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K. Marriott +</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style=""> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref02">YOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref03">OFFICE Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref04">LITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58—1512-27</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref05">THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#pref06">DEDICATION</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap00"><b>THE PRINCE</b></a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">CHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">CHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap03">CHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap04">CHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap05">CHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap06">CHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap07">CHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap08">CHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap09">CHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap10">CHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap11">CHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap12">CHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap13">CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap14">CHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap15">CHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap16">CHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap17">CHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap18">CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap19">CHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap20">CHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap21">CHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap22">CHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap23">CHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap24">CHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap25">CHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap26">CHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS</a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap27"><b>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI</b></a><br /><br /></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap28"><b>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA</b></a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="letter"> +<i> +Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512 +held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to +various European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and +returned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527. +</i> +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the second +son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of +Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of the +old Florentine nobility. +</p> + +<p> +His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly +enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of +Florence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an +Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. The +downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year +Machiavelli entered the public service. During his official career +Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted until +1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office. +The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once +more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s literary activity +and increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion +of the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having +regained office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref02"></a>YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94</h2> + +<p> +Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the +Florence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this +representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been described +as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent +and austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo. +Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight, +for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of +Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in <i>The +Prince</i>, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to +a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the life +of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he +frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo’s grandson +that he dedicates <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the young +men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer than +their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of +excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women; +their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and +acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought +the wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youth +should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer +that his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: “I have received your +letter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you +tell me you are quite restored in health, than which I could have no +better news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a +good man of you if you are willing to do your share.” Then, writing of a +new patron, he continues: “This will turn out well for you, but it is +necessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of +illness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is +done to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to +please me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and +study, because others will help you if you help yourself.” +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref03"></a>OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512</h2> + +<p> +The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of the +free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the +expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving +four years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor and +Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we +are on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli’s life, for +during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic, +and we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as +his own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with +the statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his +activities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences +and characters which illustrate <i>The Prince</i>. +</p> + +<p> +His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” of +<i>The Prince</i>, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far +better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. +This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him in +many ways as a matter of vital importance to princes. +</p> + +<p> +In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for +continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of +affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft +summarized in <i>The Prince</i>, and was consequently driven out. He, also, it +was who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to +Pope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge that +such promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith +of princes. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out of +the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke +Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of <i>The Prince</i>. +Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the +benefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can, +indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare +Borgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the +“hero” of <i>The Prince</i>. Yet in <i>The Prince</i> the duke is in point of fact +cited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls +with them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent +man but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all +eventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities +fail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an +extraordinary and unforeseen fatality. +</p> + +<p> +On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch +the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into +allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere +(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the +duke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who +thinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries +deceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare. +</p> + +<p> +It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff +was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a +successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to +his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that +Machiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and +concludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win +and hold them both. +</p> + +<p> +It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian +states, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, with +results that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events, +and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on +the personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII of +France, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has already been +alluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who +accomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality +had no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed +himself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The +Emperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his +character has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy +at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he +describes him as a secretive man, without force of character—ignoring +the human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never +insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes. +</p> + +<p> +The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled with +events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the +three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the +object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in the +battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight +hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events, +complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope and +the French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire policy +of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy League +against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French out +of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to his +terms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return of +the Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent fall of +the Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his +friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, +he died without regaining office. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref04"></a>LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27 +</h2> + +<p> +On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly +hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was +dismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was +accused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, +imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo +X, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at San +Casciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a +letter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a very +interesting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his +methods and his motives in writing <i>The Prince</i>. After describing his +daily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: “The evening +being come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off +my peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court +dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of +the men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that +food which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, and +to ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer +me; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble, +poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed +entirely by those great men. And because Dante says: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,<br /> +Unfruitful else, +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have +composed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out as +fully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a +principality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they +can be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, +this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one, +it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence +Giuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you +what is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I +am still enriching and polishing it.” +</p> + +<p> +The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in +which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its +composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown +reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. Although +Machiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or +presented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever +received or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any +employment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime, +<i>The Prince</i> was never published by him, and its text is still disputable. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this little +thing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the +fifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept +nor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped +experience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt, +because having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it; +for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his +nature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty.” +</p> + +<p> +Before Machiavelli had got <i>The Prince</i> off his hands he commenced his +“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be read +concurrently with <i>The Prince</i>. These and several minor works occupied him +until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the +affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers +of Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and +Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which +the Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was +not promulgated. +</p> + +<p> +In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to +settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable +for his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was much +sought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” It was in +the same year that he received a commission at the instance of Cardinal +de’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which occupied him +until 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici to +give him this employment, for an old writer observes that “an able +statesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the +ship unless he has an empty cask to play with.” +</p> + +<p> +When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to Rome +for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in the +meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat +remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written <i>The Prince</i> for the +instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence, +so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” to the head of the +family when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia +destroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the +hands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of +Rome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off the +yoke of the Medici, who were once more banished. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his +return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten of +Liberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached +Florence, where he died on 22nd June 1527. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref05"></a>THE MAN AND HIS WORKS</h2> + +<p> +No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence +has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most +famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in +his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her +renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest +against the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be +pointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which this +sinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that the +researches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more +reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholy +necromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade. +</p> + +<p> +Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and +industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and +with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced +retirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted +by his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful +statesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderately +prosperous in his several embassies and political employments. He was +misled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by Cesare +Borgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his +attempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised +astonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs +he was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side of +Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; his +connection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to +have recognized his real forte when he set him to write the “History of +Florence,” rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the literary +side of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no +failure. +</p> + +<p> +Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on <i>The +Prince</i>, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they +are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they +are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet they cannot +be said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on +material rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents and +personages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli +makes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct. +</p> + +<p> +Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish +some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, <i>The +Prince</i> is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are +still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of +Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which +Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men will +not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be—and +are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence +consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to a +higher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an +empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms +of a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight. +</p> + +<p> +It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government should +be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people +with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this +“high argument” <i>The Prince</i> contributes but little. Machiavelli always +refused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he +found them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of +abiding value. But what invests <i>The Prince</i> with more than a merely +artistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it +deals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in +their relationship with each other and their neighbours. +</p> + +<p> +In translating <i>The Prince</i> my aim has been to achieve at all costs an +exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase +adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no +facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh +every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain +and serious. <i>Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in +explanandis pressior?</i> In <i>The Prince</i>, it may be truly said, there is +reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word. +To an Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatise +was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of +the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to the +Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the word +<i>intrattenere</i>, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by +the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan +be correctly rendered “entertain,” and every contemporary reader +would understand what was meant by saying that “Rome <i>entertained</i> +the Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting their power.” But to-day +such a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are +compelled to say that “<i>Rome maintained friendly relations with the +Ætolians</i>,” etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have tried +to preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an +absolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can +only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’s +meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it. +</p> + +<p class="p2"> +The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli: +</p> + +<p> +Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di +trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal +duca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, +etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo +(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ Alemagna, 1508-12; +Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi +sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; +Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy +in five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; +Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; +Asino d’oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20; +Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose +della citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; +Istorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525. +</p> + +<p> +Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi. +</p> + +<p> +Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6 +vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2; +Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7. +</p> + +<p> +Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi, +1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G. +Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno +allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, The +Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="pref06"></a>DEDICATION</h2> + +<p class="center"> +To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici +</p> + +<p> +Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come +before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see +him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, +precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their +greatness. +</p> + +<p> +Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony +of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything +which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions +of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a +continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and +prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your +Magnificence. +</p> + +<p> +And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, +nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing +that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the +opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so +many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not +embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded +periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which +so many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that +no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the +weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. +</p> + +<p> +Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and +humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because, +just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to +contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to +contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to +understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand +that of princes it needs to be of the people. +</p> + +<p> +Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send +it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my +extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your +other attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your +greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see +how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap00"></a>THE PRINCE</h2> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>CHAPTER I.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED +</h2> + +<p> +All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been +and are either republics or principalities. +</p> + +<p> +Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long +established; or they are new. +</p> + +<p> +The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they +are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who +has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of +Spain. +</p> + +<p> +Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, +or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince +himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>CHAPTER II.<br /> +CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place +I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to +principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and +discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. +</p> + +<p> +I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, +and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; +for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, +and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of +average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of +it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so +deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will +regain it. +</p> + +<p> +We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have +withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in +’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the +hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it +happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause +him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be +naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of +his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one +change always leaves the toothing for another. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap03"></a>CHAPTER III.<br /> +CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be +not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken +collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an +inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men +change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope +induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are +deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from +bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, +which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him +with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon +his new acquisition. +</p> + +<p> +In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing +that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you +there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they +expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound +to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in +entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives. +</p> + +<p> +For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied +Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only +needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the gates to +him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would +not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, +after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so +lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes +the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out +the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to +cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke +Lodovico<a href="#fn-3.1" name="fnref-3.1" id="fnref-3.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second +time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies +should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes +above mentioned. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.1" id="fn-3.