produced
+at Leverkusen in a plant with a maximum monthly output of sixty tons.
+Production began, according to a statement on the works, in March, 1915.
+Its case can be judged from the fact that this compound was used almost
+as soon as the first chlorine cloud attack at Ypres.
+
+The Germans undoubtedly attached considerable importance to their
+brominated lachrymators.  In this connection their persistent
+efforts to retain the bromine monopoly with their Stassfurt product
+and to crush the American industry before the war are significant.
+The success of these efforts certainly placed us in a difficult
+situation during the war, both with regard to production of
+drugs and lachrymators.
+
+German bromine was associated with potash in the Stassfurt mineral deposits,
+whereas the American product was produced from numerous salt springs
+and rock salt mines.  Although Germany had not succeeded in crushing
+the American industry, yet the outbreak of war found her in a
+predominant position, for her two chief opponents, France and England,
+were cut off from their supplies, which were German; and American production
+was of little use, owing to the great excess of demand over supply,
+and the manipulation of output by German agents in America.  A possible
+source of bromine existed in the French Tunisian salt lagoons,
+whose pre-war exploitation had been considered by an Austrian combination.
+The French wisely developed a Tunisian bromine industry sufficient for their
+own needs, and, on different occasions, supplied us with small quantities.
+But the development of such an enterprise in time of war was
+a severe handicap.
+
+_Diphosgene or Trichlormethyl Chloroformate_.--This substance was toxic,
+a lachrymator, and slightly persistent.  It attained a maximum
+monthly Output Of 300 tons at Leverkusen, and about 250 tons
+at Hochst.  This was not a simple compound to make, and had no direct
+relationship with the stable product of the peace-time industry.
+At the same time, it provides an example of the way in which general technique
+developed by the industry was rapidly used to master the new process.
+In particular their method of lining reaction vessels was of value here.
+The reaction occurs in two stages by the production of methyl formate
+and its subsequent chlorination.  The methyl-formate plant was part
+of an existing installation, but the chlorination and distillation
+plant were specially installed.
+
+_Chlorpicrin_.--This was mixed with diphosgene and used
+in the familiar Green Cross shell.  The production was very
+readily mastered and attained the rate of 200 tons per month.
+Picric acid, chlorine, and lime were required, all three
+being normal raw materials or products of the industry.
+At Hochst no new plant was installed, the manufacture being
+carried out in the synthetic indigo plant.
+
+_Phenylcarbylamine Chloride_.--This was used in German chemical shell,
+and was not particularly effective against us, although produced in large
+quantities by the Germans, in vessels used in peace time for a very
+common intermediate, monochlorbenzene.  The ease of production of this
+substance may account for its use in large quantities by the Germans,
+in order to increase their gas shell programme.
+
+_Mustard Gas or Dichlordiethyl Sulphide_.--This was prepared
+in four stages:
+
+
+(1) Preparation of Ethylene--by heating alcohol with an aluminium
+oxide catalyst at 400'0 C.
+
+(2) Preparation of Ethylene-chlor-hydrin, by passing ethylene
+and carbon dioxide into a 10 per cent.  solution of bleaching
+powder at a temperature below zero centigrade, and subsequent
+concentration of the product to a 20 per cent.  solution.
+
+(3) Conversion of the chlor-hydrin into thiodiglycol by treatment
+with sodium sulphide.
+
+(4) Conversion of the thiodiglycol into mustard gas
+(dichlordiethyl-sulphide), using gaseous hydrochloric acid.
+
+
+The thiodiglycol was produced at Ludwigshafen and provides one
+of the best examples of the adaptation of the German dye works
+for the purpose of producing war chemical.  Technically, ethylene is
+a fairly difficult gas to produce in large quantities, but, for the
+Ludwigshafen works, these difficulties were a thing of the past.
+There were twelve big units before the war, and, by the time
+of the Armistice, these had been increased to seventy-two
+in connection with mustard gas manufacture.  In a similar way,
+the number of the units for chlorhydrin, the next step, was increased
+from three to eighteen.  These two processes had all been worked
+out very thoroughly in connection with the production of indigo.
+These new plants were identical with the peace-time units.
+The expansion was a mere question of repetition requiring no
+new designs or experiments and risking no failure or delay.
+Success was assured.  The last step, the production of thiodiglycol,
+occurred in the causticising house, to which no substantial
+alterations or additions appear to have been made for the purpose.
+As sodium sulphide is used in large quantities as a raw material
+in the dye industry, and was already produced within the I.G.,
+no difficulty was presented in connection with its supply.
+
+The thiodiglycol was forwarded to two other factories, one of which
+was Leverkusen, where 300 tons of mustard gas were produced monthly.
+The reaction between thiodiglycol and hydrochloric acid was one which
+required very considerable care.  At one stage of the war the Allies viewed
+with much misgiving the possibility of having to adopt this method.
+But the technique of the German dye industry solved this as satisfactorily
+and as steadily as other chemical warfare problems, bringing its technical
+experience to bear on the different difficulties involved.
+
+_Diphenychlorarsine_.--This was the earliest and main constituent
+of the familiar Blue Cross shell.  It was prepared in four stages:
+
+
+(1) The preparation of phenyl arsinic acid.
+
+(2) The conversion of the above to phenyl arsenious oxide.
+
+(3) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl arsinic acid.
+
+(4) The conversion of the latter into diphenyl-chlor-arsine.
+
+
+
+This is another example of a highly complicated product
+which might have presented great difficulties of production,
+but the problem of whose manufacture was solved, almost automatically,
+by the German organisation.
+
+The first step, that of the manufacture of phenyl arsinic acid,
+was carried out at Ludwigshafen in one of the existing azo dye
+sheds without any alteration of plant, just as a new azo dye
+might have been produced in the same shed.  It is believed
+that another dye factory also produced this substance.
+At Ludwigshafen the conversion to diphenyl arsinic acid occurred.
+This was again carried out in the azo colour shed, with no
+more modification than that involved in passing, from one azo
+dye to another.
+
+This chemical mobilisation of a huge dye unit was, and could still be,
+practically invisible in operation.  Not only was the process practically
+the same as azo dye production, but, as the compounds were not particularly
+poisonous in the intermediate stages, there was no risk to the workers,
+and no need to violate secrecy by indicating special precautions.
+
+The final stage, the preparation of diphenylchlorarsine,
+the actual Blue Cross shell constituent, occurred at Hochst,
+which also carried out the first three stages, already outlined
+as occurring at Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen.  The last stage
+was a simple one and was carried out in plant and buildings
+previously used for peace purposes.
+
+The other substances employed provide further examples of this ease
+of production.  Ethyl-dichlor-arsine was produced in homogeneously
+lead-lined vessels, identical with those used for diphosgene.
+Dichlor-methyl-ether presented difficulties which were solved
+by applying the German method of using tiled vessels.
+
+The part played by the I.G. in the German chemical warfare organisation
+has already been outlined, and we have seen how the German Government was
+content simply to place its demands before the directors of the dye combine.
+The latter were left to choose the process and exploit it by making the best
+use of their organisation, which was done after reviewing the plant at their
+disposal in the different branches.  An interesting feature of the production
+of war chemicals by the I.G. is thus revealed by examining the actual locality
+of the separate operations leading to any one of the individual poison gases.
+The attached table shows us how the production of any particular war chemical
+involved a number of stages, each of which occurred in a different factory.
+The directors of the I.G. simply chose a particular plant in a particular
+factory which was most suited for the operation concerned.  They
+
+{The table (spread over pages 162-163) are "raw OCR" feed!  NEEDS FIXED!!!}
+
+                                        FIRST STAGE
+                    RAW
+WAR CHEMICAL MATERIALS FROM THE I.G. PROCESS FACTORY
+
+Phenyl Carbylamine 1.  Aniline Condensation of aniline Kalle Chloride 2.
+Chlorine with carbon bisul 3.  Caustic phide to phenyldithio soda carbamic
+acid Mustard Gas 1.  Carbon Preparation of Ethyl-Ludwigs dioxide lene
+from Alcohol hafen 2.  Bleaching
+
+powder 3.  Sodium
+
+sulphide 4.  Hydro chloric
+
+acid Diphenylchlorarsine I. Aniline Conversion of Diazo- Ludwigs 2.
+Sodium benzene to Phenylar- hafen
+
+nitrite sinic acid Kalle 3.  Sodium Hochst
+
+bisulphite 4.  Sodium
+
+hydrate 5.  Sulphur
+
+dioxide 6.  Hydro chloric acid Ethyl -dichl or a rsine 1.
+Ethyl Production of Ethylar-Ludwigs chloride sinic acid from
+Ethyl hafen 2.  Caustic chloride
+
+soda 3.  Sulphur
+
+dioxide 4.  Hydro chloric
+
+acid gas 5.  Iodine Sym-dichlor-methyl- I. Chlorsul- Production
+of Formal- Mainz
+
+ether phonic dehyde from Methyl116chst
+
+acid alcohol
+
+Z. Sulphuric
+
+acid 162
+
+Review of Production
+
+SECOND STAGE THIRD STAGE FOURTH STAGE
+
+PROCESS FACTORI PROCESS FACTORi PROCESS FACTORY
+
+Conversion of Kalle Chlorination of Hochst
+
+Phenyidithio- Phenyl Mus carbamic acid tard Oil giving
+
+to Phenyl Mus- Phenyl Carby tard Oil by lamine Chlo zinc chloride ride
+Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lud- Conversion of Lever Ethylene
+into wigs- Chlorhydrin wigs- Thiodiglycol kusen
+
+Ethylene hafen to Thio-di- hafen to Mustard
+
+Chlorhydrin glycol Gas
+
+Reduction of Lever- Conversion to Lever- Reduction of A.G.F.A. Phenyl arjinic
+kusen Diphenylar- kusen Diphenylar- Hochst acid to Phenyl and sinic acid
+by and sinic acid to arsenious oxide Hochst treatment Hijchst Diphenyl:
+
+with Diazo chlor-arsine
+
+benzene by Sulphur
+
+dioxide in
+
+HCl solution
+
+Reduction of Lud- Conversion of W)chst
+
+Ethyl arsinic wigs- Ethyl arseni acid to Ethyl hafen ous Oxide to
+
+arsenious oxide Ethyl dichlor by sulphur arsine by
+
+dioxide HCl and iodine Conversion of H8chst
+
+paraformalde hyde to sym
+
+dichlor methyl
+
+ether by means
+
+of chlorsul phonic acid {END OF TABLE NEEDING FIXED!} aimed at
+the minimum conversion, and in a number of cases none was required.
+The above analysis can leave us with no doubt in our minds that
+the organic chemical industry is the logical place for efficient
+chemical warfare production.  It cannot leave us unconvinced as to
+the vital importance of the dye industry in national defence.
+
+Allied Difficulties.--Our own production was nothing but a
+series of slow and relatively inefficient improvisations.
+We have already referred to the fluctuations in chemical
+warfare organisation for research and supply during the war.
+These added to the difficulties of the supply department,
+just as they did to its complement, the research department.
+Only great patriotic endeavour could have made possible
+the relative success achieved, not only by the departments,
+but in particular by the firms with whom they were called
+upon to co-ordinate.
+
+We wanted mustard gas, and realised its need in July, 1917.
+Research work began almost from that date, yet successful large scale
+production did not materialise in England until more than a year later.
+We must admit, however, that the French were in a position to use
+their product on the front in July, 1918.  Let us examine some
+of our difficulties.
+
+The first efforts were directed towards the process by which,
+as we eventually ascertained, the Germans produced the whole
+of their mustard gas.  The actual chemical laboratory details
+of the process presented no serious obstacle, but difficulties
+multiplied as soon as we attempted large scale work.
+We wanted ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Some work had been done on this
+during the war for the National Health Insurance Commissioners
+in connection with the production of novocain.  Half scale
+work had occurred at the works of a Midland chemical firm,
+and experience so gained was freely offered and used
+in a scheme for the large scale production of mustard gas
+by the co-operation of a number of big chemical manufacturers.
+Pressing requests for the material were continually coming from
+G.H.Q., the programmes outlined being more and more ambitious.
+We had to reproduce the result of years of German effort spent
+in developing their monochlor-hydrin process for indigo.
+As a consequence, large sums of money were expended on the process,
+although it never eventually operated.  Its difficulties,
+and other reasons, led us to research on other and more
+direct methods which the French were also investigating.
+The successful outcome of this early research was due, in particular,
+to Sir William Pope and those associated with him in the work.
+The process was so promising that the long and cumbersome chlor-hydrin
+method was abandoned.  As a result our five or six months'
+work on the German method meant so much time lost.
+The new direct, sulphur monochloride method was taken up
+actively and several private firms attempted to develop
+the small scale manufacture.  The work was dangerous.
+Lack of that highly developed organic chemical technique,
+which was practically a German monopoly, rendered the task much
+more dangerous than it would have been if undertaken by one
+of the I.G. factories.
+
+The French, realising the importance of the new methods,
+spared nothing in their attempts to develop them.
+Their casualties multiplied at the works, but the only reply was
+to put the factories concerned under the same regime as the front,
+and the staffs were strengthened by well-chosen military personnel.
+The French realised the nature of their task, and organised
+for it.  When the difficulties of production were pointed
+out in August, 1917, in the British Ministry of Munitions,
+reports were instanced that the Germans had used forced labour.
+The French in their production at Rousillon, on the Rhone,
+employed volunteer German prisoners.  It was a curious
+contrast to see mingling together amongst the producing plants
+representatives of the American, Italian, and British Missions,
+with French officers, French technical men, and German prisoners.
+The latter appeared to be perfectly satisfied in their work.
+They were used for certain limited purposes, such as handling
+raw materials, and were not, as a rule, exposed to the dangerous
+operations against which the French struggled so heroically
+and successfully.  It was as though a small section of the front
+had been transferred to the heart of France.  We saw the minister
+visiting a factory and pinning the Legion of Honour on to
+the breast of a worker blinded by yperite.  We saw messages
+of congratulation from the front to the factories themselves.
+The morale was wonderful.  As a result, the French mastered
+the technical difficulties of mustard gas production and shell
+filling by June, 1918.  They shared information with us, but the race
+had started neck and neck, and it was impossible to discard
+completely the large plants to which we were already committed.
+Without disparaging our own efforts, we must pay a tribute to the
+achievement of the French yperite producing and filling factories.
+It is impossible to give personal credit in this matter without
+going beyond our scope, and we can only draw general comparisons.
+But we must draw attention to the following.  The German factories
+passed with ease to mustard gas production by a process which,
+compared with the final Allied method, was clumsy and complicated,
+but which suited their pre-war plant.  Their policy was,
+therefore, sound from the point of view of the campaign.
+The Allies experienced great difficulty and danger in attaining
+large scale manufacture with a simpler process.
+
+The same self-sacrificing zeal and patriotic endeavour was
+shown in this country, but we were handicapped in mustard gas
+production by the energetic way in which we had pressed forward
+the industrial realisation of the monochlor-hydrin method.
+The French, less committed in terms of plant and finance, could more
+readily adjust their energy, materials, and money to the new method.
+It must not be forgotten, also, that, at this period,
+chemical warfare supply organisation was experiencing certain
+critical changes which could not but reflect upon our efficiency.
+Here again the earlier centralisation of research and production
+by France was a great factor in her favour.
+
+Our difficulties with phosgene, and in particular with the arsenic compounds
+described above, were of the same nature, involving us in casualties,
+great expenditure, and little success, when compared with German production.
+The great need for these arsenic compounds was realised as early as February,
+1918, and investigations began even at that date, but they had not appeared
+in the field by the time of the Armistice.  Whatever mistakes we may have made
+locally during the war, they are small compared with the big mistake which
+was responsible for our comparative failure in chemical warfare production.
+We were almost completely lacking in organic chemical industrial experience.
+
+It is interesting to note that the activities of those elements
+of organic chemical industry which did exist in France and England
+fully justified the conclusions we have drawn.  Thus, although
+entering late into the field of chemical warfare production,
+Doctor Herbert Levinstein, Professor A. G. Green, and their
+collaborators of the firm of Levinstein Limited were able to develop
+rapidly a successful industrial mustard gas process which was
+of considerable assistance to England and America.  This work,
+both in research and production, deserves the greatest credit.
+Again, the dye factories were called upon much earlier to assist
+in French production and were of considerable assistance.
+
+It would be well at this juncture to review very briefly the other
+war activities of our own dye industries.  The outbreak of war found
+them by no means inactive.  In this country, for example, our own dye
+factories were able to keep pace with the increasing demand for dyes
+created by the rapid mobilisation of military and naval equipment.
+In particular the rapid large-scale production of indigo by the
+Levinstein firm, at Ellesmere Port, was a considerable achievement.
+In addition, the new State-aided enterprise at Huddersfield was largely
+diverted to explosives production, and rendered very valuable services
+in the supply of Tetryl, T.N.T., synthetic phenol, picric acid, and oleum.
+For such reasons, the need for essential dyes, and the use of dye capacity
+for explosives, the important part which the rapidly expanding industry
+could have played in chemical warfare production was not recognised
+quickly enough by the relevant authorities.  This is not surprising,
+for the war significance of the German dye industry was not fully
+realised until the Armistice.  It required the Hartley Mission
+to drive this fact home.  When, however, the brilliant researches,
+referred to above, on the mustard gas method had decided our policy,
+the dye factory of Levinstein Limited vigorously converted the process
+into a technical success, and what was still a laboratory reaction
+in the spring of 1917 became a successful manufacturing process in July
+of that year.
+
+Released from its war responsibilities at the time of the Armistice,
+the British industry developed so rapidly that Lord Moulton, in a speech
+to the Colour Users Association on November 28th, 1919, stated:
+"A few months before the war broke out England produced only one-tenth
+of the dyes she needed, but the amount which I am informed we shall
+be able to turn out at the end of this year would, in weight,
+be within one-fifth of the amount which England used before the war."
+
+But the Allies were not only in difficulties with regard to the lack
+of suitable peace-time plant, and industrial organic chemical experience--
+they were hindered at almost every turn by difficulties with regard to raw
+materials and intermediates, the products of other chemical manufacture.
+They had to create a liquid chlorine industry.  In April, 1915, the only
+liquid chlorine plant in England was in the hands of the firm of
+Castner Kellner, whose maximum output was not more than a few tons per day.
+Increase in capacity was rendered necessary by chemical warfare developments.
+Chlorine was a raw material for mustard gas and--practically every important
+substance employed in chemical warfare including bleaching powder.
+Tremendous tonnages of bleach were involved in the manufacture of
+chlorpicrin and for use as an antidote against mustard gas on the front.
+We refer elsewhere to the developing use of bleach in order to create
+lanes for troops and transport through areas infected by mustard gas.
+A very simple calculation will show what quantities would be required
+for such an operation.  It is true that, as regards chlorine, we were
+more favourably situated than France, and forwarded her considerable
+supplies in exchange for phosgene.  This chlorine was essential for
+phosgene production.  New plants were brought into being at different places,
+largely through the energy and experience of the above-mentioned firm,
+but so great was the demand that it finally became necessary, in order
+to protect the trade users and war interests at the same time, to institute
+a control of chlorine.  More than 20,000 tons of liquid chlorine were
+produced under the administration of the supply department concerned.
+When we consider the effort which such an increase in production must
+have involved, and the fact that expansions occurring did not do so under
+the steady and well-regulated influence of a simple demand, but were
+continually being modified to meet expansions or diminutions of programme,
+we can realise what a great advantage was possessed by the Germans owing
+to their large initial experience and production.
+
+We have no hesitation in stating that great credit is due to the old
+Trench Warfare Supply Department and the firms with which it was in contact,
+notably the one referred to above, in connection with the Loos attack.
+But for them, we would not have been in a position to retaliate,
+even at that date.
+
+The Allied lachrymator campaign was terribly handicapped by lack of bromine.
+The French performed the phenomenal task of creating a bromine
+industry in Tunis, the development of which reads like a romance.
+Apparently this industry is dying out, and German predominance in bromine
+is again asserted.
+
+French mustard gas production, for which they made such huge sacrifices,
+was threatened by the lack of carbon-tetra-chloride, and examples
+can be multiplied.  The Germans were in a very different position.
+The development of their dye industry had followed the policy
+of absolute independence of external chemical industry.
+This independence was acquired either by the absorption of other
+enterprises or by the definite development of processes and plant
+for raw materials and intermediates.  In every case the war has
+strengthened these factories for the manufacture of these products.
+In 1918 they produced nearly thirty times as much ammonia
+as in 1914, three times as much nitric acid, fifty per cent.
+as much again of sulphuric acid, and twice as much
+liquid chlorine.  This was not purely a commercial question.
+Our lack of such products was due to the fact that the Allies,
+in pre-war times, possessed few or feeble industries whose
+consumption would stimulate the production of these raw materials.
+They lacked these industries because of a blameworthy disregard
+for the fundamental importance of science, and particularly
+chemical science, in industry.
+
+Conclusion.--We have shown how, during the war, chemical warfare proved its
+surprise value and how manufacture figured repeatedly as a critical factor.