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.1">[1]</a> +Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married +Beatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second +time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to +name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any +one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely +in his acquisition than did the King of France. +</p> + +<p> +Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an +ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and +language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, +especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to +hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince +who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things +the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly +together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, +which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there +may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, +and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who +has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two +considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is +extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are +altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body +with the old principality. +</p> + +<p> +But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, +or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are +needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be +that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make +his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in +Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for +holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able +to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they +spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, +they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer +remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; +the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing +to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, +to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the +utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested +from him with the greatest difficulty. +</p> + +<p> +The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, +which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this +or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince +does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send +them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the +citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new +inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are +never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept +quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should +happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, +I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they +injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, +cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well +treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter +injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is +to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in +fear of revenge. +</p> + +<p> +But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much +more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so +that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, +because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison +up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, +and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able +to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a +colony is useful. +</p> + +<p> +Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects +ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful +neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that +no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing +there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by +those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through +fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the +Ætolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they +were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is +that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject +states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the +ruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to +take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them +quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to +take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much +authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can +easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely +master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business +will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will +have endless difficulties and troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these +measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with<a href="#fn-3.2" name="fnref-3.2" id="fnref-3.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the +greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece +appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were kept +friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven +out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for them +permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever +induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the +influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over +the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes +ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future +ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it +is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no +longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, +as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the +malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, +not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to +detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the +evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to +see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been +foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see +them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, +dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a +head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to +the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and +Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have +avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which +is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the +benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and +prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it +good as well as evil, and evil as well as good. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.2" id="fn-3.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.2">[2]</a> +See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.” +</p> + +<p> +But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the +things mentioned. I will speak of Louis<a href="#fn-3.3" name="fnref-3.3" id="fnref-3.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +(and not of Charles)<a href="#fn-3.4" name="fnref-3.4" id="fnref-3.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held +possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done +the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed +of divers elements. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.3" id="fn-3.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.3">[3]</a> +Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462, +died 1515. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.4" id="fn-3.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.4">[4]</a> +Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498. +</p> + +<p> +King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who +desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will +not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold +in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every door +was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to +accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded +very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some +mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once +the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines +became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the +Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, +of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody +made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians +realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that +they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of +two-thirds of Italy. +</p> + +<p> +Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have +maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid +down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they +were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, +some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to +stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself +secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan +than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the +Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening +himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown +themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much +temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And +having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much +so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his +becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy. +</p> + +<p> +And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived +himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it +with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy he +takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the +malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he +could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him +out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn. +</p> + +<p> +The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do +so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when +they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and +blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces +she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have +divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in +Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in +Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of +that necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he +increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought +in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send +colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he +not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; +because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, +it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but +having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their +ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from +designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented +except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would +not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the +Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander +and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given +above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is +not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another +should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would +assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his +marriage<a href="#fn-3.5" name="fnref-3.5" id="fnref-3.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +and for the cap to Rouen,<a href="#fn-3.6" name="fnref-3.6" id="fnref-3.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, +and how it ought to be kept. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.5" id="fn-3.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.5">[5]</a> +Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499 +Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of +Brittany for the crown. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-3.6" id="fn-3.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-3.6">[6]</a> +The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a cardinal by +Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510. +</p> + +<p> +Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions +observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to +retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable +and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when +Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually +called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that +the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did +not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have +allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen +that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by +France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule +is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another +becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought +about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by +him who has been raised to power. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap04"></a>CHAPTER IV.<br /> +WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE +SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH +</h2> + +<p> +Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly +acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great +became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely +settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would +have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had +to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from +their own ambitions. +</p> + +<p> +I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be +governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of +servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour +and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by +antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have +states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them +in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his +servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the +country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they +yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and +they do not bear him any particular affection. +</p> + +<p> +The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the +King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, +the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he +sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he +chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body +of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they +have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at +his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize +great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is +conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in +seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in +by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his +designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises +from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and +bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect +little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot +carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who +attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he +will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; +but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such +a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the +family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one +to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror +did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them +after it. +</p> + +<p> +The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one +can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one +always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the +reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory +easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite +difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you +have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of +the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of +fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or +exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, +you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was +only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and +then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being +killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And +if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and +at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except +those they provoked themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted +like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the +Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities +there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them +endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power +and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the +Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst +themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the +country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family +of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were +acknowledged. +</p> + +<p> +When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which +Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others +have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is +not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but +by the want of uniformity in the subject state. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap05"></a>CHAPTER V.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR +OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED +</h2> + +<p> +Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been +accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three +courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the +next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live +under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an +oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, +being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his +friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore +he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by +the means of its own citizens than in any other way. +</p> + +<p> +There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held +Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost +them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, +dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the +Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not +succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the +country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than +by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom +and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in +rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient +privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever +cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never +forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or +dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa +after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines. +</p> + +<p> +But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and +his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey +and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making +one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern +themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a +prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in +republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for +vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their +former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to +reside there. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap06"></a>CHAPTER VI.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS AND +ABILITY +</h2> + +<p> +Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as +I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; +because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and +following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the +ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man +ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those +who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at +least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, +designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing +the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much +higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great +a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark +they wish to reach. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a +new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly +as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, +as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either +ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will +mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied +least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates +matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside +there in person. +</p> + +<p> +But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, +have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and +such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not +discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he +ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to +speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or +founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular +deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to +those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining +their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune +beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form +which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind +would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity +would have come in vain. +</p> + +<p> +It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of +Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that +they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of +bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that +he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King +of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should +find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the +Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have +shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These +opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability +enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was +ennobled and made famous. +</p> + +<p> +Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a +principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties +they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods +which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its +security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more +difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in +its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of +things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well +under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well +under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who +have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who +do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience +of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the +opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend +lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them. +</p> + +<p> +It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter +thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or +have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their +enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first +instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when +they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely +endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the +unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the +nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, +it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary +to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be +possible to make them believe by force. +</p> + +<p> +If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have +enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to Fra +Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things +immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means +of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to +believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating +their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with +ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those +who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be +respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, +and happy. +</p> + +<p> +To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some +resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is +Hiero the Syracusan.<a href="#fn-6.1" name="fnref-6.1" id="fnref-6.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, +either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being +oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being +made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that +one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This +man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made +new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was +able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in +acquiring, he had but little in keeping. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-6.1" id="fn-6.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-6.1">[1]</a> +Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap07"></a>CHAPTER VII.<br /> +CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS +OR BY GOOD FORTUNE +</h2> + +<p> +Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private +citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they +have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have +many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is +given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened +to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where +princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both +for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the +corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand +simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated +them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the +knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of +great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should +know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, +they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep +friendly and faithful. +</p> + +<p> +States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are +born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies<a href="#fn-7.1" name="fnref-7.1" id="fnref-7.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is +said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that +they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has +thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid +<i>before</i> they became princes, they must lay <i>afterwards</i>. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.1" id="fn-7.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.1">[1]</a> +“Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) and +correspondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of +“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenth +and seventeenth centuries. +</p> + +<p> +Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I +wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are +Francesco Sforza<a href="#fn-7.2" name="fnref-7.2" id="fnref-7.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from +being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired +with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, +Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during +the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding +that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise +and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes +of others had bestowed on him. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.2" id="fn-7.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.2">[2]</a> +Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a +natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he +procured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent +of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the +transactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at +Sinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an +account, written ten years before <i>The Prince</i>, of the proceedings of the +duke in his “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello +ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appended +to the present work. +</p> + +<p> +Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may +be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid +with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, +all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he +laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it +superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to +give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions +were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and +extreme malignity of fortune. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many +immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to +make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he +was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the +Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under +the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, +especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would +fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi +and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of +affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of +part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the +Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into +Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy +by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came +into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of +Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him +for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of +the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the +Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered +by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, +the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the +Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might +they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had +won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a +warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go +very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind +when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and +the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to +depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others. +</p> + +<p> +For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by +gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his +gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them +with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to +the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he +awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of +the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, +perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was +ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the +rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the +duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his +authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other +outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to +conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke +did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, +and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought +them into his power at Sinigalia.<a href="#fn-7.3" name="fnref-7.3" id="fnref-7.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, +the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the +Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate +their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is +worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it +out. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.3" id="fn-7.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.3">[3]</a> +Sinigalia, 31st December 1502. +</p> + +<p> +When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, +who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause +for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, +and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience +to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon +he promoted Messer Ramiro d’Orco,<a href="#fn-7.4" name="fnref-7.4" id="fnref-7.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short +time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke +considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he +had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment +in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their +advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred +against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them +entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been +practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the +minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be +executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at +his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once +satisfied and dismayed. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.4" id="fn-7.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.4">[4]</a> +Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua. +</p> + +<p> +But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself +now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by +having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed +those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed +with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, +who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from +this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in +the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against +the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure +himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had +Alexander lived. +</p> + +<p> +Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he +had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might +not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which +Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by +exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to +take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all +the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, +as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. +Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he +could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at +the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as +many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had +escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous +party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to +become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, +and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France +(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the +Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he +pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, +partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the +Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he +was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much +power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer +have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own +power and ability. +</p> + +<p> +But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the +duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, +between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were +in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be +won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had +laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in +good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his +foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In +Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the +Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything +against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the +one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in +sound health at the death of Alexander,<a href="#fn-7.5" name="fnref-7.5" id="fnref-7.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the +Second<a href="#fn-7.6" name="fnref-7.6" id="fnref-7.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> was +elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the +death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had +never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the +point to die. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.5" id="fn-7.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.5">[5]</a> +Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.6" id="fn-7.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.6">[6]</a> +Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born +1443, died 1513. +</p> + +<p> +When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame +him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer +him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, +are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and +far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and +only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness +frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure +himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by +force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be +followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power +or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be +severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal +soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes +in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, +cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man. +</p> + +<p> +Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a +bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own +mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he ought +never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or +who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from +fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad +Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.<a href="#fn-7.7" name="fnref-7.7" id="fnref-7.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; +the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his +influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above +everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, +he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who +believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries +is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of +his ultimate ruin. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-7.7" id="fn-7.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-7.7">[7]</a> +San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap08"></a>CHAPTER VIII.<br /> +CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of +which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest +to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more +copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either +by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when +by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince +of his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated +by two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without +entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will +suffice those who may be compelled to follow them. +</p> + +<p> +Agathocles, the Sicilian,<a href="#fn-8.1" name="fnref-8.1" id="fnref-8.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject +position. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his +fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies +with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the +military profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being +established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself +prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had +been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose +with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One +morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to +discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the +soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he +seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And +although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet +not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its +defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the +siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were +compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to +be content with the possession of Africa. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.1" id="fn-8.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.1">[1]</a> +Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will +see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he +attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, +but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with +a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him +with many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay +fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, +without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if +the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from +dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and +overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less +than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and +inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated +among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either +to fortune or genius. +</p> + +<p> +In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, +having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his +maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent +to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, +he might attain some high position in the military profession. After +Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short +time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the +first man in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serve +under others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom +the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the +help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani +that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him +and his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although +he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that +the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to +come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his +friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should +be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to +his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up. +</p> + +<p> +Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and +he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged him +in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what +was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to +which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the +viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets +were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, +speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of +their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he +rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more +private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and +the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated +than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the +rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and +down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in +fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of +which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were +able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military +ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the +principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had +become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have +been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to +be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli +at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed +this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had +made his leader in valour and wickedness. +</p> + +<p> +Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite +treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and +defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own +citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able +even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of +war. I believe that this follows from severities<a href="#fn-8.2" name="fnref-8.2" id="fnref-8.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it +is possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to +one’s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can +be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which, +notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather +than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or +man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible +for those who follow the other to maintain themselves. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-8.2" id="fn-8.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-8.2">[2]</a> +Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of +Machiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than the +more obvious “cruelties.” +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to +examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to +inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them +daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, +and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from +timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his +hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves +to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought +to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; +benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them +may last longer. +</p> + +<p> +And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a +way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make +him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you +are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they +will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any +obligation to you for them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap09"></a>CHAPTER IX.<br /> +CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY +</h2> + +<p> +But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the +prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but +by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil +principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to +it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is +obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the +nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and +from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed +by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and +from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three +results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy. +</p> + +<p> +A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, +accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, +seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of +one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow +they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot +resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and +make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains +sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more +difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the +former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his +equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his +liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself +alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him. +</p> + +<p> +Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, +satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is +more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, +while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also +that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because +of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as +they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile +people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only +to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, +being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in +time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect +to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same +people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and +unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be +looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their +course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do +not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be +honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in +two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural +want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially +of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you +honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their +own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they +are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to +guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because +in adversity they always help to ruin him. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought +to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not +to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes +a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to +win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them +under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom +they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus +the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised +to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their +affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances +one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is +necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no +security in adversity. +</p> + +<p> +Nabis,<a href="#fn-9.1" name="fnref-9.1" id="fnref-9.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious +Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and +for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself +secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people +been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite +proverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for +this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades +himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by +the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened +to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali<a href="#fn-9.2" name="fnref-9.2" id="fnref-9.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can +command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in +other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole +people encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them, +and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.1" id="fn-9.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.1">[1]</a> +Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; +killed 192 B.C. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-9.2" id="fn-9.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-9.2">[2]</a> +Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s +“Florentine History,” Book III. +</p> + +<p> +These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the +civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule +personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is +weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of +those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in +troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by +intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults +to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, +accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey +him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a +scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what +he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because +then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far +distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the +state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the +more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. +Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens +will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state +and of him, and then he will always find them faithful. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap10"></a>CHAPTER X.<br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE +MEASURED +</h2> + +<p> +It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of +these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in +case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he +has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear +I say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their +own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a +sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; +and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show +themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend +themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, +but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can +say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify +their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever +shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of +his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never +be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to +enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be +an easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not +hated by his people. +</p> + +<p> +The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country +around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them, +nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because +they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them +by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches +and walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public +depots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond +this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always +have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are +the life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people +are supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover +have many ordinances to uphold them. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself +odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be +driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world +are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in +the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the +people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not +remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget +their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will +overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects +that the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of +the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem +to him to be too bold. +</p> + +<p> +Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin +the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and +ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince +to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is +already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; +and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, +he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have +been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the +nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those +they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be +difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast +from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap11"></a>CHAPTER XI.<br /> +CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES +</h2> + +<p> +It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching +which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are +acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without +either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, +which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities +may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes +alone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do +not rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from +them, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have +neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such +principalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to +which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, +being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous +and rash man to discuss them. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has +attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander +backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called +potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the +temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France trembles +before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the +Venetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to +me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory. +</p> + +<p> +Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,<a href="#fn-11.1" name="fnref-11.1" id="fnref-11.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of +Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two +principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; +the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about +whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain +the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the +defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of +Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a +pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of +the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might +arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor +wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also +a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope, +he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one +people should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the +Orsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin +the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little +esteemed in Italy. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.1" id="fn-11.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.1">[1]</a> +Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494. +</p> + +<p> +Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have +ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail; +and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason of +the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have +discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was +not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did +contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the +ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the +Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the +chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open +to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before +Alexander’s time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improved +upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the +French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much +the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church +and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions +within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them +some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, +the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not +allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. +For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for +long, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the +barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates +arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness +Pope Leo<a href="#fn-11.2" name="fnref-11.2" id="fnref-11.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made +it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his +goodness and infinite other virtues. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-11.2" id="fn-11.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-11.2">[2]</a> +Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap12"></a>CHAPTER XII.<br /> +HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES +</h2> + +<p> +Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such +principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having +considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and +having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to +hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence +and defence which belong to each of them. +</p> + +<p> +We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his +foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to +ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or +composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws +where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well +armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion +and shall speak of the arms. +</p> + +<p> +I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are +either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and +auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on +these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, +ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly +before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and +destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is +robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other +attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is +not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be +your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves +off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the +ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for +many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and +appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed +what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize +Italy with chalk in hand;<a href="#fn-12.1" name="fnref-12.1" id="fnref-12.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they +were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were +the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.1" id="fn-12.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.1">[1]</a> +“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of the +<i>bons mots</i> of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles +VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his +quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. +<i>Cf</i>. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King +Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a +felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: so +that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came +into Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than +with swords to fight.” +</p> + +<p> +I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary +captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot +trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by +oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your +intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual +way. +</p> + +<p> +And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether +mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by +a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform +the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one +is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and +when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the +command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, +making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; +and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, +under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with +foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The +Switzers are completely armed and quite free. +</p> + +<p> +Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were +oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, +although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the +death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers +by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty. +</p> + +<p> +Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the +Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,<a href="#fn-12.2" name="fnref-12.2" id="fnref-12.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, +Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna<a href="#fn-12.3" name="fnref-12.3" id="fnref-12.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into +the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the +Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and +yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I +reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of +the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not +conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions +elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,<a href="#fn-12.4" name="fnref-12.4" id="fnref-12.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will +acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his +discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each +other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church +and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while +ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent +man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man +had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the +Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies +they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The +Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted +safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with +armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to +enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this +virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their +expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their +great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they +expanded, as under Carmignuola,<a href="#fn-12.5" name="fnref-12.5" id="fnref-12.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man +(they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, +knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer +conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they +able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, +they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had +afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, +the count of Pitigliano,<a href="#fn-12.6" name="fnref-12.6" id="fnref-12.6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> +and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened +afterwards at Vaila,<a href="#fn-12.7" name="fnref-12.7" id="fnref-12.7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> +where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had +acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but +slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.2" id="fn-12.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.2">[2]</a> +Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.3" id="fn-12.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.3">[3]</a> +Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.4" id="fn-12.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.4">[4]</a> +Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought +in the English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he +collected a body of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous +“White Company.” He took part in many wars, and died in Florence in +1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married +Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.5" id="fn-12.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.5">[5]</a> +Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed at +Venice, 5th May 1432. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.6" id="fn-12.6"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.6">[6]</a> +Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; died +fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. “Primo +capitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo +Orsini, born 1442, died 1510. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.7" id="fn-12.7"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.7">[7]</a> +Battle of Vaila in 1509. +</p> + +<p> +And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for +many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order +that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to +counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to +be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, +and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that +many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly +favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was +favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others +their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell +partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church +consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, +both commenced to enlist foreigners. +</p> + +<p> +The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,<a href="#fn-12.8" name="fnref-12.8" id="fnref-12.8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> +the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and +Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the +other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all +their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, +ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has +guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might +increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without +territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did +not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a +moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were +brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were +not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every +art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing +in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not +attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at +night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did +they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military +rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; +thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-12.8" id="fn-12.8"></a> <a href="#fnref-12.8">[8]</a> +Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was the +leader of the famous “Company of St George,” composed entirely of +Italian soldiers. He died in 1409. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap13"></a>CHAPTER XIII.<br /> +CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN +</h2> + +<p> +Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is +called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the +most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor +proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, +King of Spain,<a href="#fn-13.1" name="fnref-13.1" id="fnref-13.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in +themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for +losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.1" id="fn-13.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.1">[1]</a> +Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed “The +Catholic,” born 1452, died 1516. +</p> + +<p> +And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to +leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot +fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself +entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought +about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; +because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having +risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and +others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his +enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by +other arms than theirs. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen +to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their +troubles. +</p> + +<p> +The Emperor of Constantinople,<a href="#fn-13.2" name="fnref-13.2" id="fnref-13.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war +being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the +servitude of Greece to the infidels. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.2" id="fn-13.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.2">[2]</a> +Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, +for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the +ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; +but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better +opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, +they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made +their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure +you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in +auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these +arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them +than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is +gained with the arms of others. +</p> + +<p> +I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke +entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, +and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not +appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less +danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on +handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he +destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and +the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the +difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the +French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own +soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever +increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that +he was complete master of his own forces. +</p> + +<p> +I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am +unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have +named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the +Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our +Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could +neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and +afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens. +</p> + +<p> +I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament +applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with +Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him +with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his +back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the +enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others +either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast. +</p> + +<p> +Charles the Seventh,<a href="#fn-13.3" name="fnref-13.3" id="fnref-13.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> +the father of King Louis the Eleventh,<a href="#fn-13.4" name="fnref-13.4" id="fnref-13.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized +the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his +kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, +King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which +mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that +kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely +diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry +altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as +they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that +they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand +against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well +against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly +mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than +mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one’s own +forces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be +unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.3" id="fn-13.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.3">[3]</a> +Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died +1461. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.4" id="fn-13.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.4">[4]</a> +Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483. +</p> + +<p> +But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at +first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of +hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils +until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to +few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire<a href="#fn-13.5" name="fnref-13.5" id="fnref-13.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting +of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to +decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-13.5" id="fn-13.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-13.5">[5]</a> +“Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the +reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the +conditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr +Balfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under the weight +of its military obligations, he said that this was ‘wholly +unhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power was at its +zenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, +but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer +recognised.”—<i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, 15th May 1906. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its +own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not +having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always +been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain +or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one’s +own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or +dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make +ready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me +shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father +of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and +organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap14"></a>CHAPTER XIV.<br /> +THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR +</h2> + +<p> +A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else +for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole +art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not +only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise +from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that +when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their +states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and +what enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco +Sforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; +and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from +dukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed +brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those +ignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown +later on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the +unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield +obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should +be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain +and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well +together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war, +over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be +respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, +therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace +he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do +in two ways, the one by action, the other by study. +</p> + +<p> +As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well +organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he +accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of +localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys +open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and +marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is +useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better +able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and +observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it +may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, +and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, +have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a +knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a +knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the +essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it +teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to +array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage. +</p> + +<p> +Philopoemen,<a href="#fn-14.1" name="fnref-14.1" id="fnref-14.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, +is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the +rules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and +reasoned with them: “If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should +find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should +one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, +how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, all +the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and +state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions +there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he +could not deal with. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-14.1" id="fn-14.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-14.1">[1]</a> +Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 B.C. +</p> + +<p> +But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study +there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne +themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so +as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an +illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and +famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his +mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar +Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by +Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that +imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and +liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of +Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and +never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with +industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so +that if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap15"></a>CHAPTER XV.<br /> +CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED +</h2> + +<p> +It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince +towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this +point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, +especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other +people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful +to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up +the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have +pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known +or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to +live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner +effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act +entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him +among so much that is evil. +</p> + +<p> +Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to +do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, +putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing +those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and +chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of +those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is +that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because +an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by +robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the +use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one +compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and +cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one +lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, +another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another +unbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that it +would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities +that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely +possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is +necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid +the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to +keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; +but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself +to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a +reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with +difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found +that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; +whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him +security and prosperity. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap16"></a>CHAPTER XVI.<br /> +CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS +</h2> + +<p> +Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say +that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality +exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures +you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it +may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. +Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is +obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus +inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled +in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh +down his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This +will soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be +little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many +and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled +by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing +to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality +in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he +ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come +to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his +revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and +is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it +comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does +not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does +not give, who are few. +</p> + +<p> +We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have +been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was +assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did +not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of +France; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on +his subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long +thriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or +conquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince, +therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can +defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not +forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation +for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to +govern. +</p> + +<p> +And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many +others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by +being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a +way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the +second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one +of those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived +after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have +destroyed his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been +princes, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered +very liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his +subjects’ or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be +sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for +liberality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it +by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, +this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by +soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects’ you can be +a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not +take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; +it is only squandering your own that injures you. +</p> + +<p> +And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you +exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or +despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince +should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; +and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a +reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be +compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for +rapacity which begets reproach with hatred. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap17"></a>CHAPTER XVII.<br /> +CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN +FEARED +</h2> + +<p> +Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince +ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought +to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; +notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored +it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to +have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a +reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.<a href="#fn-17.1" name="fnref-17.1" id="fnref-17.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought +not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be +more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, +from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole +people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the +individual only. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.1" id="fn-17.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.1">[1]</a> +During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and +1503. +</p> + +<p> +And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the +imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence +Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign +owing to its being new, saying: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt<br /> +Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”<a href="#fn-17.2" name="fnref-17.2" id="fnref-17.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> +Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he +himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and +humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too +much distrust render him intolerable. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-17.2" id="fn-17.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-17.2">[2]</a> +. . . against my will, my fate<br /> +A throne unsettled, and an infant state,<br /> +Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,<br /> +And guard with these severities my shores.<br /> +<br /> +Christopher Pitt. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared +or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, +but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer +to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. +Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are +ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed +they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, +and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it +approaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on +their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because +friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or +nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in +time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending +one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the +link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every +opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of +punishment which never fails. +</p> + +<p> +Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does +not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being +feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains +from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But +when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he +must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all +things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more +quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. +Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he +who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for +seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the +contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince +is with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it +is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for +without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties. +</p> + +<p> +Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having +led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in +foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the +prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing +else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him +revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that +cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And +short-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from +another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other +virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case +of Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within +the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; +this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his +soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For +this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the +corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate +of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the +legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone +in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew +much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This +disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed +in time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of +the Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but +contributed to his glory. +</p> + +<p> +Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the +conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing +according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on +that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must +endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap18"></a>CHAPTER XVIII.