+We have also shown how the importance of production is magnified from
+the point of view of the future.  The only logical conclusion is that
+the country which does not possess a strong dye industry, or enormously
+comprehensive and expensive chemical arsenals, cannot hope to escape
+serious military results, possibly defeat, from enemy chemical surprises.
+The situation is aggravated by the fact that this critical producing capacity
+exists as a monopoly in the hands of Germany.  No patriotic and thinking
+person can, therefore, conclude otherwise than to encourage the creation
+of dye industries in countries other than Germany, particularly in our own.
+It is true, however, that patriotic sentiment and political views do
+not always lead to the same solution.  But we must insist that there
+can be no two opinions on the national defence aspect of this question,
+and any political forces opposing the logical outcome of patriotic sentiment
+in this case are incurring an exceedingly grave responsibility.
+
+Further, there is a definite tendency to obscure the whole issue
+by inaccurate thinking.  When we find a Member of Parliament seriously
+discussing disarmament, endeavouring to deal with the matter
+in detail, and yet classing gas as one of those methods of warfare
+in connection with which production can he easily prevented,[1]
+we can only stand in amazement before our traditional fault,
+deliberate sidetracking of expert guidance.  When we realise that it
+was not until after the Armistice that the Hartley Commission
+opened our eyes to the war importance of the German dye industry,
+we see how blind a nation may be in matters vital to its defence.
+
+
+[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_, Major David Davies, M.P.
+
+
+From the point of view of results on the front, for which all were working,
+the German dye factories, when considered as a war weapon, were as much
+in advance of Allied improvised plants as a military quick-firing gun
+is ahead of the old muzzle-loader.
+
+Further, for progressive and flexible organic chemical production,
+some such difference will always exist between the modern dye
+industry and factories or arsenals improvised or maintained
+to meet specific emergencies.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS
+
+
+Special Attention Justified;--Special Value of American Opinion.--Various
+reasons prompt us to pay special attention to the development of
+chemical warfare by the United States of America.  In the preceding
+chapters we have attempted a more or less connected account of its
+development during the campaign.  Such an account must necessarily
+make constant reference to French and British developments.
+But American preparations, although on a colossal scale,
+were not in time to influence the campaign seriously and directly.
+Therefore, purely for the symmetry of our account, special reference
+should be made to America.  But a more serious reason is to be found
+in the great importance attached by America to this branch of warfare.
+As everybody knows, the arrival of the American troops in large numbers
+was preceded by an educational period, during which American staffs,
+officers, and men became acquainted with Allied staffs, operations,
+and methods on the Western Front.  They were less biased by military
+tradition, and not under the same necessity as the European Allies
+to organise in an improvised way for different violent emergencies.
+Their opinions of war methods on the Western Front are, therefore,
+of great interest.
+
+Chemical warfare at once assumed a place of prime importance in
+their schemes, receiving a stimulus and a momentum which, rather than
+losing force during peace, appears to have gathered intensity.
+There was at first no particular background of emotion,
+or desire for specific retaliation in this American development.
+It was purely a question of deciding on technical grounds
+the relative importance of different methods of warfare.
+Solid facts determined the matter later.  We have it on the best
+authority that 75,000 out of the total 275,000 American casualties
+were due to gas.
+
+Early American Activities.--The earliest American activities,
+consisted in attaching various officers to the British formations
+in France and to the French research and producing organisations
+centred in Paris.  A period ensued of remarkably rapid and efficient
+assimilation of the best developments in allied chemical warfare.
+Two American gas companies were attached to ours for instruction
+in the first month of 1918, and they assisted in several gas attacks
+on the British front.
+
+Field Activities.--In a sense the development of chemical warfare
+organisations by the Americans was deprived of its promised success.
+The Allies regained the general and final offensive before American
+plans matured.  But if the latter were prevented from participating
+in various types of cloud and stationary attack along the front,
+yet the coincidence of their organisation with the development of more
+open warfare gave them an opportunity, which they readily seized,
+to demonstrate the possibilities of mobile chemical attack.
+Two gas companies, known as the 30th Engineers, were assembled,
+partially trained, and embarked for France at the end of 1917.
+They entered upon a course of training with the British Special Brigade R.E.
+while further units were being organised in America.  The projector
+at-tracted the Americans, and they were ready, as General Fries
+informs us, to launch a big projector gas attack, when Marshal Foch's
+counter attack disorganised the front concerned.  They then turned
+their attention to the use of the four-inch Stokes mortar in an attempt
+to neutralise the German machine-gun nests, using phosphorus for smoke
+and thermit shell, and continued to assist the infantry either by taking
+part in the preparations for attack or in subsequent operations.
+
+Special Difficulties.--The great length of the American
+lines of communication led them to develop certain research
+and experimental organisations near to the front.
+These had to deal with the "short range" problems, those of
+immediate importance, without referring them back
+to America.  The 3000 miles of ocean represented a necessary loss
+of contact which prevented the home workers, however willing,
+from fully realising the needs of the problems concerned.
+Accordingly a strong experimental station, Hanlon Field,
+was developed near Chaumont, and a well-equipped laboratory
+was established at Puteaux, near Paris.
+
+Edgewood Arsenal.--The organisations developed in America were
+of very great interest.  The American officers in the field,
+through their contact with the British and French, realised early
+that we were extended to the utmost in the matter of production,
+that our demands and programmes were far ahead of our output,
+and that they could not reasonably expect serious help from us,
+either with regard to the results or the material means of production.
+They, therefore, made surveys of our methods and wisely determined
+to concentrate on production in America.  As a result, they developed
+the phenomenal chemical warfare arsenal of Edgewood.  Had the war
+lasted longer, there can be no doubt that this centre of production
+would have represented one of the most important contributions
+by America to the world war.  Probably had production been conceived
+on a smaller scale, however, its results would have materialised
+sooner and produced greater actual influence.
+
+A few facts with regard to Edgewood suffice to confirm its potentialities.
+We learn[1] that the arsenal organisation comprised a huge chlorine plant,
+probably the largest in the world, various chemical plants for the manufacture
+of the chief chemical warfare substances adopted by the European belligerents,
+and shell-filling plant capable of filling a total of more than 200,000 shell
+and bomb daily.
+
+
+[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919.
+
+
+Research.--Supporting this production, and in connection with
+the other branches of chemical warfare, a tremendous research
+organisation developed which, with the exception of the combined
+research facilities of the I.G.[2] was probably the largest
+research organisation ever assembled for one specific object.
+It grew until it contained 1200 technical men and 700
+service assistants, and we are told that its work covered
+exhaustive research on more than 4000 different materials.
+Nor were the Americans less ambitious on protection.
+Wisely adopting the British Box Respirator during the
+early stages, they made vigorous attempts at the same time,
+with considerable success, to develop a form of their own.
+
+
+[2] The great German organic chemical combine.
+
+
+Production.--An American opinion on the importance of Edgewood Arsenal
+at the time of the Armistice is worth quoting.[3] "Here is a
+mammoth plant, constructed in record time, efficiently manned,
+capable of an enormous output of toxic material, and just reaching
+its full possibilities of death-dealing at the moment when news
+is hourly expected of the signing of the Armistice.  What a pity
+we did not possess this great engine of war from the day American
+troops first sailed for France, for, had we been so prepared,
+how many of our boys who `have gone West' could have returned
+for the welcome home!  Shall we forget this lesson of preparedness?
+Is this great plant to be scrapped?  Possibly wise heads may find
+a solution of the problem which will add this great resource
+to American chemical industry, at the same time preserving its
+value to the nation as a greater asset, in case of future war,
+than a standing army."
+
+
+[3] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, January, 1919.
+
+
+Although mainly dependent on Edgewood Arsenal for their war schemes,
+it is perfectly clear that the Americans realised that theirs
+was not the ideal way, in fact was a very wasteful and inefficient
+way to produce poison gases or chemical warfare substances.
+Indeed, even during the war, in spite of their huge arsenal they
+established contact with various American chemical producers.
+At the present time, except in connection with its use for emergencies
+during the next few years, this huge source of production
+at Edgewood must be regarded as an unnecessary burden upon
+the State.  To be of any use, it requires costly maintenance.
+It is only capable of producing a limited number of organic substances.
+Some of these are likely to become obsolete as time goes on.
+This reliance upon a huge fixed arsenal is not only out of accord with any
+international scheme for disarmament, but it is altogether too ponderous,
+and not sufficiently flexible for reliance in future emergencies.
+This is fully realised in America.  General Fries, addressing the
+American Chemical Society, said:  "The magnificent plant at Edgewood
+may soon be a thing of the past.  We do not believe the Government
+should attempt to manufacture poisonous gases on a huge scale."
+He explains how, by reliance upon normal chemical industry,
+"We believe we can build up more quickly and to a greater extent
+than by any other method the necessary large output of poisonous
+gases required in a war with a first-class Power."  Referring to
+the mobilisation of industry for this purpose, he says:
+"We believe that if this is done satisfactorily it will be one
+of the greatest possible guarantees of future peace."
+
+Post-Armistice Developments.--But perhaps the most interesting
+and significant aspect of American chemical warfare development
+concerns what has occurred since the Armistice.  Valuable and
+successful attempts have been made to educate not only
+the public but also political leaders to its real meaning.
+No one examining the American daily and scientific press,
+or reading the records of the various Government Committees
+on the proposed bills of chemical, or chemical warfare,
+interest can doubt that the Americans are probably as a whole much
+more alive to the importance of this matter than any other ally.
+Discussions on the Longworth Bill and on the new chemical warfare
+service have provided full ventilation for the facts of the case,
+in their proper setting.
+
+It was a striking contrast to land in America early in 1920
+and find New York plastered with recruiting posters setting
+forth the various reasons why Americans should join their
+Chemical Warfare Service.  It was not only a sign of American
+methods but also one of their appreciation of the importance
+of the matter.  This is amply borne out by their final
+step in reconstruction during the last few months.
+A separate Chemical Warfare Service has been reorgan-ised in
+America in such a way as to give it a position of independence
+equivalent to that of the older branches of the service.
+The specific possibilities in the development of this form of
+warfare are acknowledged by the action of the American Congress,
+and this result is very largely due to the creation of
+an intelligently informed political and public opinion.
+Large grants of money have been placed at the disposal of
+the new Chemical Warfare Service, and its research facilities
+promise to equal the war establishments of the older services
+of other Allied countries.
+
+Views of General Fries.--In view of the creation of this independent
+Chemical Warfare Service in America and of its importance
+when measured in terms of financial and material facilities,
+it is of interest to summarise some of the views already
+expressed by General Fries,[1] the head of the new service.
+With regard to the general function of chemical warfare, he tells us:
+"In the first place, chemical warfare is a complete science in itself.
+No other invention since that of gunpowder has made so profound
+a change in warfare as gas is making, or will make, in the future.
+
+
+[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, 1920.
+
+
+"To-day there are only four really distinct arms of the Service,
+viz.: the Infantry, the Artillery, Aviation, and Chemical Warfare.  All other
+forms of warfare are a combination, more or less complete, of these.
+The gases, smoke, and incendiary materials that make up chemical warfare
+are used to a greater or lesser extent by other arms, but wherever gas
+is used it compels precautionary measures that are found in no other branch
+of the Service.
+
+"Considering its power, it has no equal.  Physical vigour is one of
+the greatest assets in any army.  Gas, used properly and in quantities
+that will be easily obtainable in future wars, will make the wearing
+of the mask a continuous affair for all troops within two to five
+miles of the front line, and in certain places for many miles beyond.
+If it never killed a man, the reduction in physical vigour, and, therefore,
+in efficiency of an army forced at all times to wear masks, would amount
+to at least 25 per cent., equivalent to disabling a quarter of a million
+men out of an army of a million."
+
+The Gas Cloud Inescapable.--He goes on to explain some of the more
+specific military needs which can be met by chemical means,
+and refers independently to a point which the Germans have
+mentioned repeatedly in their memoirs.  "One great reason why
+chemical warfare will continue is that it fills a long-felt
+want on the part of the soldier, that of shooting successfully
+around a stump or rock.  The gas cloud is inescapable.
+It sweeps over and into everything in its path.  No trench
+is too deep for it, no dug-out, unless hermetically sealed,
+is safe from it.  Night and darkness only heighten its effect.
+It is the only weapon that is as effective in a fog or in the inky
+blackness of a moonless night as in the most brilliant sunshine.
+Only the mask and the training that go with it protect.
+Terror, confusion, lack of discipline and control are fatal."
+
+Importance of Smoke.--General Fries is insistent on the future importance
+of smoke in warfare:
+
+"Chemical warfare includes gas, smoke, and incendiary materials,
+and they can't well be subdivided.  As before stated,
+all the early gas attacks were in the form of clouds.
+The value of that cloud, not only for carrying gas but for
+screening purposes, began to be realised in the fall of 1917.
+Clouds of smoke may or may not be poisonous, and they will or will
+not be poisonous, at the will of the one producing the smoke.
+For that reason every cloud of smoke in the future must be
+looked upon as possibly containing some deadly form of gas.
+When you consider this for a moment, you can realise
+the tremendous possibilities for ingenuity that gas and smoke
+afford the attacker.
+
+"The American, trained for 300 years in meeting nature on her great
+plains and in her vast forests, was early appealed to by this side
+of chemical warfare.  As early as November 3, 1917, the United States
+was urged, in a cablegram from the Chemical Warfare Service in France,
+to push the development of a large phosphorous supply for use in smokes.
+Not only were the early intuitions of the value of gas borne out by
+later events, but to-day the future of smoke appears greater still.
+The battle-field of the future will be covered with smoke--
+not the all-pervading black smoke of the battles of the Civil War
+and of earlier wars before smokeless powder came into use,
+but a field covered with dots and patches of smoke, big and little,
+here and there and everywhere.
+
+"Every man who has hunted ducks and been caught in a dense fog
+with ducks quacking all round, and who has tried to get ducks
+by firing at the quack in the fog, can realise the difficulty
+of hitting a man on the battlefield when you cannot see him,
+and have only a quack, or less, by which to locate him.
+The smoke will be generated in candles of two or three-pound
+cans that can be thrown out in front of trenches; by knapsacks
+that can be carried and which will give off dense white smoke
+in large volume for many minutes; by grenades which, while they
+may be thrown by hand, will generally be fired from rifles;
+by artillery shells reaching ten, fifteen, twenty miles back
+of the main battle line; and finally, from aeroplane bombs whose
+radius of action is limited only by the size of the earth.
+And thus smoke becomes one of the great elements of war in the future.
+It is more or less wholly protective in its nature, but as it
+costs more and takes longer to train a man in the various problems
+involved in modern war than ever before in this history of the world,
+it is worth while taking every precaution to protect him,
+once you have him trained."
+
+Casualty Percentages.--He also brings out very dearly the unique
+possibility possessed by gas warfare of increasing its military efficiency,
+while decreasing its relative atrocity:
+
+"The death rate in the first gas attack was probably
+in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent.  of all casualties--
+and everybody in front of the wave was a casualty.
+With the development of masks and training in the use of the mask
+and in taking advantage of the ground, the death rate fell.
+At the same time the total number of casualties fell, but not
+at all in the same ratio as the decrease in the death rate.
+From a probable death rate of 35 per cent.  in the first attack
+it fell to 24 per cent., then to 18 per cent., and, as gas
+attacks by artillery became general, to 6 per cent., and finally,
+with the extended use of mustard gas, the rate fell to 2.5
+per cent.  or less."
+
+Again referring to casualties, he gives us the startling fact that 75,000
+out of the 275,000 American casualties were caused by gas, "And yet,"
+he says "the Germans used it in a halting, comparatively feeble manner."
+
+Short Range Projectors.--Very much alive to the future of the
+short-range projectors developed in connection with gas warfare,
+he tells us, "The Gas Regiment in the St. Mihiel battle fired
+on the Cote des Esparges one hundred of these high explosive
+bombs at the zero hour on the morning of the attack.  That hill,
+famous for its strength through four years of struggle between the
+French and Germans, dis-appeared completely as an enemy standpoint.
+Nothing remained but torn and broken barbed wire, bits of concrete
+pill-boxes, and trenches filled with debris, and a few scattered
+fragments of clothing.
+
+"The gas troops will, in the future, handle all short-range
+methods of firing gas, smoke, or high explosive.
+They will deliver the greatest quantities of material possible
+up to ranges of a mile and a half or a mile and three-quarters.
+So effective and so efficient are these short-range methods
+of projection that the No-Man's-Land of the future will
+be the width covered by these projectors and mortars.
+They can't, and never will, compete with the artillery,
+where range and great accuracy are the most important factors.
+The efficiency of artillery gas shell or artillery smoke or high
+explosive shell is only one-fifth that of the projector.
+Hence, for economy and efficiency, the artillery will be used
+to fire gas, smoke, high explosive, and incendiary materials
+only at ranges beyond those reached by the gas troops."
+
+Again, showing how the American authorities were seized with the importance
+of the matter, we read:
+
+Vast Expansion in Personnel.--"So greatly were these possibilities
+appreciated in the summer of 1918 that the number of gas troops
+authorised for use against the Germans was increased from six companies
+to fifty-four. Back of all this, however, was the productive capacity
+of the United States, which ensured that those troops would be able
+to fight day and night, summer, winter, and fall, until the war was over.
+No wonder the German quit--it was time, and he knew it."
+
+And in conclusion General Fries tells us:
+
+"The universal adoption of gas warfare on sea and land and in the air,
+combined with its persistent quality, will make that nation able
+to produce and use gas in the largest quantity superior in war
+to any other nation on the globe.  The United States can reach
+that position and maintain it, and I believe that we are going to get
+such encouragement from the War Department that we can do it.
+I feel sure that the army appreciates the value of chemical warfare,
+and that it appreciates also the value of the chemists to chemical warfare.
+
+"So long as there is any danger of other nations continuing these methods
+of warfare, research and experiment in chemical warfare must be pursued.
+Research must not only be directed towards the gases and apparatus,
+likely to be employed in the future, but also towards protection
+against all possible gases.  Training in the use of gas will be confined
+to appropriate branches, but training in defensive measures will include
+the whole army.
+
+"We must continue our studies of what is known as chemical warfare.
+No nation has renounced the use of poison gases as the result of the
+Peace Conference.  There are nations whose word we could not respect
+if they did renounce it.  It is essential to study the offensive
+side of chemical warfare if we are to be prepared for defence.
+The great importance of adequate defensive appliances arises
+from the fact that preparations for the offensive use of gas can
+be made in peace-time with great secrecy, and may have far-reaching
+and even fatal results in the early stages of a war.
+
+" . . . For these reasons it is necessary to make adequate provision
+for research, experiment, and design in connection with war material.
+It is equally necessary to avoid overlap, duplication of effort,
+and the setting up of military institutions for scientific research
+which can better be done by existing civil institutions."
+
+He also quotes from a statement from General Debeney, Director of
+the French College of Warfare:
+
+"Should war begin now, aviation, and especially gas, would play one
+of the most important parts.  The progress of aviation would make
+the rear of each front, and very far in rear, extremely dangerous,
+and the progress of chemistry would permit the use of gas on zones
+of such an extent as cannot be imagined.
+
+"Making gas is naturally rapidly done, because all the manufacturers
+of chemical product--still so numerous in Germany--can be requisitioned,
+but to make airplanes is much slower.
+
+"The defence against gas seems to be more difficult than against airplanes.
+I believe that against airplanes, the anti-aircraft artillery is susceptible
+of making rapid progress, and perhaps in that very instance gas will be one
+of the best ways, if with appropriate shells _*the air can be poisoned all
+around the attacking airplanes_.
+
+"It would be much more effective to create, for example, a sphere
+of poisoned air a mile round the airplane, instead of trying to hit
+the machine directly with bits of the shell."
+
+British, French, and even German opinion, while not
+underestimating the importance of the matter, may not agree
+in an unqualified way with all the above statements.
+But we claim that they show vision in a branch of war which,
+on account of its scientific basis, may, more than any other,
+speedily prove the visionary a true prophet.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+GERMAN CHEMICAL POLICY
+
+
+The preceding account of chemical warfare leaves the impression of a
+successful Allied struggle against persistently unfavourable circumstances.
+We were constantly compelled to accelerate to attain the pace set by
+the enemy.  There were exceptions, undoubtedly, but in the main Germany
+kept ahead in the chemical struggle.
+
+So far, in examining the root of our troubles, we have been content
+to refer to the existence of the I.G., to describe its chemical
+warfare activities, and to indicate, briefly, its unique power to
+produce large quantities of organic chemical products at short notice.
+The close connection between the German dye industry and chemical
+warfare is now well recognised in official circles, and, to some extent,
+by the general public.  Its belated exposure was almost entirely
+due to the facts revealed by the Inter-Allied Mission to the German
+chemical factories some months after the Armistice.
+
+But the situation thus revealed was not created in a day, nor by chance.
+Indeed, one of the military features of industrial chemical development
+in the I.G. has already been traced to pre-war activities.