<a href="#fn-18.1" name="fnref-18.1" id="fnref-18.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a><br /> +CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH +</h2> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.1" id="fn-18.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.1">[1]</a> +“The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of +Machiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297. +</p> + +<p> +Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live +with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that +those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little +account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in +the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there +are two ways of contesting,<a href="#fn-18.2" name="fnref-18.2" id="fnref-18.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the +second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is +necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a +prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has +been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how +Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to +nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they +had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a +prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other +is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the +beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend +himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. +Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to +terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what +they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when +such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him +to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not +hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are +not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince +legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern +examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been +made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has +known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.2" id="fn-18.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.2">[2]</a> +“Contesting,” <i>i.e</i>. “striving for mastery.” Mr +Burd points out that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s +“De Officiis”: “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per +disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc +beluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.” +</p> + +<p> +But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be +a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to +present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who +will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in +silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought +of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who +had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, +yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according +to his wishes,<a href="#fn-18.3" name="fnref-18.3" id="fnref-18.3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> because he well understood this side of mankind. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.3" id="fn-18.3"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.3">[3]</a> +“Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” The +words “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.<br /> +<br /> +Alexander never did what he said,<br /> +Cesare never said what he did.<br /> +<br /> +Italian Proverb. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I +have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I +shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them +is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear +merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a +mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and +know how to change to the opposite. +</p> + +<p> +And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot +observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in +order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,<a href="#fn-18.4" name="fnref-18.4" id="fnref-18.4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> +friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a +mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune +force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can +avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.4" id="fn-18.4"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.4">[4]</a> +“Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro alla +fede,” and “tutto fede,” “altogether faithful,” +in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, “contro +alla fede” and “tutto fede,” were omitted in the Testina +edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may +be that the meaning attached to the word “fede” was “the +faith,” <i>i.e</i>. the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here +“fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word +“religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being +used to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “the +religion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. +South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows: +“That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laid +down this for a master rule in his political scheme: ‘That the show of +religion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and +pernicious.’” +</p> + +<p> +For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything +slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five +qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether +merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more +necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge +generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to +everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees +what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare +not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of +the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of +princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result. +</p> + +<p> +For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding +his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be +praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing +seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the +vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground +to rest on. +</p> + +<p> +One prince<a href="#fn-18.5" name="fnref-18.5" id="fnref-18.5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> +of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else +but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had +kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-18.5" id="fn-18.5"></a> <a href="#fnref-18.5">[5]</a> +Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing <i>The Prince</i> it +would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name here +without giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap19"></a>CHAPTER XIX.<br /> +THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED +</h2> + +<p> +Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have +spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly +under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part +said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or +contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have +fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and +to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of +which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is +touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with +the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways. +</p> + +<p> +It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, +mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself +as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, +courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his +subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain +himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or +to get round him. +</p> + +<p> +That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and +he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided +it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he +can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to +have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other +from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is +defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well +armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet +within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already +disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if +he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long +as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the +Spartan did. +</p> + +<p> +But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has +only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can +easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping +the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to +accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious +remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated +and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always +expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only +look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such +a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. +And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have +been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he +take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and +as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him +the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can +look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be +assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must +be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to +keep faith with you. +</p> + +<p> +And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of +the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of +punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the +majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the +state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular +goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. +For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of +his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; +because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot +hope for any escape. +</p> + +<p> +Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with +one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale +Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), +having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one +of his family survived but Messer Giovanni,<a href="#fn-19.1" name="fnref-19.1" id="fnref-19.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and +murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the +house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that, +although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule +the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the +Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son +of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their +city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the +government. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-19.1" id="fn-19.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-19.1">[1]</a> +Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna +from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies may +get its edge from his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had +been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli +conspiracy. +</p> + +<p> +For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of +little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile +to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and +everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care +not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied +and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can +have. +</p> + +<p> +Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and +in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and +security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its +authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the +nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would +be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred +of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect +them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the +king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to +from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for +favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could +beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. +Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a +greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw +another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of +reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own +hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, +but not so as to make himself hated by the people. +</p> + +<p> +It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of +the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my +opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities +of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by +subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer +these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, +and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those +alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those +things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times. +</p> + +<p> +It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the +empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and +his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus +Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus. +</p> + +<p> +There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition +of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended +with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with +the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with +difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give +satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, +and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers +loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which +qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so +that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and +cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, +either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, +especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the +difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give +satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. +Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by +someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every +one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the +utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, +those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered +more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out +advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to +maintain authority over them. +</p> + +<p> +From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being all +men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and +benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died +honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and +owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being +possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both +orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor +despised. +</p> + +<p> +But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, +being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the +honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given +cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old +age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And +here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as +by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his +state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom +you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the +people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its +humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that +among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the +fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him +unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed +himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army +conspired against him, and murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus +Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men +who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of +iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; +but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers +friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned +successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the +soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed +and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this +man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well +how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, +it is necessary for a prince to imitate. +</p> + +<p> +Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in +Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome +and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian +soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the +throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known +that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, +elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for +Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two +difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had +caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where +Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it +dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger +and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor +by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him +the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his +colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after +Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he +returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little +recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery +sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish +him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his +government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions +of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he +will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the +army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold +the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from +that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his +violence. +</p> + +<p> +But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent +qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and +acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of +fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused +him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties +were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he +killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. +He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around +him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a +centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are +deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be +avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict +them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he +has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs +or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken +this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom +also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it +turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin. +</p> + +<p> +But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold +the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had +only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and +soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to +amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his +rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, +often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing +other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into +contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by +the other, he was conspired against and was killed. +</p> + +<p> +It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike +man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of +whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the +throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated +and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him +into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great +indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his +dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial +seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, +through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many +cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of +his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the +Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, +to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and +meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, +and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him. +</p> + +<p> +I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being +thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this +discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this +difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far +less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some +indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are +veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the +armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give +satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary +to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people +rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful. +</p> + +<p> +From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve +thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the +security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting +aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. +The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of +soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must +keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is +unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the +Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a +newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the +heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, +and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it +cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those +difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince +is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to +receive him as if he were its hereditary lord. +</p> + +<p> +But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will +consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal +to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it +happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, +only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. +Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and +Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the +principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to +Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not +having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. +Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of +Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he +ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his +state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state +that may already be stable and firm. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap20"></a>CHAPTER XX.<br /> +ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, +ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL? +</h2> + +<p> +1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their +subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; +others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid +themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of +their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and +destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of +these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which +a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as +the matter of itself will admit. +</p> + +<p> +2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when +he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming +them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become +faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects +become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when +those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more +freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite +understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering +it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should +have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once +offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for +want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. +And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to +mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should +be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful +enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince +in a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of +examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a +province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that +state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these +again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; +and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the +state shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near +you. +</p> + +<p> +3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to +say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by +fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their +tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may +have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but +I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because +I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain +that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, +because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the +other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by +the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their +tributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to +bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the +citizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. +Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after +the rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state. +Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these +factions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods +for enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in +times of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious. +</p> + +<p> +4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties +and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune, +especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater +necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise +and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of +overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his +enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince, +when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity +against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher. +</p> + +<p> +5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance +in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among +those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of +Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by +others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so +much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the +commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a +description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained +over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the +prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for +them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; +and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those +who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since +the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of +secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the +reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a +natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, +then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, +for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons +for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern +affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of +those men who were contented under the former government, and are +therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were +favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it. +</p> + +<p> +6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more +securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who +might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first +attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. +Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to +demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state; +Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been +driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that +province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose +it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, +therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in +one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the +prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build +fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people +ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has +made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other +disorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—not +to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet +they will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting +foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been +seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless +to the Countess of Forli,<a href="#fn-20.1" name="fnref-20.1" id="fnref-20.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was +able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and +thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that +the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value +to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her +enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for +her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have +had the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who +builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, +trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-20.1" id="fn-20.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-20.1">[1]</a> +Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born +1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as +envoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the +appointment: “I have been with the signori,” wrote Fortunati, +“to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that Nicolo +Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the +Ten, is to leave with me at once.” <i>Cf</i>. “Catherine +Sforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap21"></a>CHAPTER XXI.<br /> +HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN +</h2> + +<p> +Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a +fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of +Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame +and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in +Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all +great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he +attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. +He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he +held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war +and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by +these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able +with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and +by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has +since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as +to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to +driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a +more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he +assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; +and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have +kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with +the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of +the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against +him. +</p> + +<p> +Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal +affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, +who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some +extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of +rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince +ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for +himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. +</p> + +<p> +A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright +enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself +in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more +advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful +neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of +them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will +always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war +strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, +you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and +satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons +to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who +conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time +of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not +willingly, sword in hand, court his fate. +</p> + +<p> +Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out +the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the +Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans +urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the +council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand +neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that which has been +said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to +interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not +interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon +of the conqueror.” Thus it will always happen that he who is not your +friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will +entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to +avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are +generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour +of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although +the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is +indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are +never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing +you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not +show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally +yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may +aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. +</p> + +<p> +In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you +have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater +prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the +aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and +conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your +assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that +a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more +powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless +necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at +his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at +the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the +Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been +avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines +when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a +case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the +parties. +</p> + +<p> +Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe +courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because +it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble +without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to +distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser +evil. +</p> + +<p> +A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the +proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens +to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, +and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from +improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or +another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to +offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way +to honour his city or state. +</p> + +<p> +Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at +convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or +into societies,<a href="#fn-21.1" name="fnref-21.1" id="fnref-21.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and +show himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always +maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in +anything. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-21.1" id="fn-21.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-21.1">[1]</a> +“Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.” +“Arti” were craft or trade guilds, <i>cf</i>. Florio: +“Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation +town.” The guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe +Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat +similar character, called “artel,” exist in Russia to-day, +<i>cf</i>. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” ed. 1905: +“The sons . . . were always during the working season members of an +artel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex +kind— permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily +responsible for the acts of the individual members.” The word +“artel,” despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude +assures me, no connection with “ars” or “arte.” Its +root is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by an oath; and +it is generally admitted to be only another form of “rota,” which +now signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the underlying +idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” were +possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individuals +connected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or +“clans” would be most appropriate. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap22"></a>CHAPTER XXII.<br /> +CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES +</h2> + +<p> +The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they +are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the +first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by +observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and +faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to +recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are +otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which +he made was in choosing them. +</p> + +<p> +There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of +Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be +a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are +three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another +which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither +comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most +excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows +necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the +second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said +and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can +recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise +and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is +kept honest. +</p> + +<p> +But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test +which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own +interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in +everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever +be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands +ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay +any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study +him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him +the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot +stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many +riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread +chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus +disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end +will always be disastrous for either one or the other. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap23"></a>CHAPTER XXIII.<br /> +HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED +</h2> + +<p> +I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is +a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are +very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts +are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in +a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from +this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of +falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself +from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth +does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect +for you abates. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise +men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the +truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of +none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to +their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these +councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in +such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall +speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen +to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his +resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or +is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt. +</p> + +<p> +I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs +to Maximilian,<a href="#fn-23.1" name="fnref-23.1" id="fnref-23.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, +yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a +practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he +does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on +them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they +are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being +pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one +day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends +to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-23.1" id="fn-23.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-23.1">[1]</a> +Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He +married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca +Sforza; and thus became involved in Italian politics. +</p> + +<p> +A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes +and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from +offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant +inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which +he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not +told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt. +</p> + +<p> +And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of +his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good +advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because +this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself +will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs +entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case +indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such +a governor would in a short time take away his state from him. +</p> + +<p> +But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more +than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite +them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the +prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they +are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you +unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred +that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the +prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap24"></a>CHAPTER XXIV.<br /> +WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES +</h2> + +<p> +The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to +appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in +the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new +prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and +when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than +ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the +past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no +further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails +them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have +established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good +laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a +double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of +wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy +in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, +there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms +from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, +some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or +if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the +nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to +keep an army in the field cannot be lost. +</p> + +<p> +Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was +conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the +greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a +warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he +sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he +lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom. +</p> + +<p> +Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their +principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own +sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change +(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm +against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought +of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, +disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This +course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have +neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to +fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore +you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for +your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not +depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that +depend on yourself and your valour. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap25"></a>CHAPTER XXV.<br /> +WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER +</h2> + +<p> +It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that +the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that +men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them; +and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to +labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been +more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have +been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. +Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. +Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that +Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,<a href="#fn-25.1" name="fnref-25.1" id="fnref-25.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little +less. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-25.1" id="fn-25.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-25.1">[1]</a> +Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the more +convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of the +business of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s “Eastern +Question.” +</p> + +<p> +I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows +the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from +place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, +without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature +be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes +fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a +manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their +force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with +fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, +and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and +defences have not been raised to constrain her. +</p> + +<p> +And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and +which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open +country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been +defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this +invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not +have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance +to fortune in general. +</p> + +<p> +But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be +seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of +disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that +have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies +entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will +be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the +times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be +successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which +every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by +various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, +another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one +succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of +two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, +two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being +cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than +whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. +This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring +about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his +object and the other does not. +</p> + +<p> +Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself +with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that +his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and +affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. +But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to +accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from +what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered +by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; +and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, +does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his +conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. +</p> + +<p> +Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and +found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action +that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against +Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were +not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise +still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally +entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a +move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the +latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; +on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that +king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his +friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. +Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other +pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in +Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything +fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have +succeeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, +and the others would have raised a thousand fears. +</p> + +<p> +I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all +succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the +contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go +cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have +deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast +in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but +unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better +to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you +wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is +seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than +by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, +woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more +violent, and with more audacity command her. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap26"></a>CHAPTER XXVI.<br /> +AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS +</h2> + +<p> +Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and +wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new +prince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to +a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do +honour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me +that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time +more fit than the present. +</p> + +<p> +And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be +captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians +should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the +soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate +the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to +discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy +should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should be +more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more +scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, +despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation. +</p> + +<p> +Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think +he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards +seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that +Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds +and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the +swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those +sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send +someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. +It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only +someone will raise it. +</p> + +<p> +Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in +your illustrious house,<a href="#fn-26.1" name="fnref-26.1" id="fnref-26.1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> +with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is +now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will +not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the +men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were +men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for +their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more +their friend than He is yours. +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.1" id="fn-26.1"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.1">[1]</a> +Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523 +Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII. +</p> + +<p> +With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is +necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. +Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great +the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom +I have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the +ways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a +cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained +manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the +rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free +will and that share of glory which belongs to us. +</p> + +<p> +And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have +been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; +and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it has +always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened +because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known +how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish +new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things +when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and +admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such +into use in every form. +</p> + +<p> +Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look +attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the +Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armies +they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency +of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one +seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished +above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. +Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past +twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always +given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, +afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.<a href="#fn-26.2" name="fnref-26.2" id="fnref-26.2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> +</p> + +<p class="footnote"> +<a name="fn-26.2" id="fn-26.2"></a> <a href="#fnref-26.2">[2]</a> +The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507; +Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. +</p> + +<p> +If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable +men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as +a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own +forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers. +And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better +when they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and +maintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with +such arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian +valour. +</p> + +<p> +And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, +nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order +would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to +overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers +are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owing +to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to +resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish +infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, +nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when +the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the +same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with +the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood +out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, if +the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It is +possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to +invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; +this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. +And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power +upon a new prince. +</p> + +<p> +This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting +Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with +which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so +much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what +stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be +closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder +him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous +dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this +charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are +undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, +and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch: +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +Virtu contro al Furore<br /> + Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:<br /> +Che l’antico valore<br /> + Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.<br /> +<br /> +Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,<br /> + And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:<br /> +For the old Roman valour is not dead,<br /> + Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.<br /> +<br /> +Edward Dacre, 1640. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap27"></a>DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE +VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR +PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p> +The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to clear +himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been raised +against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo and +other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence he +intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni +Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city +under his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy. +</p> + +<p> +These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and their +following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful, +and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroy +them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting +was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came the +cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli, +Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and +Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. +Here were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of +curbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of +being ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to +strive to win over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one place +and another, promising to one party assistance and to another +encouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting +was at once reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented +under the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of +effecting a revolution. +</p> + +<p> +Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by +certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held for +the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellan +was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the +conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to +the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn +up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge +and thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the whole +state rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so +much by the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they +expected to get assistance. +</p> + +<p> +Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose the +opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town, +should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent +again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the +common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought +not to wait for another opportunity. +</p> + +<p> +But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and +Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli, +their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his +enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against +everybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy +and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering courage +from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize before +fighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for +a reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained in +two ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlisting +men-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he +gave money. +</p> + +<p> +Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached +Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aid +of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke +resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of +reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any +practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who +had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the +title of prince, whilst others might have the principality. +</p> + +<p> +And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to him +to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a +standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every +care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such +preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in +separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there came +also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found himself +sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he +considered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them, +and for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation. +</p> + +<p> +And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in +which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand +ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an +alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come +personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the other +hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other places +seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war +against or ally themselves with any one without his permission. +</p> + +<p> +This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino, +again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his +state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the +fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by the +enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. But +the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed his +men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November +together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he +stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini, +who had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the +enterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being +concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wished +to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he did not +wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied that +he did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile to +the Florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed against +Sinigalia. +</p> + +<p> +It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the +fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it +up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come +there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by +them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. And +the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who were +with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. di +Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December, +and went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded +the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them +that any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and +permanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make +use of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very +stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not +offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by +Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he +agreed to wait. +</p> + +<p> +Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on +30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted +followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d’Euna, who was +afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo +Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followers +in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain +pairs, who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor should +they be permitted to leave until they came to the duke’s quarters, where +they should be seized. +</p> + +<p> +The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which there +were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assemble +by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano, and +await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of December +at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two +hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom he +accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms. +</p> + +<p> +Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of the +Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes +towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which +are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distant +from the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the +shore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little river +which bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the high +road. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road +along the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If +he turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance +of a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then +almost abreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight +line, but transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of +houses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side. +</p> + +<p> +The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to +honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from +Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the +duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, which +consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who +were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been thus +arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of +the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened +it, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the +country, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry +passed, without stopping, into the town. +</p> + +<p> +Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a few +horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a cape +lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his +approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of +the man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that +when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the +duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his +house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it +was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that +should be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke and +saluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they +were at once placed between those who were commissioned to look after +them. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in +Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square +before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling +them—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of +Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that +Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined +Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of their +quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he +advised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself to +meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the +duke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made his +obeisance, joined the others. +</p> + +<p> +So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s quarters, +and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them +prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of +Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of +Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini +and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the +destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing +in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses, +they stood together against the hostile forces of the country and saved +themselves. +</p> + +<p> +But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of +Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed +this outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it. +Night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill +Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be +strangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives: +Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins; +Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on +Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until +the duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the +Archbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which +news, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were +strangled in the same way. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap28"></a>THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA +</h2> + +<p class="center"> +WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI +</p> + +<p class="center"> +And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI +</p> + +<h3> +CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328 +</h3> + +<p> +It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who have +considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who +have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their +day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have +been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either been +exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage +that in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some +other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have +been because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would +not be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I +believe that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is +desirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little +to wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take +no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her. +Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds, +if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he +was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor +distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It +appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in +him such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great +exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his +actions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds. +</p> + +<p> +The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families of +Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate, +as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son Antonio, +who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for this +reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only +sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying +she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with her +brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, +and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have +access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, +Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion +to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner, +and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her +eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an +infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a +baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for +its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, +she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and +clothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to Messer +Antonio when he returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw the +child he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. They +discussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was +priest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it +up. They had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were +their own child. They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio +after their father. As the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and +gave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond +his years those lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer +Antonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted +him into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was +given with this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of +Castruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio +reached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of +Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left off +reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delighting +in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, and +wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his companions +in courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books, +only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men. +Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow. +</p> + +<p> +There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, named +Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily +strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often fought +under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was the +valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca and +was accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under +the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of San +Michele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castruccio +taking part with other children of the street in those games of which I +have spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and +that he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that they +loved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning +who he was. Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of +Castruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he +called him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in +the house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use +arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses +and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased +Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood +silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco to +speak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would +please him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of +a soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short time +he obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by his +knowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able +to hold him much longer. +</p> + +<p> +Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to the +house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to +find that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing +which we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the first +place he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the +most fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a +youth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises +of strength and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of these +accomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid +offence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the +great men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These +gifts made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all +Lucca. When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines +were driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by +the Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in +charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and +courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other +captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but +throughout all Lombardy. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he left +it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends +as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that +purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteen +years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son’s +tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco called +Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he +(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son the +gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon the +death of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo, +which increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain +amount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universal +goodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. +Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the +Guelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become +the chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the +great abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of +governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those +seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at first +treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that +Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of +King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo, +who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their +lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whom +Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting their +restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his +plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi. +Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified +the tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in +order that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When the +night came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the +plain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, +and without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and +set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the +city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side. +Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer +Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The +governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the +wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found +that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who +fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the +headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most +hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese. +</p> + +<p> +As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party that +the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined to +restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in the +Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to +Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this +Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number of +German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against the +quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrew +from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and Pescia. +Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within about two +miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of both +parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the +Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, +finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left +the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought +about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having +lost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio +observed this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this +belief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the +munitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more +insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they +drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. +Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having +mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he +spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to +them the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands. +Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the +centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of +the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant +men on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he +moved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his +lines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had +come in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre +squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the +wings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings of +the two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out +of action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separated +from each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By +this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men were opposed to +the weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most efficient men of the +enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to fight with +those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to +their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to +flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they +found themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying +their valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, +there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and +knights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come +to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and +Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of +Castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among +whom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was +killed in the first onset. +</p> + +<p> +This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that +Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it +appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of +power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited +for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of +Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the +murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the +sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven +off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to the +knowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a proper +opportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who +was the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccio +prisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, +went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, and +then thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the +people should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from +his father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and +cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four +hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yet +reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and +created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached +Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to +him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them +should close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of +what had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to +demand the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had +arrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private circles, +afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, +and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded that +Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might +happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his +friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked Uguccione; +who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friends +to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty. +</p> + +<p> +But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, and +he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they +appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this, +and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many +towns which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with the +help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to +Serezzana. To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which +is called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruccio +captured the town. With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly +seized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the +whole of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy +to Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of +Messer Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he +returned to Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now +Castruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a +prince, got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del +Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, +all of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and +deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of +Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial +crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met +him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his +deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because +of the people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received +in great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him, +and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the +Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven +out of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick +created Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the +Guelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to +accept him as their lord. +</p> + +<p> +Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian +affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines, +who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help and +counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled +to recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi, +Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all +exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention of +becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own +forces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a +league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for +him the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five +gates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he +supplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so +that he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, +without those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he +surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer +Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven +out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the King +Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in +their own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be +compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend +themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San +Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the +Florentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when +Castruccio was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca. +</p> + +<p> +There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so powerful +that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him to the +dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such +rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families +to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their +opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the +lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. They +endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a +peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and +compelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to +be their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired. +Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than they +had taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened +at Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a +troop of cavalry set out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found +the rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous +places throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio +ought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without +saying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for +doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his family +by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligations +which Castruccio was under to their house. To this Castruccio graciously +responded, and begged Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave +him more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him +anxiety to hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his +family to him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the +opportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of +Stefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately +thrown into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had +recovered San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make +peace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at +Lucca to leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a +truce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and +desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with +them