+I refer to the Haber process for the production of synthetic ammonia.
+It would be short-sighted policy to accept the set of conditions against
+which we struggled, and to explain them in terms of the I.G., without
+looking more closely into the pre-war activities of this organisation.
+Such an examination may reveal the basic forces which determined
+our inferior position in chemical warfare at the outbreak of war.
+It is true that we can explain away our inferiority by referring
+to the German breach of faith, which automatically created conditions
+for which we were unprepared.  This is a comfortable solution.
+But had chemical warfare been a strongly developed and accepted method of war
+before the outbreak of hostilities, would we then have been prepared?
+The records of the past, before April, 1915, must be consulted to answer
+this question.  We may find that our position is due to more than a mere
+negative attitude, to more than our simple neglect of the organic
+chemical industry.  It maybe that there were forces which definitely
+exploited this national characteristic to our disadvantage.
+The pre-war policy and activities of the I.G. must be examined from
+this point of view.  In no country has such an investigation been
+more complete than in America, and official statements have been issued
+by the American Alien Property Custodian[1] which throw a flood of light
+on the pre-war activities of the constituent branches of the I.G. They
+conclusively reveal the existence of a carefully directed German chemical
+policy making for world domination in the organic chemical industry,
+which greatly hampered the military effectiveness of other countries,
+and directly strengthened the military resources of Germany.  On broad lines,
+the pre-war and war activities of the I.G. produced the same result
+as an attempt to strangle the economic life of possible opponents,
+enfeebling their resistance to the subsequent delivery of a hammer blow
+designed to take maximum advantage of the situation thus created.
+Twenty years or more under the regime of a forceful economic policy,
+not without its sinister aspects, prepared the ground by weakening us
+in the concentrated chemical warfare which, ensued.  The success of this
+policy manoeuvred us into such a position that we barely escaped defeat
+under the hammer blows of German chemical aggression.  This, in fact,
+appears to have been the German conception of modern war in its relation
+to industry, and American reports have shown that it was carried through
+with typical thoroughness by familiar German methods.
+
+
+[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, Washington.
+Government Printing Office, 1919.
+
+
+Origin of German Chemical Monopolies.--The completeness of our organic
+chemical deficiencies, and the thorough way in which we had failed
+to develop organic chemical industries, creates such a sharp impression,
+when thrown into relief by the outbreak of war, that we are led to
+inquire into the methods by which these monopolies were established.
+Let us admit, without any further delay, that Germany owed the origin
+and assertion of these monopolies in part to her scientific development,
+fostered by a vigorous policy of applying scientific research
+to industrial enterprise.  So far as her success depended upon
+such factors, it merits our unqualified admiration and envy.
+But stimulating these developments was a very definite general
+and commercial policy which requires close examination.
+
+German Chemical Commercial Policy;--Evidence of the
+U.S.A. Alien Property Custodian.--Giving every credit to German
+initiative and thoroughness in the application of science to industry,
+we are still prompted to inquire how this monopoly came to be so complete.
+We can rely on more than mere rumour, when examining the commercial methods
+of the great I.G. The American Alien Property Custodian, Mr. Mitchell Palmer,
+and, later, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, had occasion and opportunity to make
+minute examination of the German dye agencies in America in connection
+with general investigations on the reorganisation of alien property.
+Their revelations truly merit the term, showing remarkably clearly
+the unity of conception, determination of purpose, and co-operation
+with the German Government which characterised the policy of the I.G.
+
+Pre-war American Situation.--Let us briefly consider the relevant
+aspects of the pre-war American situation.  According to fairly
+well-known facts, confirmed by the reports of the two American officials
+mentioned above, the American pre-war organic chemical industry
+consisted of little more than a series of small assembling plants.
+Although enormous supplies of coal-tar products were available,
+yet the dye intermediates derived from them were not made in America,
+but imported from Germany.  After various attempts to establish
+the dye industry, it seemed, at one time, about 1880,
+to have definitely taken root, but, within the space of five years,
+there were only four dye producing establishments remaining.
+
+German Price-cutting;--Salicylic Acid.--In every instance the manufacture
+was almost immediately brought to an end by German price-cutting.
+The same source reveals the direct and indirect methods used by
+Germany to prevent, at all costs, the development of an independent
+organic chemical industry.  There are many pointed examples of
+the direct method, and we will glance at the case of salicylic acid.
+This is a very important chemical, used not only for certain important
+drugs but also as in intermediate for dyes and photographic chemicals.
+In 1903 the United States possessed five manufacturers of this product.
+In ten years' time three of these had failed, and one of the survivors
+was a mere branch of a German house.  During this fatal ten years,
+the product was being sold in that country at a price twenty-five per cent.
+lower than in Germany.  The manipulation of the prices of the other products
+of the German monopoly enabled them, by such methods, to maintain it.
+Many other examples, including such important products as bromine,
+oxalic acid, and aniline, could be quoted to show the results of the German
+price-cutting policy.  The direct significance of bromine for chemical
+warfare must be borne in mind.
+
+Full Line Forcing.--Besides directly attacking the production
+of raw materials and intermediates, the Germans used an indirect
+method which has been described as "full line forcing."
+They were the sole producers of certain specialities, such as
+alizarine colours, anthracene colours, and synthetic indigo.
+These were indispensable to the textile manufacturers,
+and by refusing to supply them, except to houses which
+would buy their other supplies from German manufacturers,
+the latter could squeeze out home producers of simple dyes,
+however efficient their production.
+
+Bribery and Corruption;--German Patent Policy.--The dyeing
+industry was peculiarly susceptible to corruption.
+It was so simple for the head dyer of a mill to show
+a partiality for dyes from any particular source of supply.
+The American Alien Property Custodian very frankly tells us[1]: "The
+methods of the great German houses in carrying on their business
+in this country were from the first honeycombed with corruption.
+Bribery of dyers was carried on almost universally on a large
+scale. . . . So extensive was this corruption that I came across
+only one American consumer that had escaped its ill effects."
+Such were hardly the methods of decent commercial competition,
+although it appears that the strong patriotic sense of the German
+was able to justify, in his own eyes, what might be regarded
+as reprehensible methods.  This is not a question of bringing
+up old reproaches, but merely of coldly examining facts.
+We have already referred to their patent policy, whereby thousands
+of patents were taken out, the only value of many of them,
+being to cramp the productive initiative of possible rivals.
+Professor Stieglitz explains how the German patents were useless
+in developing large scale manufacture.  "The patent protects
+the product, but does not reveal the method."  Sir William Pope
+has also brought out this point, showing how the Germans use
+thousands of bogus patents to protect their chemical industry.
+He tells us,[1b] "In fact, some German patents are drawn
+up for the purpose of discouraging investigation by more
+practical methods; thus, any one who attempted to repeat
+the method for manufacturing a dyestuff protected by Salzman &
+Kruger in the German patent No. 12,096 would be pretty certain
+to kill himself during the operation."
+
+
+[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p.  34.
+
+[1b] _Science and the Nation_.  A. C. Seward, F.R.S. Cambridge
+University Press, 1917.
+
+
+Propaganda and Information;--Espionage; Activities of
+the Dye Agencies.--But another method which was used in this
+commercial offensive, to which we must draw further attention,
+dealt with propaganda and information.  In his comprehensive report,
+the American Men Property Custodian examines a number of large
+industries and reveals how the German interest in these industries
+through their American ramifications were active, "sowing the seeds
+of German propaganda," and collecting information, both commercial
+and military, for the use of the German Government and its agents.
+Quoting again from this report, "In many of the large German-owned
+companies taken over by the Alien Property Custodian, after investigation
+it was found that espionage was one of the chief functions.
+Every scrap of information of commercial or military value
+to Germany was carefully gathered by the representatives of these
+concerns in this country and quickly forwarded to the home office
+in Germany.  The German agents were particularly keen on gathering
+information that would be helpful to Germany's commercial warfare.
+Once in Germany, this information was carefully card-indexed
+for the use of the manufacturers.  Bulletins of commercial
+information were also prepared and placed at their disposal.
+In Germany, the collection of all commercial information is under
+a bureau which is controlled and financed by the great German banks,
+such as the Dresdner, Disconto, and Reichs Bank."  This statement
+is not mere generalisation, but is backed by innumerable examples.
+Thus we find a light railway equipment manufacturer, a projectile company,
+a wireless company, various magneto companies, insurance companies,
+and German shipping companies, all engaged in spreading propaganda,
+acquiring information, and influencing public opinion in favour
+of Germany.  But, undoubtedly more important than any of these,
+and taking a leading part in the general scheme, was the German
+dye organisation.  The American publications make this quite clear.
+Mr. Garvan goes so far as to say:  "As long as you were supplied
+by the big six (_i.e_. the I.G.), your business had no secret unknown
+to Berlin.  In Berlin you will find the card index system which
+recites every fact connected with each and every one of your sources
+which can be of any possible value to your rivals over there."
+Referring to assistance rendered by various American and Allied
+departments, including Military, Naval, and War Trade Intelligence,
+we learn from the same sources:  "All these bodies worked in close
+co-operation and their mutual assistance was of inestimable value.
+Information derived from these sources demonstrated that the chemical
+industry was a natural centre for espionage and that this had been
+true long before we entered the war--indeed, before the war began.
+The relation between the German Government and the great German
+chemical houses was so close that representatives of the industry
+were naturally almost direct representatives of the Government,
+and their work in this country gave them unequalled opportunities
+for examining our industries from within."
+
+With the outbreak of war, this organisation became more clearly defined.
+It was, perhaps, difficult before the war to know where to draw the line
+between purely commercial and actual governmental German activities.
+The outbreak of war left no room for doubt.  The German dye agencies became,
+at once, the active agents of their Government in various schemes,
+the nature of which we shall outline, and their "information" functions
+became very definitely describable as espionage.
+
+Manoeuvring Raw Materials.--In the first place, the Alien Property Custodian
+found unexampled, evidence of a definite German scheme to corner and divert
+certain important war materials destined for the Allies.
+
+Chemical Exchange Association;--Doctor Albert's Letter.--Many such plots
+could be quoted, but we will limit ourselves to one,[1] chosen because on its
+stage move the chief figures of this espionage system.  This case has been
+described under the name of the "Chemical Exchange Association," and is much
+more fitted for the pen of a Conan Doyle.  The move appears to have been
+initiated by Dr. Albert, the financial adviser of the German Government
+in America, in collaboration with von Bernstorff.  Its purpose was to
+corner the immediate supplies of American phenol in order to prevent its
+manufacture into high explosives, including the well-known picric acid.
+The outbreak of war instantly stopped the entry of phenol into the country.
+Further, this product was not manufactured there to any extent before.
+Large supplies were required for the production of synthetic resins,
+for the gramophone industry, This led to the development of a phenol industry
+by the Edison works, and there appeared, automatically, a phenol surplus.
+Dr. Albert, aware of the probable fate of this surplus as raw material
+for allied munitions, determined to seize it for the German Government,
+and he did this through Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, one of the most prominent
+members of the American agency of the great Bayer works.  In June, 1915,
+Dr. Schweitzer contracted with the selling agents of the Edison Co.
+for the entire surplus of phenol available for sale, offering a large cash
+security which was furnished by Dr. Albert.  A lapse of a week witnessed
+another contract with the Heyden Chemical Works, a branch of the German house,
+by which this phenol was purchased for conversion into salicylic acid and
+other products.  To avoid exposing the nature of the deal, Dr. Schweitzer
+registered as the "Chemical Exchange Association."  The profits amounted to
+nearly a million dollars, half of which belonged to Dr. Schweitzer.  This, we
+are told, went immediately to the German Government.  As a suitable
+climax to such a venture, a dinner was given at the Hotel Astor by
+Dr. Schweitzer in honour of Dr. Albert, and is described as a typical
+gathering of the most active German propagandists in the country.
+It was as a result of this deal that Dr. Albert sent Dr. Schweitzer
+a memorable letter in which he praises his "breadth of highmindedness,"
+and compares his work with "a military coup accomplished by an army
+leader in destroying three railroad trains of forty cars containing four
+and a half million pounds of explosives."
+
+
+[1] _Alien Property Custodian Report_, 1919, p.  43.
+
+
+Dye Agency Information System;--Dr. Albert on Chemical Warfare.--
+Although a great deal has been said in America with regard to
+the activities of Dr. Schweitzer and his followers, very little
+has been heard on this side.  Explaining the complete information
+system possessed by the Germans, Mr. F. P. Garvan informs us
+that the head of the system in America for years before the war
+was Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, President of the Bayer Company there,
+and he even quotes his secret service number given him by
+the Imperial Minister of War, stating that he came to America,
+became a citizen on the instruction of the German Government,
+and led the espionage and propagandist movements down to the day
+of his sudden death in November, 1917.  The relationships between
+Dr. Albert and Dr. Schweitzer, when the former was leaving for Germany
+in 1917, are very illuminating.  We learn from the same source
+how Dr. Schweitzer received from the former nearly one and a half
+million dollars, all to be spent in espionage and propaganda.
+Dr. Albert, leaving Dr. Schweitzer a letter of appreciation,
+to which we have referred in connection with the Chemical Exchange,
+makes a very significant reference to chemical warfare.
+"Of still greater and more beneficial effect is the support which you
+have afforded to the purchase of bromine.  We have a well-founded
+hope that, with the exclusion of perhaps small quantities, we shall
+be in a position to buy up the total production of the country.
+Bromine, together with chloral, is used in making nitric gases,
+which are of such great importance in trench warfare.
+Without bromine these nitric gases are of slight effect:  in connection
+with bromine they are of terrible effect.  Bromine is produced only
+in the United States and Germany.  While, therefore, the material
+is on hand in satisfactory quantities for the Germans, the Allies
+are entirely dependent upon importation from America."  Making due
+allowance for the fact that Dr. Albert was not a technical man,
+this information possesses an element of truth, indeed France
+was driven to the extreme of establishing a bromine industry
+in the wilds of Tunis in order to counter the German attack.
+
+The Moral Aspect.--Such facts tempt us to think hardly of these
+representatives of German culture.  But they were, no doubt,
+fiercely patriotic Germans, and it is not difficult for us
+to understand their activities after the outbreak of war.
+An American, however, can hardly adopt such a lenient view, if, as has
+been claimed, many of these agents were naturalised Americans,
+for they were abusing the privileges and the confidence of their
+adopted country.  We have no wish, however, to dwell on this aspect
+of the matter, and have no doubt whatever that many good Germans
+could justify all these activities according to their own codes.
+It would have been better not to have given this information
+the light of day, were it not of some value for the future.
+
+Report of the New York World;--German Policy Regarding Dye Supplies
+to the U.S.A.--How far can the parent organisation of these
+dye agencies be regarded as aware of their activities?
+They were largely responsible for their inspiration.
+Mr. Garvan says, "Practically all the dye salesmen were only
+nominally in the employ of the branches here; all had secret
+and personal contracts with the Home Office."  From these facts
+alone there can hardly be any doubt as to the connivance of the
+home organisation.  Again, on April 28, 1915, the _New York World_
+printed an editorial explaining that "two large German chemical
+and aniline dye concerns are reported to be establishing factories
+in New Jersey, to supply American demands hither to supplied
+from Germany."  This statement apparently alarmed Captain Boy-Ed,
+the German Naval Attache, and he communicated with Dr. Albert,
+the financial representative in New York, for the establishment
+of these factories would have countered the German policy
+of bringing political pressure by refusing dye shipments.
+Dr. Albert's reply to Boy-Ed contains the following phrase:
+"With regard to the dyes, I got into touch with local experts
+in order to determine what truth there is in the news.
+According to my knowledge of things, the matter is a fake,
+inasmuch as _*our factories have bound themselves orally
+and by word of honour to do nothing in the present situation
+which might help the United States_."  As further evidence of this
+definite policy, witness a letter from Consul-General Hossenfelder
+to the Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. This
+letter is dated New York, March 3, 1916, and, after a detailed
+examination of the economic relationships between Germany
+and America, states:  "Further, we should, according to my conviction,
+hold ourselves absolutely passive in relation to the proposals
+for the exportation of potash, chemicals, and dyestuffs,
+and if the opportunity arises, make the sanction for them,
+not dependent upon the consent for an exchange of articles,
+but upon the abolition _en bloc_ of all hindrances to intercourse
+contrary to international laws which have been instituted
+by England."  Further, Dr. Albert, cabling to the German Government
+in April, 1916, on the export of dyestuffs, tells us:
+"The hope was entertained of bringing American industries
+which were solely dependent upon German deliveries of dyestuffs
+into a position that they would have to insist on the importation
+of dyestuffs under the conditions demanded by Germany."  There can
+then be no doubt that the parent organisation of the I.G. was
+in close touch with the activities of its agencies.
+
+This, then, is a brief account of the methods by which Germany created
+the monopoly whose existence threatened our success in the world war.
+Before leaving the question of the monopoly, let us inquire a little
+more closely into its exact nature and range.  Various American official
+reports have revealed the desperate measures necessitated in that country
+in order to meet deficiencies in vital products when the German source
+of supply was removed.
+
+Professor Stieglitz's Evidence.--Professor Stieglitz, of the University
+of Chicago, giving evidence before the United States Senate, stated:[1]
+
+
+[1] Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920.
+
+
+"I have come to the conclusion that we would have saved a great deal of
+suffering and a great many lives in this country, if we had had an organic
+chemical industry, as they have in Germany, before we started the war."
+Characterising the dye industry as the source of war chemicals,
+including explosives and poison gas, he emphasises the drug question
+and shows how their development depends absolutely upon the existence
+of certain raw materials, and facilities for comprehensive organic
+chemical research, which only find a _raison d'etre_ in the existence
+of a flourishing dye industry,
+
+Ehrlich's Discovery.--Pointing out the difficulties in developing
+the manufacture of salvarsan, he explains how the process was
+originally discovered by an organic chemist, Dr. Paul Ehrlich,
+co-operating with a German dye company, the crude material coming
+from the dye plants, the product itself strongly resembling dyes,
+"containing arsenic instead of part of their nitrogen."
+The great importance of this drug is brought out by another witness
+before the same committee, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, who explains how,
+by refusing or neglecting to ship salvarsan, Germany wanted the
+United States "to starve to death" for lack of it, and he continues:
+"Think what an extension of disease and that an intensification
+of suffering and distress Germany was willing to impose upon
+her best market in order to obtain her imperial will."
+
+Germany had monopolised the production of the important
+synthetic drugs, including the derivatives of salicylic acid,
+of which aspirin had developed wide use in Allied countries.
+After every household had learnt the value of German
+produced aspirin, its supply was cut off at the outbreak of war.
+The same disadvantages applied in the field of anaesthetics.
+For a long period America had no local anaesthetics for hospital
+surgical work, being compelled to use what were termed
+"Bulgarian Operations," that is, operations without anaesthetics.
+Professor Stieglitz claims that the lack of drugs and
+anaesthetics threw back American surgery some fifty to seventy
+years in civilisation.
+
+But what of this country?  We have already outlined how the outbreak
+of war found us with, at the most, two or three relatively small
+producing centres, which did valiant service during the war
+and amply proved the importance of the dye industry by revealing
+what could have been done had we been many times stronger.
+Was the same German chemical policy responsible for our
+pre-war position?  As far as we know official investigations
+have not been pursued to the same length as in America, but it
+is beyond doubt that the German dye companies took every possible
+step to stifle the development of our organic chemical production.
+When the war broke out, our comfortable commercial contact
+with the I.G. became a strangle-hold. It could not be otherwise.
+Whatever the German attitude, and we could hardly expect it to
+be friendly, the strangle-hold at the outbreak of war was inevitable.
+But this dye menace facing our textile industries, and weakening
+our power of retaliation in the chemical war, was not the only
+danger from the I.G. We were in a critical position through failure
+to produce other commodities than dyes.
+
+Drugs and Medicinal Products;--The German Monopoly;--National Health
+Insurance Commission.--The question of drugs assumed critical
+importance at the outbreak of war.  Germany had been asserting
+her monopoly for years in the field of medicinal chemicals.
+Cessation of supplies at the outbreak of war caused grave
+apprehension of a serious shortage in these products,
+so important for the adequate treatment of disease.
+In some cases we possessed neither the raw materials nor
+the technical knowledge to undertake rapid home production.
+But in the important group of the synthetic drugs derived from
+coal-tar products, the raw materials were produced in quantity in
+the United, Kingdom, only to be exported to Germany, thus contributing
+to her monopoly.  British manufacturers, on the other hand,
+held their own in the production of certain kinds of drugs,
+such as the alkaloids, gaseous anaesthetics, and some inorganic
+salts of bismuth and mercury.  In a summary of certain war
+activities of the National Health Insurance Commission, we read:
+"It was chiefly in the making of the coal-tar synthetic remedies
+that Germany was pre-eminent, and that position was due not to any
+lack of skill or invention on the part of the British chemists,
+but to the high degree of organisation attained by the German
+chemical industry, which made it possible to convert the by-products
+of the aniline factories into medicaments of high therapeutic
+and commercial value."
+
+The Royal Society;--Novocain.--So serious was the situation
+that for some time we existed on feeble stocks.  But during this
+period the utmost efforts were made to develop our own production.
+The Royal Society promptly came forward with a scheme to link
+up would-be producers with appropriate centres of research.
+The latter not only assisted production but actually produced sufficient
+quantities of important drugs to tide us over the difficult period.
+Thus, for example, for the production of novocain the assistance
+of about forty university laboratories throughout the country
+was invoked, and they proceeded to produce the intermediates,
+diethylamine and ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. These substances
+were converted into diethyl-amino-ethanol, and the final step,
+the production of novocain, was undertaken by manufacturers,
+including a prominent dye firm.  We have referred to one of these
+substances in connection with the German production of mustard gas,
+and need only say that in England, in a time of national emergency,
+the Government had to depend on the improvised assistance
+of forty teaching and research institutions for the production
+of small quantities of drug intermediates.  Further, this work,
+although to the permanent credit of those who undertook it,
+did not enable us later to produce rapidly war quantities of
+mustard gas, itself dependent on the same important intermediate,
+ethylene-monochlor-hydrin. Germany settled the drug and mustard
+gas question by a simple demand to the I.G., because the latter,
+holding the indigo monopoly, possessed actual large-scale
+ethylene-chlor-hydrin production.
+
+Other cases, although equally creditable to those actually engaged
+in the work, also reflect our national unpreparedness and neglect
+of chemical industry.
+
+Beta-Eucaine.--Beta-eucaine is a very important local anaesthetic.
+Before the war we obtained it almost exclusively from Germany.  When urgently
+needed in 1915 for the War Office and Admiralty, the Government discovered
+that it could not obtain this substance from commercial sources.
+Seventeen laboratories co-operated to produce two hundred and sixteen
+pounds of the material.  Such examples would be ludicrous did they
+not possess such a serious national aspect.  Our position was almost
+as desperate regarding chloral-hydrate, the important hypnotic,
+and the rare carbo-hydrates required for bacteriological purposes.
+Sir William Pope's comprehensive statement[1] supplies further examples.
+
+
+[1] _Science and the Nation_, A. C, Seward.  F.R.S. Cambridge
+University Press, 1917.
+
+
+Photographic Chemicals.--Our dependence upon German monopoly,
+so drastically revealed at the outbreak of war, was not limited
+to dyes and drugs, Photographic chemicals were of special importance
+for war purposes, yet, when the development of aviation increased our
+demands for photographic chemicals, we had no normal sufficient source
+to which to turn.  We needed not only the essential bulk chemicals,
+such as amidol, metol, para-amidophenol, and glycine, but also
+certain rarer substances, such as the photographic sensitisers,
+which were so essential for the Air Force.  By calling upon chemical
+industry and research institutions both needs were satisfactorily met,
+but the contrast with Germany leads perforce to the same conclusion,
+their case and speed of production as compared with ours.
+
+This examination shows the fine texture of the tenacious web by which Germany
+had entangled and stifled the organic chemical industries of other countries.
+Although at the outbreak of war the Allies were slow to realise the war
+significance of the dye industry, yet they were quick to determine that
+the resumption of peace would not find them in such an ignominious position.
+Steps were taken to establish dye industries in England, France,
+and America.  Not only did plants spring up to meet the immediate
+needs of the textile industries of the world outside Germany,
+but the question received considerable Government attention.
+Promises were made and steps taken to encourage the growing industries.
+But these cannot be examined in detail here, and the main facts are
+common knowledge.  Two points emerge, however, which are of prime
+importance from the point of view of our discussion.  In the first place,
+the acute needs of the armies prevented the maximum use of the war
+opportunity for developing Allied dye industries on a sound basis.
+No sooner was producing capacity installed, than it was taken over for
+the production of urgently needed organic chemicals for explosives.
+Dye enthusiasts would have regarded the war as a supreme opportunity
+for a period of concentrated organic chemical research to make up
+the leeway which existed, owing to forty years of German development.
+But the research energies of the country were occupied on more
+pressing problems.  In Germany, the war chemical activities of the dye
+factories all contributed to their future post-war strength.
+In England and France it was otherwise.  Our equivalent energies were
+concentrated on developing improvised processes and plant, absolutely
+necessary to counter the German attacks, but almost without exception
+of no direct ultimate value to our peace organic chemical industries.
+This is a point which merits careful consideration.  These industries
+voluntarily threw aside what was, logically, a great opportunity for them
+to push their research investigations so necessary for eventual success.
+The state-aided Huddersfield factory represented national vision, whose fruits
+were stolen by our ceaseless need to improvise counters to German aggression.
+But we owe to our dye industry the national recognition of these facts.
+Stress of war gave us true vision, but prevented its logical outcome.
+War needs are now removed, and everything should be done to place at
+the disposal of the dye industries those facilities which they necessarily,
+but gladly, sacrificed in time of emergency.
+
+The brief survey of the preceding pages reveals the existence of a German
+chemical policy pursued vigorously for many years before the war.
+It also shows how this policy developed in America, the chief neutral country,
+during the war period, for two years before her entry.
+
+The Americans have also established beyond doubt the active
+co-operation between the German Government and the I.G. But,
+if the policy of the German Government and of the organic
+chemical industry had many points in common before the war,
+they became one before hostilities were many months old.
+The part played by the I.G. in munitions production, in which it
+was virtually a tool of the Government, has already been seen.
+It must be remembered that, after the first Battle of the Marne,
+the German Government turned to the I.G. for a large part of
+its explosives and practically all its poison gas, and, as has
+been stated on many occasions, and with reason, Germany would
+not have been able to continue the war after the summer of 1915
+but for the commercial development of the Haber process
+by the I.G. The story is too well known to repeat at length.
+The basic element of explosives is nitrogen, which is introduced
+by nitric acid.  This was produced from imported Chili saltpetre,
+but the blockade cut short these imports, and but for the Haber
+method, the vital step in producing nitric acid from the air,
+Germany would have been compelled to abandon the struggle.
+
+There is striking coincidence between the commencement of
+the Great War and the successful completion of certain vital
+German chemical developments.  As late as 1912 Germany still
+depended on other countries, chiefly England, for her phenol,
+the basic raw material for picric acid as well as a dye necessity.
+Soon after that date the development of the Bayer plant made
+her independent in that product, and gave her, in fact,
+an exportable surplus.
+
+War Activities of the I.G.--Reviewing all these activities and realising
+how they all emanate from this one organisation, we are overwhelmed by its
+formidable nature as an offensive and defensive weapon in time of war.
+Here we have an organisation, the I.G., whose sinister pre-war
+ramifications dominated the world by their hold on the supply of organic
+chemicals vital for peace and war.  This organisation functioned,
+in a sense, as the life blood of German offensive warfare.
+German sources tell us very little of the war activities and future
+significance of the I.G. A veil of secrecy seems to be cast
+over the whole matter, but behind this veil must exist an acute
+realisation of the value of the I.G. as a trump card for the future.
+Krupp is uncovered, the whole world was alarmed at its meaning for war,
+but heard with a comfortable sense of security how Krupp was
+exchanging the sword for the plough.  But the gigantic I.G. controls
+in its great hand a sword or plough for war or peace at will.
+This is no far-fetched metaphor.
+
+The Rhine Factories and the Armistice,--It therefore becomes important
+to inquire into the attitude and activities of the I.G. since
+the Armistice, and to examine its position in world reconstruction.
+For one brief period, the few weeks following the Armistice, the German dye
+industries appear to have been without policy, its leaders in confusion.
+But with the confidence inspired by the Allied Rhineland occupation,
+with the assistance provided by the Allied controlling organisations,
+with regard to labour, fuel, and commercial transactions, the industrial
+morale speedily recovered.
+
+The tide of revolution which accompanied the German debacle in
+the autumn of 1918 swept over the Rhineland chemical factories.
+Colonel Norris, writing on his visit in February, 1919, tells us
+that after peace was restored by the Allied forces:[1]--
+"the managers of several factories agreed that the occupation
+of the territory was the best thing that could have happened.
+On the other side of the Rhine, labour refused to work,
+and demanded unheard-of pay--everything was topsy-turvy. In fact,
+before the Allied armies arrived, revolutionary notions were
+growing rapidly along the Rhine.  One director of a well-known
+chemical plant is said to have escaped by night with his life
+by way of the river, when his employees were especially menacing.
+When the British Army came he returned, and is now at his old post."
+Thus, although the I.G. was model in its institutions for
+the welfare of employees, at least one of its most prominent
+directors was compelled to take refuge from infuriated labour.
+What with danger from the latter, and the uncertainty of action
+by the oncoming Allied troops, the future of the factories
+appeared very gloomy.  In fact, there are fairly credible
+rumours that the German directors were willing to dispose
+of their assets to the Allies while they remained intact.
+But the same Allied troops, whose advent was feared, rolled back
+the tide of revolution from the banks of the Rhine, and restored
+industrial security.  It is doubtful whether the investing
+armies realised the full war significance of these factories,
+except the French.  The latter instituted a fairly thorough
+control almost at once.  But, judging from reports of
+different missions to these factories, we were even backward
+in organising inspection of the purely munitions plants.
+Thus the Hartley Mission did not materialise until three
+months had elapsed.
+
+
+[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol.  XI., 1919,
+Page 817.
+
+
+War Mentality of the I.G.--We watch a vivid impression of the war
+mentality of the I.G. in a few phrases from Colonel Norris's account:
+"Around the walls of the director's room was a beautifully painted
+and artistic frieze which pictured the various plants of the
+Bayer Company and their activities.  Dr. Duisberg, the director,
+pointed out proudly to the Americans the view of the company's plant
+on the Hudson River.  We were not surprised to see it, although pre-war
+advertisements had assured us at home that Bayer aspirin had been made
+on the Hudson for years by an American company.  During the war an
+ante-room had been decorated in a similar way, with pictures illustrating
+the activity of the plant in the preparation of war-gas materials.
+One saw how gas was made, shells were filled, and gas masks assembled.
+The work was done by an artist, and has a permanent value.
+The fact that the thing was conceived and executed during the stress
+of war throws an interesting sidelight on German character."
+Incidentally, it also throws a further sidelight upon the part played
+by Leverkusen in the chemical warfare campaign.
+
+German Attitude towards Inspection.--As was quite to be expected,
+the German factories did not receive our missions with open arms,
+and they were particularly jealous of any inspection at Oppau,
+the site of the wonderful Haber synthetic ammonia plant.
+Lieut. McConnel, of the U.S. Navy, tells us:[1] "Upon arrival
+at the plant the Germans displayed a polite but sullen attitude.
+They seemed willing to afford the opportunity of a cursory
+inspection, but strongly objected to a detailed examination.
+On the third day of the visit the writer was informed that his
+presence had become a source of serious objection and that if his
+examination were prolonged a formal complaint would be submitted
+to the Peace Conference."  The Allies had only themselves to blame.
+Their facile yielding to the argument that this great arsenal
+was principally of peace significance, owing to the fertilisers
+which it would eventually make, and the feeble backing provided
+for inspecting missions, were reflected in the semi-resistant
+attitude of the I.G. personnel.
+
+
+[1] _Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry_, Vol.  XI., 1919,
+page 837.
+
+
+The Rhine and Chaulny Contrast.--It was a curious contrast, however,
+to pass through Chaulny on the way to the Rhine.  At Chaulny,
+the oldest chemical works in France, quoting again from
+Colonel Norris, "where Gay-Lussac did his famous work on the
+manufacture of sulphuric acid, where Courtois discovered iodine,
+and where plate glass was first made, had grown with the times,
+and was amongst the largest factories in France.  Around it
+was a thriving town of about 13,000 inhabitants, with some
+excellent public modern buildings.  When the Germans in their
+first retreat were forced to leave the place, they dismantled
+the factory and carried away everything that was portable.
+The fortunes of war brought them back, and before they left
+a second time a regiment of soldiers was put to work to destroy
+systematically the factory and the entire town.  For, a month
+they kept at work, and when they withdrew but a few bricks were
+left standing.  Every boiler had been blown up with dynamite,
+and every tank too heavy to be carted away rendered useless.
+About half an acre was covered with chemical stoneware of
+all kinds; each piece had been broken with a sledgehammer.
+Nothing was too small or too large to escape destruction.
+And to make sure of a good job, everything that would burn was
+set on fire."  Yet within twenty-four hours one met Germans,
+in-directly or directly responsible for this policy of destruction,
+resenting peaceful Allied inquiries on the munition activities
+of their own plants.  We hardly know whether to attribute such
+effects of Allied policy to our own integrity in respecting
+the peace activities of these arsenals or to official ignorance
+of their war-like nature.
+
+German Revolution and the Industrial Leaders.--It is curious how
+the leadership of the captains of German industry was left untouched
+by the revolutionary disturbances of the post-Armistice period.
+Evidence is to be found in the composition of the main German delegation
+to Paris for the settlement of the Versailles Treaty.  Many of the
+members were big industrial magnates, several had direct connection
+with chemical industry, and at least one was a prominent director
+of the I.G.
+
+The German Peace Delegation.--Commenting on the composition of the main
+German delegation in the spring of 1919, we find the German press
+deploring the omission of any "visible representative" of Army
+or Navy.  Does this imply the presence of invisible representation?
+Whether intended or not, there is truth in the implication.
+The list contains the name of one of the leading representatives of
+the big dye combine.  Others of the delegates have chemical interests.
+This is significant.  It more than implies the German official
+acknowledgment of the importance of the dye industry in general
+for the future of Germany, and of its prime importance for war.
+
+Recent Signs of Government Interest.--Recent developments
+have merely strengthened the dye combine and provided
+further evidence of Government interest in its welfare.
+The chief signs of reviving.  German Government interest in the I.G.
+are to be found in the loan for the nitrogen enterprise and in
+the privileges which it enjoys with regard to Government taxes.
+An American source,[1] a witness before a Senate Committee,
+reveals that the dye plants "have to pay no direct Government taxes.
+According to an understanding with the present Government,
+all organic chemical productions, the companies themselves,
+as well as all dependencies, without exception,
+for the next ten years, are freed from all direct State tax.
+In so far as community taxes come into consideration,
+I believe we will obtain a remission for our profession."
+The latest sign of Government support is to be found in
+the preferential treatment obtained by the German dye industry
+in coal deliveries.  Coal is a critical factor in the German
+attempt to regain their monopoly.
+
+Nitrogen Fixation.--The industrial fixation of nitrogen by Germany to form
+ammonia has great importance from the point of view of our discussion.
+Statements by various prominent Germans, such as Dr. Max Sering,
+of the University of Berlin, and Dr. Hugo Schweitzer, already referred to,
+leave no doubt.  The former, writing in 1915, tells us:
+"The complete cutting off of the supply of Chili saltpetre during
+the war has been made good by our now taking nitrogen directly
+out of the air in large factories built during and before the war.
+With extraordinary rapidity the question has been solved how the
+enormous quantities of the needed ammunition were to be produced,
+a question which in England still meets with difficulties, in spite
+of the help from America."
+
+
+[1] Hearings before Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, 1920, page 195.
+
+
+The German Nitrogen Syndicate.--The two great Haber plants at Oppau
+and Merseburg are both constituent parts of the I.G., and they
+introduce a new element of Government interest into the I.G. policy.
+Giving evidence before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
+of the United States Senate, Colonel Joyce develops this question
+of Government interest in detail.  He tells us how war nitrogen supply
+was energetically and specifically fostered by the German Government
+through an Imperial Commissioner under the War Department.  One of
+the three advisers of this campaign was Doctor Bueb,
+representing the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik. Colonel Joyce tells us:
+"That was a strictly war control organisation, but even before
+the war closed, Germany, with her usual foresight, was giving
+consideration to the future commercial aspects of her nitrogen works,
+and in August, 1919, there was definitely formed an association
+of the producers which was called the Stickstoff Syndikat G.m.b.H.
+or Nitrogen Syndicate.  This designation is a commercial one,
+and the organisation is along commercial lines, but it is,
+reliably stated that the establishment of this syndicate was
+largely due to governmental influence.  This will be more easily
+understood if it be realised that the German Government had given
+financial assistance to many of the new plants and plant increases
+which the war had necessitated."
+
+Haber Process Prominent.--The Badische Co.  holds a large part of the capital
+stock of this syndicate, whose Board contains a Government nominee.
+in addition the Board of Managers will have a Government chairman.
+Through such arrangements, Government interest in the I.G. nitrogen
+enterprise is clearly revealed.  In conclusion, Colonel Joyce informs us,
+"This information, which comes from most reliable sources and is
+not to be disputed, shows that, beyond question, any one outside
+of Germany producing or desiring to purchase nitrogenous fertilisers
+or similar compounds, will have to deal with a single organisation,
+essentially a branch of the German Government, which will have
+an absolute monopolistic control of all such products produced in
+Germany or whatever surplus there may be for export (Hearing before
+the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, S. 3390,
+Mar. 22nd, 1920, p.  52)." It is reported that the preliminary allotment
+of production to the Badische Co.  in the Syndicate is three hundred thousand
+tons per annum, which should leave a considerable exportable surplus.
+This would constitute a formidable weapon in any price-cutting campaigns
+entered upon by the I.G. in order to preserve her various monopolies.
+We learn from the _Colour Trade Journal_ of August, 1920, that the
+German Government has advanced something over ten million pounds
+for the construction and operation of the Haber plant.
+
+The New German Dye Combine.--Internal changes have accompanied
+the development of these external relationships.  The interchange
+of capital and directors between the different branches,
+the use of all assets for a common purpose, and the pooling of
+all profits effected in 1919, has brought about a closer union.
+From the relatively loose pre-war combination held together by common
+price interests, the organisation has passed through the cartel
+to what is now practically a form of trust.  The German dye industry
+is now a closely woven, almost homogeneous institution.  It has added
+economic cohesion to technical efficiency, and is to-day the largest
+technically efficient potential instrument of war in the world.
+We have thus revealed the existence, and indicated the nature,
+of the resultant activities of the chemical policy guiding
+the pre-war German combination of organic chemical or dye producers.
+Further, it is seen how the war stimulated and sealed closer relationships
+between the constituent firms, and between the resultant organisation,
+the I.G., and the German Government.  Continuing, we find the above
+tendencies intensified since the Armistice, from unmistakable signs
+briefly referred to above.
+
+Aggressive Nationalistic Policy.--Both in peace and war,
+the combination of interests, known as the I.G., has successfully
+pursued an intensely nationalistic and aggressive chemical policy.
+We might ignore what some have regarded as the sinister side
+of the I.G. activities, considering the whole as a wonderful
+monument to German science, thoroughness and patriotism,
+which it undoubtedly is in many respects.  But the significance
+to the Allies and associated countries remains the same.
+Even without any thought or intention on the part of present day
+Germany to use this thing for war, it remains a serious menace.
+But the direct evidence which we possess does not actually
+support such a peaceful view.  Her press confidently prophesies
+the resumption of the pre-war German monopoly, reassuring its
+readers by careful analysis of the causes of the eventful failure
+to establish organic chemical industries in Allied countries.
+
+Are we to yield in this field of economic war?  If so, then one
+of the chief lessons of the Great War will remain unheeded,
+and the future cannot fall to prove this to the hilt,
+to our cost.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X
+
+LINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
+
+
+The Element of Speculation.--It is of considerable interest to Introduce
+an element of speculation into our discussion of chemical warfare.
+In glancing at future possibilities, we can adopt one of two courses,
+follow up the clearly marked lines of recent development, or give
+the imagination play within the whole field of scientific possibility.
+The former course lies more within the scope of this book.
+
+Chemical Tactics and Strategy.--Two basic military conceptions come
+to our assistance in attempting to characterise types of chemical
+warfare development.  With a little explanation it is possible
+to place this or that method in the tactical or strategic class.
+Any new chemical warfare development capable, under a given
+system of individual protection, of successfully attacking
+the hitherto protected individual, may be termed strategic.
+The method may be aimed at a protected or hitherto immune human function,
+but if it overcomes protection it is then capable of effecting
+strategic results by its use on a sufficiently large scale.
+Thus we regard the first introduction of cloud gas by Germany,
+or their use of mustard gas, as examples of strategic chemical
+warfare moves.  Any fundamental discovery of this sort,
+applicable to chemical warfare, is capable of strategic effects.
+Used only on a small scale, however, these possibilities may be
+lost and tactical advantages may alone accrue.
+
+The tactical type of chemical warfare method involves the use
+of some new or old war chemical device in achieving a tactical
+objective which may, itself, form part of a larger scheme with
+strategic significance.  Examples were plentiful during the recent war.
+We may refer to the use of smoke, of gas shell for neutralisation,
+or of cloud gas as preparation for a local infantry advance.
+
+The same classification can be applied to the protective
+as to the offensive side of chemical warfare.  The equipment
+of an army of millions with a gas mask has a strategic value,
+if it counters the large-scale use of gas by the enemy.