for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests +they had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his +attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be +subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various +pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition +might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving +them of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life +also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to be +trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca with +the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of the +state. +</p> + +<p> +Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his +position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of +increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could +get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was +his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with the +mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confided +their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the +Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano di +Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secret +communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of +the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo +fortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese +side of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, +because they believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to +fight than the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He +gave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, +and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the +appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself +direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and both +were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal +given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di +Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of either +faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the hands of +Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, compelled +the people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises and +remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to the city to see the +new prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down, +influenced in a great measure by his great valour. +</p> + +<p> +About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness of +living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The +German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders +and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an +end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call +in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the +city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could +apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to +give him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio +considered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this +service, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any +time the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at +Lucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was +received by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time the +presence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without +bloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of +Castruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities +of corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastised +some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was +rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman +senator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being +clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on +its front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What God +desires shall be.” +</p> + +<p> +During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio +should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could +tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult +in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi +and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These +men kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aid +of the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some +of Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored +the city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and +taking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the +Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they +decided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under +the belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. +Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the +Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, +Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where the +Florentines’ lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, +nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could, +to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he +succeeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informed +that the Florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve +thousand. Although he had every confidence in his own abilities and the +valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open +lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between +Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole, +not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in +places narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still +narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twenty +men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a +German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to +remain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and +the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them wishing to +displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came +under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because the +castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his +position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his +enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no +fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they became +engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence +arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of this +castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a resident +in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his men +were to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on the +Florentines, and the castellan put to death. +</p> + +<p> +Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the +Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from +Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army from +Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached their +encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following +morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, had +also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnight +in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and the +Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the +morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a +troop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle. +The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army +which was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession of +the hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it +happened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely +taken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so +close were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. +It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were +assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, +although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting +reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The +cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable +to get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of +the pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or +what could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the +enemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without having made any +effective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer +desperation they had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had been +impossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their +enemies, and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio saw that his men +were unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, +he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join +the four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and +commanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These +orders they carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not +sustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conquered +more by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. +Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, +each man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very +sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini +dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentine +noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the Florentine +side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately +the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of the +Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not content with occupying +Prato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno, but +marched his army into the plain of Peretola, about two miles from +Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebrating +his victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races for +men and women. He also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of the +Florentines. He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, +who were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy was +discovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom +were Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the +Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty, +they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of +their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of +the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines +to receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and +he sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen. +</p> + +<p> +Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the +pressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave his +positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a +conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, one +of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should +be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy, +intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, and +drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is +essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and +in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a +person who revealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be +passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, +two Florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in Pisa. +Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded +many other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. It now +appeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly +disaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing his +position there, and this gave the Florentines their opportunity to +reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, the son of the +King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, and +assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and ten +thousand cavalry—having called to their aid every Guelph there was +in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, +and decided that it would be better to march on the latter—a course, +owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more +advantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia +would follow the acquisition of Pisa. +</p> + +<p> +In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army and +quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thence +on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army which the +Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed, +believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would deliver the +empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that his +enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, than +at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and four +thousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent +Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a +stronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its +situation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation +above the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its +being victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach +it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through +to Pisa, or attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In one +case they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one +under his own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case +they would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, +an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take +this latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the +river and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse +of land between them and the river. +</p> + +<p> +The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to +decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and, +having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the +latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the +water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of +the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commenced +the battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand +infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew +what to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantry +and three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river +before he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the +river bank, and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of the +Florentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that they +were not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made +the passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of the +few who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being +deep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many +of them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine +captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them +and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less +treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at +the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, +being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with +tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, +alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampled +each other in great confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and +those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both +sides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The +soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river, +whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make +room for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the +water would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were +urged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were +the same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the +Florentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the +few. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that +both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had +many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take +up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded +these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one +part of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This cleared a +space of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and thus gained +possession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiers +found themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s reserves they could +not stand against them and at once fell back into the river. The cavalry +of either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over the +other, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, had +commanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacks +of their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantry +he would be able to make short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he +had hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army driven back across the +river he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of +the enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own +cavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to +flight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry +had met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry +cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’s +army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of +Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines were +so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them +escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were +taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo +Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to +Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, as +might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty +thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one +thousand five hundred and seventy men. +</p> + +<p> +But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his life +just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all +those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect, +and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have +stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the +day; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he +stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from +victory and personally thank them. He was also on the watch for any +attempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the +opinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in the +saddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind +which often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, and which is often +very unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as +he was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On +the following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so +rapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, +called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows: +</p> + +<p> +“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midst +of the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes +promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if a +smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I should +have been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should +neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines with +so many injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, and +I should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left +you a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established +on a surer foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having the +arbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to +recognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast +heard, for many have told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I +entered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy—a stranger to all +those ambitions which every generous soul should feel—and how I was +brought up by him, and loved as though I had been born of his blood; how +under his governance I learned to be valiant and capable of availing +myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good +father came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, +and I have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with +that care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not +only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my +fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the love +of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which I owed +to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I +am well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee +unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which +will never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa, +where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they +may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve +under a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up +with factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the +wrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended +Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed, +who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the +acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan +thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their +help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but +in thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the +prestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou +knowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms +with the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat, +should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to make +them my enemies, because I believed that war with them would conduce to my +power and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them, +because their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is of +the greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and +the measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has +not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. +And it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to +learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and +in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that +what I have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in +that I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.” +</p> + +<p> +After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and +Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo +to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died. +He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of those +times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies were +celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San Francesco +at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to +Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death of +Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty +held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigi +until the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo. +</p> + +<p> +From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a man +of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but +also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinary +height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and he +welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left +him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short +above the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a +hat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to +his subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to +overcome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to +say that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of +achieving it. No one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in +extricating himself. He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt +everything and fear nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because +one always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also +wonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did +not look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was +not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that +he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the +following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, +and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had +said: “You would not have given more than a penny.” “That is true,” +answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A ducat is much less to +me.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he +scorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman are willing to let the +waters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few little +fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may catch a +whale”; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience but +rewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live so +sumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be a vice then you should not fare +so splendidly at the feasts of our saints.” Passing through a street he +saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen +by Castruccio, and said to him: “Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou +comest out, but when thou goest into such places.” A friend gave him a +very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: “Fool, do you think that I +wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castruccio +said to one who professed to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs who +always run after those who will give them the best to eat,” and was +answered: “We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those +who have the greatest need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn, +Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was +reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did +not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, +since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one +what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to a +banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another.” +To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio +said: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many things.” Someone +bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. Castruccio +replied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with +whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him +that it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: “She +has not taken me in, I have taken her.” Being also blamed for eating very +dainty foods, he answered: “Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” and +being told that it was true, he continued: “Then thou art more avaricious +than I am gluttonous.” Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and +splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by +Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones +representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. +Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, +and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where to +spit in order to offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said: +“God willing I will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one of +his gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of +his friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual +in one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by day will +not be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a favour of +Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on +his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said: +“Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy +feet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccio +used to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a +downward direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour by +one who used many superfluous words, he said to him: “When you have +another request to make, send someone else to make it.” Having been +wearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying: +“Perhaps I have fatigued you by speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “You +have not, because I have not listened to a word you said.” He used to say +of one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine +man, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the +wives and now he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who +laughed, he said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or because +another is unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer +Francesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I give +you if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered: +“A helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been +instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done +wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived +themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly +those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying that +they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused when +the time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that whilst +men in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if it +were good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking at +her. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when he +died, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, for I know when I am +gone this country will be turned upside down.” On being asked if it had +ever occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, he +answered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra +Lazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the +Inferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, +and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be +poor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of his +family lace him up, he said to him: “I pray God that you will let him feed +you also.” Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the +words: “May God preserve this house from the wicked,” he said, “The owner +must never go in.” Passing through one of the streets he saw a small house +with a very large door, and remarked: “That house will fly through the +door.” He was having a discussion with the ambassador of the King of +Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a dispute +arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the +king. “Is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio, +and was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should you +suggest that I should be afraid of a good man?” +</p> + +<p> +I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty, +but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high +qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And +as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also +desired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the +manacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day +fixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to +testify forever to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferior +neither to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of +Rome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he would +doubtless have excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be +born, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1232 ***</div> +</body> + +</html> + + |