+The mere fact of this protection may serve the same purpose
+as a violent resistance to a huge enemy attack.  It may render
+the attack, and, therefore, the resistance, out of the question.
+By permitting the individual soldier to retain the efficient use
+of his weapons in gas, the mask, or other form of individual
+protection, may render a costly counter-attack unnecessary.
+In this way protective methods in chemical warfare may be the
+determining factor in some strategic campaign or tactical activity.
+The distinction between tactics and strategy in chemical
+warfare cannot be made by grouping substances, or their methods
+of application to war, any more than one can say that certain
+infantry or artillery formations or weapons have a purely
+strategic or tactical function.  The distinction lies rather
+in the magnitude and incidence of use of the chemical appliance
+on the battle-field, while depending on its novel nature.
+A new substance, possessing potential strategic value,
+may be wasted, and its surprise effect lost, in some local affair.
+This applies to the use of mustard gas by the Germans and to our
+own use of the Livens projector.  Our armies were surprised
+and our plans modified by the German use of mustard gas at
+Ypres and Nieuport.  We were not clear where this new thing
+was tending.  Think of its strategic and psychological value
+had it been used on a scale and front twenty times larger.
+Leaving the chemical field, we can say that the first British
+use of the tank provided another example.
+
+New War Chemicals.--The question of entirely new war
+chemicals is of general interest.  The first main group
+of substances with which we were faced during the war
+contained such types as chlorine and phosgene, whose chief
+line of attack was directed towards the respiratory system.
+Specific protection rapidly developed and, once obtained,
+led to violent attempts to penetrate it or "break it down."
+In other words, the attempts to penetrate the mask by using higher
+concentrations of phosgene were analogous, from our point of view,
+to similar attempts by the use of an entirely new substance aimed
+again at the respiratory system.  The introduction of mustard
+gas confirmed, what the use of lachrymators had suggested,
+that the most fruitful line would be found by attacking human
+functions hitherto immune.  First the lungs, then the eyes,
+then the skin of the human being came under fire, so to speak.
+What further developments appear possible on these lines?
+Assuming that means are found to protect satisfactorily
+the respiratory system, and the eyes, what other vulnerable
+points can the war chemical find in the human organism?
+Some more specific vesicant, some modification of mustard gas,
+might arise, limited in attack to certain portions of the human being.
+The Germans were already at work on these lines.
+
+"Camouflage" Chemicals.--It is by no means visionary to picture
+the loss of the sense of taste and smell by the use of some chemical.
+Partially successful efforts were made by both sides during
+the war to mask the odour of the harmful constituent of a shell
+filling by introducing an appropriate "camouflage" compound.
+Whole series of chemicals were examined from this point of view
+by the American field laboratory at Puteaux near Paris.  The step
+from specific camouflage compounds to a single general type
+is by no means unbridgeable in theory.
+
+An insight into work of this kind has been given by Colonel R. F. Bacon
+of the American Chemical Warfare Service.  He says:
+"The gas-camouflage is of particular interest.  It has been found
+that malodorous compounds (butyl mercaptan, dimethyl tricarbonate,
+etc.), are useful to mask the presence of other `gases' or to force
+the enemy to wear respirators when no other `gases' are present.
+As in the case of lachrymators, such `stink gases' must frequently
+be accompanied by other `gases,' in order that the enemy may never
+know when toxic gases are actually absent.  Camouflage gases are also
+useful in that they save `mustard gas' and the highly lethal gases.
+Their value has been demonstrated in trials at Hanlon Field and also
+at the front."  The use of such compounds has an obvious value.
+By removing the possibility of detecting the dangerous chemical,
+they enforce the permanent use of the protective appliance or encourage
+a fatal carelessness in the individual soldier.
+
+Functions Hitherto Immune.--In this field of chemical attack upon
+hitherto immune human functions, it is particularly easy to class
+suggestions as visionary and to be wise only after the event.
+But it must be borne in mind that any nation in a position
+to effect such a surprise would be in a commanding position.
+It is believed, for example, that the human being maintains his
+equilibrium through the proper functioning of the semi-circular canals,
+organs situated behind the inner ear.  It does not appear possible
+to attain them chemically directly, but they might be reached
+by the absorption of some suitable chemical into the system in
+the very small concentrations now possible on the field of battle.
+We doubt whether any physiologist would go further than to say
+that such a mode of attack is improbable in the near future.
+No qualified person would class it as impossible.
+It has been advanced that the control of equilibrium occurs
+through the movement of certain hairs through a liquid
+within these canals.  If this be so, then one would simply
+require to solidify or change the viscosity of this liquid.
+Would this be difficult?  Probably not, for most of the body
+fluids are of that colloidal nature in which coagulation
+occurs in the presence of small quantities of special agents.
+Such a result might cause the individual to lose his equilibrium.
+This would prohibit all organised movement.  An army thus
+attained would be less mobile than a colony of cripples.
+
+Picture for a moment such a battle as the great German attack of March,
+1918--millions of men urged forward from fixed positions under highly
+centralised control--they advance, say, two or three miles beyond this
+control and are largely dependent on local initiative for the attack.
+They then enter clouds of shell chemical and in less than fifteen minutes
+a fair percentage becomes incapable of advancing in a fixed direction,
+of obeying local orders, or of anything more than a sort of drunken movement.
+By this time their supporting artillery would have been identified
+and attained, and the whole attack reduced to almost farcical conditions.
+Such a compound may never develop, but who will class it as beyond
+the realm of eventual possibility?
+
+Every one is acquainted with the peculiar effects produced by
+various anaesthetics.  The emergency uses to which they are put and
+our personal acquaintance with them may have dulled the imagination.
+Think for a moment of the possibilities which they unfold.
+Gaseous anaesthetics, in certain concentrations, produce
+temporary unconsciousness, other anaesthetics, so called local,
+produce absolute immobility without loss of consciousness.
+Chloroform and ether are common forms of the first type, but they
+are required in such concentrations as to render their battle
+use impracticable.  But the second type, of which stovaine,
+the new synthetic drug, is a good example, produces its effects
+in very small concentration.  A few drops injected into the spinal
+column are sufficient to prevent all movement for a number of hours.
+We cannot expect to obtain the conditions of the operating table
+on the battle-field, but chemicals which are effective in very
+small quantities or concentrations may find another channel into
+the human system.  For this reason the development of the mask,
+the protection of the respiratory channels, is of great importance,
+for it blocks the way to substances which by mere absorption
+might produce valuable military results.
+
+Chemical Constitution and Physiological Action.--It is impossible
+to adopt a more than speculative outlook in this field.
+So little is known regarding the relationships between chemical
+constitution and physiological action and very few sound generalisations
+have been made.  A considerable amount of scientific work occurred
+on these lines in various countries before the war on the connection
+between the chemical nature of compounds and their taste and smell,
+but the relationships are still obscure.
+
+Unsolved Problems of Mustard Gas.--The use of a chemical
+which attacks some unexpected human function introduces many
+disturbing and disorganising factors.  Thus the introduction
+of mustard gas has left us with a number of unsolved problems.
+By employing this substance Germany departed from her usual caution
+and violated one of the first principles of chemical warfare.
+It is unsound for any nation to introduce a new weapon,
+unless that nation is, itself, furnished with the means
+of protection against its eventual employment by the enemy.
+The Germans have, themselves, explained this breach of
+the principles of war.  They were convinced that we could not
+retaliate with mustard gas, because we could not produce it.
+It was a miscalculation but based on grounds of which they
+were sure, having been largely instrumental in determining them
+through their aggressive chemical policy.
+
+Mustard gas attacks the respiratory system and the outer skin of man.
+The armies were efficiently protected against the first line of attack,
+but they never developed efficient protection against the second.
+Protection of the skin of the individual soldier against
+mustard gas was theoretically possible in three ways.
+In the first place a number of chemical solutions were devised which,
+applied to the affected skin, would destroy the poisonous chemical.
+This was a bad method, and was never efficiently employed.
+German army orders after the French introduction of mustard gas were
+bristling with references to chloride of lime or bleaching powder.
+It was to be kept in every conceivable place where the gas was
+likely to penetrate.  Soldiers were provided with boxes of bleach
+called "Gelbolin."  Permanganate of potash was carried as an alternative
+for a brief period.  A wire from the Third German Army to the
+War Ministry, Berlin, dated 17th July, 1918, stated:  "Chloride of lime
+has all been issued in boxes to the troops.  Reserves exhausted."
+One had the impression of a drowning man catching at a straw.
+Supply on a sufficient scale to cover most cases was practically impossible.
+Each soldier would have to carry the protective chemical as part
+of his equipment, and its proper use depended on training.
+There was no time to identify and assemble the thousands of affected cases
+for central treatment.  Mustard gas penetrated thick clothing, even boots.
+and was often only identified hours after the damage was done.
+The second method which was attempted on a large scale was the protection
+of each soldier by special mustard-gas-proof clothing, but a man,
+fighting for his life on the battle-field, will not tolerate such
+a handicap to movement, and, although hundreds of thousands of oiled
+suits were prepared and were of definite use in certain special cases,
+for example in certain artillery formations, yet the method
+must be rejected as unsuitable from a military point of view.
+The third solution, which was tried experimentally on a large scale,
+was to cover soldiers going into action with a cream or paste of
+protective chemical.  This, again, could only be applied in special cases,
+prior to an assault, for example, and could not be regarded as a
+permanent form of protection.
+
+As we have seen, mustard gas infected whole areas for many days, owing to its
+great persistency.  It was often necessary to cross such zones for attack
+or counter-attack. How was this to be effected without huge losses?
+It was found possible, literally by creating roads of bleach, that is,
+by sprinkling bleaching powder on chosen lanes through the infected area,
+to pass columns of troops through such areas, but this cannot be viewed
+as a practicable solution.  Carried to its logical conclusion, it would
+have taxed the possibilities of supply beyond their utmost capacity.
+Here, then, we have a case in which it is not possible to protect a soldier
+by some specific appliance, and the war found us embarking on schemes
+of protection by the use of chemicals in quantities which threatened
+to carry us out of the range of possible manufacture.
+
+A New Type of Obstacle.--Chemical warfare has introduced a new type
+of strategic and tactical obstacle.  Mediaeval methods of war relied
+largely on natural and man-built barriers.  Rivers, moats, forts were,
+and still are, to a certain extent, critical factors in war.
+The conceptions of a Vauban could determine the issue of a campaign.
+Such obstacles were only effective, however, when properly manned and armed.
+The Hindenburg Line and the Canal du Nord were tremendous obstacles when
+backed by German artillery, rifles, and machine-guns, but, without the latter,
+they would have been mere inconveniences for the passage of an army.
+The massing of a multitude of guns, used for the first time during
+the recent war, produced another form of temporary obstacle, but troops
+could be trained to, and actually did, advance through the barrage.
+Further, the ultimate limits of supply and the use of counter artillery
+introduces time and quantitative limitations to the use of the really
+intensive barrage.  Chemical warfare, however, has introduced a method
+of blocking out chosen areas of the battle-field in such a way as to
+prevent their effective use for military defence, communications,
+or other purposes.  It is now possible, by chemical means, to give
+a normal piece of country the same value as a natural obstacle,
+or one organised for defence by formidable engineering construction,
+and manned by rifles and machine-guns. This can be achieved by the use
+of a highly persistent dangerous gas or war chemical of which, so far,
+mustard gas is the most effective example.  We have seen how the Germans
+formed defensive flanks during their March, 1918, offensive, by spraying
+certain areas between their fronts of attack with mustard gas.
+It is true that, in the quantities in which it has, so far, been used,
+mustard gas has not converted open areas into absolute obstacles against
+the movement of a determined individual, platoon, or even larger unit.
+But even in the quantities which have already appeared on the battle-field,
+it has rendered whole zones practically unusable for huge masses of men,
+owing to the certainty of a very high percentage of casualties.
+Up to the present its value has been rather as a serious factor in Staff
+consideration of losses than as an actual physical barrier.  Many of
+the casualties are only incurred a few hours after contact with the gas.
+This may not deter a man from crossing an affected zone, but it may deter
+the Staffs from using that zone, when they realise that this would imply
+the certainty of many thousands of casualties amongst the troops.
+The choice is between two evils, tactical acquiescence to the enemy's plan,
+blocking out a certain area, or the certainty of huge casualties.
+A very interesting case occurred in the German attack near Mt.  Kemmel in
+the spring of 1918, where large quantities of German mustard gas were
+used some distance in front of the original line of German attack.
+In this case, not only was it clear that the Germans would not attempt
+to advance beyond a limited objective (and they did not), but the development
+of their attack left them organising their defences behind their own
+mustard gas barrage.
+
+The "Persistent Lethal" Substance.--The importance of these
+considerations can hardly be exaggerated when we realise that,
+at any time, a substance possessing the same strategic value as mustard
+gas, but much more violent casualty effects, may be discovered.
+The Germans were certainly aware of these possibilities.
+According to the statement of an apparently reliable prisoner
+of the 30th R.I.R., July, 1918, the Regimental Gas Officer
+stated in a lecture that, as the Allies had used a new gas,
+the Germans were going to employ a "White Cross" gas shell.
+This gas was "stronger" than any of the gases at present
+in use; it possessed a persistence up to eight days,
+and could, therefore, not be used on the front for an assault.
+Its persistence was favoured by damp or misty weather
+and by the nature of the ground.  Neither the German drum
+nor the masks of the Allies afforded protection against it.
+The last important German development consisted in the use
+of pumice impregnated with phosgene in their Livens bombs.
+It was clear that the Germans were attempting to produce
+a gas which was not only highly lethal but persistent.
+Following up this idea, we can forecast the use of a chemical
+which will not only permit the formation of defensive flanks,
+or pockets, in the enemy front, or in our own defensive positions,
+through their influence on Staff considerations with regard
+to casualties, but, by replacing the relatively mild casualty effect
+of mustard gas by a highly and rapidly lethal effect, will render
+these areas not only strategically, but physically, impassable.
+One of the most significant possibilities in chemical warfare
+development is the arrival of this type of the compound,
+the highly lethal, highly persistent chemical.
+
+The Critical Range.--These considerations are very interesting
+from the military point of view.  Consider the phenomenal
+amount of muscular energy required to organise any captured
+stretch of territory against counter-attack. The type
+of compound we have outlined is likely to change completely
+the aspect of attack and counter-attack. The Somme battlefield,
+for example, gave the impression of a series of defensive
+positions organised by the one side or the other after attack
+or counter-attack, in order to hold small gains of ground,
+which were never intended to represent the final advance.
+Successful progress from one trench system meant building another,
+under the pounding of the enemy's artillery, and the deadly
+fire of machine-guns, exposing, in this improvised system,
+large numbers of troops, among which casualties constituted
+a continuous drain upon eventual reserves.  The arrival
+of the highly persistent lethal compound should provide
+an effective substitute for this laborious constructional
+protection in the shape of the persistent lethal barrage.
+This will render immediate counter-attack and near machine-gun
+fire very difficult.  Automatically, fewer men will be
+needed to hold the advanced positions.  It is true that,
+with the next attack, "kicking off" and assembly positions will
+be required, for these can be much more efficiently developed
+behind a deep chemical barrage and will demand the exposure
+of fewer men where more time is available for preparation.
+Such conditions, however, can only occur if one, side possesses
+some distinct advantage with regard to surprise by,
+or efficient protection against, the persistent lethal compound.
+When both sides are equally matched in this respect, a duel
+will arise in which the winner will be the one who can throw
+the critical concentrations of chemical into a given area at
+the greatest range.  This might be called the "critical range."
+Herein lies the importance of the development of such weapons
+as the Livens projector, and the Germans had certainly grasped
+an important principle, when they used our own modified
+weapon against us with a much greater range than our own.
+If we admit the possibility of a persistent lethal compound,
+this question of critical range assumes outstanding importance.
+
+The New No-Man's-Land.--The recent war witnessed a rather sudden
+adoption of trench warfare, during a period in which the artillery
+strengths of both sides were relatively feeble, when compared with
+the later stages of the war.  Accordingly, there arose very definite
+lines of field fortifications, and strongly held trench systems,
+separated from each other by a comparatively narrow No-Man's-Land, With
+the development of the formidable artillery strengths of belligerents,
+there was a tendency to form a much wider No-Man's-Land, and the front
+line systems were lightly held, approximating, in many cases,
+to an outpost line.
+
+The discovery and mass production of a persistent lethal substance is
+likely to convert No-Man's-Land into a permanently infected gas zone,
+manned by special outposts of permanently protected troops.
+Combined with the development of smoke, this may render unnecessary
+the highly organised trench assembly systems of the recent war,
+used before the assault, and, with the development of the tank
+as a fast fighting machine, and for the transport of troops, one can
+obtain a glimpse of the nature of the new attack and counter-attack.
+A recent writer[1] has shown us the future tank carrying war into
+the enemy's country and destroying his nerve centres by actually
+reaching and paralysing the G.H.Q.s. of armies and smaller formations.
+Such operations will have to occur through a wide zone of the new gas
+and will necessitate the anti-gas tank.  Indeed, one of the most
+important functions of the tank will be to carry the advance guard
+of an army beyond the infected No-Man's-Land, and such an advance will
+occur behind a series of smoke barrages created, in the first place,
+by the artillery, and, later, by the advance of tanks themselves.
+
+
+[1] _Tanks in the Great War_, Col. J. F. C. Fuller., D.S.O.
+
+
+The "Alert Gas Zone."--The development of the "gas alert"
+idea has definite interest for the future of chemical warfare.
+It is well known how the development of gas shell and surprise gas shoots
+by the Germans led to the necessity for "gas alert" conditions between
+certain times and within certain distances of the front line.
+The mask had to be worn in the so-called ready position, in order
+that swift adjustment might be possible in case of surprise attack.
+The summer of 1917 witnessed a great increase in gas shell activity.
+This was reflected in important changes in the "gas alert" regulations.
+In the autumn of that year all periods of readiness were abolished
+and replaced by a constant state of readiness.  In the forward area
+absolute readiness was required within two miles of the front line,
+and special precautions were taken as far back as twelve miles.
+That the Germans suffered under the same restraints is witnessed
+by many captured documents.  In particular, a divisional order
+taken in December, 1917, gave the gas danger zone as within
+fifteen kilometres of the front line, and within this region
+every one must carry a mask.  The alert position of the mask
+was insisted upon within two kilometres of the front line.
+By July the alert zone had increased in depth in both armies.
+This tendency must have increased, had the war continued, for both
+sides were employing gas in guns of larger calibres, and weapons
+were being devised, such as the improved German Livens projector,
+which gave high concentrations at much greater distances from
+the front line, _i.e_. with greater critical ranges.
+
+We have seen how the possible development of a persistent lethal compound
+may produce an infected and wide No-Man's-Land. Imposed on this,
+there will, no doubt, be "gas alert" conditions of great depths.
+How do these conceptions work out for the war of movement?
+It would appear that the possession of such a compound and the means of
+producing and using it on a very large scale could determine the stationary
+or open nature of warfare, if other forces were not too unequal.
+A new military factor emerges, the artificial, permanent, unmanned obstacle,
+which can be laid down at will on areas whose magnitude depends finally
+on manufacturing capacity.  The germ of the idea appeared during
+the war at Kemmel and in the various mustard gas barrages formed by
+artillery or delayed mines used by the Germans in their great retreat.
+The sudden development of such barriers will be equivalent in effect
+to the creation of strong trench systems, but these could never result,
+under war conditions, in time to approach the strategic flexibility
+and importance of the persistent lethal infected barrier.
+
+Gas and Aircraft.--The combination of gas and aircraft presents
+the possibility of attaining strategic effects by chemical means.
+Many rumours were afloat, towards the end of the war, regarding the use
+of gas by enemy aircraft, and there was apprehension amongst
+the civil populations, which has been reflected in numerous
+public utterances.  Evidence on the matter is very scanty.
+In July, 1917, the use of gas in aeroplane bombs by the Germans
+was reported, but not confirmed.  Further reports in August
+indicated the use of Blue Cross, owing to the sneezing effects
+which were produced on those within reach of the air bomb.
+In October, the evidence was more conclusive.  But the German
+aeroplanes left no blind or dud shell, and, beyond the violent nasal
+and sneezing effects of Blue Cross, evidence was again absent.
+This report was very persistent, for, in July, 1918, there were
+again rumours that Blue Cross bombs had been dropped on the British
+near Ficheux.  The Air Forces of the different armies were,
+perhaps, the last to feel the effects of the gas campaign,
+but the pilots of low-flying aeroplanes in the 1918 offensive
+were constantly crossing pockets of gas, and this, added to
+the fact that the pilots were often compelled to land in gas,
+led to their equipment with gas masks.  A respirator of special type
+was taken from a German aviator in April, 1918, after the fighting
+at Passchendaele.  But the war gave us no direct evidence
+of the successful use of gas and war chemicals from aircraft.
+This, however, is no criterion as to its eventual importance.
+The Allies definitely refrained from employing the combination
+until Germany should give them the start in what was regarded
+as a new atrocity.  The main reason for their lack of development
+on these lines was probably the fact that the most suitable
+type of gas only developed during the later stages of the war,
+when it was required exceedingly urgently on the front.
+No really harmful persistent compound appeared before the advent
+of mustard gas, and the dangerous non-persistent types,
+such as phosgene, could not have been used with great success,
+owing to the fact that very considerable quantities
+would have been required to produce any serious effect.
+Mustard gas, however, which could have haunted a city for days,
+would not have been required in such large quantities.
+But its more urgent need on the front, and the fact that soon
+after it arrived the Germans were sending out feelers to see whether
+the Allies would consider the cessation of chemical warfare,
+were probably sufficient reasons to explain their failure to use
+it from aeroplanes.
+
+Another point must be raised in connection with the use of gas
+from aircraft which has not yet received much attention.
+We must remember that the use of projectiles from aircraft
+over a city was a very different proposition from their use
+over a battle-field. One of the advantages of gas over explosives
+on the field of battle was its greater range of action.
+It produced effects at longer distances from the point of impact,
+but no such incentive existed for the use of gas from aeroplanes
+over large cities.  Explosives, which might miss their
+objective on the field of battle, could not do so in a city.
+They were bound to hit something.  The load of the aeroplane
+is always important, and the essential is to carry, weight
+for weight, the material which will produce the most effect.
+There is no doubt what this will he when the persistent lethal
+compound arrives, and mustard gas would probably have been superior
+to explosives for use by German aircraft on British cities.
+
+Protective Development;--Individual Protection.--The question of protection
+against chemical attack presents some knotty problems for the future.  Let us
+glance at the broad lines of war development in this field and forecast their
+future in a speculative way.  Protection developed along two main lines.
+Individual protection covered the mask and any other protective appliance
+used by the individual soldier, while the term collective protection was
+applied to any method or appliance which afforded simultaneous protection
+for a number of individuals.
+
+In general, the former represented an attempt to purify the poisoned
+air actually inspired by the soldier, whereas the latter was an
+attempt to purify the atmosphere of a locality or to prevent its
+initial poisoning.  How far can the individual form of protection
+develop to meet the possibilities of the chemical attack?
+It certainly seems to have countered satisfactorily all the war
+attacks upon the respiratory system, although, as we have pointed out,
+the Germans might have failed, had we been sufficiently prompt
+in introducing our arsenic compounds.  But we have forecasted the use
+of chemicals which may attack human functions hitherto immune.
+For the sake of our argument, we can divide these into two classes,
+those attained through the respiratory and digestive systems and
+those attained through contact with some other part of the body.
+The former can probably be satisfactorily met by developments
+in the mask.  Even that does not appear certain, when we
+remember the emphasis laid by Germany upon the possibility
+of penetrating the mask by using a particulate cloud.
+The last word has certainly not been spoken in the struggle
+between the mask and the chemical attempting to penetrate it.
+But both the introduction of mustard gas and general speculative
+grounds justify us in concluding that attacks may materialise upon
+other parts of the human organism, We cannot foresee the actual
+point of attack and can, therefore, only view with assurance
+some form of protection which covers the whole body.
+
+Collective Protection.--All parties dabbled in such a form of protection,
+but the French were the only ones to make a large-scale experiment
+on the front.  It was not very successful, for the burden of these
+oilskin suits was intolerable.  It may be that some successful form
+of protection for the whole body will materialise, but on general
+grounds we can assume that development will follow other lines.
+What are the possibilities?  They all lie in the direction of
+collective protection.  The individual cannot be satisfactorily
+protected from the new gas and remain an efficient soldier.
+We must, therefore, see whether it is not possible to protect numbers
+of men by removing them from contact with the poisoned atmosphere.
+A stationary form of such protection was used by all the armies,
+but emphasised by the French, by the creation of a large number of enormous
+underground chambers, some capable of holding more than a thousand men,
+the entries to which were carefully protected by special filtering
+devices to prevent the entry of the poisoned external atmosphere.
+On the British front these enormous dug-outs, although not absent,
+were largely replaced by the efficient gas-proof organisation
+of the smaller dugouts.  The use of impregnated blankets for this
+purpose must be well known to any who visited the front or took part
+in hostilities.  But you cannot imprison a whole army in this way.
+The value of these collective protective chambers depended on the fact
+that a certain number of men were always on the alert in the defensive
+systems outside and around the chambers, exposed to those gases
+against which the latter chambers were devised.
+
+In my opinion, the further intensive development of gas warfare,
+such as would have accompanied, say, the doubling or quadrupling
+of the German factory output, would have forced us into realising
+the limit of this collective protection.  It would have compelled
+us to immobilise, in these shelters, more men than was consistent
+with the safety of the zone in question.  Undoubtedly, the future
+of collective protection lies in some form which will leave
+the soldier his combatant powers, in other words some mobile form.
+This has already been forecasted by Colonel Fuller in his book on
+_Tanks in the Great War_.  But he passes lightly over the protection
+of the tank against gas.  With the increase in depth of infected zones,
+through the increasingly lethal nature of the persistent compound,
+the tank will he compelled to rely on filtration methods of protection,
+instead of the use of compressed oxygen in a gas-tight compartment.
+Once committed to the use of oxygen, the only safe procedure will
+be to close up the tank and employ the oxygen while there is any
+suspicion of the presence of gas, and, under these conditions,
+oxygen transport would become a factor militating against
+the prime purpose of the tank, the transport of troops and arms.
+It is safe to forecast a tense struggle between chemical weapons
+and protective tank devices in the event of future wars.
+
+Conclusion.--The facts which we have surveyed in early chapters,
+and the development foreshadowed above, form part of a much
+wider subject, for they are but one aspect of scientific warfare.
+In what main directions has science modified or revolutionised
+modern war?  Its influence has touched practically every weapon
+in manufacture or design, introducing profound modifications in
+many cases.  The sum total of such changes may be claimed to have
+revolutionised warfare, but the term revolution should be reserved,
+for some more specific scientific innovation, which threatens to change
+the nature of war rather than merely improve existing weapons.
+Modern wars have all echoed the popular cry for some new scientific
+principle or device to settle hostilities with one sharp stroke.
+This conception has been the sport of writers of fiction
+and others for many years.  The "electric" death-dealing ray,
+the all-powerful gas, the deadly bacteria, and the "explosion"
+wave have all shared in buoying up the hopes or quickening
+the fears of warring peoples.  Contrary to popular supposition,
+a decisive scientific military surprise of this nature is not likely
+to follow close on the heels of the discovery of a new phenomenon.
+It is more than eighty years since the mind of a Faraday delved
+so fruitfully into electrical science, yet the oft prophesied
+large scale direct use of high voltage electricity, or some
+other form in war has not materialised.  Organic chemistry was
+a well-founded branch of science early in the nineteenth century,
+and flourishing industries, fostered by it, were in existence
+thirty years ago, yet it was not until the early twentieth century,
+and the recent war, that we witnessed the rapid growth of organic
+chemical warfare, which, I claim, was as revolutionary as any
+other war development.  The physical sciences, have left their
+mark on every weapon and mechanical appliance, and the cumulative
+effect of these changes is indeed large, but the most revolutionary
+upheaval in warfare, with permanent results, came from chemistry.
+The flexible nature of organic chemistry must not be lost sight of.
+In the physical sciences, electricity, for example, years of
+co-ordinated world progress are required to produce an epoch-making
+discovery which might have critical and direct war significance.
+Radioactivity has shown us what undreamt-of energy is bound up
+in the atom, and many are the prophesies regarding the harnessing
+of these forces for constructive activities.  At least one prominent
+novelist has pictured their destructive use in the radioactive bomb.
+But the use of this wonderful store of energy for peace and war
+can only result from years of costly and voluminous research,
+and we have no idea of the difficulties involved in production,
+without which any invention, however telling and revolutionary,
+has no incidence on war.  But in organic chemistry a single worker,
+following up some rare family of compounds, may stumble
+upon a substance pot far removed chemically from related
+compounds yet infinitely more potent for war.  Mustard gas,
+or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, is a member of a group of compounds
+differing only slightly in chemical structure the one from the other.
+Yet its nearest chemical relative is comparatively harmless.
+The persistent lethal compound which will vastly change the nature
+of warfare will probably be but a slight chemical modification
+of some harmless substance, Thus, by comparison with other
+branches of science as the handmaids of war, organic chemistry
+is sympathetic, flexible, and theoretically capable of yielding
+revolutionary discoveries in a relatively short time.
+We can only base such speculations on general grounds.
+Circumstances may disprove our contention over a short historical period,
+but it will be borne out in the long run.  This is not the only reason,
+however, for the unique war importance of organic chemicals.
+It so happens that many of them are essential to our daily life,
+as dyes, drugs, photographic and other synthetic products.
+Industries, therefore, have arisen for their manufacture.
+And this is not all.  Organic chemical factories have proved to be
+not only arsenals in disguise but endowed with the flexibility
+of their parent, the science itself.  The factories and plants
+ignore the war significance of the problems put to them.
+They can develop the production of practically any chemical
+which research can produce.  The will of man can thus silently
+and swiftly convert the dye factory into an arsenal.
+
+These inherent possibilities of organic chemistry, flexibility in research
+and production, make chemical warfare the most important war problem
+in the future reconstruction of the world.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI
+
+HUMANE OR INHUMANE?
+
+
+A good deal of abuse has been showered on chemical warfare
+methods by those who understand very little about them.
+It has been claimed by such that gas is particularly atrocious.
+Feeling on the matter has been so strong in certain
+quarters that the fact that all war is particularly vile
+and atrocious seems to have been completely lost sight of.
+Let us take up this matter in a rational way.  In the first place,
+what do we mean by the atrocity or inhumanity of a weapon?
+We can either appeal to the imagination or the reason, in the
+first case, by visualising the battlefields, or, in the second,
+by making a cold analysis of the casualties caused by gas.
+
+Nature of Gas Casualties.--Every normal person who experienced
+and survived the throes of the different stages of the war,
+and of the different gas surprises, mainly German, which were
+sprung upon us, finds it difficult to think out, or express,
+a cool and balanced view on the question of poison gas.
+But such a balanced view is most important for the future.
+It must be remembered that the official protests in 1915 arose
+on the grounds, to use Lord Kitchener's words, that "they
+employed these poisonous methods to prevail when their attack,
+according to the rules of war, might have otherwise failed."
+Had the rules of war permitted their use, we should, no doubt,
+have been protected.  But these protests, submerged in popular
+sentiment, became an outcry against the atrocity of the new weapon.
+This, a just criticism at the time, became inaccurate
+when the Allies reacted, methods of protection developed,
+and the specific tactical uses of gas were realised.
+The view of the peculiar atrocity of gas has outlived the truth
+of war experience with regard to it.  We agree that chemical
+warfare is atrocious.  But it is no exception, for thus are all
+the aggressive methods of warfare.  Indeed, when we attempt
+to interpret atrocity in terms of available casualty statistics,
+we find that gas is slightly less atrocious than the other weapons.
+We must either incline to this view or dispute the figures,
+which are authoritative.  Consider the American figures.
+These will he more truly representative than our own,
+because their troops were only exposed during the later
+and more developed phases of the war.  Of the total strength
+of the A.E.F., the number gassed was about six per cent., wounded
+by rifle and machine-gun fire about one per cent., wounded
+by high explosive one and a half per cent., shrapnel wounds
+three percent., and bayonet wounds less than one half per cent.
+But although enemy gas caused more than 70,000 casualties, yet of
+these only one and a half per cent.  were fatal, while the total
+number of deaths for all types of casualties was thirty per cent.
+Thus against the American army, measured by casualties produced,
+gas was by far the most effective, and yet by far the least
+deadly weapon.  What can be more atrocious than the actual cone
+of tens or even hundreds of dead and wounded invariably left
+before an untouched machine-gun emplacement in an assault?
+What is more horrible than the captured first line trench after
+its treatment by the preparatory bombardment, or the mutilation
+of men peacefully sleeping in billets behind the battle front
+and thrown, broken and bloody, through their billet walls
+under the wheels of passing transport, as one has seen them?
+
+The whole experience of real war is beyond adjectives.
+But, leaving impressions, let us turn to facts.
+With regard to the future and from the point of view of atrocity,
+gas has a hopeful outlook as compared with other weapons.
+This may seem a curious statement to make, but consider the following.
+We cannot envisage advances in the use of explosives in shell or bomb
+to render them more humane.  Explosives, if their development be pressed,
+can only become more violent, with a wider range of action.
+Chemical warfare may follow the same lines, but it has
+the unique possibility of developing on more humane lines.
+The vesicant action of mustard gas produced huge casualties with
+relatively little permanent harm.  Chemicals may be found which
+temporarily influence human functions, enabling military objectives
+to be attained with a remarkably small amount of pain and death.
+In a fair review of the whole situation, this possibility cannot
+be overlooked.  It is more than possible that a League of Nations,
+compelled to employ an element of force in its eventual control
+of peace, may find its most effective and humane weapon in some
+chemical development.  However visionary these views may appear,
+they are not unjustified as scientific possibilities.
+Analysis of war gas casualties reveal two main trends.
+As the struggle became more intense the number of casualties multiplied.
+They were considerable during the first period of cylinder attack,
+and the rate remained steady until the beginning of the mustard
+gas period.  From the summer of 1917 to November, 1918,
+there were more than ten times as many gas casualties as for
+the preceding three years of war.  But the percentage mortality,
+the number of deaths amongst each hundred men attained,
+decreased considerably.  As high as twenty-five per cent.
+during the early cylinder attacks, it decreased to two and a
+half per cent.  for the huge number of mustard gas cases.
+Yet mustard gas was an exceedingly important military factor.
+It illustrates the possibility of development on these lines,
+but we must by no means disregard the atrocity of chemical warfare,
+and safeguards are required for the future.
+
+We cannot do better than conclude by quoting from General Hartley's
+report to the British Association.  He says:
+
+
+"The general impression that gas is an inhumane weapon is derived partly
+from the German breach of faith in using it contrary to the Hague Convention,
+and partly from the nature and number of casualties in the earliest cloud
+attacks which were made against unprotected troops.  Under the stress of a
+long war the individual is apt to forget the physical and mental sufferings
+it involves, unless he is daily in contact with them, but a dramatic
+occurrence such as that of the first gas attack forces on the imagination
+the brutal significance of war--the struggle for victory by killing--and the
+new weapon is judged as inhumane, like gunpowder in the fifteenth century.
+If we accept war as a possibility, the most humane weapon is that which leads
+to a decision with the smallest amount of human suffering and death.
+Judged from this standpoint, gas compares favourably with other weapons during
+the period when both sides were fully equipped for offence and defence.
+The death-rate among gas casualties was much lower than that among casualties
+from other causes, and not only was the death-rate lower, but a much
+smaller proportion of the injured suffered any permanent disability.
+There is no comparison between the permanent damage caused by gas,
+and the suffering caused to those who were maimed and blinded by shell
+and rifle fire.  It is now generally admitted that in the later stages
+of the war many military objects could be attained with less suffering
+by using gas than by any other means.
+
+Sargent's Picture.--"The judgment of future generations on the use
+of gas may well be influenced by the pathetic appeal of Sargent's
+picture of the first `Mustard Gas' casualties at Ypres, but it must
+not be forgotten in looking at that picture that 75 per cent.
+of the blinded men he drew were fit for duty within three months,
+and that had their limbs and nerves been shattered by the effects
+of high explosive, their fate would have been infinitely worse."
+
+
+Need for Safeguards.--We have continually referred to the need
+for safeguards instead of mere reliance on prohibition.
+Such views and facts as the above should be more generally
+known in order that very worthy sentiments may not impel us
+to adopt an unsound solution for future peace.  However alarmed
+and revolted we may have been in 1915 and later during the war,
+it is essential to take a balanced view in the present critical
+period of reconstruction.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII
+
+CHEMICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT
+
+
+Preceding chapters have shown how chemical warfare has now
+become a normal, technical, and increasingly important part
+of the science of war.  Further, it has opened vast possibilities,
+the limits of which it is very difficult to fix.
+
+The Treaty of Versailles.--Chemical warfare received definite attention
+in the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles.  Lord Moulton,
+one of the few Allied representatives who realised the full importance of
+the matter, has drawn attention to its Treaty aspect in a recent speech.
+He lays emphasis on the fact that the full significance of the German
+dye industry was not realised during the war.  Referring to its
+chameleon-like nature in peace and war, Lord Moulton says:
+"All this was imperfectly present to my mind throughout the war,
+and I was aware of the gravity of the matter, but until I learnt
+what had passed in Germany I could not appreciate it fully.
+I have spoken to you of the extent to which the Germans turned
+their chemical works into general works for supplying explosives.
+I have not touched the part in which they played the most deadly
+game against us, and that was where they used their chemical works
+to produce those toxic gases."
+
+The same statement tells us, "The knowledge that I have gleaned
+as to what was going on in Germany during the war makes me
+feel that all my anticipa-tions of the importance of chemical
+industries in time of war, all the views that I expressed
+of that importance, did not nearly approach what has been
+proved to have gone on in the enemy's country during the war."
+He then proceeds to explain how a clause was inserted in the
+treaty--"whereby the Germans have to tell us all the secrets of their
+manufacture of explosives, all their methods of making toxic gases--
+in fact, all the military secrets that made them so terrible.
+This clause was a very just one.  It is not fair that when we
+have gone through this agonising struggle, and when we are still
+suffering from the consequences of all the wealth of knowledge
+and ingenuity which they employed for their infamous purposes--
+it is not fair, I say, to allow them to keep these secrets
+to themselves, and I think you will agree with me it was in the highest
+degree consonant with justice that we should make them reveal
+them all to us."  Small wonder that we missed this vital point,
+that we failed to fathom the force behind the German chemical war,
+if such an eminent authority was left groping for the truth.
+There was no time for mature reflection with the problems
+of war supply pressing forward in an endless stream.
+Lord Moulton was himself responsible for the brilliant solution
+of the most important, the problem of explosives supply.
+
+The realisation of the facts in question led to the direct
+admission of their importance in the Treaty.  Article 172,
+the one in question, states:  "Within a period of three
+months from the coming into force of the present Treaty,
+the German Government will disclose . . . the nature and mode
+of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other
+like chemical preparations used by them in the war, or prepared
+by them for the purpose of being so used."
+
+German Information.--This clause should be fulfilled in detail.
+In any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end,
+the Germans, in addition to those devices in operation, must have had
+a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation.
+It is important to get as much information as possible on this development.
+
+A striking fact emerges.  The years 1915, 1916, and the early part
+of 1917 witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were
+used by Germany on the front.  All the research and other work which
+precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier.
+What surprises, then, had the German laboratories in store for us after 1917?
+Have these been revealed under authority of the Treaty?
+
+Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation
+with regard to the Haber process.  Its critical importance in
+the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use
+the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace.
+This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely
+responsible for the three years of war agony which followed.
+It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its
+claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry.
+To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten
+the greater ideal of world peace.
+
+Limitation of Armament.--This clause, covering only war development,
+cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future.
+It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome
+of Allied success and the German breach of faith.
+But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance
+of chemical warfare for the future.  Article 171 states:
+"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of
+analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited,
+their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden
+in Germany.  The same applies to materials specially intended
+for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products
+or devices."  What kind of guarantee is this?  How far is it
+supported by other disarmament?  It is very important to answer
+these questions.  In a sense the full execution of the other
+relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer.
+We deal with these in the next chapter.
+
+Report of the Hartley Mission.--Chemical warfare is the _point
+faible_ in world disarmament.  Judging from the above clause
+of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised.
+Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition.  The lesson
+of the war is not learnt.  The chemical menace is not countered.
+Why should this be?  There are two main reasons.  In the first place,
+very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch
+of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no
+direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions.
+The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of
+the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the
+solid facts of the case.  The great importance of the projector,
+the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery,
+and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army
+of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped.
+The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye
+factories for chemical warfare production.  But we have a shrewd
+idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed
+on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is,
+on the military value of chemical warfare.
+
+New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.--The second
+difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies
+in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain
+conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook.
+Let us examine the matter as simply as possible.
+
+During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles
+were suggested as a basis.  One which received recognition
+in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors
+or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover
+all projectile-throwing weapons.  Thus, in the sense implied,
+rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors.
+Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which,
+on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive
+shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely.
+This is true--with one most important qualification.
+Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector,
+the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence
+will decrease.  New forms of chemical weapon will evolve.
+Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one
+can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector,
+and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors
+can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated.
+These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a
+field or heavy gun.  But there is one serious exception
+to the covering power of this method of limitation.
+You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors,
+but you can run a chemical campaign without them.
+
+Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations
+or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume
+armament reduced to a police basis.  In other words, the use
+of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum
+required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace,
+and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war.
+The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material
+within certain prescribed bounds.  The work of the League
+of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here.
+We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions,
+in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted.  This may
+take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their
+inspection by the League.  Here we meet with considerable difficulty.
+Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can
+be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world
+inspecting the administration and organisation of the other.
+The matter becomes an absurdity.
+
+Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.--Considering the present
+trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring
+limitation into three classes--the combatants, and weapons
+of a mechanical and chemical nature.
+
+Tank Disarmament.--A little thought will show that the limitation
+of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types,
+and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility
+of inspection.  Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check
+against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry,
+for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns.
+If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank,
+we find it no exception to the above remarks.  Without projectors, that is,
+machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops
+and material from one place to another.
+
+Two possibilities then arise.  The number of tanks required
+might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light
+projectors without entering upon large-scale production.
+Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon
+without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance.
+This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit
+the output of the tank itself.  Are such steps possible?
+We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become,
+a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number
+of special parts which normal industry does not provide,
+and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection
+with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors.
+We now come to the third type requiring limitation under
+a disarmament scheme.
+
+Chemical Limitation.--Can we limit chemical armament?
+Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so,
+unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry
+which is essential for world progress by its contribution
+of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities.  The factories
+of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted
+into arsenals than any other type.  It is true that, under normal
+conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign
+might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery.
+But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited,
+the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance.
+One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development
+of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without
+a complicated form of projector, or with none at all.  Having thus
+shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions
+of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question.
+What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare?
+
+Research.--In the first place, can any research results accrue under
+Treaty or League conditions?  The chief poison gases used during
+the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research
+which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical.
+Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on
+the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine.
+Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects
+of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called
+radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds
+of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member.
+This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members
+of the series were harmless.
+
+These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research.
+We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially
+directed towards their discovery, but it is practically
+impossible to control such work.  The research worker's nearest
+confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was
+developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare.
+No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon
+such research.  If, then, the Government of any country desires
+to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for
+chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY
+international arrangements, however prohibitive.
+
+Production.--But what of production?  Here, again, we have an entirely
+different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun.
+Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new
+organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last
+step produces the toxic substance.  This is a fair assumption.
+Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection,
+_i.e_. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously
+toxic properties.  Given a big organic chemical industry,
+there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control.
+With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they
+will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other
+commercial organic product.  The products of these first reactions can
+either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction,
+in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction
+can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through
+a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container.
+The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a
+problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial
+secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled
+owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced.
+The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch
+with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs.
+
+Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment.  They cover a very wide
+range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and
+rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit.
+Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance
+to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical
+works with which we are acquainted.  Even under such favourable
+conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult.
+Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant,
+and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or
+finished materials.  For the inspection of suspected poison
+gas production, an examination of the first two would be of
+no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical.
+Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks.
+Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred
+different compounds at the same time, and each one of these
+compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages.
+The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown
+the plant for the manufacture of _p_-amidophenol, an important
+dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building
+filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides,
+"We have no special plant for the product you mention;
+we make it in this building with a great many other products,
+for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one
+product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety."
+In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked
+eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed
+by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another.
+It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct
+chemical tests at the different stages.  The difficulty of inspection
+is incontestable.  It could be done with a large staff, but we
+must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small
+corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection.
+Even under the most favourable conditions for detection,
+the chances are exceedingly small.  But, in most cases, an enemy
+with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake
+manufacture during peace.  He could rely on the potentialities
+of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence
+production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war.
+The question of the use of the chemical then arises.
+If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take
+its share of use in the limited number of guns available;
+on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very
+simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised
+in the future.
+
+Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case.
+The latest German designs have a range well over a mile.
+This range maybe increased.  Yet the Livens projector can
+be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant,
+in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced.
+The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy
+is not required, and simplification of production of the gas
+projector follows naturally.  We conclude from the above that
+whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting
+chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods
+of control, and must find safety in some other measure.
+
+Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.--There is a fundamental
+difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war.
+This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method
+from the point of view of disarmament.  All the modern mechanical types
+of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy,
+witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts,
+the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future
+tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices.
+This characteristic of great structural development has certain
+concomitants which are of considerable military importance.
+It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories
+for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts.
+It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance.
+All this brings control and inspection within the region of the
+theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise.
+The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions
+in military training.  It takes a definite period of time to create
+a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves.
+He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs.  He must be trained.
+The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance,
+such as the tank.  In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check
+on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament.
+
+But consider the chemical method.  The specific property
+of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately
+its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties
+or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops.
+There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical
+structure of the substance in question.  This, however,
+does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for
+the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense.
+In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical
+the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers,
+pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind.
+Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale
+conditions on the research.  Nor is it fair to say that from
+the point of view of production there is a parallel between
+the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it.
+The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were
+produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself
+when compared with the marvellous installation developed
+to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple
+sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production.
+Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly
+complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate
+temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium.
+Naturally, chemical engineering is very important,
+but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel
+with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a
+distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance.
+More than this, we believe that developments in both fields
+will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference.
+We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends
+to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be
+perfectly adequate for the mechanical type.
+
+Recent Disarmament Proposals.--A superficial examination of recent
+disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves
+one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal.
+But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical,
+but not cynical, frame of mind.  Disarmament depends for success on
+the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out
+of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely
+added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged
+supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war.
+The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements
+in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood.
+
+The great case and rapidity with which the German dye
+factories mobilised for poison gas production on a
+super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated.
+It took forty years and more to develop those factories.
+Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages
+of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others.
+In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual
+munitions long before the outbreak of war.  We must not remain
+insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon.
+When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America,
+with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison
+made in the same factories.  Even when our textile industries
+were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on
+which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas,
+each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life.
+But how does this touch disarmament?  Very simply.
+A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances
+will show that we are not pressing the point without need.
+But let us follow the matter through in a logical way.
+
+The Covenant of the League;--Need for Guarantees.--We start from
+the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations.  Article 8,
+recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point
+consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation
+and revision of plans for such reduction and states:
+"The members of the League undertake to interchange full
+and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
+their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such
+of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
+Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries.
+But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction
+with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague.  Thus, from
+Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague.
+These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion
+which has brought about so many wars.  Nations who put their
+trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League
+will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude.
+The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere
+do not give this assurance.  Something more definite is required,"
+and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered
+by an efficient disarmament scheme.
+
+[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_.  Major David Davies, M.P.
+
+
+"(_a_) Allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal
+order within its own boundaries, and sufficient also to furnish
+its quota for the League of Nations when required.
+
+"(_b_) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless
+by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation.
+
+"(_c_) Provide the League of Nations with an adequate force
+for immediate use.
+
+
+"All the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an
+International Police Force.  This scheme, which is given in
+the merest outline, is based on the assumption that our national
+security must always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before
+we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must
+be certain that the alternative offers complete protection."
+Other exponents emphasise this last essential.  This reference
+to an International Police Force raises an important issue.
+Such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations.
+Without any doubt, one of the most important contributions from
+the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and
+technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament
+conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries.
+
+Viscount Grey--"Germany Must Disarm First."--Viscount Grey,
+at the public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations
+on October 10th, 1918, stated:  "Germany must disarm first.
+She led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments.
+She must lead the way down the hill.  That as a first condition,
+from our point of view, goes without saying.  There can be no talk
+of disarmament until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed."
+One can only heartily agree with such expressions, but the
+_denouement_ brings a sense of disappointment.  There is a feeling
+that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution.
+The peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely
+admitted in these utterances.  Thus Major David Davies states:
+"If they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise
+a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack, it was more than
+possible that they would have completely broken the Allied line,"
+and Lord Grey, "You cannot limit the amount of merchant
+ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments,
+fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons
+of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships, aeroplanes,
+chemicals of all kinds."
+
+Left in this state the case is true but not complete.
+The essential point is that the new and telling types
+of armament will develop from these very peace industries.
+We are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude
+in a state of disarmament, but with the critical types which may
+develop from them.
+
+So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to counter the menace?
+In reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals,
+we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer
+weapons fall into two classes.
+
+Suggested Methods.--In the first place, it is suggested "that war's
+newest weapons--poison gas, aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery,
+and tanks, should be ceded to the League to form the _Headquarter's Force_,
+and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any
+new invention for warlike purposes.
+
+"There should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can
+claim long traditions.  Vested interests have not yet been created on
+a permanent footing.  Great disturbance would not be caused at present
+by the suggestion of denationalisation."
+
+This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is
+absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard,
+periodic "inspection."  Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and
+munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff,
+who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a
+nation other than that in whose territory they were situated."
+We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon
+to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G.
+for war purposes.  A distinction must be made between those weapons whose
+production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection.
+In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is
+difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy
+to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines."
+No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks
+and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods
+of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an
+elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament
+arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security.
+_*Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is
+difficult to prevent_.
+
+"Vested Interests."--With regard to the vested interests
+in the new method of warfare, the most striking example
+is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and
+the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast
+munition programme.  Few people have realised the existence
+of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation
+to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament
+to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly.
+For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety.
+While the sole big source of production of these substances
+exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter,
+no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground.
+
+"Handing Over" Inventions.--Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous
+ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over"
+to the League.  How can an invention be handed over?  If every country
+informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries
+would still be aware of them.  It is possible, commercially, to hand over any
+invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes.
+What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a
+valuable war invention?  Secondly, the cession of an invention to
+the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned.
+No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions.
+Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view,
+than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector,
+or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never
+know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye.
+World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries
+of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood.
+
+We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the
+possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this
+for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare.
+If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from
+a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League
+the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace.
+
+Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.--Let us face the facts.
+Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations
+and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature.
+We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most
+menacing munition plants in existence.  We knew the grave dangers of
+leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly.
+Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored.
+Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns.
+
+Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large
+scale production.  The former cannot be checked, and the latter
+cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion
+for war purposes.  Yet three distinct features of this weapon make
+the disarmament need imperative.
+
+In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament"
+as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons.
+The aggressive agent in war is the chemical.  All weapons,
+except the bayonet, depend upon it.
+
+In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important
+that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not,
+first and foremost, tackle this question.
+
+Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon
+than did Germany for chemical warfare.  Yet the levelling up process
+which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium,
+towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm.
+Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further
+increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war.
+
+This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war
+and disarmament.  Others will follow as science progresses.
+Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions,
+and therefore war incentive will be removed.  Sir Oliver Lodge
+prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy.
+The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war
+industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell.
+It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness.
+At present the chemical industry holds the field.
+
+Surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution
+of these organic chemical forces.  This, indeed, is the one solid
+chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about.
+
+The certain establishment of these industries in the chief
+countries outside Germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard
+of local politics and the reach of organised German attack.
+True, it is essential that no such support should in any way
+drug the will, weaken the initiative and impoverish the service
+of the fostered industries.  This must depend upon wise
+organisation and control in the country concerned.
+
+I claim, however, that it is one of the main duties of any League
+of Nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed
+two steps beyond the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant.  This runs
+as follows:  "The members of the League undertake to interchange
+full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
+their military, naval, and air programmes, and the conditions
+of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
+Such an exchange of information must be used, first, to isolate that
+industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period,
+either on account of its value as a universal check, or because it
+fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent.
+The chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions, for without it,
+all weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it includes the organic
+chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period.
+
+Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the existence
+of monopoly in this critical industry.  It may be objected
+that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws.
+But we must face the possibility that the war of the future
+can never be averted without such interference.  Indeed, if we
+accept the reports of the American Alien Property Custodian,
+this very monopoly which now threatens us was established
+by methods open to the same objections.  It is indeed an
+interesting question whether the German dye monopoly resulted
+from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law.
+Further, the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the
+industries which disarmament most concerns, governing technical
+changes are constantly occurring, and the normal home for
+the production of a whole range of chemical products may be
+shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials
+or new types of energy and power.  We must be ready, in certain
+critical cases, to regard disarmament as the paramount need.
+International agreement, through the League or otherwise,
+must find a suitable method to control the critical industry
+and prevent its use against world peace.
+
+To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its official guardian,
+does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international
+and national issue.  After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful,
+attempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on rational lines.
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+THE TREATY AND THE FUTURE
+
+
+I have endeavoured to present the facts of chemical warfare
+as briefly yet as truly as possible, giving a glimpse of the war
+possibilities inherent in this branch of applied chemical science.
+Nor have I ignored the hidden forces which inspired, stimulated,
+and supported the huge war chemical experiment.  The great Rhine
+factories of the I.G. still cast their shadow on the outer world,
+obscuring the issues of reconstruction.  This looming menace,
+its share in the past and future of chemical warfare, and the fatal
+growth of the latter present questions demanding an imperative answer.
+It is the weak point of world disarmament.
+
+The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in principle,
+but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled?
+
+Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions production to factories
+or works approved by the Allied and Associated Governments.  "All other
+establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall
+be closed down."
+
+True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants,
+have a dual function for peace and war.  But their recent vital
+use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope
+of the above clause.  Are they still equipped for war purposes?
+Very drastic action will have been necessary by the
+Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer.
+Has that action been taken?  If not, the I.G., a second Krupp,
+remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval
+but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent.
+of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually
+provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in
+synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none
+the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous.
+Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments
+voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast
+source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168?
+
+Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for
+the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised
+as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army,
+must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless."
+The most formidable examples of such excess production were,
+and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants
+of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives
+and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs
+of the German Army.  Why, then, should they be left.  intact?
+
+What is the authorised equipment of the German Army?  In the first
+place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden
+by the Treaty.  The plants in question are therefore all in excess
+of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless.
+At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at
+short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month.
+Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment?
+If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty.
+
+The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell.
+Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production
+of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available,
+could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production
+of little more than one day!
+
+Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade
+their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need?
+
+Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within
+the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by
+the Treaty.  It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants,
+or in special plants of the same type.  Germany's great
+advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly.
+The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are
+given below, under (A) and (B) :
+
+                              A         B              C
+     Country.            Dye Production,     Home Dye       Dye Production,
+                         1913.               Consumption.   1918,
+                         Tons           Tons           Tons
+     Germany             135,000        20,000         135,000
+                                                       (probably
+                                                       more)
+     Switzerland         10,000         3,000               12,000
+     France              7,500               9,430               18,000
+     U.K .               4,500               31,730         25,000
+     U.S.A               3,000               26,020         27,000
+     Other Countries          3,000               72,820         4,000
+                         ----           ----           ----
+     Total               163,000        163,000        221,000
+
+
+The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed.
+If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for
+poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war
+_raison d'etre_ unless the feeble production of other countries
+had even further diminished.
+
+Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption?  There is an
+increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum.
+Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed
+national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the
+exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly.
+Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered
+by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives.
+
+There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants.
+There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them.
+In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed
+because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon.
+Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty
+plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use,
+the claim could not be supported before neutral experts.  The Treaty
+provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants.
+Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this
+critical disarmament measure.  The need may justify Treaty exemption
+for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect
+is not so overwhelmingly important.  The matter demands examination.
+We can hardly conceive that this has not been done.  Are our missions
+equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter?
+In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry
+policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G.
+munition plants.  Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument.
+
+The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubtedly demand
+the same critical examination.  These plants were built almost
+entirely for war purposes, for the production of ammonia to be
+oxidised to nitric acid.  Ammonium nitrate also resulted.
+These substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, as a
+matter of fact, their production in these very plants was the chief
+factor which enabled Germany to continue the war beyond 1915.
+
+Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, the plants
+should "be destroyed or rendered useless."  Here, possibly,
+strong arguments will be advanced by Germany for the retention
+of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil.
+The argument is strong, for the impoverishment of German soil
+has been such as to demand, theoretically, enormous tonnages
+of ammonium sulphate.  But it is vital, for the stability
+of peace, that this unique capacity for producing explosives
+must not remain the monopoly of any one country.
+It is the expressed intention of certain governments outside
+Germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise.  If, then,
+we admit the immunity of these German plants from the Treaty,
+for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow Germany
+to use this privilege as a military advantage.
+
+In other words, if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions.
+In the first place, the plants to evade the Treaty clauses must
+be proved necessary for German agriculture.  Secondly, the products
+of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other.
+As far as we know, no attempt has been made to apply the Treaty
+to the nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead of being
+mainly used for agriculture on German soil, have served as a deliberate
+weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries.
+
+Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full
+demands of German agriculture were met, the plants built and projected
+leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use.
+According to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of November 23rd, 1919, the total
+consumption of nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as follows:
+
+                                        Tons
+     Source and Nature        Tons      Calculated as
+                                   Nitrogen
+     Chili Saltpetre          750,000   116,000
+     Ammonium Sulphate   460,000,  92,000
+     Norwegian Nitrate   35,000    4,500
+     Calcium Cyanamide   30,000    6,000
+     Haber Ammonium Sulphate
+          (by Fixation)  20,000    4,000
+                                   -------
+          Total                         222,500
+
+
+The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the capacity of the finished
+Haber plants to be equivalent to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum,
+and the total consumption of the old German Empire was thus less than
+the amount available from one source alone, _i.e_. nitrogen fixation
+by the Haber process.  But other pre-war German sources of nitrogen,
+expanded by the war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota.
+We can therefore very safely assume German capacity of above 400,000 tons
+of nitrogen per annum, approximately twice the pre-war consumption.
+It is exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually consume such
+a quantity.  In any case, a large excess is now deliberately used
+to recapture world chemical markets, and this, as explained above,
+should be dealt with under the Treaty even if special immunity be afforded
+the capacity required for home purposes.  We are indeed entitled to ask,
+what is being done on this vital matter?
+
+Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind
+into Germany.  Considered from the point of view of chemical munitions,
+this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation.
+Far from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves Germany the greatest
+potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world.
+Further, it is not improbable that countries outside Germany
+may encourage her in munitions production for export.
+Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in December, 1914:
+"Supposing our War Minister had been in the last few years
+buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness,
+and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp's
+of Essen.  Gentlemen, I think he would have been lynched about
+three months ago."
+
+We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days!
+Knowing the true war significance of the I.G. as a second Krupp,
+if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries,
+that warning may become a prophecy.
+
+Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous
+materials in Germany.
+
+Has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control?
+With such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production,
+need Germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace?
+Once engaged in war, what is the value of the prohibition?
+True, failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of
+the Treaty.  But a similar breach of International Convention is
+already involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 171:
+"The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc."
+
+It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties be actually
+incurred for the existing breach, why Article IV would be a serious
+deterrent for the future.
+
+A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this Treaty Article,
+and the actual operation of other Articles which should support it.
+
+The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference
+to chemical warfare.  They issued a special edict against its use.
+This alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of
+the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures of general application
+to the means of production of the different types of weapon.
+Have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic
+action under the Treaty?  It is to be feared that they and other war
+chemical plants of the I.G. have received undeserved immunity.
+
+Where lies our help apart from the Treaty?  World peace
+depends upon disarmament.  True peace must come from a
+radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals.
+The forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers.
+But a League of Nations can forward the cause by wise measures
+of disarmament, and this implies limiting war producing capacity.
+The weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry.
+There must be a redistribution of capacity, for while Germany retains
+a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions,
+which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas,
+and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration
+and sustenance, disarmament will be a hollow farce.
+
+The League of Nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production
+of certain munitions.  But organic chemical factories must survive
+for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity.
+They cannot be inspected and controlled, as we have shown,
+and there is only one sound solution.  The obstacle to peace must
+be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories.
+We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country.
+It now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created
+and wielded it with such success.  Redistributed, this dangerous
+productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength
+to a League of Nations, and will invite a national sense of security,
+so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime.
+This has only one meaning, the establishment of dye industries
+in Allied countries.  This may clash with certain political schools
+of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of
+the organic way in which production links up with national defence.
+But let there be no misunderstanding.  The refusal to support this
+critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues.
+Political principles responsible for such opposition no longer
+merit the name; they have become a fetish.
+
+Our armies repelled the German chemical attack.
+They stood and fell unprotected before the early German clouds
+and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas.
+The awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more
+than rest contented with the sacrifice.  It is an imperative
+and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the race,
+and to the Empire, that, faced once again with modern war,
+we should be able to say, "every possible precaution was taken."
+But the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic
+chemical industries are fostered on Imperial soil.
+
+But what of chemical warfare itself?  It is a growth,
+malignant or otherwise, according to our creeds, which will continue
+until very definite steps be taken to suppress it, with all war.
+Therefore, urgent guarantees for national safety are absolutely
+essential until the web of peace is strongly organised, which cannot
+be until the immediate menace of the monopoly in production is removed.
+But even then, until the general peace is fairly implanted,
+we must be ready for any surprise from an unscrupulous enemy.
+Research and training in chemical protection must be continued, and this
+can only be ensured by keeping abreast with offensive chemical warfare.
+"The Struggle for the Initiative" has at least established this.
+
+Each nation and any League of Nations must seriously face the question of
+the establishment of elaborate and complex chemical warfare organisations.
+It seems to me that the logical course of thought and action is as follows.
+If guarantees are forthcoming, internationally, removing this grave German
+chemical warfare threat through her manufacturing monopoly, then the need for
+a definite chemical striking force and organisation will be greatly reduced.
+National safety is itself a corollary of world disarmament.
+But if satisfactory guarantees were forthcoming it would be consistent
+with national safety to limit the chemical warfare equipment of each
+nation to what would actually represent a scientific military brain.
+So long as national ministries for war or defence exist, they must possess
+even under the most stringent disarmament conditions, fully accredited
+within their regular staffs, an individual or individuals with scientific
+and military training, who represent knowledge, vision, and the power
+to expand in chemical warfare.  What would be said of a great nation
+not equipped to think for the future on naval or artillery questions?
+Technical naval and military minds have evolved for these purposes.
+We are not slow to judge and act on the value of a new ship, tank,
+or machine-gun. The chemical arm is even more specialised and demands
+the same combination of scientific and military thinking and training.
+Whatever international disarmament decisions may be forthcoming,
+unless they seriously dismember the Defence Ministries, we should ensure
+that the pre-war position is corrected and that our staff conception
+and organisation covers the chemical weapon.
+
+One alone of the Allied and Associated Powers was able to see
+the chemical menace with clear and unprejudiced vision.
+This was America, for she not only entered the war less hampered
+by traditions than the rest, but at a period when the chemical
+war was in full blast.  More than a quarter of all her casualties
+were due to "gas," and no other arm produced as many in her ranks.
+As a result, we see America establishing an independent peace
+Chemical Warfare Service, as sister service to the Infantry
+and Artillery.  This can only be interpreted as a frank realisation
+of the place of chemical warfare and of the need for serious
+international guarantees in the present situation.
+
+Let us take a balanced view of the facts, realise the unique significance
+of chemical warfare and chemical industry, for war and disarmament,
+and act accordingly.
+
+
+
+INDEX {Raw OCR, needs fixed or stripped out...}
+
+A. charcoal, 129.  Aircraft, gas and, 181, 185, 229, 230, 231.
+Aisne, German attacks on, 77, 141.  Aktien Gesellschaft
+fur Anilin Fabrikation, 151.  Alert Gas Zone, 229.
+Alien Property Custodian, report of, Y9, 152, 187, 189) 190, 191,
+194~ 262.  Allied Gas Statistics, 82.  -Missions, 86,
+87-Reaction, 48.  American activities, 64, 1731 174.
+-chemical warfare development, 105, 173P 174, 178, 273f 274.
+chemical warfare service, 49, 178P 3179) 274.  Amidol, 203.
+Ammonia, synthetic, see Nitrogen Fixation.  Anaesthetics, 201, 220.
+-local, 199, 202, 220.  Anti-Gas Committee, British, 95.
+-Department, British, 98, 127.  Armendires, bombardment of, 77.
+Arras, Battle of, 63-, British 1917 offensive, 61.
+Arsenic Compounds, 26, 28, 69, 136, 137) 139, x6o, x63- See also
+Blue Cross.  Artillery Gas experts, 91.  Asphyxiating Compounds, 25.
+Aspirin, 199, 208.
+
+Austria-Hungary, gas battalion of, 47.  Azo Dyes, 16o.
+
+Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, 88, 1151P 207P 212.
+Bleaching Powder, x6g, 221, 222.  Blue Cross, 29, 69, 74-771 89,
+126, 131P 132, 136p 137, z6o, 229, 253, 258.  Bn.  Stuff, 42.
+Box Respirator, British, 69, 99,
+
+1101P 125, x26t 176.  Bribery and Corruption, x9o.
+British Association, General Hartley's report, 64, 123, 240.--
+Central Laboratory, 93,1115. -Dyes Limited, 116g, x6g.  Brominated m
+ethyl -ethylketone, 42.  Bromine, American Industry, 157) 190, 191.
+-French, 1157, 171P z96.  -Monopoly, German, 157.  Bromoacetone, 26, 41.
+B. Stuff, 4r.  Buntkreuz, ii3q.
+
+Cacodyl oxide, 35.  Cambrai sector, attack Or', 70, 79.
+Camouflage chemicals, 141, 217, 218.  Canadians, gas attack on, 19.
+Captured Documents, 52, 53t 74, 82, 128, 133, 221, 222, 229.
+Carnoy, attack at, 61.  27S Index
+
+Cartridge Mask, German, 124, 3128.  Castner Kellner, 169.
+Casualties, gas, 56, 93, X74, 182, 237-241, 274.  Chaulny, 209.
+Chemical Advisory Committee, 96.  -Exchange Association,
+x94, z96.  -Initiative, see Initiative, struggle for.
+-Policy, German, z86-i8S, 200, 205.  -Warfare Department, British,
+96-98.--Designs Committee, 99.--Medical Committee, 97.
+-Organisations, 85, 215, 217, 228, 239, 264.  ngliSh, 92, 9'~,--' E
+
+103~ 105, 165.--, French, 94, 99, 100, 105.--, German,
+85, 89, 102, 103, 149.  Italian, iox.  Policy, 88, 249p 250.
+Production, see Production.  Research, see Research.--Service, American,
+see American Chemical Warfare Service.  Chemische Fabrik
+Griesheim Elektron, iSi, 152.--Fabriken Yorm.  Weilerter-Meer, x5x.
+Chloral Hydrate, 196, 202.  Chlorine, 23, Z5, 35, 36, x55, 156, 169,
+171p 217.  276
+
+ChlormethylchIoroform ate, 64,6 9.  Chloroform, z20.  Chlorpicrin, 25, 158,
+169.  Cloud Gas attacks, 23, 46~ Szy 56, 57, 65, 215.  Coloured Cross, x39.
+Colour Users Association, Y69.  Commercial Advisory Committee, British, 96.
+Critical Industries, 261-z63, 272.  -Range, 226, 229.
+
+Defence, national, see Dye Industry and National Defence.
+Dianisidine, double salts Of, 41.  Dichlor-diethyl-sulphide, see
+Mustard Gas.  Dichlor-methylether, x63.  Diethfiamine, 201.
+Diphenylchlorarsine, see Arsenic compounds.  Diphenylcyanarsine, see
+Arsenic compounds.  Diphosgene, 25, 29, 157, 163.  Directeur du
+Mat6riel Chimique de Guerre, ioo.  Director of Gas Services,
+94, 98.  Disarmament, 20, 2,~, 142, 145, 150, 172t 177,
+242, 245, 246, 252, 254-262, 267, 271-274. See also Limitation
+of Armaments.  Drugs, igg-2or. Dumps, enemy, 79# 141.
+Dye Agency, German information system, r92, x93, 1957 197.
+-Industry and National Defence, 163, 171t 172t 198, 203, 204, 272.
+-Industry, British, 146, 168, 203~ 204-
+
+Index
+
+Dye Industry, German, 146, 147, 153$ x86, 242, 25 -Monopoly, German, see
+Monopoly, German Dye.  supplies to America, 197.  Dyes, use in Gas Shell, 72.
+Edgewood Arsenal, xo5, xo6, 175-178Entressin experimental grounds,
+
+110.  Espionage, 192, 193Ether, 220.  Fthyldichlorarsine, x63.
+Ethylenemonochlorhydrin, x64, 202.  P-Eucaine, 202.
+Exhaustion of Stocks, forced, go.  Explosives, English Production, x6g.
+German Production, i4q, 1150) 1151.  Farben fabriken vorm.  Fr.  Bayer
+
+and CO., 90, 15T, 194, 208.  Farbwerke vorm.  Meister Lucius and Briining,
+87, 151Field Organisation, British, go.--German, go.  -Tests, 86, xio.
+Flame Projector, see Flammenwerfer.  Flammenwerfer, 43, 631, 72)
+73Flexibility of Supply, German, 65, 138.  French College of Warfare, 185.
+Full Line Forcing, x9o.  Future of Chemical Warfare, 14-4, 183.
+
+Gas and Aircraft, see Aircraft.  -Casualties, see Casualties, gas.
+-Discipline, 62, 81-82, 132P 133, 140-
+
+Gas Experts on Artillery staffs, see Artillery Gas Experts.  -Mask, see
+Mask, gas, and Helmet, gas.--Personnel, 89.--Regiment~ go,
+gi.--School, German, 86, go, gi.  -Shell, see Shell, gas.
+-Specific uses Of, 39Gaswerfer, 1918, 71Gelbolin, 221.
+German Dye Industry, see Dye Industry, German.  Patent Policy,
+see Patent Policy, German.  Press, 33, 54.  -Production, see
+Production, German.  Givenchy, attack near, 51, 70Green Cross,
+29, 69P 77, 135, ,36, i5g.
+
+Haber Process, see Nitrogen.  Fixation.  Hague Convention, 32, 33,
+240Hanlon Field, experimental sta tion, 175, 2318Hartley Mission,
+87, 14 149,
+
+172, 207, 245.  Heeres-Gasschule, see Gas
+
+School, German.  Helmet, Gas, X21, 122, 124- See also Mask.  Hexamine, x22.
+Hill 6o, attack on, 40.  Hindenburg Programme, 66, 89, 149.
+116chst, Y7, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, x6x.  Hohenzollern Redoubt,
+storming Of, 51.  Hooge, attack on 2nd Army, 44.  277 I ndex
+
+Hydrocyanic acid, see Prussic acid,
+
+I.G., see Interessen Gemeinschaft.  Immune Functions, 217, 2x8, 232.
+Imperial College of Science, 97Indigo, 28, 155t 158,
+159, 165, x68, 202, 255.  Initiative, Struggle for, 111, 121,
+1347 273Interessen Gemeinschaft, 18, 32, 86, 89, 109P 148,
+149-151, z54, 163, x86, 187, 192, 198, 200, 202, 205, 214, 258-26o,
+264-267, 27P.  Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, 107-Commission
+of Control, $5, 264.--Liaison, xo6.--Munitions Council, 107.
+Intensive Chemical Warfare, 66.  International Police Force, 256.
+
+Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 35, 85, $9. Kalle and Co., 151, Kernmel, attack on,
+77, 224, 229.  K. Stuff, 41KornmandeurderGastruppen,gi, Krupp's Works, 206.
+
+La Bassie Canal, 76.  LachrymatorS, 26, 42, x18, 124, 156, 170,
+2171 218.  League of Nations, 2r, 127, 259, 246, 247, 255,
+256, 258, 26o, 261, 262, 2631 271-273Lens, attack at, 77, 76.
+Le Rutoire Farm, 43, Leopold Cassella, G.m.b.H., 3151.
+Leverkusen, 86, go, z4g, r5lt 156-158, L59, z61, 208, 250.
+Levinstein Limited, x68, 16q.  278
+
+Lewis Gun, 252.  Limitation of Armament, 114, 244-248, 254,
+264, 265, 267See also Disarmament.  Livens Projector,
+29, 6o, 41, 65, 90) IOT, 133, 175, 2x6, 227) 228, 245, 252.
+Longworth Bill, 178.  Loos, Battle Of, 43, 50, ix8f 170Ludwigshafen,
+88, 151, i56p 159# r6o, x61.
+
+M2, French Mask, 135.  March, 19x8, German Offensive,
+17, 69, 76, 219, 224Marne, Battle of, 94, 143, 205Mask, first
+improvised gas, 121.  See also Helmet, gas.--German cartridge,
+see Cartridge Mask, German.--M2 French, see M2, French Mask.
+resistance of, to breathing, 130, 1311 140MetOl, 203.  Minist6re de
+I'Artillerie et des Munitions, 200.  Monchy, attack at, 55.
+Monopoly, Germany Dye, z8, 38, 148, i8g, 198, 214, 266.
+Montauban attack, 55.  Munitions Inventions Department, 97.
+Mustard Gas, 27-29, 28, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 78, 8r, 89, xig,
+136t 1137, 141, 158, 170, 216, 217, 221, 224, 230, 236, 240,
+2491 255, 258, 272.--Allied Production, 8o, 81, zo,4, 164Y 165,
+x68, 171-casualties, 69', 224#
+
+Index
+
+Mustard Gas, defensive use of, 229.--- first use of, 66~ 67, 215.
+German production, 158, 202.  protection a g a i n I t, 137, 221, 222.
+Surprise, 66, 67, 69.
+
+National Health Insurance Commission, 164, 201.  Neglect of Chemical Industry,
+
+171, 187New War Chemicals, see War Chemicals.  Nieuport, 66, 67,
+217Nitric Acid, 171.  Nitrogen Fixation, 88, 171s z86, 205, 208,
+211-213, 244, 26o, 265, 2671 268, 269.  No-Man's-Land, fvture,
+227, 229Non-persistent substances, 28, 29.  Novocain, 201.
+
+Obstacle, new type Of, 223, 229.  Organic Chemical Industry, 145,
+
+235, 2S6, 250, 251, 271Oxalic Acid, igo.
+
+Particulate Clouds, 140, 232.  Patent Policy, German, x91.  Penetrants, 29.
+Persistent lethal substance, 225227, 229, 231.  -substances, 29, 29.
+Phenol, German cornering of, 194.  Phenylca rbyl amine chloride, 158.
+Phosgene, 25, 29, 64, 69, 124,141, 156, z67, 217, 230, 249.
+4,delayed action," 45, 53French development of, T 70 German cloud,
+44-46. Phosphorus, r75, 181-
+
+Photographic chemicals, 189, 203.  Physiological classification, 25.
+Poison gas, 25, 1507 151.  Porton, experimental station, 97,
+
+110`. Portuguese front, attack on, 77.  Potassium permanganate, 126, 2M Price
+cutting policy, German, 189, 213.  Production, 83, 149, 162, 163, 249, 250.
+critical importance of, 143Y 144, 171, 26o.  statistics, 82, 83, 88.
+Projector, German development Of, 70) 711.  -Livens, see Livens Projector.
+-short range, 182.  Propaganda by German dye agents, igr.
+-,German use of, 113.  Protection, 38, 90, 92, 95, 99, loop 109, 113p 114)
+121, 124~ 125, 127~ 128, 176, 216, 217, 220, 221.  -collective, 231, 233.
+-future deinclopmentS, 231.  -Individual, 231, 232.  -of animals, 92.
+Prussic acid, 26, ixS.  Puteaux, American laboratory, 175, 21S.
+
+Rechicourt, attack on French, 7(RedCross appeal toendwar, i ig.
+Research, 35,85, 108Y176,184,249. Respirator, Box, see Box Respirator.
+-drurns, 97.--XTXY 13 5.  Rhincland occupation, Allied, 206.  279 Index
+
+Royal Society, 50, 94-97. Rubber, German shortage of, x32.
+Russia, gas attacks against, 47, 123p 124.
+
+St. Mihiel Battle, z82.  Salicylic acid, igg, x94, igg.
+Salvarsan, igg.  Scientific Advisory Committee, 499 95, 96.
+Serni-Circular Canals, 2x5.  Sensitisers, photographic, 203.
+Service Chemique de Guerre, ioS.  Shell, Gas, 30, 40, 41, 64., 136,
+
+A3, 216.
+
+-Falkenhayn's orders,+3.--percentage Of, 77, 79, 80, 141, 245.
+Smoke, future importance of, ISO, 181, 2A.  -use with lethal gases,
+i40, 180.  Somme offensive, 52,55, 6r, 64,143. Speculative element,
+2115, 220.  Special Brigade R.E., 52, x74.  -Companies, 50, 93.
+Sternutatory compounds, a6, 28, 41.  Stokes Mortar,
+29, 52, 175.  Stovaine, 220.  Strategy, chemical, see Tactics
+and Strategy.  Sulphur Black, 155.  Sulphuric acid, 171, 253.
+Supply Department, British, iox, 105.  -Organisations, ioz.
+Surprise, critical factor of, 31, 32, 53, 111.  113, 114, 144.
+
+Tactics and Strategy, 215, 216, 225.  Tactical classification, 25, 28.  280
+
+Tanks, 143, 217, 227) 253P 254, 247, 248.  Technik im Weltkriege, Die,
+36 371 40) 417 47, 51, 57, 69, 74:  80,125,128,129,135, 136,141.
+Thermite shell, 175.  Thiodiglycol, 159.  Toxic compounds, 26.
+Treaty Stocks, 150.  Trench Warfare Department, British, 95, 96.
+Re~earch Department, 96.  Supply Department, 96, io5,
+170Tri-chlor-methyl-chloro-formate, 64, 157.  T. Stuffy 41.
+Verdun, gas attack at, 69.  Versailles, TreatY'Of, 34,150,210,
+242-244, 264-267, 270, 271.  Vesicant Compounds, 27, 137)
+217, 239Vested Interests, 258, 259.  Vincennite, zi8.
+War chemicals, new, 217, 225.--Physiological classification,
+see Physiological classification.--Tactical classification,
+see Tactical Classification.  Warsaw, cloud attacks, 123.  White Cross
+shell, 225.  Xylyl bromide, 41, 156.  Xylylene dibromide, 41.
+Yellow Cross, see Mustard Gas.  Yperite, 8o, z66.  Ypres, first
+German gas attack, 23~ 31, 32, 38-first Mustard gas, 66, 217.
+Yser, raid by Germans, 117.
+
+NAME INDEX
+
+Albert, Dr., x94-x96, 197t 198-
+
+Bacon, Colonel R. F., 218.  Baeyer, Professor, 27Baker, Professor H. B.,
+95Barley, Major, D.S.O., 46.  Beilby, Sir George, 96.  Bernstorff, von, 194.
+Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 111, 197.  Boy-Ed, Captain, 197.  Bueb, Dr., 212.
+
+Cadman, Sir John, 96.  Chevalier, Medecin aide-major,
+
+27Crossley, Professor A. W., 95,
+
+97Curmer, General, 99.
+
+Davies, Major David, M.P., 1172, 255, 257, 258.  Davy, J., 249.
+Dawson, Sergeant-Major, 5z.  Debeney, General, 185.  Duisberg, Herr, 1+7, 208-
+
+Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, x9g.
+
+Falkenhayn, General, 94, 147) 148.  Foch, Marshal, 175.
+Foulkes, Brig.--General C. H., 92.
+
+French, Field-Marshal Sir 31t 43, 48Fries, Brig.--General A. A., 114,
+17S9 177t 1791 1809 183Fuller, Colonel J. F. C., 227, 233-
+
+Garvan, Francis P., i8q, 195, 197, 199Geyer, Captain, 136-140.
+Green, Prof. A. G., 168.  Grey, Viscount, 256, 257.  Guthrie, 249.
+
+Haber, Professor, 35, 49, 85, 90Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas, 54.
+Haldane, Dr., 121.  Harrison, Lieut.--Colonel E. F., 98, x26.
+Hartley, Brig.--General H., 63, 76, 98, 123, 240.
+Horrocks, Sir William, 95Hossenf elder, Consul-General,
+
+197-
+
+Jackson, Colonel L., 942 95Joyce, Colonel, 212.
+
+Kirschbaum, Prof. F. P., 1135.  Kitchener, Lord, 33, 94~ 95)
+121) 237.  Kling, M., i0o.  Krupp, von Bohlen, Herr, 147,
+
+259 281 Name Index
+
+Lambert, Major, 126.  Lebeau, Professor P., iot.  Levinstein, Dr. H., 168.
+Livens, Major, 6o.  Lodge, Sir Oliver, 94, Ludendorff, General, 70,
+82P 90, 91) 114) 147, 149, 259.
+
+Meyer, Victor, 27 Macpherson, Captain, z2i.  McConnel, Lieut., 208.
+Moulton of Bank, Rt.  Hon.
+
+Lord, 5, 16q, 242) 243, 270.  Moureu, M. Charles, 200.
+
+Norris, Colonel, 206, 208, 209.
+
+Ozil, General, 200, 105.
+
+Palmer, Mitchell, ig, z8g.  Paterno, Senator, zoi.  Penna, Colonel, zoi.
+Pick, Dr. H., iz5, i2q, 130, 131.  Pollard, Professor A. F., zz2.
+Pope, Sir William, z65, 191, 202.
+
+Ramsay, Sir William, 9+. Rayleigh, Lord, 94.  Runciman, W., 146-
+
+Sachur, Professor, 35.  Schmaus, Lieut. Dr., 75, Schwarte, see Technik
+im Weltkriege (Subject Index). Schweitzer, Dr. Hugo, 194, 195,
+
+211.  Sering, Dr. Max, zii.  Stieglitz, Professor Julius, x9r,
+
+198, 200.
+
+Thomasl Albert, 200.  Thorpe, Prof. J. F., 96, 99.
+Thuillier, Major-General H. F.,
+
+94, 98P 105-
+
+Villavecehia, Prof. zot.  Vincent, Monsieur, 200.
+
+Watson, Colonel, 95.  Weiss, M., 200.  Wells, H. G., izz.
+Wing, Major-General, 43.
+
+282
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg Etext of The Riddle of the Rhine, by LeFebure
+